




THE  
DISPATCHES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
DURING  
HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS.

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MONUMENTUM REE PERENNIO.

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*AN ENLARGED EDITION, IN EIGHT VOLUMES.*





THE  
DISPATCHES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL  
THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,  
DURING  
HIS VARIOUS CAMPAIGNS  
IN  
INDIA, DENMARK, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, THE LOW  
COUNTRIES, AND FRANCE.

COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL AND OTHER AUTHENTIC  
DOCUMENTS,

BY COLONEL GURWOOD, C.B., K.C.T.S.

*ESQUIRE TO HIS GRACE AS KNIGHT OF THE BATH, AND DEPUTY LIEUTENANT  
OF THE TOWER OF LONDON.*

VOLUME THE SECOND.

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THE  
OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES  
OF  
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON.  

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INDIA.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 28th Oct. 1803.

I have the honor to forward a letter, with its enclosures, which I have received from Mr. Gilmour, the staff surgeon with this division of the army; which I will thank you to lay before the Hon. the Governor in Council, with my request that he will give orders that the wine, therein reported to be lost, may be replaced; and that, in future, when medical stores are sent from Bombay, they may be more carefully packed. I beg that you will inform the Hon. the Governor in Council, that I have found it difficult to procure money at Poonah for bills on Bombay, drawn at 30 days' sight; and that, as I cannot carry on the war without money, I have again drawn bills on him at 8 and 15 days' sight.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Phoolmurry, 28th Oct. 1803.

My letters of the 24th and 25th, the last of which, with the postscript, was sent to you in triplicate, will have apprised you of my return to this quarter, and of the cause of this movement. It is unpleasant that we can-

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G. O.

Camp at Binkenholey, 27th Oct. 1803.

Orders have been given that all payments at the pay office, till further orders, may be made, one fourth in rupees, one fourth in Porto Novo pagodas, and one half in other gold coins of a superior description.

In future, when bills are granted at the pay office, one fourth of the sum tendered must be in rupees, and one half in a gold coin of a better description than Porto Novo pagodas.

Heads of departments are requested to pay particular attention to the money transactions of their conicopoly and writers, and to see that they pay the brinjaries and other grain dealers in the coins which, and according to the proportions in which, they are received at the pay office.

It is requested that all large payments, such as to bullock owners, &c., and in general all payments of cash, may be made upon this principle, by which much ~~inconvenience and~~ loss will be avoided.

VOL. I. INDIA; or Vol. II. if bound separately.

not take all the advantage I could wish of our success; but the fact is, that offensive operations are not expected from us in this quarter; and, although I am willing, and have undertaken them already, I must take care not to risk, by attempting too much, that for which I am sent here, and the failure of the service expected from me: viz., the defence of the Nizam's and Peshwal's territories. Besides, I have to tell you, between ourselves, that matters are not as they should be at ———; and they cannot well be worse than they are at ———: it is, therefore, peculiarly incumbent on me to act with caution.

I think that, in a day or two, I shall drive off Ragojee Bloonslah. I shall give you notice of every thing that passes; and as soon as ever I make it certain that he is out of the country, you may begin your march towards Gawilghur. We may eventually invade Hindustan, but I think that, before we do that, we ought to secure our right flank by taking Gawilghur, and, if possible, forcing Ragojee to a peace. I wrote to Rajah Mohiput Ram to desire him to take possession of the talooks depending on Burhampoor and Asseerghur, in the name of the Subah of the Deccan. I shall be near Aurungabad to-morrow. Your Buswunt rice was to be on the Godavery on the 25th. I shall forward it on to Adjutee, to which place you might send for it.

To Ballojee Koonger.

30th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter [its contents recapitulated], and Col. Stevenson has transmitted to me a Persian letter, in which you have informed him that Mahomed Meer Khan was about to be sent on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see Meer Khan. I will receive him in a manner suitable to his rank, and I will pay every attention to what he may have to communicate.

To Mahomed Meer Khan.

30th Oct. 1803.

I have received your letter, and Mirza Wahed Beg has communicated to me what you desired he should, and Col. Stevenson has sent me different letters which you have written to him, and one which Ballojee Koonger has written to him in the Persian language, by which I learn that you are coming here on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see you, and will receive you with the honors due to your rank and character, and I shall pay every attention to what you may have to communicate.

Mirza Wahed Beg will inform you of the arrangement which I have made for a guard to meet you. I enclosed a letter to the officers in the service of the Company, and their allies, to desire that you may be suffered to pass in security to my camp. You will hear at Adjutee at what place you may find my camp.

G. O.

Camp at Chikultann, 20th Oct., 1803.

If the drum beats for marching to-morrow, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers will see that their musket ammunition is marched on the flank of their corps; and that heads of departments, and others, will see that the departments and baggage are laden and sent off early.

A guard of 1 havildar, 1 naig, and 12 sepoys, from the corps on the right of the line, to march to the rear immediately, to bring up a tumbrel which broke down, and was left without a guard on the road.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 31st Oct. 1803.

1. I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 19th inst., with its enclosure, being the copy of one from Messrs. Forbes and Co., and Messrs. Bruce, Faucett, and Co.

2. As far as I am concerned in the property captured at Baroach, I am of opinion that the proposition of those gentlemen is very reasonable, and that it ought to be complied with.

3. In respect to the letter from those gentlemen, it might probably have been as well to have omitted all the injurious expressions and reflections which it contains.

4. I have not by me at present any papers or documents to which I can refer, and I write solely from memory. But, as well as I can recollect, His Majesty has reserved to himself the disposal of the property in all forts captured in India, in the operations against which his troops may be employed with those of the Company, excepting military stores, half of which are by charter granted to the Company.

5. His Majesty has been graciously pleased, from time to time, to grant this property to the troops employed in the capture of the fort in which it might be found, and occasionally the supreme British authority in India has taken upon itself to anticipate his Majesty's intention, and to give the property to the troops; and this is the claim which the troops have to prize property.

6. The question respecting the property belonging to British merchants found at Baroach is, whether it is included in that reserved by His Majesty in his Royal charter. Those concerned in the capture, I conclude, think it is; the merchants think it is not. But surely there is no occasion for interference, or acrimony of expression, or reflection, in urging the claim of either party.

7. Whatever may be the fate of the property hereafter, it is certain that, if it had not been for the gallantry of the troops who took Baroach, it would never have come into the hands of the British merchants; and it might be as well, possibly, to refrain from accusing of injustice and unjustifiable measures those to whom such benefits are to be attributed, only because they state their doubts respecting the real ownership of the property, which, according to the writers of the same paper that contains these accusations, is a question involving points of a peculiar and delicate nature.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Naumdair Barry, 31st Oct. 1803.

I have marched every day since the 25th, and arrived here this morning. I was tantalized all the morning with the sight of the enemy's camp, pitched at the distance of 20 miles. But when I arrived within 6 or 7 miles of them, they went off in a southerly direction. They have hitherto done no mischief, excepting to the small villages. Your rice is safe at Goondy. It arrived there yesterday.

I do not know how long I shall be detained on this expedition against Ragojee Bhonslah. You must, therefore, continue your watch upon Scindiah's motions. I still think that Ragojee will move off to the east. Mirza Wahed Beg went off this morning. He wishes to have an order



upon Surat for 400 rupees, which I have promised to give him, if he will lodge the money in Capt. Johnson's hands, and order Capt. Johnson to receive it. I should not be surprised if Scindiah also were to come this way.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Naundair Barry, 31st Oct. 1803.

As soon as I was certain that Asseerghur was in our hands, I determined to march to the southward, to give a check to Ragojee Bhoomslah, leaving Col. Stevenson to watch Scindiah.

This is my second halt from the bottom of the Ferdapoor ghaut; the distance is, I believe, nearly 100 miles. Ragojee Bhoomslah's camp was in my sight from a hill at the distance of 20 miles all this morning, but he went off when I arrived within 7 miles of him. It is said that he has escaped along the Godavery. I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th. He heard of it on that night. He marched 3 times, on the night before last and yesterday, and once this day. He has a vast quantity of baggage and a number of tents, and I do not despair of coming up with him. I have pushed him so hard already, that he has not had time to do much mischief, excepting to the small villages. A large convoy of Col. Stevenson's and mine, 14,000 bullocks, is safe on the Godavery, within reach of me, and Ragojee dares not go near it. Amrut Rao has not joined him, but is at Toka. The alarm in Ragojee's camp is very great.

There is no occasion for Col. Colman sending the detachment to protect the tappall.

To Lieut. Col. Munro.

Camp at Cheekair, 1st Nov. 1803.

As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th Oct., in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts.

Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor General regarding the action, a copy of which was sent to Gen. Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Col. Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Col. Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th Sept. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary; 1st, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day; 2ndly, because it was to be apprehended, that, if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward, while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or, probably, avoided altogether. Col. Stevenson and I were never more than 12 miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than 8 miles.

As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy's position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous that, without an army, their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being Natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about 6 or 8 miles from Bokerdun.

I directed my march so as to be within 12 or 14 miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than 5 or 6 miles from it. I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground: at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprised Col. Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on, I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately, or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that, if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulnial, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning; and, at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy's camp in which they should know it was: I therefore determined upon the attack immediately. It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on; but some were, and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the piquets which were on the right of the first line. When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out of shot from that village: instead of that, he led directly upon it: the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies.

Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the necessity of the

roducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time; by which that corps lost many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made. However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the piquets on that day against Assye.

After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

Col. Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about 8 miles from me to the westward, at 8 in the morning of the 24th.

The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about 12 miles from the field of battle, 12 from the Adjutee ghaut, and 8 from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Col. Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off and never stopped till they got down the ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Col. Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men.

I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhanpoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighbourhood of Aurungabad: I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt to raise the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, and descended the Adjutee ghaut, and stopped Scindiah.

Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st Oct.; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army.

I ascended the ghaut on the 25th, and have marched 120 miles since, in 8 days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam's territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar 2 days, in the course of which he has marched 5 times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If this is the case, I shall soon begin an offensive operation there. But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bistnaph Pundit.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov. 1803.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th Oct., and I am glad to find that you are returning to the westward. Your position thereabouts strengthens every thing in this quarter.

I enclose a copy of my last letter to the Adj. Gen., which will show how matters here stand.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 2nd Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th Oct. The enclosed letter to his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward after perusal, will show you the state of our military operations in this quarter.

2. In addition to that letter, I have to inform you that I have brought Capt. — to trial before a General Court Martial, for disobedience of orders, in omitting to march from Dharore on the 21st Oct., according to the orders he had received, by which the risk to which the convoy was exposed would have been avoided, and my movements against the enemy would not have been cramped by the necessity of taking care of it.

3. The officer in charge of the treasure is at Dharore, and I shall send a detachment to-morrow to bring him in.

4. I cannot express to you how much I am distressed, and how much the public cause suffers by the total want of means of defence in this country. In order to save it this last time, I have been obliged to march 120 miles, and to pass through the Adjunttee and Chowka ghauts in 8 days; and when I arrived, all the amildars were in treaty with the enemy to pay contributions. Notwithstanding that I had announced my intention of marching in this direction, desiring that they would defend themselves, and threatening them, if they should make any accommodation with the enemy, those who received the notice paid no attention to it, and, at all events, did not communicate it to their neighbours.

G. O.

Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests Capt. Baynes to accept his thanks for the able disposition which he made of the troops under his command to defend the convoy of which he had charge, when it was attacked by vastly superior numbers of the enemy on the 31st Oct.; and that Capt. Baynes will communicate to the officers and troops under his command Major Gen. Wellesley's thanks for their steadiness upon that occasion.

This is another instance of what infantry, who preserve their order and reserve their fire, can do against numerous bodies of cavalry; and Major Gen. Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander in Chief and to Government his sense of the conduct of Capt. Baynes and of the officers and troops under his command in this action.

5. As a proof of the ease with which the country could be defended, and our troops employed in the enemy's districts, I mention that a jemidar and 20 men, who had been posted at Rackisbaum in charge of boats, and whom I have detained there since the river has fallen, in order to give confidence to the grain dealers going to the southward to purchase grain, saved that town, although Ragojee Bhoomslah was encamped near it with his army: when he marched off, the jemidar sallied out, took an elephant, some horses, and threw the baggage into confusion. If the government of Hyderabad would have attended to your recommendation, this would have been the case with every village in the country.

6. In respect to the minister's letter, I have again to observe, that I have been particularly cautious not to suffer any grain to be consumed in this camp which is brought by the grain dealers attached to the Nizam's troops. It frequently happens that they come to this camp, and as regularly I send them off with an escort to that of the Nizam. Col. Stevenson informs me that he is equally cautious upon this subject.

7. I am fully aware that it is very desirable to carry the war into Berar, and I have no doubt but that, unless we do carry it there, we shall have no peace. But the question is, can the war be carried into Berar unless the Soubah of the Deccan defends his country? and he is, or his ministers, willing to submit to the loss, which must be incurred, by exposing it to invasions, undefended by a British army, in its present state.

8. If the war should be carried into Berar, I conceive that the Soubah will not be exonerated from the necessity of storing his forts with grain; and I certainly should think the expedition into that country a matter of some risk, if the only dependence of the subsistence of troops was the grain which they should find in the Rajah's territories.

9. Although the smaller forts are in the hands of the zamindars and others, it is to be supposed that there is some mode of obliging them to keep them in repair, to have garrisons in them, and to defend them. If something is not done on this subject, I must confine the operations of the troops to a strict defensive.

10. I conclude that the Soubah's mind will have been satisfied upon the subject of the division of the conquered territory, since that depending upon Burhampoor and Asseerghur has been delivered over to the officers of this government. But he has no occasion to complain respecting the territory depending upon Ahmednuggur, as the district of Jalnapoor, which was included in that territory, has been given over to him.

11. But this question respecting territory ought not now to be taken into consideration at all. Under the treaty the parties have agreed that they will adjust the rule of partition of all conquests, and that his Highness the Nizam shall be entitled to participate equally with the Company. But the meaning of the treaty is, that they may adjust the rule of partition of conquest after the war; and, therefore, putting out of the question all considerations of the Nizam's right to participate equally with the Company, connected with the non-performance of his engagements, it does not appear to me necessary to give any other answer to this part of the minister's letter, excepting to state the fact that the Soubah's servants have

possession of Jalnapoor, which is part of Ahmednuggur, and of the districts depending on Burhampoor and Asseerghur, and that the question of participation in conquests is one to be considered at the conclusion of the war.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov. 1803.

After I had sent off my dispatch of the 24th Oct. to your Excellency, I received authentic accounts that the Rajah of Berar had passed through the hills which form the boundary of Candeish, and had moved towards the river Godavery. I therefore ascended the Adjuntce ghaut on the 25th, continued my march to the southward on the 26th, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th.

The Rajah had advanced gradually to the eastward, and was at Lucka-gaum, about 20 miles north from Puttun, when I arrived at Aurungabad; and between that night and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which time I was in his neighbourhood, he moved his camp 5 times.

On the 31st, he detached a body, consisting of 5000 horse, to endeavor to intercept a convoy consisting of 14,000 bullocks, which was going forward to join the troops on the frontier. The convoy was protected by 3 companies of the 2nd batt. of 3rd Madras Native infantry, with two 3-pounders, under Capt. Baynes, (which detachment, with 400 Mysore horse, has for some time been employed in conveying grain from the districts south of the Godavery to my camp,) and by a company from the subsidiary force, and 2 companies from the corps serving at Hyderabad, under the command of Capt. Seton.

They had marched from the Godavery on the morning of the 31st, and reached Umber, where they were attacked: they succeeded in beating off the enemy, and in securing the convoy, which arrived in safety in my camp yesterday, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers by which they were attacked.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the reports of this action, which I have received from Capt. Baynes; \* upon which I have to observe, that it

\* Capt. Baynes to the Dep. Adj. Gen.

Umber, 31st Oct. 1803.

I beg you will report to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, that I was attacked this day about 2 o'clock, P.M., by about 1000 or 5000 horse. They came on at first as if determined to charge, but receiving a few shot from our guns, they retired; and though they frequently came near us, as if to charge, and some of them within musket shot, they were always driven back.

Our loss is one European wounded, 2 sepoys wounded, and some Mysoreans killed and wounded, besides a few (perhaps 3) horses killed. The loss of the enemy is much greater, particularly in horses. I beg you to say to the General that I shall take post till I shall receive his instructions. I write this by moonlight, which will, I hope, apologize for haste. We were under arms till about sunset, at which time they were out of sight.

Capt. Baynes to the Dep. Adj. Gen.

Umber, 1st Nov. 1803.

I last night had the honor to inform you that I had repulsed a body of Bhoonslah's horse, and have now, for the information of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, to make you more fully informed of the circumstances.

I arrived with my convoy about 12 o'clock, and encamped near the town, with my right flank to it, and my rear protected by a hill. At 2 o'clock, P.M., the attack began, without more than 10 minutes' warning of their approach, by throwing

affords another instance of what can be done by disciplined infantry, determined to do their duty, against very superior numbers of cavalry.

I beg leave also to take this opportunity to draw your Lordship's notice to the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit. This corps, which consists of 2000 men, have performed all the light troop duties of this division of the army since I was detached from the Poombuddra, in the month of March last. They have performed these duties with the utmost cheerfulness, and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this description. They have frequently been engaged with the enemy's light troops, have conducted themselves well, and have lost many men and horses. To the credit of the government of Mysore, I mention that they are paid as regularly as the British troops; and the consequence is, that it is possible to keep them in order and from plundering the country. It is to their example that I attribute the conduct of the Marhatta troops serving with this division of the army, and of which I have no reason to complain.

The Rajah of Berar has moved to the eastward, and I think he is going to his own territories. I have no doubt but that he would have been obliged to do so, even without my presence in these districts, if any one step had been taken by the government for their protection, or, I might add, if there existed any government in the country. It is now obvious that horse alone cannot make any impression on a country; and if there had been only a few peons in the villages, as has been frequently recommended to the government of Hyderabad by the Resident, the Rajah must have lost the whole of his baggage in the confused and precipitate flight which he has made since I have been in this neighbourhood.

The government of Hyderabad appear determined to do nothing in their own defence; and your Excellency will be surprised to learn that even the city of Aurangabad, in which so many of his Highness' relations, and the families of so many of his sirdars reside, is held by 500 men of the old French infantry, who, I have every reason to believe, are a part of the corps which, under the treaty, ought to be in the field. This conduct in the government of Hyderabad will, I much fear, put it out of my power to carry the war into Berar as I wish, unless the Rajah should retire towards Nagpoor. I am convinced, however, that, until I am enabled to carry the war into that country, no progress will have been made towards procuring a peace. Dowlut Rao Scindiah moved to the eastward as soon as I ascended the Adjutec ghaut, and he was at Bedalabad on the 29th Oct.

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great numbers of rockets, and advancing upon our left: this obliged me to change my front by wheeling to the left; at the same time some of them were within musket shot. I then opened my guns, which stopped their approach: they at this time moved round, as if to gain the rear, where the brinjaries were. This movement obliged me to detach a party to cover them, and having previously posted a company on the hill in my rear, my line became very small: to prevent their knowing my exact strength, I drew up the Mysore horse in one line. They came on repeatedly as if to charge, but were always stopped by our guns. They continued to rocket us till dark, when they retired. I am sorry to add that 100 of the gram bullocks were carried off, and some brinjarry bullocks (perhaps 100) while at grass. I have the honor to enclose a list of killed and wounded.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace.*

2nd Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to transmit your warrant to be President of the General Court Martial, ordered to assemble in camp to-day.

As the public service requires that Capt. Baynes's detachment, and the detachment from Hyderabad, should march to-morrow, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will cause all the officers or other persons belonging to the detachments, who may be summoned as evidences on Capt. —'s trial, to be examined this day, whether on the part of the prosecution or defence; and for that purpose he requests the Court to continue sitting to as late an hour as may be necessary.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.*

Camp, 3rd Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to desire that you will march to Dharore, and there take charge of a detachment under Lieut. Hay's command, and of the treasure escorted by it, which you will find there, and rejoin this division of the army wherever you may learn that it is. I enclose a letter to Lieut. Hay, directing him to put himself under your orders.

Information has been received that a subaltern officer has marched from Hyderabad, escorting treasure for the subsidiary force or division of the army. His name, and the date of his departure, are not known, and therefore I do not send an order particularly addressed to him; but the General desires that you will show him this letter, if he has arrived, which he is to consider as an order for him to place himself and convoy under your command; and you will bring them also along with you.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Hay, commg. a detachment.*

Cheesekair, 3rd Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has directed me to desire that you will place yourself, with your detachment and the treasure in your charge, under command of Capt. Baynes, on his arrival at Dharore, and proceed with him to this division of the army.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 4th Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter I have written to the Governor General, which will show you how we stand in this country.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 20th and 21st Oct. I am in daily expectation of a vakeel from Scindiah, to treat for peace. By the last accounts I had from his camp, he had just heard of the victory gained by Gen. Lake, which will tend to hasten his determination on this subject.

I shall fix the salaries and office establishments according to your directions.

I enclose the translation of a letter that Capt. Young has received, from which, as well as from reports that have reached me, I am afraid that the Governor is not pleased with my having appointed an officer to fill the office of bullock agent, when Capt. Mackay was killed. The fact is, that nothing could keep that important establishment together at that time, excepting to appoint some person to take charge of it. Many bullocks and drivers were killed in the action of the day before; and the people were so much terrified and shocked by the death of Capt. Mackay, to whom they were much attached, that I am convinced that they would have all gone off, if I had delayed to place any body at their head, or if the situation had been given to an officer with whom they were unacquainted.

Your experience of the people of this country, and of the importance of this department to the very existence of a body of troops, will, I am



sure, convince you of the necessity of making this arrangement; and will, I hope, induce you to remove from the mind of the Governor any unfavorable impression which he may have received in consequence of it.

If it is not intended that Capt. Young should retain the situation, it would have been better for him to have remained in that which he held before; and if he is to remain in it, or whatever may be the arrangement determined on, it is best that the accounts of the department should be settled by, and pass through the hands of only one person, in the manner in practice ever since the bullock establishment has been in the Company's service.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Cheesekair, 6th Nov. 1803.

I have received Colcbrooke's letter of the 27th, and I am much concerned to find that you have been unwell; but I hope that you are now recovered. Of course, European officers must be left in Asseerghur; and if our 300 men are sufficient for the garrison, there will be no occasion for Mohiput Ram's.

Send Meer Khan to me, if he should come to you; and refer to me any proposal for peace that may be made to you: we must keep the negotiations for peace entirely clear from Mohiput Ram, or any of the Nizam's sirdars. You will have heard of Scindiah's being near Col. Lang: if he goes into Berar, you may as well follow him upon our Gawilghur plan.

You shall have my 12-pounders and howitzers, if I can get near enough to you to send them. Artillery officers are never satisfied with a battering train. In my opinion, if you have plenty of shot for your 18-pounders, you have as good a train as you can require; and my 12-pounders will only add weight to it, without much efficacy. The money for you, 100,000 pagodas, is at Adjuttee: your Buswunt rice has joined me. The convoy was attacked by about 5000 horse, at Umber, and repulsed the enemy. Baynes commanded the party, which he had joined with my supply, detached according to my orders. I shall keep the rice in my camp for a few days, till I see which way all these parties of horse, that are now travelling about the country, will go; and then I shall send it to you. The Rajah of Berar is off to the eastward.

'The General desires me to add his request that you will send him the details of the capture of Asseerghur, list of ordnance, &c., taken. If you get the Calcutta newspapers, you will see how much is made of all those things; and the Governor General remarked to the General the want of such a detail and return on a former occasion, I believe at Jaulna.

'R. BARCLAY.'

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Cheesekair, 4th Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th Oct., in which you express the desire of the Hon. the Governor in Council that I should give my opinion regarding the best mode of supplying bullocks for the armies employed on this side of India.

2. This question depends entirely upon another, viz. which is the best mode of procuring men to take care of the cattle? Money will purchase

cattle at any time ; but, unless men are provided to take care of them, and to drive them, the money is thrown away, and the service must come to a stand.

3. A bullock that goes one day without his regular food loses a part of his strength : if he does not get it on the second day, he may not lose the appearance of being fit for service, but he is entirely unable to work ; and after these animals have once lost their strength and condition, so much time elapses before they recover, that they become a burthen upon the army, and the whole expense of their original purchase and their subsequent food is lost.

4. I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion that the best mode of having good bullocks (and without good bullocks the troops can perform no service) is to have men to take care of them the moment that they are purchased.

5. In respect to the men, I do not conceive that Bombay, or indeed any other place in India, will afford them at the moment they are required ; but those hired for the service at Bombay in particular are the worst that I have seen : 1st ; because they are entirely unaccustomed to the care of cattle : 2ndly ; because my experience teaches me that, of 10 of this description of persons hired at Bombay, 9 of them desert. Supposing the army to be well equipped with bullocks and with drivers in the first instance, the ignorance of the drivers of their duty, and their desertion, must occasion the destruction of the bullocks, and would reduce the army to distress.

6. There remains but one mode of having bullock drivers, and consequently bullocks, when their services are required ; and that is, to have in the service at all times a corps of bullock drivers, regularly trained and managed.

7. This measure will create a large and permanent expense ; and before I proceed to detail my ideas of the extent of these corps, it may probably be necessary to consider whether there are not other modes of providing bullocks, at the time they might be required, which would answer equally well.

8. I have already considered the mode at present in practice at Bombay, than which nothing can be worse ; not from any deficiency of expense, or regulation, or any assistance that can be given by government, but because the people hired as drivers will not do their duty, but desert. As a proof of its inefficiency and its expense, I mention that I took from Poonah 1000, that were the only serviceable of nearly 3000 carriage bullocks, which had marched less than 100 miles from the coast with Col. Murray. These have been completed and reinforced repeatedly, at an enormous expense, and the utmost care and attention have been paid to them by the head of the department : but such is the nature of the people employed as drivers, and so great their desertion, notwithstanding that they receive double the pay of the bullock drivers who came from Mysore, that I have, at last, been obliged to give orders that the establishment might not be recruited, and that it might be allowed to die off.

9. On the other hand, the Mysore establishment of draught cattle which have marched since the month of February last, and have been exposed

to all the hardships of want of food, rainy weather, &c., has been kept up, and I do not believe that they have lost 100 bullocks.

10. In respect to the proposal that bullocks should be hired for the service, I have to observe that the system of hiring cattle has long been tried upon the coast of Coromandel; and I believe it is now the opinion of those most experienced in the service, among others of his Excellency Gen. Stuart, that the system will not answer, and that, as long as it exists, the public interests are exposed to risk. The whole of the carriage of this army is now upon hired cattle; but it is my decided opinion that the system is bad, and ought to be abolished; and I should not depend upon it for a moment if I had it in my power at present to alter it.

11. But if it is found to be so bad upon the coast of Coromandel, where it has been practised so long, where the bullock owners are the Company's subjects, are men well known, and have had long experience by having served in many wars, how will it answer on this side of India, in a concern of the first magnitude, not only to the operations, but to the very existence, of the armies? The government will have to depend upon the Marhatta brinjaries, from whom the cattle will be hired, who, of all the Marhattas that I have yet had dealings with, are the most faithless.

12. Whenever a difficulty would occur, which is always accompanied by a want of forage, which want is ruinous to the owners of the cattle, those people would leave the army immediately. But the fact is, that they will not serve us at all: they will not submit to the regularity of the service, without which it could not stand a single day; and even if they could be brought to it, they would quit it in disgust upon the first opportunity, and occasion the greatest difficulties and disasters.

13. The result then is, that the Company ought to have an establishment of bullock drivers always in its service; and if the bullocks can be purchased, as speedily as the other preparations for taking the field can be made, they should be purchased when required. If they cannot, or if, as is the case on the eastern coast, and in Mysore, the bullocks can graze upon the island of Salsette, or Bombay, or on the continent to the northward, (and the expense of their food in time of peace will be trifling,) it would be desirable for many reasons that they should be in the service, as well as the drivers, at all times. The food of the bullocks in Mysore does not cost much more than half a rupee a month each, and that is for gram.

14. The extent of the establishment ought to be calculated according to the strength of the body of troops disposable for field service on the Bombay establishment. The establishment ought to be calculated to supply bullocks to draw all the guns and tumbrils, and wheel carriages, that these troops would require, and to carry their stores. It ought also to be calculated to carry one month's provisions for them: not that I consider one month's provisions sufficient for any service on which the troops may be sent, but that quantity would be sufficient to be carried by this superior mode of carriage, and the remainder, which might be required, might be carried either by the hired brinjaries, or according to the present system.

15. The common proportion of drivers to bullocks is one driver to every 2 bullocks in draught, and one driver to every 3 bullocks that carry; and that proportion is fully sufficient.

16. I have the honor to enclose an account of the establishment of the Mysore bullocks, which is the same that Tippoo Sultan had, from which it will appear that there is only one driver for 3 draught bullocks, and this establishment has certainly been proved to be efficient.

17. In respect to the mode of purchasing bullocks, that must depend upon local circumstances, with which I cannot be acquainted, excepting in the neighbourhood of Madras and Seringapatam, and some of the large cantonments or garrisons in the Carnatic, where there is a constant demand for bullocks, and of course people prepared to supply it. The inhabitants of the countries in which I have served have always been unwilling to part with their cattle; and influence, and frequently force, have been required to procure them for the service. If this should be the case at Bombay, it is obvious that the mode of advertising for bullocks, as proposed by the Military board, will not answer; for if no man wishes to sell his bullock, none will be brought for sale. From the difficulty of procuring them, and the great price which they cost, which is nearly treble the price which they cost in other parts of India, I conclude it is the case; and therefore the best mode of procuring the bullocks would either be to employ agents to buy them, as at present, or contractors, or both.

Statement of a karkhana of carriage bullocks on the Madras establishment.

Attendants.	Bullocks.	Rank of Attendants.	Pay.		Amount.	
			P.	F.	P.	F.
1	—	Derogha.	5	25	5	25
2	—	Choudaries.	4	..	8	..
4	—	Dustadars.	2	12	9	6
37	100	Drivers.	1	30	63	18
Total star pagodas . . . .					86	7

To a karkhana of draught bullocks 12 additional bullocks are allowed for forage, 1 muttaseddee allowed to 5 karkhanas; his pay 10 pagodas per month. Each draught bullock is allowed 1 seer of chinnu or gram in time of peace; when employed, 2 seers.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 4th Nov. 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 28th Oct., with enclosures concerning the revenue arrangements made by Col. Murray in Guzerat. I have given Col. Murray no public instructions on that subject; but I apprised him in a private letter, that the Hon. the Governor in Council had been pleased to appoint Major Walker to take charge, as Collector, of all the districts which might be conquered from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in that quarter; and that it was my opinion, in any temporary arrangement he might make, that he ought to proceed in concert with Major Walker, and to deliver over the districts to that gentleman.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 4th Nov. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 30th and 31st. You will see, in the enclosed letter to Mr. Duncan, an account of what I have been doing since the fall of Asseerghur. The express you sent me was, I know, intercepted; and it is desirable that you should not send expresses. The runners think that they must risk every thing to deliver them; they do not wait their opportunities like the common tappalls, and, in consequence, they are carried off. I have heard, however, of Col. Harcourt's success. Tell Malcolm that he may now come on with great safety. Let him bring with him, however, the 400 infantry of Purneah, which came up to Poonah with his baggage.

I have heard from Webbe of the strange, erroneous impressions at Madras respecting Mysore; but no impression made there can at all affect the situation of affairs in that quarter. The Governor General took that country into his own hands shortly after I marched. Webbe's going to Mysore will, however, be useful and convenient in more than one respect, and so I have told him.

I think that we are shaking a little at Madras: I hear that the arrangement I had made in the bullock department, consequent on the death of poor Mackay, although the only one that could keep it, and consequently the army together, is disapproved of, and it is to be altered after the campaign. All this is very well: but the government, upon the present scale, cannot be carried on, as it has been, if confidence be not placed in the persons employed; and if they and their acts are liable to misrepresentation in their absence.

I will get from Appah Dessaye the letter you mention, and send it to you.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 5th Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st, relative to the arrangements to be made with the chiefs of the Bheels in the Attaveasy and Guzerat.

2. I had yesterday the honor of addressing you upon the subject of the revenue arrangements made by Col. Murray, upon which I apprised you that I had addressed the Colonel privately. I have since referred to a copy of my letter to Col. Murray, in which are the following words: 'In regard to your revenue concerns, I approve of your settling the country as you go on, and I know that this is the only mode of securing a tranquil rear. But the government of Bombay have thrown into Major Walker's hands the revenue management of all the districts conquered from Scindiah, and it will be necessary that you should make them over to him. This will save you a great deal of detailed trouble; and, as Major Walker must have good revenue servants, it may be a beneficial arrangement for your military operations.' This letter was dated the 23rd Oct.

3. I observe that Col. Murray has made a complete revenue settlement of the districts of Godra for one year; and as it appears that the Hon. the Governor in Council does not conceive that settlement contains any thing objectionable, and as to depart from it may occasion difficulties and dis-

turbances in the country, and will certainly create an impression very unfavorable to our good faith, I most anxiously recommend that Major Walker may be directed not only to abide by the general terms of it in favor of the inhabitants, but to keep in employment the person whom it appears Col. Murray has appointed to be a kind of farmer of the revenue. It may then be hoped that no inconvenience will be felt from the change of authority.

4. I believe that Godra is the last of Scindiah's possessions in Guzerat: if it should not be so, it would be proper that he should send his servants with the troops, with directions in what manner to settle the countries which will be handed over to them by Col. Murray.

5. In respect to the Bheels, I wrote to Col. Murray as follows, in the same letter of the 23rd Oct.: 'Communicate with Major Walker upon the subject of all your treaties with the Bheel and other Rajahs, in order that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements with them and Rajah Anund Rao respectively.'

6. In my letter of the 2nd Aug., I stated to the Governor in Council my opinion generally upon this subject. The greater experience I have of this people, the more convinced I am that the course which I then recommended to be adopted respecting them is the best. Col. Murray, with great truth, says, 'It is not to be expected that the Bheels and chieftains will remain attached to us without some prospect of advantage:' those which they have had hitherto are trifling, and cannot be supposed to have influenced their conduct; neither are they a description of people to be influenced for any length of time by the mild and civil language of the British agents towards them.

7. They feel strongly the oppression of the Marhatta government, and they are willing to close with any offer which holds out a prospect of a change: but when they find that the change which they have made is only of a more powerful, instead of a weak superior, that they are to continue to pay as they have done before, and to pay regularly, which probably they never did, they will become our most irreconcilable, and, from the situation and strength of their country, our worst enemies.

8. The question, whether the tribute payable by the Bheels ought to be remitted, may be viewed under two distinct hypotheses: one, if Scindiah's territory in Guzerat should be restored to him at the peace; the other, if it should remain in the hands of the British government.

9. I am not aware of the amount of the demand upon these Rajahs, but I should suppose it to be small, and not to be an object of consideration to the British government, for the short period during which, in the first case, the country will be in our hands. At all events, it will not be one when compared with the advantages of having those people for our friends during the war, and with that of returning them to Scindiah as discontented tributaries, who are close to his capital, and who must always hereafter be ready to join us in any contest in which we may be involved with that Chief.

10. If the country should remain in the hands of the British government, the revenue payable by the Bheels becomes an object of greater consequence. But even in this case, the first question that occurs is,

whether this war was undertaken to obtain an increase of revenue, and whether it is an object to obtain such military advantage as the possession of the defiles in the countries of the Bheels, and the assistance of these people, even at the expense of the remission of the tribute which they paid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before we obtained possession of the country?

11. But even if, as is supposed, we continue to enjoy the advantages which we at present possess in the countries of the Bheels, without a remission of the tribute, I doubt the policy of obliging them to continue to pay: experience teaches us that tribute of this description cannot be collected from the inhabitants of the hilly and jungly tracts of India, without frequent appeals to arms. I have but little doubt the Company would have been richer, and I am convinced that the military reputation of the British nation would have stood higher, and that the power of government would have been greater, if all tribute payable by hill polygars and rajahs had been originally remitted.

12. In this part of India, in particular, the policy of government should be cautiously to avoid involving themselves in hostilities such as those above described: their operations are very difficult and uncertain; they require large bodies of the best troops, numbers of men are generally lost, no credit is gained by success, and failure is disgraceful. The government have no troops to spare in Guzerat to fight the battles which must eventually be the consequence of the demand of the tribute. They have not a sufficient army even to guard their own territory and that of their allies against the inroads of a foreign enemy, without the assistance of these Bheel Rajahs; and it may be depended upon, that a failure in a contest with one of them for tribute, an event which, as it has happened in other parts of India, may also be expected in Guzerat, will occasion the loss of our reputation, which I believe will be found to be the strongest support of the British power in that quarter of India.

13. In respect to Rajah Amrut Rao, there may be some objection to giving up his claims upon these Rajahs, on account of the difficulty of reconciling him to the measure; but if this difficulty did not exist, I should think it very desirable that he should give up all claims of this description; and, at all events, the British troops ought to have no part of the trouble of enforcing them on those Rajahs who cover the country from a foreign enemy, and to whom the Company may have remitted the tribute payable to their own government.

14. I am also of opinion that endeavors ought to be made to induce the Quickwar government to give up these claims, rather than that they should be encouraged to make them.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 5th Nov. 1803.

I have this morning had the honor of receiving your secretary's letter of the 24th Oct., and I am satisfied that the arrangement for the payment

G. O.

Camp at Roore, 5th Nov. 1803.

The orderly drummers from Native corps to attend as orderlies at the D. A. G.'s tent constantly; they are only to be relieved on the 1st day of every month.

of the hircarrahs south of the Kistna is a convenient one. I am only apprehensive that the Governor is displeased at my having appointed a person to take charge of Capt. Mackay's office, which I certainly should not have done, had not the different circumstances of the moment rendered it absolutely necessary; and as Capt. Young accepted the office with reluctance, from an apprehension that he should not be able to give the satisfaction that Capt. Mackay did, and at my repeated desire, I hope he will not suffer for his acquiescence with my wishes, which certainly will be the case if he should be deprived of the office after this service is over. I have only to add upon this subject, that till Capt. Young was appointed Ass. Commissary of provisions with this division of the army, I had no knowledge whatever of him, excepting what I gained while he was at Seringapatam, and on the march to Hurryhur; and that in this arrangement I could have no private wishes, nor any object excepting the benefit of the service.

I took the liberty of recommending to you yesterday a jemidar of the 1st of the 6th. This man has behaved remarkably well in other instances, besides that stated in my letter to the Adj. Gen. If the Subah had had a dozen such men in his service, the Rajah of Berar would have lost his baggage in his flight from me.

I hear that Scindiah has marched to the eastward along the valley of the Taptee and Poorna, and that he is entering Berar. Indeed, I know that he passed Mulcaipoor, in which place there was a battalion of the subsidiary force, on the 30th Oct. I now hope that we shall be able to take up the offensive in Berar, as there is no longer any reason to apprehend an invasion by Scindiah.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 6th Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter to the Governor General. I am sorry to tell you that Col. Stevenson is in a very bad state of health at Burhaupoor; so much so, as to be quite incapable of attending to business, and to have been unable to march with the sub-

G. O.

Camp at Chitchooly, 6th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Company's troops, the horses belonging to the 19th light dragoons and the Native cavalry regts., the public followers attached to H. M. regiments on the Madras establishment, and the camp equipage, lascars, and carriages provided by contract, are to be mustered on the first halting day. The camp equipage, lascars, carriage, &c., at 7 o'clock in the morning, and the troop horses and followers attached to H. M. regiments at 4 o'clock p.m.

The Majors of Brigade will take the musters of the troops, horses, and followers. Lieut. and quarter master Davidson will take the musters of the camp equipage, &c., in the brigade of cavalry; quarter masters of brigade those of the brigades of infantry; a Lieutenant of artillery all the musters of the artillery; the D. Q. M. G. will muster the pioneers, the detached companies, and the camp equipage, &c., in head quarter line, carried by contract.

G. A. O.

6th Nov. 1803.

The 1st batt. 2nd regt. with its guns, and a brigade of brass 12-pounders with their proportion of artillerymen and ammunition, including shells, to be held in readiness to march at the shortest notice. The details of the 1st batt. 2nd regt. on the outlying and lying piquets to join the corps, and the camp guards and orderlies furnished by the battalion to be relieved by the 5th brigade immediately.

50 pioneers, with scaling ladders, &c., to accompany the detachment, which will rendezvous at such time and place as Lieut. Col. Chalmers will appoint.



sidiary force, on the 30th, towards Mulcapoor, near which place Scindiah was encamped with his cavalry. Capt. Johnson tells me, however, that on that day he was rather better, but still in his bed. He has been ill, I believe, ever since the fall of Asseerghur.

A vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is on his road to my camp, and I expect that he will arrive in a day or two.

To Col. Stevenson.

6th Nov. 1803.

I have received Capt. Colebrooke's and Capt. Johnson's letters of the 31st Oct. I hope that by this time you have quite recovered.

I have also received your letter of the 26th, regarding your operations at Asseerghur, &c. I want only to have from you the statement of the officers, and the regular pay and allowances which they received in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the returns of the ordnance, and stores, and grain found in Asseerghur, and of the other property.

I have already informed you that your Buswunt rice is in my camp. I desire to know to what place you wish it to march to join you. I am not more than 6 marches from the Adjuttee, or from the Dewal ghaut; and I believe I could send it in safety to either, if Scindiah should go into Berar. If he does go there, I conclude that you will go also. I wish the rice to leave my camp, as the people are much distressed, and are of course tempted to sell, although I am willing to assist them with money.

Ragojee Bhoonslah has gone along the Godavery to the eastward, in a most violent hurry.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 6th Nov. 1803.

I regret exceedingly the disasters which have befallen your peons. The want of success in their operations is very unpleasant. You may pay Mr. Grant for his attendance upon the wounded, as for sepoys, as you propose, and charge the amount in your revenue accounts.

We must retake the post of Chumargoonda immediately, otherwise we shall have the enemy attacking some other place, and approaching nearer to our communication with Poonah, which will be very unpleasant. By your account of the place, I suppose that the enemy will not attempt to hold out against our sepoys; but should they, I recommend that 2 of the short brass 18-pounders, captured at the battle of Assye, should be equipped and sent with the detachment now at Runjenganm, with 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun, if it should be possible to provide means of sending it. There are some of my tumbrils at Ahmednuggur, and I suspect there must be in the place plenty of shot for these guns, which are, I believe, of the calibre of French 16-pounders.

Capt. Lucas, who is the only officer at Ahmednuggur who has any experience, must go with the detachment. Tell him that I request that, if he should be obliged to breach the wall, he will take care to bring the guns sufficiently near; that is to say, to the distance of 200 to 250 yards. They must then be loaded with but a very small quantity of powder, otherwise the carriages will be knocked about, and probably be destroyed in the firing. He must make some cover, of course, for the guns, if he

should find no houses, nor any other cover near the place. But as there are no guns at Chumargoonda, a slight mud wall, proof against musketry, with very small embrasures for the guns, will be fully sufficient. If the wall should be so bad as not to require breaching, or if it should be breached, when the place shall be stormed, no quarter is to be given. The chitty you mention, and the jemidar of peons, in particular, must be hanged.

After Capt. Lucas shall have got possession of Chumargoonda, I agree with you in thinking that the place ought to be destroyed, and you ought to occupy Peepre. Let Capt. Lucas, accordingly, destroy Chumargoonda, and then march back to Ahmednuggur; and you will order your peons to occupy Peepre.

Be so kind as to communicate this letter to Capt. Lucas, which he is to consider as an instruction to himself. Ragojee Bhoomslah has fled to the eastward; and Amrut Rao is, I believe, coming to join me.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 6th Nov. 1803.

I now proceed to give your Excellency a detailed account of Col. Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur.

On the 16th Oct. he advanced to Asseerghur, and encamped 3 miles south of the fort. The remains of the enemy's infantry had fled towards the Nerbudda on the preceding day, in the state in which I reported them to be, in my letter of the 24th Oct.; and Col. Stevenson therefore determined to attack Asseerghur.

On the 18th he recommitted the fort, attended by a squadron of cavalry, and the piquets of the Native infantry; and having seen a favorable opportunity, attacked the pettah and carried it, and made a lodgment within 150 yards of the lower wall of the fort. In the evening he reinforced the troops in the pettah by a battalion.

On the 19th all the preparations were made for carrying on the siege; and 2 batteries were ready to open at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th; one to breach the upper wall, and another, of 4 brass 12-pounders, to destroy the defences of the lower wall. On the 18th Col. Stevenson had sent a flag of truce to the killadar to summon him to surrender the fort, to which message he did not receive a decided answer. The communication was continued; but Col. Stevenson did not relax his operations against the fort, as there was reason to believe that the negotiation was carried on only to give time to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to come to its relief. Before opening his batteries, Col. Stevenson apprised the killadar of the terms on which he should surrender the fort; which were, that the garrison should march out with their private property, and be allowed to go where they might think proper, and that their arrears should be paid to the amount of 20,000 rupees. After the batteries had opened about an hour, a white flag was shown from the walls of the fort, which was the signal which had been agreed upon in case the terms should be accepted; hostages were sent down, and an engagement made that the fort should be delivered up on the following morning. It was accordingly evacuated; the garrison carried off their property in security, and received the sum agreed to be paid to them.

Col. Stevenson mentions in high terms the conduct of the officers and troops under his command; and I cannot omit to take this opportunity of expressing to your Excellency my sense of the merits of Col. Stevenson, and of the body of troops under his command. Upon every occasion I have received from the Colonel the most cordial and zealous assistance; and the troops under his command are in the highest state of discipline and order, and fit for any service in which they can be employed.

On the 16th, 9 officers, 4 sergeants, and one matross, formerly in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, delivered themselves up to Col. Stevenson, under your Excellency's proclamation of the 29th Aug.

I have the honor to enclose a list of their names, and a copy of the order issued by Col. Stevenson to provide for their subsistence. Lieut. Stuart also delivered himself up at Poonah in the end of the last month. I have called for accounts of the regulated pay and allowances which these persons received in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency.

I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Col. Stevenson, during the operations against Asseerghur. Hereafter I shall have the honor of transmitting returns of the ordnance, stores, grain, and other property captured in that fort.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 6th Nov. 1803.

I have nothing particular to tell you from this quarter, excepting that a vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is now on his road to camp, and I expect will be here in a day or two. You may believe that I am anxious to receive from Bengal accounts of the state of your negotiations with the Rajpoots, Jauts, &c., and of your military operations, of which I know nothing since the 18th Sept.; particularly how matters are getting on in Bundelcund.

The Rajah of Berar is flying to the eastward as fast as he can along the Godavery. I have not heard that he has yet turned to the northward, but I expect he will; as Scindiah marched to the eastward in the valley of the Taptec and Poorna rivers. I know he passed Mulcapoor on the 30th Oct., as it is said, on his way to Berar. This movement relieves us from all apprehension of his attacking the territories of the Nizam or the Peshwah, and immediately sets at liberty Col. Stevenson's corps, who will follow Scindiah into Berar. I think it very possible that the four armies may be in that country in a few days, which will be delightful to the Rajah of Berar.

You will see in my letter to the Governor General of this day, that I have reported some property captured at Asseerghur. I wish he would make me acquainted with his sentiments upon the subject of these captures. You and I know well that there is nothing respecting which an army is so anxious as its prize money. Excepting by the Governor General, the army in India have not been well used by government about prize; and they in particular are suspicious and anxious on the subject. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will urge him to give me his sentiments respecting it.

Malcolm left Bombay on the 30th, on his return to the army.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Chalmers.*

Camp at Chitchooly, 6th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to inform you, that the object of the detachment under your orders is to put Appah Dessaye, one of the Marhatta sirdars in the Peshwah's service, accompanying this division of the army, in possession of the towns of Pokree, Soorernigann, and Camra, distant from this camp 5, 6, and 8 coss, and situated as in the enclosed sketch.

For this purpose the General requests that you will march at daylight and attack Pokrie first; which, being the principal place of the three, it is probable that, after succeeding against it, the other two will offer no resistance. If you are obliged to attack one or all of them by force, and take them, the General directs that the garrisons may be put to the sword.

Appah Dessaye will accompany you, or will follow you; and you are not to wait for him, with his horse and some peons, to take charge of the towns as you reduce them. And 100 of the Mysore cavalry will accompany you, to bring reports from you to the General, which he requests you will send off frequently, and on every important occurrence. If you should be obliged to open batteries to breach any of the above places, the General requests that you will send him a report of the circumstance; and that you will desist from storming until the arrival of some Europeans to your assistance.

It is probable the General will march in the direction of Pokrie the day after to-morrow: if he is to do so, he will inform you, and you may wait in that neighbourhood for this division. If you do not receive such intimation, he requests that you will return to this place the day after to-morrow, provided the objects of your detachment have been accomplished. Capt. Johnson will furnish you with guides.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 7th Nov. 1803.

We are all in confusion on the Kistna and to the southward, in consequence of a report that Sucearam Ghautky was coming to attack the post there, which has been circulated in the first instance by an hirearrah of Sir W. Clarke. The consequence is, that the officer in command on the Kistna has taken upon himself to order back Purneah's battalion that was marching up with Malcolm's baggage, and has called for a reinforcement from Hullihall, which that fort has sent him, and that post is left almost without a man.

The tappall runs very irregularly from Poonah to the Kistna, although

G. M. O.

Camp at Chitchooly, 7th Nov. 1803.

A squadron of Native cavalry from the inlying piquets, under a captain, to parade at head quarters immediately.

G. O.

7th Nov. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley has received from Col. Stevenson the detailed reports of his operations against Asseergunn, which terminated in the surrender of that important fortress.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests Col. Stevenson to accept his thanks, and to convey them to the troops under his command, for their conduct upon that occasion. At the same time Major Gen. Wellesley requests Col. Stevenson to accept his acknowledgments for the cordial and zealous assistance which he has received from him, upon all emergencies of the service since the commencement of the campaign. He has not failed to report to government, and to the Commander in Chief, his sense of the conduct of Col. Stevenson, and of the troops under his command.

G. A. O.

Monday, 7th Nov. 1803.

As the European soldiers have taken to plundering the neighbouring villages, and more irregularities have been proved against one man of the artillery, one of the 74th regt., and one of the 78th regt., Major Gen. Wellesley directs that the rolls may be called in those corps every hour. Four drummers of the 78th regt. to attend immediately with their tents at the provost serjeant's tent to inflict 200 lashes on ———, of the 4th company 78th regt., with whom one of the plundered cattle has been found. Major Gen. Wellesley gives notice that he will punish with death any man found guilty, hereafter, of plundering.

it runs on regularly enough from Poonah to the army. I wish Colman would send down the detachment, as heretofore ordered, to see how the matter regarding the tappall really stands, and to set all right. Jeswant Rao Goorparah, a vakeel from Scindiah, has come into camp this day.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 7th Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 28th Oct., on the subject of cavalry to be raised under the government of Bombay.

2. The memorandum from the Adj. Gen. appears to me to contain all the principal arrangements for that object, and the tables of pay, &c., are, I believe, correct; if not so, it will be easy to correct them, by a reference to the pay tables of the government of Fort St. George, if the cavalry establishment under that government is to be taken as the model of that to be formed at Bombay.

3. I have, however, objections to some of the arrangements proposed in the Adj. Gen.'s memorandum, which I shall now proceed to specify.

4. In the 4th paragraph, it appears to be intended that the followers, viz., the horsekeepers, shall be under the commanding officer of the regiment. Every man must be under the commanding officer of the regiment, and must be considered liable to be moved from one troop to another, and to do what may be ordered. But the horsekeepers and followers must be posted to troops, and must not be removed from one troop to another, excepting by a formal regimental order. When in a troop, they must be mustered in it; the roll must be made out by the commanding officer of the troop, and he must draw their pay, and they must be paid by him.

5. The mode of supplying forage and gram, as proposed in the 6th paragraph, will not answer. The principle of it has been exploded for years under the government of Fort St. George; and the mode proposed is far worse than the old mode under the government of Fort St. George. That mode was a contract with the commanding officer, to supply gram for the horses of his regiment, at certain rates. No individual, without public assistance, could perform the contract. The same objection exists to the mode proposed, with this addition, that the officer in command of the regiment is to send a bill, upon honor, for the expense incurred.

6. These bills upon honor should not be multiplied. The expenses of the military establishment should be brought under regular heads of account, and there should be a regular mode of supplying every thing for which there is a regular demand. A bill upon honor ought never to be admitted, excepting for an extraordinary service or demand, which could not have been foreseen, and for which no provision can have been made by any previous order or regulation.

7. Besides, the commanding officer of a regiment of cavalry has, or ought to have, too much to do, to be able to attend to a concern so complicated as that of supplying the horses of the corps under his command with gram, particularly when the supply of forage is to be added thereto. When his corps shall take the field, the carriage of a month's gram for the number of horses proposed will require 1000 bullocks, which alone is as much as he could well manage.

8. I therefore recommend that, either for the whole of the cavalry, or

for each regiment, an agent may be appointed for the special purpose of supplying the horses with grain and forage, whose bills of purchases will, of course, be checked by the usual vouchers; and that the commanding officer should have nothing to do with the feed of the horses, excepting to see that they get it.

9. It is unfortunate that the grass cutters will not answer in the countries in which the Bombay cavalry are likely to be employed, as I consider that by far the cheapest, the best, and the most efficient mode of procuring forage for the horses.

10. On the subject of the 9th paragraph of the memorandum, my opinion is as follows: In the service of the cavalry there are many minute details, which are of no great difficulty to acquire, but without the knowledge of which a body of regular cavalry cannot exist. Under the government of Bombay, I do not believe there is an officer who has served in the cavalry, and therefore none can have acquired the necessary knowledge. An establishment of this kind, in which all would be learners, and where there would be no teacher, cannot get on; and the attempt to make the cavalry a regular body at first will tend only to delay the period at which it will be of use, and to increase the expense of the establishment.

11. I should therefore recommend to government to purchase the number of horses they may require, and to hire a description of persons well known by the name of Bargeers to ride them; to give them the establishment of European officers, &c.; to arm them, and to clothe them in the red jacket, made according to the Hindustanee fashion.

12. These people will be useful immediately. By degrees, those who will submit to discipline will be disciplined; and those who will not ought to be discharged when their services shall not be required, and their places filled by young men of the description and caste proposed by the Adj. Gen. in the 9th paragraph. The officers will also learn their duty.

13. By this mode of proceeding, the government of Bombay will immediately have the service of a good body of horse, under European officers; and they will have a regular regiment of cavalry, at least as soon as they might expect one in any other manner.

14. I recommend that the person proposed to be appointed adjutant, and some of the officers who it is intended should be removed to the cavalry corps, should be sent, with the permission of the Right Hon. the Governor and Commander in Chief of Fort St. George, to do duty with the cavalry under the government of Fort St. George.

15. In respect to the 15th paragraph, I strongly recommend that government should send to England for the saddles they will require for the cavalry.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 7th Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 24th Oct., relative to the garrison of Surat.

2. The unhealthy state of the troops that have been at Surat for a length of time past is a most lamentable circumstance; and I am of opinion that, as nothing is so useful to the Company as a healthy soldier, and nothing so useless, expensive, and burthensome as one in hospital, any

measure which can be adopted to improve the state of health of those whom necessity obliges the government to detain at Surat, is one of the greatest public utility and wise economy.

3. In respect to the defence of Surat, there appears to be but one opinion upon that subject, and that is, that Surat is by no means in a state of security. The wisdom and the policy, and even the justice of government, appear to me to require that some decided steps should be taken to defend that important city.

4. In the present state of the Company's power, I have been long induced to doubt the policy of building forts on the sea coast, or in situations in which they may be liable to an attack from a power at sea; but it is very certain that, if necessity should oblige the government to build one in such a situation, it ought to be a fort of the first order, of which our European enemies could not get possession, excepting by a very long siege.

5. This general principle will apply to building a fort at Surat. However, its soundness depends upon many local circumstances, with which I am not acquainted: viz., the possibility of bringing a large fleet to Surat, and of remaining there in safety; the number of months in the year in which that is possible; and the generally prevailing winds in the offing. I have also to observe, that the Hon. the Governor of Bombay has orders from the Court of Directors not to undertake a work of this magnitude; and therefore, even if it should be decided to be necessary and proper, he could not undertake the work; and, in the mean time, the question respecting the propriety of building a fort can be well canvassed and considered.

6. But whether a fort is to be built or not, some measures must be taken to secure the wealth and people of Surat from our Native enemies. The town wall is acknowledged to be in an indefensible state, and the castle not much better; and the former to be so extensive, that even the number of troops now allotted for its defence are not sufficient. In my opinion, it will be proper to keep the town wall in repair, and to repair the castle in such a manner, that at least no Native enemy could attack it with hopes of success.

7. If the castle were in such a state as to stand the attack of a Native power, I should think the property of the town very secure from any attempt they could make upon it.

8. The intrenched camp, proposed for the troops intended for the defence of Surat, appears a good measure; but if a wholesome situation can be found nearer than 11 miles distant, I should recommend it in preference to that proposed. Indeed, it appears to me to be desirable that, if possible, the camp should not be at a greater distance than half that proposed.

To Lieut. Col. Campbell, 74th regt.

Camp, 7th Nov. 1803.

I write only to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 12th and 14th Oct., for which I am much obliged to you. I regret exceedingly your sickness, of which I had heard; but I hope that the cold weather will bring you about. I wish that you would think of going to England;

nothing but that can be a sufficient remedy for the disposition to fever which you appear to have.

Your nephew Colin will write you the news from hence.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace.*

Camp at Chitchooly, 7th Nov. 1803.

Various complaints have been made to-day to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley of soldiers going into the neighbouring villages and plundering the inhabitants of their cattle, &c.; and 2 cows have been found in camp to-day, in the possession of a man who calls himself a cook in the 71th regt., and says that he purchased them from a soldier of that corps, named Cogan, whose right arm is lame from an accident which he met with in a quarrel.

The General desires that man may be tried immediately by a Regimental Court Martial, for plundering. The cook is sent up to give evidence against him; and if he prevaricates, by failing to point out the proper person, or to prove his having sold the cattle, he is to be returned, in order that he may be punished by the provost sergeant for having those cattle in his possession.

The General further directs that the rolls may be called every hour, until further orders, in the 74th regt., in order that the men may not have it in their power to get out to plunder, without being immediately discovered.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Allen, Erroor.*

Camp at Chitchooly, 7th Nov. 1803.

I have received, and laid before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, your letter of the 29th, and 2 letters of the 30th ult.

The information received from the hirearrah by Lieut. Kettle, and circulated so industriously, is unfounded in its first principle, and the superstructure must consequently be incorrect. Sucearam Ghantky has been long at Poonah, and had not moved from that place when the last post arrived here left it. He therefore could neither have joined the Kolapoor Rajah, nor have formed the intentions and plans against Goorgherry and Erroor ascribed to him by the hirearrah, or by the man from Ankoly.

This is the season when the Marhatta chiefs usually take the field for the mooluckghery, and they may be doing so now without any further intentions, unless unnecessary alarms should put them into their thoughts. The General therefore directs me to inform you that Major Doolan has no authority for detaching any part of his force to your assistance, or to that of the other officers in charge of the posts on the southern rivers; and orders have been sent to him to recall any troops that he may have sent out on receiving your letter. You have therefore only to depend on your own strength for the defence of your post, which it is not likely will be attacked.

Notwithstanding your reports of the interruption of the tappalls, your own 3 letters above quoted have come in regularly. At any rate, orders have been sent to Poonah to station a force between that place and Erroor, which will protect the runners, and ensure their free passage.

You had nothing to do with the battalion of the Rajah of Mysore's troops, which was marching up to Poonah under particular orders, and you ought not to have interrupted its march by the letter you wrote to the commander of it. If he has returned in consequence of that letter, and he still within reach, the General desires that you will inform him that he is to proceed to Poonah, according to his original orders.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Kettle, Goorgherry.*

Camp at Chitchooly, 7th Nov. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 29th, and laid it before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who directs me to inform you that Sucearam Ghantky is at Poonah, consequently all the Bramin's stories, of his having joined the Rajah of Kolapoor, and of their intentions to attack you, &c., with which you have frightened yourself and alarmed all the country, are without foundation.

This is the season when the Marhattas always take the field about their own concerns, and they probably have no intention whatever of disturbing the British posts on the rivers; though, if they see the troops alarmed, they may be tempted to insult their posts. Major Doolan has transmitted a note to him from Lieut.



Christie, dated the 30th, circulating one of your reports; in consequence of which the Major has detached 2 companies to your assistance, and that of Lieut. Allen at Erroor. Major Gen. Wellesley has entirely disapproved of this step of Major Doolan, and ordered him to recall those companies, and all other parties of troops which he may have detached on similar reports; and I have to inform you that, in the event of any attempt being made on your post, you must defend it as well as you are able with your own force, without expecting assistance from Hullahall.

*The D.A.G. to Major Doolan, Hullahall.*

7th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letters of the 27th and 30th ult., and directs me to inform you that the Company has nothing to do with the forts and districts which you have enumerated and prepared to take possession of, lying between Hullahall and the Kistna; and he therefore desires that you will not, on any account whatever, send a single sepoy from your garrison near to them; and that you will, as much as possible, refrain from talking on such a subject as the taking possession of them, because of the evil consequences which such idle reports may produce in the country.

Lieut. Kettle has been frightened, himself, and has alarmed his neighbours, with the reports of a Bramin, who told him that Succaram Ghautky had joined the Kolapoor Rajah with a large force, and was coming to attack him and Lieut. Allen. Succaram Ghautky has been long at Poonah, and is there still; therefore the whole hypothesis raised on the idea of his having joined the Kolapoor Rajah is wrong. There was no necessity for your reinforcing those 2 officers, and your ordering Capt. Cox to march in such a hurry as you did is the more unlucky, as it harasses the troops unnecessarily, and creates suspicions and alarm throughout the country.

If Capt. Cox has not returned before you receive this letter, the General desires that you will recall him immediately; and further, that you will recall any other parties whom you may have been induced by similar reports to send into the Marhatta territories; and lastly, he desires that you will not, on any account, send out any more detachments without his previous orders.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Colman, Poonah.*

7th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to transmit to you the accompanying extract of a letter from Lieut. Christie, on the subject of the ill treatment experienced by the runners, and the interruption of the tappall between Poonah and Sungoly; and he requests that you will send the detachment to Chickorie, mentioned in my letter of the 18th Oct. last.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Chitchooly, 9th Nov. 1803.

I received in the night your letter of the 2nd. Your rice will go off

G. O.

Camp at Chitchooly, Tuesday, 8th Nov. 1803.

A squadron of Native cavalry of the adjoining piquets to parade at Major Gen. Wellesley's tent, this afternoon at 4 o'clock, to proceed with him to meet Jeswant Rao Goorparah, vakel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

A flank company of European infantry from the 4th brigade to parade at Major Gen. Wellesley's tent at half past 4 o'clock this afternoon; on the vakel advancing to the tent, the company will receive him with presented arms and drums beating. A salute of 13 guns to be fired this afternoon on the vakel's alighting at Major Gen. Wellesley's tent. The commanding officer of artillery will place sentries to ascertain the time and pass the signals.

Major Gen. Wellesley will be glad to see any officers who are off duty, and may be inclined to accompany him when he goes out to meet Jeswant Rao Goorparah.

Mem.

4 o'clock is an unlucky hour; the squadron of cavalry to be at head quarters at 5, and the company of Europeans at half past 5 o'clock.

G. O.

9th Nov. 1803.

(The 2nd batt. 12th regt. ordered in detachment, the order the same newly as that inserted in the G. A. O., 6th Nov.)

(The visit to Scindiah's vakel returned, a squadron ordered to attend, and officers invited as yesterday.)

from hence to-morrow morning, and will reach Adjuttee on the 15th. I expected that you would have been well supplied at Burhampoor, otherwise I should have sent it off as soon as it reached me. Two of the companies in charge of it belong to the corps at Hyderabad, where they are much wanted, on account of the weakness from the number of detachments out. I shall, therefore, order the officer to return to Hyderabad from Adjuttee, unless he should receive contradictory orders from you. There will remain with the brinjarries one company of the 2nd, under a *soubahdar*.

I am glad to find that your preparations for Gawilghur are so forward. You will, of course, follow Scindiah to the eastward, according to my former letter.

I do not give much credit to that story of Scindiah's *hircarra* respecting Meer Khan and Bungash. The subsidiary force did not march from Burhampoor till the 31st, and its march could not have been the subject of conversation in Meer Khan's camp, although it might have been known to Meer Khan on the 1st. I have observed that, whenever Rajah Mohiput Ram is left with few troops, we always hear through him of a large body of troops assembled in his neighbourhood, and I suspect that this is a story of the same kind.

I have never heard of Meer Khan's return across the Nerbudda; and I rather suspect that the whole of Holkar's force is assembled to the northward, at Kota, excepting a few troops to guard the person of Kunder Rao Holkar.

You have not mentioned your health in the letter of the 2nd, therefore I hope it is mending. \*

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 9th Nov. 1803.

I was sorry to hear from Colebrooke yesterday that you were still unwell, and that Col. Haliburton was also indisposed; but I hope that we shall soon have better accounts of you. I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Rajah Mohiput Ram to be cautious not to interfere with 2 *pergunnahs* belonging to Narsing Kunder Rao, one called *Dhoolca*, the other *Soungheery*, both in *Candeish*. A *vakeel* from Scindiah came in here yesterday. There is no other news. The Rajah of Berar is continuing his progress to the eastward.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Chitchooly, 9th Nov. 1803.

I received yesterday evening your letter of the 5th, and I am much concerned that Malcolm should have been again indisposed. We have now plenty for him to do. Jeswunt Rao Goorparah arrived in camp the day before yesterday, as the *vakeel* from Scindiah; and as he is a man of high family, being a nephew of Morari Rao, and as he has more the manner and appearance of a gentleman than any *Marhatta* that I have yet seen, I suspect there is an intention, on Scindiah's part, to make some concessions for the sake of peace.

Goorparah visited me yesterday, and I propose returning his visit this evening; and after that ceremony is over, I conclude that business will begin.

Our weather here is delightful, only too cold. I am concerned to hear of a deficiency of funds at Bombay. I conclude that the government of Fort St. George are laying out their money in investments also, by order of the Governor General, and I dare not alter either that order, or that relative to the loans at Bombay. I have repeatedly written to Bengal upon the subject of supplies of money and grain for Bombay; but I have not received a line from Calcutta since the 18th Sept., and I am entirely in the dark respecting all the transactions in that part of India.

As to the operations of the armies, particularly of the detachment in Bundelcund, which to us here is a most interesting point, I know nothing about them. Ragojee has turned to the northward, and is flying towards Nagpoor, which sets all matters right.

I have my doubts respecting the capture of Poonadur: I expect Amrut Rao in camp immediately, and I think that I shall be able to get that place from him; and if I should succeed in that object, it may be the means of forcing some concession in his favour from the Peshwah. But if I do not succeed in that object, the attack must be considered as a matter of risk with the force now at Poonah; and, at all events, would involve us in fresh disputes with Amrut Rao. The question is, whether the possession of Poonadur is absolutely necessary to us under present circumstances? If it is, it must be taken at all risks, and whatever may be the consequences: but I do not think it is. We have some little difficulty, it is true, with our tappall; that difficulty is only occasional, and I suspect that it is much exaggerated by the rumers, who are Mysore people, and are obliged to stay upon the road. Purneah, who has undertaken to pay them, has not paid them either so regularly, or so much, as when they were paid by the officer in camp. The killadar of Poonadur promises fairly (at least as fairly as the Peshwah), and we know that he has never interrupted our supplies, which have been constantly travelling up. I doubt whether we should be so well treated by the Peshwah's killadar. But, it may be said, it will gratify the Peshwah to put him in possession of this fort. Upon this point I have to observe, that I would not put the public interests to the smallest risk, or incur the inconvenience of a moment's dispute with Amrut Rao, to gratify the Peshwah.

His Highness may mean well, but it is impossible for a person with the very worst intentions to act in a manner more contrary to the letter and spirit of his treaty with the Company than he has, or to do us more injury by his actions. Therefore, in my opinion, the principle of all our actions towards the Peshwah ought to be, our own convenience, and the benefit of the British government.

While writing upon the subject, I have to mention to you that an officer of the Peshwah, the person who collected the choute at Aunungabad, was discovered to be in secret correspondence with Ragojee Bhonslah on the day I arrived there; and I have my doubts whether I should not have surprised that Chief, had it not been for that correspondence. His name is Soormunt, and he is now arrested at Aunungabad. Another man, in the same office at Burhampoor, has been playing the same tricks, and I have ordered him likewise to be arrested. I have also to mention

to you, that the person who, I before apprised you, was going to Poonah as an agent from Scindiah has arrived there. The Rajah of Kolapoor's letters are civil, and I enclose an answer to them.

P.S. I have just received your letter of the 8th. Nothing will give me more pleasure than to hear that Sirjee Rao Ghautky is arrested, and that the Peshwah's palace is secured by us while that is going on;—only let care be taken that secrecy is observed, and that the blow does not miss: if it does, we shall have the fellow at large in the shape of an enemy, and he will give us much trouble.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, Jaum, 9th Nov. 1803.

1. I had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 2nd inst., upon the subject of dooley bearers.

2. In my letter of the 27th Sept., I had the honor of requesting the Governor in Council to give orders that 100 doolies might be prepared at Bombay, to carry away my disabled soldiers from the hospital which I had it in contemplation to form; but that they should not be sent away till I should require them.

3. My reason for making this request was, that I thought it probable that the bearers would not desert, if they knew they were to go only to the hospital, and to return with the sick soldiers, and that they certainly would desert if they were detained for a time at any station till the soldiers should be sufficiently recovered to be able to move.

4. I fear, however, that there has been some mistake upon this subject, as the doolies which I imagine were intended for the removal of the wounded from the hospital have joined the army. However, that is not of much consequence, as the doolies were wanted for the 78th regt., to which they have been attached; and I enclose two notes, which will show that although they have not been here many days, the bearers have begun to desert.

5. The bearers now sent will be detained at Poonah, according to orders which I have given to Col. Colman some time ago, at least if that officer should hear of their arrival there, and copies of the papers sent by the Superintendent of Police should be transmitted to him: it is to be hoped that they will remain at Poonah till the wounded may recover sufficiently to bear removal.

6. I have to observe that I am ignorant of what arrangement it is proposed should be adopted to give food to these bearers, or what the quality and quantity of food they are to receive; and shall be glad to receive the orders of government upon that subject.

7. While writing upon the subject of dooley bearers, I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 26th Oct., which contained the copy of a letter from Col. Woodington upon the subject of camp followers. Upon this subject I have only to observe, that I might have hoped that a fact which I reported might have been considered as true, without the necessity of referring to Lieut. Col. Woodington for an opinion regarding its probability.

8. I have also to acknowledge the receipt from Lieut. Col. Colman of a letter from the government of Bombay on the 29th Aug., with various

depositions of deserted bullock drivers, against Capt. Mackay, taken by the Superintendent of Police at Bombay.

9. Unfortunately for the service, the gentleman against whom these accusations have been made was killed at the battle of Assye, otherwise I should not now be obliged to write his defence. This officer was notoriously the most humane and gentle towards the Natives of any I have yet seen in this army; indeed, this virtue was carried to an excess in his character, that might almost be termed a fault.

10. At my particular desire, and contrary to his own inclinations, he took charge of that part of the Bombay bullock establishment which was to serve with the troops under my command; and as it was by no means in order, 2000 out of 3000 bullocks being entirely unfit for service, it was necessary to introduce some regulations to provide for the food and care of the cattle. This Capt. Mackay certainly did, but neither harshly nor suddenly; and for having done his duty in this instance, those who have deserted this service have been allowed to libel and defame his character, through the medium of the police; and by going through the offices of government, these libels are placed upon record.

11. As the officer is killed, his character cannot be entirely cleared from the stigma recorded respecting it, on the authority of the lowest and vilest men in society. But I can safely say, that as far as I can answer for another man, these depositions do not contain one word of truth, excepting that the deponents deserted from the service.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Rimmington, commg. a detachmt. from Hyderabad.* 9th Nov. 1803.

You are to march to-morrow morning with the 2 companies of sepoys of the 2nd batt. 5th regt., and 1 company of the 2nd batt. 2nd regt., under your command, and all the brinjaries, bullocks, &c., which arrived with you in this camp (excepting the 2000 laden with rice on account of the Hon. Company), towards Adjuttee.

The 2nd batt. 12th regt. will accompany you as far as Jaulna, when Capt. Vernon will deliver the route and guide to you, with which he has been furnished. You will observe by the route that you have only 4 marches from Jaulna to Adjuttee, and you are to perform those marches in as many days, without halting a day, unless you should hear of any superior force of the enemy being near you; in which case you will take post, and send a report of the circumstance to Major Gen. Wellesley, and to Adjuttee.

On your arrival at Adjuttee you will deliver over the company of the 2nd batt. 2nd regt., and the brinjary bullocks and grain, with all accounts, receipts, or money concerning them, which may be in your hands, to Capt. Scott, commanding there; and you will then return by Aurungabad to Hyderabad, unless you receive any orders to the contrary from Col. Stevenson, which you will obey.

Capt. Vernon will send you notice of the hour when he proposes marching in the morning, and a guide to conduct you into the road; and you will have your detachment and the cattle ready to move off at that time.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Vernon, commg. 2nd batt. 12th regt. N.I.*

9th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has ordered Lieut. Rimmington, commanding a detachment of 3 companies of sepoys from Hyderabad, escorting a great number of brinjary bullocks laden with grain for the subsidiary force and for the troops of the Subah of the Deccan serving with it, to march to-morrow morning for Adjuttee with his detachment and convoy; and the 2nd batt. 12th regt. is to accompany them as far as Jaulna, which you will observe, by the enclosed route, is only 2 marches from this place.

You will accordingly inform Mr. Rimmington of the hour at which you propose to march in the morning, and send one of the guides (whom Capt. Johnson will furnish to you) to conduct him into the road, and proceed in charge of the whole detachment as far as Jaulna, which you will reach on the 11th; and you will send on Mr. Rimmington the next morning, with his own 3 companies and the bullock and grain, to Adjuttee, giving over the route and guide to him at the same; and you will return to this place to rejoin the army with the 2nd batt. 12th regt., unless you receive intimation of its having marched, when you will direct your route accordingly.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.*

9th Nov. 1803.

I have just now received your letter of this date. The General marches to-morrow morning to Jaum (S.E. from hence), only 8 miles distant, in the high road to Paurie, and about 8 miles from a well-known place called Ashta. The villages near it are (N.) Hudgaon, (S.E.) Assingaum, and (N.E.) Jarchasoni. Capt. Johnson thinks it is only 12 miles from Rampoorie (N.E. direction), and consequently it will be an easier march for you to-morrow than this place, if you receive this letter in time, and in that case the General desires that you will proceed thither.

Lieut. Rimmington marches to-morrow morning, also, with the subsidiary and Nizam's brinjaries, by Caulaygaum, to Jaulna and Adjuttee. The 2nd batt. 12th regt. escorts him as far as Jaulna. If you should have marched before this reaches you, and have advanced so far that you cannot turn off to Jaum so as to arrive there to-morrow, but to come here, then the General desires that you will detach the party of troops belonging to the Soubah, which joined you with Lieut. Hay, together with the 4 lacs of rupees belonging to his Highness, with orders to overtake Lieut. Rimmington at Jaulna on the 11th, and to place themselves under his orders, and proceed with him to Adjuttee; provided you deem that body of troops (viz., the Soubah's) sufficient to escort the treasure to Jaulna. If you send them on, write to Lieut. Rimmington by them. If you think his Highness' troops not a sufficient escort for that money to Jaulna, you must bring them and it on along with you after the army, by Jaum, till you overtake us.

I have written to you twice to-day by Goondy.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Jaum, 10th Nov. 1803.

Your rice went off this morning, and will arrive at Adjuttee on the 15th. It goes by the road of Jaulna. I have sent after the convoy this evening 4 lacs of rupees for Mohiput Ram's troops; and the Bheer man has just been here, and tells me that he will send 5 lacs of rupees more, which last sum is to meet them at Adjuttee. Inform Mohiput Ram of this circumstance. I have no news for you.

*The D.A.G. to the Captain, 5th brig., ordered for detachmt.*

Jaum, 10th Nov. 1803.

A party of the Soubah's troops, horse and infantry, arrived in camp to-day, along with Capt. Baynes, in charge of 4 lacs of rupees for his Highness' troops serving with the subsidiary force; and they have been directed to march at 3 this afternoon, in order to join Lieut. Rimmington's detachment at Jaulna.

You are to march with them as an additional escort to the treasure, but are not to take any particular charge of it, nor are you to be held further responsible for it than the general protection which your detachment can afford. You will, however, endeavor to prevail upon the officers in charge of the treasure to proceed with you, to-night, to Chitchooly, 4 coss, and to-morrow to Rewgaum, 11 coss (according to the accompanying route). From thence you may send notice to Lieut. Rimmington, in the evening of your arrival, and acquaint him that you will see the treasure up with his rear the next morning. After doing which you will join Capt. Vernon, and proceed with him.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. —.*

Camp at Jaum, 10th Nov. 1803.

You must be aware of the rule of the service, that the sentence of every Gene-

ral Court Martial, after being confirmed, must be pronounced by the Judge Advocate, in open court, in presence of the prisoner, before it can be published to the army or carried into execution; and therefore you cannot surely expect that your request, to be allowed to return to Hyderabad, with a detachment which was ordered to march to-morrow morning, will be complied with.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has no desire to detain you longer here than is absolutely necessary, or to render your return to Hyderabad hazardous; and he will detain Lieut. May's detachment to-morrow, in expectation that your trial, &c. may be finished, and that you may be at liberty to proceed with him the day after.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 11th Nov. 1803.

I am afraid that you will be disappointed respecting the arrival of your Buswunt rice. The fault is owing to Capt. —, who came in charge of it from Hyderabad. He did not obey the orders he received, and thereby exposed the convoy; for which conduct he has been tried by a General Court Martial. Afterwards it was delayed till I could hear from you what should be done with it; but this last delay was not more than of 4 days. It could not have been at Adjuttee at any rate till the 10th, after I relieved the convoy; and it will now be there on the 15th, with plenty of money for Rajah Mohiput Ram. I see also that you will not be prepared with your stores till the 18th, and therefore the delay will not be of any material consequence.

By the last accounts the Rajah of Berar had turned to the northward, and is going to Nagpoor. It will be a good measure to drive Scindiah into the Berar country before you. It will be awkward if he should turn to the south, as that must keep me here; and at all events till the motions of one of these Chiefs lead decidedly to the northward, I do not think that we can undertake the siege of Gawilghur. However, I hope that both will go into Berar; and if that be the case all will be right.

I am glad to hear that your health is better. The hock and tea go by a camel hircarrah this day to overtake the convoy, and will arrive at Adjuttee with them. There are many of your brinjarries with the convoy, besides those carrying the Buswunt rice; I believe 2500, loaded with dry grain. I think it would be advisable that you should send off 2000 or 3000 brinjarries to Ahmednuggur to get loads of rice. Give them orders upon the stores there: let me know the amount of these orders, and I will send directions that they may be complied with.

I do not think that Scindiah has it in his power to form a large force again. Numbers of his cavalry and many sirdars, I know, have deserted. Gen. Lake gained a victory in the town and on the glacis of Agra on the 10th Oct., and I expect to hear that he took that fortress on the 13th.

G. O.

Camp at Jaun, Friday, 11th Nov. 1803.

On publishing the sentence of the General Court Martial on the trial of Capt. —, Major Gen. Wellesley thinks it proper to explain to the troops, that there is much difference in the situations and cases in which an officer is permitted to exercise his discretion.

It may frequently happen that an order may be given to an officer, which, from circumstances not known to the person who gave it at the time he issued it, would be impossible to execute, or the difficulty or risk of the execution of it would be so great as to amount to a moral impossibility.

In a case of this kind, Major Gen. Wellesley is by no means disposed to check officers detached in the exercise of their discretion, but Capt. —'s case is not of this description: he could have and had no information which the officer had not who gave him orders, and it was his duty to obey.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 11th Nov. 1803

I fear that Mr. Duncan is but little acquainted with my principles or opinions, or he would not think that I had altered my mind respecting the arrangement in Guzerat.

Col. Murray's revenue arrangements are really ridiculous, and show that he has entered into a laborious investigation of a subject which ought not to have occupied his attention for a moment. I repeated my opinion to Col. Murray upon this subject, in a letter which I wrote to him on the 23rd of last month, an extract of which I sent to Mr. Duncan; and I wrote to him 2 letters upon the subject last week.

I see now that Col. Murray has involved himself in a dispute with the Paymaster and Military Auditor Gen. at Bombay. There are two parties throughout the Bombay establishment, and these are—the civil and military services; and the latter are divided into two parties—those in the King's and those in the Company's service. The disputes of these parties are the sole business of every man under the government of Bombay; and they are maintained by the system of encouragement given to correspondence, and the perpetual references to individuals by government. In short, I see clearly that nothing can succeed with those people as it ought; and I wish to God that I had nothing to do with them.

The Dhar man ought to be encouraged; and if he should be of any service to us, or even if he decidedly keeps away from Scindiah, a stipulation shall be made in his favor, that he shall receive no injury from Scindiah for his conduct during the war. But we must be cautious in all our proceedings with these fellows, otherwise we shall be burdened with the defence of a pack of rascals of inferior rank, but of the same description with their Highnesses the Nizam and the Peshwah. Ragojee has turned to the northward. Scindiah is still in the valley of the Poorna, to the east of Mulcapoor. It is said that the former, as well as the latter, is going to Nagpoor. God send it may be true. If it is, we shall destroy him entirely. Amrut Rao is at no great distance from me, and, I believe, is coming in.

In respect to money from Bombay, you are mistaken as to the amount which it was expected that Presidency should supply. I told Mr. Duncan that I thought we should require 16 lacs of rupees. Gen. Stuart told him that we should require double that sum. If 4 lacs coined from dollars belonging to the government of Madras be taken out of the account, I believe that we have not received the first sum; and certainly not to the amount of the last. It is true that Mr. Duncan may include in the expenses of this army all those of Col. Colman's detachment, all those of the troops in Guzerat, and all those of Bombay, civil and military; as he did in the account of the consumption of rice by this army, the consumption of all the troops stationed in those places, at Fort Victoria, &c., and that of the populace at Bombay.

However, there is no doubt whatever, whether it was foreseen or not, that the calls upon the resources of Bombay have been very heavy, and that they must increase. Upon this subject I have written repeatedly to Bengal, and I have received no answer upon that or any other matter, upon which I have addressed either the Governor General or his secretary.



I particularly requested that 7 lacs of rupees, in Bengal mohurs, might be sent to Bombay for my use, as long ago as during the siege of Ahmednuggur; to which request I have received no answer. Then the Governor General writes the most positive orders to spend money to draw off sirdars and horse; to pay Amrut Rao; to entertain 5000 horse under the modified treaty of Bassein; to take Meer Khan into the service of the Company and the Nizam: and, on the other hand, he sends no money, and orders the government of Bombay not to make a loan, and the government of Madras to have an enlarged investment: these orders are not consistent, but who can alter them?

I had a conference last night with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, from which I rather angur well. Great pains were taken to convince me that the war was owing to Collins's precipitate and violent conduct; and that all that was required of him was to wait in camp until my answer should be received to the famous letter proposing that Seindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah should retire to Burhampoor, and I to Madras and Seringapatam. I over-turned this statement by a relation of the facts which occurred at Ragojee's tent, two nights before these letters were sent; and I showed him that Collins had refused to admit that proposition, and had positively said that he must go if it was made, upon which another was offered. Jeswunt Rao Goorparah agreed in the truth of this story, but said that what had then passed was verbal, and ought not to have been considered as decided. In answer, I replied that we never could admit that position; for, if we did, the consequence must be, that all business must be transacted in writing. All this preliminary anxiety about the cause of the war is very natural, as they well know that we shall found our claims to satisfaction and security on the fact that they were the aggressors. He has brought no credentials, except a slip of paper to Appah Dessaye, upon which subject I have not been very strict hitherto, as, in fact, I have none myself from the Peshwah and the Nizam. But I foresee a variety of inconveniences from going any farther without seeing them. In fact, I believe he has them: he admitted the necessity of producing them last night, and I told him I expected to see them as soon as an hircarrah should return; and that I should not speak to him for a moment upon the subject, if he were not a man of high rank, of whose deceiving me I could entertain no suspicion, and whom Seindiah would not dare to disavow.

P.S. I wish that you would send me the Persian copy of my letter to Seindiah of the 14th July, and that of my letter of the (I believe) 6th Aug. I am going to meet Amrut Rao to-morrow.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 11th Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 4th inst., which contains papers on a variety of subjects referring to Col. Murray.

2. I am much concerned that there should have been any difference of opinion between Col. Murray and the paymaster of the army under his command. But I conceive that the question between those gentlemen is one entirely referrible to the existing regulations, upon which the Honorable the Governor in Council can put his own construction, without any reference to my opinion.

3. If Col. Murray has a paymaster in his camp, it must be a matter of indifference who the person is, provided he is capable of doing the duty; and I have only to add that I should consider it my place to support and enforce the existing regulations and the orders of government, whatever they may be.

4. I take the liberty, however, to recommend as a general rule, that between those public officers by whom business can be done verbally, correspondence should be forbidden, as having a great tendency to prevent disputes upon trifling subjects, and to save the time of the public officers who are obliged, some to peruse and consider, and others to copy, those voluminous documents about nothing.

5. In former letters I have had the honor of submitting my opinion to the Hon. the Governor in Council, regarding Col. Murray's political and financial arrangements.

To the Governor General.\*

Jaum, 11th Nov. 1803.

On the 6th Oct. I had the honor to apprise your Excellency that propositions, tending to negotiations for peace between the British government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had been made to me in various channels, one of which was through the medium of Siddajee Rao Nimbilkar, commonly called Appah Dessaye, who is serving with this division of the army, in the command of a body of the troops belonging to the Peshwah. The result of his communications has been, that a vakeel has been sent here by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to treat for peace. The name of this person is Jeswunt Rao Goorparah. He is the nephew of the late Morari Rao Goorparah. The usual visits of ceremony have taken place, and I have had one conference with him. In this conference nothing of any consequence passed. He appeared anxious to prove that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been desirous to remain at peace with the British government, and that if Col. Collins had not quitted his camp upon receiving the letter addressed to me, which immediately preceded the commencement of hostilities, the war would not have taken place. His arguments upon this subject were overturned by a narrative of what passed at Ragojee Bhoonslah's tent immediately previous to the dispatch of the letters in question, as related in Col. Collins's dispatch to me of the 30th July. The principal subject of this conference was occasioned by my calling upon Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to produce his full powers when I showed him in my hand the paper containing those with which your Excellency had intrusted me, of which I explained the nature.

In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that it was not customary to send a letter by a sirdar of high rank, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had particular objections to write a letter to me, because I had omitted to answer that which he had written and transmitted in Col. Collins's dispatch of the 6th Aug. I explained that I had written an answer to that letter, and a long conversation ensued upon that subject, in which he positively denied that the answer had ever been received.

I then pointed out that it was the common practice throughout the

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 497: Marquis Wellesley to Major Genl. the Hon. A. Wellesley, 11th Dec. 1803.

world, and more particularly in the Marhatta empire, that no agent ever was employed in the transaction of the most trifling business, who did not possess some powers from his employers which he could produce; and I stated the inconvenience which would result in transactions between states, if this practice was departed from. I said that I was convinced that a man of his name and high rank would not attempt to deceive me, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would not venture to deny that he had employed him as a vakeel; but on this ground, and as Appah Dessaye had a letter from Scindiah saying that he was his vakeel, I should suffer him to remain in camp, and should listen to what he had to say. But that I insisted upon his producing full powers to treat for his employer as soon as a messenger could return from Scindiah's camp. In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah acknowledged the truth and justice of my observations, and said that he should produce the usual powers as required. I have given your Excellency only an outline of the conversation which passed upon this subject. A memorandum has been taken of this conference, a copy of which shall be transmitted as soon as it can be made.

I cannot account for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah coming unprovided with the usual powers. In proportion, however, as I gain experience of the Marhattas I have more reason to be astonished at the low and unaccountable tricks which even the highest classes of them practise, with a view, however remote, to forward their own interest. As Jeswunt Rao Goorparah is a man of high family, and in his manner and appearance rather superior to the Marhatta chiefs whom I have seen in general; and as there is no doubt but that Dowlut Rao Scindiah is reduced to great distress, it is probable that his mission is intended to obtain peace.

It is only lately that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has heard of the brilliant successes of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in the neighbourhood of Delhi, and it is probable that the first accounts he will receive of that of the 10th Oct. near Agra will be from this camp, when he will of course be more anxious to obtain peace. I have, therefore, no doubt that the proper powers will be transmitted to his vakeel within the time specified; and if they are not, I shall request Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to withdraw from the camp.

As I apprised your Excellency early in the month of Oct. of the probability that I should soon have propositions for peace, and I transmitted the letters I had received from Ballojee Koonger and Mahomed Meer Khan, I think it possible that I may receive your Excellency's instructions applicable to the state of affairs at the period at which you will have received my dispatch of the 6th Oct.; but lest I should not, I proceed to state to your Excellency the demands which I propose to make to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, according to your Excellency's instructions of the 27th June.

1st; I shall demand from him the cession of all his territories north of those of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

2dly; The cession of the fort of Barouch, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to —; and the fort of Ahmednuggur, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to —.

3dly; The cession of all his territories situated southward and eastward

of the hills called the Adjutee hills, including the fort and district of Jahnapoor, and all districts in which he may have a joint right with the Soubah of the Deccan, and collects the revenues.

4thly; A renunciation of all claims of *choute*, and all other claims, of whatever denomination, upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and all the allies of the British government.

5thly; An acknowledgment of the independence of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

6thly; A renunciation of all claims upon the Ranah of Gohud, who is in future to be dependent upon the British government.

7thly; An engagement never to entertain in his service any Europeans belonging to a country which may be at war with Great Britain.

8thly; That his Majesty is to be under the protection of the British government.

9thly; That he shall not molest the chiefs who may have assisted the British government in the war, of whom I shall include the names of as many as I can procure.

I propose, also, to settle some plan for ascertaining what districts in Candeish and Malwa belong to the Peshwah, and what to Scindiah. According to this plan for a peace, Scindiah will gain his province of Ahmednuggur, excepting the fort; his territory subject to Baroach; the fort of Powanghur, and all his territory in Guzerat; the fort of Asseerghur, all the city of Burhampoor, with all the territory depending on them in Candeish. This plan appears to provide for all the material objects of your Excellency's instructions of the 27th June, and I shall now state my reasons for not making demands to the full extent of those instructions.

The only objects which I could obtain in addition to those which I propose to demand, are the fort of Asseerghur and the city of Burhampoor, and the territory depending on them in Candeish; the territory depending on Ahmednuggur; that in Guzerat depending upon Baroach; and the fort of Powanghur and its dependency and territory.

The fort of Asseerghur, if ceded by Scindiah, would belong to the Soubah of the Deccan; and, from what I have seen and experienced of his Highness' government, I think there are weighty objections to the increase of his Highness' territories on his northern frontier.

His Highness depends entirely for their defence upon the exertions of the British government. The system of operations on this frontier must be fundamentally defensive, from the nature of his Highness' government, from the deficiency of his means of defending his country, and the probable strength of the corps which the British government can allot in case of war to give him assistance. But in proportion as the distance of the frontier is increased, the difficulty of defending it will increase likewise. The fort of Asseerghur will give no strength to it; and as for the city of Burhampoor, it would be an additional weak point on the extreme frontier, for the defence of which it would be necessary to provide as for Aurungabad, in the present war, out of the means provided by the treaties with the British government for carrying on operations in the field. Another reason for ceding these territories to Scindiah is that, unless they are given to him, he has no motive for making peace. This

reason is likewise applicable to the cession of the territories depending upon Ahmednuggur, and those in Guzerat.

I have also to observe that, as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has kept himself hitherto entirely out of the war, and as he will not be weakened in proportion as Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been by its operations, and as he will be by its result, under the proposed peace, it may be thought necessary by your Excellency to preserve a part of Scindiah's strength, to enable him to support himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

On this ground, and as I think it most desirable to detach Scindiah from the confederacy, by which the peace of Mysore, and of the Company's territories on the Toombuddra, will be in a great measure insured, I have it in contemplation to propose to Scindiah to give him a compensation in Berar for the territories which he will cede to the British government in the north of Hindustan, provided that he will cede to the Company all the territory in Guzerat depending on Baroach, and will join in the war against the Rajah of Berar. This will make Scindiah more powerful against Holkar and the Rajah of Berar than he was before the war: it will probably induce him to conclude the peace immediately; at the same time that, relatively to the British government, it will not alter the state of his power. However, I shall not make this offer, unless I should find great difficulty in obtaining the other objects.

If peace, according to the plan above proposed, should be made, it will remain to be determined in what manner the Soubah of the Deccan is to participate equally with the British government in the advantages of the war. I believe there is no doubt but that his Highness has not performed all the conditions of the treaty of defensive alliance with the Company; but, upon the whole, your Excellency may think it more consistent with the liberal policy of your government to admit him to a share of the benefits of the peace.

However, before this is done, it is my opinion that advantage ought to be taken of his Highness' breach of his engagements, to improve the treaty of defensive alliance, and to provide some security in future for the due execution of its most material articles. The interests of the parties, it might be supposed, would alone provide a sufficient security for this object; but the Soubah's government are well acquainted with the interest the British government have in their preservation; they will for ever depend upon that interest, and trust to the known honor of the British government for their support, and will never make any exertion, the object of which is to provide for their own security, so long as they have the support of the British power.

I would therefore recommend the following amendments to the treaty of defensive alliance, which will ensure the existence of some strength in the government of Hyderabad.

1st; That the British Resident should have the power of mustering, at certain periods, the troops which his Highness is bound by the treaty to maintain. I believe that his Highness' government exercise this power in respect to the British troops, and no reasonable objection can be made to the exercise of it by the British Resident in respect to the troops of his Highness the Soubah.

2ndly; That for every horseman found absent at muster his Highness should pay 50 rupees *per mensem*, and for every foot soldier 20 rupees *per mensem*, till the numbers of each description should be complete.

3rdly; That the British Resident should have the power of sending persons into the forts on his Highness' frontiers to inspect the state of their magazines, and see that they are filled with grain, according to the tenor of his Highness' engagement with the Company.

Under these arrangements, the state of the Soubah of the Deccan will revive, and the government will have some strength to enforce obedience to its orders, and to preserve tranquillity in the country, besides the Company's troops stationed at Hyderabad.

If these arrangements should be consented to, his Highness will have Jalnapoor and all the districts of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah has hitherto collected the revenue jointly with his Highness, situated to the southward and eastward of the Adjutee hills. I do not know the value of these districts, but I believe it is above 3 lacs of rupees *per annum*.

I take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency to take into consideration the question regarding the Peshwah's claim to choute on his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. If the result of the discussions on that subject should be to substantiate the claim of his Highness the Peshwah, the best mode of settling the claims of the Soubah of the Deccan, under the treaty of defensive alliance, would be to take upon the Company the satisfaction of the claims of the Peshwah; and this might be done, either by restoring to his Highness the territories in the west of India, ceded to the Company by the treaty of Bassein, or by restoring to him a part of Bundelcund, ceded under a late arrangement made at Poonah to amend the treaty of Bassein, to the amount of his claims for choute upon his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. According to this plan, his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan will remain at the end of the war with a larger territory, freed from all the vexatious claims of the Marhattas.

If the result of the discussion upon the subject of choute should be, that his Highness the Peshwah has no claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, the share of the latter in the conquests can be given to him in money, or in territory south of the Toombuddra, yielding a revenue equal in amount to that to which he will have a claim. As well as I can recollect the treaty of Bassein, the Peshwah has no claim to participate in conquests; and if he had under the treaty, his breach of all its stipulations would free your Excellency from the necessity of giving him any thing. However, your Excellency may deem it proper that he should enjoy some of the advantages resulting from the war; and the cession of his territories in the Surat Attavesy would be full satisfaction for all his claims. But before this territory should be ceded to his Highness the Peshwah, he ought to be required to consent to the improvements of the defensive alliance which I have above recommended should be required from his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

I am of opinion that the fortress of Ahmednuggur ought to be kept in the hands of the British government until all these arrangements shall

have been completed, and your Excellency shall see in what manner the defensive alliances will work.

*The D.A.G. to Col. Murray, Guzerat.*

Camp at Jaum, 11th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter of the 27th Oct. last, with the packets to the address of the Hon. the Governor in Council of Bombay and to his own. He directs me to inform you that he approves of the orders which you have given for attaching the detail of H. M. 88th regt. at Surat to the 75th regt., and prohibiting Capt. — from issuing orders without Col. Dallas's sanction or yours.

The Major General is also perfectly satisfied with your decision on Capt. —'s claim to field allowances. He is of opinion that Capt. — will not be called to account for the Qr. Mr. of the 88th regt. being in India, and therefore his representations concerning him are at least unnecessary. As commanding in the province of Guzerat, you have a right to select such details of troops for field service as you think proper, and Major Gen. Wellesley sees no reason to alter any of your arrangements on that head, in consequence of Capt. —'s representations. He thinks Capt. — ought to remain satisfied with the construction put by a General Court Martial upon the orders of government, of which he has now applied for an explanation. Therefore the Major General has directed me to return Capt. —'s packets for the Hon. the Governor of Bombay.

He directs me to return Capt. —'s packets to the Hon. the Governor of Bombay and to himself, and desires that Capt. — may be informed that Major Gen. Wellesley does not see any reason for requiring an opinion from government on a subject on which the government and a General Court Martial have already decided. He recommends to Capt. — to abide by the opinion which government have already given him. If he does not choose to do that, Major Gen. Wellesley requests he will put his own construction on the orders of government, and take the consequences.

Major Gen. Wellesley agrees entirely in opinion with you, that Capt. — ought to be sent by you to his regiment in England; and he begs that you will recommend it to the Governor of Bombay.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 12th Nov. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 9th. Appah Dessaye told me last night that his troops had beat off those which were attacking Manowly, so that the Peshwah's government have misinformed you upon that point. I suspect also that they have misinformed you regarding the manner in which Appah Dessaye got possession of Manowly.

I took the fort in 1800, and gave it to Ball Kishen Bhow. He transferred it to Appah Dessaye; and if he is at Poonah he will inform you by what motive he was urged to do so. I suspect that it was some arrangement made between him and Appah Dessaye, and that the fort, by being transferred to the latter, was saved from the attack of Scindiah's campoos, which were in the neighbourhood when I quitted the Marhatta territory in November, 1800.

I have asked Appah Dessaye for the letter in question; but he tells me that he has got into so many scrapes already by giving me papers which have been afterwards handed up to the durbar, that he is afraid to give this letter. When he sees Sirjee Rao Ghautky arrested, it is probable that he will not have this fear, and that I shall get the letter.

I omitted to mention to you that I have had a very pleasant letter from Prittee Niddee, in which he promises to send his quota to Poonah, to serve as the Peshwah may think proper. I have seen Anrut Rao this day.

As for money, I am now in no want, and I expect 9 lacs of rupees from Hyderabad. I have desired Stevenson to levy a contribution on Burliam-poor; and he expected to get 10 lacs there. God knows whether he will get one. However, before the sums I have are expended, I trust that the government of Bengal will recollect our possible necessities.

I shall send to-morrow to Poonah, if possible, a dispatch I have written to Bengal on the peace. I think that it ought not to be sent to Bombay, at least till I am out of the way, as you will see that the consequence will be that I shall be burnt in effigy.

*The D.A.G. to Col. Murray, Guzerat.*

Camp at Jaum, 12th Nov. 1803.

I wrote to you yesterday, by order of the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, on the subject of Capt. —'s applications to the Hon. the Governor of Bombay and to the Major General; and I am now directed by him to inform you that, on reflection, he thinks it better not to return the packets to Capt. —, and to request that you will only communicate to that officer the General's approbation of your orders attaching the detail of the 88th regt. at Surat to the 75th regt., and inform him that Major Gen. Wellesley has not thought it necessary to forward his address to the Hon. the Governor of Bombay.

The General, however, requests that you will lay the whole of Capt. —'s papers, which were returned to you yesterday, before the government, as the foundation of the application which the General recommended that you should make for Capt. —'s being sent by you to his regiment in England, as the orders which he issued to the detail of the 88th regt. at Surat, on the subject of the gold rupees advanced to the soldiers, alone prove him to be an improper officer to be allowed to remain in India, and the necessity of his being placed under the eye and control of the commanding officer of his regiment.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Army, Fort St. George.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to transmit to you the proceedings of four General Courts Martial assembled by my orders, viz. :

1. Of a Native General Court Martial held at Tellicherry, on the 19th July last, for the trial of Sumbajee Jadhoo, jemidar in the 2nd batt. 2nd regt. Bombay Native infantry.
2. Of a Native General Court Martial held at Tellicherry, on the 21st July, for the trial of Sheek Mahomed Junnery, soubahdar in the 2nd batt. 4th regt. Bombay Native infantry.
3. Of a General Court Martial held at Poonah, on the 5th Sept., for the trial of Ludovic Lema and Joseph Hutier, privates of H. M. 84th; and
4. Of a General Court Martial held in camp on the 2nd inst., for the trial of Capt. —, of the 10th regt.

I request you will inform the Commander in Chief that I confirmed the sentences passed on Sumbajee Jadhoo, Sheek Mahomed Junnery, Ludovic Lema, and Capt. —, in terms of my warrant; and that I confirmed the sentence on Joseph Hutier, agreeably to particular authority from his Excellency. I afterwards caused these sentences to be read to the prisoners to whom they were awarded, in the courts by which they were pronounced, and published them to the troops under my command, but I remitted the punishments awarded to Lema and Hutier.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that Amrut Rao joined



me yesterday, and that I had a meeting with him in the neighbourhood of his camp. I am to visit him this day.

I have lately received a letter from Pursheram Punt Prittee Niddee, in which that chief informs me that he proposes to send immediately to Poonah his quota of troops which he ought to furnish for the service of the Peshwah.

The Chiefs to the southward are in tranquillity, and have no extraordinary numbers of troops about them. The polygars alone, situated between the rivers Malpoorba and Gutpurba, have been guilty of committing some outrages, encouraged, I believe, by Sirjee Rao Ghantky.

Ragojee Bhoomslah is gone towards the Wausim ghaut, on the road to Nagpoor; and Seindiah was, by the last accounts, with a body of cavalry to the east of Muleapoor, likewise on his road towards the Berar country. Col. Stevenson has by this time completed his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, from the stores at Asseerghur; and I hope that we shall now be able to carry on that operation, and to make the Berar country the seat of the war in the Deccan.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of the conferences which I have had with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Naroo Punt Nana, and Appah Dessaye, on the subject of peace.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana arrived in this camp 3 days ago, as vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah: the former is a nephew of Morari Rao Goorparah, and both in his manner and appearance is superior to the other Marhatta chiefs whom I have seen. Enclosed I send a dispatch for the Governor General, which I request you to forward, in which you will see what has passed in the conference I have had with these persons.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 29th Oct. I learned only yesterday from Col. Elliott that Major Campbell wished to exchange with Major Crawford; and I assure you that if I had known it before, I should have foregone all the wishes that I had formed that Col. Houghton of the 88th should exchange into the 33rd. This officer, whom I requested Col. Gore to recommend for the exchange, is an old acquaintance of mine, who has met with misfortunes in the world, which made him desirous to remain in this country, an object which would have been much facilitated by his exchange into the 33rd. I dare say that he will find no difficulty in getting another exchange; and in the mean time I am very glad that we have got Major Campbell.

Lieut. Col. Harness' letter upon the subject of Col. — was a public one, which I sent to you in a private form, in order that you might do

G. M. O.

Camp at Jaun, Sunday, 13th Nov. 1803.

The ensuing piquet of the cavalry to parade at head quarters at half past 3 o'clock this afternoon, under the field officer of the day, to escort Major Gen. Wellesley to Amrut Rao's camp.

The Major General will be glad to see any of the officers off duty who may be inclined to ride with him on the above occasion.

with it what you might think proper. Col. — is certainly not a fit person to be at the head of a regiment, and so I have told him; and I can have no objection to your making use of my sentiments on this subject, in any manner that you may think proper. At the same time I am much flattered by your desiring to have my sentiments upon the production of that letter to government, before you determined to do so.

The enclosed copies of dispatches to the Governor General will show you how we stand in this country. I think that I shall be able to settle a peace with Scindiah on the terms stated in my dispatch of the 11th. The greatest difficulty that I shall have, in my opinion, will be the arrangement for the Rajpoot Rajahs; and yet this is indispensably necessary, as I believe that the Governor General has made a treaty with these Rajahs, in which he has promised to make them independent. I know that he intended it, although these Rajahs are tributary to the Peshwah and Holkar, as well as to Scindiah. How the affair of their independence is to be settled with Holkar I cannot tell; but I have apprised the Governor General of Holkar's and the Peshwah's claims upon them.

I propose to move into Berar immediately. Col. Stevenson will be prepared to march up the valley of the Poorna by the 15th or 16th of this month. We are in the best state of equipment in every respect: I fear only our want of money, as now that Amrut Rao is arrived our expenses will much increase. We have drawn Bombay dry; and the Governor General has not sent them any money, although Mr. Duncan and I have written repeatedly to him on that subject. I have enough to keep me going on, and I desired Col. Stevenson to levy a contribution on Burhampoor. He expected to get 10 lacs of rupees: God knows if he will get one; but if I can reach Nagpoor, I think I shall levy a good contribution there. Wherever there is an army in the field there is risk, particularly in this country, in which we are liable to so many accidents of losses of cattle, &c.; but, excepting from the want of money, I think I may now venture to say that we are in such a state of equipment, and both our divisions are so well supplied with provisions, that we must bring the campaign to an honorable and successful close.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

I expect that Amrut Rao's family will go off to Ahmednuggur in a day or two, and I conclude that a dwelling will have been prepared for them at Bingar, according to my former directions. I request that the lands and revenues of Bingar may be settled in such manner and given to such person as may be agreeable to this family.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 9th. I have desired Colman to send the horses for the cavalry with you, and you must take 2 companies from the corps at Poonah to increase your escort. These 2 companies must be relieved by a detachment of 3 or 4 companies at Ahmednuggur, with guns, with which you will proceed towards Rackisbaum, on the Godavery.

On the road, or at Rackisbaum, you will meet Baynes with 3 or 4 com-

panies, with guns, and 400 horse, with whom you will come forward to the army, sending back to Ahmednuggur the detachment with the guns which you will have brought from thence. Your Mysore infantry may as well come on the whole way. I shall send off immediately some troopers, &c., to take charge of the remount horses.

I enclose dispatches which contain all that has been done, and all my papers for the peace. That of the 11th in my opinion ought not to go to Mr. Duncan; if it does, I shall be burnt in effigy at Bombay. However, I leave it to you and Col. Close to do as you please on that subject. Send the dispatch, or not, as you like.

You may well suppose that I shall soon put a stop to this go-between style of going on through Appah Dessaye.

To Capt. Lucas.

Camp, 13th Nov. 1803.

Capt. Baynes is about to proceed from camp towards Ahmednuggur, in command of a detachment which will form the escort to Amrut Rao's family, who are going to reside at Bingar.

It is desirable that Capt. Baynes should be met on the road between Ahmednuggur and Rackisbaum by a detachment consisting of 4 companies and two 6-pounders, to which he will deliver over the charge of the family above mentioned, and afterwards proceed to carry into execution further orders which he will receive. Accordingly, I request that a detachment of that strength may be prepared without loss of time, and that they march towards Rackisbaum as soon as they shall be ready.

It is desirable that the 3000 brinjarry bullocks, sent from Poonah by Col. Colman, and loaded with the Company's rice, should come with this detachment; and you will give orders and make preparations accordingly: likewise any individuals or stores waiting at Ahmednuggur for a convoy. I should wish you to take 100 loads of rice from the brinjarries, and place it in the garrison stores, and give them 100 loads of salt in lieu thereof. The officer commanding this detachment is to deliver these brinjarries, &c., to Capt. Baynes, when he shall receive from him the charge of Amrut Rao's family.

I request you to give directions that the 6-pounders which will go out upon this occasion, which are to be those attached to the 2nd of the 3rd, may have new wheels, of which many for the 6-pounders have lately arrived from Poonah; that they may have with them 2 tumbrils likewise, with new wheels, and the tumbrils and limbers to be completed with ammunition. These guns and tumbrils are to be handed over to Capt. Baynes; and the officer commanding the detachment from Ahmednuggur is to take the two 3-pounders, now attached to Capt. Baynes' detachment, with which he is to return to Ahmednuggur. Be so kind as to send 50 of the best draught bullocks with the 6-pounders above mentioned; from which, and the bullocks of his 3-pounders, Capt. Baynes will choose such as he may think will answer best for the service on which he is employed.

It will be necessary that two of the captured 6-pounders should be fitted up to go out upon occasional detachments from the garrison of Ahmednuggur.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 14th Nov. 1803.

Ragojee has decidedly gone towards his own country, through the Wausim ghaut, and I am on my march that way likewise; but I think that I shall pass by the Laakenwarra ghaut. I shall be at Tulny on the 16th, and most probably at the Laakenwarra ghaut on the 18th or 19th; unless I should find on my arrival at Tulny that the enemy hang about the Wausim ghaut, in which case I shall go that way.

I conclude that you will have begun your march along the Poorna river into Berar, as soon as possible after the rice shall have arrived at Adjunttee; and in that case, we shall probably be at no great distance from each other again when I shall pass the Laakenwarra ghaut. Your best mode of communicating with me, however, till you are certain that I am in Berar, will be by Dewal ghaut and Jaffierabad.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 14th Nov. 1803.

I have received all your letters to the 29th Oct. I certainly think that you would render a most material service to the general cause, and would give the finishing stroke to the triumph of government over Scindiah, if you could carry your corps upon Ougein. But you will have observed, from my letter to Mr. Duncan of the 2nd Aug., that in the arrangement for Guzerat, I did not contemplate offensive operations against the enemy, any further than to deprive him of the territories which he held in that quarter. My reasons for giving over all hopes of that desirable event were, that I saw the army in Guzerat in a state of disorganization, from which I could not reasonably hope that it would recover for a length of time; and I knew that there existed a domestic war in that province, which was likely to give employment, throughout the campaign, to any body of troops that I might have hoped to collect and to organize.

After the troops under your command were collected, and organized with a degree of celerity much greater than I could have expected, I began to form hopes that we might be able to do something at Ougein with your corps; but it was first necessary to defeat Canojee. If you had marched out of the province, leaving him in force within it, we should have suffered; very possibly, your communication would have been cut off, and you would have been obliged to return in distress.

In considering a variety of plans proposed by Major Walker for the campaign in Guzerat, I stated my sentiments fully to Mr. Duncan upon this subject, which it appears he has omitted to communicate to you. In my opinion, your time has been employed more profitably since you have assembled your corps, and more in consistency with the views of the Governor General, than if you had spent it in a fruitless pursuit of Canojee. You have organized the countries belonging to Scindiah; and by the arrangements which you have commenced with the Rajahs bordering on Guzerat, you have provided some barrier in that province against invasion; at the same time that if circumstances should hereafter permit you to move upon Ougein, every thing on the road is in the state to facilitate that operation. Your pursuit and defeat of Canojee is therefore now well timed, and I wish you to do your utmost in that way.

I enclose you an extract of my letter to Mr. Duncan on the subject of

the operations in Guzerat, written on the 22nd Aug. Since I last wrote to you, Scindiah has returned across the Taptee, and has gone to the eastward, along the valley of the Poorna towards Berar. I have driven the Rajah of Berar from the Godavery, I believe also into Berar; and I think that in a few days I shall make that country the seat of the war in the Deccan. My letter of the 23rd Oct. will have explained to you the arrangement made by the Governor of Bombay for the civil government of the countries conquered from Scindiah in Guzerat. In writing to government upon this subject, since I have read your dispatches to Gen. Nicolls on revenue, I have strongly recommended that Major Walker should be directed to conform to all your arrangements; and that he should continue in employment all the people employed by you, and maintain the bargain made by you with the person whom you appear to have employed as a farmer of the revenue. I think, therefore, that no public inconvenience will be felt from the apparent change of authority.

I have lately received a long letter from government on the subject of strengthening Surat. The proposal was to intrench a camp at the distance of 11 miles: I have recommended half that distance, if an equally good position should be found. This proposal comes from the Military board, not one of whom, I believe, has ever seen Surat. However, any thing is better than the present state of that place; and Mr. Duncan appears inclined to adopt that plan for its defence, which, at all events, is better than nothing.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Whistler, Chittledroog.*

11th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to send back the 'Return for Oct. 1803, of the Ordnance department at Chittledroog,' which is countersigned by you, and to request an explanation of the N.B. at the bottom of it, stating that the master carpenter, included *present for duty*, had been *absent without leave since the 8th June, 1803*.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.*

11th Nov. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to desire that you will march on the 17th inst. with the detachment under your command, and take under your convoy such persons of Amrut Rao's family as he may choose to send with you, together with their attendants and effects; and you will proceed on the route from Raekisbaun to Ahmednuggur, until you will meet a detachment coming from Ahmednuggur with 3000 loads of rice and other articles for the army, of which you will take charge; and you will give charge, to the officer in command of the party from Ahmednuggur, of the family of Amrut Rao.

You will at the same time exchange your 3-pounders for the 6-pounders and two tumbrils with the detachment from Ahmednuggur, according to the verbal instructions which you have received. The havildar and 8 troopers of Native cavalry, and the horsekeepers and grasscutters which joined you this morning, are to be sent on with the detachment to Ahmednuggur, together with the accompanying letter to the officer commanding there.

After having arranged all these matters you will proceed towards Dharore and effect a junction, in such manner as you may think proper, with a detachment under the command of Capt. Limond, of the artillery, expected to arrive at Dharore about the 20th, who is placed under your orders by the accompanying letter, which you will forward to him.

Capt. Limond has with him treasure and medicines for the army: if you find that he is pressed for carriage for the latter, such as cannot be brought forward must be left in the fort of Dharore under the charge of a small guard from Capt. Limond's detachment, for which he must leave 2 months' subsistence in advance.

If Capt. Limond has arrived at Dharore when you go to that neighbourhood to meet him, you will bring him on with you to the army: if he should not have arrived at Dharore, you are not to wait for him, but are to join the army by the route we are now marching, as far as you know it, with the grain and other stores which you will receive from the detachment which meets you from Ahmednuggur, and such brinjaries and other dealers as you can collect on the Godavery. Measures will be taken to apprise you of any alterations in the route of the army. If Capt. Limond has not arrived at Dharore, and you are obliged to proceed to the army without him, you will send the enclosed letter to wait for him there, with orders to halt there for further orders from yourself or from Major Gen. Wellesley.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 15th Nov. 1805.

I have just received your letters of the 11th, and I hope that, as your baggage arrived on that day, contrary to your expectation, you will have been able to quit Poonah at a period proportionably earlier than the 17th or 18th.

My reason for being very anxious on this subject is, that I have ordered Baynes now to march towards Ahmednuggur with Amrut Rao's family. He will arrive at Rackisbaum on the Godavery, 4 marches from Ahmednuggur, on the 19th; from thence he will go on until he shall meet a detachment that I have ordered from Ahmednuggur with grain, which will probably be on the 21st. He is then to deliver the family to this detachment, and is to proceed himself with the grain towards Dharore; and I expect he will join Capt. Limond, who is coming from Hyderabad with 9 laes of rupees and a reinforcement of artillerymen, in the neighbourhood of Dharore, on the 24th. He will afterwards proceed to join the army, and will arrive upon the Godavery about the 27th. My point at present is Nagpoor; and if Ragojee does not turn back upon the Nizam's territories, I shall not halt above one day till I reach that place. Baynes will follow me, and he will not be back again upon the Godavery, most probably, for a month after the period at which he shall leave it. I am therefore very desirous that you should join him before he shall march from the Godavery this time.

Time is every thing in military operations, particularly in conducting convoys. If these come on with celerity, they run no great risk; but if they are delayed long at any place, information is given of them, and they are attacked, and the success is always a matter of doubt. I am therefore very desirous that Baynes should not be materially delayed for you. But in order to give you a chance of coming up with him this time, I write to him to inform him of your motions, and of the latest period at which you will leave Poonah. If this should be the 18th, you ought to be at Ahmednuggur on the 23rd or 24th. From thence you might make Rackisbaum in three or at most four marches, which will bring you there on the 27th or 28th. Baynes will not be at Rackisbaum on his return from Dharore, but possibly a march or two lower down the river, so that you may join him on the 29th or 30th.

I have desired Baynes to communicate with you, and you must communicate with him. If the detachment should not have returned with Amrut Rao's family when you shall leave Ahmednuggur, you must take on your Poonah companies till you shall join Baynes, as that garrison is

not strong enough to afford 2 detachments. I enclose a sketch by which you will see, that by not going to Ahmednuggur you will save a march at least, by which means you will certainly arrive at Rackisbaum on the 26th or 27th, even if you should delay your departure till the 18th, which I hope you will not have done.

I wrote to Piele some time ago to caution him respecting the demands for rice in Canara. In fact, every inhabitant of Canara is a rice merchant, and the exportation from that province is limited only by the produce and the demand. In this season the demand will be infinite, and of course it will be necessary that Purneah should be very cautious in not allowing too much of the produce of Mysore to go to supply it. The people in Canara, although great traders, always take care to keep in their own houses a sufficiency for their own consumption till the next crop: but our Mysore people, who are not so much accustomed to trade, would not be so provident.

It appears that the arrangement proposed will answer well, if Mysore is to give Canara any assistance at all. If Purneah were to allow a certain quantity of rice to be exported from Mysore to Canara, from any part of the country from which it might be convenient to the inhabitants to export it, the inhabitants of those countries only which border upon Canara could avail themselves of this permission, as they alone could import their rice into Canara at a price which the people of that province would be willing to give for it. It is true, as Piele says, that the brinjaries will be delayed in looking for rice in the countries east of the Toombuddra; but they will not be so much delayed as they would be by looking for it first in the countries west of the Toombuddra, and, not finding it there, looking for it in those to the eastward. Besides, when they shall be informed that the rice in the western countries is allotted to supply the market of Canara, they will make their bargains at once for supplies in those to the eastward.

If any money should be sent with you from Poonah, let it come on to the camp, unless it shall be wanted to pay the current expenses at Ahmednuggur.

P. S. You may enclose your letters for Baines in a Marlhatta letter for jenidar Moodien at Rackisbaum, by whom they will be forwarded; and send duplicates by hirearrahs towards Bheer and Dharore.

To Major Cuyler, 86th regt.

Camp, 15th Nov. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th Oct., and its enclosures.

Some time ago Mr. Duncan referred for my opinion a copy of a letter which he had received from the Company's counsel at Bombay; upon which, for obvious reasons, I declined to give any opinion, but recommended to Mr. Duncan to make the inquiries stated in the two queries to Lieut. Col. Woodington, in his letter of the 7th Oct. to Major Gen. Nicholson.

My view in urging that these inquiries should be made was, to afford a ground for a claim for the army, at least for salvage for the property which they had saved from the hands of the enemy; supposing that

Mr. Threipland's opinion of the law respecting the right to the property was well founded. It appears, however, from Lieut. Col. Woodington's answers to those queries, that the army did not save the property in question from the hands of the enemy, who had taken no pains to secure it, and that the owners of it might have carried it off whenever they pleased. Therefore there appears an end to the claim of the army for salvage. However, I recommended to Mr. Duncan to refer the question to the Governor General in Council, as being the supreme British authority in India.

Since that time I have received another letter from Mr. Duncan, enclosing one from the merchants claiming the property captured at Baroach, written in rather extraordinary terms, a copy of which, and of my answer, I enclose. I now proceed to give you my opinion upon the claim of the army to this property. I have no books nor any papers by me to assist me in forming this opinion, and I write only from memory.

As well as I recollect, Lord Rodney took the island of St. Eustatia, in the West Indies, from the Dutch, during the American war; at which island was found a vast quantity of British property, which was certainly contraband, and, moreover, was intended for the supply of the public enemies of the state. The captors claimed this property as prize; there was a long lawsuit upon the subject, which was decided against them.

There can be no doubt whatever of the legality of the trade carried on by the British merchants at Baroach; and that there is nothing criminal in their property being found there, as was the case in respect to the property found at St. Eustatia. Their case, therefore, is better than that of the merchants whose property was taken at St. Eustatia, and it is probable that any lawsuit upon the subject would be decided in their favor. However, I do not wish the army to take my opinion on the subject as conclusive. The best thing they can do is to make out a fair and clear statement of the case, and refer it to a lawyer for his opinion. If he should advise them to prosecute the claim, they must do it, as they will observe, at the expense of a lawsuit with the merchants. If he should advise them to give it up, I recommend them to do so.

I do not think the government will give them any compensation for this claim. If the property is considered as private, and belonging to the merchants, of course government will object to giving any remuneration out of the public purse for any claim upon it, however well founded. I shall be happy to forward the views of the army in any thing in which they may think that I can be of service to them, and I have therefore given you my sentiments fully upon the subject on which you have written to me.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 17th Nov. 1803.

Since I wrote to you on the 15th I have written to Capt. Baynes, to desire that, if he should be of opinion that you can join him on the Godavery with more ease and celerity by any other road that he may know of, instead of by Rackisbaum, he will let you know it: you may accordingly expect to hear from him; but, if you should not, come on to Rackisbaum. Did you ever receive a letter from me enclosing one from your brother Pulteney?



pendent on Baroach. I think it better to do this than to keep Powanghur, because there are a parcel of Rajahs depending upon that place, with whom I see plainly that the Guickwar government will never come to any arrangements; and if Mr. Duncan's mooluck-gherys, on account of that government, are not stopped, of course we shall never be at peace with them; and by our operations against them we shall lose our character in that quarter, as we have already in Malabar, by similar operations. I have recommended that all tribute should be remitted while we have them under us; and I propose to stipulate, in the peace, that they shall receive no injury for having given us assistance. In this manner they will remain perpetual thorns in the side of Scindiah, and we shall avoid all contests with them.

In respect to the 6th article of the Memorandum, I have written fully, in my dispatch of the 11th, on the subject of increasing the Nizam's territories to the northward, as well as upon the subject of Ahmednuggur. I see by the Governor General's notes that he is not anxious that the Nizam should have the Taptee for his boundary; and, by the bye, as Holkar has Chandore and other territories, down to the Godavery, the Nizam would not gain strength by being brought forward to the Taptee.

The Peshwah's claim of ehoute upon the Nizam will not be a question at the peace, excepting that the Governor General should act respecting that claim as I have recommended in my dispatch, and then Scindiah will have nothing to do with it.

I shall attend to what is stated in the 8th article of the Memorandum.

You will see by my dispatch of the 11th that my plan includes all that is contained in the 9th article of the Memorandum.

The 10th article of the Memorandum contains matter to be arranged with the Peshwah, which has nothing to do with the peace. The 11th and 12th the same. All these arrangements must be made with the Peshwah, upon giving him a part of the benefits resulting from the war.

I shall stipulate for the independence of the Seik chiefs, and generally of all persons north of Joudpoor, Jynaghur, and Gohud, according to the 13th and 14th articles of the Memorandum.

The 15th, 16th, and 17th articles do not refer to me. I shall attend to the 18th in the treaty with Ragojee Bhoonslah.

The plan in my dispatch of the 11th will provide for the independence of all the persons alluded to in the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd articles of the Memorandum. But I proposed that the Ranah of Gohud should be dependent upon the Company, according to the letter of instructions of the 27th June; and I think that the Governor General proposes that he should be in the same state with the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur. I shall stipulate with Scindiah that he shall be independent of them, and that any arrangements made with the Company by the Ranah are to hold good.

In regard to the 22nd article of the Memorandum, I recommend that the stipulation respecting the independent Chiefs furnishing troops whenever they may be called upon may be very strictly drawn; and, if possible, that the British government should have the power of mustering the troops at all times.

The 23rd article of the Memorandum is provided for in my plan. The 24th and 25th articles are not referrible to me. Of course, the treaties of peace will be separate. I gave the answer to Appah Dessaye in the conference of the 11th, upon the subject of Scindiah's treating for Ragojee Bhoonslah, to lay the groundwork for giving Scindiah compensation from Berar, if that should be necessary; or rather that there might be no inconsistency in my proposing that measure, which would have been the case if I had refused positively ever to allow Scindiah to treat for Ragojee Bhoonslah.

If I can have any communication with him, I shall make a proposal to Holkar to have the projected treaty with him; but you will have observed from my former letter that I can establish nothing of the kind.

The 27th article of the Memorandum is not referrible to me; but I have to observe upon it, that if these three Chiefs are admitted to the benefits of the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein, and are each to have a subsidiary force, the military establishments must be increased to the full amount of the force which they are to have.

To Lieut. Col. Harcourt.

Camp, 19th Nov. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th Oct., and one from Mr. Melville of the 31st, written by desire of his Excellency the Governor General, and containing your opinion upon the subject of a frontier to the newly conquered province of Cuttack, towards the territories of the Rajah of Berar. I shall pay due attention to those opinions in case an opportunity should offer of settling a peace with the Rajah of Berar.

It would, however, materially forward the views of government upon this subject, and might possibly remove all objections on the part of the Rajah, to cede the districts which are thought necessary by Mr. Melville and yourself to complete the Company's boundary in that quarter, if you were to conquer and take possession of them. Other advantages would also attend this measure: one, that you would secure the province which you have already conquered; and in case of the continuance of the war, shut out the enemy effectually from the southern districts of Bengal and Bahar: the other, that you would make a diversion in favor of the troops which are carrying on their operations against the Berar country from the westward, and possibly might draw the enemy out of the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

I have to inform you that, hitherto, I have not been able to make much impression on the Rajah of Berar, which is to be attributed to various causes. If it should be possible, I propose to attack his fort of Gawilglur, in a short time; and as this is his principal hold, the attack of it may bring him to his senses. But whether circumstances may permit me to attack it or not, there is no doubt but that by taking possession of the districts which are thought by you and Mr. Melville to be necessary for the security of the Company's territories, by which means you will be brought near to Nagpoor, you will aid most materially in bringing the war to a conclusion.

P.S. I request you to communicate this letter to Mr. Melville.

To Lieut. Col. Harcourt,

Camp, 19th Nov. 1803.

I suggest the measure proposed in the enclosed letter, only in case you deem your force sufficient, or if the Governor General can reinforce you, or if this operation should suit with the other views of government. If it does, it will be highly advantageous, and will amoy the Rajah much. He has viewed your operations with great jealousy; but he is afraid to encounter the British troops, and he has collected all his force under the command of his brother and his son, under the guns of Gawilghur, the fort in which he is supposed to have all his treasure. He himself is still within the Nizam's boundary with about 10,000 horse.

Col. Stevenson's division is on its march towards Gawilghur, and I am on my march to the northward, in hopes of drawing the Rajah through the ghauts; but I fear I shall not succeed. In the mean time, if Jeswant Rao Holkar returns to the Deccan, which is not impossible, I must defer the attack upon Gawilghur, until I shall have defeated him.

If there were any government, or any strength in these countries, I should be able to destroy Ragojee Bhoonslah in a short time; but as it is, I am forced to be much on the defensive, and to take up the offensive only when a fair opportunity offers; otherwise every thing would shake at Hyderabad and Poonah, and some of the Nizam's principal cities would be plundered when I should be forward.

To Major Kirkpatrick. Camp at Wankode, on the Payen Gunga, 19th Nov. 1803.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 10th inst. You will have been agreeably undeceived respecting the report sent to you by Lieut. Hay, by my letter to his Excellency the Governor General, of the 2nd inst., which I sent for your perusal.

2. I have to observe, however, upon Lieut. Hay's report to you, that I did not order him to remain behind Capt. Seton at Dharore; in fact, I did not know of his arrival there, and gave him no orders: knowing that a detachment under Capt. Baynes had come to the neighbourhood in order to bring on Capt. Seton in safety, he ought to have joined that detachment likewise. But he waited at Dharore for orders, for which he could not be blamed, and he has since joined me in security.

3. In respect to Capt. Seton, if he had obeyed the orders which he received, the convoy would never have been in danger, and would not have been attacked; and it is possible that I should have been enabled to make a greater impression than I did on the rear of Ragojee Bhoonslah's army, as my movements would not have been cramped by the necessity of providing in the first instance for the safety of the convoy.

4. Ragojee Bhoonslah has continued his march to the northward and eastward, and I was in hopes that by this time he would have passed the ghauts into Bernar. As soon as I was joined by Lieut. Hay with the

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G. O.

Camp at Wankode, Saturday, 19th Nov. 1803.

The General has lately observed many sepoy's struggling from their corps, some in driving bullocks, others in charge of officers' baggage, and several under the pretence of guarding ammunition, to attend which a sufficient number of lascars is allowed. Officers commanding corps will be pleased not to permit in future of any sepoy's marching out of their lines on any of those pretences.

treasure, I marched also towards the Wausim ghaut, with an intention to enter Berar, to cover and support the attack of Gawilghur by Col. Stevenson's division.

5. The Rajah, however, has not yet passed the ghauts, and I think that he is going through Mahoor. Col. Stevenson was on the 15th to the eastward of Muleapoor, on his road towards Ellichpoor.

6. No sooner, however, have I begun my march, than the amildars, killadars, &c. &c., in all parts of the country have called out for assistance, not against the common enemy, but against the freebooters who have long been in the frontier, and who have been kept out of the Ahmednuggur districts by the collector's peons, with very little assistance from the battalion in the garrison of Ahmednuggur. The amildar at Bheer, in particular, has desired to have one of the Company's battalions of sepoy placed in garrison at Bheer, in order to defend that place against this rabble.

7. It is distressing to witness the state of the Soubah's territories for want of the common means of defence. In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, I observe that you have urged the Soubah's ministers to take measures to drive the enemy's amildars and troops from those districts; the revenues of which have heretofore been collected partly by the Soubah's government, and partly by that of one of the confederates.

8. Instead of taking any measures to effect this object, which is one of great importance, they have not even taken possession of their districts bordering upon the Godavery, from which we drove the enemy's amildars 2 months ago, and I cannot prevail upon them to entertain peons to keep possession of the valuable towns and districts of this quarter, from which my detachment daily drive the enemy.

9. In order, therefore, to secure these places from falling again into the hands of the enemy, by which he could have an opportunity of annoying my communication, I have been obliged to call in the freebooter Ghazy Khan, and to give him possession of the places which I take from the enemy.

10. I mention this subject to you now, as I suspect that it will be made a matter of complaint at the durbar, and you will know in what manner to answer these complaints.

P.S. I forward this day several letters to the Governor General, which are duplicates of those written to his Excellency since the 12th Sept. last. I shall be obliged to you, if you will give directions that they may be sent on express from Hyderabad. It is desirable, however, that no expresses should be sent to camp, as the runners are less cautious when they have an express to deliver, and more likely to fall into the hands of an enemy on their road. Indeed, the expresses have generally been taken; while the common dawks, by seizing their opportunities when the road has been clear, have arrived in safety.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart. Camp at Waukode, on the Payen Gunga, 20th Nov. 1803.

Nothing particular has occurred since I last wrote to you. I have been much detained in my march towards Berar by the delay in the servants

of the Soubah of the Deccan to produce the peons, who were necessary to take possession of the towns and districts from which my detachment drove the enemy; notwithstanding that the Resident at Hyderabad has repeatedly urged the ministers at Hyderabad, not only to provide means to take possession of these districts, but to drive the enemy from them themselves. In fact, the whole force of the Hyderabad state now consists of the few troops that Col. Stevenson has with him. They have not another man of any description, and they depend solely upon the British government for their support. I do not believe the Governor General ever imagined that this was the case, but so it is.

Nothing further has been done in the negotiations. I sent a messenger to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah 3 days ago, to let him know that I was impatient for the arrival of his powers; and hinted that unless they soon arrived, it would be necessary that he should take up his abode at a distance from camp, as it was very unusual to allow a person of his description, without powers, to remain in camp. He answered that he daily expected them, and that he was much more anxious for their arrival than I was.

From what I learn, I suspect an intrigue is going on in Seindiah's durbah, to have Meer Mahomed Khan employed to make peace for Seindiah, at the bottom of which is Rajah Mohiput Ram. The mussulmann will naturally wish that our demands for compensation should be in the Deccan; and that the King should not get into our hands. Meer Mahomed Khan is a servant of the King. I am indifferent who is the person employed by Seindiah, as I am determined to make peace only on certain terms. But I should doubt his having any confidence in Meer Mahomed Khan, and I suspect that this intrigue will tend only to create delay.

Capt. Johnson's salary, as Surveyor, and Capt. Noble's, as Assist. Commissary, have been retrenched by the Military Auditor Gen., although the appointment of the former was confirmed, and that of the latter was made by you. I have nothing to produce to prove that you have confirmed any of my orders, or that they were confirmed by government, excepting the letters from the Adj. Gen., stating that certain copies of orders were laid before you, and that you had confirmed them.

These retrenchments will create great inconvenience and difficulty, as well as delay in the final settlement of the accounts. I therefore take the liberty of recommending that copies of such orders as you or the government may confirm may be sent to the office of the Military Auditor General, certified by the Adj. Gen. and the Sec. of government respectively, as being confirmed. According to this mode these retrenchments will be avoided.

G. O.

Camp at Nowly, Monday, 21st Nov. 1803.

Repeated orders having been given to the agent for cavalry supplies to cause payment to be made on the spot for grain taken by his servants in the villages; and complaints having been made to-day that grain so taken has not been paid for, Major Gen. Wellesley is pleased to publish in G. O. a general regulation, that grain taken, or bargained for, in the villages, by any department belonging to the army, shall be paid for on the spot before the grain is removed; and he warns all persons concerned that any deviations from this rule will be submitted to a public inquiry.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Waukode, on the Payen Gunga, 20th Nov. 1803.

I have been detained by the necessity of depriving the enemy of his tannahs in these districts, in order to insure my communication, and by the slowness of Soubahau Khan's people in producing the peons to take possession of the districts from which I drive the enemy.

I learn, also, that Ragojee has not yet passed the ghauts, and is not even gone into the Wausim district, as I had been informed he was. I got yesterday your letters of the 15th. Your Buswunt rice will certainly be in time.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has certainly been sent here by Scindiah, but if he has come only to discover my sentiments about peace, he has not yet succeeded in the object of his mission. Scindiah would find it difficult to procure a man to undertake the dangerous office which Wahed Beg has assigned to Goorparah, as hanging would be the certain consequence of it. I suspect that there is an intrigue going on in Scindiah's camp, respecting the peace; at the bottom of which is, I am afraid, Mohiput Ram. He and the mussulmann, for obvious reasons, wish to carry on the negotiations through the channel of Meer Mahomed Khan, and I doubt whether Scindiah or his ministers would trust him. For my part, I care not whom Scindiah employs: I shall make peace upon certain conditions and no others, be the negotiator who he may. But I see clearly that all these intrigues and lies, backward and forward, will throw many difficulties in the way, and will delay the business much.

*The D.A.G. to Col. Stevenson.*

22nd Nov. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley has just now received Capt. Johnson's letter of the 19th. He is particularly engaged just now, and has desired me to write to you.

1st. That the representations of Wahed Beg are in consequence of an intrigue in Scindiah's durbar.

2nd. That Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has received ample powers as vakeel from Scindiah.

3rd. The General had a long conference with him yesterday, and has sat down again with him now.

4th. He has consented, in general terms, to a suspension of hostilities between the British troops and Scindiah, and will probably arrange all the particulars to-night: in which case he will communicate them to you immediately.

In the mean time, he thinks it necessary to apprise you of the general agreement; and also that the vakeel proposed that Scindiah should be allowed to remain with his army at Burhampoor, during the negotiation for peace, to which the General objected, and proposed that he should remove to some place 20 coss to the eastward of Ellichpooor, and remain there during the negotiation. The vakeel could not engage for his doing so, but would communicate this condition to Scindiah; and in case that Chief moves toward the position above described, of course you will allow him to go off without interfering with him: but if he should attempt to pass to the westward, he begs that you will attack him, and cut him up, if possible.

This division of the army will be through the Rajoora ghaut, or some other ghaut near it, on the day after to-morrow, or the 24th, and will move up towards you without delay.

The General's principal reason for agreeing to the suspension of hostilities with Scindiah was that the siege of Gawilghur might be uninterrupted by him; and the General begs that you will order every preparation to be made for commencing it, immediately on your arrival, and carrying it on with the utmost celerity and activity. But as he observes, with much concern, from Capt. Johnson's letter, that you are much weakened and redneed by your late indisposition, he begs that you will not risk your life in the arduous undertaking of the siege of Gawilghur,

if you do not find your strength equal to conducting the operations of it. And if you find yourself too weak for that, he will change situations with you, for the period of the siege, by his joining the subsidiary force, while you take the command of this division. He reckons it of the utmost importance that the suspension of hostilities should be kept a secret from the servants of the Soubah.

You will probably receive an order of this date to suspend hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but that is not to prevent you from attacking him, if you find that he will not take up the proposed position, and wants to pass to the westward.

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 22nd Nov. 1803.

I have received your Persian letter of the 14th Nov. In answer thereto, I have only to inform you, that I shall receive with respect and attention any person you may send here as your vakeel; and that, of course, I shall not negotiate with any person who has not a writing signed and sealed by you in the usual manner.

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 22nd Nov. 1803.

I have received your Marhatta letter dated the 17th Nov., shortly after I had received your Persian letter, in which you informed me that you would send your vakeel, Mahomed Meer Khan. In the mean time, as your vakeels Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana are persons trusted on your part, and you desire that I shall converse with them, and they have communicated to me those orders which they have received from you, I have conversed with them on the subject of peace between the British government and its allies and you, and they will make you acquainted with the particulars of my conversation. In respect to your wish that I should send an officer to your camp, I have to observe to you that I can have no objection to that measure, excepting that it is useless. The peace between the British government and you can be settled only in this camp. But if I should have any thing in particular to communicate, I shall send an officer to represent it.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Ecaumbah, 22nd Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to inform you that I have this day concluded an agreement with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for a suspension of hostilities between the troops under my command and those belonging to that Chief.

I shall hereafter have the honor of transnitting you a copy of this agreement. In the mean time, I have the honor to inform you, that the principal article of this agreement is, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah is to take up a position with his army in the territories of the Rajah of Berar, 20 coss to the eastward of Elliehpoor, in which case the British troops are not to attack those in his service. Accordingly, I request that you will refrain from attacking the troops of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, if you should find that he complies with this condition. There is nothing in this agreement which at all affects the state of the war against the Rajah of Berar.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Rajpore, 23rd Nov. 1803.

At the time I dispatched my last letter to you, I received the strongest proof of the fact which I therein mentioned, viz., that the officers of the

Soubah's government were intriguing to bring the negotiation for peace into their own hands. However, on the following day, the vakeels, who had already arrived here, received their full powers; which, although not quite so extensive as I could have wished, enabled me to converse with them on the subject of peace.

Accordingly, after pointing out to them the causes of the war, and the violence and aggression of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I told them that they were not to expect that the Company would make peace with that Chief unless they and their allies were to receive compensation for the injury they had sustained, and security against such attacks in future. I then asked them whether they had powers from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to make those principles the basis of the peace with the Company? In answer, they said they had not; and I then desired them to apply for further instructions. They then requested that I would consent to suspend hostilities. I positively refused to suspend hostilities against the Rajah of Berar; and they then proposed that I should agree to suspend them against Scindiah. To this proposal I consented, provided Scindiah would remove to a position in Berar, 20 coss east from Elliehpoor; and that he would take care to keep at the distance of 20 coss from either of the British divisions while carrying on their operations against the other enemies of the British government.

They wished the suspension to extend to Hindustan, to which I would not agree; but I agreed that it should extend to Guzerat. In that quarter our troops are not to advance beyond Dohud, which is the most advanced place we have got, and they are not to come nearer to Dohud than 20 coss. My motives for agreeing to this suspension of hostilities are;

1st; That I have no power of injuring Scindiah any further. I have taken all he had in the Deccan; and the troops in Guzerat cannot advance upon Ougein, for the reasons stated in a late dispatch to the Governor General, of which I enclosed you a copy. His army now consists of horse only; and in order to distress that, it will be necessary to follow it to a greater distance from our sources of supply; which, considering the distance we are from them already, becomes a matter of some consequence; and from our operations upon the Rajah of Berar, which are most likely to bring about a peace.

2ndly; Scindiah's horse might do us much mischief, and might derange our plans against the Rajah of Berar, supposing them to be at liberty to act. The Rajah of Berar's infantry, and a corps of cavalry, both under Manoo Bappoo, are encamped not far from Gawilghur, the place which Col. Stevenson has been ordered to attack. It is probable that both he and Scindiah would retire upon Col. Stevenson's advance; but they would attack Col. Stevenson during the time that he might be employed at Gawilghur: or, possibly, Scindiah would make an irruption into the Soubah's territories, to draw me off to a distance, and Manoo Bappoo would attack Col. Stevenson.

3rdly; Bappoojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan to defend Ougein against our troops, supposed to be advancing from Guzerat. There is already at Ougein some infantry, which have not been engaged, and the defeated infantry are on the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find Col. Murray necessarily engaged with Canoojee Rao Quickwar,



and Dohud held only by one battalion, and he would naturally make an irruption into Guzerat. This is prevented by the cessation from hostilities. Guzerat, instead of being our strongest, is, by far, our weakest point in every respect.

4thly; By leaving the Rajah of Berar out of the arrangement, Scindiah's interests become separate from his; all confidence in Scindiah, if such a thing ever existed, must be lost, and the confederacy becomes, *ipso facto*, dissolved. I see no inconvenience that can result from the measure, particularly as I have the power of dissolving the agreement whenever I please. I acknowledge that this cessation of hostilities is against all the rules; but, in this instance, I think they are rules of which the breach is more likely to be beneficial to the public than the observance.

I have not yet made up my dispatches to the Governor General upon this subject, or upon many others connected with the negotiations for peace; and the papers which must accompany them are so very long and numerous, that I fear some time must elapse before I can make them up. The Governor General has also directed me to send them in duplicate; and they are of that nature that I cannot trust them to be copied by any body excepting those officers attached to myself. Two of these have been laid up ever since the battle of Assye, and all of them have their other duties to perform. I hope, therefore, you will excuse me if you should not receive copies of the dispatches as regularly as heretofore. I shall take care, as I have above done in this letter, to let you know the result upon all occasions, and to give you the general outline of the discussions which may have taken place, and an account of my motives for all my actions. Besides this, I shall send you copies of the dispatches as soon as they can be made.

I shall be obliged to you if you will do me the favor to communicate to Lord W. Bentinck such parts of this letter as you may think proper, particularly the reasons for which the dispatches are not sent.

I have the honor to enclose a copy of the agreement\* for the cessation of

\* Armistice concluded by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 23rd Nov. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley, on the part of the Hon. Company and their Allies, and Jeswant Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, on the part of the Maharajah Aly Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, having each communicated to the other their full powers, have made the following agreement:

1. There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the troops commanded by Major Gen. Wellesley, in the Deccan and in Guzerat, and those in the service of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

2. To prevent accidents, and in order to insure the execution of the 1st article, it is agreed, that there shall be an interval of 20 coss between the different British and allied armies, and that the Maharajah will march with his army, and take up a position 20 coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and he will range still farther to the eastward.

3. In case the operations of the British and allied armies against the other enemies of the British government should draw either of them nearer than 20 coss to the position which the Maharajah will have occupied, according to the 2nd article, previous notice of such operation will be given, in order that the Maharajah may take timely measures always to preserve an interval of 20 coss between his army and the British and allied armies.

4. In Guzerat the British troops shall not advance beyond Dohud; those of the Maharajah, on the side of Guzerat, shall not approach nearer to Dohud than 20 coss.

5. Notice must be given, in case either of the parties should be desirous to put an end to this agreement.

6. This agreement is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and his ratification is to be given to Major Gen. Wellesley in the space of 10 days from this date.

hostilities. I think it is probable that I shall succeed in making peace. I have had a good deal of conversation with the vakeels upon the subject of the demand for compensation, to which they appear to have made up their minds, and to be convinced of the necessity of peace to the affairs of their masters. They hinted last night that Scindiah intended, after the war, to place himself under the protection of the Company. They seem to have much confidence in me, which, at all events, is a point gained in the negotiation.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Rajpore, 23rd Nov. 1803.

I enclose herewith the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you yesterday, and the copy of a treaty for a suspension of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I have but little to add to what Barclay wrote you yesterday upon this subject, by my desire.

You will observe that the condition of the agreement is, that Scindiah is to go to the east of Ellichpore. His ministers were very anxious that he should remain to the west; but I told them that, unless he went to the east, the agreement would be void. You are to attack him if he should attempt to pass you to the westward; and no parties of his horse must be allowed to remain near you without being attacked. At all events, whether he goes to the east or west, march towards Gawilghur as soon as possible after you shall have received your supplies, and begin your operations there. I shall be through the ghauts to-morrow or next day, and shall watch the enemy, and cover your operations.

If Manoo Bappoo remains near, you might endeavor to attack him on your march towards Gawilghur. But I do not recommend that you should leave your baggage and stores behind you, as to get them up again will be difficult, and will create delay.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 23rd Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to inform you that I have this day concluded an agreement with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for a suspension of hostilities between the troops under my command and those belonging to that Chief. I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting you a copy of this agreement: in the mean time, I have the honor to inform you, that the articles of this agreement, referrible to the troops in Guzerat, are, that the British troops are not to advance beyond Dohud; and those in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah are not to approach Dohud from the eastward nearer than 20 coss. If you should have pushed your corps, or a detachment, beyond Dohud, I request you to draw it into that place; if you should have drawn it off from Dohud, you will not advance it farther towards Ougein than the place at which this letter will find you. This arrangement is liable to be broken off by either of the parties, upon giving notice of such intention.

P. S. This agreement is applicable only to the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Rajpore, 23rd Nov. 1803.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah's vakeels have received their powers, but they

are not so full as they ought to be. I have had a conversation with them on the subject of peace, in which I told them that the British government would not make peace, unless it received compensation for the unjust aggression of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been guilty. I asked them whether they had powers to agree to make compensation and future security to the Company and their allies the basis of the negotiation for peace? They said they had not; and I referred them to Dowlut Rao Scindiah for further instructions. They then desired that I should agree to a suspension of hostilities, including the Rajah of Berar. To this proposal I declared that I never would assent.

They then proposed that I should agree to a cessation of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah only; to which I have agreed, upon condition of his going with his army into Berar, 20 coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and of his keeping at all times at that distance from the British troops carrying on their operations against the other enemies of the British government. They wished the cessation to extend to Hindustan, to which proposal I would not consent; but I consented to its extending to Guzerat, in which quarter our troops are not to advance beyond Dohud, and theirs are not to approach nearer to Dohud than 20 coss.

I suspect that I shall have some difficulty in convincing the Governor General of the propriety of this arrangement; and as there are many papers to be copied, and, moreover, from the conduct of the Soubah's amildars, the dawk is not very secure, I shall advert in this letter to the circumstances by which I was urged to adopt this measure.

I have already apprised the Governor General that it was not in my power to do anything more against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Nothing could be done on the side of Guzerat in particular, where we shall remain in possession of the most advanced station we have got, and which we hold only by one battalion; while Col. Murray, with the remainder of his corps, is obliged to move upon Canojee Rao Guickwar.

Scindiah has with him in the field an army of horse only. It is impossible to expect to make any impression upon this army, unless by following it for a great length of time and distance. To do this would remove our troops still farther than they are already from all the sources of supply, and would prevent the operations against the Rajah of Berar, from which alone, in my opinion, we are to expect peace.

These facts would possibly be sufficient to prove the propriety of the step which I have taken; but there are others which prove it still more strongly: the fort of Gawilghur, which Col. Stevenson is equipped to attack, and which I have ordered him to attack forthwith, is one of considerable strength, and is of great importance to Ragojee Bhoonslah. Ragojee's corps of infantry, and a body of horse under Manoo Bappoo, are assembled near this fort. They and Scindiah also would probably retire upon Col. Stevenson's advance to Gawilghur; but it must be expected that they will endeavor to attack him when he is engaged with the fort: or, supposing Scindiah to be at liberty, that he will make an irruption into the Soubah's territories, to draw me to a distance; and that Manoo Bappoo will attack Col. Stevenson. I avoid this by the cessation of arms.

Bappojee Scindiah has been detached to Hindustan to oppose the troops supposed to be advancing from Guzerat towards Ougein. I have already informed you there is some infantry at Ougein which has not been engaged; and the remains of the defeated campoos are on the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find that we cannot invade it, and he would naturally make an irruption into Guzerat. This is avoided by the cessation of hostilities.

The Rajah of Berar's troops are not included in it, and, consequently, there becomes a division of interests between these two Chiefs: all confidence in Scindiah, if it ever existed, must be at an end, and the confederacy is, *ipso facto*, dissolved. I see no inconvenience whatever that can result from the measure; and if the negotiations for peace are delayed in consequence of having concluded the cessation of hostilities, I have it in my power to put an end to that agreement whenever I may think proper. The rule not to cease from hostilities till peace is concluded is a good one in general; and I have adhered to it, in practice, at the siege of Ahmednuggur; and have ordered an adherence to it in all instances of that kind. But in this, I think it is a rule of which the breach is more beneficial than the observance.

I shall send a large packet to the Governor General upon this subject, and the negotiations for peace, as soon as the papers can be copied. Now that these papers become so numerous, as the Governor General has desired to have duplicates of the letters addressed to him, and as I cannot trust them to be copied by any excepting the officers attached to me, two of whom have been laid up ever since the battle of Assye, and all have, besides, their usual duties to perform, I must omit to send copies of them to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and only apprise those governments of the general results. I have received from Malcolm his memorandum upon my proposed plan for a peace, and for the division of the conquests. You will observe that I have amended my plan in part, as proposed by Malcolm; and in regard to the division of the spoils, it is a question not referrible to me. I only request that the Governor General, if he should have seen this memorandum, will not make up his mind finally on that subject till I shall have had a conversation with Malcolm.

Remarks upon Major Malcolm's Memorandum on a proposed Treaty of Peace.

23rd Nov. 1803.

I agree in the first parts of Major Malcolm's memorandum; and as will appear by my letter to Major Shawe, I intend to amend my plan for the peace, nearly in the manner proposed by Major Malcolm. In respect to the participation in the conquests at the end of the war, that is not a question referrible to me; but while writing upon the general subject of peace, I stated my ideas of the only practicable mode of settling that question, consistently with the engagements of the British government.

Under the proposed peace with Scindiah only, the Nizam will have to receive nearly 50 lacs of rupees annually, that is supposing the Peshwah

to receive nothing; Major Malcolm objects to the mode proposed by me of paying that sum, and has proposed others, though he has not specified them.

The first of the modes is to look to the territories of the Rajah of Berar. Upon the peace with the Rajah of Berar, the Company will gain the province of Cuttack; and, besides, will connect the northern Circars with Bundelcund. The Nizam must receive an equivalent upon his own frontier. If, besides this, he is to receive 50 lacs of rupees from the Rajah of Berar, the Rajah's state will be annihilated. That plan, therefore, is inconsistent with the Governor General's idea of preserving all these Marhatta states; and, at all events, is impracticable consistently with making peace at an early period.

The next plan is to increase the subsidiary force, and to keep a body of horse. My object in proposing a plan for obliging the government to have some force, was, that I felt severely, in carrying on the war, the want of it; and I wished not to increase the dependence of the government upon the British power, but to create some force in the state which could carry it through ordinary events. Without such a force in the state, all will look well at Hyderabad and in a dispatch from the Resident to the Governor General, but really, and at bottom, all will continue to be weakness and confusion; and in the end the Nizam's government will fall to pieces.

If such a force is not established in the state, in my opinion, the subsidiary force ought to be doubled; and there ought to be a body of horse besides: and, moreover, the British government will be involved in constant warfare and constant expense to support the Nizam's government in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Let Major Malcolm come into the country, and he will soon perceive the truth of this statement.

In respect to the Peshwah's claim of choute, it is one, as I understand, founded on treaties; and the British government is bound, by treaty to both parties, to arbitrate and decide it according to the principles of justice, on the ground of the treaty of Mhar.

There never was such an opportunity for a government to show its justice and its power; and surely that opportunity ought not to be lost. But the fact is, that choute is collected in all parts of the Nizam's territories at this moment; and when Major Malcolm shall come here, he will know it. The strongest advocate for the Nizam ought, therefore, to wish that that question should be decided.

Major Malcolm says that the Nizam has claims upon the Peshwah for expenses incurred in restoring his government. That is a point for the justice of the British government to decide, and is no argument at all against canvassing the question. He then says that the Peshwah might be induced, by some concession or consideration, to give up his claim of choute upon the Nizam. In my opinion it would not be right to urge him to do so; as, if that is done, there will be no other mode of satisfying the claims of the Nizam under the peace. But, supposing the Peshwah could be induced, by any concession, to give up his claims of choute upon the Nizam, the Governor General has to choose between the Attavasy and Bundelcund. I shall deliver no opinion upon this subject, excepting that

I consider the Attavesy as no object for the defence of Surat; and that I consider Bundelcund as a great object for the defence of Benares.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 24th Nov. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 18th and 19th. You have done right in not sending the letter to Mr. Duncan. I have received a memorandum from Malcolm on the subject of my plan for a peace, part of which I approve of, but in the latter part I cannot agree. As is frequently the case, Malcolm has said that other arrangements would be better: I know that well; but let him specify those arrangements; let him examine my instructions, and then see whether any thing else is practicable. For instance, he does not approve of giving up the Attavesy; but let him ask the Governor General whether he will give back Bundelcund or the Attavesy to the Peshwah: he will choose the Attavesy. He says the Nizam must be indemnified by the Rajah of Berar: but he forgets that the Governor General takes to himself all Orissa, and connects the northern Circars with Bundelcund: and the fact is, that it will be as difficult to find compensation for the Nizam, for the British acquisitions, from Ragoojee Bhoonslah, as it will for those from Scindiah, consistently with the preservation of the state of Ragoojee at all. Then he says, 'Keep horse for the Nizam, and increase the subsidiary force rather than muster the troops.' In answer, I say that I do not want to increase the dependence of the Nizam upon the British power: on the contrary, I want to see some power in the country that can go on, in ordinary cases, by itself. There is no such thing now in the country of any sort, and that is the greatest inconvenience I feel. Malcolm's plan is no remedy for this evil; mine is. But I agree that, if mine is not adopted, the subsidiary force ought to be doubled.

There is no foundation for any of Sir W. Clarke's reports. The secret history of Col. ——'s report has reached me. Angria discharged his troops lately; among others, a party of Seindians. A sirdar of these people went to Col. ——, and told him this story with a view to procure employment for himself, and to have the plundering of his old master. There is no truth whatever in the report.

I shall write you further about Amrut Rao, when I receive your dispatch to the Governor General upon that subject. I mentioned to his vakeel my wish, that Amrut Rao should give up all the territory he held from the Peshwah, and no great objection was made to the measure. But Amrut Rao has been a march or two in the rear ever since he joined, for the sake of plundering more conveniently; and I have not yet been made acquainted with his sentiments. I, however, expect the vakeel to-morrow or next day, as I have sent for him.

I shall order the guns for the Peshwah from Ahmednuggur, with bullocks, &c., but I have no tumbrils. He shall have bullocks with them, and every thing complete.

The progress I have made in the negotiation is just this. I have desired that compensation to the Company and their allies should be made the basis of the treaty. The vakeels have no authority to make it so, and I have referred them to Scindiah for further orders. I have

the conferences which I had with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, as the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I have received a letter from that Chief, dated the 14th, by which it appeared that he intended to appoint Mahomed Meer Khan to be his vakeel in this camp; and that he in a manner disavowed Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana. This was further confirmed by a letter received at the same time from Mahomed Meer Khan, Ballojee Koonger, and Mirza Wahed Beg, translations of which I enclose.

In my letter of the 24th Oct., I apprised your Excellency that I had received a variety of propositions, all tending to the commencement of negotiations for peace, but made by unauthorized persons; and which, being unworthy of your Excellency's notice, I omitted to transmit. On the 30th Oct., Mirza Wahed Beg arrived in my camp with letters from Mahomed Meer Khan and Ballojee Koonger, addressed to Col. Stevenson and myself, translations of which are enclosed; in answer to which I wrote a letter to Mahomed Meer Khan, in which I told him, that if Scindiah should depute him to this camp, he should be received with attention and respect. I likewise enclose a translation of this letter, and that of one written at the same time to Ballojee Koonger. This is the letter which I conceive Scindiah has construed into a request that Meer Khan should be sent here; and I transmit translations of all the papers addressed either to Col. Stevenson or to me, which have come into my hand, and translations of all that have been written, in order that your Excellency may form a judgment upon the subject.

I should have apprised your Excellency of the receipt of these letters on the 30th Oct., only that at the very moment I wrote to Meer Khan, I learnt that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah was on the road, and I sent a passport to enable him to come to my camp. I therefore concluded that this supposed mission of Mahomed Meer Khan was one of those transactions constantly going on in the Native durbars, for which it is impossible to account.

As soon as I received the letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 14th Nov., I sent for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and his colleague, and had a conference with them, of which your Excellency will find the details in the enclosed paper.

I had no doubt whatever of the mission of Jeswunt Rao Goorparah; indeed I had sufficient proofs of it; and it appeared to me to be probable that full powers would be sent to Jeswunt Rao, as soon as Scindiah should receive the accounts of the manner in which he had been received in this camp; and that the mission of Mahomed Meer Khan, in whom it was not probable that Scindiah could have much confidence, was the result of an intrigue in the durbar. I deemed it most prudent therefore to point out to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, and Naroo Punt Nana, the dangers of the situation into which they had been brought, and the great moderation and favor with which they were treated in not being punished, rather than to dismiss them at once with disgrace as impostors. They accordingly departed from my tent much pleased with the manner in which I behaved to them, and much disgusted with their employer; and in the course of 2 hours after they had left me, Naroo Punt Nana returned with a letter

from Scindiah, conveying powers to these persons, and Appah Dessaye, of which I enclose a translation.

Since I received this last letter, I have received another letter from Mirza Wahed Beg, and Col. Stevenson has received one from Mahomed Meer Khan, translations of which I enclose. From these letters, it appears clearly that there is a scramble at the durbar of Dowlat Rao Scindiah, who shall conduct the negotiations for peace. It is probable that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has succeeded, by exaggerated reports of the wishes he found here for peace, and by encouraging hopes that I would send an officer to Scindiah's camp. But whatever may be the mode in which he has succeeded in retaining his appointment, I think it more probable that he has, than that Mahomed Meer Khan has, Scindiah's confidence. At all events, the communications which we have had with him and his colleague already, have had the effect which they have upon all the Natives, of convincing them of the justice and propriety of our proceedings; they appear to have confidence in us, they are open and candid in all their proceedings, and have declared more than once, that if Scindiah did not make peace with the Company, his state must be destroyed, and that his only reliance was upon the generosity of the British government.

On the other hand, your Excellency will have observed that Rajah Mohiput Ram was the person who began the communications with Mahomed Meer Khan, a circumstance which has never been accounted for; and that endeavors have been made by the latter, in Scindiah's durbar, to carry on the negotiations with the former.

I enclose an extract of a letter from Col. Collins, which shows who Mahomed Meer Khan and Mirza Wahed Beg are, and what is the nature of the employment of both at Scindiah's durbar. From the nature of Mahomed Meer Khan's employment and his connexions, it is not very probable that he would be desirous to see the King, Delhi, and the Doonb transferred to the Company; and of course Rajah Mohiput Ram and Ballojee Koonger would wish that the compensation for the war should be taken in the Decean. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the result of this intrigue in Scindiah's durbar, which shows the great anxiety and desire there is for peace, is fortunate for the British government.

In the memorandum of the conference, your Excellency will find a detailed account of what passed at the first meeting between Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and me, upon the subject of peace. I thought it proper in that conference to go no farther than to require that compensation to the British government and their allies, for the injury they had received by the unjust aggression of Dowlat Rao Scindiah and his confederates, should be made the basis of the negotiations for peace; and when I found that the vakeels were not authorized to grant compensation, I referred them to their master for further authority. They then pressed me to agree to a cessation of hostilities, to which your Excellency will observe that I have agreed; and you will find the terms in the minutes of the conference of the 22nd inst.

My reasons for agreeing to a cessation of hostilities are as follow:

In my letter of the 20th Oct., I have shewn your Excellency that as I



had deprived Dowlut Rao Scindiah of all his territories in the Deccan, and as the corps in Guzerat was not sufficiently strong, and as there existed a domestic war in Guzerat which required all its exertions, and as it was necessary to guard the frontier of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and of his Highness the Peshwah, and to endeavor in the first instance to take Gawilghur, I could not hope to be able to make any further impression on Scindiah at present. The army he now has with him consists only of horse; and in order to make any impression upon that description of troops, it would be necessary to follow them for a great length of time and of distance, by which means the distance from the sources of our supplies would be increased, which is a subject of very serious consideration, and our operations against the forts in Berar delayed.

On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary to endeavor to strike a blow against the Rajah of Berar which he will feel; and with this view Col. Stevenson's corps has been equipped for the siege of Gawilghur. Ragojee Bhoonslah's infantry and cavalry under Manoo Bappoo, and Scindiah's army, are both encamped at present on the road towards Gawilghur, but not joined. It is probable that both will retire, upon Col. Stevenson's advance; but it is also probable that they would afterwards endeavor to interrupt the siege, or that Scindiah would, with his cavalry, make an irruption into the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, in hopes to draw me to a distance, and to leave Manoo Bappoo at liberty to interrupt Col. Stevenson in the siege of Gawilghur. The result of this operation would be fresh loss to, and fresh complaints from, the Soubah of the Deccan, and possibly some of our convoys would be cut off.

Bappoojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan, to oppose the troops supposed to be advancing from Guzerat. He will be joined at Ougein by some corps of infantry that have not yet been engaged, and by the defeated infantry which were upon the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find that the troops in Dohud consist only of one battalion; and that Col. Murray is necessarily employed with the strength of his corps, in the pursuit of Canojee Rao Guickwar. It is probable that he would then make an irruption into Guzerat.

Upon the whole, therefore, upon military principles, the cessation of hostilities with Scindiah was desirable to me; and I had made up my mind to grant it, as soon as I had reason to suspect that it would be asked. As a political measure, as it does not extend to the Rajah of Berar, and as Scindiah is kept within his territories, it has the effect of separating the interests of those Chiefs entirely. It is impossible that the Rajah of Berar can ever hereafter have any confidence in Scindiah, and it may be considered that the confederacy is dissolved. If advantage should be taken of the cessation of hostilities to delay the negotiations for peace, your Excellency will observe that I have the power of putting an end to it when I please; and that, supposing I am obliged to put an end to it, on the day after I shall receive its ratification, I shall at least have gained so much time everywhere for my operations, and shall have succeeded in dividing the enemy entirely. Such an agreement is certainly not usual, and in general impolitic: but the circumstances of this case are also un-

usual, and upon the whole I am induced to hope that your Excellency will approve of the measure.

I have great hopes that I shall be able to conclude a peace with Scindiah on favorable terms; and your Excellency will observe, in the conclusion of the conference of the 22nd, a hint thrown out by the vakeels, of an intention to place Scindiah's government under the protection of the Company, which I think is likely to lead to satisfactory results.

I have the honor to enclose translations of my letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.\*

To Col. Stevensen.

Camp at the bottom of the Rajpore ghaut, 25th Nov. 1803.

I have just received your letter of the 24th; and in the night, one of the 21st, and another of the 22nd. I have already informed you that the whole of Scindiah's durbar are intriguing for the office of vakeel in this camp, and who shall make the peace. This information will give you the clue to all Mirza Wahed Beg's letters; and will account for his urging us one day to do every thing that can be agreeable to Scindiah, and on the next, to attack him with all our forces. In a military, as well as in a political point of view, I never was more convinced of the propriety of any measure, than of that of agreeing, at the present moment, to the cessation of hostilities with Scindiah; and I am glad to find, by your letter to me of the 24th, that you are of the same opinion. Indeed, the cessation is so favorable to us, and so little so to Scindiah, that I almost doubt his ratifying it. If I find it is used as a mode to delay the conclusion of the peace, I shall put an end to it directly.

Notwithstanding the arrangement in the cessation of arms, I think it probable that Scindiah will endeavor to place himself to the westward, instead of to the eastward, of Ellichpoor. If you should find that you can stop him, without delaying materially your arrival at Gawilghur, it would be desirable to do so; but if to attempt it should be likely materially to delay your arrival at Gawilghur, it is better to take no notice of him.

\* Translation of a Persian letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, 14th Nov. 1803.

After titles and compliments:

The sincere Mirza Wahed Beg has arrived here, and has explained the whole state of affairs.

He has also brought your letter inviting Azim ool Dowlut, the Nabob Mahomed Meer Khan Behander, Naswunt Jung, who is born of an illustrious race, and sprung from the family of the Prophet. He laid the letter before me, and it has given me much pleasure. I always have approved, and I still approve, the friendship with the Company, which was formerly confirmed by treaties. I see no manner of alteration in it. The Nabob who is named above will soon be sent off, in compliance with your summons. My friend, if in the mean time any other person should hold out that he is negotiating for me, you must by no means believe him, without a writing, signed and sealed by me in the usual manner.

What shall I write more?

G. O.

Camp at Ankourghur, 26th Nov. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that all officers and heads of departments will give orders to their servants not to burn the spare forage or straw in the mornings: any person found doing so will be punished.

If he should send my letter to you to inform you of the cessation of arms, (a duplicate of which I sent on the 23rd,) and he should still be to the westward, I recommend that you should write to him, that the condition of the cessation is, that he should go to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and that you hope that he will comply with it. If he should not comply with it, and he should be within your reach to attack, without putting yourself materially out of your way, I recommend that you should do so; otherwise not. I recommend that you should march by the west road towards Ellichpoor, as you propose.

My intention is to move up towards Ellichpoor, to cover your operations. I shall be to-morrow at Barsee Tankly, or at Seindkeira: they are only 2 coss distant from each other; next day I shall be at Akola. I conclude that you will leave Ballapoor to-morrow, the 26th, and will be at Huttee Andoorah, on the Poorna river, on the 27th. This place is only 4 or 5 coss from Akola; and I shall send you two of my 12 pounders, and my two 5½ inch howitzers, on the 27th. I have no 8 inch howitzers. I shall send with this ordnance some pioneers; but I cannot send you any artillerymen, as I have but few of them.

If any thing should prevent me from sending you the ordnance, as I have above proposed, it shall be sent on to join you from Ellichpoor, long before you can require it at the siege. I shall also endeavor to get an account of Gawilghur, which I will send you.

I am happy to hear that your health is mended. Shall you want my bullocks with my ordnance? If you do, you shall have them. I shall send the ammunition with the howitzers, but not with the 12 pounders.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Seindkeira, 26th Nov. 1803.

I have just received your letter of yesterday; but you differ, in your account of your situation, from a man who declares he saw your camp last night at Moorgaum, about 11 miles from hence. The account I have of the distance between Akola and Huttee Andoorah is, that it is 12 coss: it will, therefore, be impossible to send you the guns to-morrow, as I intended; but if I should find the distance to be within reach, I shall send them to you; if not, I shall send them to you hereafter, as I told you in my letter of yesterday.

Let me know the particulars of your route to Ellichpoor, in case I should have an opportunity of sending the guns before you reach that place.

To Lord W. Bentinck, Gov. of Fort St. George.\* Camp at Seindkeira, 26th Nov. 1803.

Your Lordship will have been made acquainted with the state of affairs in this quarter, from time to time, by the copies of my dispatches to the Governor General, which I have regularly transmitted through Gen.

\* The late Governor General of India, who had at that time relieved Lord Clive in the government of Fort St. George. The resignation of Lord Clive (Earl of Powis) forms no part of the history of India, as referrible to the Dispatches of the Duke of Wellington; the important letter, dated 21st Feb. 1803, which Lord Clive wrote on that occasion to the Court of Directors, is, however, of great interest, as containing the detailed financial and political history of the Presidency of Fort St. George, whilst under his Lordship's government, from 1798 to 1803.

Stuart. But within these few days the enclosures of these dispatches have been so numerous, and are so long, that I have been under the necessity of delaying, for some time, to send copies of them to Fort St. George; but I have acquainted Gen. Stuart, in a letter of the 23rd inst., with the general situation of our affairs here; and I have requested him to lay such parts of it before your Lordship, as he might think necessary for your information. I hope you will excuse my adopting this mode of communicating to you the state of affairs, to which nothing but the circumstances I have above mentioned should induce me. Since I wrote that letter to Gen. Stuart, matters have remained nearly in the same state in which they then were. I have moved into Berar, and am at a short distance from Col. Stevenson, who is on his march towards Gawilghur.

I take this opportunity of congratulating your Lordship on your arrival at Fort St. George. I should have written to you when I heard of your arrival, only that at that time I had nothing to communicate which you were not likely to know from a perusal of my dispatches to the Governor General. I beg to present my respects to Lady W. Bentinck, with whom I had the pleasure of being acquainted formerly: but so much time has elapsed since I have met her, that I am afraid she will have forgotten me.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 26th Nov. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 20th. The present state of the Peshwah's mind is very satisfactory, and I will give him the guns. I wrote this day to Ahmednuggur, to desire that 6 guns may be got ready, their carriages to be neatly painted, the bullocks, &c., to be well equipped with yokes, and to be sent to you at Poonah. I beg you to present them to the Peshwah; but before you do so, it will be necessary to have some Poonah people as bullock drivers, as my Mysore people will not stay with him; and even if they would, I could not well spare their services from Ahmednuggur, where I have nearly 1000 gun bullocks.

Amrut Rao has not yet joined; his vakeel is not yet come in, and, therefore, I am unable to give you an answer upon the subject of your letter to the Governor General. In a few days, however, I hope to be able to write to you fully upon that subject. I have taken the freebooter Ghazy Khan into the Company's service; and he is to be employed in keeping my rear quiet. I have nothing new to tell you about the negotiation.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Akola, 27th Nov. 1803.

Amrut Rao has come within a short distance from camp, and I have seen and spoken to his vakeel respecting a cordial reconciliation with the Peshwah. I spoke to him particularly respecting the cession of Poonadur; and he said that he was certain that Amrut Rao would have no difficulty in giving up the fort, provided the killadar with his family were taken under the protection of the Company, and carried away to Ahmednuggur; and that the arrears of the garrison, amounting to 50,000 rupees, were paid, and Amrut Rao allowed to carry away his private property, which is now there.

The vakeel is to come to me again to-morrow, upon this and other

subjects, and I will let you know what I shall arrange with him. Amrut Rao's vakeel told me that Baba Phurkia had taken service with the Soubah of the Deccan.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 27th Nov. 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 18th inst., upon the subject of Capt. Parmentier. The Governor General certainly intended that his proclamation of the 29th Aug. should be liberally construed; and I am of opinion that, as far as the evidence goes, Capt. Parmentier is entitled to benefit by it. Before I can fix the sum which Capt. Parmentier is to receive, it is necessary that I should know from him the amount of his monthly pay and regulated allowances in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Accordingly, I request that this account may be required from him. In the mean time, if Capt. Parmentier should want money for his present subsistence, which, as he has money at Bombay, is not very probable, I request that he may be supplied to the amount of 300 rupees *per mensem*. The difference between this sum and that which he received in Scindiah's service will be paid to him, as soon as I shall have ascertained what he received heretofore.

I have no objection to Capt. Parmentier residing at Bombay on his *parole*, if the Hon. the Governor thinks proper to permit him so to do. I have called upon Lieut. Stewart to give an account, similar to that I have above requested might be required from Capt. Parmentier. I have no objection to his residing at Bombay; and I will let you know what sum is to be paid to him monthly, as soon as I shall receive the document in question. In the mean time, he might receive 200 rupees *per mensem* on account.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 27th Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th, relative to the supply of medicines to the troops under my command, by the medical storekeeper at Bombay. Under the regulations of the government of Fort St. George, this description of medicines is supplied by the medical storekeeper at the Presidency; and the medicines are paid for by a stoppage of 20 cash *per diem* for each European soldier, stopped from the allowance given to the surgeon of the regiment to which such soldier belongs; which sum of 20 cash *per diem* is received by the medical storekeeper. The bills for the supplies for the European regiments ought, therefore, to be discharged by the medical storekeeper at Fort St. George. The supplies of medicines to field hospitals of the government of Fort St. George are made on different principles, and the expense of these is defrayed by the surgeons in charge of them respectively. But the accounts of these supplies ought likewise to go through the medical storekeeper at the Presidency. Upon the whole, therefore, I take the liberty of recommending that all these bills be sent to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George, who will give the necessary orders that they may be adjusted, and their amount recovered from those by whom they are payable, according to the regulations of his Lordship's government.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp at Akola, 27th Nov. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 22nd, and long before I received the account of the articles captured by the pcons. I have desired Capt. Frazer to receive charge of those articles, as part of the captured property. In fact, they belonged to Scindiah, and ought never to have been taken away from Ahmednuggur. I shall be obliged to you if you will deliver them to Capt. Frazer, when he shall ask for them. I wrote orders, some time ago, that the damaged chinna might be given to my gun bullocks; and the damaged bijary must be disposed of in the same way.

You may release the patel of Korget Coraygaum; but write a complaint of him in my name to Rao Rumbo's manager. You did right to promote the jemidar's son.

Some days ago Amrut Rao sent me a memorandum, by which it appears that a village, now in the Ahmednuggur district, was formerly allotted for the support of a pagah of horse, which is now serving with him. He acknowledges that they have no longer any right to draw their subsistence from that village; but he wishes that the horses which are detained there should be allowed to be taken away.

I shall be obliged to you if you will inquire upon this subject. I have lost the memorandum, but have explained the contents of it, as well as I can recollect them, and I beg you to let the horses go.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Parterly, 30th Nov. 1803.

I have the honor to inform you that I attacked the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday afternoon, on the plains of Argaum, in this neighbourhood, with the divisions of the army under my immediate command, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under Col. Stevenson, and completely defeated the enemy, having taken from them their cannon, ammunition, &c., and destroyed vast numbers of them. I have reason to believe that the loss which I have sustained upon this occasion has not been great. No officer has been killed, and but few wounded. I will forward to your Excellency a detailed account of this action, as well as of the circumstances which led to it, as soon as I shall receive a return of the killed and wounded.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Parterly, 30th Nov. 1803.

Having found that the Rajah of Berar was moving towards his own territories; that the body of troops he had with him was but small, decreasing in numbers daily, and not likely to do much mischief to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, I descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th, in order to support and cover Col. Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur, in Berar. Col. Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of that fort, and had marched to Ballapoor, where he was joined on the 24th by the brinjaries, and other supplies which had been saved from the enemy by Capt. Baynes' affair at Umber; and he marched forward on the 26th.

G. O.

Camp, Yalikally, 28th Nov. 1803.

In case of marching to-morrow, it is requested that all baggage and departments may be laden and sent off early.

Your Excellency has been informed that, on the 23rd, I had consented to a suspension of hostilities\* with the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in this quarter and Guzerat. The condition on which this agreement depended, viz., 'that Scindiah should occupy a position 20 coss to the east of Ellichpoor,' had not been carried into execution; and Scindiah was encamped at Sersooly, about 4 miles from the camp of Manoo Bappoo, brother to the Rajah of Berar, which was at this place. The army of the former consisted only of cavalry; that of the latter, of cavalry, and a great part, if not the whole, of Ragojee Bhoonslah's regular infantry; and a large proportion of artillery.

In the course of the 28th, the vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah urgently pressed me not to attack these troops; but I informed them repeatedly that there was no suspension of arms with Ragojee Bhoonslah; and none with Scindiah, till he should comply with the terms of his agreement; and that I should certainly attack the enemies of the Company wherever I should find them.

Col. Stevenson's division and mine both marched to this place yesterday; the Colonel having, with great prudence and propriety, halted on the 28th at Huttee Andoorah, to enable me to co-operate in the attack of the enemy. We found on our arrival that the armies of both Chiefs had decamped; and, from a tower in Parterly, I could perceive<sup>a</sup> a confused mass, about 2 miles beyond Sersooly and Scindiah's old camp, which I concluded to be their armies in march. The troops had marched a great distance on a very hot day, and I therefore did not think it proper to pursue them; but, shortly after our arrival here, bodies of horse appeared in our front, with

\* See Agreement, p. 878.

G. M. O.

Camp, near the plains of Argam, Wednesday, 30th Nov. 1803.

The 1st batt. 3rd regt. and 2nd batt. 11th regt. are to encamp at the entrance into the gardens where the action ended last night, and are to protect the captured guns and ammunition. The quarter masters of brigades to which those corps belong will<sup>a</sup> see that their camp equipage, baggage, and bazaars are sent down to them.

Major Gen. Wellesley congratulates the troops upon the success of yesterday, which he has every reason to hope was effected without very great loss. The Major General's thanks are due, upon this occasion, to all the troops for the perseverance with which they went through the fatigues of the day, and for the steadiness they displayed during the action, but in particular the 74th and 78th regts.

To Col. Stevenson for the advice and assistance he received from him; to the Hon. Lieut. Col. St. Leger for the manner in which he led the British cavalry; to Lieut. Col. Pogson, Major Middleton, Lieut. Cols. Wallace and Adams (who commanded Lieut. Col. Harness' brigade during his absence on account of severe indisposition), Haliburton and Maclean, commanding brigades of cavalry and infantry; and to the officers of the staff belonging to Major Gen. Wellesley's division, and the subsidiary force. Major Gen. Wellesley had also particular satisfaction in observing the order and steadiness with which the 94th regt., commanded by Major Campbell, advanced to the attack. The artillery of both divisions was well served and brought up; and Major Gen. Wellesley's thanks upon this occasion are due in a particular manner to Capt. Beauman, commanding the artillery in the division under his immediate command, and to Capt. Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force.

Returns of the killed and wounded to be sent to the D. A. G. as soon as possible.

Royal salutes to be fired this day at 12 o'clock in the divisions under the immediate command of Major Gen. Wellesley and Col. Stevenson, in honor of the victory gained yesterday over the enemy's troops on the plains of Argam.

The paymaster of each division will pay 200 rupees to each corps of cavalry and infantry in their respective divisions as a zealot, and 100 to the detachments of artillery for the same purpose. Capt. Bellingham will pay 200 rupees to the 1st batt. of pioneers, of which Capt. Heiland will allot a proportion to the pioneers with the subsidiary force.

which the Mysore cavalry skirmished during a part of the day; and when I went out to push forward the piquets of the infantry to support the Mysore cavalry, and to take up the ground of our encampment, I could perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argauin, immediately in front of that village, and about 6 miles from this place, at which I intended to encamp.

Although late in the day, I immediately determined to attack this army. Accordingly, I marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy's line; covering the rear and left by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry. The enemy's infantry and guns were in the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left. Scindiah's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, having upon its right a body of pindarries and other light troops. Their line extended above 5 miles, having in their rear the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argauin; and in their front a plain, which, however, was much cut by watercourses, &c. I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right; and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced, in order to

G. O.

Camp near Argauin, 30th Nov. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley publishes to the troops under his command the copy of an agreement, dated 23rd Nov., 1803, into which he had entered with Dowlat Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of suspending hostilities between the troops under his command and those in the service of that Chief.

Major Gen. Wellesley on the part of the Hon. Company and their allies, and Jeswant Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana on the part of the Maharajah Aly Jih Dowlat Rao Scindiah, having each communicated to the other their full powers, have made the following agreement, dated Camp, 23rd Nov. 1803:

1. There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the troops commanded by Major Gen. Wellesley in the Deccan and in Guzerat and those in the service of the Maharajah Dowlat Rao Scindiah.

2. To prevent accidents, and in order to insure the execution of the 1st article, it is agreed that there shall be an interval of 20 coss between the different British and allied armies and that of the Maharajah; and the Maharajah will march with his army and take up a position 20 coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and he will forage still farther to the eastward.

3. In case the operations of the British and allied armies against the other enemies of the British government should draw either of them nearer than 20 coss to the position which the Maharajah will have occupied according to the 2nd article, previous notice of such operation will be given, in order that the Maharajah may take timely measures always to preserve an interval of 20 coss between his army and the British and allied troops.

4. In Guzerat the British troops shall not advance beyond Dohad; those of the Maharajah on the side of Guzerat shall not approach nearer than 20 coss to Dohad.

5. Notice must be given in case either of the parties should be desirous of putting an end to this agreement.

6. This agreement is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlat Rao Scindiah, and his ratification is to be given to Major Gen. Wellesley in the space of 10 days from this time.

The condition of this suspension was, that Dowlat Rao Scindiah should go with his army to a position to the neighbourhood of which it was not probable that the operations of the British troops would carry them for some time. This condition remained unexecuted on his part, and he was repeatedly informed that until it was executed he was liable to be attacked, as well as any other enemy of the British government, wherever he should be found. As this transaction, connected with the action of yesterday, may possibly become a matter of general conversation, Major Gen. Wellesley adopts this mode of making the real facts public, that all persons may form their own judgment upon it.

Mem.

30th Nov. 1803.

A vakeel from Ragojee Bhoomslah is to wait on Major Gen. Wellesley this afternoon. The General will be happy to see any officer who may wish to be present on this occasion.



press upon the enemy's left. Some little time elapsed before the lines could be formed, owing to a part of the infantry of my division which led the column having got into some confusion. When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regts. were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah's cavalry charged the 1st batt. 6th regt., which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands 38 pieces of cannon and all their ammunition.

The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Some of the latter are still following them; and I have sent out this morning all of the Mysore, Mogul, and Marhatta cavalry, in order to secure as many advantages from this victory as can be gained, and complete the enemy's confusion. For the reasons stated in the commencement of this letter, the action did not commence till late in the day; and, unfortunately, sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night.

I have the honor to enclose a return of our loss in this action. The troops conducted themselves with their usual bravery. The 74th and 78th regts. had a particular opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and have deserved and received my thanks. I am also much indebted to Col. Stevenson, for the advice and assistance I received from him; to the Hon. Lieut. Col. St. Leger, for the manner in which he led on the British cavalry; and to Lieut. Cols. Wallace, Adams (who commanded Lieut. Col. Harness' brigade, the latter being absent on account of severe indisposition), Haliburton, Maclean, Pogson, and Major Huddleston, who commanded brigades of cavalry and infantry; to Major Campbell, commanding the 94th regt.; to Capt. Beauman, commanding the artillery with the divisions under my immediate command; to Capt. Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force; and to the officers of the staff with my division, and belonging to the subsidiary force.

I have also to inform your Excellency, that the Mogul cavalry under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard from Scindiah's troops. The Marhatta cavalry were not engaged, as the person who went to them with orders missed his road. Amrut Rao was not in the action, as he had encamped some distance in my rear on the 28th, and he could not march the whole distance to Parterly yesterday morning; but he sent for orders as soon as he heard that I intended to attack the enemy.

I propose to march to-morrow towards Gawilghur, and I shall lose no time in attacking that place.\*

\* Return of the killed and wounded at the battle of Argaum.

	<i>Europeans.</i>				<i>Natives.</i>
	Cap.	Sub.	Drum.	R. & F.	Non-Com. Officers & Privates.
Killed	—	—	—	15	31
Wounded	3	6	6	145	148
Missing	—	—	—	—	5

N.B. The Officers being British are included under the head of Europeans.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 1st Dec. 1803.

Since I wrote to you on the 24th ultimo, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has failed to carry into execution the articles of agreement made by his vakeels for suspending hostilities with the troops under my command, and joined himself with an army commanded by Manoo Bappoo, in the service of the Rajah of Berar. Accordingly, I attacked their combined armies on the 29th Nov., and entirely defeated them, taking from them cannon, ammunition, &c. My loss upon this occasion has not been great. Since this action, Scindiah is gone off to the westward with the remnants of his army, which, likewise, is directly contrary to the treaty.

By letters received this day from the government of Bombay, I am happy to observe that you will soon be relieved from the fruitless pursuit of Canojee, and that the Resident at Baroda is exerting himself to bring into the field a respectable body of Marhatta cavalry. Whatever may be the success of those exertions, you will be enabled, by the flight of Canojee, to join Major Holmes at Dohud; and I conclude that you will have commenced your march to that quarter as soon as possible. You will be so kind as to make all your preparations for moving forward upon Ougein from Dohud, when I shall send you orders to do so. I certainly never should have agreed to the suspension of hostilities in Guzerat, if I had had the smallest hopes that you could have been able to move forward upon Ougein; and I certainly shall not allow myself to be tricked out of the benefits of it in this quarter, now that I find that the situation of affairs is so much improved in Guzerat, as to render it no longer desirable there.

I should not be surprised if Scindiah were himself to go into Hindustan. I know that he has once or twice intended it, as he is now only a vagabond in the Deccan: but I will keep you apprised of events as they occur; and I have only to request that you will be in a state of equipment to move forward at once, when you shall receive orders to do so; and that

G. M. O.

Parterly, 1st Dec. 1803.

All the men of the 1st batt. 8th regt. off other duty, to be sent immediately, with a proportion of European and Native officers, as a working party, to the plains of Argum, to assist in collecting and drawing over the ravines the guns and tumbrils captured from the enemy.

Half of the artificers, with their tools, belonging to the corps in camp, to be sent to the park immediately, to assist in repairing the carriages of the captured guns.

Mem.

Camp, 1st Dec. 1803.

All the elephants and camels captured from the enemy, in the late action, to be sent immediately to the head quarters of the subsidiary force, and to be sold by public auction at 10 o'clock this forenoon. If the commanding officers of corps require any hackeries for the conveyance of sick, they will be supplied on application to Capt. Beauman.

G. O.

Camp at Parterly, 1st Dec. 1803.

Capt. Young will send all the spare elephants to Mr. Gilmour to-morrow morning, to be distributed amongst the corps for the carriage of the sick. The detachment will march to-morrow morning by the right.

G. E. O.

Thursday, 1st Dec. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley is surprised to hear, by the report of the staff surgeon this evening, that the officers commanding corps who have the charge of carrying their sick, have provided themselves with so few hackeries, after the early notice given to them to-day that they might have the hackeries by applying to Capt. Beauman; and he desires that they will without delay provide themselves.

you will do every thing in your power to obtain information of roads, distance, &c.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec. 1803.

I have but little to add to my letter of the 30th to the Governor General respecting the battle of Argaum. The number of the enemy destroyed is very great. Vittell Punt, who commanded the cavalry of the Rajah of Berar, was killed; and Gopal Bhow, who commanded Scindiah's cavalry that fought, was wounded. If we had had daylight an hour more, not a man would have escaped. We should have had that time, if my Native infantry had not been panic struck, and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly 3 entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assye, being broken and running off, when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there, I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for every thing that we should certainly have performed. The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from 6 in the morning until 12 at night.

Nothing could have been more fortunate than my return to the northward. I just arrived in time. Col. Stevenson was not delayed for me more than one day; and it is a curious circumstance, that, after having been so long separated, and such a distance between us, we should have joined at a moment so critical.

A vakeel has come in from the Rajah of Berar, but nothing very particular has occurred. I have demanded compensation from the Rajah; and I have desired the vakeel to stay at Ellichpoor until he is authorized to grant it. The powers to Scindiah's vakeels were not quite so perfect upon this point as I wished; and they shall go away to-morrow, unless they can produce them in a more perfect form. There is no dealing with these Marhattas, unless they are treated in this manner; and unless a regular document is brought forward upon every point that may occur. The Rajah is much alarmed about Gawilghur, and I think he is sincere; indeed, I think Scindiah is so likewise. But every Marhatta chief is so haughty, and so prone to delay, that I suspect that both these Chiefs will be ruined, rather than submit to the conditions which I must require from them.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec. 1803.

I have received and perused your letter to his Excellency the Governor General, of the 15th Nov. I entirely agree in opinion with you respecting the propriety of resuming parts of the great jaghire lands as the best mode of restoring the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. But I beg leave to recommend, that the first step taken should be to provide some public force for the service of the Soubah's government, by the means of which this measure could be carried into execution. Unless this is done, the execution of the measure will fall upon the British go-

vernment, whereby a great expense will be incurred ; and the unpopularity of the British government, which certainly exists already in a great degree, will be much increased.

This object is certainly not one immediately referrible to me ; but I think it possible that, at the conclusion of the war, some means may be devised to place the public force of the Nizam's government upon a better footing ; and it is very desirable that you should turn your thoughts to that subject. In its present state, it is of no use whatever. The Soubah can do nothing without the assistance of the British government : this inconvenience will increase daily, unless some remedy is applied, and in a greater proportion as the extent of the Soubah's territories may be greater ; or the consequence will be, that the British troops must always be in the field ; and indeed, if the Soubah's military establishments are not improved, the subsidiary force, as at present, will not be equal to the duties which will be required from it. I hope that you will excuse the liberty I have taken in drawing your attention to this subject ; but it is one which I consider of great importance, and the evil certainly requires a speedy remedy.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 2nd Dec. 1803.

I received yesterday evening your letters of the 9th and 12th Nov., after I had written to you the public letter of yesterday's date, which will reach you through Mr. Duncan.

I am concerned to observe the state of your Marhatta cavalry, and the trouble they give you by plundering the country : there is no remedy for it, but I positively forbid it. I recommend to you to have a conference upon this point with the Chief of the Guickwar troops, to tell him that this practice must be stopped, and that you are determined to punish, with the utmost severity, any that might be guilty of it.

If my Marhatta allies did not know that I should hang any one that might be found plundering, not only I should have starved long ago, but, most probably, my own coat would have been taken off my back.

There is no intention whatever, at least I shall never consent to the measure, to give the countries conquered in Guzerat to the Guickwar government to pay their troops. I have recommended that no tribute should be taken from any of the Bheel Rajahs.

In respect to your being under my orders, the best thing you can do is, to correspond officially with me ; and to send copies of your letters, or of such parts of them as you may think necessary, to Mr. Duncan. By this mode of transacting business, every thing will be much more clear than it is now, and you will be made acquainted with my sentiments on every point in a public form.

In respect to your arrangements with the Bheels, they must and shall be confirmed as far as they affect the British government, provided they are not inconsistent with the other engagements of the government with other powers. The Guickwar government has nothing to do with them. But you must let me have an account of all the arrangements you have made with the Bheels and other Rajahs.

The Company never can nor will pay choute, and therefore the arrangements you have made with the Barreah Rajah must be confirmed.

I hope to be able to write to you to-morrow, to let you know whether or not you are to advance to Ougein.

What troops do you leave at Surat, if you draw away the 75th? That city is very important, and I know that each of the confederates has had an eye upon it; and Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had designed to march there with their cavalry after the battle of Assye.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart. Camp at Paundry, 15 miles S. of Gawilghur, 3rd Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Capt. Dalrymple, which Col. Stevenson has put into my hands, at the same time strongly recommending the writer of it. It appears that he has taken much pains with his department, and is well deserving of your favor. While writing upon this subject, I take the liberty of mentioning to you that Capt. Noble has applied to be made a commissary, instead of an assistant, as he now is. To grant this application will make no difference in point of expense, and it is an object to Capt. Noble in case he should be promoted. I beg leave to recommend him to you, as an officer with whom I have every reason to be satisfied.

I have Gawilghur now in sight, and it does not appear to be so strong as many hill forts in Mysore taken by our troops. However, we shall see more of it in a few days.

You will have been surprised to have seen in my letter to the Governor General a report that part of our Native infantry got into confusion. The fact was, that the 1st of the 10th, and 2nd of the 12th, and the Native part of the piquets, broke and ran off, as soon as the cannonade commenced, although it was from a great distance, and not to be compared with that of Assye. I am convinced that if I had not been near them, to rally them and restore the battle, we should have lost the day. However, those of them whom I was able to collect and form again behaved steadily afterwards.

I am sorry to tell you that the iron axletrees of 2 of the brass 12 pounders broke in less than a quarter of an hour's firing. You may recollect that I wrote to you on this subject formerly. There is no remedy for this inconvenience, excepting to lengthen considerably the trail of the carriage, and by that means to prevent the stress of the recoil coming entirely upon the axletree. I recommended this matter to the Military board, in respect to the 12 pounder gallopers made at Seringapatam, but it was not approved of: at all events it is really worth a trial; and I therefore take the liberty of mentioning it to you. The axletree of one of the 12 pounders in Col. Stevenson's corps broke likewise.

Scindiah has ratified the treaty for suspending hostilities; and his vakeels say that he is going to the east of Ellichpoor, according to the agreement. I have told them that I shall consider it as void on my part if he does not perform all the conditions. We have advanced no farther in the peace, than that the vakeels have brought forward a kind of consent to treat upon the basis of giving compensation to the Company.

Ragojee Bhoonslah has likewise sent a vakeel here. I have made the same demand from him. I have sent him to wait at Ellichpoor, till he receives an answer to it. They are most terribly alarmed for the loss of

Gawilghur, &c. On this ground, I expect to conclude with Ragojee immediately. His vakeel pressed hard for a suspension of hostilities, which I positively refused.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 4 miles W. of Ellichpoor, 4th Dec. 1803.

I had the honor of receiving last night your letter of the 14th Nov. ———'s hirearrahs spread, some time ago, false and ridiculous reports among my posts on the Kistna, by which all were alarmed; and the commanding officer at Hullihall thought proper to detach a great part of his garrison to their relief. There was not the smallest foundation for this, or many other reports brought to and circulated by ———; and I have desired him to order his hirearrahs, if he should think proper to employ them, not to go near my posts. The country has been undisturbed since I passed through it in March last, except by a few polygars who attacked the fort of Manowly, belonging to Appah Dessaye, when Gen. Campbell last moved down towards Raichore. It will remain in the same state of tranquillity, if no unnecessary alarm is created; but if the common hirearrahs and news writers are attended to, we shall in the first place suffer all the inconvenience of war in imagination; and in the next place we should, by our fears, at last provoke disturbances. I have given a pretty strong hint to ——— upon this subject; for I see that these histories of his are circulated in all parts of the country, and at Bombay; and they even come to Poonah. I know that they are entirely without foundation.

P. S. The communication with Mysore has been to this day uninterrupted. We have not lost a bullock load of any thing during the war, or a tappall among the rivers. The few tappalls which have been carried off, have been by thieves near Poonah, and I have a post near Poonadur to check them.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 5th Dec. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd Nov., upon the subject of the conduct of the military at Surat. When the residence of officers who have been accused of improper and riotous behaviour has been described, names have in some instances been stated, and in all a description of their persons, and of their mode of conveyance, has been given, it is scarcely to be credited that the commanding officer had it not in his power to discover those who were accused. At all events, measures might and ought to have been adopted by the commanding officer to put an end to these disgraceful proceedings, which it appears he entirely neglected.

2. Under these circumstances, I take the liberty of recommending, first, that the commanding officer of Surat may be removed from his

G. O.

Camp at Harram, 4th Dec. 1803.

Money will be issued from the pay office, until further orders, in the following coins and proportions. One third in rupees, one third in Venetian and Behaudry pagodas, and one third in star pagodas, Porto Novo pagodas, and other gold coins less current.

A field hospital is to be established at Ellichpoor (the orders the same as for Adjutee). (See G. O. 29th Sept. 1803; p. 710.)

Commanding officers of European corps will send in packalies with their sick in the proportion of 1 to 30 men; and the commanding officers of brigades will order in packalies from the Native corps in the proportion of 1 to 50 Natives.

situation; and, secondly, that orders may be given to the civil magistrate to seize, and send to Bombay for trial in the court of the Recorder, any officer who may hereafter be accused of rioting in the streets or city of Surat. Of course, the civil magistrate must do every thing in his power that the person of the officer of whom complaint may be made may be ascertained, and his name known; and in this respect I have to observe, that the civil magistrate does not appear to me to have done every thing that he could do.

3. I have also received your dispatch of the 23rd Nov., relative to Col. ——. Upon this subject I have to observe, that it would be very agreeable to me if Lieut. Col. —— were removed to another corps; and this measure would put a stop to all complaints from the Peshwah's amildar at Panwell. I cannot allow Lieut. Col. —— to join his corps at Poonah, because I do not conceive he is the fittest person to have the command of the troops there; I have therefore ordered that he should remain at Panwell; for it appears that he acknowledges, and is determined to continue, the abuses of which the amildar complains.

4. I have likewise the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 24th, regarding S<sup>r</sup> De Sousa's complaint against Lieut. Col. ——. I beg leave to suggest that S<sup>r</sup> De Sousa may be desired to prosecute Lieut. Col. —— in the Recorder's Court for his conduct. I beg leave to recommend that Lieut. Col. —— may be dismissed from his command, and Lieut. —— from his situation of Fort adjutant of Baroach; and I am of opinion that it would be very beneficial to the service in this country to send Lieut. Col. —— to join that part of his corps which is in Europe.

5. I have likewise had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 25th Nov. It is impossible but that the Governor must suppose that I should feel the greatest concern in reading Col. Murray's letter to Major Gen. Nicolls of the 12th Nov. It must rest with government to take such measures as may be thought proper to vindicate its own dignity and authority. I cannot presume to suggest any thing in such a case; and I have only to add, that I will submit with cheerfulness, and carry into execution, as far as may be in my power, whatever may be ordered upon this unfortunate occurrence.

6. In respect to the allusions to my opinions on the Governor's remarks upon Col. Murray's letter, I have to say, that I never had but one opinion upon the subject of the revenue management of the districts conquered from Scindiah in Guzerat; and that was, that it should be in the hands of Major Walker. In my private letter to Col. Murray the same opinion was given; and a conduct conformable thereto was enjoined. It is perfectly true that I approved of Col. Murray's settling the country as he went on; but the reasons for that approbation were, 1st, that it was absolutely necessary for the subsistence and safety of the troops that the country should be settled; 2ndly, that Major Walker was not with the army himself, and had no servants with it to take charge and make the settlement of the countries which it should conquer. The approbation contained in my private letter to Col. Murray went no farther than to his settling as he went on under these circumstances; and it is followed by a

particular injunction to do it in communication with Major Walker, to whom I informed him that the revenue management had been given by order from the Bombay government.

7. In conducting the extensive duties with which I am charged, it has been my constant wish to conform to existing rules and establishments, and to introduce no innovations; so that at the conclusion of the war, when my duties would cease, every thing might go on in its accustomed channel. For this reason, and for others not necessary at present to discuss, I have sent no orders to Col. Murray, excepting two orders applicable to the general state of affairs, which have lately gone to him, but which were first submitted to the Governor for his approbation.

I do not comprehend, and cannot say that I admire, the system according to which the connexion with the Guickwar government is carried on; but this possibly proceeds from ignorance of the subject. At all events, I know that I am not able to suggest or order any measure that could remedy it; and if I were to interfere at all, I might order a measure which would be inconsistent with the existing system. I am therefore very desirous not to be called upon to take a more active part in the internal concerns of Guzerat than I have hitherto; and that matters should be conducted as usual, under the immediate orders of government. Whenever the Hon. the Governor in Council may think proper to call for my opinion upon any subject, I will give it him, to the best of my judgment and abilities; and I shall do so whenever I may think it necessary, in all matters which have a relation to our general situation. But I hope that he will not desire me to enter into the detail of Guzerat affairs, which I cannot be supposed to comprehend, and with which I am convinced it was never intended that I should be charged.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 6th Dec. 1803.

I have this instant received a proposal from Baba Phurkia to be allowed to come in upon a cowle. The amount of the proposal is, that I should give an asylum to him and his family, and endeavor to procure a pardon for him from the Peshwah; the meaning of which is, that I should find means of paying 4000 horse, which he says he has with him.

Baba Phurkia, in my opinion, stands strictly in the relation of a rebel to the Poonah state; and it is doubtful to me whether it will be proper to have any communication with him, excepting with the Peshwah's consent. At all events, I should not like to commence an arrangement with Baba Phurkia without first sounding the Peshwah on the subject.

It is certainly desirable that this, as well as every other great chief of

G. O.

Camp at Ellichpoor, Tuesday, 6th Dec. 1803.

Capt. Young will send into Ellichpoor one month's allowance of arrack, salt, and rice, and 8 days' allowance of sheep, for 150 Europeans.

In consequence of the great labor of the dooley bearers in the public service, and the important services they have performed in removing the wounded men to the hospitals after the late battles of Assye, and in the plains of Argann, Major Gen. Wellesley desires that a donation of 2 star pagodas may be given to each ministry, and 1 star pagoda to each dooley bearer, in the public service on the Madras establishment. This donation is to be drawn for in a separate abstract, and paid as soon as possible, by the persons in charge of the public dooley bearers in the divisions under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley and Col. Stevenson.



the Marhatta empire, should be conciliated and brought back into the service of the Peshwah. On this ground I wish you to try whether you could prevail on the Peshwah to pardon Baba Phurkia. He promises fairly that he will serve his Highness faithfully, and will never again have any communication with his enemies. If his Highness should consent to pardon Baba Phurkia, I think that I can arrange with him to serve the state for his ancient *serinjau*, which was for 700 horse.

I have informed Baba Phurkia that I know the Peshwah is much incensed against him, and that I fear I shall find it difficult to appease his Highness. In the mean time, I have desired him to remove from the Soubah's territories, in which he now is, to those of the Rajah of Berar, beyond the Wurda, and I have promised to move to his assistance in case the Rajah should attack him. Thus I have succeeded in bringing upon that rascal the full measure of God's vengeance; and if I live a month longer, he shall either be at peace with the Company, or I shall be at Nagpoor, with all the armies either with me or about me. We shall take Gawilghur, I hope, with ease. The fort has been firing all day at my parties, which I have pushed to the foot of the hill.

Our late victory was grand; it has made a great impression throughout the country. Indeed, between the destruction there dealt out, and the consequent desertion of troops, the enemy have but few troops left; and I anxiously hope that they will come within reach, to allow me to give them a parting blow with our cavalry only.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 6th Dec. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 15th Nov., upon the subject of Bulchund having joined Canojee. That may be the case, and yet Holkar may not have entered the confederacy. I acknowledge that, as he has kept out of the scrape so long, and as we have been so successful, I shall be slow to believe that he will now come forward.

I have already answered you upon the subject of the arrangements with the Bheels. Concert them with Major Walker, so that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements; and let me know what you propose should be done, and I will ratify them, if I should approve of them.

I have read, with the utmost concern, the copy of a letter which you wrote to Gen. Nicolls on the 12th Nov. This paper was hastily drawn and dispatched, to say no more of it; and I strongly recommend to you to desire to withdraw it. It contains some strong censures upon Mr. Duncan personally, and upon his government; and a hope is expressed in it, which I am convinced you could never entertain, that the day was not far distant when the government, and of course the British interests, would be involved in difficulties. An officer in the service of a government, let his rank be what it may, has no right to, and cannot with propriety, address such sentiments to that government; even supposing that they were merited, and had been excited in his mind by a long course of injurious treatment by such government. So far from that being the case, I must say that the occasion upon which you wrote did not warrant such opinions, and ought not to have excited your anger in any manner. On the contrary, I think that the letter written to Major Gen. Nicolls, by the government

of Bombay, promised the fullest support to your revenue arrangements at Godra, and that was all that you could expect. For my part, I did not expect it; and when I received the copy of their letter to Major Gen. Nicolls, which I did when it was written, I was astonished that the subject should have been viewed in so liberal a manner. I enclose you a copy of my letter to the government of Bombay upon this subject. Remember that I tell you that no person can approve of your having written the letter in question; you may depend upon it that the Governor General will take the most serious notice of it; and, therefore, I again most anxiously recommend you to withdraw it.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 10th Dec. 1803.

Since I wrote to you this morning, Amrut Rao's vakeel has been here, and has told me that 30 sirdars and 500 of the Peshwah's Pagah horse, whom his Highness sent away when he embarked at Mhar, had joined Baba Phurkia. Baba Phurkia has lately dismissed them (in fact, he has been defeated in the Nizam's territories), and they are now desirous of returning to the Peshwah's service, obtaining a pardon; or, if that should not be granted, they are ready to deliver up their horses. They are now in a village in the Nizam's country, 10 coss; and if the Peshwah chooses

G. A. O.

Camp at Boregaum, 8th Dec. 1803.

The brinjaries, magazine, grain, and provision department, &c., belonging to Col. Stevenson's division now with the camp, are to march to-morrow morning, and to encamp to-morrow on the ground on the hills on which Col. Stevenson encamped yesterday: Major Drew's battalion will escort them at that place: further orders will be received from Col. Stevenson.

The infantry, excepting the 2nd batt. 12th regt., and park and provision department, of Major Gen. Wellesley's division, will march to-morrow morning by the right. The cavalry, 2nd batt. 12th regt., the grain and bullock department, will remain on this ground; the bullocks attached to the provision department, the park and magazine, excepting 200 draft and 100 carriage bullocks which are to be in charge of the Commissary of stores, are likewise to return to this ground after to-morrow's march.

The 2nd batt. 12th regt. remains here to furnish the necessary guards for the public cattle, as also the forage guard of the elephants and camels.

The infantry outlying pickets are to be discontinued till further orders. The cavalry are to have a grand guard, consisting of a troop from each regiment, the whole to be commanded by a captain.

The grand guard is to be encamped at the village of Diryabad, and is intended to preserve communication between the corps of cavalry and infantry. This grand guard is besides the outlying pickets of the cavalry, which must continue to patrol their front. The cavalry and infantry of the allies, excepting Major Drew's battalion, will halt on this ground.

G. A. O.

Camp at Deogaum, 9th Dec. 1803.

A working party, consisting of 150 Native non-commissioned officers and rank and file, with a proportion of European and Native officers from the 4th brigade, and a similar detail from the 5th, to be sent to the park immediately, to receive tools, and proceed with an officer of pioneers to collect materials for the batteries. The carpenters of all corps to be sent to the commanding officer of pioneers at 2 this afternoon, to make mallets and point pickets.

G. O.

9th Dec. 1803.

The 1st batt. 4th regt. ordered as a working party to-morrow at 6 o'clock.

G. M. O.

Camp at Deogaum, 10th Dec. 1803.

The company of the 1st batt. 3rd regt. upon outlying picket to be sent to head quarters immediately to take charge of materials, and the coolies to carry them to Col. Stevenson's camp; the company will be out 2 days.

to have them, Capt. Graham will be able to find out from Amrut Rao's son where they are. I enclose an account of their names. Besides these people, there is a body of 3000 horse in this camp belonging to Amrut Rao, which I am now paying, which the Peshwah might as well take into his service. I wish you would propose this measure to him; but if he does not comply with your proposal, I shall discharge them immediately.

Amrut Rao has also a very fine battalion of infantry of 700 men; possibly the Peshwah would like to have that also. But I do not know whether Amrut Rao would part with it. You may sound the Peshwah, and I will try Amrut Rao. The whole expense of Amrut Rao's troops is 87,000 rupees *per mensem*.

To Capt. Armstrong.

Camp before Gawilghur, 11th Dec. 1803.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 14th Nov., conveying the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, that I should order one of the European regiments in Guzerat to be sent to Fort William.

From the different letters which I have lately addressed to him, his Excellency will have observed that the troops in that part of India are very unhealthy. There are in Guzerat 3 complete regiments of Europeans, besides detachments, which in numbers of companies ought to amount to a fourth; but Col. Murray has been obliged to draw from the garrisons, and from Surat, the troops thought necessary and allotted for their defence, in order to reinforce his corps in the field. The 65th regt., which arrived at Bombay 900 strong in May last, has not now 100 men for duty; and the 75th regt. is nearly in the same state. Under these circumstances, it does not appear to me that it will be practicable to withdraw a regiment of Europeans from Guzerat, without exposing to risk all the British interests in that quarter.

The actions in which the troops of this army have been engaged, and the general severity of the service, have weakened the corps to such a degree, that none of them would be a great acquisition to the army under the Commander in Chief, or to the garrison of Fort William, even if it was practicable to detach a regiment through Berar in either direction. But that appears to be impossible, on account of the great distance, the natural difficulties of the country through which the troops would have to pass, and the savage ferocity of the inhabitants. The batteries against this fort will, I hope, open the day after to-morrow.

To Major Shawe.

Camp before Gawilghur, 12th Dec. 1803.

I sincerely congratulate you upon Gen. Lake's victory at Cassowly,\* which I hope will be the last in this war.

\* Afterwards called the battle of Laswarree.

G. O.

Camp at Deogaum, 11th Dec. 1803.

When working parties of troops receive tools from the Commissary of stores, or engineer, the officer commanding such parties must grant receipts to the issuing officer for such tools, and will be held answerable that they are neither lost, nor unnecessarily injured, unless he specifies, in the certificate for working money, the corps or individuals by whom they may have been lost or so injured. The Commissary of stores or engineer must have people ready to receive the tools back from the working party when their tour of duty is over.

I wish it was in my power to reinforce Gen. Lake's army; but you will have seen, by my letter to Capt. Armstrong, that it is impossible; and, indeed, I doubt much whether the Governor General will wish to weaken Guzerat, when he observes the importance which the enemy attach to the operations of the corps in that country; and when he contemplates the probability, that if I should make peace with Ragojee Bloonslah, or should be able to disengage one of the divisions from the operations in his country, I shall carry it immediately into Hindustan, and the corps in Guzerat will come into activity.

I think that I am getting on towards peace. Ragojee's vakeel does not object to the compensation which I have asked for the Company; but he does to that required for the Nizam. I have demanded that his boundary should be the Wurda river, from its source in the Gawlic hills to its junction with the Godavery. It would then be advanced as far as it appears to be in Rennell's map.

I shall find a difficulty in settling with Scindiah, on account of the total want of information respecting the countries which I have demanded from him. His vakeels declare that he has no countries north of the Rajpoots, of which the Peshwah and Holkar have not each a third; excepting Peron's jaghire, which he is willing to make over to the Company. Therefore, unless we make war upon Holkar, and deprive the Peshwah of his territories, we shall not succeed in driving the Marhattas entirely from these countries, although Scindiah should cede his rights. And I acknowledge that, if this is really the state of the case, I should prefer to see Scindiah remain in the partnership, than to introduce the Company. However, I shall adhere as strictly as I can to the instructions which I have received. But the want of information regarding the proceedings of Gen. Lake, even to the extent to which he has pushed his conquests, and

Mem.

Camp at Deoganm, 12th Dec. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will cause as many baskets fit for carrying earth to be collected as can be found in their lines, and sent up to the pioneers' dépôt immediately. They will be returned or paid for.

Ci. O.

Camp at Deoganm, 12th Dec. 1803.

A working party for the batteries, consisting of the following details and corps, to parade at 4 o'clock this afternoon in front of the park:

	Capt.	Sub.	S.	D.	R. & F.	Puck.
H. M.'s 74th regt. . . . .	—	2	4	2	110	4
78th do. . . . .	1	3	10	4	220	10
The 1st batt. 2nd regt., besides Europeans and Native commissioned and non-commissioned officers, drummers, and fifers . . . . .	—	—	—	—	580	6

The men to march down in their fatigue dress, but with their arms and accoutrements.

The detachment of pioneers to march at the same time.

A covering party of Europeans, as hereafter detailed, to parade on the right of the working party, and to march with it and join the battalion on duty at Barry.

	Capt.	Sub.	S.	D.	R. & F.	Puck.
H. M.'s 74th regt. . . . .	—	—	1	—	13	1
78th do. . . . .	1	1	2	2	32	1

The officer commanding in the trenches will direct the working parties when to return to camp.

The commissary of provisions will send down an extra dram and biscuit for all the Europeans to lie in the trenches to-night, which will be issued to them by orders from Lieut. Col. Wallace, who will be there.

of the country from which he has expelled the Marhattas, and taken possession, is a great bar to the progress of the negotiations.

The battle made by Scindiah's ministers, this day, was principally to preserve his influence over the King, and his territories about Ahmednuggur; the last of which, they declared, being the place of his nativity, and the old possession of his ancestors, he never could be brought to consent to give up. I think it appears, from what they said about the King, that the countries in Hindustan were managed in the name of His Majesty, by Scindiah, his vizier.

The vakeels disclosed this day a great apprehension of Holkar's power; and they almost expressed an expectation that Holkar would attack them, as soon as the peace with the Company should be settled. They said that, in that case, they must depend upon the Company for assistance, in money and troops. When going away, they said they had a proposition to make, to draw closer the connexion between the two governments after the war; to which they hoped we should consent.

In short, every thing appears to go on well, and I think I shall succeed in settling a peace to the satisfaction of the Governor General.

P. S. I shall open upon this place to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 12th Dec. 1803.

I have perused your letter to the Governor General, and have received that written to me upon the subject of the Peshwah's desire to receive Cashee Rao Holkar at Poonah.

You will have observed, by my correspondence with the Governor General, that I refused to receive Cashee Rao in my camp. The reasons for which I refused it were: 1st, that he is useless; 2ndly, the reception of him was likely to create uneasiness in Holkar's mind, and to increase the number of our enemies.

Both these reasons apply equally to the reception of Cashee Rao by the Peshwah. It is certain that he will be useless, and a burthen to his Highness; but that will not be of much consequence, as his Highness will not do any thing for his relief. It is equally certain, that his residence at Poonah will make Jeswunt Rao uneasy; and it will never be believed that his arrival there has been unknown to, and without the concurrence of, the English.

When the war with Scindiah is concluded, of which the prospect becomes better every day, it will be necessary that some arrangement should be made with Holkar to obtain from him the territories of the Poonah government, provided the Peshwah can make such an exertion as to raise troops to take and keep possession of them. But Holkar may, upon good grounds, refuse to give up the Peshwah's territories, so long as his Highness gives an asylum to one whom he affects to call a rebel and a pretender to the Holkar territories. I most anxiously deprecate fresh cause for war and disturbance, particularly when no end is answered by it; and, therefore, I am anxious that the Peshwah should be told that he must not receive Cashee Rao Holkar. One of two things will be the consequence of his arrival at Poonah: Holkar will refuse to give up the Peshwah's territories, so long as he is there; and we must go to war to force them

from him, or we must dismiss Cashee Rao from Poonah on his demand. The first will be inconvenient, the last disgraceful; and it is best to avoid to do that which will probably lead to the necessity of adopting either.

I have got very far with Scindiah's vakeels. It is strange, that the only demand with which they have positively refused to comply, is one for the Ahmednuggur territory. They consent to give up the fort for the Peshwah. But they say that Jaunpore, Chumargoonda, &c., are the earliest possessions of Scindiah's family, and that he never can give them up. My first project went to his keeping them, but I altered it on Malcolm's suggestion. I wish to know from you, whether these territories are a great object to the Peshwah, and whether they really are the family possessions of Scindiah. I shall storm this fort either to-morrow or next day.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp before Gawilghur, 12th Dec. 1803.

I have received your letter of the 3rd. I approve of your having relieved the garrison of Neemgaum, as you state.

It will not answer to place in the field a permanent detachment, as you propose, because we have not certain means of feeding it: for, however strong it may be, we can never make it one-tenth of the strength of the enemy; and they, by bringing all their forces upon it, may distress it for provisions, and destroy it. In the former case it must retire, and in both cases we should lose our reputation, and that will not answer. It is therefore best to go on as hitherto. Your tour, whenever you make it, will be attended with great advantage.

I approve of your having given 5000 rupees to Amrut Rao's son; and I wish you to give him 10,000 more. Make an arrangement with one of Amrut Rao's people for the rent of Bingar. I enclose 2 memorandums which I have received from him: one regarding some horses belonging to a sillardar in his service, which have been seized in the Ahmednuggur district: I have given this man a cowle, and I request you to let him have his horses; the other, regarding a village said to belong to this man: I have promised him that you would inquire into this claim. I also enclose a claim from Holkar to some villages, upon which I request your answer. I expect to-morrow to open my batteries against this place.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp before Gawilghur, 13th Dec. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th Nov., enclosing one from the Medical board upon the subject of the surgeons sent to this army. Since that letter was written, this army has fought another

G. O.

Camp at Deogaum, 13th Dec. 1803.

(A covering party as yesterday.) Capt. Beauman will order the reliefs of the artillery for the battery, as he may find necessary.

G. E. O.

13th Dec.

The 74th and 78th regts. to march without their guns at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning, and encamp on a spot near Embhubany, which will be pointed out in the morning to brigade quarter master Campbell.

Arrack and provisions for to-morrow to be sent along with these regiments.

The guns, &c., attached to the 74th and 78th regts. to be sent into the park to-morrow morning.

battle, in which many officers and 300 men were wounded; and one of those surgeons is in charge of the hospital which I have established for them. I am at present engaged in a siege, in which I must expect some loss; and, upon the whole, I do not think that I can allow these surgeons to return to Bombay, with justice to the troops under my command.

I have also received your letter of the 1st inst., enclosing one from the superintendent of police, with a demand of food for dooley bearers. The quantity demanded is three times as much as is issued to any fighting man in this army, and therefore I conclude it is inadmissible; unless the government of Bombay should think it proper to send with them a commissary of provisions, supplied with provisions which it is stated to be necessary to issue to these followers.

[Memorandum, 14th Dec. 1803, see Addenda, p. 1460.]

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec. 1803.

I take advantage of a few moments' leisure, afforded me by having completed all the arrangements for storming this fort this day, as soon as the breach shall be practicable, to write to you upon the subject of the reconciliation between the Peshwah and Amrut Rao.

I enclose a long paper which I have received from Amrut Rao, which contains rather a history of the rascally intrigues of himself and the Peshwah, than an account of the real ground of their dispute. It appears to me to be the desire of Amrut Rao to exercise part of the power of the Poonah government, and the fear and the determination of the Peshwah not to give it to him.

In the prosecution of this dispute, both have been guilty of unjustifiable measures. Amrut Rao joined the Peshwah's enemies; and I believe there is little doubt that he was concerned in a plot to deprive his Highness of his government, and to substitute his son in his place. The Peshwah, on the other hand, has imprisoned the families, has seized the houses and property, not only of Amrut Rao's immediate servants and adherents, but he has imprisoned the persons of the old servants of the state; those who formerly carried on its business, and those who alone can again carry it on; under a pretence of their being the adherents of Nana Furnavees, or of Amrut Rao.

In respect to Amrut Rao, he has now placed himself in the hands of

G. O.

Camp near Gawilghur, Wednesday, 14th Dec. 1803.

Cul. Stevenson's division is to storm the northern face of the fort of Gawilghur to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock; and the following arrangements are to be made to facilitate and support that operation.

The 74th regt., 5 companies of the 78th, and the 1st batt. 8th regt. to be in readiness to march at 3 o'clock to-morrow morning, under the orders of Lieut. Col. Wallace.

5 companies of the 78th, and the 1st batt. 10th regt., with a 6 pounder attached, are to be under the command of Lieut. Col. Chalmers, and to be in readiness to march at 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

A company of the 1st batt. 8th regt., under an European officer, to be left in the 12 pound battery, Barry, &c., for the security of all the stores, &c., there.

A company of the 1st batt. 10th regt., under an European officer, to be left in the camp for the security of any thing there.

A party of 70 pioneers, with crow's, pickaxes, hatchets, and a saw, to accompany each detachment.

Major Gen. Wellesley desires that the soldiers and sepoys may not be allowed to quit their ranks without the special permission of Major Gen. Wellesley or Col. Stevenson, and the officers are made responsible for a due obedience of this order.

the British government; and, considering all the circumstances of the moment, it is not very probable that he will again be guilty of the crimes of which the Peshwah has complained with so much reason.

In respect to the Peshwah, I cannot consider his conduct in the light of that of a wise sovereign. In a case such as Amrut Rao's, there are two lines of conduct to be pursued. One is to raise a force to attack and subdue the rebel, the other is to pardon him; and if he will not accept the pardon, to endeavor to draw off his adherents by conciliating them: and, at all events, by avoiding every act of oppression on their families and servants. But the principle of the government of Poonah is revenge; and the gratification of that detestable passion, and nothing else, has yet been listened to.

The parties at this moment stand thus in the contest: Amrut Rao has possession of Poonadur and some other forts, and valuable territory belonging to the Peshwah; and the Peshwah has possession of some women, children, and houses at Poonah belonging to Amrut Rao's servants and adherents, and has the means of annoying others. I think that Amrut Rao has certainly the best of it. In order to bring the parties to a decent state of reconciliation and friendship, it will be necessary to save the honor of both, and that there should be no formal stipulation.

Amrut Rao is ready to give up Poonadur and all the places belonging to the Peshwah, provided the houses and property are restored, the families released, and no longer oppressed, belonging to the persons whose names are in the enclosed list No. 1; and provided no oppression is practised on those whose names are in the list No. 2; and on the terms which I stated in a former letter for the surrender of Poonadur particularly. If the Peshwah should comply with these terms, I will engage for Amrut Rao's surrender of the forts, &c. But his compliance must be accompanied by a real execution of the measures required from him.

In respect to the persons whose names are mentioned in the paper No. 3, Amrut Rao does not make their release a point on which must depend his reconciliation with the Peshwah; but I consider it to be one of material importance to the welfare, if not to the existence, of the Poonah government.

The day, I hope, is not far distant, when I shall be able to resign my charge in this country, and when the Peshwah will have an opportunity of settling his countries. But how is it to be done? At present, he has not in his service a common carkoon or amildar whom he can trust with the management of a single district; he has not a sepoy or a peon whom he can place as a guard on any tannah; and not a soul in his government capable of giving a line of information upon any one point, concerning the administration of the extensive territories, the government of which is in his hands. His territories are all either in the hands of his enemies, or without managers on his part; and all those persons belonging to his state who are capable of arranging it, and of rendering its resources available for the service of his government, are either in the service of his enemies, or the greater part of them imprisoned or oppressed by his Highness' government: this is a most serious consideration.



Not less than 50 times I have pressed the fellow he has here by way of a vakeel, to urge the government to send into Candeish proper persons to take possession of his Highness' rich districts in that province, which the Nizam's officers (whom I desired not to interfere with them) have told me are going to ruin for want of a person to manage them. But nothing is done; because, in fact, all the people who are capable of taking charge are in prison, or oppressed by the Peshwah: I therefore most anxiously recommend it to you to urge the Peshwah to release these people, and to make arrangements for employing them in settling his country and government upon some rational principle: otherwise, be assured that the Poonah state will never revive.

Another question which occurs upon this point is, what is in future to become of Amrut Rao? I certainly think that the most satisfactory arrangement for him would be to give him a jaghire to the amount of his pension; and for the British government to make good the jaghire to the Peshwah, either by a payment of money, or by a cession in Bundelcund. But this is a question, like many others, which may be deferred till the conclusion of the peace. At all events, I conceive that the British government ought not to give over to the Peshwah any part of the territories which they may intend to cede to him, until he shall have arranged all his matters with Amrut Rao to their satisfaction.

[*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace, 14th Dec. 1803, see Addenda, p. 1461.*]

To Col. Murray.

Camp before Gawilghur, 14th Dec. 1803.

I have received your letters of the 17th, 19th, and 23rd Nov. I have already written to you fully upon the subject of the revenue concerns. All that you have arranged in revenue will be confirmed; but Major Walker has been appointed by government to take charge of the districts conquered from Scindiah, and they must be made over to him. This arrangement will be convenient, as it will save you much time and trouble; provided there is a perfect understanding between you and Major Walker, and a sincere desire on both sides to carry on the service, and no wish in either to raise his individual personal consequence above that of the other, all will go right; and the natives will not perceive that there is a divided authority. It might possibly be proper that there should be no such division of authority; but upon this point I have to observe, that it is impossible, at such a time as this, to alter all the established systems and usages of government without inconvenience, and I certainly cannot attempt such a change. You do not say where Lieut. Carter is, but I have issued an order that he may go to Surat.

In respect to Canojee, I must write you public orders, which I will send to Mr. Dunean. It is a most desirable object to accommodate matters with Canojee; but, unluckily, the state of our engagements with the Guickwar government does not allow of our guiding their affairs in relation to foreign states, in which description may be classed such rebels as Canojee. An arrangement between us and Canojee, in which the Guickwar should not be included, would be liable to the inconveniences of its being unattended to by them, and the war would continue between Canojee and Anund Rao. In this state of affairs we should be obliged to

take part with one of the two; and in this manner we should lose all the advantages which we might hope to derive from the arrangement.

I have very little hope, I acknowledge, that the Guickwar government will be brought to consent to such an arrangement with Canojee, as he ought reasonably to be satisfied with; not because it is impossible to prevail upon them to consent to such an arrangement, but because I observe that in all our concerns with that government, instead of endeavoring to check the inveteracy of their prejudices and hatreds, (which are common to all Native governments,) and the propensity to making their individual passions the rule of the conduct of the government, those evil dispositions are encouraged, and British assistance is given to carry into execution their dictates. I therefore almost despair of an arrangement with Canojee on any ground; but, at all events, supposing him to be inclined to accede to one, it will not answer to make it simply with the British government, without including the Guickwar state.

I had always the idea of the Bheels stated in Col. Anderson's letter. The Bheels (properly so called) are the uncivilized race who inhabit the hills, and rob and plunder every body indiscriminately. The Rajahs, in and bordering on the hills, have great influence over these people, and are besides formidable in themselves, on account of the natural strength of their countries, and the numbers of armed men they can bring into the field for their defence. Both would be our best defence against the attack of a Native army; and the adoption of a liberal policy towards them at once will secure them to us for ever. The way of securing the uncivilized, or thief Bheels, would be to conciliate the Rajahs, and then we shall be secure. I recommend that, of all other things, we should avoid any interference in their individual quarrels; or the consequence will be, that we shall be involved in a system of hostilities, more destructive than that which would attend an attempt to subdue them to the British authority. Under existing circumstances, I think that the suspension of hostilities in Guzerat is a great advantage.

I expect to storm this fort to-day. The batteries are open, and the troops are in readiness, waiting till the breach is complete. If I do not storm this day, I shall to-morrow. I have then to take Nermulla, and shall make my arrangements for marching a division upon Ougein by Burhampoor. I think that Nermulla will be given up; but, at all events, as soon as I shall get possession of it, I shall break the suspension of hostilities with Scindiah, and shall march a division upon Ougein. You might then come forward also.

To Major Malcolm.

Deogaum, 15th Dec. 1803.

We have taken the fort without much loss. I am this moment returned from thence, and have opened this letter. I don't detain the bearers a moment and send them back to you. God bless you, my dear Malcolm! I long to see you.

I believe you will be able to join to-morrow, as I think Anjengaum is not more than 16 miles. At all events, it is not more than that from the cavalry camp at Boregaum, 4 miles from hence.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Deogaum, 15th Dec. 1803.

After the battle of Argaum, I determined to lose no time in commencing the siege of Gawilghur. I accordingly marched on, and arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th inst., with both divisions, and halted there the 6th, in order to establish an hospital for the wounded in the battle of Argaum. The fort of Gawilghur is situated in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee. It stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one complete inner fort, which fronts to the south, where the rock is most steep; and an outer fort, which covers the inner to the north-west and north. This outer fort has a third wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers.

The communications with the fort are through 3 gates; one to the south with the inner fort; one to the north-west with the outer fort; and one to the north with the third wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is practicable only for men; that to the second is by a road used for the common communications of the garrison with the countries to the southward; but the road passes round the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance to its fire: it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to approach regularly by it, and the rock is scarped on each side. This road also leads no farther than to the gate. The communication with the northern gate is direct from the village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of the fort; but the road to Labada leads through the mountains for about 30 miles from Ellichpoor; and it was obvious that the difficulty and labor of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great. However, after making inquiry at Ellichpoor, it appeared, both to Col. Stevenson and me, that this point of attack was, upon the whole, the most advantageous, and we accordingly adopted it.

Col. Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of

G. M. O.

Camp at Deogaum, Thursday, 15th Dec. 1803.

The breach having been reported practicable, the troops will advance to the attack at 10 o'clock.

Storming party to be commanded by Lieut. Col. Kenny, and to be formed as follows:

The advance to consist of a serjeant and 12 volunteers of H. M. 94th regt.

First party, under the command of Lieut. Col. Kenny, to be composed of 1 flank and 2 battalion companies of the 94th regt., and the flank companies of the 2nd brigade. Second party, under the command of Lieut. Col. Desse, to consist of 1 flank and 2 battalion companies of H. M. 94th regt., and the flank companies of the 1st brigade. Third party, the remainder of H. M. 94th regt., under Major Campbell. The 2nd brigade, under the command of Lieut. Col. Haliburton, will follow the storming party, advancing from the right.

The first party, after entering the breach, will turn to the right, and the second party to the left, to drive the enemy from the ramparts, while the 94th regt. and the 2nd brigade will advance and gain possession of the heights and of the enemy's guns. A detail of artillery to accompany each party, to take possession of the guns, and turn them upon the enemy.

The 1st brigade will form the reserve, under the command of Lieut. Col. Maclean: it is to advance by the right and follow the 2nd brigade, and will enter the breach, if found necessary. The whole of the troops will march down and form in situations which will be pointed out. One company of each Native corps is to remain in camp for the protection of the lines.

Pioneers and scaling ladders will be allotted to each party.

Gawilghur, for which service it had long been destined; and I therefore determined that he should make the principal attack by Labada, while I should cover his operations with my own division and all the cavalry; and, if possible, assist them by other attacks to the southward and westward. On the 6th inst., the 1st batt. 2nd regt., under Lieut. Col. Chalmers, and 2 companies of the 94th, and the 1st batt. of the 6th, under Capt. Maitland, were detached; the former to drive in the enemy from the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort; and the latter to seize the fortified village of Damungauni, which covers the entrance of the mountains by the road by which Col. Stevenson was to pass towards Labada, and to protect the parties sent forward to reconnoitre and repair the roads in the mountains. Both these detachments succeeded.

On the 7th, both divisions marched from Ellichpoor: Col. Stevenson into the mountains by Damungauni, and my division towards the southern face of the fort of Gawilghur. From that day till the 12th, on which Col. Stevenson broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division went through a series of laborious services, such as I never before witnessed, with the utmost cheerfulness and perseverance. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over mountains, and through ravines, for nearly the whole distance, by roads which it had been previously necessary for the troops to make for themselves.

On the 12th, at night, Col. Stevenson erected 2 batteries in front of the north face of the fort; one, consisting of 2 iron 18 pounders and 3 iron 12 pounders, to breach the outer fort and third wall; and one, consisting of 2 brass 12 pounders and two 5 inch howitzers, to clear and destroy the defences on the point of attack. On the same night the troops of my division constructed a battery for 2 iron and 2 brass 12 pounders on the mountain under the southern gate, with a view, if possible, to breach the wall near that gate; or, at all events, to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. Unfortunately the iron guns could not be moved into the battery, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the troops; and the fire of the brass guns produced but little effect.

The fire of all these batteries opened on the 13th, in the morning; and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. All the arrangements were then made for storming on this day. Lieut. Col. Kenny, of the 11th regt., commanded the party for the storm, consisting of the flank companies of the 94th regt., and of the Native corps in Col. Stevenson's division, supported by the 94th regt. and Lieut. Col. Haliburton's brigade, with Lieut. Col. Maclean's brigade in reserve. At the same hour, I made two attacks from the southward, to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. One, under Lieut. Col. Wallace, consisting of the 74th regt., 5 companies of the 78th, and 1st batt. 8th regt., on the southern gate; and one, under Lieut. Col. Chalmers, consisting of 5 companies of the 78th and the 1st batt. 10th regt., on the north-west gate. These last attacks could be of no service, except to draw the enemy's attention from that from the north; unless they should succeed in blowing open the gates; and till they should communicate with detachments from Col. Stevenson's corps, as they had no other means of entering the fort. All the troops advanced at about ten in the

morning. The detachment under Lieut. Col. Chalmers arrived at the north-west gate at the moment when the enemy were endeavoring to escape through it, from the detachment of Col. Stevenson's corps which had been sent to communicate with Col. Chalmers; and he entered without difficulty.

The wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been made, was then to be carried. After some attempts upon the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, a place was found at which it was possible to escalate the wall. Capt. Campbell, with the light infantry of the 94th regt., fixed the ladders against this place, escalated the wall, opened the gate for the storming party, and the fort was shortly in our possession.

The enemy's garrison was numerous. It consisted of Rajpoots, and of a great part of Beny Sing's regular infantry, which had escaped from the battle of Argaum, commanded by Beny Sing himself. They were all well armed with the Company's new muskets and bayonets. Vast numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different gates.

G. A. O.

Camp at Deogaum, Thursday, 15th Dec. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley has great satisfaction in congratulating the troops under his command upon the brilliant success of this day.

In the course of this short but active and laborious siege, Major Gen. Wellesley has, with pleasure, observed in all a most anxious and zealous desire to forward this service, the most steady perseverance in the performance of laborious services, which would be thought impracticable by other troops, and that gallantry when opposed to the enemy which they have shown so frequently during the campaign, and which has carried them with honor through so many difficulties.

This most laborious and brilliant part of the siege of Gawilghur fell to the lot of the subsidiary force, serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under the command of Col. Stevenson; and Major Gen. Wellesley adopts this mode of declaring that he never witnessed such laborious and persevering exertions as were made by this corps to bring their ordnance and stores to the point of attack.

The gallantry with which the attack was made by the detachment under the command of Lieut. Col. Kenny has never been surpassed.

Major Gen. Wellesley returns his thanks to all the officers and troops employed on this occasion, particularly to Col. Stevenson, for the manner in which he conducted the service intrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Ellichpoor to that of the capture of Gawilghur; to Lieut. Col. Kenny, who led the troops to the storm; to Capt. Campbell of the 94th, who led the light infantry of the 94th to the escalate of the inner fort; by which the capture was finally insured; to Major Campbell of the 94th regt.; and to Lieut. Col. Haliburton, who supported the attack with his brigade.

Major Gen. Wellesley's thanks are also due to Capt. Burke, commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force; to Capt. Heitland, of the pioneers; and to Capt. Johnson, of the Bombay engineers. Major Gen. Wellesley takes this opportunity of bearing public testimony of the services rendered by Capt. Johnson, in the course of this campaign, in the important department under his charge.

Although the brilliant part of the service did not fall to the lot of the division under his immediate command, Major Gen. Wellesley observed with satisfaction the exertions they made in the part allotted to them, and his thanks are particularly due to Capt. Bauman, commanding the artillery, and to Lieut. Cols. Wallace and Chalmers, for the manner in which they conducted the attacks respectively intrusted to their commands.

Major Gen. Wellesley desires that the officers who have taken charge and an account of the property captured at Ahmednuggur and Asseerghur, and upon different occasions during the campaign, will lose no time in taking charge and an account of that captured in Gawilghur, and forwarding all the accounts to Major Gen. Wellesley, in order that he may lay them before his Excellency the Governor General, and request his orders for their distribution. A Royal salute, &c. &c.

G. M. O.

Camp at Deogaum, 16th Dec. 1803

Returns of killed and wounded during the siege and the storm of Gawilghur to be sent in to the D. A. G. immediately,

This service has been performed, I hope, with small loss on our side. No officer has been killed; and but few wounded, that I have heard of, excepting Lieut. Col. Kenny of the 11th regt., and Lieut. Young of the 2nd of the 7th. In the performance of this service all the good qualities of British troops have been conspicuous to a degree which I have seldom witnessed. In bringing on their ordnance and stores to the point of attack, the troops of Col. Stevenson's division performed the most laborious work with a zeal for the service, and patience and perseverance never surpassed; and, when opposed to the enemy, their conduct showed the same gallant spirit that has carried the British troops through so many difficulties in the course of this war.

I am particularly indebted to Col. Stevenson for the manner in which he conducted the service intrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Ellichpoor to that of the capture of Gawilghur; to Lieut. Col. Kenny, for the manner in which he led on the storming party; to Capt. Campbell and the light infantry of the 94th regt., for the escalade of the inner fort; to Major Campbell and the 94th regt., and to Lieut. Col. Haliburton and his brigade, which troops supported the attack.

Capt. Burke, who commanded the artillery with the subsidiary force, Capt. Heitland of the pioneers, and Capt. Johnson of the Bombay engineers, are also entitled to my acknowledgments. The two latter were sent from my division to assist Col. Stevenson. Upon the occasion of mentioning the name of Capt. Johnson, I cannot omit to inform your Excellency, that throughout this campaign that officer has performed the most important service in the department of the guides intrusted to his charge; and I have no doubt but that his surveys will be a valuable public acquisition.

Although the most laborious and the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of the troops of my division, I have to apprise your Excellency that they performed the part allotted to them in a manner perfectly satisfactory to me: and Lieut. Col. Wallace, Lieut. Col. Chalmers, and Capt. Beauman, commanding the artillery, have received my thanks for the manner in which the two former led their divisions to the attack, and the latter exerted himself to forward the service of his department.

I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency a list of the killed and wounded, and returns of the ordnance and property captured in the fort.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose the English, Marhatta, and Persian copies of a treaty of peace, which I have this day concluded with Jeswunt Rao Ramehunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar.

I have made the treaty in the name of the British government and its allies generally, and have engaged that it shall be ratified by your Excellency only. The reasons for omitting to name the Allies in the treaty, and to engage that they shall ratify it, will become sufficiently obvious, when the character and conduct of the government of these Allies are recollected. It will remain with your Excellency to give such orders as

you may think proper, to the Residents at the different durbars, to obtain the assent of the Allies to this treaty. But I should imagine that the Rajah of Berar will be satisfied with your Excellency's ratification.

The cessions under the treaty are made to the British government and its Allies; and I have drawn it in this manner in order that your Excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter, in such manner as you may think proper. As soon as the Rajah shall ratify the treaty, I propose to desire the officers of the Soubah of the Deccan to take charge of the countries ceded in this quarter; but I shall request the Resident at Hyderabad to apprise his Highness' ministers that it must be considered only a temporary arrangement; and that all the acquisitions must be liable to be disposed of hereafter, when peace shall be made with all the powers engaged in the war.

I wished to be able to define more accurately the bounds of the cession of the province of Cuttaek, but I had no information upon the subject. Lieut. Col. Harcourt stated his opinion, that it would be convenient if the districts of Sohnporc and Boad were ceded besides Cuttaek; and Mr. Melville his, that it would be convenient to add to the province of Cuttaek countries which would have joined the northern circars with the province of Bundelcund. But upon reference to the map, which is all the information that I could procure, I found that even the first would have increased the extent of the demand, on that side, to such a degree as to make it necessary to give up part of what I demanded on this side; or to risk the conclusion of the treaty altogether.

I learn also, by a late letter from Lieut. Col. Harcourt, that he has commenced negotiations with the Rajahs of Sohnporc and Boad; and if he should conclude them by treaties, those districts will be added to the Company's territories under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. If he should not, it is certain that the Company will not have for Cuttaek the boundary for which Lieut. Col. Harcourt wished; but I do not doubt but that that province will have a very good boundary.

By the 3rd article, the Company and their Allies gain, on this side, the whole province of Berar, and the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan will be carried forward to the Wurda river. The countries thus ceded are old possessions of the Soubah of the Deccan, the revenues of which have been collected by them and the Rajah of Berar, in different proportions at different times. When the latter were admitted to a participation of them, they received one fifth, afterwards a fourth, then half, by treaty; and latterly, four fifths by exaction and violence. It appeared to me to be an object of greater importance to get rid of the Rajah of Berar entirely from this fine country, than to secure an additional barrier for Cuttaek.

The revenues of Berar, on this side of the Wurda, are computed to amount to about one crore of rupees. The Rajah had appropriated entirely to himself countries, the revenues of which are computed to have been 10 lacs of rupees; and the remainder, under different treaties, was to be divided equally between him and the Soubah of the Deccan. However, I have reason to believe, from the conferences during the negotiations, that the Rajah of Berar never received more than 30 lacs, as his share of the countries on this side of the Wurda.

Territory of this value was a great object to gain in this quarter, considering the probable circumstances of the peace with Seindiah; but whatever may be the real value of the acquisition, a great object is gained by defining the frontier of the Rajah towards the Soubah of the Deccan; and by his renunciation of all claims, of every description, not only on the countries ceded, but on the other territories of the Soubah. In the course of the conference in the negotiation, the minutes of which I shall have the honor of transmitting as soon as they can be copied, the Rajah's minister declared repeatedly, and I have reason to believe with some truth, that the demands made were of the finest and most valuable parts of his territory.

By the 4th article I have agreed that the Rajah shall have possession of the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur. In fact, these forts are of greater importance to the power which remains in possession of the mountains, than to that which possesses the plains. Without them the Rajah could not have exercised the powers of his government over the Goondwanah Rajahs in those mountains, a race of people who, above all others, require restraint; and to have given them to the Soubah of the Deccan would have added nothing to his Highness' power.

I consented to the 5th article, because the districts in the plains immediately under the hills will always be liable to the depredations of the inhabitants of the hills. The loss to the Soubah's government will be but trifling, in comparison with that which it would incur if the Rajah were not interested, as he will now be, to restrain the incursions of the hill people into the plains.

The 7th article provides that the Hon. Company are to arbitrate between the Rajah and the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah. The Rajah's minister was desirous that I should consent to confirm all grants and treaties made heretofore by those powers; but I refused this, on the ground that I could not consent to anything of which I had no knowledge. I then proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British government and its justice, as the best security the Rajah could have for his claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah; which proposal was accepted.

The territory which the Rajah wished to secure by this demand was the province of Gurrah Mundela, of which he ought to collect the revenues in participation with the Peshwah; but I imagine that he has lately seized the whole for his own use.

At all events, it appears to me to be an important point gained, and highly honorable to the character of the British government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice, against the demands of its allies. There was no objection on the part of the Rajah's minister to the 8th or 9th article of the treaty. The last clause was added to the 8th, by his desire, after the treaty had been drawn up.

The 10th article is one of considerable importance. The Rajah's minister appeared to feel the full extent of the engagements to which it bound the Rajah, and expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject. He said, that after ceding Berar and Cuttaek, the Rajah had no territories excepting what he had conquered from the zemindars, rajahs, &c.; and that by this article he might be bound to give up the whole of his terri-



tories. I told him, that whatever might be the consequence, the article was indispensable, and must be agreed to; that peace would not have been agreed to, if the British government had wished for the destruction of the Rajah's state; and that it certainly was not intended that the article should apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government; and I promised him that the British government would apply it to as few cases as possible, consistently with an adherence to good faith. The vakeel was satisfied with this assurance, which I requested him to convey to the Rajah; as I think it probable that this article will be that to which his durbar will have the strongest objections.

I had demanded an hostage for the performance of the 11th article of the treaty; but upon considering all the circumstances of the case, it appeared to me, that the best security the British government could have, would be its strength and continued success, and I had therefore determined not to persist in that demand. In giving his answer upon it, the vakeel said that the Rajah would send to me whomever I pleased, excepting his brother, his son, or his nephew, who are the only persons whose detention in my camp might possibly be a security against his hostility. It appeared to me that he would not consent to send either of those persons, and the presence of any other would certainly have been useless. Upon the whole, therefore, I thought it best not to persist in a demand with which he would not comply, and which might have risked the whole treaty.

I hope that your Excellency will approve of, and ratify this treaty. It appears to me to provide for all essential points, at the same time that it leaves the Rajah's government in existence and strength. I should have demanded a sum of money, but I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar is as poor as the other Marhatta chieftains.

I have written to Mr. Webbe, to inform him that I have signed this treaty; and to request him to prepare to set out for Nagpoor as soon as possible. In the mean time, I propose to send the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone to the Rajah, to act as Resident, till the arrival of Mr. Webbe. In case your Excellency should ratify the treaty, I request that the ratification may be sent to the Resident at Hyderabad, to be forwarded either to Mr. Elphinstone or me, according to circumstances; as I might be at a great distance, and the ratification might not reach the Rajah in the time specified. Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice to that gentleman to inform your Excellency that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the languages, has experience and a knowledge of the interests of the Marhatta powers, and their relations with each other, and with the British government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at all the sieges; he is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, and with my sentiments upon all subjects. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your Excellency.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec. 1803.

I desired Barclay to apprise you of the circumstances which prevented

me from writing to you yesterday; and as I did not sign the treaty till 7 o'clock this morning, the same occupations prevented me from writing to you before I marched.

By the treaty of peace with Ragojee Bloonslah, he will cede to the Company and their allies territory of the value of 50 lacs of rupees annually; and I have consented to restore to him the fort of Gawilghur. I shall send a copy of the treaty, as soon as one can be made. He is to ratify the treaty in eight days from this day. If I had not made this peace, my plan was to march my own division upon Nagpoor, in order, if possible, to force Ragojee to it; and to occupy yours, first in the capture of Nernulla, which, I believe, would not be a difficult operation, after what has been done in Gawilghur; and afterwards to watch the motions of Seindiah (with whom I intended to have broken the suspension of hostilities) till I should have forced Ragojee to the peace. This is a general outline of the plan I had in contemplation when I spoke to you on the day before yesterday. From circumstances which have occurred in the course of the negotiations, I am induced to believe that Ragojee is serious, and that he will ratify the peace, the terms of which have been for some time before him. But there is nothing so likely to produce this desirable result as the continuance of the pressure upon him. I propose, therefore, to continue my march to the eastward, but not with so much celerity as I should have done, if there had been no peace. I intend to halt here to-morrow, and move on slowly afterwards towards the Wurda river, which is to be hereafter the Nizam's boundary, where I shall arrive about the day that Ragojee ought to send back the peace ratified.

In respect to your corps, the first thing to do, after they shall have got a little rest, will be to repair your carriages, and to re-equip yourself for a siege, in case the continuance of the war with either of the confederates should make another necessary. The next thing to do will be to bring your division back into the plains; as I believe at all events, supposing even that you are to attack Nernulla, you must approach it by coming to the southward of the mountains. I believe that, upon the whole, the best way for you to return to the plains will be by the roads by which you entered the mountains. The road through the fort from Labada, and out of the Kood gate, is very bad; and Capt. Johnson reports that it is not practicable for guns, excepting it receives much repair. The road is not much shorter to Damungaum than that by which you marched; and, these things considered, I am of opinion that if measures are taken to avoid the ravine at Col. Maclean's old post, which I am informed can be done, that by which you entered the mountains will be the best and easiest for your return.

The fort of Gawilghur is to be restored, but not till the countries ceded

G. O.

Camp at Ellichpoor, Saturday, 17th Dec. 1803.

When Major Gen. Wellesley issued his orders to the troops on the 15th inst., he was not aware that Lieut. Cols. Desso and Lang had such opportunities of personal distinction, of which they availed themselves, as appears from the report of Col. Stevenson. Major Gen. Wellesley has more than once in the course of this campaign observed the zeal of those officers in the service on which they have been employed, and he requests them to accept his best thanks for their services in the storm of Gawilghur.

are taken possession of. However, I think it will be desirable, on many accounts, that the property should be moved out of the fort at an early period, and carried to Ellichpoor; from whence we can move it as occasion may offer. I shall be obliged to you if you will acquaint the gentlemen in charge with my sentiments upon this subject, and if you will give them every assistance of carriage in your power to send it away. You may probably be able to do this by keeping your grain department, and that part of your stores carried upon bullocks, at Labada, till the last moment; and let the bullocks carry away the prize property, and afterwards return for their loads of stores and grain. If you have any empty brinjaries, they likewise would let their cattle on hire for a trip of this kind.

The prize property might be lodged in the caravansera at Ellichpoor; one of the gentlemen might come over and look at it, and have it cleared out. It is very possible that there may be some treasure concealed at Gawilghur; and when I agreed to give up the fort (which, by the by, it was impossible to avoid without ruining Ragojee altogether), I determined to leave with you half my pioneers to assist the prize agents, as well in removing the property, as in searching for what might be concealed under ground. You will use them in such manner as you may think proper.

I have kept a battalion encamped hitherto under the Peerputty gate, near Emblee-baug, in order to keep open the communication, and guard the road through the jungles from the attempts of Bheels and others upon the passengers. As the prize property is now to come down by that road, and I shall draw off my battalion, I think that it would be advisable that you should send there 5 companies of one of yours. I likewise recommend that you should send down, by the same road, a battalion without guns, to encamp at Damungaum, near Major Drew's battalion. This battalion might reconnoitre the road from Maclean's post, clear of the ravine, and might bring down your ordnance carriages, still at Maclean's post. These 2 detachments, with St. Leger's cavalry in the plain of Bourgaum, will keep the road very secure to Ellichpoor; but I still recommend that when any thing of value is sent, it may have a small escort.

I received last night your letter written at 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ , and this morning your report of the attack. I did not know that Col. Lang and Col. Desse had acted such conspicuous parts in the assault; but I shall issue this day a G. O. upon the subject, in which I shall express my opinion of those officers.

Capt. Barclay informed me that, while detained at one of the gates to allow the troops to pass out, he had amused himself with making some of them lay down their plunder. But, for my part, I have seen many places taken by storm, and I never saw one in which so little irregularity was committed, and which was so little plundered; and it is but doing justice to the corps to declare that, in an hour after having stormed that large place, they marched out with as much regularity as if they had been only passing through it. I think the best garrison for Gawilghur will be a detachment under one of the gentlemen appointed to take an account of the prize property.

I have written you a very long letter in a great hurry, and possibly may have omitted something I had to mention to you; but if I have, I

shall write again. I forwarded your letter to Mrs. Stevenson on the 15th, and told her we were all well, after having taken the place.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Ellichpoor, 18th Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded at the siege, and in the storm of Gawilghur.\* Lieut. Young died after I addressed your Excellency on the 15th.

I have likewise the honor to enclose a return of the ordnance, &c., captured at Gawilghur. The quantity of property captured has not yet been ascertained; but I imagine that there will not be much.

After I had addressed your Excellency on the 15th inst., I received from Col. Stevenson a detailed report of the proceedings of the division under his command, in the storm of the fort, from which I observe that Lieut. Col. Lang and Lieut. Col. Desse had opportunities of distinction, of which they availed themselves. In the course of the campaign, I have more than once had occasion to observe the zeal of these officers for the service, and their exertions to forward it; they have received my thanks for their conduct on the 15th inst.; and I beg leave to recommend them to your Excellency's notice.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.*

19th Dec. 1803.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to request that if you do not find the enemy strong on the road you will proceed by the direct route to Adjuttee, and deliver over the 500 loads of rice under your charge to the Commissary of provisions' servants there, to be issued on regular indents and according to the orders for the use of the European and Native sick in hospital and the garrison of that place. If you should find the enemy in force upon the direct road, the Major General desires that you will turn off it and proceed by Akowla and the Laakenwarra ghaut to Adjuttee. If you find the enemy immediately in your neighbourhood at any time, and have reason to apprehend an attack, you are to take post and send notice of your situation.

Whether you proceed by the direct road or by the Laakenwarra ghaut, the Major General desires that you will dispatch the 2 letters delivered to you this morning, addressed to the people at Dewal ghaut who have charge of the 216,000 rupees, which are to be delivered over to you, and direct them to proceed with that treasure so as to meet you with it on the day of your arrival at Adjuttee.

You will then take charge of that money, and will give rupees to the paymaster's shroff there for all the gold coins in his possession, at the exchange of 365 Chillauny rupees for 100 star pagodas. If Capt. Seott represents to you that the shroff has not a sufficient sum of money in his possession for the use of the garrison and sick, you will advance him, upon his receipt, such further sum as may be deemed necessary.

You will carry on the remainder of those 2 laes of rupees and the gold coin received at Adjuttee, employing for that purpose as many of the Company's hired bullocks as may be necessary, and proceed towards the Godavery with a view of

<i>* Europeans.</i>					<i>Natives.</i>
	Lieut. Col.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Rank & File.	Non-Com. Officers and Privates.
Killed	—	—	1	5	8
Wounded	1	—	1	59	51

\* The officers of the Native Infantry, being British, are included under the head of Europeans.

G. O.

Camp at Ellichpoor, Sunday, 18th Dec. 1803.

Major Gen. Wellesley intends paying a visit to Rajah Mohiput Ram this afternoon, at 5 o'clock, and will be glad to see any officers off duty who may be inclined to ride with him on the occasion.

bringing up any convoy or officers from Hyderabad who may have arrived at Dharore, and all the brinjaries and bazaar men belonging to camp and grain dealers of the country whom you may be able to collect.

On your arrival at Adjutee, and when you are able to ascertain the time when you can be on the Godavery, you will apprise Major Robertson, who will be at Dharore, of your approach, and take such measures as you may find necessary to insure his joining you with such other officers and convoy as may be at Dharore. You will at the same time inform the soubahdar at Rackisbaum of your coming down, and direct him to give intimation to the brinjaries, &c. of the time and place which you will go to on the river, that they may join you.

If the officers and men who quitted Scindiah's service and proceed with you from camp towards Bombay, or those who will join you at Adjutee, should require a month's pay to be advanced them, you will pay them the sum stated in the G. O. upon bills addressed to Capt. Bellingham, in the form which they have in their possession.

An account shall be sent to you at Adjutee of the money advanced to the brinjaries for their hired bullocks with you; and if you find that they are in want of money after you receive the rupees from Dewal ghaut, you may advance them some and take their receipt for it.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 14 miles E. from Ellichpoor, 20th Dec. 1803.

When the peace shall be ratified by Ragojee Bhoonslah, I propose to send Mr. Elphinstone to his camp, to act as Resident till the arrival of Webbe. I may also have occasion to request Malcolm to go to one of these chiefs, and, in this case, I shall be much in want of assistance. Malcolm tells me that you would have no objection to allow Mr. Strachey to come here, and if this be the case, I shall be much obliged to you if you will ask him to give me his assistance. If he starts from Poonah immediately on the receipt of this letter, he will meet Capt. Baynes' detachment on the river Godavery, or it will arrive there in a few days after him. I have no doubt but that Ragojee will ratify the treaty.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 20th Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose a translation of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar. I should have sent it off 2 days ago, only that I learned that our tappalls were stopped about 30 miles from Ellichpoor, by Scindiah's pindaries wandering about the country. But I have sent to disperse them; and I fancy that the tappall will now run without interruption.

Capt. Colebrooke has purchased many horses for the cavalry; and has nearly completed the regiments with very good horses, at a rate as cheap, I believe, as they are purchased by the horse agent. Indeed, the 19th dragoons have now better horses than I have ever seen with them.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know what you wish that Capt. Colebrooke should have. I imagine the best mode of paying him for this trouble would be to give him an agency of 10 *per cent.*: as

G. A. O.

Camp at Dewalwarra, Tuesday, 20th Dec. 1803.

The Parsee merchant has represented that native servants come to his shop and take away goods without paying for them or giving a receipt, and sometimes without leaving their master's name, by which conduct he is in danger of being ruined. As the credit of the army, as well as its future convenience, is interested in preventing this, Major Gen. Wellesley requests that, when gentlemen send their servants to the Parsee's shop for goods, they will send ready money to pay for what they want, as the man has resolved not to allow any thing to be carried away by servants until paid for.

The 5th brigade to furnish a havildar's guard immediately, for the care of the Parsee merchant's property. It is to be relieved daily.

of course his agency will cease as soon as the regiments are completed ; a salary would not, I imagine, answer.

I have no doubt but that the Rajah will ratify his treaty, and that Seindiah will make his peace as soon as he can. Indeed, his vakeel and I are agreed upon the principal points ; and we should have concluded a treaty some days ago, if I had received from Bengal any information whatever of even the names of the countries which the Governor General wished to have. I was, therefore, obliged to acknowledge my ignorance, and to ask the vakeel for information of the state of the countries in Hindustan. This is preparing in Seindiah's camp, and is the cause of the delay.

I believe that Seindiah's vakeels are not yet aware that I have concluded peace with the Rajah of Berar. When they believe so, they will lose no time in concluding one likewise. But little property has been found in Gawilghur, and all the dreams of treasures are disappointed. There is some money, but in copper ; and I imagine the whole cannot amount to one lac of rupees.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 21st Dec. 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st inst. I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote to Ghazy Khan's son, which will show you the extent of the engagements into which I have entered with that freebooter. It appears that he has long been in the habit of collecting money for the zemindars, in the neighbourhood of the range of ghauts between the Godavery and the Poorna, under the pretext of protecting them from robbers, but really to refrain from robbing them himself. Upon my arrival in that part of the country, I found it to be in a state so defenceless, and so little the object of the care of the Soubah's government, that I saw clearly that unless I could attach Ghazy Khan to my cause, I must give up all hope of preserving my communication with the Godavery, through the extensive jungles and hills bordering on the Payon Gunga. I therefore thought it best to interest that freebooter in my success, by giving him some of the districts close to the ghauts, from which my detachments had driven the enemy ; and as his son, whom he sent to my camp, expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject of his claims upon the zemindars, when the countries should come into the possession of the British government, I promised, in the enclosed letter, that the Company's troops would not interfere with those claims ; and I further granted him an allowance of 3000 rupees a month, to assist him in carrying on the war against the Rajah of Berar.

Peace having been made with the Rajah of Berar, and the whole of the country as far as the river Wurda having been ceded to the British government and its allies, it becomes necessary to put these arrangements, made with Ghazy Khan, on a more permanent foundation. At all events, his hostilities against the Rajah of Berar must be stopped ; although it is necessary to continue the payment of his allowance, so long as any of our troops are in this quarter, in order to insure the communication with the Godavery.

I propose immediately to send for his vakeel, and to make the following arrangements : 1st ; That he shall enjoy the districts which I have

given to him, in the quality of a jaghiredar in the service of the Soubah of the Deccan. 2ndly; That he shall continue to receive the money which he has hitherto received from the zemindars, on account of protecting them from robbers; provided he does really protect the country, and keep the communication free. 3rdly; That he is to be, in all respects, a faithful servant and subject of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

The pindarries have lately been on the road by which my dawk runs, and I find that my peons have concealed themselves and their packets in the villages, till the road shall be free. For this reason I sent you the letter to the Governor General of the 17th, containing the copy of the peace; and I send you another this day, containing the memorandum of the conferences during the negotiation, by Rajah Mohiput Ram's tappall, which he informed me went by a shorter route to Hyderabad than mine.

You will find in the margin the dates of all the letters which I have received from you since the 25th Oct. I beg you will make the use you proposed of the money sent for me by Major Bownass; and forward the remainder, with that expected from Vellore, as soon as it shall arrive at Hyderabad. If Major Bownass loses no time on his road, he will arrive at Dharore by the time that Capt. Baynes' detachment will be upon the Godavery.

I think it will be advisable that you should purchase half of the 30,000 bullock loads of rice, to which you allude. I am sorry to say that I think there is reason to apprehend a scarcity of grain throughout the country; and although I think it almost certain that we shall have no foreign enemy, in a short time the troops will require that supply of rice.

I am concerned to observe the state of affairs between the Soubah and his ministers. However, it is probable that all parties will be pleased with the English connexion, after the events of this war, and the care taken of his Highness' interests in the negotiation for the peace; and although, on private grounds, we might feel for the disgrace of his present servants, we may probably have no public cause to regret it, or to interfere in their favor. Rajah Mohiput Ram acknowledged to me that he had received orders to increase the numbers of his Highness' troops, but no money to enable him to carry these orders into execution; and I really believe that the body of troops in camp is not equal to more than half the number of which it ought to consist by treaty.

Upon a late occasion the Rajah brought to me a proposal, to take into the Company's service a mussulmann sirdar in the service of Scindiah with 1000 horse. I took that opportunity of reminding the Rajah of the orders he had received from the durbar to increase his force, and of pointing out to him its incomplete state at that moment; but I told him that if he had not the means of paying the sirdar in question, and that if he plainly told me so, I could take him into the service, on the account of the Company. The Rajah then proposed that the Company should pay half of the expense: to which proposition I made the same reply; and as I believe in the course of that day he had received from the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar some information of the demands which I had made, for the satisfaction of the Soubah of the Deccan, he returned next morning, and told

me that Rajah Sookroodoor had agreed to procure the money, and that he had apprised the sirdar in Scindiah's service that he should be taken into that of the Soubah of the Deccan.

In the present state of the war, it is, in my opinion, a matter of immaterial importance whether the Soubah's army is increased or not; but I consider it as one of very great importance, with a view to the future settlement and management of his territories. These objects cannot be attained without a large body of effective troops in the service of the state, or the assistance of the subsidiary force. If the latter are required for the support of the internal government upon all the occasions that must be expected to occur, there is no difficulty in foreseeing that its number must be doubled at least; the forts must be delivered over to the British government, and the whole system of the connexion must be altered. This would certainly end in the annihilation of the Soubah of the Deccan. If the government are willing really to have in their service a body of effective troops, for the purpose of the support of the internal government in time of peace, and to act with the British troops in time of war, their own system in regard to their troops must be in some degree altered; the state must have troops paid by the public resources, through the medium of the public officers, without the intervention of the jaghiredars. This last system appears to me to be most consistent with the Governor General's views and liberal policy; and I think it probable that he will be desirous of seeing the Soubah's army placed on a respectable footing. If you should be of this opinion, I anxiously recommend to you to turn your attention to this subject: and as, from the disposition already manifested by his Highness, it is not probable that he will spontaneously adopt the measures which are necessary in order to give him an army, I suggest for your consideration the propriety of continuing to press upon his ministers the breach of the treaty by his Highness, in not producing the requisite force, as a ground-work of an amendment of the treaty of defensive alliance in this point, before the territories ceded by the enemy at the peace are given over to him.

Memorandum transmitted to Col. Stevenson.

23rd Dec. 1803.

1. Col. Stevenson will have observed that, by the 3rd article of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, the province of Berar, as far as the Wurda river, is ceded to the British government and its allies; and it is necessary to take possession of it, and settle its government.

2. From the nature of the government which has hitherto existed in

G. O.

Camp at Dowalwarra, Thursday, 22nd Dec. 1803.

The line to be under arms to-morrow morning at 7 o'clock, and prepared to move in their columns of brigades from their left, according to the orders which officers commanding brigades will receive. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that they will be at his tent with their staff at 7 o'clock to receive their orders. The guns, but not tumbrils, to accompany corps; corps to parade as strong as possible; all piquets to join, but the quarter and rear guards to stand fast.

When Amrut Rao approaches the right of the line, a salute of 19 guns is to be fired from the guns which Capt. Beauman will appoint. Corps of cavalry to carry their swords, and infantry to present their arms, and officers to drop their swords by corps, as Amrut Rao shall pass each. The music, trumpets, and drums to sound and beat a march as the corps carry swords and present arms.



this province, that will not probably be a very difficult measure. The government has, in fact, been in the hands of the Nizam, and his officers are already in all the principal places in the country. The Rajah had the largest share of the revenues, but he collected the money by sending his carkoons into the different districts at the time the revenues were paid; or by having them constantly residing in the districts, at the same time that the Nizam's officers were carrying on the business of the government.

3. These carkoons belonging to the Rajah of Berar have been driven out of the districts; and it is reported by Rajah Mohiput Ram that not one remains. The government therefore of the country may be supposed to be in the hands of the Nizam's officers.

4. However, enough has been seen of the mode of conducting business by the Nizam's officers, to render it doubtful whether they really have possession of the country, as they say they have; at all events, it will be necessary to keep a force in this quarter, till the peace shall have been comparatively consolidated, and the Rajah shall have resumed his residence at Nagpoor, and dispersed his troops.

5. Intelligence has been received, that he has crossed the Wurda, and is now employed in dismissing his troops. But these very troops thus dismissed may, and will most probably, employ their leisure moments in the plunder of this country; and the Rajah himself might not be disinclined to give us some employment in the territories ceded to us; not only by encouraging these discharged troops, but also by the inroads of some in his own service.

6. For all these reasons, therefore, it appears necessary that some force should be kept up for a time in this country; and they have been particularly detailed, in order that Col. Stevenson may have an opportunity of applying his instructions to the officer in command, to the different points which can occur.

7. Rajah Mohiput Ram has been desired to take possession of, and

G. M. O.

Camp at Dewalwarra, Friday, 23rd Dec. 1803.

The ratification of a treaty concluded with Ragojee Bhoonslah, Rajah of Berar, is to be delivered to Major Gen. Wellesley at 12 o'clock to-day.

A Royal salute to be held in readiness in the park, to be fired on the delivery of the treaty.

A European flank company from the 4th brigade, and the band of H. M. 78th regt., to parade at head quarters a quarter of an hour before 12 o'clock.

A troop of Native cavalry to parade at head quarters a quarter before 2 this afternoon.

Major Gen. Wellesley intends riding out to meet Vittel Punt, the Dewan of Dowlut Rao Scindiah: he will be glad to see any officers off duty, who may wish to be present at the delivery of the treaty, or to ride with him to meet the Dewan.

An extra drain to be issued to the Europeans to-day, on the occasion of the peace with the Rajah of Berar.

G. O.

23rd Dec. 1803.

A troop of the infantry piquet of Native cavalry to parade at head quarters at a quarter before 5 o'clock this afternoon, to attend Major Gen. Wellesley to the tent of Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, vakeel of the Rajah of Berar. Major Gen. Wellesley will be glad to see any officers who may be inclined to ride with him on the above occasion.

Amrut Rao has requested Major Gen. Wellesley to allow the troops to accept of a *zeafet* from him to-day, as a testimony of the satisfaction he derived from their military appearance and performance this morning. The Majors of Brigade, adjutant of artillery, and commandant of pioneers, will accordingly receive 300 rupees for each corps as a *zeafet* from Amrut Rao and will distribute the money immediately.

make the arrangements for, the government of the country. He will leave in it a force in his Highness' service, with the commander of which Lieut. Col. Lang may be desired to communicate for the public good. This force might be under Col. Lang's orders, if Col. Stevenson has been in the habit of arranging the service in that manner.

8. From what has been above stated, it will appear that although Ellichpoor, or possibly Oomrawootty, which is farther to the southward, would be the most central situation for the detachment, it ought not to be entirely stationary; but should move, and with celerity, to those parts of the province in which its services may be most required.

9. For the present, a garrison of 300 men must be left in Gawilghur; and in case the detachment should move from Ellichpoor, the number of troops stationed there ought to be increased to 100. In a few days, it is expected that it will be possible to give up Gawilghur entirely, according to the treaty.

10. Along with this memorandum will be sent the translation of a letter to Rajah Mohiput Ram, and translations of 2 proclamations, which will point out more clearly the arrangements which have been ordered. Maps of the country, as far as they can be made out, shall be sent to Col. Lang.

11. Lieut. Col. Lang must be requested to have an eye upon the proceedings of the Nizam's officers, and to report any deviation from the instructions in that letter and those proclamations.

12. He must be desired also to correspond with Mr. Elphinstone at Nagpoor (whose tappall will run to Ellichpoor), and to inform that gentleman, in case he should find any difficulty on the part of the Rajah's officers in settling the country, or that the Rajah's troops remain in it; and of course they must be attacked if they do remain.

#### Proclamation.

23rd Dec. 1803.

By the article of the Treaty of Peace between the Hon. Company and their allies, on the one part, and Senah Sahab Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other, the province of Berar, lying to the westward of the river Wurda, having been ceded in perpetual sovereignty to the British government and their allies, by Senah Sahab; all amildars, &c. &c., are hereby required to obey the orders they will receive from Bahrah Muce, who is appointed by Major Gen. Wellesley, and empowered to settle that country.

#### Proclamation.

23rd Dec. 1803.

Peace having been concluded between the Hon. the East India Company and their allies, on the one part, and Senah Sahab Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other: Hostilities are to cease forthwith; of which, all officers and others concerned are to take notice.

No person whatever is to be molested for the part he may have taken in the late war, or for having been heretofore the subject of Ragojee Bhoonslah. Persons who may have been in his service, or his subjects, inhabitants of countries transferred by the articles of the peace to the authority of the British government, and their allies, are to be treated in

the same manner, in every respect, as the ancient servants and subjects of the British government, and their allies; provided they are obedient to the laws and to the orders which they shall receive.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 23rd Dec. 1803.

You will learn, by a perusal of the enclosed dispatch, that the Rajah of Berar has ratified the treaty of peace. In consequence thereof, I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to make arrangements for taking possession of the territories ceded in this quarter by the 3rd article of the treaty, in a letter, of which I herewith enclose a copy.

I beg you to communicate this circumstance to the government at Hyderabad; but, at the same time, apprise his Highness the Soubah that this must be considered only as a temporary arrangement, and that all the territories conquered from the enemy, or ceded by treaties of peace, must be deemed liable to be disposed of hereafter, when peace shall be made with all the powers at war.

To Rajah Mohiput Ram.

23rd Dec. 1803.

I have to inform you that I have concluded a treaty of peace with the vakeel of Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, which has been ratified by that Chief, and the ratifications have been delivered to me this day.

By the 3rd article of that treaty of peace, Senah Saheb Soubah has consented to cede to the British government and their allies all his rights and interests, and all the territories which he may possess which are to the westward of the river Wurda, and to the southward of the hills on which are situated the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur.

His boundary, therefore, in future, towards the Soubah of the Deccan, will be the Wurda river and the hills above mentioned. I have to request that you will make the following arrangements to take possession of, and settle those countries in the name of the allied governments. You will bear in mind that, from their situation, it is probable that they will be hereafter the possession of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan solely; but it is impossible to settle that point definitively, till peace shall be made with all the powers at war.

1st; You will appoint a sirdar to take possession of the countries, in whose ability and integrity you can confide. Let me know the name of the person on whom you shall fix, in order that I may insert it in the proclamation of which No. 1 is a copy.

2ndly; You will place under the command of this sirdar a sufficient body of horse and foot to enable him to perform the service intrusted to him; and to drive out the enemy's pindarries, who may be expected to remain here for some time. I will appoint some British troops to remain in the country, and assist those of his Highness.

3rdly; You are to give orders to this sirdar to circulate proclamation No. 2, which is enclosed; and he must conduct himself in every respect in the manner pointed out in the proclamation. If I should learn that he has been guilty of any oppression, or that he has persecuted any person because such person has formerly been the subject, or has rendered services to Ragojee Bhoonslah during the war, I will desire you to deprive

this sirdar of his office ; and will make to the court of Hyderabad a complaint of you and of him ; and I shall particularly desire that he may never be employed again.

In the arrangements which I have thus requested you to make, you will observe a fresh mark of my confidence in you, and of my desire to act in a manner that will be agreeable to the Soubah of the Deccan ; and I hope that, in carrying them into execution, you will take care to act in such a manner as will justify the confidence I place in you, and will be honorable to the British government and its allies, and particularly to the Soubah of the Deccan.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 23rd Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I this day received the ratification of the Rajah of Berar of the treaty of peace, signed on the 17th inst., by myself on the part of the Hon. Company and their allies, and by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder on the part of Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah. I propose hereafter to forward this instrument to your Excellency.\*

Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers, Eitul Punt and Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp this afternoon, for the purpose, as they say, of making peace for their master. I yesterday gave notice to Scindiah's vakeels, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, that I was desirous to put an end to the agreement made on the 23rd Nov. for suspending hostilities ; and that I should consider it as null and void from the 27th inst.

To Lieut. Col. Harcourt.

Camp, 4 miles E. of Ellichpoor, 24th Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose for your perusal duplicates of dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward as soon as possible. In consequence of the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah, you will, I presume, cease all negotiations with his subjects and servants, without waiting for further orders from his Excellency.

I beg you to acknowledge the receipt of this letter by post, as well as by the return of the messenger.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

†24th Dec. 1803.

Peace having been concluded with the Rajah of Berar, I have appointed you to go to the camp of that Chief, and act as Resident till the arrival of Mr. Webbe. You will, accordingly, commence your march as soon as will be convenient to you, attended by the troops appointed in this day's orders as your escort.

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 633 : Treaty of Deogaum, 17th Dec. 1803.

† No date in the copy ; but on reference to the Wellesley Dispatches, '*Marquis Wellesley to the Court of Directors*, 21st Feb. 1804, vol. iii. p. 565, it appears that Mr. Elphinstone was dispatched by Major Gen. Wellesley to reside at the durbar of the Rajah of Berar on the 24th Dec. 1803.

G. O.

Camp at Cowlah, 24th Dec. 1803.

The detachment of the 1st batt. 2nd regt., ordered to be held in readiness, is to proceed with the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone to the camp of Ragojee Bhonslah, Rajah of Berar, and will join him at sunrise to-morrow morning. Mr. Gilbert Briggs, Ass. Surgeon, to attend Mr. Elphinstone on his mission to the camp of the Rajah of Berar. Cornet Robert Close, 4th regt. Native cavalry, is appointed to command Mr. Elphinstone's escort.

A principal object of your attention, on your arrival in the camp of the Rajah of Berar, should be to endeavor to convince him of the sincere desire of the British government to consolidate the peace. You will omit no opportunity of assuring him that the British government is desirous that he should continue a respectable power in India; and that, if he should fulfil the articles of the peace, and perform the common duties of friendship, the British government will never break with him. If he should make any propositions, such as you have heard his vakeel make, in the conferences during the negotiations, to draw more closely the alliance between the two governments, you will encourage him to speak plainly upon that subject. Inform him that it is probable his Excellency the Governor General will be inclined to attend to his wishes, provided you are enabled to state them to him distinctly; at the same time, apprise him that all governments must consider their own interests in such a case, and unless bound by previous engagements, it might be possible that to give him assistance, in the moment of danger, might be inconsistent with the interests of the British government. On this ground, you will urge to the Rajah the necessity of providing, by previous engagements, for the support and assistance of the British government, and of his stating his wishes upon this point in the most distinct manner.

Another object which I recommend to your attention, is to see that the articles of the peace are carried into execution.

It is not impossible but that the Rajah's amildars and sirdars in the province of Berar will be unwilling to withdraw; and that the person appointed to take charge of it will complain to you of their delays, and of the irregularities of their troops, and of those of the Rajah upon the borders. In every such case you will remonstrate, in the strongest manner, in the name of the British government. You will require the Rajah to give into your hands written orders addressed to the persons complained of, and messengers of his to carry them; and you will apprise him of my determination to retaliate, in the manner which I may think most efficacious, any injury done to the territories ceded by the treaty.

I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah is sincere in his desire for peace with the British government, and that he will adhere to his treaty, even if the war should continue with Scindiah. But his treachery is notorious, and the sacrifices which he has made are very great; and he might be induced to renew the war in hopes to regain part of what he has lost. For this reason it is necessary that you should do every thing in your power to be accurately informed of all that passes in his durbar, particularly with the emissaries of Scindiah and Holkar, and the southern chiefs.

Endeavor to obtain an accurate account of the numbers and description and disposition of the Rajah's armies. Observe the movements of each corps, and endeavor to trace the causes of them; and if you should find the movements of the troops to correspond with the intelligence you may receive of the intrigues carrying on in the durbar with the emissaries of Scindiah and Holkar, you must remonstrate without loss of time, and point out to the Rajah the certain loss of his government, which must be the consequence of a renewal of the war.

An accurate knowledge of the numbers, description, and disposition of the troops will enable you to judge not only of the truth of any reports you may receive of the existence of intrigues between Ragojee Bhoonslah, Scindiah, and Holkar, and of Ragojee's intention to renew the war; but also of the fact whether he does or does not impede the Soubah's officers in the settlement of the countries ceded by the treaty of peace.

It is very desirable also, that you should endeavor to ascertain the extent of the Rajah's resources, the amount of his revenue, from what source it is derived, and how collected; and the nature of his tenure of the different portions of territory still remaining in his possession. It is obvious, however, that much information upon these last mentioned extensive and intricate subjects cannot be acquired for a great length of time; and, indeed, it does not appear to be an object of such consequence at this moment, as to obtain information regarding the communications with Scindiah and Holkar, and of the strength and position of the troops.

In regard to the modes of acquiring this intelligence, I have but little to say. You must employ those which your own experience and discretion will suggest; and as I know that no intelligence can be gained without expense, I beg you to incur such as you may think absolutely necessary to obtain that which is required.

I beg leave also to recommend to you, as much as possible, a constant personal intercourse with the ministers of Ragojee Bhoonslah's durbar, instead of communicating by means of any Native servants. The establishment of this mode of communicating at an early period, if it does not immediately lay open to you sources of information which would otherwise be wanted, will, at least, give the government the advantage of them hereafter.

It is vain to hope that any Native, in the situation of a minister at a durbar, will ever trust another in the situation of servant to the British Resident; and it is equally so to hope that the British Resident will ever be able to gain any useful intelligence from the ministers at any durbar, if his intercourse with them is to be a matter of state or parade, or any thing but a daily occurrence for the transaction of the daily business. I therefore most earnestly recommend it to you, to establish this intercourse with the durbar of Ragojee Bhoonslah without loss of time, as a measure from which may be derived, immediately, all the information which can be required; and, at all events, from which the best consequences may be expected hereafter.

I request you to make me acquainted with all that occurs, and you will make your reports regularly to his Excellency the Governor General.

It is desirable that, if possible, you should establish a dawk from Nagpoor to Cuttack, and another from Nagpoor to Hyderabad. The latter will not be a matter of much difficulty, as the road, for the greatest part, runs through the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan. You will press these points upon the Rajah's ministers, and urge them particularly, as being the consequence of the 9th article of the treaty of peace; but if they should refuse to allow of these establishments, or should secretly defeat their objects, which is not improbable, you might run a dawk from Hyderabad to Oomrawootty, or any other principal place nearer Nagpoor

on the frontier, and communicate with such place by means of daily cossids.

In pressing these points, and, indeed, every other detailed in this letter, on the Rajah's ministers, it is scarcely necessary that I should urge you to adopt the most conciliatory language and manners.

Those qualifications which have induced me to send you upon this important mission, and to recommend you to his Excellency the Governor General, give me full confidence that every thing in your power will be done to conciliate the Rajah to the British government, and to diminish the acuteness of his feelings upon the occasion of his late misfortunes and losses by the war.

Enclosed, you have Persian, Marhatta, and English copies of the treaty of peace. As soon as it can be copied, I will send you a copy of the memorandum of the conferences with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 4 miles E. of Ellichpoor, 25th Dec. 1803.

Licut. Col. Close has transmitted to me a copy of your dispatch of the 2nd inst., on the subject of the claims of the Hon. Company on the Rajahs of Kolapoor and Sawunt Warra, and Baboo Rao Angria, for piracies committed under the authority of those chiefs. The Rajah of Kolapoor is, I know, independent of the Peshwah; and it would not, perhaps, be consistent with justice to call upon his Highness to pay for his piracies, which he cannot have in his power to control. I know of no connexion between Scindiah and the Rajah of Sawunt Warra and Angria, excepting, perhaps, relationship to the latter. At all events, the political connexion, if any ever existed, has been dissolved, as both these chiefs have been neutral during the war; and the neutrality of the latter has been most advantageous to our cause.

I think it desirable to avoid affording grounds for the renewal of this political connexion, by calling upon Scindiah to satisfy the Company's claims upon the Rajah of Sawunt Warra and Angria; and, therefore, unless the Governor in Council should particularly desire it, I propose not to notice this subject to Scindiah's ministers. Another reason for omitting to mention it is, that it would answer no end whatever: Scindiah has no pecuniary means of satisfying those claims; and the consequence of agitating the question would be the necessity of deferring the consideration of it to a future period, and the certain revival, by our own act, of the political connexion between Scindiah and the chiefs on the coast, which, if it ever existed, has been destroyed by the success of the war. In respect to the claims upon the Rajahs of Kolapoor and Sawunt Warra, and Baboo Rao Angria, I think it very probable that they have not now, and never will have, the means of satisfying them. The Supreme government alone can decide what measures ought consequently to be adopted: but, in the mean time, it appears wise to block up their ports entirely; and I believe that this measure, which is certainly a severe punishment, is the only satisfaction of which such a case will admit.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 30th Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I have this day con-

cluded, with the vakceels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and signed, a treaty of peace;\* copies of which, in the English, Persian, and Marhatta languages, I have the honor to enclose.

This treaty, like that with the Rajah of Berar, is concluded in the name of the British government and its Allies generally, and the cessions are made to all the allied powers. It will remain with your Excellency to give orders to the Residents at the different durbars, to procure the consent of the Allied governments to the treaty, and to divide the conquests in such manner as you may think proper.

By this treaty, which I hope your Excellency will ratify, all the important objects detailed in your Excellency's instructions of the 27th June are secured, and the ground is laid for a more complete alliance with Scindiah's government; or, supposing that he should omit to take advantage of the terms offered to him, to ally himself more closely with the Company's government, such an influence will be established in his as will render it very improbable that its means will ever be again directed against that of the Company.

By the 2nd article of the treaty, Scindiah consented to cede to the Hon. Company all his territories north of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud. A schedule is annexed to the treaty, which contains the best account that can be procured of the revenue of those territories.

Besides the territories included in the schedule, there are 3 pergunnahs also north of the countries of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud, viz., Dhoolpoor, Barce, and Rajah Kerruh, which were formerly granted to the family of Scindiah in enaum, which have never been carried into the

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii., p. 631; Treaty of Surjee Anjengann, 30th Dec. 1803.

G. O.

Camp at Khan Zemann Nuggur, 26th Dec. 1803.

As it is deemed expedient to give spirits to some of the native sick in the field hospital at Ellichpoor, Capt. Young will send a quantity of arrack into that place for the purpose of complying with the daily indents which the surgeon will make upon him.

Capt. Young will employ a conicopoly at Ellichpoor in the provision department, and another for the grain department.

Major Gen. Wellesley's division and the subsidiary force are to march to-morrow morning by the right. Major Gen. Wellesley's division to lead from its right, followed by the subsidiary force from its right. The *general* to beat at 5, and the assembly at 6 o'clock.

The brigades of cavalry in both divisions to form the advance, and to march with their guns upon the high road, to be followed by the advanced piquets of Major Gen. Wellesley's division. The guns and tumbrils attached to corps in Major Gen. Wellesley's division to march upon the high road, each brigade escorted by a serjeant or havildar and 13 rank and file of the corps to which they belong. The guns, tumbrils, and other wheel carriages in the park and provision department of that division to follow.

The guns, &c., attached to corps of infantry in the subsidiary force are then to follow upon the high road, and escorted as above, and the guns, tumbrils, and carts in the park and provision department, and private carriages belonging to the subsidiary forces.

The corps of infantry of both divisions will march on the left of the high road.

The officers commanding brigades will take care to lead off their brigades on the left of the wheel carriages at once, and not cross them on the road. The wheel carriages in the departments in Major Gen. Wellesley's division are to be put in motion very early in the morning, so that there may be no delay in the march of the carriages of Col. Stevenson's division.

The advanced guard of Col. Stevenson's division to precede his own infantry; the rear guards of both divisions to follow Col. Stevenson's corps.

A squadron of Native cavalry to be sent to head quarters at assembly beating.



dufters under the head of lands in Hindustan, and have been considered as the private property of Scindiah's house. These pergunnahs are to remain in his possession under certain stipulations, which exclude his troops from the line fixed upon by your Excellency.

Besides these pergunnahs, there are others, the jaghire lands of the ladies of the family of the late Madhajeo Scindiah, and those of some of the principal sirdars and ministers of Dowlut Rao, also not included in the schedule, which, according to the 7th article, are to remain in the hands of their present possessors, under the protection of the British government; and the British government is to give pensions, or jaghires, according to its option, to sirdars to be named by Scindiah, to the amount of 17 lacs of rupees, including the value of those jaghires to remain in the hands of their present possessors under the 7th article.

It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in the disturbed state of Scindiah's government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation, in comparison with that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's hands, and to add to his armies, all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries; and who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindiah's service, and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent with your Excellency's policy; and it appears that, besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindiah's durbar which must guide its measures in a great degree, even if Scindiah should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British government in his durbar, if he should agree to the terms of

G. O.

Camp at Surjee Anjengaum, Friday, 30th Dec. 1803.

Col. Stevenson, being unable, on account of severe indisposition, to remain longer in the field, has permission to return to Hyderabad, and eventually to Fort St. George, for the recovery of his health, without prejudice to his situation as commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, or his allowances. (The head surgeon ordered to attend the Col.) Major Gen. Wellesley is much concerned that Col. Stevenson's state of health should oblige him to quit the field, and he accordingly hopes that it will soon be so far re-established as to give the public the advantage of his services.

Major Gen. Wellesley has for some years had the assistance of Col. Stevenson in the various services in which both have been employed by the government of Fort St. George; and in the course of that time he has derived the greatest advantage from his great experience, his advice and opinions on all occasions, as well as a zealous and active discharge of all the duties of an officer in his situation in the field, particularly in this last campaign. Under these circumstances, every public feeling for the benefit and advancement of the public service, and every private feeling for an officer with whom Major Gen. Wellesley has been in the habit of friendly intercourse for some years, and from whom he has received the greatest assistance, unite to induce him to regret the want of Col. Stevenson's services at this moment, the distressing disorder which occasions it, and to express his most anxious wishes for his speedy and perfect recovery.

G. O.

Pannaz, 31st Dec. 1803.

The officers commanding the rear guard will consider the whole of the departments, baggage, and bazaars, as under their protection on the march.

Heads of departments are directed to see that they are laden and sent off every marching day without delay.

the general defensive alliance. Upon the whole, therefore, I hope that your Excellency will approve of this arrangement, the expense of which will amount to about 14 lacs of rupees annually, to be deducted from the revenues stated in the schedule.

The next point to which I wish to draw your Excellency's attention, in order to bring under your view at once every thing relating to the cession in Hindustan, is the 15th article of the treaty; by which it is agreed that Scindiah shall have a subsidiary force, the expense of which shall be paid out of the cessions made by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles of the treaty.

In the course of this war, Scindiah's power, reputation, and military resources have been greatly diminished; while his rival, Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family, by his treaty of peace with Scindiah, remains with undiminished power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of Scindiah, his power and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the war; and I have little doubt but that the contest between those Chiefs will be revived. This would be a matter of little consequence to the British government, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindiah in every point of view; and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be, that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar; or if he should endeavor to avoid the contest, which I do not think probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent upon that of his rival.

Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your Excellency's determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established, by the exercise of the force of the British government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindiah an option of becoming a party of the general defensive alliance; and, as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his revenue. I was induced to make this last engagement, by the conviction that Scindiah would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he was to be obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive; and that, if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is insured so far as it can be by human means.

I have every reason to believe, also, that when Scindiah shall wind up his affairs at the end of this war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue, such as the British government would require to pay the expenses of the force which might be given to him. Upon this point I have likewise to observe, that, supposing Scindiah should agree to the treaty of defensive alliance, the diminution of receipt to the Company will be of 8 lacs of rupees annually, if his Highness the Peshwah be admitted to participate equally with the Company and the Nizam in the benefits of the war; and 12½ lacs of rupees if his Highness the Nizam only should be admitted to that participation. I have sanguine hopes, therefore, that your Excellency will approve of this article of the peace.

By the cession of Baroach, the Company will gain a clear revenue of 10 lacs of rupees annually, and a valuable territory in a commercial point of view.

I ordered that the hill fort of Powanghur might be destroyed, when I determined to return that conquest to Scindiah. My motives for returning the conquests in that part of India, and Asseerghur and Burhampoor in the Deccan, are explained to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 11th Nov.; and although I intend to endeavor to retain possession of Powanghur and Dohud in the negotiation of the treaty of general defensive alliance, in exchange for land elsewhere, I am still of opinion that, without making some sacrifices, I could not have peace; and these places appeared to me to be of less consequence than any of the other conquests which the British troops had made.

The territories restored in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur are the ancient family lands of Scindiah; and your Excellency will perceive, in the minutes of the conferences, which will be sent as soon as they can be copied, the great anxiety to retain their lands. They have been returned, therefore, under a particular stipulation, that no armed men are ever to be kept in them. I did every thing in my power to retain the lands of which I took possession upon the capture of Ahmednuggur, as I wished to exclude Scindiah entirely from the Deccan; but as the lands are really his family property, to have kept them would have occasioned a personal inconvenience, which your Excellency would have been desirous to remove; and the restoration of them is accompanied by a stipulation which I hope will prevent the bad consequences attending his having any lands in those countries.

There was considerable difficulty, also, in settling the 9th article, respecting the treaties made with the Rajahs. The ministers appeared to be aware of the loss which Scindiah's government might incur under this article, and they contended strongly against it, till at last I was obliged to tell them that, unless they agreed to it, I could not make peace. The advantage which it appeared to me that your Excellency expected to derive from the independence of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, was, that these chiefs should connect themselves by treaty with the British government. From the different accounts, however, which I have received, I observe that treaties have not been concluded with any of these chiefs, notwithstanding the rapid and astonishing success of his Excellency the Commander in Chief. The consequence of their independence, unless they should have connected themselves with the British government, would be, that the annual contest which they have had with the Marhattas, for the Peshwah, would cease, and the British government would derive no additional security. I therefore deemed it best to stipulate generally for the independence of every Rajah with whom a treaty should have been concluded, by which your Excellency's object is insured in respect to all of this description; and in regard to the others, they are left to their fate.

There was not much difficulty in arranging the other articles of the peace. There were some objections to the 12th article, founded upon the

necessity of Scindiah's performing the duties of his office of Vakeel ool Mutuluk, which, however, were easily overcome.

In negotiating this treaty, I have received the greatest assistance from Mr. Elphinstone, and, since he arrived in camp, from Major Malcolm; indeed the acquaintance of the latter with your Excellency's sentiments upon all political questions, and his own political knowledge and abilities, have enabled me to conclude this difficult treaty in a manner which I hope will be satisfactory to your Excellency. I have requested Major Malcolm to prepare to go to Scindiah's camp, as soon as I shall have received the ratification of the treaty. By a residence there for some time, he will be enabled to settle with that Chief the treaty of general defensive alliance, if it should be possible to arrange it; or, at all events, to acquire a knowledge of the characters at his durbar, and of the state of his remaining military resources.

In case your Excellency should think it proper to ratify this treaty, it will be best to send one copy of the ratification to Major Kirkpatrick, to be forwarded to Major Malcolm; and one to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, to be forwarded through Hindustan; as one of the objects of Major Malcolm's attention will be to communicate with his Excellency by a dawk.

I propose to desire the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan to take possession of Scindiah's territories, ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of peace. In respect to the other territories, they will remain to be disposed of, according to the orders which I may receive from your Excellency.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Panmorg, 31st Dec. 1803.

I have the honor to enclose 2 papers which I have received from Col. Stevenson, containing his appointment by their Highnesses the late Nizam and Secundar Jah to command their armies.

In former instances of similar appointments of British officers to command the Nizam's troops, it has been usual for his Highness to give an allowance to such officers, upon which subject Col. Stevenson has referred to me. I must say that in no instance whatever has the exertion of any commanding officer been greater than that of Col. Stevenson to forward the service; or have the government or the troops derived greater advantage from the zeal, activity, and ability of the commanders employed.

I shall be obliged to you if you will take such steps, as you may think necessary, to procure for Col. Stevenson the allowance usually given by the Court of Hyderabad upon such an occasion; and if it should be proper to refer the subject previously to the Governor General, that you will forward this letter to be laid before his Excellency.

I am sorry to have to inform you that Col. Stevenson is so much indisposed that I have endeavored to prevail upon him to go to the coast for his recovery, and have given him leave to quit the army.

The vakcel of the Rajah of Berar, Jeswant Rao Ramchunder, has desired me to apply to you in favor of Mada Rao Ramchunder, his brother, who is in the service of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. This

person has now the command of 100 horse, and possesses a jaghirc for their support; and his brother is desirous that his command should be increased to 200 horse, with the means of supporting them. I shall be obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange this matter.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Manusgaum, 5th Jan. 1804.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I concluded a treaty of peace with the ministers of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 30th Dec., which that Chief has ratified.

The enclosed dispatches for his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward when you shall have perused them, will make you acquainted with the terms on which this treaty has been concluded. You will have been informed that I concluded a treaty of peace with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar on the 16th Dec., of which I received the ratification on the 23rd. But lest you should not have received that information, or a copy of the treaty, I enclose one.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah has expressed a desire to have some guns and military stores which are in the forts of Kanoor, Kishengur Mcwat, Hansi-Goculghur, Mulaghur, and Schaurunpoor, which he alleges have not yet been taken by the troops under the immediate command of your Excellency. I have promised him to apply to your Excellency for the guns and stores in those forts, provided they should not have been taken before my application should reach you; and I hope, in consideration of the great degree to which his military power and resources have been reduced in the war, and of the difficulty which he will experience in supporting himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, your Excellency will be induced to grant my request.

I enclose a memorandum\* which I have received from moonshee Kavel Nyn, one of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers, of which I request your Excellency's notice.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Manusgaum, 5th Jan. 1804.

You will have observed by the 7th article of the treaty of peace with

\* Memorandum from moonshee Kavel Nyn.

The Baugh Barah Derry belongs to moonshee Kavel Nyn; but an officer has taken possession of it. The moonshee requests that his property in Delhi, in houses, gardens, &c., may be protected. The person who has charge of it will be found on inquiring at the Barah Derry.

G. M. O.

Camp at Manusgaum, Thursday, 5th Jan. 1804.

The ratification of a treaty of peace, concluded with the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, is to be delivered to Major Gen. Wellesley at 10 o'clock this forenoon.

A Royal salute to be held in readiness in the park to be fired on the delivery of the treaty.

Two European flank companies from the 5th brigade and the band of H. M. 78th regt. to parade at head quarters a quarter before 10 o'clock. On the delivery of the treaty, these flank companies will present arms and beat a march, which is to be the signal for firing the salute. The music to play at the same time.

Major Gen. Wellesley will be glad to see any officers off duty, who may wish to be present at the delivery of the treaty.

Mem.

5th Jan. 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley is very desirous of having some dogs, which were found in Asseerghur, and also some of the fowling pieces taken there; and he will be much obliged to any gentleman who may be in possession of those dogs or fowling pieces, if they will send them in to him. The full value shall be returned.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, a copy of which I transmitted to you in my dispatch this day, that the districts of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah in Hindustan, and situated, I believe, on the river Chumbul, are to remain in the possession of that Chief on certain conditions specified in that article.

In case the districts should have been taken possession of by the troops under your Excellency's command, I write this letter to request that you will give orders to the collector or other persons in charge of them on the part of the British government to give them up to the person who will be sent by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to take possession of them.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Manusgaum, 5th Jan. 1804.

I have but little to add to my public dispatches of this date. The copies of my dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General, which I forwarded to you, will have apprised you of the late event of the campaign in this quarter; but, lest they should not have reached you, I now mention that I defeated the combined armies of the enemy at Argaum in Berar on the 29th Nov., taking all their cannon, and destroying vast numbers, with small loss on our side, no officer killed, and few wounded. The infantry and cannon in this action was the Rajah of Berar's, and the cavalry his and Scindiah's.

On the 15th Dec. I took the hill fort of Gawilghur by storm; on the 19th I signed a peace with the Rajah of Berar, and on the 30th Dec. one with Scindiah. By the former the Company gain the province of Cuttack and the province of Berar, half of which, however, before belonged to the Nizam. But the revenue of the Rajah's share is said to have amounted to 50 lacs of rupees. I really believe it is 30 lacs, and we certainly have got the only productive parts of the Rajah's territories.

Scindiah's cessions in Hindustan appear by the account to be more than one crore and 50 lacs, Baroach is 10 lacs, and 7 lacs in the Deccan.

I beg leave to take this opportunity of congratulating your Excellency upon the success of the troops under your immediate command in Hindustan. I am concerned to inform your Excellency that Lieut. Col. Harness of the 80th regt. died at Ellichpoor on the 1st inst. Upon mentioning this event I must again take the liberty of mentioning to you Lieut. Col. Wallace of the 74th regt., whose services I have again had occasion to report in a favorable manner, since I addressed you upon this subject after the battle of Assye.

To Jeswant Rao Holkar.

5th Jan. 1804.

I wrote you a letter on the 16th July last, which I hope you have received; but lest you should not, I now send a duplicate of it.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have concluded treaties of peace between the Hon. Company and their allies, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Senah Sahib Ragojee Bhoomslah respectively; and I take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the restoration of peace in Hindustan and in the Deccan. During the existence of the late war, your conduct has been most wise and politic, and has been perfectly satisfactory to me; and I repeat to you, upon this occasion, the assurance which I have

frequently given you, that so long as you refrain from attacking the Hon. Company and their allies, the British government will not interfere with you.

This will be forwarded to you by Major Malcolm, a gentleman who is going to reside with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the part of the British government. He will receive from you any communication you may be desirous of making to the British government or to me, and will communicate with you on any point that you may consider likely to forward your interests, or to promote the friendship between the Hon. Company and you.

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Camp, 5th Jan. 1804.

This letter will be delivered to you by Major Malcolm, a gentleman of rank, and in the confidence of his Excellency the Governor General, whom I have sent to you, in order that he may take every opportunity of rendering permanent the friendship now re-established between the Hon. Company and you.

I request you to consider what Major Malcolm will say to you as coming from me.

To Col. Murray, or Major Walker, or the Officer, Civil or Military, in charge of the Revenue department in the districts conquered from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Guzerat.

Camp, 5th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to inform you, that, by virtue of the authority vested in me, I have concluded a treaty of peace on the part of the Hon. Company and their allies with the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which the latter has ratified, and I have the honor to enclose a paper which contains copies of all the articles of the treaty which relate to Guzerat.

I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will cede the districts, places, &c., depending upon Powanghur and Dohud, including Godra, and every other place and right depending upon those forts, to the person who will be sent on the part of the Maharajah to take charge of them. The forts of Powanghur and Dohud are not to be evacuated till further orders shall have been received from me; and I write by dawk to the commanding officer in Guzerat, to desire him to make certain arrangements for occupying those forts.

In case any treaties should have been made with any Rajahs or others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, you will be so kind as to apprise me thereof; and you will acquaint all Rajahs and others from whom the British troops have received assistance, but with whom no treaties have been made, of the purport of the 10th article of the treaty of peace. 174 villages are included in the Baroach territory, ceded to the Hon. Company by the 3rd article.

There does not appear to me to be any necessity to inform the Rajah Anund Rao of the purport of the 5th article, till further orders shall have been received from his Excellency the Governor General.

The districts ceded by the 6th article are to be given up in the state in which they shall be on the day that you will receive this letter; you are to have nothing further to do with them, and are to make no claims what-

ever for arrears of revenue, &c., unless you should have made advances to the ryots, in which case you are to take measures to recover those advances.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 5th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that, by virtue of the powers vested in me, I have concluded a treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and I have the honor to enclose a copy of the articles of that treaty which relate to Guzerat. I likewise enclose a copy of a letter which I have written to the officer, civil or military, in charge of the revenue department in that province, from which you will form a judgment of the measures which are to be adopted for restoring the conquest made in that quarter.

You will be so kind as to allot for the defence of the forts of Powanghur and Dohud such garrisons as you may think necessary for their security; and you will throw into the garrisons a supply of provisions to last 4 months, which you will inform the officers commanding is not to be touched excepting in a case of necessity. I conclude that the upper fort, or balla killa, at Powanghur, has been destroyed, according to my former orders. In respect to the detachment which you have in the field, you will draw it back towards Baroda, into the territories of the Rajah Anund Rao, unless it should be required in advance for any local purpose.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp, 5th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that, by virtue of the authority vested in me, I have concluded a peace on the part of the Hon. Company and their allies with the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which the latter has ratified; by which I have consented to cede to the Maharajah the districts, lands, and villages specified in the enclosed paper, which is a copy of the 8th article of the treaty of peace.

I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will cede the districts and places therein specified to the officers who will be sent by the Maharajah to take possession of them; provided that the condition stated in the 8th article is complied with, and particularly provided that Mulwa Dada withdraws his banditti from the country, and crosses the Godavery, and proceeds into Candeish. But if Mulwa Dada should still remain with his banditti in that quarter, you are not to deliver up the districts in question till you receive further orders from me. The fort of Ahmednuggur, and the other districts taken possession of, at the time of the capture of that fort by the British troops, are to remain in the possession of the British government and their allies, under the treaty of peace.

You will give up the districts in the state in which they are on the day you shall receive this letter. You are to have nothing further to do with them, and to give up all claims upon them for arrears of revenue, &c. unless you should have made advances to the ryots, in which case you are to recover those advances.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone, with the Rajah of Berar.

7th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd inst., upon the subject of the claim of the Rajah of Berar to the possession of certain dis-



tricts heretofore belonging to the Nizam, situated on the left bank of the river Wurda, under the 4th article of the treaty of peace.

It is impossible to frame a treaty of peace in such a manner as to find in it a decision of all questions which can arise between the parties concerned; particularly when the parties have frequently been at war, and have preserved a recollection of a variety of contradictory claims arising out of the events of their wars, which they are ready to bring forward on all occasions. But there are certain principles which supply the defect of all instruments of this description, and enable us to decide upon the scope and meaning of the different articles of the treaty, and to apply them to cases not in contemplation when the treaty was made. One of these principles is, that the meaning of an article of a treaty shall not be construed in a sense directly the reverse of the principles and basis on which the treaty of peace was negotiated.

The basis of the negotiation of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar was, that he should give compensation to the Company and their allies for the injury he had done them by his aggression. It does not follow that, because he was to give a compensation to the Company and their allies, the Allied Powers were not to make any cession to him for the sake of peace, or for the general convenience of all parties; but the principle above stated requires that every such cession should be particularly specified in the treaty; and when such cession is not specified, there is strong reason to believe that the intention of the parties, at the time they were contracting the engagement, was, that the cession should not be made.

The 4th article does not specify that the districts in question are to be ceded to the Rajah of Berar; and to suppose that it conveys an intention to cede those districts, which it does not express, is to construe it in a sense directly the reverse of the principle and basis of the negotiation for the peace. I, therefore, cannot now admit that construction. To this reasoning I have to add, that although I was misinformed by Rajah Mohiput Ram, and believed, when I negotiated the treaty, that the Soubah of the Deccan had no territories beyond the Wurda, I never had an intention to cede any thing by it, excepting the fort of Gawilghur and neighbouring districts, of the yearly value of 4 lacs of rupees; and that, if the demand to cede any territories of the Soubah's had been made, I should have positively rejected it. Besides this general reasoning upon the subject, which, in my opinion, must be considered conclusive as to the intentions of both the parties interested in the negotiation of this treaty of peace, and the fact above mentioned regarding my own intentions, there are some facts relative to these districts, which prove in the clearest manner that the Rajah's ministers did not imagine that it was intended to cede them.

G. O.

Camp at Rajah Ka Peepulgaum, 7th Jan. 1804.

The detachment will halt to-morrow.

The 2nd batt. 12th regt., and 1st batt. pioneers, excepting a detail of 60 men of the latter, to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. The details of the 2nd batt. 12th regt. on picket to join, and the camp-guard furnished by that corps to be relieved.

Capt. Young will send 8 days' arack for the artillerymen, &c., attached to the corps ordered to march to-morrow. They will parade on the road in the rear of the advanced pickets.

The districts were held previous to the war, and are held at this moment, by the Nizam's officers and troops, in the same manner as all the other districts of which the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar collected the revenues jointly. One of the places claimed is the fort of Annair; and in each of the districts there is a place of strength, of which it would not be very easy for the Rajah to dispossess the Soubah's officers. But although they certainly could not have taken the fort of Annair, and in all probability would have found it difficult to get possession of the pergunnahs in the districts, the Rajah's minister has never applied for orders to the Nizam's officers and troops to evacuate them; and I therefore conclude, that he who negotiated the treaty knew well that it had never been intended to give them up.

I have also to mention to you, that, in a conversation which I had with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder upon this subject last night, he did not contend that the districts had been ceded; but he requested that they might be given up to the Rajah, as a mark of friendship and of favor. The districts in question are the pergunnah of Ashtie, the annual value of which is one lac and a half of rupees; the pergunnah of Berroor Ahah, or Belloor Akal, the value of which is 20,000 rupees; and the pergunnah of Arvee, the value of which is 20,000 rupees; half of each of which sums belonged to the Nizam, and half to the Rajah of Berar. The fort of Annair, also, is on the left bank of the river, and is the capital of the district of Annair, which is on the right bank. The value of these districts to either party is trifling; but I request you to inform the Rajah's ministers that I consider that the Soubah's claim to his share is just; that I must support him in the enjoyment of his just right; and that I trust they will urge the Rajah to cease all opposition to it. At the same time, I request you to tell them that I have desired Rajah Mohiput Ram not to interfere with the Rajah's rights in the same districts.

I am much concerned that the Rajah of Berar should have demanded the sole possession of these districts, as it will be necessary to report the demand to his Excellency the Governor General; and his Excellency may, upon receiving this report, entertain doubts of the Rajah's sincerity in making the peace. Explain this apprehension to the ministers; and tell them that, in my opinion, the only mode of removing these doubts from his Excellency's mind, and to induce him to believe that the demand of the districts originated in error, will be for the Rajah to renounce this unreasonable claim without loss of time.

As a proof of such renunciation, I request you to demand from the Rajah's ministers orders to his officers in those districts, not to interfere with the rights of the Soubah of the Deccan; and to cease all hostilities against, and to withdraw from, the post of Annair.

Rajah Mohiput Ram declares that Mollagies Abier is still in the Annair pergunnah, with 2000 men; that Trimul Rao is in Roora and Munyloor, with 2000 men; and Ambajee, a brahmin, in Corga and Wausim, with 1000. The Rajah's vakcel declares that he has sent them orders to cross the Wurda, and that they have passed that river. But I request you to make inquiries upon this subject, and to procure orders addressed to those chiefs to withdraw without loss of time.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th Jan. 1804.

I enclose you a memorandum upon certain subjects to which I wish to draw your attention during your residence at Scindiah's durbar. The topics in this memorandum have been the subject of many discussions between you and me; but I have put them in this form in order to recall them to your recollection, and that I might lay my sentiments before the Governor General, to whom I shall send a copy of this memorandum. I send your letters with this; likewise 2 letters to me from Bengal, which I beg you to return to me. Nothing else that is new.

Memorandum for Major Malcolm on his mission to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

7th Jan. 1804.

I think that there are not any troops of Scindiah's now in Hindustan, and there are certainly none in Guzerat; therefore there will be but little necessity to press him to perform his treaty, as far as it respects those two countries; but his pindarries have lately been spread in the province of Berar ceded by Ragojee Bhoonslah: and the Nizam's officers appear determined to do nothing to get rid of this evil, and depend entirely on the British government. I shall endeavor to check it by a disposition of the troops to cover the country.

It will be necessary to urge Scindiah to send his pindarries off to the northward of the Nerbudda; and I beg that you will take an early opportunity of conversing seriously with Scindiah's ministers upon this subject. Inform them that, if the peace is to continue, the ryots and inhabitants of the country must enjoy the benefits of it, and be free from military violence, otherwise the governments shall not, and the war must recommence.

Mulwa Punt, or Mulwa Dada, still continues his depredations also on the Nizam's frontier towards Perinda. I beg you to inform Scindiah that I shall not think myself authorized to restore the places detailed in the 8th article of the treaty of peace, till that person and his troops shall have gone to the northward. In case he should disavow Mulwa Dada, it will be necessary that he should write me a letter to that purport, which I shall send to that person; and at the same time inform him that, finding him to be little better than a common thief, I propose to hang him, if I can catch him. I shall likewise offer a large reward for his apprehension.

I promised Jeswunt Rao Goorparah that he should be provided for by the British government; and I wish you would endeavor to have him included in the list of persons to be provided for by the Company under the 7th article of the treaty. If Scindiah should not consent to do this, or should give him an inadequate provision, I must recommend him to the Governor General.

I think that you ought to see all the persons whom Scindiah shall name as those to receive these pensions or jaghires, and give them some kind of paper, by way of sunnud, for the sum which he shall fix for them; explaining to them that the mode in which they shall receive the money will be hereafter made known to them. By these means they will be taught immediately to look up to the British government as the source from which they shall receive their subsistence.

The payments to these people will commence from the day Scindiah shall ratify the treaty; but as in the mean time, till orders from the Governor General shall arrive, they may be distressed for the want of money, you might draw upon the Governor General for one, 2, or 3 lacs of rupees, to be distributed among them, according to the proportions which Scindiah will fix for them.

I expect that Scindiah will be much annoyed when he finds the loss sustained by his consent to the 9th article of the treaty. However, you may remind him and his ministers, that they were repeatedly informed of what was going forward, and that they must attribute the greatest part of the loss to the 8 weeks' delay in the negotiating the treaty of peace.

I recommend that you should watch his military movements very closely, and take care that he does not attack some of the Rajahs who have made treaties with us, in the interval between the time when he shall ratify the treaty, and that at which he shall receive the ratification of the Governor General.

If you should find Scindiah at all alarmed about the 11th article of the treaty, you will tell him that there is no intention to go into an examination of all that has passed at Poonah for the last 7 or 8 years. My opinion upon that point is, that it would be best for the British government if the Peshwah had no territories north of the Godavry, or of the hills north of that river; at all events, none intermixed as those in Malwa are with those of Holkar and Scindiah.

It is very probable that many grants that Scindiah has of lands in Malwa were extorted from the Peshwah. But I do not think that circumstance ought to affect their validity. They are regular grants from the Poonah government; and unless we should enter into a detailed inquiry into all that passed for 3 or 4 years at Poonah, it will be impossible to dispute them. Those grants made by Ballojee Koonger after he quitted the Peshwah, stand on quite different grounds, and must be disputed to the last.

Upon the subject of the general defensive alliance under the 15th article of the treaty of peace, my opinion is, that Scindiah and his ministers will readily agree to all the stipulations of the treaty, excepting that of placing a corps at Ougein, or any where in Scindiah's dominions. I acknowledge that, if Scindiah were left in a situation, at the end of the war, to support his own government against Holkar, and if he were equal in abilities to the latter, or had any person in his service capable of conducting the affairs of his government in such a manner as to afford a reasonable ground for hope that his government would regain such strength as that it would stand against Holkar's attacks, I should be very indifferent upon the success of this treaty; as I am convinced that the attention of both these Chiefs will always be occupied by the gratification of their mutual enmity and revenge, and that they will never unite; and that, whether singly or united, neither will ever dare to attack the British government or its allies. But, in the present state of Scindiah's affairs, it does not appear possible that his government can last, without the support of the Company. He must either be destroyed entirely, or his government must fall under the influence of Holkar; and it is unnecessary

to detail the probable consequences of such an event. On this ground only do I think it advisable to connect the Company with Scindiah, in the present situation of affairs.

The principal features in the treaty of defensive alliance are the subsidiary force in the territory of our ally, the engagement of our ally to have no communication with any foreign power, excepting with our knowledge, and to be guided by our advice in his foreign relations; and the aid to be derived from our ally upon the occasion of a war. It is my opinion, both from the nature of Scindiah's government and from what passed in the conferences with the vakeels, that the only point to which Scindiah will have any objection is that fixing the force within his territories. In considering the necessity of forcing this point as a *sine quâ non*, it is my opinion that all reference to what passed, and what was necessary at Hyderabad at the moment at which the treaty of defensive alliance was formed with the late Nizam, may be dispensed with, and ought to be laid out of the question. At that time there were 3 or 4 great parties in the Nizam's state contending for its power, each, excepting the English party, having great military power.

The French party could not have been put down without the presence of the English detachment. The English party could not have been supported against the fears occasioned in the Nizam's mind by the threats of the Pagah party, or of the Marhatta faction, if the English troops had not been at Hyderabad. But it is doubtful whether, hereafter, the presence of the troops will be necessary to preserve our influence even over those. At all events, the troops are not necessary, and do not produce any benefit at Poonah, and still less would they be necessary at Scindiah's capital.

The enemy, the fear of whom will induce Scindiah to throw himself upon the Company, is the personal enemy of himself, and of every individual about his person. It will not be very difficult for the British Resident to prevent that enemy from gaining a preponderating influence in his durbar, or, at all events, such as will be likely to be injurious to the British interests. I conceive, therefore, that no political object will be gained by having the troops at Scindiah's capital. There is a military objection to stationing them at Ougein, resulting from the comparative strength of the detachment with that of Holkar's army.

I certainly think that 6 battalions of the Company's troops, without Europeans or cavalry, ought not to be risked in an action with Holkar's army, excepting in a case of absolute necessity, which ought to be avoided if possible. But as Holkar's army will be stationed at Indore, it will not be possible to avoid the action, if that Chief should think it proper to bring it on suddenly, which, from the ferocious and superstitious nature of his disposition, must be expected.

One of the effects which has attended the placing of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, has been the complete destruction of the military power of the Soubahdar of the Deccan. It is not necessary now to canvass the benefits or disadvantages resulting from that effect: like every other political measure, it has both, which are felt in different degrees upon different occasions; but the effect has been produced by the entire

reliance of the government upon the exertion of the British troops for the performance of all the services, for which they had before kept up their own military establishments, and by the desire of the Nizam and his ministers to hoard up treasure.

The consequence of Scindiah's discharging all his military establishments, an effect which will certainly be produced by the same cause, will be much more serious than those experienced by the Nizam's discharging his, however inconvenient. All the persons discharged must go into Holkar's service, in order to gain a livelihood, and thereby increase his means of annoying the other powers of India, every one of whom will be connected with the Company; and also render more urgent the necessity of using those means, in order to procure support for his numerous followers. This is, in my opinion, a very serious consideration. The consequence of the extension of the Company's army has been to destroy the military power of their allies. But those armies, formerly in the service of the Peshwah and of the Nizam, must have gone somewhere; and there can be no doubt but they are at this moment in the service of Scindiah and Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar; and when this alliance shall be formed with Scindiah, they will have Holkar for their only resource, unless, in forming it, great pains should be taken to oblige Scindiah to preserve his military power.

I have also to observe upon this point, that Scindiah's government is in a state so unsettled, that if the Company's troops are to be introduced into his country, and we are to be employed in settling it, and he is not to be obliged to keep up his military establishment, and all means adopted to insure that object, the expense to the Company will be much greater than that estimated.

I have already shown that the presence of the military force at the seat of Scindiah's residence will not be necessary to support the British influence in his durbar; and I have stated a military objection to keeping the force at Ougein. I might possibly contend that no political influence can be produced at Scindiah's durbar from stationing the force in any other part of his country; but I think that, in the present situation of the British power in India, no advantage of that kind can compensate for the loss of his military power and its consequences, which must result from stationing the force in his country at all.

I will suppose even the worst that can happen: as it is probable that the alliance will have the effect of supporting Scindiah's government throughout the ensuing two years, and that it will have time to regain its strength, much will have been gained: and even if the alliance should be then broken, the Company will enjoy a greater advantage, and will have a better prospect of the continuance of peace, than it would have if Scindiah should allow his military establishment to fall. In this state of the case, the question regarding the position of the subsidiary force becomes merely military; and where political considerations affect it, they operate against placing the subsidiary force in Scindiah's territories.

Whatever may be the result of this negotiation with Scindiah, there are two points which must be strengthened; the troops at both of which will materially check both him and Holkar. One of these is Guzerat, respect-

ing reinforcing which province I have measures in contemplation; the other is the southern part of Bundelcund: either of these provinces might be fixed upon, with Scindiah's government, as the station of the subsidiary force; and the British government would derive the greatest advantage in these territories from the adoption of either.

In giving my opinion upon this subject, I am fully aware that I have departed from one of the principles adopted by the Governor General, in framing his instructions upon all these subsidiary allowances. But the circumstances of the case, and of the moment, are entirely different from those which have hitherto occurred. We are aware of a practical inconvenience in all the subsidiary alliances, and of the danger of its being caused in Scindiah's government; and I think that the Governor General will authorize the deviation recommended from the original plan, when he shall consider the circumstances of this case. However, you are better acquainted with his sentiments upon this and every political subject than I am, and must know best how far the reasoning above detailed would have the effect of inducing him to alter the original plan. If you should think it would not, I beg you to insist upon the reception of the subsidiary force in Scindiah's territories as a *sine quâ non*.

It is absolutely necessary to insist upon Scindiah's agreeing to all the stipulations by which the allies are bound to have no intercourse with foreign states, excepting with our consent; and to follow our advice in all their relations with such states. The object which he has in view, in this alliance, is to gain support against Holkar; not so much for his own defence, as in his plans of aggression against that Chief. We must, therefore, take care that we are not drawn into an offensive war by these engagements.

It appears that, in consideration of Holkar's engaging to join in the attack on the British government and their allies, Scindiah gave over to him the territories of his family, and agreed that Kunder Rao Holkar, the son of Mulhar Rao, should be placed on the musnud, under the protection of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. By this act he relinquished the right of Cashee Rao Holkar, in support of which he had before committed murder, and had carried on the war for years; and he abandoned that Chief to his fate. When the treaty of defensive alliance shall be taken into consideration, it will be absolutely necessary to see this treaty with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

In respect to its conditions, it is my opinion that the British government must determine at once to adopt one of two lines: either to acknowledge and support the treaty, and consider it in every respect as containing the register of the rights of the two parties; or to disavow the treaty as being the bond of an offensive alliance against the British government.

If the first is adopted, a mode will exist of ascertaining the rights of each party, and the British government have some document by which its conduct relative to each can be guided. I have also to observe, that this line of conduct is most consistent with that heretofore followed in respect to Holkar, and with the assurances given him, that as long as he refrained from attacking the British government and their allies, the British government would not interfere with him. In this case, Scindiah's conquest of Holkar's territories, and his right to dispose of them

as he might think proper, must be admitted. If the second is to be adopted, Holkar must be considered as an usurper. The question regarding the right of his possession may be renewed by Scindiah at any time; and, at all events, it will be difficult to find out a mode of understanding and settling the claims of both parties.

Upon the whole, therefore, however extraordinary the proceeding may be, to acknowledge the validity of the stipulations of a treaty of offensive alliance against the British government, I do not see how it can be avoided, without risking another war immediately, which the alliance with Scindiah is intended to prevent; or without depriving the British government of the means of deciding upon questions between Scindiah and Holkar. The rights of Scindiah, also, over all the Rajpoots who will remain liable to his extortions, as having omitted to connect themselves with the British government, must also be ascertained. The next point to be considered is, the amount of the aid to be received from Scindiah, in case the British government should be involved in a war.

In the course of this memorandum, I have already adverted to the tendency which these subsidiary forces have to destroy the military establishments of the Native powers; and I have pointed out the bad consequences which must result from the destruction of Scindiah's military establishment.

It is possible that if the subsidiary force is not stationed in his country, and if he cannot command its services upon all occasions for which he will require troops, he may be induced to keep up his military establishments. But whether the situations above proposed for the Company's troops have that effect or not, it will be necessary that the treaty should provide for his keeping up a respectable force.

1st; Whatever may be his military establishments of cavalry, regular regimental infantry, and artillery, he ought to be obliged by treaty to keep up the same.

2ndly; He ought to be obliged to furnish certain proportions of those troops to serve with the British troops at his expense, when required; to allot regular funds for their support, and to pay a certain sum monthly for every man absent from the number settled by treaty that he is to furnish.

3rdly; That in case the British government should at any time require that more of his troops than the number which he is obliged to supply should serve in the field with their army, they are to be furnished at certain rates, to be specified in the treaty.

I think, also, that there might be some additional exceptions against employing the British troops in the collection of the revenues, and in the business of mooluck-ghery, or levying tribute from polygars or rajahs, unless in cases in which it should appear to the British Resident that the assistance of the British troops is essentially necessary to enable Scindiah to recover his rights.

In case you should find Scindiah to be inclined to consent to the treaty of defensive alliance, I think it will be very desirable to endeavor to prevail upon him to cede to the Company, Powanghur and Dohud, in exchange for lands elsewhere; and you might point out to him the



advantage which he would derive from having the Company's troops so near to Holkar as they would be at Dohud, as an inducement to him to adopt the measure. He will possibly offer to allow us to put a garrison in Dohud, or to post our troops there, while he will have a garrison in the fort. But in answer to this offer, you might tell him that we could not venture to post our troops so far forward, unless we had possession of the countries, and had the Rajahs of Ravera, &c., under our government. That if this arrangement were made, we could afford to conciliate these Rajahs, and thus secure our communication with Baroda and the sea coast. But that as long as they remain under him, and he continues to levy the tribute, they will be his enemies, and of course ours also, if we should be his allies; and that we should experience the greatest difficulties in keeping up the communication through those jungly and mountainous tracts, under those circumstances.

I think it certain that Scindiah is sincere in his desire for peace. Indeed, the state of his affairs with Holkar requires it. But in the course of the negotiation of this treaty, I have observed a fickleness and unsteadiness of principle and of action, which is scarcely consistent with the existence of government. That which guides all the measures of Scindiah's government, appears to be jealousy of the power of the house of Holkar, a personal enmity against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and a desire of revenging injuries received from, and of repeating others done to that Chief; but we have already seen Scindiah's government depart from that great and ruling principle of his measures, and make great sacrifices to obtain peace with Holkar, certainly contrary to the sense which Scindiah himself and all his ministers entertained of his true interests: I think, therefore, that it is desirable to watch closely their future negotiations.

I do not think it probable that they will unite, or that if they did, the British government would have much to apprehend from their union, excepting that which is always to be apprehended from the weakness and inconsistency of Scindiah's character, and the violent ferocity and superstition of Holkar.

This union is by no means so probable as the immediate renewal of the war between them; and you will possibly find it very difficult to prevent this war. But this is very desirable for many reasons.

I have already pointed out that Scindiah's military resources are nearly destroyed, those of Holkar are unimpaired: Scindiah has no abilities himself, and has no person about him capable of managing his affairs; Holkar has the reputation of being an able man, and has certainly been a successful one. The consequence of the existence of tranquillity for a year, or two years, will be, that Scindiah's government and his military resources will in some degree recover; and Holkar's will become worse than they are at present, as the certain consequence of tranquillity to an overgrown army, constituted as his is, must be its gradual dissolution. It is also probable, that, if the peace should be preserved for one or two years, the influence of the British government with both Chiefs will be so much increased as to render it possible to prevent the war altogether. I therefore most anxiously recommend this point to your attention.

In my letter to Holkar, I have informed him that you are going to

Scindiah's camp, and have desired him to send the answer to you; you will, of course, peruse it, and if you should find any opportunity of opening a communication with Holkar, do so, and exert yourself to the utmost to preserve the peace between him and Scindiah. Of course you will do every thing in your power to obtain accurate intelligence of the remaining strength of Scindiah's armies, of his revenues, &c. &c. In my opinion, the best mode of acquiring this information is to keep up a constant personal intercourse with his ministers and those about his durbār; to have this intercourse a daily occurrence, and by no means a matter of state or parade; and by these means it is not possible that we can remain in ignorance of any thing that is going on, as in other places.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 8th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th Dec., upon the subject of the weakness of the garrison of Surat. I have not received any return of the troops at that station, and I cannot say what their numbers are. Col. Murray has, I imagine, lately called the European troops into the field, as I observe that the 75th regt. is among those composing his corps.

G. O.

Camp at Rajah Ka Peepulgaum, Sunday, 8th Jan. 1804.

A company of Native infantry from the pickets to be posted every evening at sunset, in the rear of the bazaars, with orders to patrol frequently and take up all thieves.

The detachment will march to-morrow morning by the left.

The officer commanding at Seringapatam will be pleased to give orders that the sepoys belonging to the corps on duty in that garrison, and the artificers and others belonging to the public departments, may inhabit the former the cantonments allotted for them, and the latter such places as may have been appointed for them by the gentleman in charge of the police.

It is positively forbid to allow any sepoy to inhabit Shanai Gunge-aum, or any part of the island or fort, excepting the cantonment allotted to the corps to which he belongs.

The following rules are to be observed in the conduct of the police at Seringapatam:

When a sepoy or other person belonging to the military profession is seen in the act of rioting or transgressing the rules laid down for the preservation of good order and cleanliness, or any others which come immediately under the superintendence of the gentleman in charge of the police, such person is to be taken by the police peons, and carried before the magistrate; and the magistrate will give notice of this arrest to the commanding officer, in order that the military authorities may be regularly apprised of the transaction.

When the magistrate shall require the presence of a sepoy or other military person, either to answer to a charge brought against him, or to give evidence in any cause, or for any other purpose, he will apply to the commanding officer to give orders that such sepoy, &c., may be directed to attend him, and the commanding officer will comply with his request. In case the magistrate should find it necessary to detain such sepoy or other military person beyond the day, he will give notice thereof to the commanding officer.

A large police establishment is kept at Seringapatam, by order of government, for the purpose of protecting the lives and property of the inhabitants, an object which, from the situation of the place, must be difficult completely to attain. The gentleman in charge of the police has been desired to send patrols of his police peons in all parts of the fort and island, to take up all persons out of their houses and quarters at unseasonable hours. The military patrols are to assist, and not to impede the execution of the duties required from the police peons. No soldier or sepoy ought to be out of his quarters at unseasonable hours, according to the orders of the garrison of Seringapatam; and no soldier or sepoy is to be allowed to quit his guard. The military patrols ought to have orders to stop soldiers or sepoys disobeying these orders.

Major Gen. Wellesley has experienced during the late war the greatest benefits from the protection which he has uniformly given to the inhabitants of Seringapatam, and he is determined to continue it. He requests, therefore, that the commanding officer at Seringapatam the support of, and co-operation with, the civil magistrate in the exercise of the duties of his office, as the foundation of the system, at that place, from which such extensive and important public benefits have been derived.

I am decidedly of opinion that Surat is a point of too much consequence ever to be exposed to risk, excepting in a case of very urgent necessity. The plan which I proposed to the Hon. the Governor, in my letter of the 2nd Aug., provided effectually for the security of Surat, under every possible contingency; and I conclude that the departure from that part of it has been occasioned by the extraordinary sickness of the troops.

The change of the circumstances of our situation, in consequence of the peace, may render desirable a small alteration in that plan. I purpose immediately to take the subject into consideration, and to lay my sentiments before the Governor. In the mean time, I think that it will be advisable to station the Fencible battalion at Surat; unless Col. Murray should require its services for any extraordinary emergency, of which I am not aware. I now beg leave to recommend generally to the government, that the first step taken should be to supply the deficiencies of men in the established corps, and to call upon the officers to discipline their sepoys. I see that in one corps there are no less than 500 supernumeraries, all undisciplined. This corps has had the same number of supernumeraries for the last 6 months; and it might have been expected that before this time some of them would have been disciplined. In their present state they are worse than useless.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 8th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th Dec. I do not apprehend that any inconvenience can result from the continuation of the correspondence of Col. Murray with the Hon. the Governor in Council, through the accustomed channel; and it has the advantage of affording to government the assistance of Major Gen. Nicolls' opinion upon the different points which may occur, and I therefore recommend its continuance.

To Capt. Graham.

Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 8th Jan. 1804.

I received your letters of the 11th and 13th Dec., but have been obliged to delay answering them, because the Nizam's amildars thought proper to drive my tappall peons off the road, and to interrupt my communication with the southward.

The Bheel who, you say, proposes to connect himself with the British government, merely refers you to his carkoon, laments the death of some other Bheel, and says that, if certain others are released, he will have full confidence in your professions. There is nothing in all this.

I am sorry for the defeat of the Perinda detachment; but I conclude that, as usual, they had only 100, instead of 1000 men.

I must consider of the proposal to have the mint at Ahmednuggur. I have concluded treaties of peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and a letter will go to you with this, which will show you what is to be given up on the side of Ahmednuggur; which fort will remain in our possession.

I shall also give Neemgaum to the Rajah of Berar. I fear, however, that nothing will restore peace to that part of the country, excepting my marching that way with the army, which I am now doing.

To the Officer coming. at Gawilghur. Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 8th Jan. 1804.

I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will deliver up the fort of Gawilghur to the officer of the Rajah of Berar who will give this letter to you. You will take a receipt for the guns, stores, &c., which you will deliver up, as well as the armour, swords, &c., which have been kept by my directions. After having done this, you will march with the troops under your command to Ellichpoor, and place yourself under the orders of Lieut. Col. Lang.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Jeypoor, 9th Jan. 1804.

The bearer hereof is the person fixed upon by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to be his vakeel at the Peshwah's durbar, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has desired me to recommend him to you. I therefore take this mode of making him known to you, and request for him such attentions and assistance as you may be able to afford him.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Jeypoor, 9th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose orders for the delivery of the forts and districts ceded in Hindustan by the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I likewise enclose copies of letters which I have addressed to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and have dispatched through Hindustan.

Major Malcolm quitted camp on the 7th inst., on his march to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. That Chief had gone towards Burhampoor, and some of the sirdars had come from Ougein, escorted by a body of infantry, to join him.

I have recommended certain objects to the attention of Major Malcolm in a paper of which I will transmit a copy as soon as it can be made.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Jeypoor, 9th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose dispatches which have been sent to me by the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone, from a perusal of which your Excellency will observe that the Rajah of Berar has claimed the exclusive possession of three districts east of the Wurda, the revenues of which had been collected, previously to the war, jointly by him and by the Soubah of the Deccan. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Elphinstone upon the subject of this claim.

Besides the conversation alluded to in that letter, I had another yesterday evening with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder upon this subject, in the course of which he entirely gave up the claim; and said that he had not a doubt but that the Rajah would also give it up, as soon as Mr. Elphinstone should make him acquainted with my sentiments. I told Ramchunder, however, that till that claim was given up, and till I should receive reports that the Rajah's troops had been withdrawn from the province of Berar, I should not restore the fort of Gawilghur, or deliver over the districts for the support of its garrison, or of the garrison of Nernulla, and that I had ordered one division of British troops and the Nizam's army to halt in Berar till further orders. He has again assured me that the Rajah would have no hesitation in renouncing this claim, and he wrote a dispatch to the ministers which I forwarded last night. I

think that the claim has been brought forward only to try whether the British government was likely to yield any point about which there could be a dispute, and it will be given up immediately. It is scarcely possible to believe that Rajah Mohiput Ram did not know that the Soubah of the Deccan had territories on the left bank of the Wurda, but he told me, upon more than one occasion, that he had none. But supposing him to

Lieut. Gen. Stuart to the Governor General.

Choultry Plain, 9th Jan. 1804.

I have considered it unnecessary to report to your Excellency the operations of the British army employed against the Marhatta confederates in the Deccan, as they have been regularly communicated direct to your Excellency by the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley. It is my duty, however, to inform your Excellency of the proceedings of the division of the army serving in the Doab since the period of time when I left that division to return to the Carnatic.

The state of affairs at Hyderabad at the time of the death of the late Nizam, and the intention manifested by the Marhatta confederates of proceeding towards that capital, appeared to render it advisable, that the force under Major Gen. Campbell should occupy a position favorable to a speedy advance upon Hyderabad. That officer, pursuant to the instructions which he received, proceeded to the Kistna in the month of September, and made the necessary preparations for the expeditious passage of that river. The maintenance of order at Hyderabad, and the successes of the British armies to the northward of the Godavery, removed, however, every probability of the services of the division under the command of Major Gen. Campbell being required at that capital. In the month of October intelligence was received from different quarters, of a nature calculated to excite suspicions regarding the dispositions and views of the southern Marhatta jaghiredars. The Rajah of Kolapoor increased his troops, and permitted a relation of Dowlat Rao Scindiah to make large levies in his country. The members of the Putwurdun family, and Madhoo Rao Rastia, also increased their forces to a considerable extent, and the Talloor jaghiredar made an irruption into the country of Siddajee Rao Nimbilkur, Appah Dessaye, who, with his quota, had accompanied Major Gen. Wellesley, plundered that chieftain's villages, and attacked his fort of Manowly.

Major Gen. Wellesley, on the 24th Oct., requested that Major Gen. Campbell should adopt measures for the protection of the country of Appah Dessaye, and the hostile tendency of the conduct manifested by the southern jaghiredars in general rendered it expedient for the latter officer to enter the Marhatta territory for the purpose not only of relieving the fort of Manowly, but of preventing acts of aggression on the part of the other jaghiredars. On approaching the Marhatta frontier, Major Gen. Campbell wrote to the several jaghiredars, and in the letter which he addressed to the Talloor jaghiredar enjoined that chief to withdraw from the country of Appah Dessaye. Receiving no reply to that letter, Major Gen. Campbell continued his march, and arrived at Manowly, where he was joined by the manager of Appah Dessaye. He proceeded from thence to Talloor, and being unable to effect an accommodation between the jaghiredar of that place and the manager of Appah Dessaye, he delivered over the fort of Talloor, which was surrendered to him without opposition, to the latter, on the 24th Dec., until the orders of his Highness the Peshwah, relative to its disposal, should be received. The jaghiredar fled to the Rajah of Kolapoor.

Major Gen. Campbell, on the 27th Dec., received information that a large body of plunderers, amounting to 10,000 horsemen and peons, had crossed the Kistna at the Dharore ghaut, and were proceeding towards the Toombuddra and the Company's frontier. This body of plunderers was conducted by a mussulmann, who assumed the character of a fakir, and the name of the late Dhoondiah Wangh. The depredations already committed by these plunderers, their manifest intention of passing the Toombuddra, and the extensive and serious evils which they were calculated to occasion in the countries of the Company and its allies, rendered it indispensable to attack and disperse them with every possible degree of promptitude, and Major Gen. Campbell commenced his march in pursuit of them on the 28th Dec. with the cavalry and the flank companies of the infantry of his division. After a forced march of considerable length, Major Gen. Campbell

have had a knowledge of the extent of his master's territories in that quarter, his conduct in deceiving me upon that subject is not more extraordinary than his having been the channel by which a present of 5 laes of rupees was offered to me, *provided I would consent to make peace with the Rajah of Berar, on condition of his ceding to the Company the province of Cuttaek.* It is true, that when he spoke to me upon this sub-

bell had the good fortune to get up with the plunderers on the morning of the 31st Dec.; he attacked them immediately, and dispersed them, after killing and wounding upwards of 3000 of their number.

I had the honor of forwarding to your Excellency a copy of Major Gen. Campbell's report of that affair, which reflects considerable credit on the exertions of that officer, and the troops under his command. No doubts can exist of his early success having relieved the Company's northern provinces and the Dooab from depredations similar to those which were committed by the late Dhoondiah Waugh.

I embrace with sincere pleasure this opportunity of offering my cordial congratulations to your Excellency on the important, brilliant, and decisive successes which have attended the operations of the British armies during the present war in every quarter of India. Those events lead me to anticipate with the fullest confidence the speedy termination of the contest in which we are engaged, on terms eminently calculated to extend our resources, and secure the stability of the British power in India.

The Sec. Supreme Gov. to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 9th Jan. 1801.

1. Your dispatch dated the 17th Dec. 1803, enclosing the copy of a treaty of peace concluded by you on that date, on the part of the Hon. Company with the Rajah of Berar, has been received and submitted to the Governor General in Council.

2. The Governor General in Council has great satisfaction in communicating to you his high approbation of the terms of peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar, which his Excellency in Council considers to be in the highest degree advantageous, honorable, and glorious to the British government.

3. The Governor General in Council discharges a satisfactory part of his duty in expressing to you the high sense which he entertains of the judgment and ability manifested by you on this occasion. The Governor General in Council considers you to have rendered an essential service to the interests of the Hon. Company, and to have augmented the reputation of the British name by the conclusion of this advantageous and honorable treaty.

4. The Governor General in Council has this day ratified the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, and the ratified copy will be immediately dispatched to the Resident at Hyderabad, for the purpose of being transmitted to the Rajah of Berar through Mr. Elphinstone, whom you have appointed to act in the capacity of Resident at that chieftain's Court.

Marquis Wellesley to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 9th Jan. 1801.

I have this instant received your letter of the 17th Dec., announcing the happy event of peace with the Rajah of Berar. Your treaty is wise, honorable, and glorious, and I shall ratify it the instant a copy can be made.

The only article upon which I should wish any alteration, is that respecting the admission of Europeans into the service of the Rajah. It would be more complete to exclude them altogether in peace and war, unless with the consent of the British government. But this is not an object to be placed in competition with the great advantages of this admirable treaty; the stipulations which will confer advantages on the Nizam are highly politic, and afford a splendid proof of the British faith. Upon the whole I feel the greatest pride in the treaty, and I am satisfied that it will form a brilliant point in the history of this country, and a noble termination of your military glory.

P. S. I entirely approve your mission of Mr. Elphinstone, and your sending for Webbe. Let me know what situation Elphinstone wishes to fill.

ject, I do not believe that he was aware that I had demanded the province of Berar, as a compensation for the Soubah of the Deccan; but the fact above mentioned will show your Excellency that, in negotiating these treaties of peace, I had to contend not only with the ministers of the enemy, but against the intrigues of the servant of the allies: this will account in some degree for my want of information respecting the extent of the Soubah's territories and rights beyond the Wurda.

There is a Marhatta interest in the government of the Soubah of the Deccan which pervades all branches of the administration. It is to be hoped that the operation of the treaties of peace will destroy this interest, for if it should not, the government must fall.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, bottom of the Badowly ghaut, 10th Jan. 1804.

The letters which I sent under cover to you on the 8th inst. will have apprised you that I have made peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and those which I now send you will show you the principles on which I agreed to those terms. Mr. Elphinstone is with Ragojee Bhonslah, and appears to be getting on well. The Rajah has claimed the possession of 3 trifling districts, of which the revenues had been collected by him and the Nizam jointly, which are to the eastward of the Wurda, under the operation of the 4th article of the treaty of peace. But I have combated that claim by stating that the basis of the treaty was, that the Rajah was to give compensation; and that in a case of doubt of what was the meaning of any article, it must be construed conformably to the basis of the treaty, and that when no cession is specified, no cession was ever intended. The Rajah's vakeel with me does not pretend that this cession was ever intended; and he says that he has no doubt that when the Rajah shall have been made acquainted with my sentiments, he will give up the claim. It would certainly have been better if the 4th article of the treaty had been more accurately drawn. But the fact is that Rajah Mohiput Ram deceived me in this instance, as he has in many others; and gave me reason to believe that the Soubah of the Deccan had no territories and no claims to the eastward of the Wurda; although I now believe that he has a claim upon the city of Nagpoor itself.

Malcolm is gone to Scindiah's camp, where his principal business will be to arrange the treaty of defensive alliance. I think that the only objection to the treaty, in the same manner as it stands with the Soubah and

G. O.

Camp at Turroa, 10th Jan. 1804.

The 2 brigades of infantry, with the park and provision department, head quarters, bazaars, Amrut Rao's cavalry, and the guns belonging to the other allies, to march to-morrow morning by the left.

The brigade of cavalry, except one squadron of Native cavalry, the department of general agent for cavalry supplies, and the cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, to Appah Dessaye, and to Goklah, to halt to-morrow.

The pickets of infantry will form the advance; each corps will hand its own guns and tumbrils up the ghaut; and the officer commanding the 4th brigade will order such working parties as may be necessary for the park, provision and store carts, and also the guns belonging to the allies, up the ghaut. A squadron of Native cavalry will guard the baggage as usual. The old pickets of infantry will send a company of infantry up the ghaut to take post at the hills at the top, and the remaining companies will wait below the ghaut, till the whole of the departments directed to march and Amrut Rao's cavalry have passed up.

the Peshwah, will be the stations of the troops in Scindiah's territories; and I am of opinion that this is not important, and I have recommended to Malcolm to give it up. The reasons on which I ground this opinion are too long to be detailed in this letter; and I have so much business that I cannot get you a copy of the paper which I have sent to Malcolm on this subject: but they appear to me to have had their weight with him, and to have induced him to alter his opinion. Whether Scindiah will agree to the treaty of defensive alliance or not, the first object of our attention must be to strengthen Guzerat, and place our military affairs in that province on a respectable footing. I am sure that I do not know how that is to be done, unless a thorough reform is to be introduced into all the military arrangements of the Bombay government, and possibly into the government itself. But I believe I must go to Bombay on this business.

I see that the Fencible battalion is turned into a regiment, and that it was to be sent into Guzerat. It is probable that this arrangement will be altered as soon as Mr. Duncan shall hear of the peace. But, at all events, whether it is altered or not, it will be necessary to move another battalion into that quarter. This can be done only by marching from Poonah the Bombay battalion stationed there, and I have this measure in contemplation. But before I carry this into execution, I must get farther to the southward, and see the real state of the country of the Soubah of the Deccan, which I am informed is chaos itself. We must introduce a reform into that government; we must give it some public force, and establish that force on permanent principles, otherwise the government must fall to pieces. Six British battalions are not equal to keep in subjugation and tranquillity a country 600 miles long by 400 broad. Its disturbances will at some time or other prove fatal to our military operations: they would have distressed us much, if the late war had continued; and even now that we have made peace, I much doubt whether I shall not be obliged, in consequence of their existence, to draw the troops to the southward to insure their subsistence.

There are some points to which I wish you to turn your attention, and to give me your opinion before I write upon them to the Governor General. The first of these is the fort of Ahmednuggur. Shall we keep the fort, or give it up to the Peshwah? If we keep it, shall it be in the name of the Peshwah? What shall be the station of the subsidiary force? I observe that the Peshwah has no territories in Candeish, or beyond the hills to the northward of the Godavery. Probably a station on that river would be the best. But as this subsidiary force will have no Europeans, and will be weak, as the Peshwah will most probably be desirous of keeping 2 battalions near his person, it is my opinion that unless the subsidiary force with the Soubah of the Deccan should be stationed also upon the Godavery, that with the Peshwah ought not to be so far forward: shall it therefore be at Ahmednuggur? Upon the whole I believe that this would be the best plan.

What is to be done about settling the Peshwah's countries? My opinion is, that until his Highness raises a subsidy to take and keep possession of his tannahs, and puts his government into some kind of regular



sure to him; but if he does not comply with your proposition, I shall discharge them immediately.

Amrut Rao has also a very fine battalion of infantry of 700 men: possibly the Peshwah would like to have that also. But I do not know whether Amrut Rao would part with it. You may sound the Peshwah, and I will try Amrut Rao. The whole expense of Amrut Rao's troops is 87,000 rupees *per mensem*.

To Major Malcolm. Camp at Turora, bottom of the Badowly ghaut, 10th Jan. 1804.

The only business at Ragojee Bhoonslah's durbar is the elaim of the districts beyond the Wurda, and the delay of the orders to call in the horse who are still in Berar. If any thing material should occur, I shall let you know; but I cannot promise to send you copies of Elphinstone's dispatches, as I, and those who are obliged to assist me, have already much more to do than we can manage. I have told Ragojee's vakeel that I should not give up the fort of Gawilghur, or the country of the value of 4 lacs of rupees, and that I should leave a division of the British army in Berar, till all these questions should be settled. He declares that the Rajah will not hesitate one moment in complying with my requisition.

The Nizam's territories are, I believe, in one complete chaos, from the Godavery to Hyderabad. Major Robertson writes me from Dharore that Bheer has been plundered, and the plunderers are spreading wide. This is a serious evil. Unless we can draw supplies from those countries, it will not be possible to keep the army to the northward. Some reform must be introduced into the government of the Subah of the Deccan, or we shall yet be obliged to draw back to our frontier. A country 700 miles in length, and 400 in breadth, cannot be kept in subjection by 6 battalions.

I should be glad to have the translation of the schedule of the treaty with Seindiah. Likewise the paper received from Amrut Rao, on the subject of the division among his friends of the sum of one lac of rupees annually, which Kishen Rao has in his possession. I have not yet got the papers from Seindiah's vakeel, containing a memorandum of his demands, which were discussed in my last meeting with Eitil Punt.

P.S. I send, with this, letters to Clementi and the other fellows in Burhampoor, which I think will induce them to give up the place. If they do not, I wish Seindiah would attack it, and Capt. Vernon shall join him; or, if he chooses, I will go there myself, and teach Clementi and his fellows to obey my orders. I wish that you would send to Clementi, and point out the bad consequences of his withholding the place. I have written to Rajah Mohiput Ram upon the other points in your letter.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp above the Badowly ghaut, 11th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th Nov., on the subject of the trial of private W. Clarke, of H. M.'s 74th regt. The reason for which I omitted to apply to you in favor of that soldier, at the time the proceedings on his trial were transmitted to be laid before you, was, that Lieut. Col. Wallace did not recommend him;

and when I pressed him to recommend him, he told me that if he had not been tried by a general Court Martial for murder, he must have been tried by a regimental Court Martial for theft. However, I think it very desirable to avoid punishing with death a man belonging to the 74th regt.; and therefore I propose to offer to the man to commute his punishment to transportation for life to Botany Bay. By this mode the punishment of death will be avoided, and the 74th regt. will get rid of a bad soldier, of which Col. Wallace is very desirous.

My tappall has for the last month been very irregular, owing to the increase of the disturbances in the Nizam's territories, and I am much afraid that you will not have received many of my letters. I have, however, within these few days, made a fresh effort to re-establish the runners upon the road, which I hope will be successful, particularly as I have passed through the ghauts with my own division, on my return towards the Godavery.

I shall therefore now give you an outline of our operations, and of events in this quarter, since the battle at Argaum on the 29th Nov., of which I think you must have received the account. I marched immediately after that action with both divisions to Ellichpoor, where I established an hospital for the wounded. On the 7th Dec. both divisions marched to take up their ground for the siege of Gawilghur. The subsidiary force having been equipped for that operation at Asseerghur, was destined to attack the northern face, in which it appeared probable we should have the best chance of success; while I should cover the siege with my own division and all the cavalry, and make such attacks to the southward and westward as might appear practicable, and likely to divert the attention of the enemy from Col. Stevenson's attack.

The difficulty of dragging the guns through the mountains to the northern point of attack was terrible; but it was overcome by the labor of the troops, and our batteries opened, both to the northward and southward, on the 13th in the morning. On the 15th in the morning a breach was effected in two outer walls of the northern face, and the place was stormed. But then there still remained an inner wall which had not been touched. This was escaladed, and the place was soon in our possession. Lieut. Col. Kenny, who commanded the storming party, was wounded; and Lieut. Young of the 7th died of a wound he received. Our loss was not great. No impression was made by my battery on the southern face of the fort; but still I made two attacks with my division, while Col. Stevenson stormed the northern face, one on the southern and

G. O.

Camp at So-gaum, Wednesday, 11th Jan. 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley thinks it necessary to remind the officers that there is a large forage guard sent out daily, with which they may send their camels; and he has further to observe to them that, the peace having occasioned the dismissal of a great many people from regular service with the Native powers, the number of thieves has been thereby increased, and it becomes more necessary for the officers to send their cattle out under the protection of the guard.

G. M. O.

So-gaum, 12th Jan. 1804.

All the men off duty of the 1st batt. 3rd regt., with a proportion of officers, to be employed to-day in a working party, in assisting to draw the remainder of the carriages in the store and provision departments, and the guns belonging to the allies, up the ghaut.

one on the western gateway. The former could have done no good, excepting by distracting the enemy; but the latter got into the fort and co-operated in the attack of the inner wall.

I have only given you an outline of our proceedings at Gawilghur, as I think it probable that you will have received my dispatches detailing them more particularly.

On the 17th Dec., in the morning, I signed a treaty of peace with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, of which, and of my dispatch on this subject to the Governor General, I enclose other copies. I marched the same day, and till the 19th, to the eastward towards Nagpoor, in order to keep alive the impression under which it was obvious that the treaty had been concluded; but I halted on the 20th, as I had every reason to believe that the Rajah would ratify the treaty, and that if I crossed the Wurda, his government would be entirely destroyed.

On the 23rd, I received the ratification of the treaty. On the same day, Eitil Punt and moonshee Kavel Nyn, two of Scindiah's principal ministers, came into camp to settle the peace for their master. Although this Chief had ratified the suspension of hostilities, he had not performed any one of the conditions of the treaty. He had remained to the westward, instead of going to the eastward of Elliehpoor; and his pindarries had taken advantage of my being occupied in the siege of Gawilghur, to spread over and plunder the country. Accordingly, I gave notice to his ministers, that in a few days I should put an end to the suspension of hostilities.

I marched on the 24th to the westward, and joined Col. Stevenson to the westward of Elliehpoor on the 26th; and on the 27th, we both marched to Surjee Anjengaum, where I concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah's ministers on the 28th, which I signed at one in the morning of the 30th. I received Scindiah's ratification of it on the 5th Jan., and I have now the honor to enclose another copy of it, and of my dispatch of the 30th Dec. to the Governor General.

I have nothing to add to that letter. The power of Scindiah is gone. The Rajah of Berar will never dare to venture into another war with the Company; and if he does, we know that we can destroy him. Holkar alone remains of all these Marhatta chiefs, and he will be formidable only as a freebooter. However, if we can oblige our allies to keep, or rather to restore their military establishments to some degree of efficiency, (and if we cannot effect that object, our system is essentially defective, and must, in the end, fail,) freebooters will never again be formidable.

Mr. Elphinstone has gone to the Rajah of Berar's durbar, where there is a little difference of opinion respecting the meaning of the 4th article of the treaty, whether it was intended to cede some small districts belonging to the Nizam, situated beyond the Wurda. I have no doubt upon the subject; and the Rajah's vakeel who negotiated the treaty with me agrees in that opinion, and tells me that the Rajah will give up the point. In the mean time, however, till this point is decided, I have kept the fort of Gawilghur, and have left the subsidiary force in Berar.

Scindiah is gone to the northward of Burhampoor, and Major Malcolm

was to join him this day. The principal object of his attention would be to arrange the treaty of defensive alliance. I have recommended to him not to insist upon fixing the subsidiary force in Scindiah's territories. I should prefer to have it either in Guzerat or Bundelcund, for reasons which are too long to be given in this letter. But I shall send you the copy of the paper which I have given to Major Malcolm upon the subject, in which they are detailed. Unless I have convinced Major Malcolm, which I believe I have done, (if his silence upon the subject is not to be attributed to sickness,) I am afraid I stand single in this opinion. However, I am convinced this is the only point upon which there will be any difficulty in Scindiah's durbar; and I see by the Governor General's instructions to Col. Close, that he was disposed to give it up, even at Poonah.

My intention is now gradually to draw off the troops, and to establish the Peshwah's subsidiary force according to the Governor General's orders. I propose to appoint Lieut. Col. Wallace to command it, of which arrangement I trust you will approve. We must keep up all the troops about the Godavery, till every thing shall have been settled, and every body gone to his home; but I cannot exactly decide upon this point, till I shall have received further intelligence from the southward, and shall know the exact extent of the disturbances in the Nizam's territories. They began almost immediately after I had passed through the ghauts to the northward; and, it is said, have spread greatly. But I have no accurate intelligence from the southward of a later date than the 20th Dec. from Ahmednuggur.

I propose to reinforce Guzerat as much as I can, as it is very obvious that that is now our weak point, and that it is also the point from which we can most easily annoy the Marhattas. A good force in Guzerat, the Nizam's and the Peshwah's subsidiary forces, the troops in Bundelcund, and Scindiah, must keep Holkar in check; or, if he should move, must destroy him. If he should adopt the freebater plan, the allies must look to the security of their own dominions. Our scattered detachments are not equal to catching thieves in all parts of these extended territories. But I have recommended to the Governor General's attention the state of the military power of the allies, and I trust that he will take measures to have it amended.

I informed you that I had given leave to Col. Stevenson to go to Madras. He must go to England, or he will not live. In the mean time, Lieut. Col. Haliburton commands the subsidiary force; and I beg leave to recommend him to you to succeed Col. Stevenson, if that officer should go to England. I believe that I have now adverted to all the points on which you may not have before received intelligence. I shall be much obliged to you to communicate to Lord W. Bentinck such parts of this letter as you may deem necessary for his information.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 13th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the memorandum of the conferences with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the day on which they delivered the ratification of the treaty of peace by that Chief.

I have likewise the honor to enclose the copy of a memorandum\* which I gave to Major Malcolm previous to his departure for Seindiah's camp. It contains my sentiments upon a variety of points, upon which I had before conversed with Major Malcolm; and I put them in this form both to recall them to his recollection, and that I might have an opportunity of laying them before your Excellency. I have reason to believe that Major Malcolm arrived in Seindiah's camp on the 11th inst., but I have not yet heard of his arrival there.

By the last accounts from Mr. Elphinstone, dated the 6th inst., the Rajah of Berar had made another march towards Nagpoor, and the hurgoories had attended Mr. Elphinstone, for the purpose of carrying the orders to the different chiefs who still remained with their troops in Berar. My letter upon the subject of the claim to the districts in Berar east of the Wurda had not been received.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp on the top of the Badowly ghaut, 13th Jan. 1804.

I received last night numerous and voluminous packets from Bengal, but which contain nothing of any importance.

Nothing has been concluded with any of the Rajahs or other chiefs; and I think it probable, from the complexion of the negotiations, that nothing will be concluded. Every endeavor appears to be made to delay; and the Commander in Chief was still halting on the 22nd Nov. The Rajah of Calpee, in particular, was hostile; and Edmonstone mentions that matters had not been conducted in a very satisfactory manner in Bundelcund; and I think it probable that the report that I sent to you yesterday of Meer Khan's march may have been made with an intention to keep up the spirit of opposition to our views in that quarter. The Rajah of Jansi is favorable.

There are 2 or 3 sheets of instructions from the Governor General, upon the peace, which I send to you. From his notes in the margin, I suspect that he will, upon the whole, approve of the peace. But I am much annoyed by the receipt of a letter from Sydenham, written by the Governor General's order, from which I perceive that some suspicion is entertained respecting the propriety of demanding the contribution at Burhampoor, the report of which had reached the Governor General through a private channel. Great pains are taken in Sydenham's letter to prove to me that no suspicion is entertained, that the questions upon the subject are asked merely for information; but those very pains prove the existence of the suspicion, and in fact, why is he in such a hurry to ask for information upon a subject upon which information must be given, unless some suspicion is entertained?

I have answered this letter, and have shown, that from the increase of my expenses, by measures not mine; by the total want of funds provided for this army; by my being left to chance; and by the Governor General having employed the frigate sent to Bengal for money; and by not paying my bills at Benares, and not furnishing money to pay them at Bombay, there was every reason to expect the loss of the campaign from the deficiency of funds to carry it on; and that, in fact, I could not have paid

\* See page 945.

the troops in December, if it had not been for this very sum of money raised by contribution at Burhampoor, and the sales of goods captured at Asseerghur.

I have told the Governor General that if he disapproves of the measure, he may order the money to be restored; but I have warned him, that if he does give those orders, Seindiah will certainly put the money into his pocket. In fact, if I had not exerted myself to keep in my hands a command of money, what would have become of the campaign? Where would have been the national honor or character, if the campaign had been lost?

They have made the Fencible battalion into a regiment at Bombay, upon which subject I send you some papers which you may keep. Nothing new. We have had violent rains.

P.S. Violent rain here for 2 days, which has made the weather cool.

I send you the memorandum given in on the 5th Jan., as well translated as I can translate, and the memorandum of the conference of that day.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 13th Jan. 1804.

I received last night Mr. Sydenham's letter of the 4th Dec., which I take the earliest opportunity of answering.

When I sent a division of the army to Burhampoor, I determined to raise a contribution upon that city. My reasons for this determination were: 1st; I had reason to believe from Col. Collins' report, that Burhampoor was an open town, which it would not be possible for me to retain; and, therefore, to levy the contribution was a likely mode of distressing the enemy, who, in fact, did give orders upon that city to part of his troops for their pay: 2ndly; although I was not in immediate want of money, I had the prospect before me of an approaching want.

The expenses of this army had been vastly increased, 1st; by the course of the campaign, and the increased distance of our operations from the sources of supply: 2ndly; by the increased price of every article of consumption, particularly of grain for the horses of the cavalry: and 3rdly; by the necessity of paying the Peshwah's troops, and at times those of the Rajah of Mysore, when their money had not arrived. I had, besides, every reason to hope that Amrut Rao would join; and, by arrangement made with the Peshwah, 5000 men were to be raised, 3000 of which were to serve with my army, and to be paid by me.

The rough estimate of our expenses would then stand thus:

	Rupees.
My own division . . . . .	400,000
Col. Stevenson's . . . . .	300,000
The Peshwah's . . . . .	100,000
The Rajah of Mysore's . . . . .	80,000
Amrut Rao and part of the 5000 troops, about . . . . .	150,000
	<hr/>
	1,030,000

To answer these demands no fund had been provided, excepting what I could get at Poonah for bills upon Bombay and Bengal, and what Major Kirkpatrick could get at Hyderabad. In respect to the supply from Poonah, I have to observe, that, besides my expenses, it was to pay those

of the troops there, and at Ahmednuggur; and also that not a post came in that I was not informed, either directly by Mr. Duncan or by Major Malcolm, that the government of Bombay could supply me no longer. Mr. Duncan had been obliged to insist that we should draw at 30 days instead of 8 days; and then we could get no more money for our drafts; and nearly at the same time we received accounts from Benares, that our drafts upon that place had not been paid. In the mean time, no money came from Bengal, and the frigate which Mr. Duncan sent round for specie was detained for another service. The supply from Hyderabad was likely to be more plentiful, and has proved to be much so; but still the supply was liable to many accidents, from the number of desperate thieves who infest the roads.

Besides all these demands upon me, compared with my means of answering them, the Governor General had desired that any chief, who offered himself from the enemy, should be taken into the service, and particularly Meer Khan, the Patan chief in Holkar's service. This expense would also have fallen upon me, as the Nizam government have not supplied one farthing; and I have lately been obliged to lend Rajah Mohiput Ram 3½ lacs of rupees, to prevent a mutiny among the troops usually in his service. But I do not mention this circumstance as a reason for levying a contribution upon Burhanpoor, as I was not aware of it at the time I ordered that measure. I knew that the moment at which I should cease to pay the troops regularly would be the date of the commencement of the disasters of the campaign in this quarter; and, therefore, I conceive that I should have neglected my duty to the Governor General, if I had omitted to take any measure which could avert or procrastinate that evil day.

In respect to the amount raised at Burhanpoor in this manner, I did not order that any particular sum should be raised. I desired Col. Stevenson, generally, to raise a contribution, if he should be of opinion that the inhabitants would pay it. The most he first demanded was 10 lacs of rupees. Upon finding that sum could not be paid without difficulty, and without resorting to measures which I had forbid, he reduced the demand to 2½ lacs; and the inhabitants who had been charged to collect the money then paid 75,000 rupees more, which they had levied beyond the reduced sum. This is the fact related to me by Col. Stevenson, and I have every reason to believe it is correct. You have now the whole story, and the Governor General may form his own judgment upon it. I should have reported it before now, as I am desirous that this and every other part of my conduct should be investigated; only that I did not know the result of Col. Stevenson's measures at Burhanpoor till after he joined me at the battle of Argaum: and I did not know the exact sum which had been levied until a few days ago, when he was about to leave the army, and gave me the receipt of the Paymaster. But I had intended, and shall still make a regular report to the Governor General, upon this subject, as I have upon every other, either to him or to Gen. Stuart.

The Governor General has trusted me to carry on an extensive service here; and I conceive that my duty to him requires that I should omit nothing which can insure its success. It would have been no excuse to

him, or to the world, if I had been obliged to give it up for want of money; and yet I must tell you, that if it had not been for this money levied at Burhampoor, and from the produce of the sales of property captured at Asseerghur, I should not have been able to have paid the troops in December, and I should not be able to pay them now, but for the sales of property captured at Gawilghur. There is to the value of 2 lacs of rupees of plate captured at Gawilghur, which, unless I get up money from Poonah or Hyderabad, is my only resource for next month.

It is impossible to reason on the effect on the national character of levying a contribution, because no facts can be produced by which a judgment can be formed. I know that to levy a contribution is common in India and in Europe; that I should have levied one at Oomrawootty, and another at Nagpoor, if the Rajah of Berar had not made peace; and that it would have been much more disgraceful and disastrous to have lost the campaign from the want of money, than to have insured in this manner the means of gaining it.

I believe I am as anxious as any other man that my character should not suffer, I do not mean in the mouths of common reporters and scandal bearers, but in the eyes of a fair judging people. I declare that I think that I have done what is right; but if the Governor General thinks it was wrong, it is easy to return the money to the people of Burhampoor. However, if he does this, he returns the money into Scindiah's pocket, for he will take it immediately. I have many other important matters to write to you upon; but as nothing can go on smoothly till this matter is explained, I have thought it best to begin with this, and to send off the letter without delay.

P. S. At the same time with Sydenham's letter of the 4th, I received yours of the 8th, and also his of the 9th, enclosing the commencement of the Governor General's instructions upon the peace. As far as I can judge from his notes, in the margin of the sheets transmitted by you, I believe I have made a better peace than he expected. At all events, the Governor General's mind will very soon have been relieved from all anxiety respecting the junction of the interests of Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, as he must have received my letter on the subject of the suspension of arms with Scindiah.

I have received Mr. Edmonstone's letters with the accounts of the negotiations with the Rajahs, &c., and I think there is every reason to believe that they have not been concluded by treaties. I hear that Meer Khan is gone towards Bundelcund: if that report be true, he must have done so in communication with Ambajee.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 13th Jan. 1804.

I enclose a copy of the Governor General's different projects, with remarks. Upon the whole, I hope he will approve of the treaty. The only doubt I have is about Ambajee.

It has also occurred to me, that he may not approve of the cessions being made to the allies generally. The fact is, that, if I had begun to draw up the treaty by stating the cessions to be made to each of the different powers, the vakeels would have begun intriguing with the Nizam's



and the Peshwah's servants in camp, respecting the cessions demanded for them; and I should never have got through the business. I might have entered in the treaty every cession as made to the British government, but this would have had the same consequences. I have received the account of the captured property, which I propose to forward to the Governor General to-morrow. It is not much, I am sorry to say.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 14th Jan. 1804.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have examined more particularly the papers received from Mr. Edmonstone on the subject of the negotiations with the Chiefs on the north-west frontier; and I think it is much to be regretted that I did not receive them before I concluded the treaty with Scindiah. It now appears to have been the Governor General's intention to restore the power of the Jauts as a State, at the expense of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; I did not know that their State had ever been destroyed. However, I still hope it will be possible to do every thing that the Governor General wishes, under the article of the treaty of peace which relates to these Chiefs.

I observe, from the first sheets of the Governor General's instructions, that he wishes Scindiah may have nothing south of the Taptee. I imagine the reason for such wish is, that the territories in Candeish may afford compensation for the Soubah of the Deccan, as that prince has now a better frontier than the Taptee could afford him; particularly considering that the greater part of Candeish and of Gungatena, or the countries bordering upon the Godavery near its source, will belong to Holkar. But Scindiah's possessions in Candeish are not worth above 4 or 5 lacs; and the account which I now send of the Soubah's gains in Berar will remove all uneasiness upon the subject of compensation for him.

This is an account of the revenues of Berar, which I have received from Rajah Mohiput Ram; from which it appears that the Soubah will gain 60 lacs annually. His minister will dispute this account, and will say that the country does not produce that revenue. I believe this is true; but the same argument may be used respecting every country ceded, and there is no way of settling a question of this kind, excepting by reference to the ancient documents, of which this is a copy. I would send you a translation of this paper, but that I have no person in camp to translate it; and it will be better done in the office at Fort William than it can be elsewhere.

I believe that Malcolmu wrote to you to propose that he should be sent to England, with the Governor General's dispatches upon the peace. I think this will be an advisable measure. At all events, Malcolmu must go to England. His health is entirely gone, and the medical people think that his remaining in this country will be attended with danger. He is at present entirely incapable of doing business; and he was knocked up by what he had to do in this camp when Elphinstone went away: so that to detain him will be useless. I think that Webbe ought to relieve him at Scindiah's durbar, and I propose to endeavor to prevail upon Webbe to go there. He is now, I hope, on his road to Poonah.

In respect to Mysore, I recommend that a gentleman from the Bengal

civil service should be Malcolm's successor there. The government of that country should be placed under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor General in Council. The governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah, than they have with the Soubah of the Deccan, or the Peshwah. The consequence of the continuance of the existing system will be, that the Rajah's government will be destroyed by corruption; or, if they should not be corrupt, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil; or who has strength of character or talents to defend the government against the second. In my opinion, the only remedy is, to take the Rajah under the wing of the Governor General; and this can be done effectually only by appointing, as Resident, a gentleman of the Bengal civil service, and by directing him to correspond only with the Governor General. To fill this office with advantage to the public will not require very extraordinary talents when this arrangement shall be made. Good character, and decent, respectable manners will be far more important.

Since writing the above, I have received your letters of the 11th, with the remainder of the Governor General's instructions. I have now better hopes than I had that the peace will be approved of. It contains all the articles proposed by the Governor General, excepting the independence of the Rajpoots and Jauts, whether they make treaties with us or not; that respecting the taking any Europeans into Scindiah's service; and the renunciation by Scindiah of all claims upon Jansi and Calpee, &c.

I see clearly the difference between my arrangements for the Rajpoots and Jauts and that proposed by the Governor General: my public letter gives my reasons for making the arrangement as it stands in the treaty. I have to add to these reasons, that I thought it very improbable that Scindiah would ever consent to declare these people independent of his government, unless compelled thereto by necessity; such as the British government having made treaties with them. However, it is useless to add any thing upon the subject; the article cannot be altered, and I have only to regret that I did not receive instructions at an earlier period.

I have already written to Malcolm to insert an article in the treaty of defensive alliance upon the subject of Europeans, as proposed by the Governor General. In respect to the renunciation of Jansi, Calpee, Bundelcund, &c., Scindiah's ministers declared that Scindiah had nothing to do with those countries, which belonged to the Peshwah. This appears in the minutes of the conferences. I was anxious to find out to what countries they had claims, and probed them particularly upon that point.

I have sent to the Governor General a copy of my memorandum to Malcolm, on the subject of his negotiations at Scindiah's durbar; but, since the receipt of your letter of the 11th Dec., I have written to him to desire he will do his utmost to secure the introduction of the subsidiary force into Scindiah's territories, as I see that is the wish of the Governor General.

In answer to the latter part of your letter of the 11th Dec., upon the subject of the subsidiary alliances, I have to tell you that I am perfectly aware of their benefits. The consequences of them have been, that in

this war with the Marhattas, which it is obvious must have occurred sooner or later, the Company's territories have not been invaded; and the evils of war have been kept at a distance from the sources of our wealth and our power. This fact alone, unsupported by any others which could be enumerated as benefits resulting from those alliances, would be sufficient to justify them. But they undoubtedly have a tendency to reduce the strength of the powers with which we are connected; and this is an evil, the growth and inconvenience of which daily increase. The memorandum to Malcolm will show the great evils which will attend Scindiah's discharging his military establishments; and the present states of the countries of the Nizam and the Peshwah show the consequences of their discharging those formerly in their service.

The question is exactly this: Is it necessary for the general tranquillity and security of the British government that the banditti who infest those countries should be put down? and that the governments of the Peshwah and the Nizam should be established in their territories respectively? If so, it is absolutely necessary that those powers should be obliged to keep up some military force for the purposes of their own government; or, if they refuse to keep up their military establishments, and the *onus* is to fall upon the British troops, their numbers must be doubled, or even trebled; for it stands to reason that they are not now sufficiently strong to preserve order in countries of such vast extent.

I do not object to the subsidiary alliances, but I do to forming them all upon the Hyderabad model. The circumstances at other durbars are entirely different; and it is obvious that to form the subsidiary alliance with Scindiah upon that model would be attended with risk. In respect to my saying that the establishments must be increased to the full amount of the subsidiary forces, if established at the durbars of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, I meant that the same number of troops would still be necessary to support the authority of government in their own provinces and immediate dependencies.

In the provinces depending upon Bengal, there is a civil government, and some strength, besides that of the sword; but in the territories depending upon the subordinate governments, there is no other power; and the moment that is weakened, the people rise in rebellion. I think, therefore, that the same number of troops will still be necessary, at least for some time, to support the authority of government in our own provinces.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 10 miles N. from Jaffierabad, 15th Jan. 1804.

I informed you, some time ago, that I was determined to assist the Peshwah, as far as might be possible, in settling his government; but, before I employ the Company's troops in reducing rebels and taking mud forts, I must see some arrangements made by his Highness' government to settle his country, and to take possession of the places which the Company's troops may hand over to him. The Company's officers cannot be employed as amildars, nor the Company's troops as subundies; and yet, under present arrangements, if they do not take charge of the districts from which they may drive the rebels against the Peshwah's go-

vernment, these districts will just fall again into the hands which now hold them, and the Company will have made for themselves a few more enemies.

The first step, therefore, is for the Peshwah to organise his revenue department upon some permanent footing, to raise the subsidies of the country, and then the troops can be employed to advantage in giving him assistance; otherwise, in my opinion, they will only lose their time, and throw away their trouble.

The Peshwah's conduct respecting Baba Phurkia is strange. The vakeel of this person is now in camp, and I shall let him know the result of my negotiation. But the treaty does not bind the British government to attack persons of this description, and I shall tell Baba Phurkia that, as long as he does not molest the Peshwah, nobody will interfere with him. His troops have lately been cut up in the Nizam's territories, and his party are entirely dispersed. But if the implacable revenge of the Peshwah is to be allowed to be the rule of our conduct, the war will be eternal.

Col. Murray received my letter of the 1st Dec., and did not march into Malwa. — has been already ordered up to Poonah for trial.

You will have observed, by my letter to the Governor General on the peace, that I have been obliged to yield the point to Scindiah respecting Chumargoonda, &c., and the stipulation made to prevent that arrangement from being prejudicial to us.

I believe that I must move the army towards the Nuggur district, in order to set matters to rights. I do not think there is any thing in the supposed plans of the French to the northward.

I think that you have mistaken my letter upon the subject of Amrut Rao. That chief did not propose that the adherents of Nana Furnavces should be released, as a measure for his gratification, but as one likely to be beneficial to the Peshwah's government. Amrut Rao will give up Poonadur and the other forts, districts, &c., in his possession, whenever I may demand them. But the demand would, in my opinion, be very unjust, till the Peshwah shall have released his private servants, and the families of his servants, and restored their property.

But it is my opinion that the Peshwah is endeavoring to deceive us all upon the subject of Amrut Rao. Did you know that he had sent a brother of Muunkaiseer to speak to me about him? He came to me in company with Goklah, and questioned me in a very extraordinary manner, as he said, by orders from his Highness. I refused to answer his questions, as he could produce no authority from the Peshwah for asking them. But I told Goklah that, as he was an old acquaintance of mine, for whom I had a respect, and that as he was a servant of the Peshwah, I had no objection to impart to him every thing that had ever passed between Amrut Rao and me. I then told him the whole story, stated the causes for which I had made the whole arrangement, and desired him to tell the Peshwah that, if he wished to see the treaty, he might ask you for it, and you could give him a copy of it.

They tell me positively that the Peshwah's durbar is guided by Sirjee Rao Ghautky. Appah Dessaye was here again the night before last, and

said that his vakeel at Poonah had seen, in Ghautky's hands, the sunnud from the Peshwah for Manowly. The polygar of Moodgul has written to inform me that Ghautky had ordered him to attack Appah Dessaye. I enclose a copy of that letter. I hear also, but of this I am not quite certain, that the Peshwah has given to Ghautky and Ball Kishen Gungurdlur, serinjamy for 4000 men each; as it is said, for the purpose of attacking Holkar. The only importance that can be attached to this act, is the Peshwah's duplicity in employing Ghautky after he had proposed to us to arrest him. He must not be allowed to attack Holkar's territory; and we must take care that sirdar intrigues in the Peshwah's durbar are not carried on through this same Ghautky, in order to bring on a contest between us and Holkar, for which Scindiah and his ministers are most anxious.

Upon the subject of the intrigues of Nana Furnavces' partisans, I have to observe, that the Peshwah has one certain mode of getting the better of them all, and that is to allow Dhoondoo Punt to go to Bombay with Nana's family, thus to get possession of the fort of Loghur. This arrangement, and the possession of Poonadur, by doing common justice to Amrut Rao's followers, will make the Peshwah's government so strong and respectable, that there might be hopes of seeing it revive. But it will not answer to break faith with the Loghur man by attacking him, or to take Poonadur from Amrut Rao without getting the Peshwah to relieve his servants and restore their property.

Malcolm has arrived in Scindiah's camp. I have not received the account of his reception, but I have a letter of the 13th, which must have been written subsequent to the account he must have sent me of that ceremony. Malcolm was very unwell, I am sorry to say, and could not write himself. Have you heard any thing of Webbe's progress?

To the Governor General.

Camp, 15th Jan. 1804.

My time and attention have been so much taken up by other important objects, that I have been obliged to delay till this moment to address your Excellency upon the subjects of the arrangements made with Amrut Rao, since I apprised you, in my letter of the 13th Nov., that he had arrived in my camp. The objects to be settled with him were; 1st, the operation of the 4th article of the treaty which I had concluded with him; 2ndly, the operation of the 5th article of that treaty; and, 3rdly, his possession of certain districts belonging to the Peshwah.

In respect to the 1st object, Amrut Rao proposed that the sirdars who accompanied him to camp should have pensions, the total amount of which would have been 2 lacs of rupees *per annum*. I brought this demand down to one lac of rupees *per annum*, which has been distributed in the proportions stated in the enclosed paper.

In respect to the 2nd object, viz., the payment of the troops, I have already informed your Excellency that I proposed to pay these troops as a part of those which your Excellency was bound to pay for the Peshwah, according to the modification of the treaty of Bassein. Their expense, including a body of infantry, which, if the war had continued, would have been useful, is 87,000 rupees *per mensem*, to commence from the 12th

Nov., the day on which Amrut Rao came into camp. I have desired Lieut. Col. Close to make an offer of the services of those troops to the Peshwah; and, if his Highness should not accept their services, I propose to discharge them.

The troops have remained under the command of Amrut Rao; who, since he has been in the camp, has appeared well disposed to conduct himself in a manner satisfactory to me.

In respect to the 3rd object, I have been able to settle nothing definitively. I proposed to Amrut Rao, on his arrival, that he should give me an account of the produce of the districts of which he had possession, belonging to the Peshwah, as it would be necessary to subtract their value from the amount of his pension; or if he should prefer to receive the full amount of his pension, it would be necessary that he should resign the districts to the Peshwah. In answer to this proposal, Amrut Rao made no objections: he said that the districts were situated upon the Godavery; that they were on the high road of every army that had marched to Poonah for the last eight years; that the Peshwah had destroyed them; that the inhabitants had fled from the country; and that there was no produce and no revenue. In respect to giving them up, Amrut Rao said, that having thrown himself upon the Company, he should have no scruple in doing whatever was desired; and that he would resign the districts to me whenever I chose to ask for them. He expressed a wish, however, that these districts, and the fort of Poonadur, and certain other forts of which he has possession, might be made the means of procuring from the Peshwah orders to release the persons and restore the property of the families of his private servants who had been arrested, and which had been seized by his Highness' orders. He at the same time gave me a list of the persons to whom these injuries had been done, which I have transmitted to Lieut. Col. Close, with a request that he would arrange with the Peshwah's ministers, that the persons might be released, and the property restored, on the ground of Amrut Rao's giving up the forts and districts of which he had possession. I have hitherto received no answer, and there this matter rests for the present.

Besides this list of his own immediate dependents, to whom injuries have been done by the Peshwah, Amrut Rao gave me another list of the old servants of the Marhatta state, who had been imprisoned by his Highness' orders, and were at that moment confined in different hill forts. Amrut Rao declared that he had nothing to say about these persons, excepting that they were the old official people who had conducted the business for years, under Nana Furnavees; and he recommended that, if the British government were desirous of seeing the Peshwah's state recover, they should procure the release of these servants. I have also recommended this point to Lieut. Col. Close's attention. In fact, my Lord, the Peshwah's government is at present only a name. His Highness has not settled even the country along the Beemah, 5 miles from Poonah. It is at this moment a dreary waste, overrun by thieves; and his Highness is incapable of conducting his government himself: he gives no confidence or power to any body, and he has no person about him able to conduct the common business of the country.

I have called Lieut. Col. Close's attention particularly to this point. Amrut Rao could certainly settle the government; but the Peshwah's aversion to him appears to be so rooted, that I am afraid I shall not be able to persuade his Highness to refrain from acts of open hostility; much less to receive him as a brother, and employ him in a confidential situation under the government. The only mode, therefore, that appears practicable, is to persuade his Highness to release these old servants of the state, to have them employed in the management of the revenue; to keep Amrut Rao at a distance, and at peace with the Peshwah; and to increase the power and reputation of the government as much as possible, by giving it possession of Poonadur, and the other hill forts near Poonah.

Amrut Rao's pension, and those given under the 4th article of the treaty, have been paid since the 14th Aug., the day on which it was concluded. Besides these pensions, I have promised one of 6000 rupees *per annum* to Prubbaukur Bellall, Amrut Rao's vakeel, with whom I concluded the treaty with Amrut Rao; and to whose influence over his master I attribute his having joined at the time he did. The reputation of the British government, and the successes of the British armies, afforded him powerful arguments; but I think there is great reason to believe that, however satisfied Amrut Rao may now be with his situation, he might have joined the banditti who have overrun the defenceless territories of the Subah of the Deccan, if this person had not possessed his confidence, and exerted his influence to induce him to join the British army. There are three other persons whom I wish to recommend to your Excellency, for similar marks of the favor of the British government. One of these is Jeswunt Rao Ramehunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, who negotiated the peace; the other is Ball Kishen Letchma, a person who was employed as a vakeel from the family of Pursheram Bhow; and the third is Surjun Pundit, who has been employed in carrying on the communications between Goklah and me.

By the customs of India, I imagine that the first is entitled to a reward, as having negotiated an important treaty of peace; and it is but justice to this man to say, that he conducted himself throughout the negotiation with the utmost candor. I have also to observe, that rewards of this description have a good effect in the native durbars.

In respect to the persons mentioned in the 2nd and 3rd instances, I have only to recall to your Excellency's recollection the events of the last year, as a ground for my recommendation of them. When I entered the Marhatta territory in the month of March, the Peshwah had been driven from his capital, and his cause was deemed desperate throughout the Marhatta Empire. By the influence of these persons, principally, I was enabled to bring their employers forward to Poonah in his cause. Pursheram Bhow's family, it is true, did not serve throughout the campaign, but Ball Kishen Letchma exerted himself to persuade those chiefs to accompany me from Poonah; and when he found that he could not succeed, he quitted their service. Goklah's conduct, however, has been exemplary, and considering that he must have believed that we commenced the campaign under discouraging circumstances, very extraordinary in a Marhatta.

Upon the whole, I consider these persons deserving the reward of the

British government; and I therefore beg leave to recommend that they should have each a pension of 6000 rupees *per annum*, to commence from the date of the fall of Ahmednuggur, and that of Jeswunt Rao Ramclunder from the date of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar. The services of the people of the description of those I have above recommended to your Excellency are more useful to the British government than those of any other description about the Native durbars. They, in fact, do all the business, and direct all measures; and one reward from the British government, for services actually rendered, creates a general desire to merit and obtain a similar advantage by the same line of conduct. It is not possible to reward these people excepting by pensions. They are so depraved in their habits; their notions of justice and government are so erroneous; and they are so little to be depended upon, excepting to follow their own interests, that they cannot be employed in any manner in the Company's service.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp, 10 miles N. of Jaffierabad, 15th Jan. 1804.

I have the pleasure of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 30th Dec., and I congratulate you upon the success of your operations. This plundering excursion was quite unexpected, but it has been at once most fortunately and vigorously checked.

I enclose copies of the treaties of peace which I have made with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. Scindiah's cessions amount to above 67 lacs of rupees, and the Rajah of Berar's to about 70 lacs. Both these treaties have been ratified.

Chintomeny Rao has written to me to say that he was about to join you, and that he hoped you would assist him against the Rajah of Kolapoor. I wish to warn you against interfering, in any manner, in this dispute. Purnsheram Bhow's family have not behaved very well to us, and they do not deserve the smallest assistance; but the refusal to give them this assistance must be made as little injurious to their feelings as possible.

To Major Graham.

Camp, 15th Jan. 1804.

I have received your letters of the 7th and 8th. I am sorry to observe that your peons behave so ill. I believe I must move down towards Ahmednuggur, to settle matters in that quarter. I enclose you an order from Scindiah to Mulwa Dada, to cease all hostilities, to withdraw with his troops, and to join him. You will have this letter delivered to him in public, and read to him by a person of your own; and you will write to him a letter, which is also to be read to him publicly, in which you will tell him that I am coming into that quarter with the army; and that if I find him, or any of his adherents, I shall pursue him till I catch him, and will certainly hang him as a freebooter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 16th Jan. 1804.

I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to send forward, as soon as possible, all the money that you may have belonging to me.

I enclose a memorandum from Jeswunt Rao Goorparah; and I shall be



obliged to you if you will take care that he does not lose his jaghires, &c. He comes within an article of the treaty.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Waroor, 16th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 22nd Dec.; and I am rejoiced to find that Lieut. Wight's convoy is safe.

The increasing disturbances in all parts of the territory of the Soubah of the Deccan are a most serious inconvenience, and urgently require a most effectual remedy. I am on my march to the southward, and propose to give a check to those on the western frontier; but the whole of the army, if scattered and employed in the pursuit of the various troops of banditti which infest his Highness' territories, would not be able to restore peace for years, without the exertion of his Highness' government. The evil is to be traced to avarice. The government, or rather the mutasaddes of the government, found that they could depend upon the protection of the British troops, and they discharged their own. The British troops are employed in an external war; and the consequence is, that his Highness has no troops to support his government and authority; and any other support but that of armed men will not answer. This discharge of their own troops has contributed to these disturbances in two modes: 1st; the government has no power to support itself; and this is well known throughout the country: 2ndly; the people discharged have no means of gaining a subsistence, and they are obliged to plunder to support life.

It appears that there is no doubt whatever of the necessity of introducing a reform into the military establishments of the Soubah of the Deccan; the only question will be, in what manner this reform ought to be effected, and what ought to be the nature of the reform. Two objects are required: one is to give the government some strength, to enable it to go on, without being obliged to have recourse to British assistance upon every trifling occasion; the other is, that the military establishments shall be so efficient as in case of future wars to provide for the defence and tranquillity of the country in some degree, and reduce the government to the necessity of confining the operations in this quarter to defensive objects.

In respect to the plan you propose in your letter of the 22nd Dec., I have no scruple in declaring, that if I was to consider the question of forming a military establishment abstractedly, I should recommend that plan. It is, undoubtedly, the best, and will give the Soubah of the Deccan the command of the greatest number of good troops, probably in the shortest space of time, and at the smallest expense. But upon this occasion there are many questions to be considered, besides that of forming a good military establishment for the Soubah of the Deccan; not to overburthen it with regular troops; and upon this point it must be recollected, that upon all occasions of external war, and upon almost all other important occasions, he will have the assistance of the Company's battalions.

Upon this point I have also to observe, that on a service with the British troops, the irregulars are far more useful than the regulars in the service of the Native powers, although some of these are very useful.

Upon the whole, therefore, I think that the best plan would be, that the Soubah of the Deccan should have a moderate establishment of infantry, possibly but little stronger than that which he is required by the treaty of defensive alliance to supply. But this establishment ought to be kept complete, and in the immediate pay of the government; and not made up, as at present, of 60 or 70 men, or possibly as far as a battalion, in the service of each chief who commands a body of horse. It is obvious that as long as that system shall continue, the government cannot command the services of these people; they are never paid, as the jaghiredars have not the means of defraying their expenses upon distant expeditions, and are totally unfit for the purposes of external war.

In respect to regular cavalry, it is my opinion that it ought not to be attempted. The formation and discipline of a body of cavalry are very difficult and tedious, and require great experience and patience in the persons who attempt it. After all, it is doubtful whether they will succeed, and whether the body of cavalry thus formed will be worth the expense of maintaining it; for at the same time that nothing can be more useful in the day of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry, nothing can be more expensive, and nothing more useless, than a body of regular cavalry half and insufficiently disciplined; I should therefore recommend that this may not be attempted.

In respect to cavalry, I should recommend that the Soubah might have in his own immediate service, and paid by the treasury, either silladar or Pagah horse, to the full amount of the number which he is obliged by treaty to furnish, in a joint operation with the British government. I should prefer silladar horse: 1st, because the employment of these will give subsistence to a greater number of people; 2ndly, because they are more useful, and better troops; and, 3rdly, because they are less dangerous, and, being more divided, less liable to create disturbances by mutinies and sedition.

The question respecting the jaghiredars comes next to be considered. There is certainly no mode by which the revenues of the state can be increased, excepting by depriving the jaghiredars of their jaghires. The necessity of increasing the revenues of the state may be doubted, considering the addition to his Highness' territories and revenues, consequent on the late war; and considering the vast increase which may be given to these revenues by inspecting closely the conduct and the accounts of Ragotim Rao, and the management of all the persons on the frontier employed by that person.

From what I have seen, I have no scruple in declaring that I am convinced that, with proper management, the Soubah of the Deccan will gain, by the peace, the whole amount of revenues of Berar on this side of the Wurda; for, as far as I have been able to gain any knowledge of the facts, his share of those revenues has heretofore gone to the Rajah of Berar, has been dissipated in the country by the amildars, the creatures of Ragotim Rao, or has gone into Ragotim Rao's pocket. It may be a question, therefore, as it will not be necessary, whether it will be proper to encourage the resumption of the jaghires.

The British government has been left, by the late war, in a most glo-

rious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part of India, the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators, by treaty, of the disputes of all. The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their power is settled upon more permanent foundations, than any before known in India: all it wants is the popularity which, from the nature of the institutions, and the justice of the proceedings of the government, it is likely to obtain, and which it must obtain, after a short period of tranquillity shall have given the people time and opportunity to feel the happiness and security which they enjoy. But the resumption of these jaghires will bring ruin and distress on many noble families and ancient servants of the Nizam's government. Some of these may possibly have assisted in the different wars in which the British government have been engaged, and in the establishment of the present happy state of affairs; and all the odium which the measures must produce will not fail to fall upon the British government. I think, therefore, that it is advisable to avoid it, if it should be possible, and, at all events, that the British government should not appear in the execution of the measure.

I have taken the liberty of giving you my thoughts more at large than I intended at first, on the subject of the military establishments of the Soubah of the Deccan. I have felt severely the bad consequences of their weakness. I see the cause of it, and that an effectual remedy must be applied immediately. You have my opinion upon the whole subject, which may be of use to you in forming your plans, and for that reason only do I communicate it to you.

I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to Dharore, as soon as you can, all the money that you may have which is intended for the use of the army.

To Col. Murray.      Camp at Waroor, 10 miles N. of Jaffierabad, 16th Jan. 1804.

I have received all your letters written between the 7th and 21st. My opinion respecting Surat is, that the first object should be to find a healthy spot for the troops, European soldiers in particular, who must be there; as it will not answer to lose two or three more regiments in that place. The next object is to place the troops as near the town as may be possible, consistently with the first. In respect to the intrenched camp, my idea is, that all that is necessary will be, to throw up such works as will cover the buildings required for the convenience of the troops, and to enable a small body to give them protection while the troops may be absent from them in the field.

My former letter will have apprised you of my concern upon the occasion of your letter to Mr. Duncan. I hope you have desired to withdraw it according to my advice; as you may depend upon it that the Governor General will be highly displeased with it. While writing upon this subject, I may as well mention to you, that I should be glad to see a little more conciliation towards the Guickwar chiefs and troops. Upon a late occasion, I observe in the correspondence, that a wish was expressed that your communication with those chiefs should be carried on through a particular officer belonging to your staff, with which you declined to comply.

It is true, that the gratification of the wishes of the Natives may at times be attended with inconvenience; but unless they are gratified and conciliated, we can derive no advantage from their assistance. What would you say if they were all to insist upon communicating personally with yourself, as they do with me? Yet, I believe that as much business goes through my hands as through those of any other person; and I am convinced, that if I had refused to gratify this wish, I should have derived no assistance from them.

I have seen such places as Dohud appears to be by your description. It is a most convenient situation, and might be very useful to us. Of course, Scindiah will give no protection to Canojee. I will confirm the treaty with the Sounte Rajah, enclosed in your letter of the 19th Dec., excepting the 3rd article.

You had better draw up a new treaty. The 1st article, specifying that he shall pay no tribute; the 2nd will answer as it is; the 3rd to be what the 4th now is.

It will not answer to engage to defend the territories of any power or chief, unless such power or chief should submit all his foreign concerns to the decision of the British government; and a savage, such as this Sounte Rajah, would not understand, and would never comply with all the conditions of such an arrangement.

I can give you no positive answer upon the subject of the arrears of revenue of the pergunnah of Dohud. Every question respecting property is referrible, and must be referred, to the Governor General: my own opinion is, that arrears of revenue can in no manner be considered as that species of property which is given to troops as prize, for reasons too long to be detailed at present.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st Dec. The fact is, that our expenses in this division of the army only, exclusive of Poonah and Ahmednuggur, amount to 2 lacs of pagodas monthly. In this sum, however, are included one lac of rupees to the Peshwah's sirdars, 67,000 to Amrut Rao and his sirdars, under the treaty with that chief; 87,000 to Amrut Rao's troops, as part payment of the 5000 men which the Governor General engaged to keep for the Peshwah, under the modification of the treaty of Bassein; and 80,000 rupees to the Rajah of Mysore's troops, which I have paid for the last 2 months. None of these sums will eventually fall upon the Company, excepting that to Amrut Rao's troops; and as I intend to discharge those troops at the end of this month, that expense will entirely cease. The Rajah of Mysore's money

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The Gov. Gen. to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 17th Jan. 1804.

My instructions of the 11th Dec. will have apprised you of my sentiments with regard to the conditions to be required from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the conclusion of a treaty of peace with that Chieftain. It does not appear to me to be necessary to make any material alteration of those instructions, or any addition to them.

2. The treaty which you have concluded with the Rajah of Berar contains abundant proofs of your accurate attention to the general principles which I am desirous of establishing as the foundation of the treaties of peace with the Confederates. (*See p. 930: note \*.*)

will be repaid at the end of this month, when the convoy shall arrive; and the Peshwah's will be repaid in time, in proportion as the revenues come in from Ahmedabad.

I get supplies of money occasionally at Poonah, for drafts on Bombay, which will keep me going, with the lac and 40,000 pagodas which you mention is provided. But it is desirable that I should have as much money as can be spared from other services. I am not in want of horses, indeed I believe I have some at Poonah to spare; upon which subject I shall make a report to you, as soon as I shall receive an accurate return. That is an expense which is at an end.

I am drawing off slowly to the southward; and if the banditti, upon the Nizam's frontier near Perinda, do not disperse, I think I shall spend the time, between this and the arrival of the Governor General's ratification of the treaties, in dispersing them. It will not do to break up the army till that time. The subsidiary force is still in Berar, and I shall not draw it off till I shall have given over Gawilghur to the Rajah of Berar.

I have great hopes that the Governor General will ratify the treaties. In a note which I lately received from him, he authorizes me to make the arrangement which I have made for the subsidiary force with Scindiah, and to restore the territories depending upon Baroach and Ahmednugur, if Scindiah should agree to the defensive alliance. In this respect my treaty is better than his. But he insists upon the independence of the Rajpoot Rajahs, as a separate arrangement; and that Scindiah shall have no Europeans without the permission of the British government.

I am convinced that I should never have made the peace, if I had pressed the independence of the Rajpoots, in any other manner than as it stands in the treaty. They combated it strongly, and consented to it only when they found that we had treaties with them from which we never should depart. In respect to the Europeans, I could have arranged that in any manner I pleased; and that point shall be settled to the Governor General's satisfaction in the treaty of defensive alliance. But I acknowledge that I think that point may be pushed too far, and that it is not desirable to see the destruction of Scindiah's infantry.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose my answer to the letters which I have received from the Soubah of the Deccan and his ministers, and copies of them for your information.

Naroo Hurry, one of the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, employed in the negotiations of the late peace, is a native of Bheer, and has desired me to apply to the Soubah of the Deccan to give him a village in that district, in enaum. I believe that it is usual to give rewards of this description to persons employed as Narroo Hurry has been, and I am convinced that these rewards have a good effect; I shall, therefore, be obliged to you, if you will apply to the minister for this mark of favor to Narroo Hurry, if you should see no objection to making the application, and if you will forward the sunnud to me in case the application should be complied with.

## Memorandum.

1. I recommend that the property captured may be divided, by order from the Governor General, according to the plan contained in the annexed paper, (a copy of one received from Bengal,) which plan appears to have been approved by the Commander in Chief.\*

2. I have not allowed the election of any prize agents; I have appointed 5 officers, to take charge of the property and dispose of it on account of government, to whom I should wish the commission to be given. Of course I appointed those officers to take charge, whom the officers of the army would have elected to be agents, if an election had been allowed.

3. I am desirous that the Governor General should order the distribu-

\* Gen. Lake to Major Gen. Ware, President of the Prize Committee.

In compliance with the wishes of the committee, I have the honor to communicate the following, as my sentiments on the most just and equitable appropriation of prize.

1. All corps, officers, and soldiers, who were present with the army on the 29th Aug. and 4th Sept. 1803, are entitled to share in prize taken by the army during the war, with the exceptions hereafter mentioned.

2. All corps, officers, and soldiers, who joined the army between the 4th and 11th Sept. are entitled to share in prize taken subsequent to the 11th Sept.

3. Corps, officers, and men, who joined and shall join the army subsequent to an action, or capture of a place, are not entitled to share in prize which was the immediate consequence of such action or capture.

4. Corps, officers, or soldiers, are to be entitled to share in prize made subsequent to their junction, with the exceptions alluded to in the foregoing articles.

5. No officer who quits the army on leave of absence is entitled to share in prize made during his absence; unless his absence shall have been occasioned by wounds or ill health.

6. Officers transferred from corps with, or which have been with the army, to corps in other situations, are not entitled to share in prize taken after their quitting the army.

These appear to me to be the leading principles upon which the division of prize ought to be adjusted. I shall, however, with much pleasure, take into consideration any suggestions which the committee shall offer.

Proceedings of the Prize Committee, assembled agreeably to the G. O., 19th Oct. 1803.

The Committee have resolved, that all officers shall share according to their rank, viz.:

Major Generals, Colonels, Lieut. Colonels, Majors, Captains, Majors of Brigade, Aides de Camp, Surgeons, Chaplains, and Field Paymasters, Lieutenants, Assistant Surgeons, Cornets, Lieutenant Fire Workers, Ensigns, and Veterinary Surgeons, Quarter Masters of Cavalry, and Conductors of Ordnance.

*Europeans.*

	Shares.
The Committee resolve, that corporals, gunners, drummers, trumpeters, and privates, shall receive . . . . .	1
Sergeants . . . . .	2
Sergeant majors . . . . .	4
Conductors and quarter masters of cavalry . . . . .	12
Ensigns . . . . .	50
Lieutenants . . . . .	70
Captains . . . . .	120
Majors . . . . .	210
Lieut. colonels . . . . .	360
Colonels . . . . .	600
Major Generals . . . . .	1500

The Commander in Chief, one eighth of the whole, after deducting Prize agents' commission.

Prize agents to receive 5 per cent. commission, paying all incidental expenses.

*Natives.*

Naiks, 2d findals, troopers, sepoy, golundauze, drummers, trumpeters, gun lacars, pioneers, picketries, and bleesties, receive two thirds of a share.

Havildars, 1st findals, and native doctors, one and one third of a share.

	Shares.
Jemidars of cavalry and infantry and syrangs of artillery . . . . .	3
Soubahdars . . . . .	5
Prize to be drawn for all officers and soldiers who may have been killed in action.	

tion of the prize according to this plan, without the intervention of any committee, the assembly of which must be attended with delay, at all events, and inconveniences, as it is probable that before the committee could assemble, the corps who have served in the war will have separated.

4. It appears to be the Commander in Chief's wish that the corps only which were actually engaged in particular service should enjoy the benefit resulting from it, and I am entirely of the same opinion. Accordingly;

i. I recommend that those officers and corps who were present with my division, or the subsidiary force, when the former were at the siege of Ahmednuggur, including a detachment employed at Toka, under Capt. Campbell of the 84th regt., or at the battle of Assye, or with the subsidiary force employed at Asseerghur, or with either at the battle of Argaum or siege of Gawilghur, shall share in all the property captured.

ii. The troops in Capt. Baynes' affair with the enemy at Umer, on the 31st Oct., and those engaged at Korget Coraygaum, on the 27th Sept., under Capt. O'Donnell, to share in all the property captured during the war. (N.B. This arrangement excludes the troops stationed at Poonah and Hyderabad, who have incurred no expense, and had nothing to do with the service; and includes every body who had.)

5. In respect to the shares and persons, I recommend the following deviations from the plan approved of by the Commander in Chief:

i. That Col. Stevenson, in consideration of there being no Major Gen. with the army, should have 1000 shares instead of 600. (N.B. When I was in his situation, in the war against Tippoo, I received only 600.)

ii. I recommend that the Governor General should order that, in consideration of the favorable reports made of the conduct of the officers on the Staff on all occasions, the Dy. Adj. and the Dy. Qr. Mr. Genls. of Mysore, and of the subsidiary force, and the Staff Surgeons attached to each division, may draw Major's prize money, and that Major Malcolm may have Lieut. Colonel's. (N.B. Sir John Kennaway had Lieut. Colonel's prize money at Seringapatam.)

6. I have not included the troops of the allies, because nothing that they have taken has been carried to account. Elephants, camels, and even jewels, to the amount of several lacs of rupees, taken in the battles of Assye and Argaum, and upon other occasions, have been disposed of, and the produce given to them by their own chiefs. In the battle of Argaum they got Vincatjee Bhoonslah's jewels, which his vakeel declared to me were worth 6 lacs of rupees.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the accounts of the property captured during the war, by the troops under my command.

The articles sold at different times were howdahs, rich cloths, &c., which could not be moved away; and the amount of the sales has been paid into the hands of the Paymasters of this division of the army and of

G. O.

Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804.

In future the bullock grazing guard is to be sent to the karkhana at assembly beating on marching days. It will march on the flank with the spare cattle, and proceed with the whole to graze as soon as they come to the lines.

the subsidiary force. The jewels were taken at Asseerghur, and have not been sold; the plate was taken at Gawilghur, and I propose to order that it may be sold immediately; or if there should be no purchasers for it, I shall have it coined, and lodge the money in the hands of the Paymasters.

I beg leave to recommend that the money resulting from the sale of this property may be given to the troops. In the course of the campaign I have had frequent opportunities of reporting their good conduct to your Excellency; and I have likewise to report, that their patience under fatigue, and the persevering activity with which they performed all the duties required from them, were equal to their bravery when opposed to the enemy in the field; and the consequence of all those good qualities is, that notwithstanding the distance and difficulties attending our communication with the sources of our supplies, the great bodies of the enemy's horse, and the disaffected and disturbed state of the countries under the government of the Company's allies, I am enabled to state that, throughout the campaign, we did not lose one convoy, nor a particle of the Company's property of any description.

The troops composing the division under my immediate command were assembled from the most distant parts of the country, and have been in the field during two monsoons, that on the Eastern coast in the winter of 1802, and that on the Western coast in the course of 1803. These circumstances, and the exhausted state of the countries from the Kistna to the Taptee, have been the cause of the loss of equipments of the officers of the army three or four times in one year. Those belonging to the subsidiary force were equally unfortunate; and all must have suffered the greatest inconveniences, from the great advance of price of all the necessities of life, in the countries which have been the seat of the war.

Besides this property captured, a contribution, amounting to 3 lacs and 25,000 rupees, was levied upon the city of Burhampoor. I was induced to order Col. Stevenson to levy this contribution, from a desire to deprive the enemy of the resource of money which the city of Burhampoor would afford him, in case it should have proved either convenient or necessary not to occupy that place with the Company's troops, and from a wish to secure, on the spot, as large supplies of money for the service of the war as circumstances would permit. In obedience to my orders, Col. Stevenson, having made inquiries, and judging from the appearance of riches in the place, first demanded 10 lacs of rupees; but having subsequently found that that sum could not be raised without distressing the inhabitants, and either delaying his march towards Gawilghur, after he had completed the equipments of his corps for the siege of that place, or having recourse to measures of severity which I had forbid, he reduced the demand to the amount of the sum which had been collected. This sum has likewise been paid to the Paymaster of the subsidiary force.

I have likewise the honor to enclose accounts of the ordnance and stores captured at Ahmednuggur and Asseerghur. The accounts of stores captured at Gawilghur have not been completed. Your Excellency has already the accounts of the ordnance captured at the battles of Assye and



Argaum; but I cannot report the value of the ordnance at present, as an opportunity has not yet offered of ascertaining the weight of each piece.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804.

I have written the Governor General a letter\* upon the subject of the property captured by the troops under my command; and I now enclose you a Memorandum upon the same subject, which will explain my wishes. I intended to have recommended that the contribution levied at Burhanpore might be given to the troops; but I have since thought it best to say nothing upon the subject.

Some time will elapse, I am afraid, before I shall be able to send an account of the value of the ordnance and military stores, as the ordnance must be weighed. But I think the best thing the Governor General can do, is to give the troops a sum of money, instead of the value of those articles. All I can say is, that there are no troops who are more deserving of his favor; and I declare that I am convinced there is not one officer with the army, who has not been obliged to live at an expense far exceeding his pay, since the troops crossed the Kistna.

I am very anxious to have an early answer to my letter upon this subject. I have checked all interference of the army in this question, and I am desirous that they should experience the advantage of conforming to the wishes of government, and that the officers should be relieved at an early period from the distress which I know they suffer at present.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Donegaon, 18th Jan. 1804.

I am sorry to be obliged to trouble you again on the subject of Amrut Rao's servants, in confinement by the Peshwah, of whom I sent you a list in my letter of the 14th Dec. I wish to have a decided answer, whether the Peshwah will or will not release them and their families, in order that I may be guided accordingly in the measures which I shall adopt respecting Amrut Rao.

A great part of my time, for which there is plenty of occupation, is now taken up in hearing Amrut Rao's complaints, (which, I must acknowledge, are just,) and in framing excuses for the Peshwah's conduct. Amrut Rao has again this day offered me the fort of Poonadur, and every other piece of land that he possesses belonging to the Peshwah, or to which his Highness can have any claim.

All I wish to have is an answer, that I may determine what manner of conduct I shall adopt.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Camp at Jalnapoor, 19th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the (without date), in which you have enclosed your dispatch to his Excellency the Governor General, of the 11th inst. The letter of the 10th inst., a copy of which forms part of the dispatch to the Governor General, has not yet reached me.

As the Rajah of Berar has relinquished the unjust claim he made to the

\* See G.O., Bombay, 3rd May, 1804; and G.O.G.G. following, p. 1163 to 1165.

rights of the Soubah of the Deccan, on the left bank of the river Wurda, and has withdrawn his troops from the countries on the right bank, I have given orders to the officer commanding at Gawilghur to evacuate that fort, and deliver it to the person who will be sent to take charge of it on the part of the Rajah of Berar. The fort will be delivered over in the state in which it was on the day the peace was made, with its guns, stores, &c., &c.; and the swords, armour, &c., belonging to the Rajah of Berar, which still remained in the fort when I was apprised of his wish to have those articles, will be given to his officer there, and a separate receipt will be demanded for them. Some of the arms and armour which had been removed to camp have already been delivered to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, and I believe that a quantity of these articles have been removed to Ellichpoor, and are still there. If this should be the case, or if there should be any more in camp, they will be given to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder; and I beg that you will tell the Rajah's ministers that I am happy to have this opportunity of conforming to the wishes, and anticipating the orders of the Governor General, by doing that which is agreeable to the Rajah of Berar.

I have had one conference with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder on the subject of the lands to be delivered over to the Rajah of Berar, contiguous to the hills, on which are situated the forts of Gawilghur and Nernulla. We should have settled what districts should be delivered to him in that conference, if I had received true accounts of their value from Rajah Mohiput Ram. But this person takes advantage of my desire to forward the interests of his master consistently with the stipulations of the treaty of peace, and with justice to others, to deceive me in every instance; and I have been obliged to adjourn the decision upon this point till I shall receive more correct accounts. In the mean time, I have told Rajah Mohiput Ram that if he does not give me correct accounts, I must take those I shall receive from Ramchunder, consider them as correct, and decide this question accordingly; so that I hope I shall soon receive the accounts I have required.

I beg that you will explain the cause of the delay in the settlement of this business to the Rajah's ministers, and that it can be no loss to the Rajah, as I will give orders that he shall collect the revenue from the day on which the peace was made.

Tell Screeedur Pundit that I have settled the question respecting the villages, &c., belonging to him and the Rajah's other servants in Berar, to his satisfaction; and I have sent the papers regarding them to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.

I propose, also, to settle with Rajah Mohiput Ram respecting the villages for Mahajee Naig.

I will write to Rajah Mohiput Ram respecting the village of Proslee. It occurs to me that the village of Proslee is on this side of the Wurda, and is probably held in enaam by the Rajah. If that is the case, this complaint is made merely to try that point, and whether we are likely to yield it; and if we yield in this instance, every village or district held in enaam will be claimed in like manner. It will be well, therefore, to tell Screeedur Pundit that, if Proslee is on the right bank of the Wurda,

Gungaram has done right to attack it, and that the Rajah of Berar has behaved improperly in attempting to retain it contrary to the treaty. If the village should be on the left of the Wurda, the Rajah must have it.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Jaulna, 19th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone, from which I observe that the Rajah of Berar has given up his claim to the districts beyond the Wurda. I have therefore given orders to the officer commanding at Gawilghur to evacuate that fort; and, as soon as I shall receive true accounts of the revenues of the districts near the hills, from Rajah Mohiput Ram, I propose to settle which districts shall be delivered over to the Rajah of Berar. Hitherto I have been unable to settle this point in the manner I wish, viz., agreeably to the treaty, at the same time consistently with the views and interests of the Soubah of the Deccan; because all the accounts I have received from the Soubah's officers have been framed with a view to induce me to attend only to the latter object, and to lose sight entirely of the former.

I have settled, for the Rajah of Berar's servants, that they are to continue to enjoy the advantages which they have hitherto held in Berar. They are very trifling; and to continue to them the enjoyment of them will be attended with good consequences. I shall also endeavor to ascertain the grounds of the complaint of the Rajah against the Soubah's servants, that they have seized a village of his.

I have to inform your Excellency, however, that the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan are not less rapacious than the Marhattas; and that I experience the greatest difficulty in forcing them to be moderate in their exactions in Berar, and to refrain from the plunder of some of its rich inhabitants, only because they have heretofore been the servants of the Rajah of Berar; and, what is still more extraordinary, in obliging them to perform the stipulations of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, in evacuating the city of Burhampoor and districts depending thereon.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Jaulna, 19th Jan. 1804.

I have received your letters of the 15th and 16th, with a number of Persian papers, not one of which I can read nor understand, but I suppose that all is right.

I have written to Capt. Johnson, to request he would speak to Rajah Mohiput Ram about the talook of Paunchore, and desire him to evacuate it. But I cannot promise that it will be evacuated, unless I send my own troops to drive out those of the Soubah, as his officers appear every day to be more determined to do as they please.

Goorparah spoke to me on the subject of the horses, not horsemen, taken at Peepulgaum. In the 1st place, peace was then made, and Scindiah had no right to collect hundry there, or any where else. In the 2nd place, a cessation of hostilities had existed before the peace for 6 weeks, and he had no right to collect hundry during that period. In the 3rd place, these horsemen were near our camp, and came there for the purpose of plunder: therefore they were attacked, and their horses taken from them, and they shall not be returned. This is all Greek to Scin-

diah; but we must adhere to the rules. When Goorparah mentioned the subject to me, I would not listen to him at all.

I shall write again to the Soubah's camp, to desire that all prisoners may be released.

There is a great deal of difference between Scindiah restoring horses taken, and our doing so. When we have taken horses, it has been in our own defence; when his pindarries have taken them, it has been as thieves in our camps. The day I came up the ghaut we had no cavalry in camp, and they carried off 15 camels; and if they had come 100 yards farther on, they would have carried off more with them.

I desired Barclay to send the man to you who came from the person in Holkar's camp with a desire to be supplied with money. This person is the same, I believe, whom you sent there in May last.

The letter from Scindiah contains a desire that I should attack Mulwa Dada; and I see clearly that unless I go across the Godavery, that banditti will never be driven out of the country. The Nizam's servants, who, at the commencement of the campaign, drove us away from their forts, and refused to allow us to purchase grain in their country, now press me, by dozens of letters in a day, to move to their assistance, otherwise they will be destroyed.

Scindkeira positively cannot be given up. It is at this moment a nest of thieves. The situation of this country is shocking; the people are starving in hundreds, and there is no government to afford them the slightest relief!!!

You must draw your bills either on the Governor General's agent at Benares, or on the collector there and at Moorshedabad. Give notice of the draft to the Governor General, and to the person on whom it is drawn. It will not answer to enter the expenses of the Residency with Scindiah in my military accounts.

I shall send the memorandum on the subject of Vittojee Patel to Capt. Graham; but I suspect that this person is a relation of Mulwa Dada, who has been taken up for misbehaviour. If so, he cannot be released until Mulwa Dada shall have joined Scindiah, or until I shall have him hanged, which I certainly shall do if I can catch him. The Eedlabad man shall be released, if I can effect his release.

I have written to Bengal fully upon the subject of your going home with the dispatches, and have recommended the arrangement for Mysore about which we spoke.

There is nothing new. The Rajah of Berar has given up that most unjust claim he made of the Soubah's districts beyond the Wurda, and I have consequently sent him the orders for the evacuation of Gawilghur. He shall have the districts near the fort as soon as I can get some true accounts of their value from Rajah Mohiput Ram.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Alungaum, 20th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst., upon the subject of the rice from Bengal and Canara. The difference between these two descriptions of rice is, that the former is boiled partly in the operation of breaking off the husk, the latter is not. The former, there-

fore, becomes harder, will keep longer, and is consequently more fit for a magazine than the latter. Both are used by the Natives, but those of some of the castes have an objection to that which has been boiled. Provided the rice which is sent is of a good quality, it is a matter of indifference to me whether it comes from Canara or from Bengal.

I have likewise received your dispatch of the 6th, upon the subject of the pay department in Guzerat; and I am much concerned to observe, from a perusal of the papers, that disputes still exist, upon subjects that appear to me to be of no importance whatever; and, supposing them to be important to the public interests, they are not referrible to the military officer.

The principal point of dispute, at present, is a contract which has been given to a sircar, by name Terwaddy, to supply the troops with coin. I do not observe that any specific inconvenience has been stated, as resulting from the operations of that contract, excepting that coins of a bad description were received at one or two stations. I must observe that that is an inconvenience to which all troops are liable. Those under my command in this quarter have, for months, been paid in coins not current in this part of the country; but, supposing that, or any other inconvenience, to result from the contract, the military officer can have no more to do with it than to report it to government. The government, particularly one situated as that of Bombay, must decide as to the propriety of continuing the contract, notwithstanding its inconveniences, even supposing them to be greater than they are. It is well known that the necessary expenses of the government of Bombay are much larger than their means of defraying them; and particularly in the last year, from the aid afforded to this army, they exceed the ordinary means. It is possible also that the expenses in Guzerat exceed the means of the government in that quarter.

The military commanding officer in Guzerat, although he may be a proper person to report the inconvenience felt by the army, resulting from any particular mode of finding money for its payment, cannot be the proper person to decide upon the benefits or evils resulting generally to the public interests from its adoption. He cannot tell what has passed heretofore, and whether government is in debt or otherwise to the contractor; he does not know whether the resources of Guzerat are equal to the payment of this army (indeed in this instance it appears that he does not know the amount of the expenses of his army;) and supposing that those resources are equal to his expenses, he cannot be aware to what other exigencies of the public service it might be convenient to the government to apply them.

This reasoning scarcely requires to be applied; but I have to observe that in the late scarcity of specie at Bombay, in consequence of the demands of this army, among other causes, it might have been convenient to the Governor in Council to have brought the resources of Guzerat in coin to Bombay, and to have paid Terwaddy's bills, by bills upon Benares or Calcutta, or any other part of India. The military commanding officer in Guzerat, who could have no knowledge of the facts which occasioned this necessity, could not be a proper person to deliver an opinion upon

the subject at all. Therefore it is not the commanding officer's business to give an opinion upon this subject. He is to report inconveniences, if they should exist; it will rest with government to balance them with others, and to decide upon the remedy to be applied. I have written thus much upon this subject, because I observe that the Hon. the Governor in Council has, contrary to his own judgment, abolished Terwaddy's contract, only because it has been disapproved of by Col. Murray.

The principle on which he has adopted this measure is that of obedience to the Governor General's orders of the 23rd Nov., a copy of which has been transmitted to me.

As I think it important to the public interests, which are certainly likely to suffer upon this occasion, as well as upon others, (upon which I have observed that the Governor in Council has adopted measures contrary to his own judgment,) I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to declare that I do not conceive that his Excellency the Governor General ever intended, by his orders of the 23rd Nov., that the Hon. the Governor in Council should, for a moment, suspend his salutary superintendence and control over all the military operations to the northward; much less that he should so far abdicate the duties peculiarly belonging to his office, as to alter a financial arrangement, only because it was disapproved of by one military officer under his orders. I shall only advert to one or two objections made by Col. Murray to the mode of payment adopted by Prendergast.

One of them is, that the troops are not paid till the 10th or 12th of the month. I believe, if the facts were ascertained regarding the troops in all parts of India, it would be found that by far the majority were not paid till a later period in the month. Those in this army are paid when it is convenient; the payments to some are made early in the month, to others at a later period, according, as it may prove convenient, to the length of the marches, or the importance of the other operations carrying on. There are posts, hospitals, &c., belonging to this army, as well as to that in Guzerat; but I am sorry to say that however desirable that these (the hospitals in particular) should be paid at an early period, I have not been able to effect that object, particularly for want of a Terwaddy, to give bills upon sircars at the different stations at which my posts, hospitals, and detachments are situated.

I have also to observe that although it is desirable that, under the system adopted for the payment of the army, and for finding funds for that purpose, the convenience of individuals should be accommodated, a system which does not accommodate individuals ought not to be departed from only for that reason. It appears that Terwaddy considers it a breach of his contract for the Paymaster to take up money from individual officers, and to grant bills upon Surat, which, as I understand the contract, it certainly is. It appears also that government have been so kind as to provide means for the officers to remit their money to the coast; and if they do not choose to adopt these means, they can get bills from Terwaddy's agents.

In my opinion government do a great deal, if they have funds in camp to pay the troops regularly; and no individual ought to complain, if it

should not suit the public interests to provide as he wishes for his private accommodation. In a very late instance, under the government of Fort St. George, the provincial Paymasters were positively forbidden to grant bills upon the Presidency. As there is no internal commerce in that part of the peninsula, the inconvenience felt by individuals was much greater than it could be in Guzerat, even if government had not provided means of remittance for the officers of the army.

To the Officer commanding the British troops advancing from Cuttack into the territories of the Rajah of Berar. Camp, 20th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to inform you, that I have concluded a treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar on the 17th Dec., and received his ratification of it on the 22nd; and I have reason to believe that the copy of the treaty which I sent to the Governor General arrived at Calcutta on the 6th inst. Under these circumstances, unless you should have received intelligence that his Excellency the Governor General has not ratified the treaty, and unless his Excellency should have ordered you to continue hostilities against the Rajah of Berar, I request you to stop them, and to halt until you shall have received further orders from his Excellency.

I also request that you will take measures that no injury may be done to Gadwar, Jeypoor, Ooreen, and Sumbulpoor; or any other places in the territories of the Rajah of Berar, and that you will not give an asylum to the zemindars of the country, with whom treaties may not have been concluded previous to the receipt of this letter.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch of the 8th inst., which I have received from Mr. Elphinstone. Your Excellency will have been apprised by a subsequent dispatch of the 19th, that the Rajah of Berar had relinquished the claim which he had made to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, east of the Wurda.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst., upon the subject of the claim of the medical gentlemen serving in Guzerat to an additional allowance.

This subject is one entirely referrible to the Bombay regulations, upon which I must beg leave to decline giving any opinion, excepting that, of all the liberal establishments of the Hon. Company, that of the medical department is the most so. The custom on the Madras establishment is for a soldier to pay the surgeon  $3\frac{1}{2}$  fanams *per diem*, when he is in hospital, either general or regimental, for his diet. The Hon. Company incur no expense whatever on account of hospitals for European troops, excepting European medicines, and the allowance which they give for attendance, country medicines, &c., to the surgeons of European regiments.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have addressed this day to the Governor of Bombay, from the perusal of

which your Excellency will observe that, in obedience to your orders, through your military secretary, I have made arrangements for sending from Guzerat a regiment of European infantry to Fort William. The other arrangements proposed in that dispatch, if approved of by Mr. Duncan, will leave at Bombay 2 European regiments.

As soon as I shall receive Mr. Duncan's answer to this dispatch, in case he should approve of the arrangements recommended, I propose to ask his permission to resign the command of the troops in Guzerat; as I am of opinion that the reference to me upon every question that arises occasions considerable delay and inconvenience; and as peace is now concluded, no adequate benefit can be expected from my interference in Guzerat concerns.

To Marquis Wellesley.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

I have only this day received your letter of the 23rd Dec., which had been transmitted by the Soubah's dawk to Ellichpoor, and I am delighted to find that you are pleased with our battle of Argaum.

I do not know whether I detailed the causes of the departure from the armistice, in that instance, in any of my public or private letters; but they appear fully on the minutes of the conferences. The fact was, that Scindiah complied with none of the conditions of the armistice, which he had not ratified at that time, and I attacked him; as I gave notice to his vakeels that I should, on the preceding day. They thought he was at too great a distance from me, and the intention of both Scindiah and Vinatjee Bhoonslah, in drawing up their army and apparently offering battle, was to impose upon the troops, and induce them to believe that we wanted confidence in our own strength. They would have drawn off at night, and we should have been obliged to fight a more desperate battle, in a position more favorable to the enemy, under the guns of Gawilghur.

You will see, by one of the dispatches which I have written to you this day, that I have arranged to send a regiment of European infantry to Fort William, and that I have provided an efficient disposable corps for Guzerat, and an European garrison for Bombay.

I have written to Col. Close to have his opinion upon some points relative to the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, and as soon as I receive his answer, I shall issue orders for the establishment of it. I propose to appoint Col. Wallace to command it, till your orders shall be received. He is a brave soldier, in whom the troops have confidence. I shall leave the remains of the 74th with the subsidiary force for some time, till we see how affairs settle at Scindiah's durbar.

I am much annoyed by the lumbago, a disorder to which, I believe, all persons in camp are liable; and if I do not go into a house soon, I am afraid I shall walk like old Pomeroy for the remainder of my life. I do not propose, however, to break up till I shall receive the ratification of the treaty of peace; although I shall have all the preparatory arrangements made, such as subsidiary force established, &c. &c.

I am now going across the Godavery, to try if I cannot surprise and cut up the banditti upon the Nizam's frontier. At all events, I shall disperse them.



Since the receipt of your letter of the 25th Nov., Mr. Duncan has, in a manner, abdicated his government. I have written to him a public and a private letter, with a view to raise his spirits a little; and yesterday I wrote him a dispatch on the subject of Col. Murray's interference in one of his financial arrangements in Guzerat, in consequence of which, Mr. Duncan acted contrary to his own judgment; in which I told him that it was my opinion, that you never intended that he should cease his superintendence over the military affairs in Guzerat, or that he should abdicate the duties of his office. I mention this subject, because I think it will require a little explanation, but I only hope that the explanation will be of a healing nature.

I have allowed Col. Stevenson to go to Madras for his health. He must go to England soon, or he will not live. Col. Haliburton now commands the Nizam's subsidiary force, in Col. Stevenson's absence, and I recommend him as his successor, if Col. Stevenson should go to England. He has been long at Hyderabad, and has served well during the campaign.

I have generally written to Major Shawe for two reasons: \* 1st; because it was probable I should get an answer from him: 2ndly; it was probable that this answer would contain intelligence of matters in Bengal which it was desirable that I should have.

P. S. Malcolm writes from Scindiah's camp, that at the first meeting Scindiah received him with great gravity, which he had intended to preserve throughout the visit. It rained violently; and an officer of the escort, Mr. Pepper, an Irishman, (a nephew of old Bective's, by-the-by,) sat under a flat part of the tent which received a great part of the rain that fell. At length it burst through the tent upon the head of Mr. Pepper, who was concealed by the torrent that fell, and was discovered after some time by an '*Oh Jesus!*' and an hideous yell. Scindiah laughed violently, as did all the others present; and the gravity and dignity of the durbar degenerated into a Malcolm riot; after which they all parted upon the best terms.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

1. I received, some time ago, a letter from the Mili. Sec. of the Governor General, expressing the desire of his Exeellency, that if I should think it possible to spare their services from this side of India, I should send a regiment of European infantry to Calcutta. I have now the honor to enclose a copy of that letter.

2. At the time I received that letter, I did not deem it consistent with the public safety to send a regiment to Fort William, but the peace with the confederated Marhattas has made a great alteration in the situation of affairs in this quarter; at the same time, the increase lately made to the Bombay army has added to your means. It will be proper now, therefore, to send a regiment of European infantry to Fort William, and I request you to give orders that tonnage be prepared for them, that they

\* P.S. of the Governor General's letter, 23rd Dec. 1803: 'I do not know why you address your private letters to the private secretary, and not to me; consult, however, your private convenience. W.'

may embark when it is prepared, and that you will apply to Adm. Rainier to give them a convoy.

3. When writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should address you on the future military arrangements in Guzerat. It is my opinion, that the proportion of European troops in that quarter is much larger than is necessary; the consequence is, that your expenses there are much increased, and the European troops stationed there are wanted, either for the security of Bombay, or for the service of other parts of India. In the course of a few days, I hope that I shall either have destroyed or dispersed the handitti who have been so long hanging upon the frontiers of the Soubah of the Deccan; and that I shall be able to take a position with this division of the army as near to Poonah as possible, consistently with the necessity of providing for its forage and easy subsistence. At that period I propose to send from Poonah the battalion of Bombay Native infantry, at present stationed there, and I beg leave to recommend that it may be ordered to march into Guzerat through the Konkan.

4. When this battalion shall arrive in Guzerat, the troops there will have been reinforced by 2 battalions of Native infantry; and one regiment of Europeans will have been drawn from thence, according to the request made in the first part of this letter, should you think proper to comply with it.

5. I am of opinion that you might then reduce still further the European force in Guzerat, by drawing away the detachments of the 84th, 88th, and 61st regts., leaving in that quarter only 2 complete regiments of European infantry. If you should determine to send the 75th regt. to Fort William, I recommend that the detachments of the 88th and 61st regts. should go with it, as the 75th is not strong.

6. When the arrangements shall be made, I beg leave to recommend the following modification of the plan detailed in my letter of the 2nd Aug. 1st. I recommend that the European infantry should be withdrawn from the garrisons of Songlur, Parneira, Baroach, and Baroda; that one of the regiments of European infantry should be in the cantonments in front of Surat, and the other in camp or cantonments in front of Baroda.

7. According to the plan detailed in my letter of the 7th Aug., which I imagine has been nearly carried into execution, there remained for service in the field, after providing for the garrison, 2 regts. of European infantry, and 4 battalions of Native infantry, which were to have been divided into two corps, one north of the Nerbudda, the other south of the Taptee. The success of the operations in the war, and the terms of the peace, have made a great alteration in the situation of our affairs.

8. There is but little danger of an invasion south of the Taptee; but still it is necessary to provide effectually for the security of Surat. I should therefore recommend that, besides the 500 Native infantry allotted in the letter of the 22nd Aug., and the regiment of European infantry in the cantonments, as above recommended, a battalion of Native infantry may also be stationed either in, or in the neighbourhood of that city. There will then remain a disposable corps for the service north of the Nerbudda, consisting of one regiment of European, and 5 battalions of

Native infantry; which, in case of war, or the existence of any urgent necessity, might be reinforced by the other regiments of European infantry from Surat.

9. I recommend that a healthy and convenient place in front of Baroda may be fixed upon for the cantonment of this corps; and that its proportion of field ordnance and stores may be either with it, or in the nearest garrison.

10. By this arrangement, by keeping the corps complete in numbers and in discipline, you will have a large disposable force in the most important point of the Company's territories, whether considered with reference to the defence of their territories and those of their allies, or to the attack of the only freebooter that remains.

11. Shortly after I shall send the Bombay Native infantry from Poonah, I hope to be able also to send to Bombay the detachment of the 84th, stationed at Poonah, and the 78th regt., which forms part of this army. These troops, together with the detachments of the 84th, 88th, and 61st, from Guzerat, will render the garrison of Bombay as strong in European troops possibly as you may wish.

12. Thus, by these arrangements, which I recommend for your consideration and adoption, if you should approve of them, you will reinforce the Bengal army in conformity to the wishes of his Excellency the Governor General; you will provide, for the service in Guzerat, a body of troops, whose services will not be so expensive as those at present stationed there; at the same time that the army in Guzerat will be composed of a due proportion of European and Native infantry, and you will provide a sufficient European garrison for Bombay.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

I have received your public and private letters of the 27th Dec. Col. Anderson acted exactly as he ought, and I only hope that very few of the Arabs may have escaped.

I am sorry to observe, from the perusal of a voluminous correspondence which you have had with the Paymaster, and with the government of Bombay on the subject of the Paymaster, that your disagreement with that public officer still continues. I notice this subject to you, because I have been obliged to enter into details upon it in my correspondence with the government of Bombay. I dare say that you have seen my letter; but if you should not, I apprise you that I think you ought not to have interfered respecting the contract with Terwaddy. That is a financial question, referrible entirely to the civil government, upon which we cannot form an opinion. Mr. Duncan alone can decide whether the inconveniences of the contract balance the conveniences which have been derived from it, and you ought to have done no more than report the inconveniences resulting from it.

As I think the question is not for our consideration at all, and that, by interfering in it, we have taken upon ourselves an unnecessary responsibility to find funds for the payment of the army in Guzerat, in which, if the war had continued, we should undoubtedly have failed, I do not think it necessary to enter into any consideration of your reasoning upon

the contract, although I am of opinion that you are mistaken in parts of it.

In respect to the inconveniences experienced, that the troops do not get their pay until the 10th or 12th of the month, when I consider that by far the majority of the troops in India (particularly in Bengal) do not receive their pay till between the 20th and 30th of the month, I cannot conceive that your troops have much reason to complain; and in respect to the want of bills from the Paymaster by the officers, I have to observe that the receipt of money from officers is a breach of Terwaddy's contract, by no means necessary, even for private convenience, as it appears that there was a mode of remitting money to the Coast provided by government, and the officers could have got bills from Terwaddy's agent in camp. But private convenience must, in my opinion, be always a secondary consideration; and, therefore, even if there had been no mode of remittance to the Coast for officers, those bills ought not to have been drawn by the Paymaster. Upon this subject I have to observe, that very recently the government of Fort St. George ordered that the Paymasters might not draw bills upon the Presidency; but they did not provide means of remittance to the Coast for the officers of the army: although there is no internal commerce in that part of the peninsula, there was no such means excepting the transmission of cash.

I mention these subjects to you, because I think it very desirable, as well for yourself as for the public service, that you should draw well with the government and its servants. For my part, I shall shortly resign my charge in this part of India; and, excepting as far as my wishes may go, I shall be indifferent to what passes. But I shall ever be sorry to hear that you misapply your talents by entering into these questions and disputes, and that you have thereby tired the government, and put it under a necessity not to employ you.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 21st Jan. 1804.

I enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor General. I have this instant received your dispatch of the 4th inst., and I have the pleasure to inform you that Lieut. Ferrier is now with his convoy, and Capt. Baynes' detachment at Umber, about 7 miles from this camp. I hope to cross the Godavery on the day after to-morrow; and I intend to endeavor to cut up, if not, I shall disperse, the banditti on his Highness' western frontier.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp at Paunchore, 22nd Jan. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 18th inst., and I am much concerned to find that you are indisposed. I trust that this letter will find you recovered in health.

You will have observed, by my letter to Mr. Duncan, which I sent you yesterday, that I am on my march on an expedition against a banditti on the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan. I intend to cross the Godavery, if possible, to-morrow. As soon as I shall have either destroyed or dispersed this banditti, I shall place the troops in a situation in which they can get forage, and I shall go towards Poonah. I think

that they will disperse as soon as they hear that I have crossed the Godavery.

In respect to Amrut Rao, my fixed intention is, that he shall reside at Surat. There he shall receive the amount of his pension, which, with the provision for his adherents, is 8 lacs of rupees annually. I have got from him orders to his killadar at Poonadur, and to his servants in different districts, to withdraw from them; but I do not propose to make any use of those orders, till the Peshwah consents to release those of Amrut Rao's servants, and the families of his servants, whom he has confined, and restore their houses and property which he has seized. Amrut Rao's property in Poonadur also, and the killadar and his family, must be allowed to join Amrut Rao in security; and a sum of 50,000 rupees must be given to pay the arrears of the garrison of the fort. Indeed, this sum of 50,000 rupees was required some time ago, and I think it probable that those arrears now amount to more than that sum.

Under this arrangement the Peshwah is required to do no more than an act of common humanity, and to spend 50,000 rupees. If he does not choose to adopt this line of conduct, his government must take its chance. It is my opinion that the British government cannot interfere with Amrut Rao, to obtain possession of the fort of Poonadur, till the Peshwah decides to release Amrut Rao's servants, and to restore their property. I request you to procure a positive answer upon this subject, one way or the other, as soon as you shall be sufficiently recovered.

Upon the subject of your letter of the 7th inst., I have to observe, that it is impossible to propose any thing to Amrut Rao that is inconsistent with the treaty made with him, which has been approved of by the Governor General. I rather think you wrote that letter under the notion that, in my letter of the 14th Dec., I wished that the old servants of the state, the adherents of Nana Furnavees, should be released from their confinement, as a *sine quâ non*. Amrut Rao recommended that measure to me, and I recommended it to your consideration, as the most probable mode of settling the country. I insisted only upon a release of Amrut Rao's servants, and the families of his servants, (of whom I sent you, I am sorry to say, a very long list,) and the restoration of their houses in Poonah and their property. I do not wish to go into a consideration of the question respecting the revival of Nana's party in the state, but we are all agreed that, till the Peshwah is reconciled to Amrut Rao, his government cannot be settled; and I repeat that he cannot be reconciled to Amrut Rao, if he continues his cruel usage of his servants.

Goklah was with me last night, and made a proposition, the meaning of which I cannot comprehend. He said that Munkaiscer's brother had received letters from Poonah, stating that the Peshwah was willing to be reconciled to his brother, provided the measures to bring about the reconciliation should be consistent with his dignity. Upon inquiring what the measures were, Goklah said that I must send a message by Munkaiscer's brother to the Peshwah, on the subject, and a person to you; I do not understand all this manœuvring, and I shall therefore beg to communicate with his Highness in the ordinary official channel. I have received another letter and message from Baba Phurkia; he throws himself upon

able position for the execution of the plan, being at the top of a ghaut; but I have some hopes that I shall succeed.

Webbe had not left Hurryhur on the 11th, but was prepared to leave it. Nothing new from Hyderabad, excepting that the Subah has threatened to murder the minister. The latter has asked for and received the protection of an additional guard of British troops.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 7 miles S. of the Godavery, 24th Jan. 1804.

I have just received your letter of the 19th: that of the 18th has not yet reached me; and I therefore can say nothing upon the draft of the treaty which you say it contains.

I am glad to see that Mr. Duncan bears his letter from Bengal so well. I have publicly disapproved of Murray's conduct respecting Terwaddy, and also respecting his treatment of the Guickwar sirdars; and have recommended to the Governor General, in a private letter, to dismiss him from his situation. I had recommended the same to Mr. Duncan, but I fancy he will not attend to my recommendation.

I write again this day to Rajah Mohiput Ram respecting the release of the zemindar of Eedlabad. I am delighted with Scindiah's treatment of the pindarries. I only fear that the measure will throw more power into the hands of Holkar. But probably this may be a very usual mode of settling accounts of arrears with troops.

I apprised you yesterday of my intentions respecting the freebooters in this quarter. Col. Close is obliged to quit Poonah, and go to the coast for the recovery of his health. He had fever for 8 days without intermission. Mr. Frissell is in charge of the Residency.

P. S. The lands held by Ambajee belonged principally to the Peshwah: 13 lacs of rupces only, I believe, to Scindiah. I shall look over the treaty, and return it to-morrow.

I have received your letter of the 18th, which, by the bye, had been opened.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 24th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th inst. There are at present in the depôts at Poonah and Ahmednuggur, about 20,000 bags of rice; besides about 5000 with the army, and nearly as much with Col. Stevenson's division. Under these circumstances, and the alteration of the general situation of affairs, in consequence of the peace, I rather think that it will not be necessary to send a larger quantity of rice to Poonah than is at that place at present. At all events, supposing that it should be necessary to send it up at a later period than in the month of April, the inconvenience and expense will not be equal to what might be suffered by the want, at Bombay, of a supply for other quarters; and to the loss which might be sustained by having in hand at Poonah so large a quantity of rice, for which there would be no consumption.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 24th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 16th inst., upon the subject of Senhor de Sousa's house. Upon a former occasion, I took

the liberty of recommending that Lieut. Col. ——— might be removed from the command of Baroach, which I now beg leave to repeat. In respect to Senhor de Sousa's house, it is impossible for me to determine, without further inquiry, whether it does, or does not, belong to him. The only mode for determining that will be for the Hon. the Governor in Council to give orders that the civil authority on the spot may make the necessary inquiries. I have recommended that Lieut. Col. ——— may be removed from his situation, because he seized the house, which was an improper act of authority, whether the house did, or did not, belong to Senhor de Sousa.

To Lieut. Frissell, Residency at Poonah.

Camp, 21th Jan. 1801.

I have received your letters of the 20th and 21st; and regret exceedingly the circumstances which have occasioned Lieut. Col. Close's departure from Poonah.

I beg that you will correspond with me publicly or privately, as you may think proper.

Tell the Peshwah's ministers, that Col. Close has not had orders from the Governor General to communicate to his Highness the treaties of peace; and that, of course, it would be very improper to communicate them to any body, till his Excellency shall have ratified them.

I do not know whether the Colonel ever mentioned to the durbar the arrangement alluded to in my letter of the 15th regarding Loghur. However, supposing he did not, there is no harm in having mentioned it. After the behaviour of the Loghur man during the war, the British government will not take Loghur for the Peshwah, and there does not appear to me any other mode of getting it than that proposed. I have an order in my possession for Poonadur, and with or without the Peshwah's consent, I can get Loghur for him whenever I please. By the possession of those 2 forts, and Ahmednuggur, in my opinion, his government will be more respectable than it ever was.

In respect to the release of Amrut Rao's servants (and I rather believe that Col. Close did not understand me clearly), the names of the persons whom I wished to have relieved from the Peshwah's oppression, as being Amrut Rao's servants, were included in a list No. 8, enclosed in my letter of the 14th Dec. No. 2 contained a list of persons to whom I wished that no injury should be done in future; and No. 3 a list of persons whom I recommend to Col. Close to have released from their confinement, as being the ancient servants of the Poonah state. I imagine, from his answer to that letter, that he thought I wished those included in No. 3 to be released as a *sine quâ non*, but he was mistaken.

I will send to the Pagah sirdars, as the Peshwah wishes it, and let them know that nothing will be done for them through our mediation. But it is proper that the Peshwah should be informed, that, from the highest man in his state, to the lowest, there is not one who will trust him, or who will have any connexion or communication with him, excepting through the mediation, and under the guarantee, of the British government. I have no wishes in respect to those sirdars, or any other person whatever, excepting to forward his Highness' government. But possibly

he will be able to settle it without any assistance from us. He shall try it, as I intend to fix the troops in a place of security, and in such a position as will prevent foreign invasion, and then let him do his best.

You may tell the Peshwah's government that they shall have one month's pay for the 2000 men. But I want in camp all the money collected at Poonah, and that payment must consequently be delayed. Does the Peshwah mean to take into pay the cavalry and infantry belonging to Amrut Rao, respecting which I wrote to Lient. Col. Close?

I am going to-morrow to endeavor to cut up the freebooters in the frontier. If I do not succeed in cutting them up, I shall disperse them.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Boodaygaum, 24th Jan. 1804.

I observe that, by the orders of the Commander in Chief at Bombay, Major Urquhart is posted to the 2nd batt. 9th regt., and officers, not on furlough or on staff employments, are to join their corps without delay. I do not know whether Major Urquhart's situation at Baroda is considered a staff employment; but at all events, whether it is or not, it is of the utmost importance that he should not quit it until the orders of the Governor of Bombay are received on the subject; or some arrangement for conducting its duties, equally beneficial to the public interests, shall be made, if Major Urquhart is to quit his situation. Accordingly, I request that you will detain Major Urquhart at Baroda, until you shall receive further orders.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Boodaygaum, 8 m.S. from the Godavery, 24th Jan. 1804.

As the army has now come to the southward, and I shall possibly soon go to Poonah, I shall be obliged to you if you will desire the Postmaster to send all the letters by the Poonah dawk.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Yailum, 26th Jan. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone, and the copy of one which I have written to that gentleman, which explains my sentiments upon the subjects to which Mr. Elphinstone's dispatches relate.

It is impossible for persons to have behaved in a more shuffling manner than the Soubah's servants have in every transaction relative to the peace. Their conduct has been entirely inconsistent with every principle of policy or good faith; they have withheld from me information upon every point, particularly upon the subject of the revenues of Berar, only with the miserable view of delaying the cession of the districts near the hills, in order that they may have an opportunity of plundering them for some time longer; and at last, after delaying the decision on this question for nearly 6 weeks, for want of the accounts, I am obliged to decide it on this day, fixed by myself, on the accounts of the revenues produced by the Rajah of Berar. After all, I suspect that I shall be obliged to make use of the British troops to put the Rajah in possession of those districts.

- To the Hon. M. Elphinstone, with the Rajah of Berar.

Camp, 26th Jan. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th, and that for the Governor General of the 19th.



I do not apprehend any civil design in the detachment to Hoossingabad, which it is probable is sent for the purpose stated. The necessity of making this detachment is a proof of the difficulties in which the Rajah of Berar would have been involved, if the war had continued, and the troops had marched to Nagpoor; and I recommend that you should take an opportunity of pointing this out to the Rajah's ministers.

I do not think the difference between the account given by the Rajah and Jykissen Ram, of the cause of the detachment to Hoossingabad, is material. It is very probable that the Affghan Nawaub of Bopal has been residing in the Cuttack country, possibly in the service of the Rajah of Cuttack, or pensioned by him, and that the Rajah has encouraged or possibly assisted him in making this attack. The Marhattas are but little in the habit of adhering to truth; they are generally indistinct in their account of a transaction of the nature of that alluded to; and it rarely happens that those accounts are found to agree exactly with the state of the facts.

You have acted quite right in pressing the Rajah to send orders to his troops to withdraw. I have received no complaints lately, and no accounts from Lieut. Col. Lang, who is in Berar with a British detachment, that any of them remain. But the fact is, that the Marhatta troops are but little under control, and they withdraw from a country, even belonging to their own employers, with great reluctance, as long as there is any thing in it to be plundered.

The Mogul troops and Chiefs are not much better, for I have been obliged to do all but attack the troops left in Burhampoor, in order to induce them to withdraw; and although the Soubah's officers must be aware that the Soubah's government will be a loser by the omission or delay to perform strictly the stipulations of the treaty, it is with the utmost difficulty, and only by the threats to use force, that I can prevail upon them to perform them: even at this moment, parts of the treaties, both with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, are not performed. Under these circumstances of irregularity and want of principle and good faith, and as it appears impossible to raise the views of those with whom we are obliged to act above those of a pindarry, or a rapacious amildar, I have only to recommend to you to continue your efforts to oblige the Rajah to withdraw the few troops who remain in Berar; but their being there shall not prevent me from giving up the fort of Gawilghur, or the districts, the revenue of which is to be applied to the support of the garrisons of Gawilghur and Nernulla.

I hope to be able to settle all remaining points with Jcswunt Rao Ramchunder this day; and he will then go to Nagpoor. I gave him a letter a few days ago, addressed to the officer commanding the British troops advancing from the province of Cuttack, to request that he would halt, and do no injury to the country, until he should have received further orders from the Governor General, unless he should have heard that his Excellency had not ratified the treaty of peace.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 26th Jan. 1801.

I have had a correspondence with Lieut. Col. Close, upon the subject

of the proper situation for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, the result of which is, that I propose to post it at or in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, detaching 2 battalions, if they should be required by the Peshwah, to Poonah. In this position the troops will enjoy a healthy climate; and the advantage of drawing their supplies from the Soubah's territories, from which alone I fear that, for some time, they will be able to procure subsistence. They will be in a good position to check invasion by a foreign enemy, or internal insurrection or commotion; they will protect effectually the frontiers, both of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan; and they will give countenance to the operations of the Peshwah's troops in settling his countries, should his Highness ever manifest a disposition to re-establish his government in them.

Of course, the fort of Ahmednuggur will remain in our possession till your Excellency's orders regarding its disposal shall have been received. But whether it is given over to the Peshwah or not, I most anxiously recommend that, at least for some time, till it shall be seen in what manner the peace operates upon the different Marhatta states, and how the whole will settle, that fort may be garrisoned by British troops.

Your Excellency has had experience in the late war how little the killadars and forts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan are to be depended upon; but I assure you, that if it was in their power, those belonging, or rather nominally belonging, to the Peshwah, would behave still worse. I acknowledge that I do not consider this disposition of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah to be the best which I could make, connecting it with that serving with the Soubah of the Deccan. It is my opinion that, after leaving 2 battalions of the former at Poonah, and 2 battalions of the latter at Hyderabad, the whole of the remainder of the troops ought either to be upon, or to the northward of the river Godavery; the former in the territories of the Peshwah, and the latter about 40 or 50 miles lower down the river. This disposition, with a British garrison in Ahmednuggur, and one devoted to the British government in Dharore, would be an effectual security against foreign invasion and internal commotion. But I cannot recommend it at present, as I have not a sufficiently correct or extensive knowledge of the state of the politics at the court of Hyderabad, to be certain that the presence of the whole subsidiary force at Hyderabad is not necessary to preserve the British influence in the Soubah's councils.

Unless the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan should be posted on the frontier, I do not think it would be prudent to post that serving with the Peshwah farther to the northward than Ahmednuggur, and therefore I recommend to your Excellency the adoption of the position which I first proposed.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 26th Jan. 1801.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd inst. As you have sent a copy of it to the Governor General, it is probable that you will receive his Excellency's sentiments upon your operations. In the mean time I have to inform you that I conceive you did every thing in your power in the common cause. Your corps was certainly not suffi-

ciently strong for the invasion of the enemy's country, but you obliged a formidable rebel to retire, and you preserved the peace of Guzerat, a country which was certainly, in some degree, exposed to be invaded by the enemy.

In respect to your arrangements with the Bheels, there will be no difficulty in confirming them. All the Rajahs whom you have named are provided for under the article of the treaty of peace; and I will send a list of their names to the Resident with Scindiah, with a request that he will take care that no injury is ever done to them on account of their conduct during the war.

The Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte come under the article of the treaty of peace. I do not exactly understand the nature of your arrangements with the former, whether it is that the tribute due should be remitted, or that it should be remitted in all future times. I beg to hear from you on this subject. I also hope to receive from you the amended treaty with the Rajah of Sounte, which will, of course, be confirmed. I have the pleasure to send you copies of the two articles of the treaty of peace, which provide effectually for all engagements of this description.

I have now only to recommend to your attention the discipline of the troops under your command, and a determined resistance to every thing like an abuse in the service, which can tend to subtract from the efficiency of the corps in the field. I have lately written to Mr. Dunean, to propose an alteration in the plans which I submitted to him on the 2nd Aug. last, according to which, if he should adopt it, your strength in European troops will be diminished, but that of Native troops will be increased by 2 battalions. This arrangement is advisable, and indeed necessary, for many reasons not required at present to discuss; but if troops in Guzerat are kept in a proper state of discipline and efficiency, I do not apprehend any inconvenience from it. Upon this subject I have to observe, that there is a tendency in the service in this country to admit abuses beyond any other that I have met with. I cannot say whether this is to be attributed to former habits and example, or to the laxity which must attend all distant establishments. But of this I am very certain, that it is the first duty of a commanding officer to resist every thing of the kind in a most determined manner. The want of discipline among troops is very bad, and renders them useless; but the want of efficiency, which is the result of the application to private purposes or profit of the persons paid by the public as troops, or as the necessary attendants or equipments of these troops, is worse, as it may exist with a certain degree and appearance of discipline, and government may be misled by the notion that they have an army, whereas they have nothing but paper.

The troops under your command are in a distant country, and they can come but seldom under the view or inspection of the government; it is therefore particularly incumbent on you to take care that no practice or custom shall exist which may destroy their discipline or lessen their efficiency; and I beg leave to assure you, that without the most constant vigilance on your part, you will not be able to avert these evils.

To Major Shawe. •

Camp, 26th Jan. 1804.

I have written to the Governor General this day on the subject of the future position of the subsidiary forces. I prefer that disposition which I recommended in the second instance; viz., both corps upon the Godavery; but I am afraid that we cannot carry it into execution.

There are symptoms of ill temper at Hyderabad, which must be met by firmness, but conciliation; and we must be strong at that point, either to support Aristo Jah in his office, or whoever may be appointed to conduct the government in his room.

I give up the notion of posting the troops upon the Godavery with great reluctance; because I want to have it understood, particularly at Hyderabad, that our troops are not to be the only support of the government; that they are to oppose foreign invaders and great rebels, but are not to be the support of the little dirty amildary exactions. It is, besides, very disadvantageous and unjust to the character of the British nation, to make the British troops the means of carrying on all the violent and unpopular acts of these Native governments, such as, for instance, the resumption of the jaghires of the Mussulmann chiefs in the Soubah's countries. It makes our cause unpopular, which it ought not to be, and would not be; and, in our present glorious situation, it is very desirable that we should avoid this unpopularity.

In respect to the Peshwah's government, I have given my opinion fully to Col. Close, that till the Peshwah organises his revenue departments, and the other departments of his state, which he cannot do without relinquishing the whole system of revenge, which is the only principle of his government at present, (excepting, indeed, jealousy of my influence,) the Colonel ought to give him no assistance whatever in settling his country. The consequence of a departure from this recommendation will be, that the troops will take mud forts, which they must garrison, and the British officers must be amildars; or the forts, after having been taken, must be abandoned to their old possessors, who, instead of being in the light of friends, as they have hitherto been, would be our worst enemies. I could settle the Peshwah's countries in a few days, if I could bring him to act rationally, or if I could inspire him with confidence in me or the British government.

I have got from Amrut Rao orders for the fort of Poonadur and all the districts he held under the Poonah state, which I would give to the Peshwah if he would only release the servants and women belonging to Amrut Rao and his servants. Besides this, I could get possession of the fort of Loghur on the Bhore ghaut for him. By these possessions, his government would be more respectable than ever it was, and his country would settle itself. But he will not do any thing that is desired of him. He will not consent to liberate Amrut Rao's servants, and therefore I cannot give up the countries without violating every principle of good faith, and keeping alive for ever the spirit of hostility; and he will not consent to allow the killadar of Loghur to remove with his property and the family of Nana Furnavees to Bombay, under the protection of the British government.

There are two modes of getting the better of these inconveniences; one

is to restore Amrut Rao's districts, and to take, for the Peshwah, the fort of Loghur. I have already given my opinion upon the restoration of Amrut Rao's districts; and in respect to taking the fort of Loghur, I have to observe, that this fort commands the road by which, during the war, we have communicated with Bombay from Poonah. To take the fort would have been impossible; the enmity or even the treachery of the killadar would have proved fatal to our operations in this quarter. We must have depended entirely upon the Nizam's territories, which are but a slender prop. The killadar has been kept in order only by the assurances given him, that as long as he should be friendly to the cause of the Peshwah, nobody would interfere with his fort; and by the hopes that at some time or other he would be permitted to send his property to Bombay, and go and end there his days. After this statement, I believe it will be agreed that it will not answer to attack Loghur.

Another mode of arranging this matter would be, that we ourselves should release Amrut Rao's servants and restore their property, and then give the Peshwah possession of Poonadur, to settle with the killadar the mode of transporting his property to Bombay, and to send the whole down there under convoy of the corps which will march thither in a short time. But the adoption of these measures will incense the Peshwah, beyond all hopes of forgiveness, however advantageous they may be to his government. He will immediately begin again (or rather will continue, for I have reason to believe that he has never discontinued) his old intrigues with Scindiah's government; and, by giving him these two forts, we should have added most considerably to his strength, and particularly to his means of annoying us. Upon the whole, therefore, I recommend that all these measures connected with the settlement of the Peshwah's government may be left to time and the efforts of Col. Close.

From many circumstances, and particularly from a letter which I have received from Mr. Frissell, a copy of which will have gone to the Governor General, containing the Peshwah's answer to a request I made, that he would pardon 400 or 500 of his Pagah horse, who had been serving with Baba Phurkia, I am induced to believe that he is very jealous of me, and of the influence which he imagines the British government maintains through my means; notwithstanding all that I have done for him, his declared sense of it, and the confidence he has expressed. If this be the case, we shall never be able to prevail upon him to do any thing which can be beneficial, either to his own government or the common cause; and if to maintain our influence in the Marhatta Empire be an object, the sooner I withdraw from the scene, and the sooner his jealousy is allayed, the better. In fact, this influence can be maintained only by conferring benefits on the persons who are the objects of it; it is now fed and upheld by hope, but as soon as people shall find that my recommendation is the road to disgrace instead of to favor, they will not follow our fortunes much longer. I therefore think that as soon as I shall have settled every thing that I have to do, I ought to withdraw. I certainly have a bad opinion of the Peshwah; he has no public feeling, and his private disposition is terrible. I have no positive proof that he has been treacherous, but I have a strong suspicion of it; and I know that since he signed the

treaty of Bassein, he has done no one thing that has been desired, either with a view to forward his own interest, or the views of the alliance, or the common safety during the war.

It may be asked, will you leave a fellow of that kind in possession of that government? I answer, I have no remedy; I cannot take it for the British government, without a breach of faith and another war. I do not know whether I should mend the matter in respect to treachery, by giving him either of his brothers as a dewan; but I do know, that if I was to give the government over to Amrut Rao, I should establish there a most able fellow, who, if he should prove treacherous, would be a worse thorn in the side of the British government than the creature who is Peshwah, at present, can ever be.

In respect to Amrut Rao, I recommend that he should, for the present, reside at Surat upon his pension, to be paid by the British government. This pension, as well as the value of the countries ceded by Amrut Rao, may be carried to the Peshwah's account, as so much gained by him during the war; for it is ridiculous to suppose that the British government are to bear the expense of this pension, excepting by such an arrangement. Amrut Rao is very anxious that the Governor General should ratify the treaty with him; upon which subject I will address him.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 26th Jan. 1801.

I return the treaty, which I think will answer well; but I should doubt their adopting the arrangement. Nothing new. The Rajah of Berar has detached troops towards Hoossingabad, to oppose the ancient Nawaub of Bopal, who has attacked him in that quarter.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Malmoor, 27th Jan. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 20th, and this morning that of the 22nd.

I beg that you will open any dispatches that may come into your hands addressed to me, either from the Governor General, or any other person, from whom you may think it desirable to receive intelligence.

I am afraid that the people who were at Peepulgaum were killed; if they were not, they have gone to Scindiah's camp. They are certainly not here at present. I shall inquire about them particularly, and will let you know the result of my inquiries.

I have desired Rajah Mohiput Ram repeatedly to release every person who may have been taken by his troops. He says that he has done so. I have also written to him positive orders regarding the zemindar of Eedlabad, and I have complained of his conduct in this and other transactions.

The Peshwah has no districts in Candeish. That province is divided principally between Scindiah and Holkar; and some other chiefs may have interests in it, but the Peshwah himself none. I must put a stop to this plan, for it will not answer to be intrigued into a war with Holkar, through the medium of Ballojee Koonger.

It is most desirable that we should prevent, as much as possible, the communication between the Peshwah and Scindiah; otherwise, without

allying ourselves with Scindiah, we shall do his work for him through the Peshwah. I see that the intriguers at the Peshwah's durbar are hard at work upon something of this kind at this moment.

I have written fully to the Governor General and to Shawe about the Peshwah; and have pointed out the necessity there is for retaining possession of Ahmednuggur. I have also laid open the Peshwah's character, rather more than it has been hitherto. He has lately disclosed a great jealousy of the British government, and of me personally; and has intimated plainly to Mr. Frissell, that one reason for not carrying into execution a measure recommended to him by me was, that I had recommended it. This measure was neither more nor less than to pardon 500 Pagah horsemen, who offered, as the price of their pardon, to give up their horses. I have got from Amrut Rao the orders for all his countries, and the fort of Poonadur; but the Peshwah will do nothing.

There is no doubt about the 7th article of the treaty of peace. I consented to it for several reasons: the principal of which were, 1st, to facilitate the cession; 2ndly, to provide for so many people in Scindiah's service, who would otherwise be obliged to go into Holkar's; and, 3rdly, to establish an influence in the durbar of Scindiah himself. This arrangement, in my opinion, is one of the main stays of the peace, and none of its principles ought to be departed from. But you will depart from its principles, either if you give the money in a lump to Scindiah, or if you allow him to dispose of it without the intervention of the British government.

I think it immaterial whether the condition of the grant is that the receiver shall maintain a body of cavalry or not. It might be as well, for many reasons possibly, that it should be so. The arrangement also is perpetual, as well as the treaty; but it may be proper not to canvass that point. It also stands to reason that the grant is made only during the good behaviour of the receiver; and I do not see any objection to the insertion of such a clause in the sunnud. But it is not necessary to us, and may as well be avoided, unless you should be of opinion that the insertion of this clause will decrease the jealousy, in Scindiah's mind, of the whole measure. I have no doubt whatever of the necessity of insisting that we should appear very prominent characters in this transaction. It is honorable to the national character; and if we do not appear, we shall lose all the benefit that we expect from it.

In case any further difficulty should be made by Scindiah's ministers on this subject, I refer you to the words in the treaty, 'under the protection of the British government,' which are clearly demonstrative of the intention of all the parties, when they made the treaty.

I shall take care of Munsoor Saheb. I do not see any advantage resulting from giving Scindiah the regiment of cavalry, and the regiment of European infantry, in lieu of the 6 lacs of the pension money, excepting that of saving so much money.

Whenever we come to assist Scindiah seriously, we must employ our whole force situated every where; and every detachment of our troops must have with them a proportion of European infantry and of regular cavalry. But unless you should decide that it is necessary to have the

subsidiary force at Scindiah's capital, and Scindiah should fix that capital at Ougein, I do not think that the European infantry and regular cavalry are at all necessary, for the purposes which it is supposed the ordinary residence of the subsidiary force in his country will produce. However, I differ in opinion upon the whole of this subject with all the other doctors; but my comprehension may be dull upon the minute parts of the question, of which this is one.

In respect to Scindiah's residence at Ougein, I think it probable that he dislikes as much to trust his person in that city, as I do 6 battalions of British infantry, and probably for the same reason. If that be the case, and he should determine to reside at Burhampoor, which I think he will, there is no necessity whatever for our giving him either cavalry or European infantry; excepting that we may save ourselves the expense of maintaining them.

It may not be unnecessary to observe upon this point, that if Scindiah gets European infantry, they must come from England, as we have not one corps here to spare. Within these 5 days I have ordered one from Guzerat to Bengal; and I suppose that hereafter Bombay must have a soldier or two in its garrison. Upon the whole, putting lucre out of the question, I am of opinion that we shall gain more influence, and that is real strength, by the arrangement as it stands in the treaty, than by that proposed: but supposing that you should think it necessary to give the regiment of Europeans and one of cavalry, instead of 10 lacs of rupees, I would still distribute the 5 lacs in the manner settled in the treaty. Bel-  
lingham has sent you the cipher.

I have no doubt about the peace; and every body is delighted with it. But the machine in Bengal was so much screwed up, that I fear the Governor General may not feel about it as I do.

I send you a letter from Mr. Duucan, from which you will observe that all is now right. Murray has withdrawn his letter, as I desired him, and I hope will go on well in futurc. The Nizam's rascals in this country have given me false intelligence of the practicability of the ghauts; and I am in consequence a little thrown out in my pursuit of the thieves.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 27th Jan. 1804.

Cashce Rao, the late deshmook of Ellichpoor, gave his daughter in marriage to Cashee Rao Ramchunder, the brother of Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, who negotiated the peace. Jeswunt Rao has desired me to apply to the Soubah's government for a sunnud, appointing his brother deshmook in the room of his late father-in-law Cashce Rao; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange this matter.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 27th Jan. 1804.

I have been desired by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder to request that you would be so kind as to recommend his brother Eital Rao Ramchunder to the government of the Soubah of the Deccan, for some employment under that government; and I now take the liberty of asking you to use your influence in his favor.



To Rajah Mohiput Ram.

Camp, 27th Jan. 1804.

I have been for some time waiting for the accounts of the revenues collected from the districts in Berar, bordering upon the hills on which are the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur, in order that I might arrange with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar what districts should be given over to him. But you have not sent me these accounts; and I am now under the necessity of referring Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder to you, in order to have this question settled, according to the treaty of peace.

I enclose you a copy of the article of the treaty of peace, under which I have bound the British government and their allies to give over to the Rajah of Berar country which will produce annually 4 lacs of rupces, and which is to be in the neighbourhood of the hills on which are situated the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur.

I request you will examine the accounts, and fix upon the countries which, in conformity with this engagement, it will be most convenient to the Soubah of the Deccan to cede. You will strike out of the amount of the revenues, the amount of the jaghires granted by the Peshwah, or by the Soubah of the Deccan; and you will then ascertain the amount of the remaining revenue actually collected from each district. You will ascertain what has been the highest revenue collected in any one of the last 12 years, and you will fix the amount as that at which the districts are to be given over to the Rajah of Berar. After having done this, you will deliver over the districts, which you will settle with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, that the Rajah is to leave to the person whom the Rajah shall appoint to take charge of them. You will withdraw all your people from these districts, and you will understand clearly that the Rajah of Berar is to have the revenue of them from the 17th Dec., the day on which I signed the treaty.

I have desired Capt. Johnson to wait upon you with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder to settle this affair, and I beg that no time may be lost.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 27th Jan. 1804.

I before addressed you upon the subject of Madhoo Rao Ramchunder, and now trouble you again, at the request of his brother, Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder. Madhoo Rao Ramchunder had heretofore, in the service of the Soubah of the Deccan, 100 horse; he now wishes to have 300 horse, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange this matter for him.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 27th Jan. 1804.

Since I wrote to the Governor General the other day, I have received a letter from Col. Murray, in which he acknowledges his error in writing to the Governor of Bombay his letter of the 12th Nov. According to my advice he has made an apology, and has desired leave to withdraw it. His letter upon this subject will probably have reached Bengal as an accompaniment, before you will receive this; but as these accompaniments, or possibly the text, are seldom read, I shall be obliged to you if you will notice the subject to the Governor General.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Kailud, 28th Jan. 1804.

Previous to the late war with the Rajah of Berar, his confidential servants possessed, in the province of Berar, certain villages in enaun, some of which belonged to the Peshwah, and others to the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar. They enjoyed the whole revenues of some of those villages, and only the Rajah of Berar's share of others, but their rights are exactly known and acknowledged by the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan. When the province of Berar was ceded by the treaty of peace, Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder mentioned to me these possessions, which he was desirous to secure. I told him that the war was not carried on against individuals, and that I would recommend the Rajah's confidential servants to the Soubah of the Deccan, for a continuance of the favor they had received from his father's government, and of the benefits they enjoyed in Berar.

I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to renew the sunnuds, or rather to give orders to his officers in Berar not to interfere with their possessions; and I have the honor to enclose copies of the papers which have been written by him on this occasion. I request you to use your influence at the Soubah's court, to procure the regular sunnuds for these possessions, to the same purport as the enclosed papers.

One of the papers relates to the revenue derived by Goneish Punt, for doing the duty of an office in a village in Bheer. It appears that half the revenue of the office, amounting to about 80 rupees a year, has been lately sequestrated, and I have prevailed upon Rajah Mohiput Ram to restore it. I request you also to procure from the durbar a sunnud upon the subject. Goneish Punt was employed under Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder in the negotiations for the peace, and he was very useful. I have recommended Ramchunder to the Governor General for a reward; and I beg to recommend Goneish Punt to the Soubah of the Deccan for a mark of his Highness' favor. In case his Highness should be pleased to attend to this recommendation, Goneish Punt is desirous that what his Highness may give him may be situated in the province of Bheer.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Camp, 28th Jan. 1804.

This letter will be delivered to you by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, who is on his return to Nagpoor, and to whom I have intrusted a present of an elephant, &c., &c., for the Rajah of Berar.

I have had every reason to be satisfied with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder since his arrival in this camp, and I beg leave to recommend him to your good offices.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 28th Jan. 1804.

I am concerned to inform you, that I have not yet been able to settle with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar what districts are to be handed over to him, according to the treaty of peace, as I have not yet been able to

G. M. O.

Camp at Kailud Damungam, 28th Jan. 1804.

No green grain to be cut for forage, except in case of absolute necessity; to be first reported.

induce Rajah Mohiput Ram to give me the accounts of the revenues of the districts in Berar, bordering on the hills; and I am afraid that I should be accused of having acted unjustly towards the Soubah of the Deccan, and with precipitation, if I was to settle the business on the basis of the accounts received from the Rajah of Berar. I have, therefore, thought it best to refer the business to Rajah Mohiput Ram; and I have the honor to enclose the translation of a letter which I have written to him upon this occasion.

From the unaccountable delays which have occurred in furnishing me with the accounts to enable me to settle this business, I am induced to imagine that Rajah Mohiput Ram is inclined to object to and frustrate the arrangement. If this be true, much time will elapse before it is concluded; and, until it is concluded, we cannot withdraw our troops from the neighbourhood of Berar, or from that province. Under these circumstances I shall be much obliged to you, if you will urge the minister to send orders to Rajah Mohiput Ram, to the same purport as the requests contained in my letter, of which the enclosed is a translation. As Rajah Mohiput Ram is gone to Ellichpoor (I believe), the minister's orders will reach him by the Soubah's dawk, before Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder can arrive in his camp.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 29th Jan. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 23rd. The people whose horses were taken at Peepulgaum were plundering; and they ran off when attacked by our horse. Not a man was taken, positively; and of 18 horses, only 12 now remain, or, indeed, were ever brought into camp. The others were small, and were left behind.

I enclose the copy of the only letter I have received from Gen. Lake, which gives a better account of the state of affairs in Hindustan than I have yet received. I am now of opinion that the treaty of peace will be approved of in Bengal. At all events, there will be no reasonable ground for finding fault with it, as it provides for all the Governor General's objects, and he will have the barrier for which he wished. I rather believe that Narwar, the possession which is guaranteed to Ambajec, belongs to the Peshwah, as it appears in the map to be near Jawa, which undoubtedly belongs to him; but if Narwar belongs to Scindiah, under the treaty of peace, of course Scindiah must have it; and we must give compensation to Ambajec.

As to Gwalior, the question is, to whom did it belong? to the Ranah of Gohud, or to Scindiah? I think to the former. I know that our government always considered it so; and that, under this consideration, Gwalior was heretofore given over to the Ranah of Gohud, when we had taken it. If Gwalior belonged to Scindiah, it must be given up; and I acknowledge that whether it did, or did not, I should be inclined to give it to him. I declare that when I view the treaty of peace, and its consequences, I am afraid it will be imagined that the moderation of the British government in India has a strong resemblance to the ambition of other governments.

I do not know what Scindiah collected from the Rajpoots; but I ima-

give something not far short of 20 lacs of rupees, of which he has been deprived. If a Marhatta could sit down quietly, and establish a regular government, with a view to future prosperity, I should not despair of the peace. But unless Scindiah changes his nature, and that of a great proportion of his subjects, and dismisses a very large part of his army of horse (who must eat up more revenue than he can afford to pay them), and obliges the men to adopt habits of industry, which are entirely foreign to their nature, I do not see how the peace is to last. I rather believe now it would be a good measure to attack Holkar, in order to give Scindiah something to do, and to look forward to.

A letter is written by this day's post to Asseerghur, upon the subject of the complaints of the officer there. I enclose to you a copy of the letter sent to Guzerat, containing the orders for the surrender of the districts there, than which nothing can be more positive. I wrote to you fully, on the day before yesterday, respecting the 7th article of the treaty.

Your accounts ought to go to Bengal in the usual way. All my accounts go to Gen. Stuart, who lays them before government. This ought not to be the channel in which your accounts should go. Strachey will be here this day, and shall go on immediately with a guard.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Damungaum, 29th Jan. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 12th inst. Long before this you will have received particular details of all my proceedings in this quarter; as in my letter of the 11th inst., I have recapitulated all that has passed, and enclosed additional copies of my dispatches to the Governor General.

Nothing extraordinary has lately occurred. The Rajah of Berar has given up his unjust claim to the Soubah's territories east of the Wurda, and I have in consequence restored the fort of Gawilghur. Scindiah has been very busy plundering his own pindarries, and much progress has not been made in the negotiation of the treaty of defensive alliance; but I imagine that he is not disinclined to it.

Col. Haliburton must by this time have passed through the ghauts. He will remain to the northward of Jaffierabad for some time, until I can make arrangements for drawing off the captured guns from Adjuttee and Ellichpoor, and for removing the hospitals from those places. I have come to the southward, and am now between Ahmednuggur and Kurdlah, nearly at an equal distance from each place.

The banditti have begun to disperse, and those who remain collected are at too great a distance for me to attempt any thing upon them. But I have some hopes that I shall yet be able to strike a blow at them.

Col. Stevenson and I were obliged to use our brass 12 pounders at Gawilghur, and I am sorry to say that we broke the axle-trees of every carriage we had.

I enclose a copy of the only letter I have received from Gen. Lake, from which you will observe that the treaty of peace will secure all the objects which the Governor General had in view. If Narwar, which has been guaranteed to Ambajee Inglia, belongs to Scindiah, it must be given up, and Inglia must receive compensation from the conquered countries. I rather believe, however, that it belongs to the Peshwah.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 30th Jan. 1804.

After I had written to you yesterday, Goorparah came here; and I had a conversation with him on the subject of Gwalior. He said that accounts had been received that Gen. Lake had attacked that fort. I told him that those accounts were to be expected. He desired that I would give him a letter to Gen. Lake to cease his attack. I told him that such a letter would be useless, as it was probable that he would have possession of the fort long before the letter would reach him. Goorparah then desired that I should inform the General of the peace. I told him that I had done so already in quintuplicate, and had sent him copies of the treaty; and that as soon as he should receive any one of them, he would act in respect to Gwalior as the treaty would require. I then hinted to Goorparah that treaties had been made with many chiefs. We afterwards conversed about different other points, chiefly relating to the execution of the treaty in this part of the country, which was all settled to his satisfaction; and at last Goorparah said that the Maharajah had written to him, to desire that I should devise some mode of furnishing him with money. He said that the Maharajah was in the greatest distress, and he proposed that an advance should be made to him, on account of the money which was to be received out of the territories ceded in Hindustan.

I pointed out to Goorparah the meaning of the 7th article of the treaty, and showed that it was made only to avoid bringing distress upon individuals, and by no means to give an additional resource to Scindiah's government; and I observed that the consequence of giving Scindiah part of it would be, that the individuals, for whose benefit the article had been agreed to, would lose all the advantage expected from it, and would suffer the distress from which it was intended to relieve them. In answer to these objections, Goorparah said that Scindiah was to name the persons who were to receive these advantages, and might he not dispose of them as he may think proper? I told Goorparah that it was intended that he should name the persons who should suffer by the loss of their jaghires in Hindustan: but that if any of these persons should have behaved ill to the Maharajah, there would be no objection to his naming others; and that the revenues must be paid to persons in his service, and not allotted to his own use. Goorparah said that this was just and proper.

Goorparah then renewed the proposition for the loan of money. In answer, I told him that the Company had large revenues, certainly, but that the expenses also were numerous; that they supported several large armies, and the establishment of their great government; and that although they could always command money from their subjects and servants, they were not rich. I at the same time told him that the Company would not act in the quality of money lenders themselves, on any account; but that it was possible that if the Maharajah should make a proposition to you upon the subject, you might find means of obliging him. I said that this was only possible; and that even the possibility depended upon the orders you would receive upon the subject from the Governor General. I took this opportunity of saying that early measures might be adopted to settle the country, as the best mode of filling the Maharajah's treasury.

If you should think it advisable, for any reason, to assist these people with money, it is evident that the mortgage of the pension revenues must be out of the question. It is possible that you may be able to get in mortgage the Powanghur and Dohud territories. But you will observe by the enclosed account of their revenues, that they will not repay a very large loan. I got the paper, of which this is a copy, from Mr. Dunean this morning. The revenue of Dohud is not included, but it is very small.

I enclose the copy of a paper which I received this morning from Poonah. I am afraid that it is late to endeavor to stop these Frenchmen now. But I have given directions on the subject to Major Graham, as it is more than probable that, if they go to the northward, they must pass through his districts. There is no government in any other part of the country which could find them out: but besides Major Graham, I have written to Aurungabad, to Adjutec, and to Col. Haliburton in the Badowly ghaut, to watch these gentry, and to take them up, if they should pass near any of these places. You will do well to have an eye upon the proceedings of the durbar respecting them.

I have always thought the Rajah of Kolapoor a proper instrument for the French. His country is well situated for their designs. He has no money, it is true: but nobody has in India; and the choice of allies for the great nation must depend upon local situation, and upon means in troops, and good will or security towards the British government, and the system of order. Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your letter of the 21st. I have already given you my opinion about the regiment of infantry and the regiment of cavalry. I have also received your letter of the 24th. Mr. Strachey is arrived, and goes on to-morrow. He shall have an escort from the Hyderabad subsidiary force. I shall write hereafter about medical aid for Mr. Strachey. It is my opinion that Webbe will be appointed to that Residency. Mr. Strachey shall take 10,000 rupees to you. As for rice, if you should want more than you have got, Col. Haliburton, who is near the Badowly ghaut, will send you some. Not a line from Bengal for this age.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 30th Jan. 1804.

Since writing this morning I have received the enclosed, which has relieved my mind from great anxiety; also a copy of the treaty with Ambajee Inglia, which I send you.

We shall lose Gwalior, I am afraid; but Seindiah has taken us in about Dhoolpoor, Rajah Kerrah, and Baree, which, it appears by the enclosed, were in Ambajee's hands.

Holkar has had a correspondence with Gen. Lake, but there is nothing in it of any consequence. The General writes with confidence of the impossibility that Holkar should penetrate that way, and he says his army is in a state of mutiny.

I have another letter from Lord Wellesley, in which he mentions that the Court of Directors treat him ill, and that the ministers have informed Henry that they cannot support him against the Court. He approves of your going to Scindiah, and says that Webbe must go to Berar, but he

may alter this notion when he shall receive my subsequent letters. Return Lord Wellesley's letter.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 30th Jan. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 26th, upon the subject of the landing of 3 French officers in the Konkan; and I have taken measures to have them arrested, should they attempt to pass to the northward of Poonah, through the district under the management of Major Graham, or through the city of Aurungabad, or the Casserbarry, the Adjunter, or Badowly ghauts. I have also given notice of their landing to the acting Residents at the durbars of the Rajah of Berar and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I think it probable that their first communication will be with the Rajah of Kolapoor, and I recommend that you should endeavor to gain a knowledge of what is going on in the durbar of that Chief. He has lately renewed his attack upon the chiefs of the Putwurdun family, which is of little consequence, as both parties respect our communication, and the posts established to protect it. But the Rajah of Kolapoor is a likely person to make himself the medium of communication between the French and the northern Marhatta chiefs.

I have also received your letter of the 24th inst., and it is very satisfactory to me to find that the Peshwah is likely to adopt the measures which I have recommended, as most likely to lead to a settlement of his government. His Highness has not stated the names of the persons included in the list No. 1, who, he says, are not the servants of Amrut Rao; and, therefore, I can say nothing regarding them, excepting that I think it would be best to release the whole of them.

I beg you to inform the Peshwah, that I have got from Amrut Rao orders to his servants to evacuate all the Peshwah's forts and territories, which I will deliver to whomsoever he will appoint to receive them, when I shall hear that the persons mentioned in the list No. 1 are released from confinement, and their families, houses, and properties restored to them.

In respect to the fort of Poonadur, I apprised Lieut. Col. Close, at an early period, that it would be necessary to pay the arrears of the garrison, amounting to 50,000 rupees; and that the killadar should be allowed to move away with their property to a British garrison. This condition must be likewise complied with; but if the Peshwah should not have the means of paying this expense at present, we must advance the money, and it can be repaid in the same manner as the advance made to Goklah and Appah Dessaye.

In respect to Loghur, I beg you to apprise the Peshwah's ministers, that I cannot attempt to induce the killadar to give up that fort, unless his Highness should consent to allow the widow of Nana Furnavees to go away, as well as all the other persons mentioned in your letter. I can easily conceive, that to have allowed this lady to reside at Bombay might have been attended by dangerous or inconvenient consequences formerly; but under present circumstances, when the Peshwah is closely allied with the British government, he can have nothing to apprehend from her being used as a means of intrigue, either by that government or by any other person. The Peshwah should be made to understand, that the British

government feel for the honor, the security, and the prosperity of his government, in the same manner as they do for that of the Company; that they are too strong to render it necessary that they should have recourse to intrigues to overturn his government, if they should wish it, which is by no means likely; and that, on the other hand, their strength will always protect him from the effects of the intrigues among his relations and subjects, which he had heretofore so much reason to apprehend.

I am glad to see that the Peshwah has determined, at last, to make arrangements to take possession of and settle his countries. It is necessary, however, that we should proceed with caution in this business, as the Peshwah's territories are much intermixed with those of the Soubah of the Deccan, of Holkar, and of Scindiah; and it will not answer to allow the Peshwah's amildars to be the judges of the right of possession of each of those powers and chiefs. This will be the case, if their requisitions for assistance are not accurately examined, and the assistance given confined entirely to the demand. Accordingly, I beg leave to recommend the following rules for the consideration of the Resident. He will, of course, ascertain exactly the object which is required, who is the present possessor, in whom is the right, &c.; and he will give directions that the assistance may be given accordingly: 2ndly, that the commanding officer of the troops should have positive orders, on no account whatever to give to a greater extent than will be specified in the orders he will receive; and that he should give information to the Resident, if he should observe that the amildars take possession of districts which do not belong to the Peshwah. This last clause is particularly necessary, as the amildars will be very likely to take advantage of the presence of the British troops, to seize and plunder many districts to which the Peshwah has no right whatever. According to the principles above suggested, I should wish, before I detach troops to assist the Peshwah's amildars, to receive from you a particular statement of the objects which it is intended this assistance should require.

I have the honor to enclose copies of letters which I have written to Narsing Kundee Rao, and Kundee Rao Rastia, in answer to letters from those persons, on the subject of my interference in favor of Narsing Kundee Rao, at Scindiah's durbar. The communications of all these persons, or of the Peshwah, through any channel, excepting that of the Resident, are very irregular, and must occasion inconvenience. I have, therefore, written fully upon that subject to Kundee Rao Rastia, and have taken this opportunity of alluding to the necessity of settling the country.

I have the honor to inform you, that I have made arrangements for discharging Amrut Rao's troops, when their month of service shall have expired. Amrut Rao will reside, for the present, at Bingar, under the guns of the fort of Ahmednuggur.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 31st Jan. 1804.

After I had closed my dispatch to you yesterday, Goklah called upon me, accompanied by the person who, I before apprised you, passed himself in this camp as the accredited agent of the Peshwah, and is, I believe, the brother of Suddashee Munkaiseer. He said that he had some papers to



send to me, upon which he wished to have my answer. I then told him that I was very desirous that the Peshwah would be so kind as to communicate to the British Resident what he had to say to me, and intimated that I could give no regular answer to any thing that came to my knowledge in that irregular manner. This person, however, persisted in reading a long paper upon the subject of the former disturbances in the Marhatta Empire; and I told him that the best answer I could give him to that paper would be to read a letter which I had written to Kundee Rao Rastia, a copy of which was enclosed in my letter of yesterday. He said that Kundee Rao Rastia must not be informed of his communication, and that my letter did not contain any answer to the point on which he was instructed to procure information. I begged him to state what that point was. He then went into a long history of the injuries the Peshwah had received from Amrut Rao; and said that he had obliged the Peshwah to ally himself with the English, and asked whether the English now intended to pass those injuries unnoticed, or to put Amrut Rao in the Peshwah's power? In answer, I told him that it was impossible I could believe that he had been deputed by his Highness the Peshwah to put such a question to me; and that, at all events, whether he had been so deputed or not, I should not answer such a question, so put; nor, until I should know who he was, should I hold any communication with him whatever: and I then called for beetel, and dismissed him from my tent. After he was gone, I explained to Goklah the particulars of the letter of the 24th, which I had received from you, and pointed out the inconsistency of the questions put to me by Munkaiseer's brother, with the arrangements entered into by the Peshwah at Poonah.

I have to request that you will apprise the Peshwah's ministers of these circumstances; and that you will communicate to them my earnest entreaty that they will send me the Peshwah's orders through the British Resident; but if his Highness should think proper to communicate with me through one of his own servants, I request that the person he will send to me may have some authority. It will also be desirable that his communications should be consistent with those which I may receive from the British Resident.

I wrote to you yesterday on the subject of the fort of Poonadur. It is absolutely necessary that the arrears should be paid to the troops. But the sum required may be advanced by the British government. Suddasheo Munkaiseer has written to me upon the subject of assisting the Peshwah's amildars to the southward, and I propose, in answer, to refer him to you. I think that the Peshwah might now be assisted in obtaining possession of the southern countries; but when you write to Major Gen. Campbell upon the subject, I recommend that you should adhere to the rules proposed in my letter of yesterday; and that you should take care not to interfere with the Putwurdun, the Rajah of Kolapoor, or Goklah. I shall write to Gen. Campbell, and let him know that you will apply to him upon the occasion.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp, 31st Jan. 1804.

The Peshwah's minister has written to me, to direct that I would entreat

you to assist his Highness' amildars in taking possession of his countries situated on the Toombuddra, &c. I have written to the Resident at Poonah, to request he will be so kind as to ascertain exactly what the objects are which his Highness wishes to acquire in the southern countries, and to acquaint you with them, and urge your assistance in putting the Peshwah's amildar in possession.

I have requested the Resident at Poonah to be very cautious respecting the rights of the Rajah of Kolapoor, of the Putwurdun, and Goklah, and other great jaghiredars in the southern districts; and to give you the most accurate information respecting the particular objects to which he will be desirous to direct your attention. I know the Peshwah and his ministers, and the character of every Marhatta amildar, sufficiently well to be very certain that they would not scruple to involve the British government in another war, were it only to get possession of, and plunder, one village. It is, therefore, very necessary that we should proceed with all this caution.

I have passed the Godavery, and have come to the southward, with a view to check the banditti upon the Nizam's frontier; and I am now encamped between Kurdlah and Ahmednuggur. They have already begun to disperse, and I imagine that in a few days none will remain. The Nizam's subsidiary force is still to the northward.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 31st Jan. 1804.

I received yesterday your letter of the 25th, after I had closed my dispatches, and could not get the treaty with the Rajah of Jeypoor copied in time. I now send it to you. If he has written to Seindiah, you see he has deceived him, or is deceiving us.

If the news writer of whom you speak is Mirza Wahed Beg, I recommend you to have nothing to do with him. I shall recollect what you say about Kawder Nawaz Khan.

If Seindiah pushes you on the subject of money, you might possibly get Dhoolpoor, Rajah Kerrah, and Barce in a mortgage. Upon considering the subject of the pensions, I think that 14 or 15 lacs of rupees may be more than will be necessary to lay out in that manner; and we might give a part to Seindiah himself, possibly a third; as I rather believe that some of the persons in the list, who have lost their serinjaumy lands, have joined us already. However, do you arrange this matter as you think best. It will not be a bad plan to bribe the prince, as well as his ministers.

I have discharged Amrut Rao's horse. He goes to Bingar. I thus get rid of a very large expense in camp. Webb was to leave Hurryhur about the 27th. Strachey went away this morning.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 31st Jan. 1804.

The Governor General has received a letter from Henry, in which Henry informs him that he had had a long conversation with Mr. Addington on the subject of the support which the Governor General was to expect from ministers hereafter, in which Mr. Addington said plainly that they could not support the Governor General against the Court of

Directors. Mr. Addington talked in strong terms of the services of the Governor General, but, almost in the same breath, he told Henry that, as his private friend, he could not advise him to stay beyond the year 1803. The Governor General has asked my opinion what he ought to do, and writes of staying till December. I have told him that it is obvious that ministers are not more desirous than the Court of Directors that he should remain in office; and that, if he remains one moment beyond the first opportunity that will offer for his going home, allowing a reasonable time to wind up his government, and the affairs at the end of the war, he will be ordered to resign the government to Sir G. Barlow; and that in this manner greater injury will be done to his character, and to the public cause, than could result from the failure of all his plans, supposing that to be certain. I have, therefore, recommended him to fix the 1st Oct. for the period of his departure, and to apprise the ministers that he would go at an earlier period, if the season should permit. He referred to my opinion upon several points connected with the Residences. I have recommended him to send you home; to appoint Webbe to Scindiah's durbar (which, by the bye, he desired me to offer to you), and Elphinstone to Nagpoor; and to make the arrangement for Mysore, which we agreed was the best, supposing that you were not able to go back. I expect a duplicate of the Governor General's letter, which I shall send you. I have not time to copy that which I have written to him; but this letter contains the outline of it, and I will show you, when we meet, the copy which I have taken in the press. I have recommended the Governor General to send you to England from Bombay.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 1st Feb. 1804.

In answer to that part of your letter of the 29th Jan., relative to Narsing Kundee Rao's claims in Malwa, I have to request that, in future, after having ascertained the nature of such claims, you will state them yourself to Major Malcolm, or the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar.

*The D.A.G. to Major J. G. Graham.*

Camp, 1st Feb. 1804.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Ameer ool Omrah, the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, has represented to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley that certain villages in the pergunnah of Bheer were long ago granted in enaum to Gooroojie, the Maharah's Peer, and that they were lately taken possession of by you in the name of the Company, and requested that they might be restored to the Peer, viz.:

The General requests that you will send choire chitties for these several villages to camp to be given into Goorparah's hands, that the Peer may report to his master that he has obtained the restoration of his enaums through the representation of the vakeel.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, Chob Neemgaum, 2nd Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th Jan. I have no doubt whatever but that the building which has been taken, and used as a native hospital at Baroach, is the property of Senhor de Sousa. However, the inquiry, which it is probable that the Hon. the Governor in Council will have ordered into that point, will ascertain it to the satisfaction of every body. If it should turn out that the building is

Senhor de Sousa's property, I hope that the Hon. the Governor in Council will give orders that it may be restored to him, and that he may have a reasonable compensation for the use the Hon. Company have had of it.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 2nd Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 22nd Jan. I have heard nothing about Houghton. The freebooters are off. The Nizam's killadar and amildars have behaved upon this occasion with their usual fortitude and good sense, in paying their contributions at the moment at which they heard that I had arrived in the country to give them assistance.

I have a letter from Webbe, who had not quitted Hurrayhur on the 25th Jan. Lord W. Bentinck has written to him, that he thinks there will be a vacancy in the Council at Fort St. George, in which case he intends to call him (Webbe) to fill it. This is pleasant news for Fort St. George and its dependencies, but not very pleasant for affairs in this quarter.

I enclose a paper which I have received from Mr. Frissell, on the subject of Narsing Kundec Rao's claims in Malwa. I wish that, if possible, you would arrange this matter for Narsing Kundec Rao. The Peshwah positively denies that he desired Scindiah to seize his jaghire. However, the discussions upon this subject must of course be postponed, till other matters are settled. I have no doubt about the hostage you mention: they gave a bond for a valuable consideration, viz., a whole skin, and they ought to discharge it. Bonds given, or hostages taken, to make good contributions, stand upon entirely different grounds.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 2nd Feb. 1804.

In answer to your letter of the 12th Jan., I have to tell you that I entirely approve of your having ordered Capt. — to Bombay, and I trust that Major Gen. Nicolls will order him to join his corps in Europe.

In answer to your letter of the 14th Jan., I have to observe, that we cannot expect that Canojee will give up his followers; or that, if he should be willing to give them up, he will have the power to do so. If Canojee should himself reside under the Company's protection, and in a place sub-

G. O.

Camp at Choh Neemgaum, Thursday, 2nd Feb. 1804.

The following corps to march to-morrow morning under the orders of Major Gen. Wellesley:

All the cavalry, the 74th regt., the 1st batt. 8th regt., 150 pioneers, and 100 men from each batt. of Native infantry. Men must be picked for this service who have some means of carrying their baggage besides placing it on their backs: two 6 pounders, 2 brass 12 pounders, with their ammunition.

Capt. Nagle is to proceed in command of the details of Native infantry. The remainder of the division will halt under the command of Lieut. Col. Wallace.

The sick of the corps named to be left with the army. Mr. Gilmour will provide medical attendance for them.

300 bullock loads of rice to be sent with this detachment, and 10 Company's carts with arrack, each drawn by 6 bullocks. Rice, salt, &c., for the Europeans in proportion; double sets of bullocks to go to carry the rice, and to draw the arrack, guns, and ordnance carriages.

The staff, excepting the D. A. G., to accompany Major Gen. Wellesley.

The corps which are to march, which have not received their pay for last month, are to send this evening to get money on account of their abstracts.

The general will beat at 5, the assembly at 6 o'clock, for the troops ordered to march. The infantry will close up to the left of the cavalry before assembly beating.

The troops will march by the right.

ject to their power, there is little to apprehend from his followers. They must disperse, and they no longer can do any mischief. I am, therefore, of opinion, that it is not necessary to require that Canojee should give up his followers. As the Guickwar government will necessarily have to pay a part, if not the whole, of the expense attending this arrangement with Canojee, you will take care to conduct it in concert with Major Walker.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Morgan, 1st batt. 2nd regt.*

Camp, 3rd Feb. 1804.

You will receive orders from Capt. Lucas to join a party of Mysore horse and infantry, which will pass Ahmednuggur to-morrow or next day, on their return to the Mysore country. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will proceed with those troops until you have passed the Malpoorba river at Sungoly, when you will pursue such route as the information which you will obtain there of the situation of the division of the army under Major Gen. Campbell will point out, as the safest and shortest for rejoining your corps.

You will indent for as much rice before leaving Ahmednuggur, at the rate of half a seer per man daily, as the company, &c., can carry conveniently; and you ought to write by tappall to the officer commanding your battalion, to inform him of the orders you have received, and request him to send you notice from time to time, to the care of Lieut. Christie, commanding at Sungoly, of the position occupied by Gen. Campbell, and the safest route for you to join.

The drafts which left this division with you must proceed with you, according to the original orders issued concerning them.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Haliburton, commy. subsidiary force.*

Camp, 3rd Feb. 1804.

Mr. Strachey, belonging to the Residency at Poonah, is on his way to the durbar of Dowlat Rao Scindiah, on public service, and left this division on the 31st ult., escorted by a company of Native infantry, commanded by Lieut. Fenwick. He will take your camp in his way; and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will order a company of Native infantry, under a European officer, to relieve Lieut. Fenwick, and to proceed with Mr. Strachey to his destination.

Major Malcolm has a company of sepoys with him, which went provided with a considerable quantity of rice; and if the Major resolves on leaving the Maharajah's durbar on Mr. Strachey's arrival there, he will be able to leave some rice for the company which escorts that gentleman; or, if the Major continues at the durbar, he will send back one of the companies, in which case also there will be a surplus of rice for the company which remains there: therefore the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley is of opinion that if the company, which you will detach with Mr. Strachey, be paid up to the 1st inst., and be served with as much grain as the men can carry, one month's pay advanced to the officer commanding it, and 20 days' grain carried on bullocks, will be sufficient.

*The D.A.G. to Major Graham.*

Camp, 3rd Feb. 1804.

The General marched this morning with our cavalry, the Mysore, Goklah's, and Appah Dessaye's horse, and the 74th regt., 1st batt. 8th, and 500 men of the other Native corps, to do all the mischief possible to thieves collected under Mulwa Dada, the Ncemgaum man, Ghautky, and others, who have retired towards Perinda. He thinks it probable that they may disperse and endeavor to get round him, and so off to the northward; and he has left instructions with Col. Wallace to be ready to fall upon any party that may come within reach of him, or may halt any where within a forced march or two; and in order that the Colonel may have the earliest information of any such parties, the General desired me to request that you would instantly dispatch messengers to every place north of Perinda where you have authority, influence, or correspondence, with orders to forward such information to some man whom you will send to this camp to receive their reports, and communicate continually with the peaceable inhabitants.

Give the man whom you will depute hither a line to me, and tell him that he

shall be well rewarded, if he will procure an opportunity to this party to give the rogues a bawling.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 6 coss N.W. from Perinda, 4th Feb. 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your official letter of the 1st inst. The Peshwah's conduct is certainly very extraordinary. What can he mean by staying away from Poonah for such a length of time, at such a crisis? and by delaying all business, however important to him, till he shall return and see me? It occurs to me, that his object is to avoid to see me altogether. The change of the moon will not be till the 11th, and he must have expected my arrival at Poonah long before that period. It is probable, now, that I shall not arrive there till after it. But he could not have known that, and he must have determined to stay away in order to avoid seeing me. If this conjecture be correct, it will answer no purpose to endeavor to see his Highness; and if I should succeed in being admitted to an audience, I shall do no good. I have for some time been of opinion, that the sooner I should withdraw from the country the better, which opinion is now confirmed. But I should be sorry to take any step of this kind, without the opinion of those more interested in the question than I can be. Accordingly, I should wish to know from you and Col. Close, if he should be well enough to give an opinion, what you think upon this subject.

I am convinced that the Peshwah is desirous not to see me, because he thinks that I shall urge him to adopt the measures recommended in respect to Amrut Rao, and that he stays at Wahy in order to avoid this meeting. If this be the case, surely it is better that I should not go to Poonah at all.

Instructions for the Captain of the day.

4th Feb. 1804.

You will march at one in the morning, on the high road to Perinda, with the baggage, &c. of the detachment. The company of the 1st of the 8th, now on piquet, is to be the rear guard of the baggage. On your arrival at Perinda, you will send the accompanying letter to the killadar, and desire him to point out a place in which you can secure the baggage. You will then endeavor to procure forage and water for the cattle; but will be prepared to move as soon as you shall receive orders from me. You will of course halt occasionally on the road, to allow the baggage to keep up with you, but you will not allow it to get before you. Guides are sent herewith.

The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Colman, Poonah.

4th Feb. 1804.

I have laid your letter of the 31st ult. before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, and am directed by him to inform you that the hired bullocks which brought up rice from Poonah to camp, were sent off from Aurungabad on the 10th of Jan., to make the best of their way through a clear country to Poonah. That it is usual to pay the owners of cattle in such circumstances the hire of their cattle while returning to their homes at the rate of 15 miles per day, consequently the owners of these bullocks ought to be paid for them to the 20th of Jan. inclusive.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Munkaiscer, 5th Feb. 1804.

After I had crossed the Godavery, and made one or two marches to the

southward, I agreed to give cowle to the chiefs who commanded the bands of freebooters who had carried on the operations on the western frontier of the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, on the condition of their dismissing their troops, and coming into my camp within 5 days, and I had some reason to believe that they would act as I had desired; but, upon the expiration of the term fixed for their arrival in my camp, viz., the 2nd inst., finding that they had not come in, and that their troops were still assembled in the Soubah's territories, between Perinda and Toljapoor, I determined to endeavor to cut them off. They were at the distance of 80 miles from my camp, and there was some reason to hope that I might surprise them by making forced marches.

I began my march on the 4th, in the morning, with the British cavalry, the 74th regt., the 1st batt. 8th regt., and 500 men belonging to the other Native corps in my camp, and the Mysore and Marhatta cavalry. On my arrival at Sailgaon, near Perinda, after a march of 20 miles, I learnt that the enemy had broken up from their camp at Vyerag, and were come nearer Perinda, and that at that time they were not farther from me than 24 miles. I therefore marched again last night with an intention to attack their camp at daylight this morning.

Unfortunately, the road was very bad, and we did not arrive here till 9 in the morning. The enemy had received intelligence of my approach, and I am sorry to say that I have every reason to believe that they received it from persons in my own camp: their camp was struck, and they had begun their march to their rear when I arrived. I followed them, however, with the British cavalry, in one column, acting upon the right of their rear, while the Mysore and Marhatta cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, Goklah, and Appah Dessaye, pursued the centre and left. The enemy formed a large body of cavalry, apparently with an intention to cover the retreat of their guns and baggage, which were falling into our hands, and I formed the British cavalry in two lines to attack them. I followed them in this order from height to height, as long as I could see any of them collected. In this advance, some horse and infantry were cut up, and the whole of the enemy's guns, ammunition, bazaars, and baggage, fell into our hands.

The Mysore cavalry under Bistnapah Pundit, and the Marhatta cavalry under Goklah, were engaged with the enemy on the right of the British cavalry, and killed great numbers of them, and these troops also followed them as long as they could see any collected. Upon the whole, although I have reason to believe that the chiefs have escaped, the result of this day is the complete defeat of a numerous and formidable band of freebooters, who were the terror of the country, were daily increasing in numbers, and had already defeated a body of the Soubah's troops, and had taken from them the guns which I have retaken. I do not think that they will venture, or indeed that they can collect again, as they have lost every thing which could enable them to subsist when collected. The troops bear with the utmost cheerfulness the extraordinary fatigue of this short, but active expedition.\* The infantry under Major Swinton, of the 74th regt., ar-

\* This expedition has often been remarked by the Duke of Wellington as the greatest march he ever made.

rived at the point of attack at the same time with the cavalry; but from the nature of the action, they could not co-operate further in it than by moving into the enemy's former camp, which they did with great regularity.

The advance of the British cavalry, when formed, was in the best order, and very rapid, notwithstanding the fatigue to which both men and horses had been exposed for the last 24 hours. Our loss, of which I enclose a return, is but small. I have given the 4 guns which we have taken to the killadar of Perinda, who lost them about 6 weeks ago.

Return of the killed, wounded, and missing of the troops under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the action near Munkaiseer, on the 5th Feb. 1804.

H. M.'s 19th Lt. dragoons	wounded	Jemidar.	R. and F.	Horses.
4th regt. Native cavalry	wounded	1	—	1
5th do.	killed	—	1	—
7th do.	killed	—	—	1
Total		1	3	5

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Munkaiseer, 5th Feb. 1804.

I this morning attacked in this neighbourhood, and defeated and dispersed, a formidable band of freebooters, who have been for some time on this frontier.

I left my camp on the 3rd, about 30 miles s.e. from Ahmednuggur, and I arrived by forced marches at Sailgaon, near Perinda, on the 4th. I there heard that the enemy were at this place, 24 miles from me, and although I had marched 20 miles that morning, I determined to march on in the night. The road was very bad, and till one o'clock the night was very dark, and we made but little progress. The consequence was that we did not arrive till 9 in the morning, instead of at daylight. The enemy had received intelligence of my approach; I believe from my own camp. They had struck their camp and had begun their march, but were still in sight. I pursued them with the cavalry, cut up some, and took all their guns, baggage, bazaar, &c., and followed them as long as they remained collected. I had with me the cavalry, the 74th regt., the 1st of the 8th, and 500 men from the other regiments.

The camp is at Neemgaum, where I left it on the 3rd. The infantry were up with the cavalry when we advanced to the attack. The Marhatta and Mysore horse were very active, and got much booty. Our loss is trifling. I shall send you a regular account of this expedition, as soon as it can be made out.

To the Hon. H. Wellesley. Camp, 40 miles n.e. from Ahmednuggur, 24th Jan. 1804.\*

I have not written to you, I believe, since I sent you the account of the battle which I fought at Assye on the 23rd Sept. last, although many interesting events have occurred since that time; but the fact is, that I have not had leisure; and I knew that you would learn these events from the public dispatches. I propose, however, in this letter to give you an

\* This letter, although dated 24th Jan., was not finished until the 5th Feb., and is placed accordingly.



outline of our operations in this part of India, which have ended in treaties of peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

After the battle of Assye, those two Chiefs fled into Candeish with their armies in great confusion; Scindiah's in particular was almost entirely disorganized, and vast numbers deserted him. Col. Stevenson followed them down the Adjuttee ghaut. They fled to the Taptee, along which river they marched to the westward. As soon as I had placed my numerous wounded in security, I marched with my division to Adjuttee, and ordered Col. Stevenson to advance towards Burhampoor, and levy a contribution upon that city, and to lay siege to Asseerghur.

Upon my arrival at Adjuttee, I found that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had quitted the Taptee, and had moved to the southward, apparently with an intention of passing out of Candeish through the hills situated north of the Godavery, and of invading the territories of the Peshwah or the Nizam, and all the remains of the defeated infantry had been sent across the Taptee towards Hindustan. This movement was intended to divert my attention from the siege of Asseerghur; or, if I should persevere in that operation, the confederates would have invaded the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and would have entirely destroyed the rich provinces of the latter, upon which I depended for resources of grain to enable me to carry on the war, and would, at all events, have cut off or impeded the communication which I had with Poonah and Bombay by Ahmednuggur. I therefore determined to leave the siege of Asseerghur to Col. Stevenson's division, and to march myself to the southward, in order to follow the motions of the confederates.

On the 11th Oct., I arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, and there remained till the 15th. On that night I received most accurate accounts of the disposition of the enemy's army, from which I was of opinion that they intended to move upon Col. Stevenson, in order to interrupt the siege of Asseerghur, and I returned immediately towards Adjuttee. I arrived there on the 18th, and descended the ghaut into Candeish on the 19th. Scindiah, who had returned to the northward, then halted his army at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, within three marches of Burhampoor.

Col. Stevenson arrived on the 15th at Burhampoor, of which place he took possession; he marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, drove in the enemy, and took possession of the pettah on the 18th, by which means he had a fine situation from whence to carry on his attack against the fort; he broke ground on the 19th, and the fort surrendered on the 21st. I did not receive intelligence of the surrender, on which I could depend, until the 24th, in the evening; and at the same time I learnt that the Rajah of Berar, who had separated from Scindiah when he had marched to the northward for the relief of Asseerghur, had passed through the hills which form the southern boundary of Candeish, and was then encamped between the hills and the river Godavery. There was no longer any reason for remaining below the ghauts, and I therefore determined to re-ascend them. I sent orders to Col. Stevenson to re-equip his division for the siege of Gawilghur, in Berar, from the stores in Asseerghur; and while he was making the necessary arrangements for that purpose, to

watch the motions of Scindiah's army, and prevent him from undertaking any thing of importance.

I arrived at Adjunttee, on the top of the ghaut, on the 25th, marched on the following days to the southward, and passed Aurrungabad on the 29th. The Rajah of Berar, in the usual style of a Marhatta, had spent his time, after he had come out of Candeish, in plundering the country, and negotiating with Amrut Rao, who was encamped on the Godavery, to induce that Chief to join him. The Rajah was still, on the 29th, between Aurrungabad and the Godavery, and I hoped to have been able to attack him. He marched, however, on the night of the 29th, and between that time and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which I was in his neighbourhood, he marched with his camp five times. On the 31st, in the morning, he detached a body of 5000 horse to attack a large convoy on its march from the southward to join the troops on the frontier, the arrival of which had been delayed by the obstinacy of the officer who commanded, before it crossed the Godavery, and which river it crossed only on the 30th. The Rajah's troops were beat off with considerable loss, and the convoy joined me in safety on the 1st Nov.

The necessity of taking care of this convoy was unfortunate. If I had not been under the necessity of directing the movements of the troops in such a manner as to protect it, at the same time that I pushed the Rajah, I should have had it in my power to have destroyed him between the 29th and 31st Oct. But all the subsequent solid operations of the war depended upon the arrival of that convoy, and it was more important to secure it, than to gain a victory over a body of horse; in the attempt to obtain which I might have failed, and then I should have lost the convoy.

The troops had now been in march nearly every day, from the beginning of October, and it was necessary to give them some rest. Accordingly, I left the Rajah to go off to the eastward, towards Berar, and I halted till the 4th, in the neighbourhood of Umber.

Immediately after the battle of Assye, I had received from the confederates a variety of propositions tending to the commencement of negotiations for peace: they were all made in the usual Marhatta style, in such a manner, that it was possible either to deny that they had been made, or to continue the negotiations founded upon them, as it might suit the interests of the confederates. In answer to them all, I said that if the confederates, or either of them, wished for peace, they might send a vakeel to my camp with proper powers, who should be received with the respect due to his rank and character; and that I would listen with attention to what he might have to communicate, and would give him a distinct answer.

The result of the different propositions, and a variety of messages, was, that on the 6th Nov., a vakeel from Scindiah arrived in camp. His name was Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a nephew of the celebrated Morari Rao. He was received with due respect, but when we began business, it was found that he had no powers, and then we came again to a stand. However, I allowed him to remain in camp for a few days, till he should receive his powers, which shortly afterwards arrived. In the mean time, Amrut Rao, with whom, I believe I before informed you, I had made a treaty in

August, joined me on the 12th Nov. According to the Marhatta custom, after making this treaty, he had waited to see which of the parties was likely to succeed in the war; and he had not decided this question in his own mind, till after the battle of Assye and its consequence, the fall of Asseerghur. As soon as Goorparah received his full powers, the first measure he proposed was a suspension of hostilities between the confederates and me. I refused to suspend hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, but agreed to suspend them with Scindiah, in the Deccan and Guzerat, upon certain conditions, which appear in the treaty of which I enclose a copy. My reasons for agreeing to this treaty were:

1st; I had, in fact, at that moment, no means of annoying Scindiah. I had defeated and destroyed his army, and taken every thing from him which he had in the Deccan. I could not carry the war into Hindustan till I should have secured the Rajah of Berar.

2ndly; He might do me a great injury, and materially impede my operations in Berar, either by assisting the Rajah with his army of horse which still remained, or by a diversion such as the Rajah had made for him, viz., an irruption into the Nizam's or Peshwah's territories.

3rdly; I could do him no injury on the side of Guzerat; the troops there were not sufficiently strong, or well organized, or equipped; and in that most important point in a war with the Marhattas, our attention was taken up by a domestic contest with a member of the Guickwar family. On the other hand, Scindiah had collected a numerous body of defeated infantry, cavalry, &c., at Ougein; and their advance into Guzerat would have been attended by unpleasant consequences.

4thly; By making the suspension of arms with Scindiah only, and by including in the treaty arrangements for the continuation of hostilities with the Rajah of Berar, I, in fact, dissolved the confederacy in the very best manner in which I could dissolve it; and Scindiah left the Rajah to our mercy.

I concluded this treaty on the 23rd Nov. While all this was going on, I was advancing gradually towards Berar, and pushing the Rajah before me to the eastward, and annoying his rear with my Mysore horse.

Towards the middle of November, Col. Stevenson had completed all his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, and was enabled to quit Burhampoor. He marched up the valley of the Poorna river to Ballapoor in Berar, where he arrived on the 23rd, and he was joined on the 24th by the convoy which had been saved from the Rajah of Berar by Capt. Baynes' affair at Umber, on the 31st Oct., and my march to the southward. As soon as I found that the Rajah of Berar's march was decided, I determined to go into Berar to support and cover Col. Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur. Scindiah had moved to the eastward in front of Col. Stevenson, and towards the end of November had encamped in the neighbourhood of an army commanded by Vincatjee Bhoonslah, the brother of the Rajah of Berar, consisting of the greater number, if not the whole, of the Rajah's regular infantry and artillery, and a large body of cavalry. Thus, in the end of November, no less than 4 armies were assembled in Berar. A happy circumstance for the Rajah, who is supposed to have planned the confederacy.

The united armies of Scindiah and Vineatjee Bhoonslah were between Col. Stevenson and the fort of Gawilghur, and it was necessary to beat them before the siege of that fort could be undertaken. Col. Stevenson and I joined on the 29th Nov., at Parterly, about 17 miles north of the Poorna river, and I attacked the enemy that afternoon on the plains of Argaum, about 6 miles from that village, and gained a complete victory with but small loss on our side, having taken from them all their cannon, ammunition, &c., numbers of elephants, camels, quantities of baggage, &c. From unavoidable circumstances, we did not begin the action till late in the day, and not more than 20 minutes' sun remained when I led on the British cavalry to the charge: but they made up for it by continuing the pursuit by moonlight; and all the troops were under arms till a very late hour in the night. I do not send the detailed account of this action; I think it probable that you will have received it before you get this letter.

It was an extraordinary and fortunate circumstance, that after Col. Stevenson and I had been separated for above 2 months, at a distance of nearly 300 miles, I should have joined him on the very morning of this engagement; and that, in order to enable me to join him, he was not obliged to halt more than one day. But the operations of this war have afforded numerous instances of improvement in our means of communication, of obtaining intelligence, and, above all, of movement. Marches, such as I have made in this war, were never known or thought of before. In the last 8 days of the month of October, I marched above 120 miles, and passed through 2 ghauts with heavy guns, and all the equipments of the troops, and this without injury to the efficiency of the army; and in the few days previous to this battle, when I had determined to go into Berar, I never moved less than between 17 and 20 miles, and I marched 26 miles on the day on which it was fought.

After the battle at Argaum, I moved on the 1st Dec. with the 2 divisions in 2 columns, towards Gawilghur. I arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th, and established there an hospital for the wounded in the battle of Argaum. On the 7th, both divisions moved to take up the ground for the siege of Gawilghur. Col. Stevenson's division, which had been equipped for the siege of Asseerghur, was destined to make the principal attack on the northern face; while that under my immediate command, with all the cavalry (British and Native), should cover the siege, and co-operate with Col. Stevenson as far as might be practicable, by attacks to the southward and westward. The march of Col. Stevenson's division through the mountains, to the northern face of the fort, was one of the most difficult, and, in the success of the execution, extraordinary operations I have ever witnessed. All the heavy ordnance and store carriages were dragged by hand by the troops over high mountains, through valleys and ravines, for nearly 30 miles from Ellichpoor, by roads made by themselves with a laborious exertion to which I did not think they were equal. They were enabled to break ground on the 12th, and on the same night I commenced an attack upon the southern face.

On the 15th, in the morning, Col. Stevenson had effected a breach in the outer walls of the fort, and we determined to storm. While he

attacked the breaches on the northern wall, the infantry of my division were to attack the western and southern gates. There remained a third wall, which had not been breached, and this the troops escalated, and we were shortly in possession of the place. Our loss on this occasion was not great, but that of the enemy was immense. The killadar, all the principal officers, and the greater part of the garrison were killed.

During the siege, the negotiations for peace were going on briskly, particularly with the Rajah of Berar's vakeel, who had arrived in camp on the day after the battle of Argaum. I concluded a treaty of peace with him, of which I enclose you a copy, on the 16th Dec., and signed it on the following morning, previous to my march towards Nagpoor, in order to keep alive the impressions under which it was evident that it had been concluded.

I halted, after making 3 marches towards Nagpoor; as I found that the Rajah would ratify the treaty, and I saw that if I marched forward I should destroy his government entirely. I received the ratification on the 23rd Dec.

You will have observed, that after I had concluded the treaty for suspending hostilities with Scindiah, I had fought his army at Argaum on the 29th Nov. At that time he had not ratified the treaty, and he had not performed any one of its stipulations; and I gave notice to his vakeels that I should attack him if I should meet his army. After the battle he did ratify the treaty, but he did not perform the condition which required that he should go to the eastward of Ellichpoor. However, he did not interfere in the siege of Gawilghur, and did not take advantage of my being employed in that operation, to attack the Peshwah or the Nizam.

As soon as he found that the Rajah of Berar had made peace, he began to be a little alarmed respecting his own situation; and the negotiations for peace with his vakeels, in which no great progress had been made, then took a favorable turn.

On the 23rd, the day on which I received the Rajah's ratification of his treaty, Scindiah's 2 principal ministers, Eitul Punt and moonshee Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp to conclude the treaty of peace. On the same day I gave them notice, that, on the 27th, if the treaty of peace should not then be concluded, hostilities would no longer be suspended; and on the 24th I returned to the westward, and joined Col. Stevenson (who had only then come out of the mountains from Gawilghur), on the 26th, to the westward of Ellichpoor.

On the 28th I concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah's ministers, which I signed at one in the morning of the 30th; and on the 5th Jan. I received Scindiah's ratification of the treaty. I enclose a copy of this treaty, and copies of my letters to the Governor General upon this treaty, and that with the Rajah of Berar.

I have now brought you from the battle of Assye to the conclusion of peace, and my hand is almost tired; but I have other circumstances to mention to you, and if I do not continue now, it is possible that I may be delayed for another week before I shall be able to finish this epistle, the first page of which was written, as it appears, on the 24th Jan., and the remainder on the 1st Feb.

Since the peace I have marched to the southward, and am now encamped between Ahmednuggur and Kurdlah. A banditti were on this frontier, whom I intended to destroy, but they have dispersed, and I propose to break up the army almost immediately. Malcolm is at Scindiah's durbar, endeavoring to arrange the defensive alliance, in which he has not made much progress. Mr. Elphinstone is with the Rajah of Berar. The Governor General is well pleased with the treaty with the latter, and has ratified it: he has sent me copies of your letters of the 30th Aug.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Munkaiseer, 5th Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a letter to the Governor General, which contains an account of the attack and defeat of a band of freebooters who have been for some time on this frontier, under the command of Viswaz Rao Ghautky, heretofore in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of Gopal Bhugwunt, heretofore in the service of the Rajah of Berar, of Hurry Punt Bhony, a plunderer from Poonah, and others of inferior note. I beg you will explain the circumstances of this action to the Soubah of the Deccan, and tell him that I was happy to have had an opportunity of rendering him a service, and of restoring to him the guns lately lost by his own officers.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp at Munkaiseer, 6th Feb. 1804.

I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote yesterday to the Governor General, giving an account of the destruction of a band of freebooters near this place. I endeavored to imitate you, and to surprise them; but the night was dark, the road desperately bad, and my allies, like true Marhattas, gave them information. This party consisted of Sirjee Rao, or Viswaz Rao Ghautky, Gopal Bhugwunt, Nimbajee Bhoonslah, and others. Mulwa Dada is in the Solapoor country. Baba Phurkia is not with him, as you suppose. He has always been to the northward, and I understand has lately separated his troops and quitted the Nizam's territories.

I received yesterday your public letter of the 12th, containing an address from the officers of the division under your command, to the Governor of Fort St. George. I rather believe that address would never have been written, if it had not been imagined that we had taken a large prize. But I do not believe the accounts of every thing amount to 10 lacs of rupees. At all events, it is not necessary that I should write any answer upon the subject; and I notice it only to apprise you that I have received it, and

G. O.

Camp at Munkaiseer, Monday, 6th Feb. 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley thanks the troops for the persevering activity with which they underwent the fatigues of the march on the 4th and 5th inst.

When the cavalry was formed, they advanced in great order; but Major Gen. Wellesley has occasion now to point out the necessity of their preserving their order at all times. To lose it is easy, but to regain it after it is lost is difficult, if not impossible, in front of an enemy. The discipline of the troops when singly opposed to large bodies of the enemy is of no advantage to them; the greatest number must have the advantage: but when disciplined troops preserve their order and attend to the commands of their officers, and act together, the inequality of numbers is of no avail, and the disciplined troops must succeed. The advance of the infantry under Major Swinton was very proper, and in the best order.

The detachment will halt to-morrow.

that I propose not to communicate it to the troops under my command, as it is possible that every body may not be equally disinclined to enter into discussions. These never can do good, and may do much harm; and they have been discountenanced, if not positively forbidden, by government. Between ourselves, therefore, I think it best to leave to government the consideration of a question, which government alone can decide.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp at Munkaiseer, 7th Feb. 1804.

I have this day received your letters of the 23rd and 27th Jan. A duplicate of my letter to Major Kirkpatrick on the subject of your allowance from the Nizam shall go to him this day. I had recommended to the Governor General that you should have additional prize money, and I think that he will attend to my recommendation in this instance. However, this is between ourselves.

My idea respecting your entering the King's service was this, that you should get your rank in England, and a regiment in what is called the army of reserve. If you should succeed in that object, you might then resign your regiment or brigade of cavalry in this country, but not your pension on retirement. If you should not succeed, you ought not to give up your regiment or brigade here, without having a further provision. These are my opinions; you will see how affairs stand when you get home, and can arrange accordingly.

I am anxious, first, that the public should continue to enjoy the benefit of your services, in a country of which the climate may be more favorable to your health; and next, that you should have the satisfaction of serving in a war which goes to the existence of Great Britain as a nation. But you must not lose your income by it.

I destroyed on the 5th a formidable band of freebooters near this place. The march we made was terrible. I send you the copy of my letter to the Governor General on this subject. Remember me kindly to Mrs. Stevenson.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Munkaiseer, 7th Feb. 1804.

I have received a paper from Gen. Campbell, being the copy of an address from the officers of his division of the army to the Governor of Fort St. George, in which they claim to share in the prize taken by the troops under my command. I have declined to answer this paper, or to procure an answer for it, by communicating it to the troops under my command. However, there is one short and simple answer to it: I am, by the orders of the Governor General, Commander in Chief of an army. Gen. Campbell and the troops under his command can form no part of that army, as he is senior to me. I could receive no orders from him, or from any person whatever, excepting Gen. Lake, if I had communicated with him; or Gen. Stuart, if he had remained in the field.

To Col. Murray.

Munkaiseer, 7th Feb. 1804.

I have already answered your different letters on the subject of Canojee, the last of which is dated the 23rd Jan., by letters which have gone to you

before this time. The arrangement with that Chief must be made in concert with the Guiekwar government.

I should wish to decline to give any opinion upon the subject of the claim of any part of the troops under my command to share in prize, as that question must depend upon government. However, I must say, that as far as they could do so, the troops in Guzerat have decided it for themselves. At all events, the question is not deserving of consideration, as all the prize taken does not, I believe, amount to 10 lacs of rupees.

On the day before yesterday I destroyed a band of freebooters, who had for some time plundered the Nizam's territories, and had become very formidable, had beaten his Highness' troops, and taken from them 4 guns. I marched on the morning of the 4th, 20 miles; at night, 24 miles, and arrived here at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 5th. Some of our faithful allies in my camp had given them intelligence of my march, and they had struck tents and were going off. But I pursued them, cut up many, took all their baggage, bazaars, guns, ammunition, &c., and entirely dispersed them.

The 74th regt., one battalion of Native infantry, and 500 men from the other corps in camp were up in the pursuit. The whole was over by 12 o'clock on the 5th. I think that by that time the troops had marched 60 miles, from 6 in the morning of the 4th, in which time they halted 10 hours, from 12 at noon to 10 at night of the 4th. If the night had not been very dark, and the road very bad, I should have been in their camp at daylight, and should have taken the whole party. I think we now begin to beat the Marhattas in the celerity of our movements.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Munkaiseer, 7th Feb. 1804.

I have destroyed Sirjee Rao Ghautky, Gopal Bhugwunt, Nimbajee Bhoonslah, and others. Mulwa Dada was in Solapoor. I enclose a copy of my letter to the Governor General upon this subject.

The exertion made by the troops is the greatest I ever witnessed. Every thing was over by 12 on the 5th; and I think that by that time the infantry must have marched 60 miles from 6 in the morning on the 4th. We halted from 12 in the day till 10 at night on the 4th, so that we marched 60 miles with infantry in 20 hours. That rascal, Appah Dessaye, gave notice to Ghautky: I have every thing but the most positive proof of it. However, as it is, the destruction of the band is complete, but I wished to hang some of their chiefs, *pour encourager les autres*. I enclose you the letter from Lord Wellesley.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 8th Feb. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving the instructions of your Excellency in council of the 9th Jan., and at the same time a dispatch from the Commissioners in Cuttack, dated the 19th Jan.; and upon comparing these 2 papers, I have doubts respecting the instructions which I shall give to Mr. Elphinstone regarding the communications to be made to the Rajah of Berar, on the subject of the 2nd and 10th articles of the treaty of peace. No evil can result from the delay in referring the subject to your Excellency's consideration, and I have, therefore, been induced to desire Mr.



Elphinstone to defer to make any communication to the Rajah till your Excellency's further orders shall have been received.

The first point upon which I entertain a doubt, is the extent of the province of Cuttack. The boundaries are clearly defined in the 7th paragraph of the dispatch from the Commissioners, and include the Gurjaut possessions of Khordia, Deopalah, Ougole, Hindole, Dakunal; and I understand from that paragraph, that the Rajahs of Baany Bandera and Koonjoor are independent.

It appears by the 14th and 15th paragraphs of your Excellency's orders of the 9th Jan., that your Excellency considers every district, the revenue of which was paid at Balasore, to be included in the province of Cuttack; and a list of those districts is in the margin.

The Commissioners, who have had a copy of your Excellency's orders before them when they wrote, have not stated whether those districts were or were not within the province ceded by the 2nd article of the treaty of peace, according to their definition of its limits in the 7th paragraph of their dispatch; and supposing that they should not be included in those limits, I am at a loss to know whether your Excellency is desirous that they should be demanded from the Rajah of Berar.

The names written in the margin of your Excellency's dispatch are not included in the Persian List No. 6, in the dispatch from the Commissioners, as far as the names in that list can be made out.

Another point upon which I entertain a doubt, is the nature of the communication to be made to the Rajah of Berar under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. It appears by the 12th paragraph of your Excellency's orders of the 9th Jan., that engagements have been made with various zemindars situated within the province of Midnapoor, of whose names I have received no list. But their districts may be included in the limits of the province of Cuttack, as they are defined either by your Excellency's orders as having paid their tribute at Balasore, or by the Commissioners in the 7th paragraph of their dispatch. In that case, no list of them is required. But this point must be settled by your Excellency.

The 10th article of the treaty of peace is to be construed with reference to the promise which I made to the Rajah's ministers, as reported to your Excellency, and to the liberal construction which your Excellency's policy induces you to give to it. When I apply these considerations to the state of the negotiations with the Rajah's feudatories, as reported by the Commissioners at Cuttack, I am induced to be of opinion, that the only persons who come under the 10th article of the treaty of peace are the Rajahs of Mohurbunge and Singboom, unless your Excellency should be of opinion that the districts in Midnapoor are not in Cuttack, and that the zemindars of those districts, with whom treaties have been concluded, come under its stipulation.

In the 11th paragraph of their dispatch, the Commissioners write that they are in hourly expectation of receiving the agreement of the Rajah of Koonjoor to become a tributary to the Hon. Company. But I have to observe, that to wait for this treaty is not consistent with the letter, much less with the spirit, of the 10th article of the treaty of peace; or with my

promise to the Rajah's ministers, or with your Excellency's liberal policy: I therefore conclude, that the Rajah of Koonjoor ought not to be included in the list to be delivered to the Rajah of Berar.

In respect to the Rajahs of Boad, Ramghur, Sohnpoor, and Sumbulpoor, I have only to refer your Excellency to the enclosures from No. 2 to No. 5, in the dispatch from the Commissioners of the 19th Jan.; from which your Excellency will observe, that although most advantageous offers had been made to those persons, they had delayed till that moment to accept them. I certainly cannot conceive them to be included in the 10th article of the treaty of peace upon any principle of good faith.

I have no doubt whatever but that the Rajah of Berar will satisfy your Excellency upon the subject of the meaning of the 8th article of the treaty of peace; and that he will engage not to molest those persons who have assisted the British government during the war. I have protected his friends and adherents in Berar from the depredations of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan; and I am convinced that he will be inclined to seek the favor of the British government, rather than to provoke its anger by any act of revenge. But I know that he looks with confidence to the justice and generosity of the British government, that the 10th article of the treaty of peace shall not be used as a means of diminishing his power. Indeed, without such confidence, no government that was not reduced to an extremity of distress would have agreed to such an article. While writing upon this subject, I have to express a doubt with which I am impressed, that the Commissioners at Cuttack have defined the limits of the Soubah of Orissa, instead of those of the province of Cuttack. The reasons for which I entertain this doubt, are, that I have understood the province of Cuttack to be no more than the district included between the hills and the sea, the province of Midnapoor and the Chilca lake; and I observe that all the papers I have received from the Commissioners refer to Orissa, and not to Cuttack.

The cession under the 2nd article of the treaty of peace is confined to the latter only; and it would not be proper to demand more from the Rajah. But it is very possible that I may be mistaken, as I have no information upon the subject on which I can place any reliance; although, as I entertain this doubt, it is proper that I should make it known to your Excellency.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 9th Feb. 1801.

My dispatch of the 5th will have made you acquainted with the destruction of a band of freebooters on that day. The remains of them have fled towards the Solapoor country, where they are likely to join another band of the same description, situated in that quarter, and commanded by Mulwa Dada. But their strength is destroyed, and if the Soubah's killadars and sirdars will exert themselves, they will soon disperse entirely.

I enclose the copy and translation of a letter which I have written to the Rajah of Solapoor; and I beg leave to recommend that orders to the same purport may be sent to him from the Soubah of the Deccan.

I do not propose at present to follow the remains of the freebooters towards the Solapoor country. In the first place, it has now become a

that the treaty of peace will be approved. He approves of the general article regarding the treaties with the feudatories, instead of the particular articles providing for the independence of each petty Rajah. He appears anxious to avoid a contest with Holkar; and in instructions to Gen. Lake, of which I shall send you a copy, if I should be able, he desires him to give him assurances of friendship, provided Holkar does not interfere with the Company or their allies. He particularly desires him, however, to avoid guaranteeing to Holkar the possession of the dominions of the Holkar family, which he has usurped. He wishes not to enter at all into the discussion of that question. Attend to all this in your negotiations with Holkar. I will try to get you a copy of this paper; but really the Governor General's dispatches are so long, that I have not sufficient assistance to master them, and do my own business besides.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

In answer to your letter of the 3rd inst., regarding Mr. Ambrose, I have to inform you that I do not consider that person to be entitled to the benefit held out by his Excellency the Governor General's proclamation of the 29th Aug. 1803, to Europeans in the service of the Marhatta states.

To Lieut. Col. Gore.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 28th Jan., for which I am much obliged to you. It is true that there are many important objects to engage my attention; but none of them can ever make me indifferent to what passes in the 33rd regt., in whose honor and welfare I always consider myself particularly interested. Accordingly I shall be glad to hear from you whenever you may have leisure to write; and whatever may be the nature of my occupation at the time I shall receive your letters, you may depend upon it that they will not remain unanswered.

I conclude that the mistake respecting West's promotion will be rectified, as soon as the deaths of Capt. Anderson and Capt. Lowe shall be known. Capt. Eustace will then be the senior Captain; Capt. Eustace, of the 16th, the second; and Lambton, I suppose, the third. I approve of the exchange of Mr. Orrock, although I rather believe that I refused him once before; also, of your recommendation of Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Fitzpatrick to be Ensigns.

I have no objection to Mr. Macintosh, with whom I am acquainted, and I believe him to be a very good man. But he cannot be so good a man for the 33rd as Mr. Naig; and as the object of the exchange is the wish of the latter to go to England, I hope that the exchange will be delayed: indeed, it must be delayed till the 73rd regt. be ordered home. As I think it very probable that, under the present circumstances, the 73rd will remain in India at least as long as the 33rd, our regiment will continue to enjoy the advantages of the services of our own quarter master, who has been with us so long. I know that Col. Money Penny has always an eye to get a good and useful officer into the 73rd; and he has already succeeded in getting one or two from the 33rd. But I rely upon you to be equally watchful, and not to lose the services of useful men, so long as you can keep them.

Upon the subject of clothing, you must obtain the permission of the Commander in Chief in India, to give money in lieu of clothing, according to the terms of the warrant; after having done which, draw upon the agents for the money to be paid to the men; at the same time send home to the agents an account of the clothing you have in store, and let them know at what time you will want more clothing. The men should have their clothing as soon as possible, whether in the field or not. You did quite right to go to Vellore. The 33rd could not join me. I should have lost the campaign if I had attempted to have drawn troops from Gen. Campbell's division. I shall be happy to have the regiment with me always; but God knows whether I shall be more successful in my future, than I have been in my past endeavors to effect this object, or whether I shall ever be 5 days in the same place.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 3rd inst., and I am rejoiced to find that you are recovering.

The last letter I received from Webbe was dated the 30th Jan., and he was then likely to leave Hurryhur on the 30th. It is probable that he will not be at Poonah till the 20th at soonest.

You will have observed by my letter to Mr. Frissell, of the 4th, a copy of which he will, of course, have sent to you, that I am of opinion that the Peshwah has gone to, and now stays at Wahy only to avoid having an interview with me; and I judge from your letter of the 3rd, that you are nearly of the same opinion. If that is the case, I really do not see any end that is to be answered by my pressing that meeting, and I think that it would be best for me to avoid going to Poonah.

Webbe and I can easily join at Tullygaum, and go down to Bombay together; and from this measure we shall gain the additional object of having an interview with you, and of giving you the benefit, for a greater length of time, of the sea air at Bombay. Let me know whether this arrangement will suit you.

You will have heard of my expedition against the freebooters. I am watching them still, and they do not seem to me to know which way to go or what to do. Mulwa Dada was not in the action, and he is still entire somewhere upon the Mangeyra river. The others are scattered in all parts. I believe that I shall yet have an opportunity of striking another blow at them, although I am very anxious to give the troops some rest.

To Col. Murray.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

I observe in a letter from Major Walker to the government of Bombay, of the 18th Jan., that when that gentleman applied to you for a supply of military stores, for the use of Babajee, an officer in the service of the Guickwar government, you informed him that the supplies of powder and shot in Guzerat are confined to the exigencies of the service. I have to request, that whenever the Resident may apply for military stores, you will attend to his application, and order the supply of such as may not be immediately required for the use of the Company's troops; and you will

indent upon the stores at Bombay for an equal quantity. In this instance, as the demand was only for 20 barrels of powder, 400 eighteen pound, 400 twelve pound, and 200 six pound shot, the supply might possibly have been granted without inconvenience to the service.

While writing upon this subject, I have to recommend generally a system of conciliation and encouragement to the Guickwar sirdars and troops, as the best mode of drawing from them the assistance which they may be capable of giving, and of precluding the necessity of employing the Company's troops upon every trifling occasion.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

Since I had the honor to address your Excellency on the 8th inst., I have received from the Commissioners in Cuttack a dispatch, dated 29th Jan., in which they have enclosed a letter from the Sec. of Government, dated the 24th Jan.

All doubt is now removed respecting the limits of the province of Cuttack, which I understand to be those stated in the 7th paragraph of the dispatch from the Commissioners of the 19th Jan.; and that they include the districts in Midnapoor, and those, the list of which is written in the margin of your Excellency's instructions of the 9th Jan. I am still in doubt, however, regarding the communication to be made to the Rajah of Berar, under the 10th article of the treaty of peace, and I propose still to wait for your Excellency's further instructions upon this subject.

I do not think it appears that the Rajah of Koonjoor has yet come to an agreement with the Commissioners. His letter is written only in general terms; it is such as the Natives are in the habit of writing to officers commanding British troops; and I received many such from the Rajah of Berar himself, before I brought the treaty of peace to a conclusion. But instead of considering those letters as containing engagements, they appeared to me, as this letter does, to have been written to procrastinate, or, possibly, entirely to avoid the conclusion of real engagements. The cases of the Rajahs of Sohnpoor, Boad, and Ramghur, are similar. They have received and sent messages, they have sent vakeels, have received cowle, and written letters in general terms, but it does not appear that they have concluded engagements.

My idea of the conclusion of an engagement is, that the party should have positively agreed, at least verbally, to certain stipulations, under which it was to enjoy the benefit of the protection of the Company. It does not appear that any of these Rajahs have entered into any such agreements; although I am well convinced that, having witnessed the effects of the Company's power, and having reason to expect benefit from the protection of the British government, they will now readily enter into all the stipulations required. But that is not consistent with the letter of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar, much less with my promise to the Rajah's ministers; that this article should not be made to extend farther than was necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government, or with your Excellency's policy.

It is certain, that when the party has not agreed to required stipulations,

as the price of the protection offered to it, it is not necessary, for the preservation of good faith, to extend to it the British protection.

I have been very particular in stating to your Excellency all that occurs to me upon this subject, because it appears that the Commissioners in Cuttack are not aware, or not sensible, of the circumstances under which that article of the treaty was concluded, and which must be a guide in its application. They have a natural desire to extend it to as many cases as possible; because they feel that, in proportion as they can extend its benefits, they increase the chance of the peace, the happiness, and the prosperity of the people whose country is committed to their management. But these, although important objects, are not to be compared to the importance of preserving the national faith.

Under this view of the subject, and having witnessed the confidence reposed in your Excellency's government by all the powers of this part of India, I have given your Excellency more than ordinary trouble upon it, and I have only now to request your orders.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 10th Feb. 1804.

I have received your dispatch of the 28th Jan., and likewise that of the 6th inst., as I have established a communication with the dawk between Hyderabad and Poonah.

As I have not by me my papers, which were left in my camp near Neemgaum, I am obliged to defer for some days to reply to parts of your dispatches. I proceed, however, immediately to reply to that part of your dispatch of the 28th Jan., which refers to the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th paragraphs of your dispatch to the Governor General of the 27th Jan.

There can be no doubt on the subject of the 5th article of the treaty of Deogaum. It is therein positively stated that the districts to be ceded shall be contiguous to the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur. My various reasons for agreeing to the cession of districts in that quarter are fully stated in my dispatch to his Excellency the Governor General on the subject of the peace, and have been approved of by his Excellency; and, in fact, the cession, instead of breaking in upon the continuity of the frontier, will eventually become a security to the whole country. Of this no man will doubt who knows the nature of the Soubah's territories, and the total absence of all government. But the reasons for agreeing to the stipulations, on the effect of the cession, are now immaterial; it is in the treaty which has been ratified by both parties, and the question is, whether it is to be carried into execution. Upon this point there can be no doubt.

In respect to Rajah Mohiput Ram's proposal, that the districts beyond the Wurda should be ceded, instead of those on this side of the river, I have made it known to the Rajah of Berar's minister, and it has been rejected by him, and, of course, I cannot insist upon it. I have also to observe that the statements in Rajah Mohiput Ram's letter, regarding the districts near the hills, are not correct; those districts have been the seat of the war; they contained, during the greater part of November, the whole of December, and part of January, 4 hostile armies; and I am afraid that the best that can be said of any army, situated in a district, is, that it has done no mischief.

I was desirous that the execution of the 5th article of the treaty should be consistent with the views and interests of the Soubah of the Deccan, and I think that I could have arranged it if I could have obtained from Rajah Mohiput Ram the required information; but he has given me none, even till this moment, and the cause of the delay is now very obvious. I have therefore been obliged to refer to him the settlement of the question, as I informed you in a former letter, in which I requested that positive orders might be sent to him to carry into execution that article of the treaty of peace.

I beg that you will accept my best thanks for the attention which you have paid to the request which I made in favor of Narroo Hurry, an attention of which I have fully enjoyed the benefit on a variety of occasions throughout the service in this quarter; and that you will make my acknowledgments to Azim ool Omrah, and to the Soubah of the Deccan, for this mark of his Highness' favor.

I am still watching the motions of the freebooter, Mulwa Dada, who was not engaged, as his band was to the southward near Solapoor: he has a small force on the Mangeyra, and is apparently going to the northward. The others who were engaged are scattered, and moving in different directions in the greatest distress. If I can gain intelligence on which I can depend, of Mulwa Dada's position, I propose to endeavor to strike a blow on him, although I am very anxious to give my troops some rest, and I think that the Soubah's troops might destroy him entirely if their commanders thought proper.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 11th Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone; I have desired him to inform the Rajah's ministers that your Excellency had ordered Major Broughton to retire from Sumbulpoor, as soon as you had received the intelligence that the peace had been ratified.

I have also desired him to tell the ministers that your Excellency did not intend to increase the number of persons to be included in the benefits of the 10th article of the treaty of peace, further than should be necessary; and that the cause of the delay in the delivery of the list of those persons was to be attributed to the desire to render it as perfect as possible, and that no person should be included, the insertion of whose name was not absolutely necessary, by the nature of the engagements which had been made.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 11th Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Major Irton, relative to the desire of the body of troops under his command at Hyderabad, to be included in the distribution which it is imagined your Excellency will order of the property captured during the war, by the army under my command. I am perfectly satisfied with the manner in which Major Irton and the officers and troops under his command have done their duty, and it is with regret that I feel myself obliged to give an opinion which is not favorable to the wishes of those troops. They certainly have been in an important post; but I must observe, that it was

not more important to the success of the war, and had no greater effect, than many other posts occupied by the British troops.

When I submitted to your Excellency my sentiments on the subject of the distribution of the property captured in the war, I considered that it was necessary to draw a line. The most distinct line that could be drawn, under existing circumstances, was between the troops who had, and those who had not, been engaged with the enemy. According to this plan, many of the troops who have been employed in the detachments mentioned by Major Irton will be included in the distribution. The principle of the distribution, which I have above stated guided me in the formation of the plan which I recommended to your Excellency, appears to be that which has guided the Commander in Chief, as published in the G. O., and is particularly applicable to the present case, as the amount of the property captured is not large. If it had been great it would have been otherwise.

There can be no doubt but that Major Irton's detachment, with the exceptions which have been provided for, underwent none of the labor, suffered none of the fatigue, incurred none of the expense or risk, and gained none of the honor of the late campaign in this quarter; and, therefore, as the amount of the property captured is not great, I have not recommended, and do not recommend, that any part of it should be distributed to them.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Camp, 11th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 27th Jan., for which I am much obliged to you.

I beg that you will inform the Rajah's ministers that the Governor General has ordered the officer commanding the troops in Sunbulpoor to withdraw into the Company's territories, and to give up that district to the officers of the Rajah of Berar. Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder must recollect that I told him repeatedly that the consequence of the Rajah's delay to make the peace would be a great attack on his territories on all sides, and the truth of my information is now experienced. However, if the Rajah of Berar had forwarded immediately, and with due celerity, the dispatch which I sent him on the 23rd Dec., for his Excellency the Governor General, hostilities would have ceased at a much earlier period, as I observe that the Governor General gave orders that they should be discontinued, and that the troops should withdraw on the day he received the notification that the Rajah had ratified the treaty of peace.

In respect to the lists of the feudatories with whom treaties have been made, you may assure the Rajah that the delay in giving him those lists arises from my desire to include in them no person with whom an engagement had not been *bonâ fide* made, before the accounts were received of the conclusion of the peace; and a wish to break as many of those engagements as possible, consistently with the necessary attention to the preservation of the faith of the British government. The Governor General has the same wish.

I write to Rajah Mohiput Ram on the subject of the villages of Wurroor and Janoor; and I will attend to all the other points mentioned in your letter. But I recommend that you should hint to the Rajah, that one of



the causes of the unjustifiable conduct of the officers of the Soubah of the Deccan, which the British government will always resent, is, his bringing forward, at various times, unjust claims to different parts of the ceded territories.

P. S. I have already given a passport to Rigajee Naig, and I enclose a duplicate of it.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 11th Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward after you shall have perused it.

You will observe, in the letter from Mr. Elphinstone to me, of the 27th Jan., a request that I would recommend Saecaram Latchmun Paundry to the countenance and favor of the Soubah's government, and I shall be much obliged to you, if you will be so kind as to forward this recommendation. I have written to Rajah Mohiput Ram on the subject of the other points mentioned in the letter from Mr. Elphinstone.

To Col. Stevenson.

Camp, 11th Feb. 1804.

I received your letters, and answered them some days ago. They were to the same purport as one of the 4th inst., which has just reached me.

I have sent to the Resident at Hyderabad a duplicate of my letter, regarding your allowance from the Nizam's government. I had recommended to the Governor General what you have desired respecting your prize money, when I reported to him the state of the property captured. But you know that every thing in that question depends upon him.

Since I wrote to you last I have seen some English papers, and perused debates on the subject of the increase of the army. When I first wrote to you on the subject of endeavoring to get removed to the King's service, I had reason to believe that all parties in England had agreed that it was absolutely necessary, at last, that Great Britain should really have an army, and not the skeleton of one, as had been the case hitherto. I knew that the object of having an army could not be accomplished without a very large increase of the number of officers, particularly of high rank; and it appeared to me that the services of yourself, and others of your description, from the service in this country, would be desirable. The plan adopted, however, does not by any means go upon the scale that I supposed it would. Every body appears to be convinced of the necessity of having an army, but nobody appears to be inclined to adopt the measures which are necessary for that purpose. The same little temporary expedients are adopted that have been before practised, and they will equally fail; and in respect to the plan I contemplated for you, that is entirely out of the question, as I observe that the service of several officers belonging to this country has been offered and declined. I am therefore most decidedly of opinion that you ought not to make up your mind to any thing till you shall get home. If you should find that circumstances are then favorable, and that you can change without material loss to yourself or your family, you might do so, but not otherwise. But I am afraid that you will find that you will not be able to change at all.

I send you the book which you desired. The Governor General wishes

that it should not, on any account, be generally circulated or published. You will recollect this.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 11th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 3rd, and I am much obliged to you for the pains you have taken to recover my horse. I had always understood that he was killed.

I now enclose the dispatches on the subject of Holkar. Also a dispatch from Mr. Edmonstone, regarding Ambajce Inglia, received this morning; and I think that the facts therein stated will remove a great deal of embarrassment on the final settlement of affairs.

I have had a great deal of trouble with the Cuttack gentlemen. They construe general letters from zemindars about 'master's favor,' and professions of obedience to orders, into treaties; and I think that the moderation of the Governor General, which in any other man would pass current for ambition, induces him rather to adopt the principles of the Commissioners in Cuttack, and to increase as much as possible the limits of the province, and the number of people to enjoy the benefits of the 10th article of the treaty of peace. I have, however, written to him 2 public letters upon the subject, in which I have pointed out that the objects of the Commissioners, in claiming to enlarge their province as much as possible, however praiseworthy, are not very consistent with national good faith, of which they, very naturally, have entirely lost sight.

It is really ridiculous to read the dispatches on this subject: whole provinces must be considered to be included in Cuttack, under the 2nd article of the treaty. The 10th article must be construed to apply to many zemindars, who have only asked for 'master's favor,' and taken cowle and safeguards, and the poor national faith goes to the devil. In fact, my dear Malcolm, I see very clearly that I have made 2 very good treaties of peace, but I have not influence to carry them into execution in any of their stipulations; and there is no person about the Governor General to take an enlarged view of the state of our affairs, and to resist the importunities of the local authorities to force on the treaties a construction which will tend to the increase of their own petty power and authority.

The Soubah's government, who will not execute the 5th article of the treaty regarding the 4 lacs of rupees, plunder the forts, although any man in his senses must see that that article will eventually be beneficial to the country and to them. After witnessing the prosperity of Berar, I acknowledge that my opinion is much altered, regarding the propriety of excluding the Marhattas entirely from the Nizam's territories. As long as the government remains in its present state of weakness, it is a good principle to interest in the prosperity of the country those who would be its enemies and would plunder. But you will say that plunder must now be at an end, and the exclusion of the Rajah takes away every pretence for it. The question is, will it be at an end, in fact? Will the British government leave their troops in Berar? Will they force the Soubah of the Deccan to reform his military establishment? If they do not either the one or the other, take my word for it, that the average of the

Nizam's receipts, for the next 10 years, will fall short even of those of the last 10.

*The D.A. G. to the Officer commg. a detachment.*

Camp at Wauky, 12th Feb. 1804.

You will receive charge of 10 carts loaded with arrack from the Commissary of provisions, and 16 wheels for cavalry guns, and a cart, from the Commissary of stores, and will proceed with them to Periuda by the enclosed route, and you will endeavor to arrive there on the 15th inst. The gun lascars and pioneers are to carry the gun wheels, and you will allow them to do so in such manner as they may find easiest for themselves, and to run them at times when they may find that convenient.

You will observe that your route is by the tappall road to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley's camp, and you will take the opportunity of the tappall to report your progress every day to the General: and you ought to send a careful man to inquire at every tappall station that you pass for letters, as well as to look over all packets in the possession of the peons who may pass you on the march, for any that may be addressed to you.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 13th Feb. 1804.

I have to request that you will allow Mr. Goodwin, of the Civil service of Bombay, to act as an assistant to the Residency at Poonah, till the further orders of his Excellency the Governor General shall be received. I request you to apprise Mr. Goodwin of the receipt of this letter.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 13th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and I enclose a letter for the killadar of Loghur, which will settle this concern. I request you to fill up the blanks in the letter with the name of the carkoon of Samuldoss, and the date of his arrest; and to forward the letter to Loghur. If he should not release this man, I will take his fort from him. Desire your hircarrah to see that the carkoon is released.

I have written to Amrut Rao respecting Dowlut, and I beg that you will tell the Peshwah's ministers, that they may do as they please about that person. I have pointed out to Amrut Rao very clearly the danger of his attempting to deceive me. The soucars at Poonah will now possibly recommence the business of their profession; but I must observe, that although I have taken pretty strong measures to satisfy them, I shall adopt others of a nature still stronger; if these should fail, I do not think that they ought to be allowed to discontinue the exercise of their trade, only because one carkoon was arrested, who, after all, might have been arrested very deservedly, and for reasons entirely unconnected with the disputes between Samuldoss and his brother. I am by no means satisfied yet with the propriety of my going to Poonah, and I think that Col. Close agrees in opinion with me.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 13th Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have this day received from Lieut. Col. Harcourt, upon which I have to observe, that it is dated 10 days after that on which he received the notification of the conclusion of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Camp, 14th Feb. 1804.

Since I wrote to you last, a part of the freebooters have collected again

to the southward, upon a band who were not engaged with us on the 5th. I have, therefore, thought it best to move upon them, and I hope to give a good account of them on the 16th. I wish you would move after us gradually by the route by which we came. Keep upon the tappall road, of which I send you the stages, and come on to Perinda, upon the Scenah river. I send you with this a sketch of the country. Bring with you the remount horses of the cavalry.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 14th Feb. 1804.

I have this day received your letter of the 25th Jan., and I am concerned to observe that you had not received several of my letters: viz., one of the 17th Dec., one of the 23rd, one of the 30th Dec., and one of the 5th Jan., all relating to the treaties of peace. Besides these, I wrote you a long letter, on the 11th Jan., I think, in which I recapitulated every thing that had passed from the battle of Argaum; shortly after which the tappall began to be irregular to that day on which I hoped that I had re-established the communication; and I sent you, with that letter, additional copies of the treaties of peace, and of my letters regarding them to the Governor General. I still hope that you will have received that letter; but if you should not acknowledge the receipt of it before I return to camp, I shall again write to you the purport of it, and shall send you copies of the papers above mentioned.

The whole of the subject of your letter of the 25th has had much of my attention and consideration; and I shall proceed to give you my sentiments upon it, according to your desire. That part which first calls for a decision relates to the subsidiary corps serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. The first point to be considered is, the station for those corps in future; and the decision upon this may facilitate the decision regarding the establishment to which the troops forming the subsidiary corps ought to belong. If the subject can be decided upon military principles; if there are no political considerations to induce the government to wish to have the subsidiary corps at Hyderabad and at Poonah (and I acknowledge that I see none); it is my opinion that the subsidiary force, serving with the Peshwah, ought to be placed either upon the Godavery, at or below Toka, or upon the high road between Toka and Ahmednuggur. This last place ought to have a British garrison, and there might be 2 battalions at Poonah. By this position, the Peshwah's territories will be secured from foreign invasion; at the same time that the supply of the subsidiary force will be certain from Bombay, by the medium of Poonah and Ahmednuggur. But I do not think that one regiment of cavalry and 4 battalions of Native infantry will be very safe in a position so far advanced; unless it should be convenient to place the subsidiary force, serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, (excepting 2 battalions to be at Hyderabad,) likewise upon the Godavery, about 40 or 50 miles lower down that river.

If that should not be politically inconvenient, (and I really do not understand the gentlemen who contend for the necessity of fixing the subsidiary force at the capital,) many benefits will result from the measure. In the first place, it will secure that capital position for the subsi-

diary force serving with the Peshwah; and, in the next, it is the only measure that can be adopted which will give the Soubah of the Deccan the full benefit of the territories lately ceded by the Rajah of Berar.

The late arrangements made with the Soubah of the Deccan, regarding his forts, will secure the use of the fort of Dharore for the subsidiary force; supposing that it should be convenient and cheap to supply it from the eastern, rather than from the western coast. That is the position which I should recommend, supposing there is no objection on the part of the politicians, whom I do not understand upon this subject, and who, I believe, do not understand themselves. But if the subsidiary force with the Soubah of the Deccan must be at Hyderabad, I would still recommend that we should continue to hold Ahmednuggur, and post there the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, excepting 2 battalions to be at Poonah.

If the forward position which I have proposed should be adopted, I think that the country will be saved from plunder. We tried a similar experiment in the Nabob of Oude's territories, above 30 years ago, which we have ever since saved from plunder; although the Marhattas were much stronger, and we much weaker, than either are at the present moment.

Supposing all consequences to be equally convenient, I acknowledge that I should wish to see the Bengal troops composing all the subsidiary forces. The men are of a better size and description, of a higher caste, and the Natives have more respect for them than they have for the Coast or Bombay troops. They have proved in this campaign that they yield to none in bravery; and, I believe, are tolerably disciplined, and they have been long notorious for their contempt of their enemies on horseback. But all these circumstances must yield to others of a more pressing nature; and certainly, in a great military arrangement, the facility of relief is an important consideration. However, supposing it should be decided that the subsidiary corps should be posted on the Godavery, as I have above proposed, the plan for relief will no longer be convenient; and then possibly you may be of opinion that the Bengal troops ought to be the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan. While writing upon this subject, there is one convenience resulting from the employment of the Bengal troops, which, in a pecuniary point of view, will more than compensate for all the additional expense which may attend it. It is that they eat the flour of dry grains, whereas the Coast and Bombay troops must have rice. This article will always cost much money in this country, but flour of all kinds will be cheap.

In respect to the subsidiary force serving with Scindiah, supposing that he should become a party to the defensive alliance, it ought certainly to be composed of Bengal troops; and if the Bengal army should furnish this force, the Governor General may possibly not think it proper, and indeed may be unable, to detach a force to the Deccan for the Soubah, or for the Peshwah. But my opinion upon this subject, which I have never given to the Governor General, is independent of all considerations of relative promotion, and is founded solely upon the relative qualities and fitness of the troops for the service. If you and the Governor General

should adopt this opinion, the Bengal army will eventually furnish all the subsidiary forces; and the others will be confined to the Company's own territories.

After this consideration of the question, I come to the point of the battalions lately raised. Whatever may be the decision regarding the composition of the subsidiary forces in future, those battalions are absolutely necessary to enable you to conquer Malabar again, and to relieve the Bombay troops in that province and Canara: a measure which, I have already observed, is absolutely necessary, both to preserve the peace of Malabar, and to secure the existence of the Bombay army as a respectable body. If the Coast army are to continue to furnish either of the subsidiary forces, they will require a permanent augmentation, to the full amount of the number of troops to be sent to Malabar and Canara, to relieve the Bombay troops.

The principle on which I go is, that the subsidiary arrangement with the Peshwah, and even that with Scindiah, supposing that it should be carried into execution, will not decrease the necessity for keeping up the same garrisons, and of the same strength, as they were established in the year 1802; at least as far as I have any knowledge of the principles on which those garrisons were established, which, I confess, extends no farther than the Ceded districts and Mysore.

If the Coast army are to furnish both subsidiary forces, they will require a permanent augmentation to the amount of 6 battalions, and whatever force may be stationed in Malabar, in relief of the Bombay troops. If the Coast army should not furnish either of the subsidiary forces, it will require a permanent augmentation only to the amount of the number of troops which Malabar and Canara will want beyond 6 battalions. But, till the Governor General shall decide all these points, and, at all events, to enable you to relieve Malabar, I conceive that it is indispensable to keep up the 8 new battalions.

I do not think that you will be able to do any thing effectual in Malabar in this season. I conclude you will not wish Gen. Campbell to withdraw from his position, till I shall break up in this country; and, supposing that I were able to do so on this day, the troops would not arrive at Seringapatam till the end of March; and it would then be too late to commence a serious settlement of that province.

I should therefore recommend the assembly at Seringapatam, during the summer months, of a respectable garrison, which might be made the foundation of the force to enter Malabar by Wynaad, early in the next fair season; and in the mean time, possibly a battalion might be sent down to enable Col. Montresor to hold his ground throughout the rains. I am very certain that, if the troops spend the rains in Malabar, they will not be fit for much upon the opening of the fair season, particularly as much time does not remain to provide for their comfortable accommodation; that they will not have time to do much before the rains; and that they can do nothing while they last, and for some time after they have ceased, possibly till the month of December.

I have always been of opinion that Malabar is our weakest point in India, against an European enemy. There is no mode of keeping in order

the inhabitants, whose turbulence is the great cause of our weakness, excepting by having in Malabar a strong and efficient force, and a strong garrison at Seringapatam to support that force, and act upon the back of the rebels, through Wynaad. When some years of peace shall have elapsed, and the inhabitants shall have acquired habits of tranquillity, and shall have enjoyed its advantages, the experiment of weakening the military force in Malabar might be tried; but certainly not till tranquillity, which will first be the effect of fear, becomes a habit.

I agree entirely with your opinion regarding the cavalry. In fact, we have as large a body of regular cavalry as we can want, or as we can support. The expense of it is enormous. The gram alone, for the 4 regiments with me, has in some months cost 50,000 pagodas.

There is no doubt whatever of the advantage of a body of irregular cavalry; but I acknowledge that I am not prepared with an opinion on the best mode of supporting such a body in the Company's service. I am afraid it will be found that the allies, instead of being satisfied with what has been done for them in the war, and being in consequence inclined to give up the territory in Savanore or the Dooab for the support of such a body of cavalry, will be much dissatisfied with the greater share of the benefits of the peace which will fall to the Company. There is no hope of being able to have in the Company's service, permanently, a body of irregular horse, without the existence of all the abuses which prevail in the Native armies, and which, in fact, are the cause of the destruction of every power in India. Besides, another fact is, that land given to pay troops will not provide for their payment upon distant expeditions. I believe, therefore, that nothing would be gained by such an establishment, excepting the certainty of having the horse in the time of service, when an additional expense must be incurred in their support; and I very much doubt whether it would not be easy to get them at such time, without the constant expense.

I have already, as you will have observed, called the attention of the Governor General to the improvement of our alliances in this particular point, as an object of essential consequence in other respects; and I have written more than one letter upon the subject to the Resident at Hyderabad. Besides this, I propose to recommend to the Governor General to pay the expenses incurred by the Rajah of Mysore in this war (whether the Rajah is or is not entitled to such payment, which I acknowledge I think he is), as a certain mode of insuring for the Company, at a future period, the services of all the horse that have served with me in this campaign.

I have now, I believe, gone through, rather more at length than you expected, all the subjects on which you desired my sentiments. Since the 5th, I have been watching the freebooters, many of whom have dispersed; but some have again collected, near Alkuleotta, under a chief, who was not with the others on the 5th, and whose baggage was not plundered. I have therefore made a movement to the southward towards them; and if they remain where they are, I shall destroy them on the day after tomorrow. As soon as I shall have dispersed these bands of freebooters, I propose to wait till I receive the Governor General's ratification of the

treaty with Scindiah, and then break up the army. For the present, the troops must remain in this neighbourhood, as there is no forage or subsistence for them to the northward, every thing being ate up or destroyed.

I think it desirable that I should soon quit this country. The Peshwah has manifested a most unaccountable jealousy of me, personally; and has refused to adopt certain measures, evidently calculated for his advantage, only because I recommended them. He has allowed their benefit, and has avowed this motive for refusing to adopt them. We have always found it very difficult to manage him; but it will become quite impossible, if this principle is allowed to guide his conduct. I therefore think it best that I should go away as soon as possible; and I am certainly very desirous of getting some rest.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 12 miles S. of Solapoor, 15th Feb. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th, but not that which you say you had written to me upon the subject of bullocks, which I conclude has gone to my camp, and which I shall probably get this day.

I am very much obliged to you for the communication of your sentiments regarding the representation of the officers with the army in the Dooab. Gen. Campbell sent me a copy of the representation by desire of the officers who made it, and I have the honor to enclose a copy of my answer upon that subject.

Since I wrote to you last, I find that the accounts of the numbers of the freebooters who had collected about Alkulcotta were much exaggerated, with a view to induce me to march that way to drive out the few that hung about the district. In this, I am sorry to say, those who gave the accounts have succeeded, and I have made some terrible marches in this hot weather. But the freebooters are all gone in different directions across the Beemah, I suppose to their homes.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 16th Feb. 1804.

I have received a letter from the subsidiary force, by which I learn that the killadar of Dewal ghaut has been deprived of his fort and district, which have been made over to Soubaban Khan. This killadar has behaved remarkably well during the war; he has kept up a constant correspondence both with Col. Stevenson and me, and has, at times, given us valuable intelligence; under these circumstances, I think it is to be wished that he had not been deprived of his fort. At the same time I draw your attention to this subject, I am aware that it is possible that it may not be proper to attempt to alter the arrangement complained of. I mention the circumstance only, that, in case it should be possible, you may endeavor to save the late killadar of Dewal ghaut.

It was reported to me that the freebooters, who, since the 5th, had been wandering about in different directions, apparently without design or means of subsistence, or of annoyance to the country, were collecting again about a party which was near Toljapoor on that day, and whose baggage was not plundered, and which remained entire. I have therefore moved with celerity towards Alkulcotta; and I have now the pleasure to inform you,



that the whole have crossed the Beemah, and have gone in different directions, all in great distress, and apparently towards their own homes. I hear that the party supposed to belong to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, which was not in the action of the 5th, was cut off, a day or two afterwards, by the troops from Hyderabad, near Toljapoor. This party has also crossed the Beemah, near Abdulpoor.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 12 miles S. of Solapoor, 16th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 5th. I think there is nothing in Bitul Punt's letter of much consequence. The treaty is clear. We are to have nothing south of Joudpoor, &c., and all treaties made by us are to be confirmed, no matter where the Rajahs are, unless serinjaumy or khas lands should have been granted away by them.

Narwar is a Raajee, of which place there is a Rajah, at least so I learn. You never mentioned the desire to have the pettah of Asseerghur, and I acknowledge that I wish not to give it up. However, in case they should insist upon it, I enclose an order for the pettah; and I request you to settle that my troops in the fort are supplied with provisions from the country. The only mode of attacking Asseerghur is from the pettah; and till every thing is finally settled, I hope that it will be possible to keep it.

I have made some dreadful marches to the southward after the freebooters, who, it was reported, were about to collect again in the Alkulcotta districts. But they have gone off, in different directions across the Beemah, I hope to their homes. I enclose a duplicate of my letter of the 29th Jan., which you had not received.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp, 16th Feb. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th inst. Mr. Elphinstone did not apprise me of his wish to receive from Bombay the articles mentioned in Mr. Smith's letter of the 6th. If he had, I should have written to you upon the subject. But it appears to me to be very necessary that he should have these articles, and it is very satisfactory to find that they have been sent.

Mr. Elphinstone (to whom I conclude a copy of the bill has been sent) will of course carry the different articles to the account of the Hon. Company as received from Bombay.

To Capt. Vernon.

Camp, 16th Feb. 1804.

Upon the receipt of this letter you will withdraw your troops from, and deliver up to the person who will be sent on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to take charge of, the pettah of Asseerghur, and you will confine your attention entirely to the care of the fort. In case you should experience any difficulty in getting provisions after you shall have withdrawn your troops from the pettah of Asseerghur, you will correspond on that subject with Major Malcolm.

To Capt. Munt.

Camp, 12 miles S. of Solapoor, 16th Feb. 1804.

I learn from the Resident at Hyderabad that you were likely to march on the 8th inst. towards Dharore, in charge of treasure to the amount of 6

lacs of rupees, for the use of the troops under my command. I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will continue your march, with the cavalry and half of the infantry under your command, to Jalnapoor, with half of the treasure, or 3 lacs of rupees; and send the remainder of the infantry with 3 lacs of rupees to join my camp at or near Perinda.

You will find or hear of Col. Haliburton's camp at Jalnapoor, and you will deliver to Capt. Down the 3 lacs of rupees which you have been above directed to keep in your charge.

I have not yet by me a list of the coins in which you have brought the sum of 6 lacs of rupees; but I request you to desire the person in charge of the money to divide the different denominations of coin as equally between the 2 divisions as may be practicable.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp, 12 miles S. of Solapoor, 16th Feb. 1804.

Since I wrote to you last, the freebooters, who had been, for some days, marching about in different directions, apparently without plan or determined intention, at length manifested the appearance, as I was informed, of collecting again in strength in the Alkulcotta district, upon a party which, having been near Toljapoor on the 5th inst., had not been engaged, and which had preserved its baggage entire. I therefore again moved upon them, and they have now crossed the Beemah, and are gone off in different directions. Mulwa Dada is, I believe, gone towards Beejapoor.

I send this letter by an hircarra to that place, to be forwarded thence by dawk.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 16th Feb. 1804.

I send you an extract of a letter which I have received from Gen. Stuart,\* from which you will observe, that he agrees in opinion with me, upon the subject of the representation from the officers serving in the Dooab, regarding the property captured by the troops under my command.

Since my last letter, some of the freebooters manifested an inclination to collect again in the Alkulcotta district, upon a party which had not been engaged on the 5th. I have made some rapid marches upon them, and they have now left the country entirely.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp, 17th Feb. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th, and I am much obliged to you for the trouble you have taken to procure orders to Rajah Mohiput Ram, to carry into execution the 5th article of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

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\* Lieut. Gen. Stuart to Major Gen. Hon. A. Wellesley. Choultry Plain, 4th Feb. 1804.

I judge it proper to inform you, that I have received a representation from the army in the Dooab, stating their claim to participate in the prize money of the troops in advance. Although I do not approve of the subject of the representation, yet, as it is addressed to this government, and to the Governor General, I shall be obliged to submit it to the Governor in Council. It will, of course, be forwarded to Bengal; but I do not suppose it will meet a favorable decision. I shall send you a copy of the representation.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that I have this instant received a letter from Capt. Johnson, the Persian interpreter with the subsidiary force, whom I had requested to act as mediator between Rajah Mohiput Ram and Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, by which I learn that the arrangements required by that article had been completed on the 7th inst., to the satisfaction of both parties. Capt. Johnson has conducted himself, upon this occasion, much to my satisfaction; and I take this opportunity of mentioning, that, throughout the late war, he has made himself very useful both to Col. Stevenson and me.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 17th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 11th, containing a copy of your dispatch to Mr. Edmonstone, on the subject of the Frenchmen supposed to be at Poonah.

I think it desirable that you should continue to remonstrate with the Peshwah's ministers on his Highness' conduct in this business; and particularly that you should point out to them that, in this instance, his Highness has broken the only stipulations of the treaty which are important to the British government, viz., those contained in the 1st and 17th articles.

You may likewise hint to them that it is of little importance to the British government whether the Frenchmen are given up by the Peshwah or not, only as far as that by not giving them up his Highness will break his treaty with the Company, and it will be necessary for the British government to adopt the measures which, in that case, will provide for its security and that of its allies; as I have adopted measures to seize their persons, which must throw them into my hands as soon as they leave Poonah. In the mean time, I conclude that you will not relax in your endeavors to discover them in Poonah, and if you should find them out, I beg you to apply to Col. Colman for a sufficient force, and take measures to seize their persons. If the Peshwah should persist in his refusal or evasion to deliver up the Frenchmen, I beg you to delay to make any communication to his Highness regarding the treaties of peace, respecting which you may receive orders from his Excellency the Governor General.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 17th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 11th. The Peshwah's conduct appears extraordinary only to us, who, since he signed the treaty of Bassein, have trusted to his professions, notwithstanding a variety of facts of which we have a knowledge. The first of these was his telling me plainly, that he could not say whether or not he wished Scindiah to come to Poonah with his army, when I was pressing him to dispatch a letter to that Chief with orders not to advance, which letter he had promised to write.

The next fact was his contrivance to correspond with Scindiah's durbar, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty with the Company, to the very day that I ordered the dawki to be drawn off the road.

The 3rd fact was his breach of the treaty in not sending his *quota* of troops to join the army.

The 4th fact, that he notoriously communicated with the enemy, by means of Ballojee Pundit at Poonah, during the existence of the war.

The 5th fact, that he never gave any demonstration of public satisfaction upon the occasion of the successes in the war, in which he was supposed to be the Company's ally.

The 6th fact, that since the signature of the treaty of Bassein, to this hour, he has never adopted any one measure recommended to him by the British government, either for his own benefit, or for the general benefit of the alliance. On the contrary, he has always resisted those measures, only because they were recommended by the British authorities, although he acknowledged their benefit.

The 7th fact, that he has kept at his durbar, only for the purposes of mischief, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, notwithstanding our repeated remonstrances, and his own proposal, that he should seize his person. By the by, while writing regarding this person, I may mention, that a buckshee and a body of horse, belonging to this same man, were opposed to me in the action of the 5th; whom I dare say that I shall have the pleasure of meeting, shortly, at the Peshwah's durbar, as he and his horse, after having plundered the Nizam's country, and having been employed to cut off the supplies going to the British army, have gone direct to Poonah.

The 8th fact, that the Peshwah wrote a letter to Scindiah, at the time of the negotiation with Col. Collins, to desire Scindiah to concede nothing, as he did not find the English as yet sufficiently disposed to punish the rebels. Major Malcolm has a copy of this letter, of which Amrut Rao has the original, which original I shall bring with me to Poonah. Under this head I may mention, that Amrut Rao has in his possession letters from Scindiah to the Peshwah, intercepted, as this letter was, upon the road, in which Scindiah gives the Peshwah accounts of his negotiations with Col. Collins, which, by the description of them, I judge to be far more detailed than those which the British government received from Col. Collins. I have also to mention, under this head, that Goorparah, in the course of many confidential conversations which I have had with him, told me repeatedly, that Scindiah, in his negotiation with Col. Collins, never took a step without consulting the Peshwah, and that his Highness ought, in fact, to have been considered a party to the war on the side of the confederates.

The 9th fact, which crowns the whole, that he has communicated with Frenchmen, and has endeavored to conceal his communications from the agents of the British government, and to screen the Frenchmen from their search.

I acknowledge that I always have been induced to view his Highness' conduct as the effect of weakness and folly; and I believed him to be sincere in his alliance with the Company; but while I encouraged this belief I shut my eyes against the facts of which I had a knowledge, and which I have above detailed; and against his Highness' notorious treachery, which was the theme of all the public dispatches, previous to his signing the treaty of Bassein; and I considered nothing but what I wished to be true, and what I knew to be the Peshwah's interests. This last act, however, has rendered it necessary that we should turn our minds seriously

to the consideration of the measures to be adopted for the safety of the British government in this critical moment.

At such a time, it is very unfortunate that Col. Close should be sick; but we shall have Mr. Webbe at Poonah, and shall be able to avail ourselves of his advice. I think it probable that Mr. Webbe will be at Poonah about the 20th. I write to him by this post, but I beg you to show him this letter, and my public dispatch of this day. I cannot be at Poonah before the 24th; but I think I may on that day, or in one or two days afterwards. I conclude that you will not have forwarded my letter to Dhoondoo Punt, regarding the harbour of Samuldoss. I am sorry to find that Col. Close is still very unwell.

To Major Graham.

Camp, 17th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst. All the property taken from the family of Mulwa Dada must be considered as captured property, and must not be restored. It would be ridiculous to adhere to the terms of a capitulation, of which he has broken every stipulation. The 1000 rupees for Ram Rao and the peons, respectively, must be taken from the property captured. I cannot, and have no inclination to take any article myself; and cannot consent that any article should be taken by any other person. Every thing that is sold must be put up to auction, unless the officers to whom the charge of captured property has been given should be of opinion that it can be sold to advantage by private contract, under a valuation. You will observe, that this principle applies to the article which you proposed to retain, upon the valuation by the shroff.

I shall write to Goorparah, to desire him to send a person to point out Seindiah's horses; and you will be so kind as to give up those which he shall point out. I gave notice to Seindiah's vakeels, that I should not give up the districts till Mulwa Dada should have gone away to the northward. They deny that Mulwa Dada is Seindiah's servant, and have expressed a wish that I may treat him as I may think proper. I think, therefore, that they ought to get the districts; but I beg you to tell the vakeel with you, that my reason for not giving them to him is, that I know well that they have not the means of keeping them from Mulwa Dada; and that if he or his troops should ever get into any of them, I must immediately again take possession. Mulwa Dada cannot now last much longer; and therefore it is desirable that the delivery of the districts should be delayed for a short time.

I am decidedly of opinion that some serious step might still be taken to annoy this banditti, who were breaking up daily. They almost all belong to the districts under Ahmednuggur, and their families are living under the Company's protection. Surely their families might be arrested; and I can tell you that if they were, a more effectual stop would be put to the depredations of the freebooters than can be by the operations of the troops, however successful.

I am very desirous at all times of doing what is satisfactory to you, and to every officer. But I am sorry that I cannot consent to your going to Madras, at the time you propose. It is absolutely necessary that you should wait till the Governor General shall have ratified the treaty of

peace, and shall have disposed of the territories which are under your management. I never had any doubt respecting your sharing, with the remainder of the army, in the property captured during the war.

I have reason to believe that the Frenchmen, about whom I wrote to you formerly, are in Poonah; and I beg you to have an eye upon them, in case they should endeavor to pass through your district.

I wish that you would send Capt. Barclay an authority for Gundapoor, and desire him to send it to Major Palmer. I rather think it will be best to give the districts over to Scindiah's people, if you should find they wish to have them, after what I have requested you in the letter to point out to them.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Lucas.*

Camp at Kurkut, 17th Feb. 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has ordered a number of doolies and bearers to be sent up from Poonah, and a surgeon and a number of bullocks belonging to the grain department, to proceed from the army to Ahmednuggur. They are intended to bring away a part of the sick in the hospital at Adjunttee, with their tents, and provisions for the time they will be on the way to Ahmednuggur.

The General desires that you will have a company of Native infantry, under a European officer, in readiness to march for Adjunttee as soon as the doolies will arrive from Poonah, which may be about the 25th. The surgeon, Mr. Stewart, and the bullocks, have already proceeded to Ahmednuggur. It is necessary that the company should carry its camp equipage and spare ammunition, and be provided with as much rice as the men can conveniently carry, that their demands on the store at Adjunttee may be small. This convoy, like the last, must proceed by the way of Toka and Auringabad, and return by the same route.

I have not yet heard of the march of the escort with the gun carriages, &c. ordered on the 9th inst. I hope they are well advanced on their way by this time.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Scott, at Adjunttee.*

Camp at Kurkut, 17th Feb. 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has ordered all the doolies and bearers which are at Poonah to be sent to Adjunttee to bring away such a part as may be practicable of the hospital at that place.

I reckon that 100 doolies will be sent up, and that they will reach Ahmednuggur on the 25th, and will proceed under convoy of a company of Native infantry from that garrison on the 26th or 27th. Mr. Assist. Surgeon Stewart, and a number of carriage bullocks from the army, have already gone to Ahmednuggur, to proceed with the doolies to Adjunttee. Mr. Stewart to attend the sick on their march to Ahmednuggur, and the bullocks to carry their tents, and rice and provisions for them, and the company which escorts them. The General requests that you will apprise Mr. Surgeon Scott of this arrangement, and desire him to have the patients selected, and every thing ready for dispatching them without delay; and you will be so good as to issue what rice the escort can carry, and to send as much more as they may require, and the tents and provisions for the sick on their march to Ahmednuggur, upon the bullocks which will be brought up from that place along with the doolies. These doolies are over and above the 50 doolies and 20 sets of bearers sent off from camp on the 10th, and also independent of 20 sets of bearers who were dispatched from camp on the 16th, with orders to proceed direct to Adjunttee and join the first division.

As there were only 90 Europeans and 245 Natives in the hospital by the returns of the 1st inst., some of whom may be able to march, I think it is possible that the above number of doolies, with the platform carts, may be sufficient for the removal of the whole of the hospital; and I have requested the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley's instructions, in such an event, for the garrison of the place and the stores and provisions which would remain in Adjunttee after supplying the last division of the sick and the escort for their march to Ahmednuggur; those instructions shall be immediately communicated to you. In the mean time I beg to hear from you by return of post what more carriage may be necessary, and if it

were practicable to procure it at Adjutnee or Aurungabad, or even from the subsidiary force.

The General has directed particularly that Mr. Scott must remain at Adjutnee till the whole of the hospital shall be removed.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 18th Feb. 1804.

I have this day received your different dispatches of the 6th, 7th, and 8th; and of the 5th and 6th for the Governor General, which I have forwarded. There is also a letter for me without a date, but which I believe was written on the 5th.

I wish that you would send me a copy of the dispatch to the Governor General, of the 5th (No. 5.), as it contains some valuable information.

Not a word yet from Bengal about the peace with Scindiah; but I hope it has been received: 6 copies of it were sent.

You will have been relieved from all anxiety about Ambajee Inglia, by the dispatch which I sent you lately, announcing the intention of the Governor General not to adhere to his treaty with him. Not that I rely upon that intention either, as he may alter it; and I observe that he is inclined to make the most of the 10th article of the treaty with Ragojee Bhoonslah, notwithstanding my promise to that Chief's valkeel. To this he is urged by Mr. Melville and Col. Harcourt, who do every thing in their power to increase the limits of their province; but I have written a serious dispatch upon the subject.

I agree in opinion regarding your diplomatic arrangements. You have done very right about the soucars. I have been to the southward of Solapoor, after the freebooters, who made some show of an intention of meeting again. But they are now across the Beemah, and can do no more mischief; and I am on my march towards Perinda.

I should have been glad to stay to the southward a few days longer, but I am obliged to go to Poonah; and excepting Wallace, who is with the camp to the northward, there is nobody that I can trust with the command of the cavalry. I declare that this is becoming a most serious concern. My reason for going to Poonah is to meet Webbe, who, I believe, will be there on the 20th; and to endeavor to prevail upon his Highness the Peshwah to give up the Frenchmen, who are at Poonah, after having had an interview with his Highness at Wahy. The Secretary of state for foreign affairs, Rigajee Naig, has almost acknowledged that they are at Poonah, but they are not yet given up. Is not this shocking? What is to be done with the fellow? It is my opinion that he wishes us to adopt some extreme course.

Viswaz Rao Ghautky and Ballojee Punt, Sirjee Rao's buckshee, with a body of horse, who were in the action of the 5th, fled from the field of battle to Wahy; and I dare say that the next place at which I shall meet them will be at the Peshwah's durbar at Poonah! This is our good and faithful ally!

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Camp, on the Seenah, 18th Feb. 1804.

I have returned to the northward along the Seenah, and I shall be tomorrow at Soorapoor or Ilingerry, and on the 20th at Reedoora Naulgaon, on the Seenah.

I conclude that you will have marched from Walkee to Kurkut, either on the 16th or 17th; and that you will have continued your march to Perinda, after having received my letter of the 14th. If you should have reached Kurkut on the 16th, you will be at Taundobwarry this day; if not, you will be there to-morrow, and near Perinda on the 20th.

If you should arrive near Perinda on the 19th, I should wish you to meet me on the 20th at Reedoora, on the Seenah, about 10 miles from Perinda. If you should not be near Perinda till the 20th, I should wish you to meet me on the 21st at Roossa, on the Seenah, 2 or 3 miles to the westward of Perinda, on the road to Poonah.

Tell Capt. Barelay that I shall not want the rice for which I wrote to him yesterday; but that instead of it, I should wish to have 50 bags of rice at Reedoora, on the Seenah, on the 20th.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 18th Feb. 1804.

In answer to your letter of the 13th I have to mention, that unless the Peshwah delivers over the 3 Frenchmen, and all their papers, I do not conceive that he ought to be considered in the light of an ally to the British government, or that he is entitled to such a mark of confidence as is proposed, by showing him the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Camp, 18th Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 31st Jan., and I enclose copies and translations of letters which I have written to Gungaram Pundit and to Rajah Mohiput Ram, on the subject of its contents.

I have forwarded to the Governor General your dispatch of the 31st.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 20th Feb. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 10th. The escape of the piadarries is unlucky, and I have no doubt but that they will enter Berar, as you foresee. But Col. Haliburton must be alert, and march upon them, give them no rest, and then they will soon come away again. I am afraid that they will be joined by the vagabonds of this quarter. But the Subah must keep an army to preserve the peace of his own territories.

I regret the change of the ministry. It will appear to the world as if it had been made because the late ministers had negotiated the peace; and I considered it as a beneficial circumstance that Eitil Punt was so long in our camp, and saw how we went on. Every thing, but particularly this change of councils, convinces me that you ought to stay at Scindiah's durbar till you shall be relieved by Webbe, or by the person whom the Governor General shall appoint the permanent Resident with Scindiah. Your health is mended, and you have given up all thoughts of going to England, unless sent home on a public mission.

I do not think that there is now a great probability that you will be sent in this capacity, for the reasons you state yourself; and because I learn that Col. Houghton is going in the *Tigris*, as soon as the accounts of the peace shall be received. That being the case, you surely cannot be better employed than at Scindiah's durbar; and by the delay of your de-



pasture for some time, you not only will have an opportunity of rendering essential services, but you possibly will regain your health by rest; and you will have a better season for your march to the southward than you have at present. I wish that you would consider these circumstances. I have the pleasure to inform you that the Peshwah has delivered up the Frenchmen. They are now in charge of a guard of British grenadiers at Poonah.

I omitted to mention to you, as an inducement to you to stay at Burchampoor, that Capt. Wilks has been appointed to act as Resident in Mysore during your absence.

To Capt. Wilks, at Mysore.

Camp at Roossa, near Perinda, 21st Feb. 1804.

I have just received your letter of the 9th inst., and I beg leave to congratulate you upon your appointment in Mysore, of which I am convinced that Lord Wellesley will approve. I shall always be ready to assist you with my opinions whenever you may require them, and in any other manner in which you may think that I can be useful to you.

I have lately written to Piele, to recommend that the Rajah's army may be kept upon the frontier till I shall be enabled to break up in this quarter, on receiving the Governor General's ratification of the treaty of peace with Scindiah. Indeed I think they ought to remain in their position till some of the Company's troops shall return to Mysore, as we must expect that some marauders will still keep the field, and the territories of Mysore are a most tempting bait to them.

I have lately driven a band of freebooters out of the Nizam's territories, and some of them are gone towards Meritch. It is not impossible but that they might go farther south, particularly if there should be any hopes that they would not meet with opposition.

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Camp at Roossa, 21st Feb. 1804.

I have received your letters of the 11th, and I think your sunnud will answer well. Ambajee Inglija is just like the rest of the Marhattas. I am not sorry for Gwalior either.

I returned to the army this day, and shall go towards Poonah the day after to-morrow. Webbe is arrived there.

I have settled the subsidiary force. Agnew, Adj. Gen.; Johnson, Dy. Quart. Mast. Gen.; Welsh, Judge Advocate; and Campbell, Postmaster. This is the best I could do.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Roossa, 21st Feb. 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 14th inst. When all the arrangements consequent on the late war, and the treaties of peace shall be made, particularly those which may be necessary in consequence of the 15th article of the treaty of peace with Scindiah, his Excellency the Governor General will probably take into consideration the state of all the military establishments in India, and will fix them in reference to the state of public affairs at the moment.

When he shall take this subject into his consideration, he may find it convenient to keep up the 9th Native regt. on the Bombay establishment; and, on the other hand, if he should think it proper to reduce it, the men will

be required to complete the other Native corps belonging to the Bombay establishment. Till his Excellency shall decide whether the regiment shall be kept or not, the expense of keeping it, considering the fact above mentioned, will be but trifling, and certainly no object in comparison with the advantage of having a regiment of disciplined, instead of one of undisciplined soldiers, supposing that his Excellency the Governor General should determine that it is expedient to keep up the 9th regt.; I, therefore, beg leave to recommend to the Hon. the Governor in Council not to reduce the 9th regt. till he shall receive the further directions of his Excellency the Governor General.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp at Roossa, 22nd Feb. 1804.

I shall leave camp to-morrow, and I expect to arrive at Poonah on the 26th. I shall be obliged to you if you will send my letters, and those for camp, by the Hyderabad dawk, made up in a separate packet. I enclose a letter, which I beg you to send to the killadar of Loghur.

To the Governor of Bombay.

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I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 14th inst. When carrying on the operations of the late war against Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, I found that the rebellion of Canojee Rao Guickwar was very inconvenient, as it kept in employment a large body of troops, which, at the period to which I am alluding, were equipped for service, and which might have marched towards Ougein, and thus have carried the war into the heart of the territories of the most powerful of our enemies, and have created a most seasonable diversion in favor of the troops in this quarter. I therefore requested Major Malcolm, who was at Bombay, to suggest to you the expediency of endeavoring to reconcile Canojee, by making to him some concessions. I was not aware that any former attempts, with these same views, had been made, or that they had been treated in the manner in which it appears, by your dispatch of the 14th, that Canojee received and answered them. If I had had that knowledge, I should have been very certain that, under the circumstances of the moment at which the fresh offers should be made, Canojee would not accept them; and that the effect of the offers would be to draw from him additional insolence. Much less was I aware that you had fixed the amount of the concession to be made to Canojee; and, indeed, upon that

G. O.

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The following detachment to be prepared and held in readiness to march:

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Major Gen. Wellesley proposes proceeding to Poonah to-morrow morning. All reports of this camp to be made to Lieut. Col. Wallace in his absence. All communications necessary to be made to the General to be forwarded to him at Poonah.

While the army remains of the present strength, and composed as at present of so many European troops, the officers at the head of the provision, grain, bullock, and store depôts are to continue to keep and draw for the establishments heretofore fixed for them, as stated hereafter. When the European troops shall be withdrawn, and the quantities of grain carried are reduced, the establishments of those officers are to be the same as those fixed for the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Subahdar of the Deccan.

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point, which I consider to be in a great degree referrible to the Resident at Baroda, as the Guickwar government would pay the expense, I never formed any decided opinion.

The circumstances of the times are much changed, but still it is my opinion that it is desirable that you should have in security the person of Canojee Rao Guickwar. He is a legitimate pretender to the government of the Guickwar state; and I am sorry to observe, that in the present state of the military establishment of all the powers in India, a person of that description will never fail to have numerous followers, for whom he will gain subsistence by the plunder of the country of which he claims the government. You must employ your troops against him, and they must be strong, and equipped in such a manner as to be enabled to act at a distance from their magazines, and in exhausted countries, as they must be prepared to pass the boundaries of the Guickwar state, and to follow Canojee into those of Holkar, or wherever he may go. The operations against Canojee then come to be of considerable importance, and they involve financial and political considerations, upon which it is necessary that you should take the orders of his Excellency the Governor General.

The question is, in what manner is Canojee Rao Guickwar to be reconciled? My opinion is, that too much has been already done, with the best intentions, to carry into execution that object, and that we shall not succeed in it as long as he shall believe, as it appears he does, that the Company's government are anxious to reconcile him. His vakeel repeats in his letter to you the number of offers which had been made to Canojee through various channels, only for the purpose of founding thereon his own insolent answers, and of introducing an account of an insolent debate, which, if it ever took place, is the strongest proof of an indisposition to accept the terms which you are disposed to grant. In fact, Canojee's views have been raised by these offers, and he must be humbled in some degree, before he will accept any terms which, to a man in his situation, can be called reasonable.

I therefore take the liberty of recommending you to answer the letter from the vakeel in very few words, stating that you are concerned to find that Canojee Rao Guickwar is not disposed to accept the terms which you had intended to grant to him, and that you desire that he (the vakeel) will quit the territories of the Guickwar without loss of time. I recommend that you should apprise Col. Murray of the contents of this letter, and order him to have no communication with Canojee Rao Guickwar, which shall not be commenced by Canojee Rao, and no negotiation till Canojee Rao shall have manifested a disposition less haughty, and shall use language less insolent. In giving this recommendation, I am not cavilling about words, but from some experience and intimate knowledge of the Marhatta character, gained by having conducted a variety of negotiations with many chiefs, I am of opinion that no progress can be made in any negotiation that is not founded upon a respect for the character of the British government, and which is not carried on in cordial and civil language.

After having sent away this vakeel, Col. Murray must, of course, be prepared to attack Canojee if he should venture into the territories of the

Quickwar state; and I do not doubt but that he will conduct his operations with such rapidity and vigor, as will induce that chief to repent his conduct, and to refrain from future invasions. The arrangements for the military in Guzerat, which I proposed to you in my letter of the 2nd Aug., will give Col. Murray the means of carrying on these operations. If Canojee should make no overture to renew the negotiations, and he should persist in keeping his troops collected on the frontiers in Holkar's territories, the Governor General must decide upon the measures to be taken against him; and the attack upon Canojee must be one connected with other military operations and movements, to provide for the safety of the corps making it, and to show Holkar the danger of treachery towards it.

I am much obliged to you for the copies of the letters from Col. Murray and Major Walker, with their enclosures, to the Secretary of government in Bengal, which papers I had not before seen.

P.S. I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that a copy of this letter may be sent to Col. Murray.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp, 22nd Feb. 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd, from which I perceive that you have received mine of the 11th Jan.

I joined my camp yesterday, and made the arrangement for the subsidiary force, which I shall send you hereafter. I shall go to Poonah tomorrow to meet Mr. Webbe and Col. Close. The latter is still at Bombay, but I hope that he will arrive at Poonah about the beginning of March. I have already reinforced Guzerat with one battalion of the 9th regt., and I proposed to send there the Bombay battalion now at Poonah. I have drawn from thence the 75th regt., which is to go to Bengal by order of the Governor General, and 5 companies of the 84th will go to Bombay. But Guzerat will still have 2 complete regiments of Europeans, and a disposable Native force of 6 battalions. I see that the Governor General has disapproved of raising the 9th regt.; but either that regiment must continue on the establishment, or some of the corps must be drawn from the coast of Malabar.

If the Governor General should ratify the treaty with Scindiah, I can break up immediately, and send the troops supernumerary to the subsidiary force off to the southward; at least I now think so. It would be very desirable for me to know from you what corps you would wish should form the subsidiary forces. The 2 battalions of the 3rd, the 1st of the 2nd, the 2nd of the 18th, the 1st of the 4th, and 1st of the 10th, appear to be the strongest and most complete corps for the subsidiary force with the Peshwah; but none of them are of the required strength, viz., 1000 firelocks. The 5th or the 7th regt. of cavalry would likewise be the most proper to remain in this country. The 4th regt. have not been at Arcot since the year 1799, and you would possibly wish that corps to go to Arcot. I must inform you, however, that neither the 5th nor the 7th regt. is in such a state of order, or so complete or efficient as the 3rd and 6th; indeed the 5th regt., as I have heretofore reported to you, has always been very bad.

If we should break up, the rice will not be wanted; but till the Governor General shall ratify the treaty, and so long as the troops are in the field, I think it will be advisable to keep the bullocks hired to carry it. If they should be ordered to march, they ought to cross the Kistna by the Kalachabootra ghaut, and to Ahmednuggur by the same route that Major Dallas took.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Roossa, 22nd Feb. 1804.

I returned to my camp yesterday, and having examined my papers, I write in the margin the dates of all the letters which I have received from you since I wrote on the 21st Dec.\* I have also received your letter of the 5th Oct. I shall leave camp, and proceed to Poonah to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Camp, 23rd Feb. 1804.

Bappojee Goneish Goklah called upon me yesterday afternoon, and, after some previous conversation, informed me that he had applied to the Peshwah's government to make a permanent provision for the pay and support of his troops; and that his agent at Poonah had been told by the Peshwah's ministers that the lands held by the family of Pursheram Bhow should be made over to Goklah for this purpose. Goklah said he was desirous to have my opinion upon this subject before he should send his answer to his agent at Poonah. I pointed out to Goklah that it was very improbable that the chiefs of the house of Pursheram Bhow would resign their possessions without a contest; that they were masters of some strong places, and it was probable that the contest would not be a short one; but that, whether it was long or short, the result of it would be, that the country which was to be fought for would be ruined. That, in the mean time, it did not appear that any funds had been provided to pay Goklah's troops, who, I supposed it was intended, should fight this battle; and that certainly a ruined and exhausted country would be but an inadequate reward to them if they should be successful. I then said that it appeared to me that it would be better for Goklah to endeavor to get possession of some countries for the support of his troops, for which he would not have to fight with the most powerful family in the southern part of the Marhatta empire.

Goklah said that he felt the force and truth of every thing I had urged to him; and that he saw clearly he was not equal to a contest with the family of Pursheram Bhow, unless the English should assist him; and that, in fact, he was not desirous of having the possessions of those chiefs, or of seeing them ruined. In answer, I said that it was not necessary that I should tell him whether, in the attempt to gain those possessions, he would or would not be assisted by the British government; that to afford that assistance would not diminish the inconveniences which he would feel, in the mean time, for the want of pay for his troops, or those he would feel for the same want after he should have obtained full possession of a ruined and exhausted country.

Goklah said, that, of course, without the assistance of the British government in money, he should feel those inconveniences. In answer, I told

\* Dec. 5th, 16th, 22nd; Jan. 4th, 7th, 15th, 24th, 28th; Feb. 6th, 12th.

him, that if the British government are to incur all the expense, as well as their troops to perform the service of this expedition against the family of Pursheram Bhow, it would be desirable to ascertain clearly the necessity of destroying this family before the measure should be undertaken; and that, of course, the British government would act in this instance with its usual caution and wisdom. I desired him to understand clearly, that I had given no opinion on the subject whether assistance would be afforded or not, as that was a question which must be referred to the Governor General; but I mentioned these circumstances to him as a friend, to point out the difficulties and delays in the way of carrying this plan into execution; and as a ground for recommending that he should endeavor to obtain the grant of other lands, either not already granted, or in the possession of a family not so powerful as that of Pursheram Bhow. He said that he should follow my advice in every thing.

I have thought it proper to communicate to you this conversation much in detail, and I shall proceed to give you my opinion upon the subject in general; as the plan of the Peshwah, disclosed in this conversation, is one of the utmost importance in every point of view, and will probably cause another war, if it is to be carried into execution.

Goklah says most truly, that it is impossible to carry it into execution without the assistance of the British government, both in money and troops; and it stands to reason, that the British government must exercise its discretion regarding the propriety of attempting it. To attempt it, unless these chiefs should be guilty of some act of infidelity towards the Peshwah's government, would be a breach of an engagement I made to those chiefs in a letter which I wrote to them during the war. But I think that reasons exist for which it should be discountenanced entirely, and that the British government should not assist in it.

The family of Pursheram Bhow are the most ancient friends that the British government have in the Marhatta Empire. Pursheram Bhow had under his command a body of British troops during the former war against Tippoo. His sons and relations, the present chiefs of that family, served in the same army, and there gained a knowledge and respect for the valor and discipline of a British army, which was the first cause of their joining me in the campaign of 1800 against Dhoondiah Waugh. The friendship then established, and the friendly terms on which I was with those chiefs in the beginning of last year, enabled me to bring them forward to Poonah to re-establish the Peshwah on his musnud, although, with or without reason, these chiefs did not wish well to his Highness' cause. This service ought never to be forgotten by the Peshwah, and probably never will be forgotten by the British government, as it is a well known fact, that if the chiefs of the Putwurdum family had done so little in the cause of his Highness, or rather had done so much against that cause at that moment, as others now enjoying his Highness' favor, the success of the march to Poonah would have been a matter of doubt, and if they had opposed the advance, it must have been relinquished under the orders of his Excellency the Governor General. Afterwards, they did not come forward in support of the cause of the allies in the war. But when I consider the circumstances under which that war was commenced, the



nature of the Marhatta character, the fact, that for a Marhatta to suppose the allies would be successful, was to relinquish every idea of national pride, and to lose the recollection of their former triumphs, I am not astonished that these chiefs should have kept aloof. But some of the Marhattas cordially supported the cause of the allies in the war. That cause was supported by two Marhatta chiefs of inferior rank and interest. The troops of both were paid by the British government during the war; and that of the Peshwah did not give the assistance even of the grain and cattle which it might have supplied. Neither of them was considered by the Peshwah as his servant when I marched to Poonah; neither was ordered by the Peshwah to accompany me, and both came because they had known me before, and saw a prospect of advantage.

The chiefs of the Putwurdun family were, at least, neutral in the contest; which neutrality, however, was a most important object for the Company's possessions. I cannot say this for some of the persons now in favor at the Peshwah's durbar. Under the engagement that I have made, that they shall not be attacked so long as they are the faithful servants of the Peshwah, it will certainly be necessary that the Peshwah should produce some proof of their want of fidelity to his government, before he can receive the assistance of the British government in the execution of this plan of destruction. It is probable, in the present state of the Marhatta empire, that either the refusal of these chiefs to resign their lands, or to come to Poonah without the guarantee of the British government for their personal safety, will be deemed acts of infidelity. But admitting them to be so, and that the British government is at liberty, consistently with an adherence to good faith, to act against these chiefs, I still doubt the expediency of giving British assistance to work their destruction. The Putwurdun family, connected, as I have above mentioned, as they are with the British government, are certainly the most respectable of all the Peshwah's subjects properly so called. They are the support of the system of order which exists on the Company's frontier, and on the frontiers of Mysore; and they are a check to the nest of freebooters kept by the Rajah of Kolapoor, and to the numerous polygars who inhabit the countries watered by the Kistna, Malpoorba, and Gutpurba.

If the Peshwah had the power, or had manifested an inclination to establish his government on a respectable footing, or on any footing, I should doubt the propriety of allowing him to root out this family of friends to the British government from their important position, in respect to the frontiers of Mysore and the Company's territories. But when I see that the Peshwah does nothing to settle his government; that the only system of government is that of a robber, I cannot think it expedient to allow this family to be destroyed. In a discussion upon this subject, the motive for their destruction may be considered. It is revenge for the acts of Pursheram Bhow, during the political disputes at Poonah. If it was because these chiefs did not support the cause of the allies in the war, why are not others punished as well as the chiefs of the Putwurdun family? Why do some escape who have actually been opposed to the British troops, and others who did not assist in restoring the Peshwah to his government?

In respect to the plan itself, it will be one of great unpopularity, and of some difficulty in the execution. It is well known throughout the Marhatta Empire, that those chiefs are the ancient friends of the British government, and that they are detested by the Peshwah, for former acts which have nothing to do with the politics of the present day. The other chiefs of the Empire will, I fear, have but little reliance upon the friendship of the British government, to protect them against the effects of the known feeling in the Peshwah's character, if we should be the instruments of his revenge in this instance; and each will expect, in his turn, to become the victim of the same passion. This feeling may operate to induce them to make the defence of the possessions of the Putwurdum family a common cause; and, in that case, the attack of those possessions becomes a military operation of some magnitude and extent.

At all events, whether all the chiefs do or do not make the defence of those possessions a common cause, it is my opinion that it would not be prudent to send any part of the subsidiary force at present to the southern countries to attack them. The attack, therefore, must be made by troops brought from the frontiers of Mysore and the ceded countries: and here arises a new question of expense; another affecting the safety of the frontiers of Mysore, and the Company's territories, while these troops are to be employed in this manner; and a third, regarding the preference of this operation to others in the Company's territories, on parts of which it is absolutely necessary to take some effectual measures to establish the authority of government. Upon the whole, I think I may conclude that the Governor General will not attend to the Peshwah's wishes upon this subject, and I have to request that, if his Highness should propose this plan to your consideration, you will not encourage it till you have taken the orders of his Excellency.

*The D. A. G. to Capt. Lucas.*

Camp at Kurkut, 23rd Feb. 1804.

You will see by the G. O. of yesterday that a European and a Native General Court Martial is ordered to assemble in camp.

You will accordingly order Bhoad Sing, soubahdar, and Jemaul Sahab, jemidar, 2nd batt. 3rd regt. Native infantry, who are in arrest, and all the evidences to be produced for and against them, to proceed to camp near Perinda immediately; and you will also inform Lieut. Burn, of H. M. 81th regt., that his trial will come on as soon as he arrives in camp, whither the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that he will proceed. You will also direct all the evidences for the prosecution, and such others as Mr. Burn has called upon, excepting one of the surgeons, to proceed to camp at the same time as he does. As the two surgeons cannot be spared from the garrison at the same time, one must do the duty of the other in their hospitals respectively, while each goes to camp in his turn to give his evidence on Mr. Burn's trial.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley permits Lieut. Wilson to proceed to Secroor for the benefit of his health.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Camp, 24th Feb. 1804.

I find that I shall not be able to reach Poonah till the 27th, in the morning; but I shall be at Nizam Pett, about 17 miles from Poonah, on the 26th.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 26th Feb. 1804.

I have this day received from Heshmut Jung a copy of Mr. Edmon-

stone's dispatch of the 4th inst., on the subject of his plan for the resumption of the jaghires in the Soubah's territories; in order to provide a fund for the payment of the expense of a reform in the military establishments of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. I am afraid that the Governor General will not approve of the sentiments which I have expressed to Heshmut upon these subjects, and therefore I state to you the grounds of them.

You will have observed that I agree in opinion with the Governor General regarding the resumption of the jaghires. It is a measure which must be attended by great unpopularity, and ought not to be adopted, excepting in a case of very evident necessity; and even in such a case the British government ought not to appear in it, unless it should be necessary in order to carry the measure into execution. This, I am afraid, would be necessary; and you will see that I dislike the whole proceeding, and have pointed out to Heshmut other funds from which he may draw the supplies of money which may be necessary in the reform of the army.

The reform of the army is the point upon which I am not of the same opinion with the Governor General, and I think it very possible that my opinion may be biased by the inconveniences which I have experienced during the war from the extreme weakness of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. However, on the other hand, I do not think that sufficient weight is given in Bengal to the necessity that the army should be employed in all these Native governments, in the administration of the civil government and in the collection of the revenue.

Bengal, 'the paradise of nations,' enjoys the advantage of a civil government, and requires its military force only for its protection against foreign enemies. All the other barbarous establishments called governments, without excepting even that of Fort St. George, have no power beyond that of the sword. Take from them the exercise of that power, and they have no other; and can collect no revenue, can give no protection, and can exercise no government. The Native governments, I mean those of the Nizam and the Peshwah, are 50 times worse than ours in this respect. They do not choose to keep armies themselves, their territories are overrun by a race of armed men, who are ready to enlist with any body who will lead them to plunder; and there is no power in the country to support the government and give protection to the industrious classes of the inhabitants, excepting the British troops.

Upon this subject two questions occur for consideration: one is, whether the subsidiary British troops, now with the Peshwah and the Nizam, are sufficiently strong to be able to give the requisite support to the civil government in all parts. As far as I am able to form a judgment, I am of opinion that they are not; and that if the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan are not to entertain armies for the support of their own authority, the number of troops supplied to each ought to be doubled. I am clearly of opinion that each force is fully equal to any particular service in which they may be employed; but their services are required in so many places at the same time, in these extensive countries, that the number of troops is not sufficient for the demands upon them.

The next question is, whether the Soubah of the Deccan or the Peshwah will pay for an increase of the forces subsidized. It must not be expected that the Soubah of the Deccan will do any such thing. The Peshwah, indeed, may be induced to grant lands in Bundelcund, or in any other province of which he has not possession, to increase his subsidiary force, if at any time he should be disappointed in the execution of any favourite plan, from its weakness; but not otherwise. In fact, excepting in Bundelcund, the Peshwah has nothing to give; and the Soubah of the Deccan will not give any thing.

I have no apprehension of any future foreign wars. Indeed no foreign powers now remain; even if Scindiah should not come into the defensive alliance, we have got such a hold in his durbar, by the treaty of peace, that if ever he goes to war with the Company, one half of his chiefs and of his army will be on our side. But I think that we run a great risk from the freebooter system. It is not known to the Governor General, and you can have no idea of the extent to which it has gone; and it increases daily. I could state facts on this subject, which would prove the extraordinary weakness of the allied governments, and would show the necessity of strengthening them. But a letter is not the proper place for them. Conceive a country, in every village of which there are from 20 to 30 horsemen, who have been dismissed from the service of the state, and who have no means of living excepting by plunder. In this country there is no law, no civil government, and no army to keep these plunderers in order; and no revenue can be collected; indeed no inhabitant can, nor will remain to cultivate, unless he is protected by an armed force stationed in his village. This is the outline of the state of the countries of the Peshwah and the Nizam.

The extension of our arms and influence certainly increases this evil; because, wherever we go, it is soon found out that we are always ready and willing to fight; money is always wanted for the expenses of luxury and debauchery, and armies are discharged to procure it. The danger of the evil is also increased by the extension of our arms, our influence, and our protection: first, by the increase of the number of the people, who must and will subsist by plunder; secondly, by narrowing the scene in which the freebooters may plunder with impunity.

The first requires no illustration. In respect to the second, I have to observe that, after having stood still nearly 40 years (with the exception of the small acquisitions made by Lord Cornwallis from Tippoo), we have, within the last 5 years, extended ourselves by our policy and our bravery over the whole of India, excepting the territories of Holkar and the Rajah of Berar; supposing that Scindiah should come into the defensive alliance. In this vast extent of country, in which the numbers of the people, with arms in their hands, who have no means of living excepting by plunder, are so much increased, no man can venture to plunder without incurring the risk, at least, of being destroyed by a British army. Habits of industry are out of the question; they must plunder for subsistence, or be destroyed, or starve, or be taken into the service of some of the allied powers. As we have now narrowed the scene so much, we must not expect that our own territories will be

entirely free from their depredations. In fact, if they are to meet the Company's troops in all countries, they have no choice excepting the richest and best cultivated, and those in which they are likely to meet the smallest number of these formidable troops. The Company's territories answer the description in every respect; and there, I think, is the danger of our present exalted situation.

The Governor General has never had this picture before him. No man has ever had so many opportunities of contemplating the subject in all its parts as I have; and possibly no man has ever adverted to it. The remedy is clear, viz., to force the allies to keep up their military establishments. This is the first step; I would then give them no assistance in carrying on their internal government, excepting to oppose formidable rebellions. After this is done, by degrees a regulation may be introduced, which I recommended in 1800, in Mysore, viz., that no horse be kept that is not registered, and that no horseman should be allowed to travel through the country without a passport from the government. In this manner the breed will, by degrees, be diminished. But Mr. Edmonstone says, in his dispatch, that to put the military establishments of the allies in a state of efficiency is inconsistent with the fundamental principles on which all the treaties of defensive alliance have been framed, which were to make the powers dependent upon the British government.

In the 1st place, the military establishments can never be made so efficient as to place the Native powers in any other excepting a state of dependence on the British government, in respect to all their foreign concerns.

In the 2nd place, the measure which I propose goes no further than to insist upon having that body of troops really, which the treaties require they should have.

In the 3rd place, if, after all that has happened, I could suppose it possible that any of our allies would rebel against us (for I think that the breach of the defensive alliance ought with propriety to be called rebellion), I should say that they have in their hands at this moment a most formidable weapon against us, in the numerous horse which reside in their countries; every one of whom would join their standard, if it were raised to collect a body for the invasion of the Company's territories, by any chief, no matter by whom. This weapon, the strength of which my system would go to destroy, is far more formidable in the hands of any one of them than the regular military establishments of all of them put together.

I see clearly that the Governor General has never contemplated this state of the question; indeed he could not contemplate it, for it has never been brought before him in any shape. The gentlemen at the Residences see nothing excepting what passes in the durbars, and therefore could not report it; and it could not reach the Governor General in any other manner. I have had many opportunities of seeing and feeling the effects of the evil. Seindiah's and Ragojee Bhoomslah's armies were composed of horse drawn from the countries of the Nizam and the Peshwah, and from Mysore. The freebooters whom I destroyed the other day, and who had become amazingly numerous, were, first of all, 500 horse belonging to Seindiah, who escaped from Ahmednuggur the day the pettah was

taken; about 100 belonging to Ragojee Bhoonslah's amildar of Naemgaum; and about 300 brought from Scindiah's army by Viswaz Rao Ghautky. When I destroyed them they were a very formidable body, which nothing but British troops could venture to oppose; and they were composed of horsemen collected from Poonah and from the districts of Bheer, Perinda, Dharore, Beeder, Puttun, &c. I mention this as a fact, which I know from information collected on the spot.

Heshmut Jung, in a letter which I received from him this day, dated the 19th, talks of a party of them having been defeated by the Soubah's troops, with an immense slaughter of the freebooters. I mention this just to show you the kind of information picked up at the durbars. The fact was, the Nizam's troops were at first defeated by a party of freebooters under Mulwa Dada, who were not engaged with me. During the action Mulwa Dada heard of the defeat of the party under Ghautky and the others, by my troops, and he was afraid to push his advantage so far as he might have done. In the mean time the guns were brought up, and a cannonade was commenced. Mulwa Dada went off, and in his retreat lost some baggage; but he could have lost very little, as, in my pursuit of the others across the Beeniah towards Beejapoor, I heard of him with a great quantity of baggage. In order to bring this subject before the Governor General, I called the attention of Heshmut Jung to the state of the military establishments belonging to the Nizam; and I now give you the grounds of my opinion. The remedy is clear, easy, and I think not attended with danger. This last is the only point on which we differ. But take the danger at its greatest pitch, and I think it not so great as that which will be the consequence of the increase of the freebooter system.

P.S. I shall be at Poonah to-morrow.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. de Meuron, Seringapatam.*

26th Feb. 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has just now received your letter of the 18th inst., and being particularly busy, has not time to write you to-night himself. He has therefore desired me to request that you will direct the engineer to erect the wall which you have deemed necessary between the post office and the place in which the Bilghy Rajah is confined; and that you will report to government that you have done so without waiting for their orders, as a matter of urgent necessity, the expense whereof will be trifling. The engineer should at the same time forward his estimate of the expense to the proper office.

To Col. Munay.

Camp at Poonah, 27th Feb. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th inst., in which you have enclosed a copy of a treaty which you have made with the Rajah of Lunawara. There is no date to that instrument, but, from the purport of your former letters; I imagine that it has been concluded since you received the accounts of the signature of the treaty of peace with Scindiah. If that should be the case it cannot be ratified, and the British government cannot return the name of the Rajah of Lunawara as one of the chiefs with whom a treaty had been made, and whose case is provided for by the 9th article of the treaty of peace. Your promise to the Rajah that this year's revenue should not be taken from him, will, of course, be performed, and the Rajah will be entitled to all the benefits of the 10th article of the treaty of peace.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace.*

27th Feb. 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will order a committee of officers to examine the effects of the late Lieut. Col. Harness, and compare them with the accompanying list made out at Ellichpoor. If there be any deficiency, the servant, who has been in charge of the effects, ought to be made to account for it. After they have been examined, the General requests that you will order them to be sold by public outcry, and a staff officer to superintend the sale, to receive the money, out of which he will in the first place pay the sum of 55 star pagodas into the pay office in camp, being a sum advanced by the officer in charge of the sick at Ellichpoor, out of the public money lodged in his hands, to Lieut. Col. Harness' servant, according to the enclosed account; what other expenses may have been incurred in bringing on the effects to the army, and the other debts in camp: after which, the balance is to be remitted to Lieut. Col. Harness' executors, of whose names Capt. Tolfrey will inform you.

The officer, appointed by you to superintend the sale of Lieut. Col. Harness' effects, must be also authorised to draw what arrears of Company's allowances may be due to the Lieut. Colonel's estate, and are payable in camp, and be directed to remit the same, with the balance of cash arising from the sale of the effects, to the executors.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. de Meuron.*

28th Feb. 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has observed in the minutes of Major Symons' inquiry into the plot for the escape of the Bilghy Rajah from his confinement in Seringapatam, that strangers were allowed to visit and remain with him during the night, that he was allowed to converse with whomsoever he chose, and even that he has taken off his irons at times.

The General therefore desires that you will give the most particular orders that no strangers may be permitted to go into the place of confinement of the Bilghy Rajah, and that neither he nor any of the state prisoners in Seringapatam may be allowed to converse with any person whatever; and further, that they may all be handcuffed, as well as fettered, with strong irons; the handcuffs only to be taken off, by a non-commissioned officer of the guards over them, when they are at their victuals or at their necessary occasions, and immediately replaced when those are over. The sentinels must be also directed to examine the irons on all the prisoners at every relief, and to report immediately if they are in the least out of order.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Poonah, 29th Feb. 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd inst. I followed the freebooters to the Beemah, to the southward of Solapoor, and in fact I was not farther than 30 or 40 miles from Beejapoor. I remained upon the Beemah till the 19th, and then returned to the northward, and joined the army on the 22nd, near Perinda. There was not a soul near the Beemah when I was in that part of the country; and in fact the bands of freebooters whom I had pursued were entirely dispersed; and some of them have been caught in their flight to the northward, by the Mysore troops, which escorted me from the army to this place. I rather believe that your intelligenceer must have reported to you what passed before I reached the Beemah, as the enemy were then collected at Dewanganm, and wanted to enter Solapoor, but the Rajah stopped them; they then returned to the northward, but, hearing of me, they went off to the westward and dispersed.

To Major Graham.

Poonah, 29th Feb. 1804.

I conclude that by this time you will have given up to the agents of Dowlut Rao Scindiah the places restored to him by the 8th article of the

bounty of the Hon. Company. But this arrangement will not prevent you from paying them in any other parts of the Marhatta Empire, if you should think it proper; and if any of the pensioners, or Amrut Rao, should wish to reside in any other part of India, you will be so kind as to apply to the Governor General in Council for orders to the British authority, at the places in which such persons may choose to reside, to provide for the payment of their stipends.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

Since I wrote to you last, I have received your private letters of the 7th and 13th, and several public letters, which I shall acknowledge and answer by this day's post. In answer to those two, I have only to observe, that I should not have noticed the circumstances to which they relate, only that I saw that they would become the subject of discussion in Bengal; and I wished you to avoid all discussions upon points which can tend to keep alive heats and animosities, by which your efforts in the service of the public must be impeded.

We have not exactly understood each other about the Rajah of Lunawara, but I shall set all right in my letter of this day.

To Col. Murray.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 13th, 22nd, and 23rd Feb.

You will observe by a letter which I have lately addressed to the Governor of Bombay, a copy of which I requested him to transmit to you, that I conceive it to be absolutely necessary to dismiss Canojee's vakeel, and that the negotiation with that chief ought not to be renewed, excepting by his request, made in terms of decent civility. If I had been aware of the transactions with Canojee before I came to this part of the country, I never should have recommended a negotiation with him.

When I wrote to you on the 27th Feb., I did not exactly comprehend the reason for which the treaty with the Rajah of Lunawara bore no date, as I had not received your letter of the 13th, which fully explains that circumstance, as well as the reasons for which the agreement with the Rajah had not been reduced to writing at an earlier period. In a transaction of this nature, however, the very foundations of which are the necessity of preserving the Company's faith, and the confidence of the enemy in the honor of the British government, it is necessary to proceed with caution in every instance. Accordingly I wish you to let me know the particular agreement which you have made verbally with the Rajah of Lunawara before you received my letter of the 26th Jan.: I still fear that Scindiah's ministers may object to the treaty, that it was not concluded till 6 weeks after they had signed the treaty of peace. However, if verbal engagements were made, by which both parties were bound, it must answer the same purpose.

I shall send you orders regarding the trial of the officers in arrest.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

Naroo Hurry, to whom I delivered the paper enclosed with your letter of 6th Feb., has informed me that he cannot get possession of the villages



which the minister intended he should have, till he shall produce a sunnud from his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. I request you to do me the favor to apply for this sunnud, and to forward it to me.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

Since I wrote to you last, I have received particular accounts, on which I can rely, that the frechooters, or many of them, are gone off to the northward, and have broken. Some of them are now at Rymurpoor, near Sattarah, between this and Meriteh, and I propose forthwith to disperse them. I shall be obliged to you if you will send the money you have for me to Hyderabad. The bullocks and grain may as well be kept till some future opportunity.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose two dispatches from Major Maleolm; I shall be obliged to you, if you will be so kind as to make arrangements to be prepared to take up the bills which Major Maleolm will have drawn on you for one lac and a half of rupees. I have written to Gen. Campbell, to request that he will send to Hyderabad the money waiting on the Toombuddra, for the use of the troops, part of which may be applied to the discharge of Major Maleolm's draft, and the remainder be sent to Dharore.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Camp, Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

I received yesterday your letters to the 25th and 26th Feb., and I should have written to you before now, if I had had leisure upon my march to, or since my arrival at, this place.

I beg that you will allow Lieut. Shawe to go to Bombay. Send me a regular application for leave of absence for him. You did quite right to open the letter from the officer coming with the tents.

Barclay will send you orders respecting Col. Harness' baggage; and you shall have the order for the distribution of the remount horses, as soon as I shall receive the proceedings of the casting committees.

When you shall find it necessary to move, I wish you to keep up the Seenah towards Ahmednuggur. If you should find that Gopal Bhugwunt stays in your neighbourhood, send Bistnapah to make a dash at him. But I think he is going towards the Rajah of Berar's country; at least he sent me word that he was.

I hear from camp that every body was well satisfied with the arrangements which I made before I left it, excepting your friend —. I must say that I think his dissatisfaction is unreasonable; and its existence entirely removes the regret which I felt upon the disappointment which he suffered. Supposing that your friendship for him gave him a claim upon you, his friendship for you should induce him to omit urging that claim, when your ease, your satisfaction, and your future success are at stake. I declare that I conceive it was necessary you should have Capt. Johnson in the subsidiary force, and I do not think it would have been fair to call upon him to make every sacrifice, in order that you might have that advantage. It was desirable to you, but not equally necessary, to have

——. You have therefore, in my opinion, decided as every man ought who takes upon himself a public charge : and if you are not of the same opinion now, you will be so soon as you have anything to do.

To Major Malcolm.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 16th, 17th, and 18th, and have forwarded the enclosures to Major Kirkpatrick, and I have requested him to be prepared to take up your drafts.

I enclose you a letter which will remove all uneasiness about the treaty of peace. The minutes of the conferences had been received ; but not one copy of the treaty. I have sent 6 copies. I have no anxiety respecting the draft of the treaty which you have received from Scindiah's ministers : it is probably in the same style with the treaty of peace, in two articles given to me, which you will find recorded in the minutes. But whether you can conclude the treaty of alliance or not, I hope that you will stay at Scindiah's durbar till every thing is settled. You have the Governor General's opinion upon the subject ; you have Webb's, and you have my most anxious request ; and I hope that, after all these, you will not think of coming away, particularly as your health is mended.

I am every day more convinced that it is necessary that I should quit this country. In short, nothing can settle till I do quit it. But of course I shall not go, if there should be a war with Holkar. This I think very improbable, notwithstanding the reports we have from your quarter, as well as from Hindustan. Mercer is in treaty with Meer Khan ; and if he should draw him off from Holkar, there is an end of the latter. I have had one conversation with Munkaiscer since my arrival here, in which there was more confidence than I expected ; and the result of which was, in my opinion, favorable.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th Feb. My letter to the Adj. Gen., dated the 6th July, 1803, will have shown that I wished all accounts of expenses, incurred by officers on the Bombay establishment, to be submitted for audit to the Auditor Gen. at Bombay, and to be settled with that Presidency. All expenses relating to the stores at Poonah, with which the Resident has nothing to do, come under this head.

Capt. Young's accounts shall be rectified in the manner wished by the Military board ; but it is necessary that they should be sent to me for that purpose. I never conceived that my signature was a voucher to the correctness of the charges contained in any account to which it might be affixed ; or even of the propriety of incurring any expense. I conceive that my signature to an account is only an authority to the paymaster to discharge it ; and that it is afterwards liable to all the forms of audit, &c., required by the regulations of the government. I am not aware whether this notion is consistent with the principles of the Bombay regulations ; but if it should not be so, I beg to be informed of it.

To Major Graham.

Poonah, 2nd March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 1st inst. It is necessary for a man

who fills a public situation, and who has great public interests in charge, to lay aside all private considerations, whether on his own account or that of other persons. I imagine that you must feel on this subject as I do. I am very much distressed on account of the inconveniences which your family suffer in your absence from Madras; and equally so, that it is not in my power to relieve their distress, by allowing you to quit your situation. But, under present circumstances, it is not in my power to grant your request to go to Madras, consistently with the duty which both you and I owe to the public, as public men. I shall be much obliged to you if you will not urge me again upon this subject.

To Major Malcolm.

Poonah, 3rd March, 1804.

I enclose a gazette, which will show you that the treaty has been ratified. The first copy which arrived was that which I sent to Burhampoor with you.

I have received your letter of the 21st. You must recollect that in the conferences, I positively refused to agree to the proposition that every thing south of the Company belongs to Scindiah; as I should thereby agree that Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud were his, which, by another article of the treaty, would be independent of him and every body else. I trust that I am getting on a little here.

P.S. I enclose the copy of the translation of a letter which I have written to Graham, which ought to satisfy Scindiah's mind about his countries here. In fact they are restored to him.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Camp at Poonah, 3rd March, 1804.

I rather think it will be desirable to draw some of the troops a little nearer to Poonah, in order to settle some of the political points now depending. I therefore wish that, upon the receipt of this letter, you would send the 78th regt. and 2 battalions of sepoys, of which Hill's corps may as well be one, with their guns, to march by the road which I took towards Gardoon on the Beemah. From Gardoon they must keep along the Beemah, till they come near the junction of the Moota Moola with that river. Send 500 of Bistnapah's horse with the 78th, &c., and let them have with them 20 days' arrack and provisions. Let some proper person have charge of the Company's camels and draught bullocks that will go with them; and let their guns, as far as possible, be the Bombay guns with Scindiah's cattle.

I should wish the army to keep up the Seenah. You can afterwards come towards the Beemah, gradually, to join the detachment above ordered to march by the route by which I marched. It will not answer to march by that route with the whole army, as there is neither water nor forage, excepting the former in wells, and the latter in small quantities. You will probably be able to arrange the marches better than I have done in the enclosed; but, after Gardoon, this route is not to be followed, excepting as far as it leads along the Beemah. Take care to keep up a communication with this detachment in order that you may be able to supply them with provisions.

— You have therefore, in my opinion, decided as every man ought who takes upon himself a public charge: and if you are not of the same opinion now, you will be so soon as you have anything to do.

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To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Camp at Poonah, 3rd March, 1804.

I rather think it will be desirable to draw some of the troops a little nearer to Poonah, in order to settle some of the political points now depending. I therefore wish that, upon the receipt of this letter, you would send the 78th regt. and 2 battalions of sepoys, of which Hill's corps may as well be one, with their guns, to march by the road which I took towards Gardoon on the Beemah. From Gardoon they must keep along the Beemah, till they come near the junction of the Moota Moola with that river. Send 500 of Bistnaph's horse with the 78th, &c., and let them have with them 20 days' arrack and provisions. Let some proper person have charge of the Company's camels and draught bullocks that will go with them; and let their guns, as far as possible, be the Bombay guns with Scindiah's cattle.

I should wish the army to keep up the Seenah. You can afterwards come towards the Beemah, gradually, to join the detachment above ordered to march by the route by which I marched. It will not answer to march by that route with the whole army, as there is neither water nor forage, excepting the former in wells, and the latter in small quantities. You will probably be able to arrange the marches better than I have done in the enclosed; but, after Gardoon, this route is not to be followed, excepting as far as it leads along the Beemah. Take care to keep up a communication with this detachment in order that you may be able to supply them with provisions.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Poonah, 3rd March, 1801.

I have this day received your letter of the 16th Feb. I beg that you will inform the ministers of the Rajah of Berar, that I intended that the lands to be ceded to the Rajah, under the 5th article of the treaty of peace, should be contiguous to the forts of Nermulla and Gawilghur, according to the words of the article; and, *bonâ fide*, of the yearly value of 4 lacs of rupees.

The difficulty was, to find out what was the real value of any of the lands in Berar; and, in order to ascertain it, I adopted the mode proposed by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, the Rajah's vakeel in my camp; viz., to call for the accounts of the collections for the last 40 years, and to fix the value of the districts to be ceded according to the result of the examination of those accounts. This was done accordingly, and although it may happen that the districts ceded may not now yield the revenue at which they have been valued, as these very districts were the seat of the war for nearly 3 months, there is no doubt but that they will yield the whole of it hereafter. At all events, I could not fix the value of the districts in any other manner, consistently with justice to all the parties concerned in the decision; and this manner ought to be satisfactory to the Rajah, as it was proposed by his own vakeel.

In respect to the situation of the lands, I beg that you will mention to the Rajah's ministers that I resisted the importunities of the servants of the Subah of the Deccan to fix upon districts at a distance from the forts; and in fixing upon those to be ceded to the Rajah of Berar, the greater number was chosen by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, and I hear from Capt. Johnson that the whole arrangement was concluded very much to the satisfaction of the Rajah's vakeel.

Under these circumstances I am very much surprised that the Rajah's ministers should have brought forward any complaints upon this subject.

In case Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder should have returned to Nagpoor, I beg that you will inform him that his Excellency the Governor General has been pleased to grant him a pension of 6000 rupees *per annum*, from the 17th Dec. 1803. I will forward to you the sunnud for this pension in the course of a few days.

The D.A.G. to Capt. Johnson.

Camp at Poonah, 3rd March, 1801.

I have laid your letter of the 28th ult., with its enclosures, before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, and am directed by him to request that you will give directions to Mr. Hawkins to apply to the officer commanding at Ahmednuggur for permission, and afterwards to make a thorough search of all the pipes or water-courses which now do, or formerly did, bring water into that fort, so as to ascertain the cause of the present deficiency; and, without further reference, to take all measures necessary for bringing back all the former streams into the fort, so as to insure an ample supply in future; and in the mean time the Major General authorises Mr. Hawkins to turn in from the pettah as much of the stream mentioned by him as may be necessary for the present supply of the fort.

Major Gen. Wellesley authorises you to draw a second advance of money, equal to one third of the estimate for building ramps at Ahmednuggur, in consequence of the report of the committee on that work.

The Army of the Deccan to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Camp at Poonah, 4th March, 1804.

At a meeting of the principal officers of Gen. Wellesley's division of the army,

assembled in Col. Wallace's tent on the 26th Feb. 1804, a proposal was made to present Gen. Wellesley with a token of their esteem, accompanied by an appropriate letter. Col. Wallace in the chair. The following proposals were made :

To present Gen. Wellesley with a handsome gold vase, of superior workmanship, of the value of 2000 guineas, with an inscription recording the principal event, so decisive of the campaign in the Deccan, and denoting the present from the officers to Gen. Wellesley.

It is proposed, that officers commanding corps, staff and departments, should send the secretary a list of officers who may choose to subscribe, in order that the sum may be ascertained ; and they are requested to receive the amount subscribed, and pay it to a committee, that will hereafter be appointed, on or before the 1st May next.

The above proposals were submitted for general consideration, and a meeting was again requested in Col. Wallace's tent at 10 o'clock in the morning of the 28th Feb.

Camp, near Perinda, 28th Feb. 1804.

The officers having assembled agreeably to appointment, communicated the general approbation of the officers of Gen. Wellesley's division of the army of the proposals suggested at the meeting of the 26th ; and appointed a committee from their number, to receive the amount subscribed, and to carry into execution the wishes of the officers.

*Committee.*

President ; Col. Wallace.

Members ; Major Swinton and Major Dallas.

Treasurer ; Capt. Heitland.

*Proposed Inscription on the Vase.\**

' Battle of Assye, Sept. 23rd, 1803. Presented to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, by the Officers of the division of the Army who served under his immediate command in the Deccan, in commemoration of the campaign in 1803.'

The Committee directed the following letter to be written to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding the division of the army in the Deccan, &c.

The officers who served with the division of the army under your immediate command, in the Deccan, are desirous of presenting you a pledge of their respect and esteem ; and to express the high idea they possess of the gallantry and enterprise that so eminently distinguish you, they request your acceptance of a golden vase of the value of 2000 guineas, on which it is proposed to record the principal event that was decisive of the campaign in the Deccan.

In conveying to you this mark of their esteem, they sincerely add their wishes for your future welfare and prosperity, and their hopes, that when the public claims on your talents allow you repose, this vase may give pleasure to your social hours, in bringing to your remembrance events that add so much to your renown.

W. WALLACE, Lieut. Col. commanding 5th brigade ; J. M. CHALMERS, Lieut. Col. commanding 4th brigade ; J. KENNEDY, Lieut. Col. 19th dragoons, commanding 1st brigade cavalry ; J. FORTNAM, Major 19th light dragoons, and officers of H. M.'s 19th dragoons ; J. COLEBROOKE, Capt., and officers, 5th regt. Native cavalry ; ——— DAVIDSON, Lieut., and officers, 4th regt. Native cavalry ; R. HIDDLESTON, Major, and officers, 7th regt. Native cavalry ; W. CUNNINGHAM, D.Q.M.G., and officers of the general staff ; J. LIMOND, Capt., and officers of artillery ; S. SWINTON, Major, and officers, H. M.'s 7th regt. ; A. ADAMS, Lieut. Col., and officers, H. M.'s 78th regt. ; J. M. CHALMERS, Lieut. Col., and officers, 1st batt. 2nd Native regt. ; P. H. VESY, Capt., and officers, 1st batt. 3rd Native regt. ; J. HILL, Lieut. Col., and officers, 1st batt. 4th Native regt. ; W. ORROCKS, Lieut. Col., and officers, 1st batt. 8th Native regt. ; P. DALLAS, Major, and officers, 1st batt. 10th Native regt. ; A. MACLEOD, Lieut. Col., and officers, 2nd batt. 12th Native regt. ; W. HEITLAND, Capt., and officers, 1st batt. pioneers ; J. JOHNSON, Capt., and officers, engineers.

\* A service of plate, with the inscription, was afterwards substituted for the gold vase.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace, &c., and Officers of the division of the Army in the Deccan.

Camp at Poonah, 4th March, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st inst., in which you have announced your intention to present to me a most handsome pledge of your respect and esteem, which shall commemorate the great victory which you gained over the enemy. Be assured, gentlemen, that I never shall lose the recollection of the events of the last year, or of the officers and troops, by means of whose ability, zeal, and disciplined bravery, they have in a great measure been brought about in this part of India; but it is highly gratifying to me to be certain, that the conduct of the operations of the war has met with the approbation, and has gained for me the esteem, of the officers under my command.

To Major Shawe.

Camp, 7th March, 1804.

The letter which will go this day to the Governor General, will show you the state of affairs at Poonah. Take my word for it, that the Peshwah will come into no arrangement for the partition of the conquered countries; and that he will commence his intrigues immediately with Scindiah's durbar, respecting Jansi, Calpee, &c., which the Governor General may have taken for the convenience of our frontier. He will grant sunnuds for them to Scindiah or Ambajee Inglia, or he will intrigue in any other manner to distress the British government.

In order to bring the proposed partition treaty and the cession of Jansi and Calpee to a favorable conclusion, there is but one remedy, and that is to bribe the Peshwah with money; to supply him with small sums occasionally, till he shall finally have come into all the Governor General's views, for the final settlement of the peace, and for the frontier of Bengal.

Nothing but this will answer. The Peshwah is callous to every thing but money and revenge. He will call upon the British government to gratify the latter passion; but he will make no sacrifices unless to procure money. I must see Col. Close before I give my opinion about his sincerity. I think it will be difficult to account for his having the Frenchmen concealed in Poonah for a month, and having never communicated one word to the British Resident respecting their arrival. But supposing him to be insincere, it is difficult to say what ought to be done at the present moment. The arrangements which I have made for restoring to the Peshwah the forts of Poonadur and Loghur, will conciliate his Highness to us; and will show us what effect that will have. At all events, they will lay the grounds for any other measure that the Governor General may think proper to adopt, whether of force or bribery, to induce his Highness to come into our views; and it has really become absolutely necessary to give the Peshwah's government some respectability in the eyes of his own subjects, and of foreign nations.

The appointment of our killadar to the fort of Loghur, upon which the communication with Bombay depends, was worth the 50,000 rupees which I agreed to pay for the fort of Poonadur; and I was happy to have an opportunity of showing upon that occasion, and in giving 2 months'



pay to the 2000 men, which, in my opinion, was justly due, that we were desirous to forward the Peshwah's objects, and to attend to his wants whenever he should demonstrate a spirit of accommodation. I shall write fully about the southern jaghiredars when I shall have seen Col. Close.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Chowke, 7th March, 1804.

After I had completely dispersed the freebooters, who had for some time infested the frontiers of the Soubah of the Deccan and of the Peshwah, I returned to the northward and joined the army near Perinda on the 21st Feb. I quitted it on the 23rd, with the troops under Goklah and Appah Dessaye, and a squadron of Native cavalry, to go to Poonah, where I arrived on the 27th.

Upon the former occasion on which I visited Poonah, I observed that every attempt made by the officers employed by the British government, to settle the government of his Highness the Peshwah, had been resisted by his Highness; and every object recommended to his attention had been neglected. The same had occurred during my absence, and it was particularly stated, in reply to a recommendation, which I had forwarded, that his Highness should pardon some of his Pagah horse; or that, if he was not willing to pardon them, he should send and take possession of his horses, of which they had had the use, 'that it was not proper that his Highness should adopt those measures upon my recommendation.' I therefore determined, on this visit to Poonah, not to ask his Highness to admit me to an audience, and to avoid to recommend any measure to his attention through his ministers, unless my opinion and advice should be required; as every measure which I had to recommend was with a view to pardon and conciliate his Highness' numerous subjects, from whom he has undoubtedly received great injuries, rather than to revenge those injuries at the present moment.

Shortly after my arrival at Poonah, the Peshwah's minister, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, appointed a day to meet and converse with me on the Peshwah's affairs, previous to a meeting for the same purpose which, he said, his Highness was desirous of having with me.

There were present at the meeting, which took place on the 1st March, Suddasheo Munkaiseer, Anund Rao, and Byajee Naig. Suddasheo Munkaiseer first alluded to the fact, that peace had been made with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and he said, that his Highness the Peshwah had not been consulted on the terms of the peace, and that his orders had not been taken on many points in which his interest was concerned.

In answer, I told Suddasheo Munkaiseer, that the fact of the vakeels of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar being in my camp, and treating for peace, was notorious; and that as his Highness the Peshwah had troops and a vakeel there on his part, he must have been apprised of it at a very early period after their arrival: that Scindiah's vakeels were there nearly two months, and the Rajah of Berar's nearly one month, before their negotiations were concluded by treaties of peace; and that there certainly had been many opportunities for his Highness to intimate to me his wishes

regarding his objects with those Chiefs respectively. He had omitted, however, to attend to his interest upon this occasion, and the treaties of peace had been concluded. But I observed, that though they had been thus concluded, and I had not had the benefit of being made acquainted with his Highness' wishes, I hoped, when your Excellency should give orders that the treaties might be communicated to his Highness, that his Highness would find that his interests had not been neglected by me. Suddasheo Munkaiseer then adverted to the conclusion of the foreign war; but said there still remained the punishment of rebels. I begged him to name them; and he said, 'Amrut Rao and the freebooters who had been plundering on the frontiers,' and who had lately been defeated and dispersed by the British troops. He went much at large into the subject of the Peshwah's complaints against Amrut Rao; and declared that even his name was so odious to his Highness, that if it were only mentioned in his presence, it would be necessary for his Highness to perform his ablutions.

In answer to this speech, I related the progress of the British government and their armies, from the date of the signature of the treaty of Bassein, to the moment of the breaking out of the war with the confederated Marhatta chiefs. I pointed out to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had derived all the benefit of his treaty with the Company, and that he had been restored to the exercise of the powers of his government; but that when he was called upon to perform his part of the treaty, and to produce his army, his treasure to pay his troops, his provisions and equipments in the common cause in which the allies were subsequently engaged, he was deficient in every respect. I said that I did not mean to inquire into the causes of that deficiency. It existed at the moment of difficulty, and for what cause the inquiry was not then material; but that as I was charged with the defence of his Highness' territories and person, it was necessary that I should take every step to preclude the possibility that his Highness should suffer from this deficiency.

On this ground, as soon as the war broke out, it had appeared important to me to secure, by a treaty of peace, one great branch of the confederated chiefs, and I had made a treaty with Amrut Rao, of which I, and of course his Highness, had received all the advantage during the war; and I further observed that his Highness had been distinctly apprised that this measure would be adopted if he should omit to furnish his *quota* of troops, &c., for the war.

In respect to the freebooters upon the frontier, I observed, that I had beaten and dispersed them. It was true that I had not seized their persons; but I informed Suddasheo Munkaiseer that the principal of all those persons, Sirjee Rao Ghautky, had resided at the Peshwah's durbar, where he had received marks of his Highness' favor; that I had reason to believe that his brother, Viswaz Rao Ghautky, had fled to Waly, after his action with me on the 5th Feb., and that he had been received into his Highness' presence; and that certainly I thought if one freebooter deserved punishment, it was he who had been the principal, but who had received marks of his Highness' favor.

In answer, Byajee Naig denied that Sirjee Rao Ghautky had received

the marks of his Highness' favor which I supposed he had. He said that Sirjee Rao had been allowed to depart, because it was not the custom of the durbar to seize the persons of those who had been allowed, or who had been encouraged, to come to Poonah to pay their respects to the Peshwah.

Munkaiseer observed, that the reason for which the Peshwah had omitted to perform his treaty was, that the Putwurdun and other principal jaghiredars of the Empire had refused to serve, and had disobeyed his Highness' orders. He said that Goklah and Appah Dessaye had served; and it was his Highness' wish to reward them with the lands held by the chiefs of the family of Pursheram Bhow, by Prittee Niddee, and by Rastia; and he asked whether the principle of rewarding those who did serve, and of punishing those who did not, was not fair?

I told Munkaiseer, that it was not possible for me to give any answer to a question asked in such a manner. I said that I considered the plan which he had then proposed to my consideration, viz., to destroy all the great families of the state, as one of the greatest importance, and likely to be attended with much difficulty in the execution, in the present state of the Marhatta Empire. I observed to Munkaiseer, that the Peshwah had not even settled the country about Poonah; and that after having come out of a foreign war of great extent, he was about to commence a domestic one.

I then asked Munkaiseer what resources of money and troops his Highness had to carry on this war, and in what manner he proposed to proceed? In answer, he gave me to understand, that his Highness expected the assistance of the British government; and he gave me the choice of two plans, either to begin with the family of Pursheram Bhow, or with Rastia and Prittee Niddee; and to deceive, in the mean time, that party whose destruction might be delayed.

I told Munkaiseer that his plan was impracticable: that those chiefs were not to be deceived by the Peshwah; that the whole would join for their common defence; that, in that case, the operations against them would become of importance; that they could not, at all events, be undertaken without your Excellency's orders; and that while they were carrying on, the foreign enemy might come in again, and his Highness and his territories would be involved in fresh difficulties and troubles.

I observed to Munkaiseer that, in my opinion, it would be much better for his Highness, after 7 years of difficulty and civil wars, in the course of which, nearly every man in the Empire had at some time or other been opposed to his government and armies, to endeavor, by pardon and conciliation, to settle his government and country, than to enter on any system of revenge so extensive as that proposed, and so dangerous and so imprudent.

Munkaiseer asked how his Highness' country was to be settled: and said his Highness' most anxious wish was to follow the advice of the British government in every thing. I here again recommended the plan which I apprised your Excellency, in my letter of the 15th Jan., I had recommended to Lieut. Col. Close, with a view to a final settlement with Amrut Rao, which went to the release of the persons and the restoration

of the houses and property of Amrut Rao's servants in Poonah and elsewhere; and to the evacuation of the fort of Poonadur, by the killadar, upon receiving 50,000 rupees for the arrears of his garrison, and being permitted to depart with his property from the fort. In answer, Munkaiseer denied that many of the persons included in the list which I had sent to Col. Close were servants of Amrut Rao; and he said that it was entirely inconsistent with the rules of the Peshwah's durbar ever to pay money to those who were in rebellion.

I told him that although I recommended, I did not require, the release of the servants of the state, included in the list of his own servants given in by Amrut Rao; but I said that, in every case, the British government were desirous of sparing the effusion of blood, and even if the fort were attacked, would give money to procure its evacuation, as, I observed, had been done at Asseerghur in the late war.

Munkaiseer said that, besides the fort of Poonadur, the possession of the fort of Loghur was absolutely necessary to enable the Peshwah to conduct his government, and live in peace and respectability at Poonah. I answered, that the killadar of Loghur had, above two years before, offered to relinquish his fort upon very reasonable terms, and that he had lately renewed the offer, but that his Highness would not listen to it, because it did not go to the punishment and plunder of the killadar; and now there was more reason to believe that the killadar would not agree to surrender his fort.

I observed that the siege of Loghur was a very serious operation, for which, as usual, his Highness had no means, and depended upon the British government; and it certainly was incumbent upon that government to see that there were just grounds for depriving the killadar of his fort before they entered upon that operation. I here remarked that, during the late war, his fort had been most important, and the killadar of Loghur had conducted himself in a satisfactory manner.

Munkaiseer said, that the killadar had lately sent some Arabs from his fort to attack a fort in the Konkan belonging to the Peshwah, which they had taken; and that a fort under Loghur had lately fired upon the Peshwah, near Wahy. He asked whether this was to be suffered? I told him, certainly not; these were acts of hostility and insult, which no government would bear, and against which the British government would certainly protect the Peshwah, if the facts were as he had stated. I observed, however, that it was desirable to come to an arrangement with the killadar of Loghur; and I asked Munkaiseer, whether the Peshwah was willing to allow him to go and reside at Bombay, taking with him his property and the widow of Nana Furnavees.

Munkaiseer said there was no objection to his taking his property; but that the Peshwah was desirous that the widow of Nana should reside at Poonah; that the Peshwah would make any provision for her the British government might think proper, and would allow that government to be her guarantee, but she must reside in his Highness' territories.

The conversation then turned upon the importance of this fort; and I said, that if I should be able to get it for the Peshwah, I hoped a proper person would be made killadar, who would not betray his trust, or lose

his fort by his negligence, as had been the case with others of his Highness' forts; and I asked whom the Peshwah intended to appoint killadar? Byajee Naig said, himself, if the British wished it; and Munkaiseer said that he, Munkaiseer, would undertake the office of killadar, if it was wished; and then there could be no doubt but that the duties would be performed to my satisfaction. I then ended this discussion, by saying that I expected that if the Peshwah should get this fort, no person should be appointed killadar who should not be approved of by Lieut. Col. Close. In this Munkaiseer acquiesced, and repeated the offer of his own services.

As I found now that the Peshwah's ministers showed more confidence than they had at the commencement of the conversation; and that the arrangement above alluded to, if carried into execution, was likely to be highly advantageous to the British government, and to preclude the possibility of inconvenience from the change of the killadar at Loghur, which must sooner or later occur, I told Munkaiseer, that I was so much pleased with that accommodating mode of proceeding in the instance of the fort of Loghur, that I was willing to remove the difficulty attending the obtaining possession of Poonadur; and that provided his Highness acted upon a broad liberal principle respecting the release of Amrut Rao's servants, and the restoration of their property, I would give him the fort of Poonadur, and take upon the Company the payment of the arrears to the garrison. With this the Peshwah's ministers expressed great satisfaction, and said that it would convince his Highness more forcibly than they could convince him otherwise of the desire of your Excellency to settle his government.

Munkaiseer then expressed a wish to know what was to be done about the payment of the body of horse by the British government under the modification of the treaty of Bassein. He said that 2000 horse had been raised to serve at Poonah, and 3000 ought to have been raised to serve with the army. I told him that I had raised the 3000 horse, and paid them for 3 months, and at the end of the war had discharged them; but I understood that the Peshwah had 2000 horse, and had received notice to discharge them at the end of the war, and assurances that they should be paid for the month in which they had been in the service.

Munkaiseer answered, that the Peshwah did not consider the war to be concluded, as Holkar had not yet been punished; and he pointedly contrasted the benefit received by the British government by the modified treaty with the expense incurred by this body of horse.

I answered, that it was true, the war had been short, and the Company had the full benefit of the arrangements made by government, and the bravery of the troops which had brought it to a conclusion at so early a period. But I said, that as the Peshwah really had the troops, and the ratification of the treaty of peace by the Governor General had not been received; and, above all, as I had paid the troops who had served in camp for 3 months, I was willing to take upon myself to pay those serving at Poonah for the same period, under the distinct understanding that they were now to be no longer a burden upon the British government. The ministers still endeavored to get pay for them for a month longer, to

which I refused to consent, and at last they went away apparently well satisfied with this conference.

Since that day I have had various meetings with Byajee Naig, Anund Rao, the Peshwah, and Suddashee Munkaiseer, the particulars of which have been reported to your Excellency by Mr. Waring.

Notwithstanding the arrangement settled in the first meeting, and confirmed in a subsequent one, regarding the servants of Amrut Rao, the Peshwah on one day refused to release them, or restore their property, unless they should comply with conditions which would have delayed the final settlement to a very distant day, if it did not defeat it entirely; at last, however, the arrangement was fully adopted, and a battalion marched this morning to Poonadur to put the Peshwah in possession of that fort.

In the meeting which I had with the Peshwah, his conversation was only general. He expressed his desire to punish those persons in his service who had disobeyed his orders, and prevented him from performing his treaty with the Hon. Company; and, in answer, I requested his Highness to consider maturely the step which he was about to take, and to do nothing which could be deemed imprudent. I attempted once or twice to render the conversation more particular; but I could not succeed.

Although I believe that your Excellency will have had before you an account of the conference I had with the Peshwah's ministers on the 1st inst., I have been particular in relating it to you, as it alludes to points of great importance, and lays open, in a great degree, the views of the Peshwah's durbar. The principal object there is to procure money, not for the service of the state, nor even to gain the power of inflicting punishment on the objects of the Peshwah's hatred, but to bear the expense of the pleasures of the Court. To incur expense, or to adopt any solid mode of settling the country, is entirely out of the question. To incur expense for troops is equally out of the thoughts of the Peshwah and his ministers; and although to gratify his revenge is a great object of his government, and he really believes his personal honor involved in it, he leaves that to the British government and to the exertion of the British troops.

The question with Amrut Rao is completely settled; and Amrut Rao has proposed to go and reside at Benares, as soon as the next rains shall be over. But it is strange, that notwithstanding the Peshwah was professing such an invincible aversion to Amrut Rao, one so forcibly described by Munkaiseer, his Highness had opened a negotiation with him since my arrival at Poonah. Amrut Rao's vakel has attributed this negotiation to the desire of the Peshwah to make for himself better terms than he supposed I should propose to him, and to keep in confinement some of Amrut Rao's servants. My opinion is, that it has been entered into in order to avoid the necessity of attending, on any subject, to the advice of an officer employed by the British government. I encouraged this negotiation as much as possible; for nothing can settle so long as the Peshwah and his brother are at variance.

Your Excellency will have observed the commencement of Munkaiseer's discourse respecting the Peshwah's wishes in the peace. In the

course of the conversations which I had with his Highness and his ministers, all expressed his Highness' hopes that he should rise, and his state increase in proportion with that of the Company, accompanied by strong expressions of confidence in your Excellency's justice.

It is also my duty to inform your Excellency, that while I was at Poonah, I received intelligence from more than one quarter, that the Peshwah had determined to ask me, whether you did not propose to give up to him all the territory which his servant Seindiah had ceded by the late treaty of peace. I mention these circumstances only because they tend to elucidate the foreign policy of this Prince. In respect to his domestic policy, his chief object is to destroy all the great families in what can be called his Empire; and he proposes to use his alliance with the British government in effecting this object.

Besides this, his Highness encourages the Rajah of Kolapoor, a foreign prince, to invade and destroy his own territories, in the possession of the family of Pursheram Bhow. The Peshwah's ministers scarcely deny this fact, and the chiefs of Pursheram Bhow's family allege it as the reason for not serving when called for.

There is no doubt whatever that the Peshwah's government cannot exist on its present footing. Unless the British government interfere in some manner respecting the southern jaghiredars, there will be a contest in the southern part of the Empire, which will, in its consequences, affect Mysore and the Company's territories. They will be obliged to interfere in the end, probably with less effect than they can at present, and in the mean time all the benefit of the services of the southern chiefs and their troops is entirely lost.

In my opinion, the first step to be taken is to give a check to the Rajah of Kolapoor. His country is the resort of all the freebooters driven from other places, and he is ready to place himself at the head of every disturbance. He has received into his territories the freebooters lately opposed to me on the Nizam's frontiers; on which subject I propose to write to him, and it will remain with your Excellency to determine what shall be done with him hereafter.

In respect to the southern jaghiredars, the following lines of conduct may be pursued :

To concur with the Peshwah in destroying them; to leave them and the Peshwah to their fate; and to allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all. To interfere in a certain degree to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars; to oblige them to afford it; and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government; and to guarantee to them their possessions as long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity. To make them at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British government.

Whatever may be the determination of your Excellency upon this subject, it appears to me to be absolutely necessary that the Peshwah should be obliged to check the Rajah of Kolapoor and his nest of freebooters, in the first instance. In respect to the mode of settling the question regard-

ing the southern jaghiredars, I should wish to delay to give an opinion upon it till I shall have seen Lieut. Col. Close.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp, 8th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose papers which were found in Lieut. Col. Harness' writing box, when his effects were lately examined in my camp, which prove his intention to have resigned his commission in his Majesty's service nearly a month before he died. He was possibly prevented from carrying this intention into execution by the violence of the disease by which he was afflicted.

If, in consideration of the services of Lieut. Col. Harness, you should think proper to allow that his commission may be sold, I beg leave to recommend to your attention Lieut. Col. Elliot, the Major of the 33rd regt. This officer has served in the 33rd regiment above 20 years, and has been Major above 7 years.

Capt. Sale of the 19th dragoons, who was wounded in the battle of the 23rd Sept. 1803, has desired me to request your Excellency to give a Lieutenancy in the 19th dragoons to his brother Lieut. Chas. Sale, of the 12th foot. I beg leave to recommend Lieut. C. Sale to your favor upon this occasion.

I took the liberty, in a former letter, of recommending Mr. Mars, who had come over from Scindiah's service, for an ensigncy. I observe that your Excellency has appointed Mr. Mars to be an ensign in the 94th regt. on the — Sept., and I am induced to believe that this person is the same that I recommended to you. If this should be the case, I shall be much obliged to you if you will direct that the mistake in the G. O. may be rectified.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poonah.

Cundolla, 8th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and I beg you to send on Antojec Pundit. No money has been given to Lingun Pundit or Ball Kishen Letchma. He must be paid till the day he died. I must get fresh orders for a pension to his son. I wish that you would give a hint to Prubbaukur Bellall, that I shall be much displeased if I find Amrut Rao interfering in the affairs of Loghur.

P.S. Tell Mrs. Waring that, notwithstanding the debate at dinner, and her recommendation, we propose to go to Bombay by Panwell, and in the balloon!!

To Capt. Wilks.

Cundolla, on the Bhore ghaut, 8th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 1st March. The Governor General has ratified the treaty of peace with Scindiah, and I only wait for his orders to break up the army. These I daily expect. I think, however, it will be prudent for Purneah to keep his troops on the frontier till those of the Company shall return to the southward; but there is no occasion for his remaining at Hurryhur.

I sent Purneah a letter which I had received from Chintomeny Rao, to the same purport as that received by Purneah. Very probably the Rajah of Kittor, who cooperated in the destruction of some freebooters about



the Malpoorba, may have afterwards attacked Chintomeny Rao's jaghire ; and he may have said, or Chintomeny may have believed, that he was assisted in this operation by Purneah's troops, stationed, by my desire, between the Malpoorba and Gutpurba.

I am going with Webbe to Bombay, to meet and have a conference on Marhatta affairs with Lieut. Col. Close. You have done quite right about the Nairs. I have already turned my mind to the measures to be adopted for the conquest of Malabar.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Chowke, 9th March, 1804.

In the memorandum which I gave to Major Malcolm, a copy of which has been transmitted to your Excellency, I requested him to urge Scindiah's ministers to give Jeswunt Rao Goorparah a provision out of the sums, the payment of which is stipulated by the 7th article of the treaty of peace. From the letters which I have received from Major Malcolm upon this subject, I imagine that he has not been able to effect this object ; and therefore I have to request the bounty of the British government for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, in the same manner as for those persons recommended in my letter of the 15th Jan.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah is, however, a person of greater family and consequence in Scindiah's durbar than those to whom, at my recommendation, your Excellency has been pleased to extend the bounty of the British government ; the treaty of peace, which he has negotiated, involves interests of greater magnitude than those intrusted to the other persons ; and he certainly conducted himself throughout the negotiation in a manner perfectly satisfactory to me. I therefore beg leave to recommend that he should have a pension of 12,000 rupees *per annum*.

When addressing your Excellency upon this subject, it is proper that I should recommend to your favor the Native agents who served me in the transaction of the business with which I was intrusted.

Govind Rao, an officer in the service of the government of Mysore, was sent by me, in consequence of orders from Lieut. Gen. Stuart, in the month of Dec. 1802, to the chiefs of the family of Pursheeram Bhow, and the other southern jaghiredars then upon the Kistna. He conducted himself with great propriety, and was very successful in his negotiations upon that occasion. He afterwards joined me upon the Werdah, and has been employed as a channel of communication with the different Marhatta chiefs and their vakeels. During the war he was at the head of one of the intelligence departments which I formed in camp ; in the negotiation for the peace he was very useful ; and your Excellency will have observed that he was present at every conference that I held with the vakeels. Upon the occasion of recommending Govind Rao to your Excellency, I must inform you that he was formerly an officer in the department of the Meer Suddoor under Tippoo's government, and was attached to the fort of Chittledroog. He was very useful in obtaining peaceable possession of that fort for the late Col. Dalrymple, and Govind Rao afterwards accompanied him, and was very useful to him in the first campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh. I found him at Chittledroog in the year 1800,

when I passed that place in the second campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh, and took him with me by permission of the government of Mysore; and, in consequence of his services, I recommended him to the Dewan, who added 100 rupees *per mensem* to his salary. He was afterwards employed in Raidroog on a service for the government of the Rajah of Mysore, for which he received a mark of the approbation of that government, and subsequently in Bullun, where I met him at the commencement of the year 1802. I had again occasion to recommend him to the Dewan for his conduct in that country.

As Govind Rao is an officer belonging to the government of Mysore, I did not think it proper to give him any salary on the part of the Company; and he has served in a confidential manner since Dec. 1802, for 100 rupees *per mensem* beyond his usual allowance in the Rajah's service, which amounted to 200 rupees *per mensem*: however, I imagine that your Excellency will not deem it proper that the government of Mysore should pay the expense of Govind Rao's service since I sent him from Seringapatam in Dec. 1802; or that of the reward of his services in his different negotiations during the war and in the negotiations for peace. I accordingly beg leave to recommend to your Excellency, that he should have an allowance of 600 rupees *per mensem*, from the 1st Jan. 1803, to be continued to him, as a reward for his services, so long as he shall conduct himself in a manner that shall be satisfactory to the government of Mysore. I also beg leave to recommend that the Rajah's government may be informed that it is not intended that they shall bear the expense of the additional salary of 100 rupees *per mensem*, which they have given to Govind Rao, since he was sent on his mission to Meritch.

Another person whom I have to recommend to your Excellency's favor is the soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan: this person has already received marks of your Excellency's favor for his conduct in the war against Tippoo Sultaun; he has since been employed by Gen. Campbell in the Ceded districts, and he accompanied me when I marched from Hurryhur, in March, 1803. I sent him on a mission to Jeswant Rao Holkar in July, 1803, as I heretofore informed your Excellency, but he never reached the camp of that Chief. He was detained for some months in the barbarous countries bordering on the Taplee, where he conducted himself with great discretion and fortitude; particularly when Scindiah's army was in the neighbourhood of the place in which he was concealed. He afterwards passed through Scindiah's army to join me in Berar, and he was present in the battle of Argaum. He is now with Major Malcolm in Scindiah's camp. He lost his brother, a jemidar in the cavalry, and his son, in the battle of Assye, and the consequence is, that a large family of females are thrown upon him for support. I therefore take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency, that, in consequence of his long, faithful, and various services, his pension should be increased 100 rupees *per mensem*, and that it should be continued for the lives of his widow, the widow of his brother, and the widow of his son, to be divided equally amongst the three families.

In the course of the campaign, I have frequently had occasion to men-

tion to your Excellency the services of the Mysore horse, which I found upon every occasion to be of the greatest use. I attribute the alacrity and cordiality with which their services were afforded, the regularity of the troops, the strict obedience of orders, and the consequent dependence which I could place upon them, to the measures taken by the government of Mysore to ensure their regular payment, and to the excellent character and disposition of their commander, Bistnapah Pundit. This officer was high in the service of the late Hyder Aly and Tippoo Sultaun. Upon the death of the latter, he was one of the first who joined Gen. Harris, and he was the person who negotiated the return of the present Dewan to Seringapatam. Since that period, upon every occasion in which the British troops in Mysore have been employed, he has acted with them in command of a body of the Rajah's troops; and he has always conducted himself in such a manner as to gain my applause and repeated recommendations to the government of Mysore, and the esteem of every officer of the British army. In this last campaign, in particular, in which his situation was naturally very delicate, his discretion in refraining from all communications or connexion with the Marhatta Chiefs, who have frequently applied to him to exert the influence he was supposed to have, to carry their sinister objects, has been equally satisfactory to me with his military conduct.

Your Excellency is aware that, although the pay allowed by the Dewan is regularly given to his troops, and, in respect to the common men, is fully sufficient, the allowances to his officers are far from liberal; accordingly, Bistnapah's pay, particularly in time of peace, is by no means proportionate to the importance of his situation of buckshee of the Rajah's troops; especially when it is considered that he is always likely to be employed in co-operation with the British troops in situations in which he may be exposed to great temptations, and in which he may have the power of doing great mischief.

Upon the whole, in consideration of the conduct of the troops under his command, of his own discreet conduct, and as a reward for his services, and as a mark of your Excellency's approbation of the government of Mysore, I beg leave to recommend that a pension of 12,000 rupees *per annum* may be given to Bistnapah Pundit, and from the 1st Jan. 1804, to be continued as long as he shall conduct himself in a manner that shall be satisfactory to the government of Mysore.

I have to observe, that the pensions to Bistnapah and Govind Rao are likely to produce the very best effects amongst the Rajah's servants. They will see, in the handsome provision for those 2 faithful servants, the honorable rewards for essential and honest services to the British government; and every one who is employed will be stimulated to make similar exertions in order to merit and obtain similar rewards.

While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid adverting to the conduct of the government of Mysore during the late war, and congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your measures, and the accomplishment of all your objects in establishing it. In consequence of the regularity of the system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to

provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, or for the large quantities of grain required for the cavalry, and by the brinjarries. All these supplies were furnished with a facility and celerity hitherto unknown in this part of India. He has since continued to forward supplies to the army under my command, as fast as the brinjarries have been found to take them up; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of the corps under Major Gen. Campbell, he has lately forwarded large quantities of grain to Canara, in order to enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of Bombay and Poonah. Besides the troops employed with me, to whose services I have already drawn your Excellency's notice, the Dewan has had a respectable corps of troops on the Rajah's frontier since I marched from the Toombuddra, which he has commanded in person; and a detachment of these troops, under Khan Jehan Khan, distinguished themselves upon a late occasion, in the destruction of a numerous band of freebooters who had assembled in the Savanore country, and threatened Mysore.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poonah.

Bombay, 12th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and I am concerned to observe that the Peshwah is disinclined to perform his promise in respect to the release of Amrut Rao's servants, and the restoration of their property; but you must continue to urge his ministers on that subject, and I am happy to say that your remonstrances will have the advantage of being supported by the restoration of the fort of Poonadur.

If Antojee Pundit should be still at Poonah, I beg you will inform him that the troops have marched, and are already on the Beemah; and point out to him the danger of allowing them to approach the fort of Loghur, as I certainly shall not order them to halt.

I wish you would mention to Byajee Naig, that Goklah has informed me that no arrangement has been made by the Peshwah for the payment of his troops; and that he appeared to me to be very uneasy on that subject before I marched from Poonah: that I have since taken the whole into consideration, and, as the services of Goklah's troops are necessary to his Highness at present, I am willing to advance their pay for the ensuing month, provided his Highness the Peshwah has no objection. Apprise Goklah's vakeel that I have sent this message to the Peshwah, and make him acquainted with the Peshwah's answer.

The person who has applied to have his property restored is a relation of the killadar of Ahmednuggur. The killadar broke his treaty in two instances: 1st, in carrying away Scindiah's property from the fort; 2ndly, in carrying on hostilities against the British government and their allies. But that has nothing to do with the question, excepting to show that neither he nor his relations are entitled to favors. The property in question was taken from the killadar of Ahmednuggur, in a subsequent action with his troops, and has been reserved for the orders of government, and probably will be given to the army as prize.

I think it will be well to mention to Munkaiseer upon this occasion,

that I have long observed that his applications and his humanity are confined to one description of people only in the Marhatta Empire, viz., those connected with Scindiah, whose persons were seized, and their property taken from them in the operations of the late war. When war is concluded, I am decidedly of opinion that all animosity should be forgotten, and that all prisoners should be released; but property carried to account cannot be restored, and, at all events, I do not see what immediate concern it is of Munkaiseer. In this instance, as Mulwa Dada is still in rebellion, I should have been justified in detaining the persons of their relations.

Col. Close is better than I expected to find him, and I think that you will have him with you soon.

To Major Walker, Resident at Baroda.

Bombay, 12th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 2nd March. In respect to Amrut Rao's bond, I did no more than refer the subject for your consideration; and wished you to do no more than have the subject inquired into, and to take measures to have the transaction closed in a manner that should appear equitable to both parties, whether by payment of the debt, or by a refusal of payment. I agree entirely in opinion with you, that some valuable consideration or advantage should have been received by the grantor of the bond, and that it is necessary that the holder of it should be able to show this advantage. But it is difficult to apply this nice rule of jurisprudence to a transaction of this kind, which, to say the best of it, was corrupt, and such a one that no Englishman could have been concerned in it, however common it may be among the Marhatta and other Natives. If Raoba had had the command of money at the time he gave this bond, it is possible that he would have given money for the same considerations which induced him to grant the bond, and the same course of political events would equally have impeded the execution of his projects. On these grounds, therefore, as the corruption of the transaction between the two Natives cannot be taken into consideration, you may possibly be of opinion that Amrut Rao ought to have some compensation. But how much, and when and how paid, I cannot venture to give an opinion. Upon the whole, I leave the question to you, only with this request, that you will take pains to satisfy all parties of the justice of your decision.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poonah.

Bombay, 13th March, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th inst. The agreement made by the Peshwah's ministers, that they would release the persons, and restore the property, of Amrut Rao's servants, was upon broad principles; and, after many arguments upon the list of those servants furnished by Amrut Rao, it was finally settled that every person whose name it included should be released, and his property restored. I am, therefore, much surprised that there should be now any difficulty on the subject of this arrangement; particularly as the fort of Poonadur has been restored; but you must continue to urge the Peshwah's ministers on this subject.

In your private letter of the 10th, you report a conversation which passed at Suddasheo Munkaiseer's on the subject of Holkar's demand of tribute from Jeypoor, which is of more importance than any thing relating to Amrut Rao's servants. In the first place, I request you to take the earliest opportunity of denying positively that Holkar has demanded tribute from the Rajah of Jeypoor; or that, since I arrived at Poonah, he has in any manner interfered with the Peshwah's territories. After having done this, I request you to hold no further conversation with the Peshwah's ministers regarding Jeypoor, or any subject connected with his Highness' supposed rights in Hindustan, or with the late war, or the treaties of peace. In case the ministers should advert to such a subject, you will inform them that you will report to the Governor General what they have said, and that he will probably send you his orders upon the subject.

It is perfectly true, as you observed, that the Peshwah had not for many years collected or enjoyed any part of the tribute paid by the Rajah of Jeypoor. It was collected by Scindiah's government, which, since the treaty of Salbye, has been considered as independent of that of the Peshwah, and whose independence has been repeatedly asserted and contended for by the British government in all its transactions and negotiations with the Peshwah. The late war was carried on on the principle of Scindiah's independence, and peace was negotiated and concluded on the same principle. If any other principle had been adopted, Scindiah must have been considered as a rebel in the war, and in the negotiations for the peace, or the Peshwah must have been considered as a party to the war on the side of his servant Scindiah.

In the usual Marhatta style, Scindiah's ministers, after having made some progress in the negotiation on the principle of Scindiah's independence, shifted their ground, and asserted that Scindiah was the Peshwah's servant, and could do nothing without his consent. But I obliged them to adhere to some principle in the negotiation, and informed them that, if Scindiah chose to be considered as the Peshwah's servant, I should treat him as a rebel, and would break off the negotiation on its former footing immediately. Scindiah's government having been independent, and having for many years collected the tribute of Jeypoor, had a full right to dispose of it in any manner that Scindiah might think proper.

But I rather imagine that the right to the tribute of Jeypoor is founded upon the possession of the office of Vakeel ul Mutuluk, or, in fact, the power of the crown of Delhi. If that be the case, the right ceases the moment that His Majesty thinks proper to dismiss Scindiah and the Peshwah from their nominal offices in his court; and I conclude that His Majesty will not have delayed to free himself from the claims which they might found upon the possession of these offices, as soon as he shall have been delivered from the oppression of the French infantry in Scindiah's service. In this view of the question, it is probable that the Peshwah has no more claim to the tribute at present, than he has in the view of it first considered, viz., that of Scindiah's dependence upon his government.

I have gone into this question only to point out to you its intricacy, and the variety of ground which it affords for the chicanery of the Peshwah's ministers. But I recommend to you to avoid touching upon it till

the orders of the Governor General upon every subject connected with the peace shall have been received.

To Capt. Wilks.

Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 4th. It does not appear to me that the meeting between Appah Saheb and Rastia is connected with the letter from Chintomeny Rao. I traced the probable cause of that letter in my last address to you; and you may depend upon it that Chintomeny Rao will have been satisfied with the answer which I wrote to his letter.

The chiefs mentioned by Ram Rao were beaten by me near Perinda; I afterwards pursued them to the neighbourhood of Bccjapoor, where, not hearing more of them, I quitted the pursuit. They have since broken into different parties; some have gone to Kolapoor, others have been cut up by Baba Saheb Putwurdun, and others by Punt Prittee Niddce, and some have been employed in the plunder of others of the same party. I may conclude, therefore, the whole to be completely annihilated, and I have written a letter to the Rajah of Kolapoor which will possibly prevent him from allowing them to reassemble.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poonah.

Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

Madhoo Rao Hurry Phurkia is Baba Phurkia (I believe); at all events he is a subject of the Peshwah's, and possibly his enemy. You will tell Amrut Rao's vakeel to recollect his treaty. He is to have no communication with the Peshwah's enemies. I have applied to the Peshwah to pardon Baba Phurkia, and he has refused it. He is to have no communication with Baba Phurkia, in particular.

To Col. Murray.

Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 2nd. It appears by the accounts from Hindustan, which are of a date as late as the 17th Feb., that Holkar avoided hostilities with us, or to attack those connected with us in alliance. It is very improbable, therefore, that he will connect himself with Canojee. But his army is certainly diminishing; Meer Khan has certainly left him; and it is possible that, in the break up of his corps, the Bhow may join Canojee. If these persons should enter Guzerat, you will attack them at once, and pursue them as long as your means or prudence will permit.

I will send to the Resident with Scindiah your letter regarding the workmen employed at Powanghur.

To Major Malcolm, Resident with Scindiah.

Panwell, 13th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Murray, the commanding officer in Guzerat.\*

\* Capt. Kenny to Capt. Dale, Major of Brigade.

Powanghur, 24th Feb. 1804.

I was last night favored with yours of the 15th, and, in reply thereto, have to acquaint you, for the information of Col. Murray, that I had destroyed 675 yards of the works of the balla killa, previous to my receiving instructions to discontinue it.

Scindiah's Brahmin at Champaneer is quite implacable in his threats against the workmen who were employed in the destruction of the balla killa, of whom he has been very diligent in ascertaining all the names and places of abode, and only waits this place being given up, when he intends to carry his designs into execution.

Shortly after the capture of Powanghur, a considerable time previously to the negotiations for the treaty of peace, I gave orders that the works of the upper fort of Powanghur might be destroyed. I gave these orders, because those works were useless to the British. The destruction of the works was subsequently discontinued, when it was agreed that the fort should be eventually given up to Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I beg leave to request that you will communicate the purport of the enclosed letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah's ministers, and you will observe to them, that to punish any body for his conduct during the war will be a breach of an article of the treaty of peace. The breach will be more flagrant, and it will be more incumbent on the British government to notice it, if artificers and coolies employed at Powanghur are punished only because they exercised their trade.

I request you to procure from Scindiah's ministers a positive order to his officer in charge of Champaneer, to discontinue the oppression of the people employed at Powanghur by the British engineer, and to inform the ministers, that, if I should hear more of it, I shall be under the necessity of reporting the subject to the Governor General; and that, in the mean time, I shall require from them that Scindiah's officer at Champaneer may be dismissed from his office.

To the Resident with Scindiah.

Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Col. Murray, in which he mentions that the fort of Powanghur has been attacked, as he suspects, in consequence of the interference of the officers in Scindiah's service employed in Guzerat. There does not appear any proof that the attack has been occasioned by them, but, at all events, their conduct in demanding possession of the forts of Powanghur and Dohud so frequently as they have lately, is irregular, and must proceed from ignorance of the terms of the treaty of peace, or from insolence, if they should have been made acquainted with the treaty.

I have sent to Col. Murray a copy of the article of the treaty in the Persian and Marhatta languages, which I have desired him to communicate to Scindiah's principal officers in Guzerat; and I have requested him to cut up the party which attacked Powanghur, if he can find them out, and to write to me, particularly if he should discover any proofs that the attack was excited by Scindiah's officers.

I request you to represent this matter immediately to Scindiah's ministers, and to point out to them the misconduct of the officers employed on the part of their master in this instance, as well as in that of the punishment of the persons employed by the engineer at Powanghur. This conduct is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of peace, and the principal officer in Guzerat ought to be dismissed. If persevered in, it may occasion the greatest disasters to Scindiah himself. It is ridiculous to suppose that a fort can be taken from British troops in the manner attempted; but, if the attempt had succeeded, the consequence must have been a fresh attack upon the fort by the British troops, followed by the expulsion of Scindiah's officers from Guzerat, and other consequences which I do not wish to anticipate. In fact to attack these forts, until the



conditions are fulfilled on which their restoration depends, is a breach of the treaty of peace, equally with the attack of any other fort in the possession of the Company's troops.

#### Bombay Occurrences for March, 1804.

On Saturday last Major Gen. the Hon. Arthur Wellesley, and Josiah Webbe, Esq., Resident at Nagpoor, arrived at the Presidency, accompanied by their respective suites.

On the Hon. the Governor's yacht, which had proceeded to Panwell to convey Gen. Wellesley to Bombay, approaching the harbour, a salute of 15 guns was fired from the *Elphinstone* Indiaman, and the compliment was repeated on the Hon. General's landing; whilst the whole of the troops in garrison formed a street from the Dock yard, through which the General passed to the Government house. Capt. Barclay, D.A.G. in Mysore; Capt. Knox, Persian translator; Capt. Bellingham, Paymaster; Capt. Close, commanding the Body guard; Lieut. Campbell, Major of Brigade; and Lieut. Burne, composed Gen. Wellesley's suite.

The vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Kolapoor, have accompanied Gen. Wellesley to Bombay.

#### Presentation of a Public Address to Major Gen. Wellesley.

Yesterday, being the day appointed by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley to receive the address from the British inhabitants of this settlement, Mr. Henshaw, attended by the other gentlemen of the Committee, proceeded to the Government house for that purpose.

The Committee waited first on the Governor, and delivered into his hands the address to the Most Noble the Governor General, accompanied with a request that he would be pleased to forward it to his Excellency, through such channel as he might make choice of; to which the Governor having expressed his willing assent, the Committee then proceeded to the hall of the Government house, where they were received by Major Gen. Wellesley, attended by some of the officers of his suite. Mr. Henshaw, in presenting the address to the General, expressed himself as follows:

This Committee have the honor of being deputed by the general meeting of the British inhabitants, to present to you their congratulations on the glorious and happy termination of one of the most decisive, brilliant, and rapid campaigns ever known in the annals of British India; a campaign in which you have personally borne so conspicuous a share, and proved yourself, at its close, equally great in the cabinet as in the field.

The address, in the following words, was then read by Mr. Henshaw:

To Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley,

We might be justly deemed insensible to the signal benefits which your late brilliant career has conferred upon your country, if we did not avail ourselves of the opportunity which your temporary residence in this island affords, to express the high sense we entertain of your memorable and important services. To you, Sir, in an eminent degree, are owing, not only the immense advantages resulting from a successful campaign in the Deccan, but, those having been attained, the blessing of an early peace in India. The enemy's systematic inclination for desultory and protracted warfare was met on your part, as it likewise was, with equal energy and success, in another quarter, by a wise and gallant resolution to bring affairs to a speedy as well as glorious issue. And the battle of Assye, which displayed how justly you relied on the disciplined valor of your troops, and the zeal, courage, and conduct of every officer under your command, struck a damp on the hopes of the adverse powers, which may almost be said to have decided the fate of the campaign.

But it is not in your military career alone that we have observed the effects of an active, able, and determined mind. The difficult negotiations which you carried on with two hostile powers, while at the same moment your attention was occupied by the operations of the field, do the greatest honor to your talents as a statesman, and display a happy union of military science and political skill. Your victories have taken place in our neighbourhood; they immediately affect

our future interests, and are intimately connected with our present prosperity. They lay the foundation of a peace to us and our successors, which is no longer likely to be interrupted by the feuds and combinations of a Marhatta confederacy. They open to the trade and to the industry of Bombay, the resources of an extensive and populous country.

Under these circumstances, when assembled to express our gratitude towards your noble and illustrious relative, we should have felt our duty only half discharged, if we had omitted this tribute of respect to one who is so justly dear to him, and under whose auspices the troops of every description have shown themselves worthy of such a leader, and of their former renown.

ROBERT HENSHAW, and 123 other British inhabitants.

#### Extract from the Bombay Gazette.

Major Gen. Bellasis, Commandant of artillery, gave a dinner at the theatre to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, at which were present the Hon. the Governor, and most of the principal characters in the settlement. The theatre was handsomely fitted up for that purpose, and displayed an elegant transparency of Gen. Wellesley's arms, fixed so as to face the company. The utmost conviviality prevailed, and the pleasures of the evening were much enhanced by the introduction of several loyal and appropriate toasts, and a few excellent songs.

#### Splendid Fête in Honor of Major Gen. Wellesley.

An elegant entertainment was given at the theatre, by Lieut. Col. Lechmere, and the officers of the Fencible regiment, to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

#### Reply of Major Gen. Wellesley to the Address of the British Inhabitants of Bombay.

The approbation of this Settlement is a distinction which will afford a permanent source of gratification to my mind; and I receive, with a high sense of respect, the honor conveyed to me by your Address.

The events which preceded the war are of a nature to demonstrate the justice of our cause; while the forbearance with which the British government refrained from the contest is calculated to manifest that the efficient state of our military equipment was directed to the preservation of peace, and consistent with the principles of our defensive policy. The comprehensive plan of operations for the conduct of the war was equalled by the extent of our resources, and supported by the concentrated power of the empire. The conflict in which the British armies were in consequence engaged presented a theatre capable of displaying at once the most splendid objects of military glory, and substantial proofs of the pervading wisdom of the British councils. To be engaged in such a scene was an object worthy of the highest ambition; and the contingencies which placed a division of the army under my command enabled me to appreciate the permanent causes of our success and power, in the established discipline of our troops, in the general union of zeal for the public interests, in the uniform effects of our consolidated strength, and in the commanding influence of our national reputation in India.

Under the effects of those certain causes, the troops under my command were enabled to give that support which they were destined by the Governor General to afford to the operations of the Commander in Chief. And, while the grand army, under his Excellency's immediate command, decided the war in Hindustan, by the most rapid career of brilliant victories, the army of the Deccan, emulating that noble example, contributed to elevate the fame and power of Great Britain in India, to a height unrivalled in the annals of Asia.

In concluding the peace (a duty imposed on me by the local situation of the respective armies) I was enabled, under the immediate orders and instructions of the Governor General, to manifest a practical example of the moderation of the British councils, which arrested the progress of our arms in the hour of victory; to fix the tranquillity of India on the foundations of that enlarged policy; and to receive the best assurances of the continuance of peace from the confidence reposed by the states lately confederated against us, in the generosity, honor, and justice of the British government.

In reviewing the consequences of our success, it is with unfeigned satisfaction that I perceive the increasing channels of wealth which have been opened to this opulent settlement; and it is peculiarly gratifying to my feelings, that I should have been instrumental in renewing the benefits of peace to a settlement, from the resources and public spirit of which, the detachments under my command have derived the most essential aids during the prosecution of the war.

The occasion which it has pleased you to choose of uniting my name with that of the Governor General has excited the warmest affections of my heart, together with the highest sentiments of public respect; at the same time, therefore, that I receive, with peculiar gratitude, this mark of your kindness, I cannot discharge the obligations you have imposed on me, in a manner more conformable to my sense of the honor and welfare of this settlement, or of the reputation and interests of the empire, than by expressing my confidence of your cherishing those principles of loyalty, subordination, and government, which have raised and finally established the British Empire in India on the extensive foundations of its present security, prosperity, dignity, and renown.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poona.

Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter of the 6th inst. from the Resident in Mysore, and the copy of my answer.

I request you to take an opportunity of pointing out to the Peshwah's ministers the difficulties which attend the establishment of his Highness' authority in Savanore, and urge them to take some measures to provide for Goklah's troops, as the first step towards a peaceable settlement of that province. It is not necessary to inform them, specifically, whether his Highness will have the assistance of the British troops to drive out Goklah, in case no other provision should be made for the payment of his troops; as you will observe that I think that point ought to be referred for the opinion of his Excellency the Governor General; but you will impress upon them particularly the danger, that, if they do not make some provision for Goklah, there will be a contest in the province; and that the consequence will be, it will not be worth holding by any body.

Indeed, in the present state of the Peshwah's affairs, and considering how little revenue he ever gets from any of the countries held by his sirsoubahs, and that, till he can provide for Goklah in land, he must pay his troops in ready money, it appears to me to be by far the best arrangement to leave in Goklah's hands those parts of Savanore which he now holds, and to receive them hereafter when their state shall have been amelior-

ated by tranquillity, and his Highness will be enabled to provide some other mode to pay Goklah's troops.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 7th, upon the subject of the attack made by the Bheels upon the fort of Powanghur. It does not appear quite clearly proved that the attack was excited by Scindiah's officers in Guzerat; but, at all events, their conduct in making these frequent demands for the possession of the fort is very irregular, and must be attributed either to ignorance of the terms of the treaty of peace, or to insolence. I now enclose Persian and Marhatta copies of the article of the treaty regarding the surrender of the forts in Guzerat. I request you to send this paper to Scindiah's principal officer in Guzerat, with a letter to inform him that you have acted only in conformity with the treaty, in retaining possession of the forts; and that he departs from the treaty in attempting to get possession of them before the time specified. You may also inform him that I have written to Scindiah's durbar upon the subject.

If you should have an opportunity of cutting up the people who have attacked Powanghur, I beg you to attack them; and to report to me particularly, if you should obtain any proof that Scindiah's servants have been concerned in this outrage. I likewise enclose a Persian and Marhatta copy of the article of the treaty of peace which provides for the safety of every individual, notwithstanding his conduct during the war. I request you to communicate this paper to Scindiah's officers, in reference to his conduct towards the persons employed by the engineer at Powanghur.

I have written to the Resident at Scindiah's durbar regarding this subject, and I shall write this day on the subject of the attack on Powanghur.

To Capt. Wilks.

Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 6th inst. The Peshwah has certainly granted sunnuds for the province of Savanore to Cashce Rao Ball Kishen; and his Highness' ministers appear to expect that Bappojee Goneish Goklah will deliver over the management to the persons employed by Cashce Rao Ball Kishen. But they have made no other provision for the payment of Goklah's troops; and the suspicion that they either would not or could not make such provision has, probably, drawn from Goklah the secret orders to the officer acting in Savanore on his part to delay delivering over the province.

It is certainly true that I have written to Gen. Campbell, to request that he will assist the Peshwah's sirsoubah in Savanore, if he could do so consistently with other objects. But I have informed him that the Resident at Poonah would make him acquainted with the particular objects for the attainment of which his assistance would be required; and I have requested Gen. Campbell to be particularly cautious not to interfere with the rights or interests of the principal jaghiredars or commanders of the troops of his Highness the Peshwah. I therefore imagine that my letter

will have the effect of preventing Gen. Campbell from interfering with the persons employed by Goklah.

Under these circumstances, you will observe that the line of conduct which you have recommended to the Dewan is the most prudent which he could adopt. He could not interfere in favor of Goklah's officers, without opposing the person immediately employed by the Peshwah; and, on the other hand, he could not interfere in favor of Cashee Rao Ball Kishen, without depriving Goklah of the only means he possesses of supporting his troops. As this officer has been an old adherent of the British government, and in the late war served with the British troops with great zeal and fidelity, and is a singular instance of a Marhatta sirdar possessing these qualifications, it would be very prejudicial to the interests of the British government to employ the troops belonging to the government of Mysore in destroying him.

I propose to refer the state of affairs in Savanore to the Residency at Poonah, and to request the Resident to prevail upon the Peshwah to provide for Goklah, as the first step towards accomplishing his Highness' objects in that province. If that should be done, the settlement of the province under his Highness' authority will not be difficult. If Goklah should not be provided for, it will be necessary to make a reference to the Governor General to ascertain his Excellency's wishes regarding the assistance to be given to the Peshwah in depriving Goklah of Savanore. In any event, it is desirable that the troops in the service of the Rajah of Mysore should not interfere, excepting to defend the Rajah's territories; and that they should not pass the Rajah's boundary, unless, as in the late instance, to punish a freebooter who had committed depredations within the Rajah's territories.

I do not apprehend any evil from the meeting of the chiefs at Sirhitty mentioned in your letter.

*The D.A.G. to Col. Murray.*

Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter of the 5th March, concerning Capt. Prother. He approves of the arrangement which you have made for that officer's being released from arrest; and he authorises you to permit Lieut. Col. Callander to withdraw the charges he preferred against Capt. Prother, and begs that you will then release him.

On this occasion the Major General requests that you will caution Capt. Prother against being concerned in such an affair again.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. —.*

Bombay, 14th March, 1804.

I have perused your letter of this date, with its enclosure, and will take an opportunity of laying them before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley. I never saw the letter to the General till now.

The General has never accused your general character in the army, therefore I cannot imagine that he will enter into an investigation of it; but having been obliged, on public grounds, to notice an act of yours which he disapproved, he could not, without a dereliction of those principles, recommend you to the favor of the very officer to whom he had reported that conduct; and I think the expression in your letter to me, implying that the General bears you 'ill will' for what has passed, is not well judged. A sense of public duty supersedes all private considerations with him; but I could not name a person with whom he had an intercourse for the last 4 years against whom I think he bears 'ill will.' I would therefore recommend you to write me another letter, with the above phrase cor-

rected. The General is out at present, and I cannot see him on business to-night. You will therefore have time to send me the other letter before I can have an opportunity of showing him the present packet; at all events I will defer doing that until I hear from you on this subject.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Bombay, 16th March, 1804.

Having put every thing in a train of settlement above the ghauts, and having many matters to arrange with this government, and Col. Close, who is here on account of his health, I came here about a week ago, and have just received your letter of the 6th inst. I received in due course your letter of the 22nd Feb. The freebooters are entirely dispersed, and they have lately plundered each other.

I shall be obliged to you if you will send the money up to Ahmednuggur, by the road through the Nizam's country, taken by Majors Dallas and Hill.

Major Malcolm has concluded a treaty of defensive alliance with Scindiah, and therefore there is an end to foreign wars with the Native powers.

The conduct of Holkar, however, is still dubious; indeed I think it probable that the Governor General will be under the necessity of ordering him to be attacked; and if that should be the case, I suspect that the operations will be confined to the frontiers of our own territories in Hindustan, and those of Guzerat. The tranquillity of the Deccan will not be disturbed. It is possible, however, that Holkar, the existence of whose power depends upon his avoiding to come in contact with the British troops, will adopt a course of conduct, when he shall hear of the treaty of defensive alliance with Scindiah, which will enable the Governor General to save him.

P.S. I have just received your letter of the 2nd. The money will do as well at Hyderabad as at Ahmednuggur. I am much obliged to you for the gram, but we do not want it, nor indeed the rice at present.

To Gungaram Pundit.

16th March, 1804.

I learn from Mr. Elphinstone that, notwithstanding the treaty of peace, my repeated orders and those of Rajah Mohiput Ram, and, above all, of the Sircar, you have refused to deliver to Senah Sahib Soubah the lands situated under the forts of Gawilghur and Nernulla, which, it was settled, he was to have; you have seized forts and villages which do not belong to Secundar Jah; and you have refused to adopt the measures necessary to establish an arbitration to decide all differences respecting boundaries, &c., which is the fairest and most reasonable way of proceeding. The consequence of your conduct will be, that the country will be ruined, and Secundar Jah will get no revenue from it.

I desire that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will give to the servants of Senah Sahib Soubah the lands which it was settled by Rajah Mohiput Ram that he should have; that you will withdraw your people from all places the right of possession of which is doubtful; and that, when you want to possess any villages or districts, the right to which is doubtful, or the possession likely to be disputed, you will apply to Mr. Elphinstone before you attempt to take possession; and that you will

immediately correspond with Mr. Elphinstone, and arrange a plan for establishing an arbitration, under his mediation, to define the boundaries of the lands of the two states, and act in conformity with Mr. Elphinstone's requisitions on this subject.

In this manner we may put an end to those petty disputes before the evil which they occasion will increase to any great degree; but if you should omit to do every thing in your power to give tranquillity to the country acquired for the Sircar in the late war, you will be responsible for the loss and disgrace which will be the consequence of the confusion, of which your conduct is the immediate cause.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 16th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose copies of two public letters which I have received from Mr. Elphinstone. They describe the conduct of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan in such strong colors, that it is unnecessary that I should advert to that part of the subject; but I cannot avoid drawing your attention to the consequences which will certainly be the result of that conduct. The Soubah has already experienced the first of these consequences. Gungaram Pundit has seized the Rajah's villages, and has refused to deliver up the districts ceded by the treaty of peace; and the Rajah's troops now plunder the southern parts of Berar. The Rajah of Berar will, of course, deny that they plunder the district by his order and authority, because he will fear the consequences of acknowledging to the British Resident that he has been guilty of a breach of the treaty of peace. But when he finds that the British government, which is the mediator between the Soubah and him, wants authority or influence to enable it to carry the treaty into execution, it is a doubtful question whether he is not justified in having recourse to the means in his power to do justice to himself. One of the smallest evils that will result from this state of affairs in Berar, will be the necessity of keeping up these large military establishments, so as not to be able to derive any revenue from the country. The Soubah's troops, which are not in the best order, will plunder the country, at the same time that a great proportion of its revenues will be spent in paying them. Indeed, I suspect that Gungaram's object in breaking the treaty is to induce this result, as the most likely mode of enriching himself. I request you to urge the Soubah's ministers to adopt some effectual mode of putting a stop to these evils. To issue orders is useless, if those who disobey them are never punished.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th Feb. The amount at which the revenue of the districts to be ceded to the Rajah of Berar, under the 5th article of the treaty of peace, should be valued, was fixed by me, in concert with the Rajah's vakeel, at the highest sum they had produced for the last 40 years. The districts were fixed upon by Rajah Mohiput Ram, and the Rajah's vakeel, in presence of Capt. Johnson, and both parties appeared to be perfectly satisfied.

The gross revenue of the districts, as valued in the old Revenue accounts, was ———. Besides these districts, the Rajah of Berar's confidential servants enjoyed a few villages in Berar, in enaum, of some of which they had held the Rajah's share; of others, the whole revenue

belonging to the Peshwah, or to the Soubah of the Deccan. Under all the circumstances of the late peace, I considered it to be desirable that the Rajah of Berar's servants should continue to enjoy these advantages, and I requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to give them sunnuds for them. I also wrote to you, in duplicate upon the subject, a letter of which I now enclose a copy. These are the 14 or 15 villages alluded to in the 4th paragraph of your letter.

In respect to the sirdeshmookey of Bheer, the Rajah of Berar has no right to it. I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter to Ghazy Khan, which will show you that I do not think that person deserving of any favor.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

16th March, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 18th and 20th (I believe). I have already written to you fully on the subject of the complaint of the Rajah's minister respecting the value of the districts ceded by the 5th article of the treaty of peace; and I have now referred the Rajah's complaints respecting the conduct of Gungaram Pundit to the Court of Hyderabad.

I think it desirable that upon these occasions you should write, yourself, to the Resident at Hyderabad, and urge him to take measures to restrain the irregularities of the Soubah's servants. The fact is, that I have no power to enforce obedience of the orders that I may have to give them, and it is only a waste of time to write to them. I have written, however, to Gungaram Pundit upon this occasion, and have positively ordered him to arrange with you an arbitration to fix the boundary. But no arbitration will answer any purpose, when it is not superintended by an European gentleman, and I have no person to send. I must therefore request you to send the parties with a servant of your own to the spot, to settle that, when they may agree, the boundary shall be fixed; and when they differ, a description shall be written and signed by all the parties and your servants, and you must decide. It might have been expected that there would have been no disputes about a boundary so well defined in the treaty of peace; but the fact is that the Soubah's servants encouraged those disputes, in order to have a pretence for entertaining troops, and for deducting the revenues of the country from the public treasury.

In the mean time, however, it is absolutely necessary that the Rajah of Berar should withdraw his troops from Berar; and I beg you to remonstrate with him seriously on this point. Apprise his ministers of the measures which I have taken for his satisfaction; and inform them that I expect that, if the troops have entered Berar with his consent or by his orders, he will forthwith order them to withdraw.

I rather expect, however, that but little more has been done than to pass the boundary for forage.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the duplicate of a letter to Gungaram Pundit, the soubahdar of Ellichpoor, which I request you to have forwarded by the Soubah's dawk. I likewise enclose a translation of that letter.



To the Governor General.

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

I forwarded the day before yesterday some important dispatches from Major Malcolm; and I received this morning his dispatch No. 18, of the 8th inst. As I think it desirable that Major Malcolm should receive your Excellency's orders, written subsequently to the receipt of that dispatch, before he makes any communication to Scindiah's durbar of your intentions respecting Gwalior, I have written a letter, of which I enclose an extract, which will allow time for his receiving those orders.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

Having many matters to arrange with Mr. Duncan and with Col. Close, who had been obliged to come here on account of his health, I arrived here about a week ago, and I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th Feb.

I did not mean to compare the state of discipline of the Bengal troops with that of the troops of the Madras establishment. They are not to be compared at all, I imagine; but I gave the preference to the Bengal troops on account of their superior size and appearance, and their caste; and I conceived them not to be objectionable on the score of discipline.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Major Malcolm has concluded the treaty of defensive alliance with Scindiah; so that, if we only make the arrangements depending upon the treaty of peace in the same liberal manner that we have made the peace itself, there is an end to all formidable foreign wars with the Native powers in India. The subsidiary troops are not to be within Scindiah's territories, an arrangement which I acknowledge I prefer to having them there.

The conduct of Holkar is still dubious. He has written to me a letter, dated about the 1st Feb., in terms very civil and respectful towards myself, but much otherwise towards Gen. Lake, whose letter he has not answered, and whom he threatens in his letter to me. I rather think it will be necessary for the Governor General to order him to be attacked, unless he should alter his tone, and adopt a line of conduct more suitable to his interests in the present situation of affairs, by which the Governor General may be enabled to save him. This is possible, as Holkar's power depends upon his avoiding to come in contact with the British troops; and he will see that he cannot avoid this much longer, as soon as he shall hear of the alliance with Scindiah. He must then determine to adopt one of three lines: viz., either to adopt the line of conduct prescribed to him by Gen. Lake, or to enter into a war and fight Gen. Lake, or to go away by Ajmeer, into the Seik countries, and endeavor to establish himself among the Seiks and Affghans. He cannot delay his decision in the usual Marhatta style, as Gen. Lake will not give him time, after so much has elapsed, and the rainy season is approaching. I rather think, therefore, that he will go off to the Punjaub; and what gives me stronger reason to think so is, that on the seal of his letter to me he calls himself '*the slave of Shah Mahmoud, the King of Kings.*' Shah Mahmoud is the brother of Zemaun Shah. He seized the musnud and government of Caubul, after having defeated Zemaun Shah 2 or 3 years ago, and put out his eyes; but he was in his turn

defeated and dethroned very lately by another brother, assisted by the King of Persia. Holkar has taken this title, either to frighten us with the prospect of an invasion of India by the Affghans, or he has really communicated with and entered the service of Mahmoud Shah. In the latter case he may be going to the Punjaub; and his march to Ajmeer, and the state to which he has reduced the whole of Hindustan and the Deccan, and the certainty that he cannot now subsist his troops any where without coming in contact with the British troops, render that movement very probable. In that case the war with Holkar will be delayed to a very distant period, if it ever takes place at all. In case of the war with Holkar, the Deccan would not be the scene of the operations. The contest would be on the frontiers of Hindustan and Guzerat; and, excepting to lay siege to Chandore, there would be nothing to do in the Deccan. It is pleasant to think that, for once, the Deccan will escape.

I informed you that I intended to send into Guzerat the battalion of sepoy now at Poonah. I propose to draw another battalion from Goa to Guzerat by sea, to relieve the battalion drawn from Goa, by the corps now at Hullihall in Soonda, occupying that post only by one company, till further arrangements are made. I think it probable that it will be necessary to draw another battalion from Goa, and to relieve it by one of the Coast battalions with me. I hope that you will have no objection to these arrangements; it is the only mode in which I can reinforce Guzerat, without sending there some of the Coast troops, which would entirely destroy them. At Goa they will be within your reach, and you can relieve them, or withdraw them altogether, as you may think proper.

It will not answer to march the troops from the Deccan into Hindustan. If the troops go north of Chandore, 50 Holkars will start up in all parts of the territories of the Peshwah and of the Soubah of the Deccan; and it would be a most difficult operation to get through the hills between the Nerbudda and the Taptee. But we may establish a communication through them, between the troops operating on the frontier of Guzerat and those about Chandore.

Whether the war with Holkar be immediate or not, I think it desirable to reinforce Guzerat at an early period. In the first place, the Governor General may fix Scindiah's subsidiary force in Guzerat; and in that case the troops will be wanted: in the next place, whether he fixes there the subsidiary force or not, Guzerat is our weakest point. It is that from which we can most easily annoy Holkar and assist Scindiah, and it is that in which we have the smallest means. This arrangement, therefore, is desirable on every ground in which it can be viewed.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 17th March, 1804.

I received the day before yesterday all your letters from the 22nd Feb. to the 5th March, and yesterday that of the 8th March. I imagine that you have altered the time of the dawk, which may have caused the delay in the arrival of the letters.

I am delighted with every thing that you have done. The treaty of defensive alliance includes, in my opinion, all the material points; and you will recollect that I always thought it was preferable to post the subsidiary

force in our own territories, to keeping them in the territories of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

I have written fully to the Governor General on the subject of Gwalior; and if you can only keep down the discussions respecting Gwalior, till he shall have had time to receive my letter, the decision respecting that place will, I think, be satisfactory to us all. I enclose you a copy of my letter, as the shortest mode (for me) of explaining my sentiments.

There is one part of the question into which I have not entered in that letter very fully, that is, our right to Gwalior. This stands upon two grounds: 1st, our right under the 9th article of the treaty of peace, a treaty having been made with the Ranah of Gohud; 2ndly, our right under the same article, a treaty having been made with Ambajee Inglia. I think your argument with Kavel Nyn is unanswerable, respecting the first ground. The treaty of peace mentions the Ranah of Gohud and his territory frequently; these are the Company's boundary, &c. &c.; and if they do not exist, one of the parties who made that treaty was guilty of a fraud, of which he has no right to the benefit. But, supposing that the Ranah of Gohud is to have territory, the question is, whether Gwalior is included in that territory? I have not got a translation of the treaty with that chief; but I am informed that it does not notice Gwalior. The Governor General claims that on the other ground, the treaty with Ambajee; therefore the ground on which I, who made the treaty of peace, considered that we should get possession of the fort of Gwalior, entirely fails.

The fact is, that we now feel the consequences of my ignorance of the real state of affairs in Hindustan. Till I received the Governor General's great dispatch regarding the peace, I thought that the state of the Ranah of Gohud existed; but that dispatch for the first time informed me, that it was a state to be restored, and not one to be supported in independence, for which I was to provide. There was the error; and the same error will be found in his own treaty.

In respect to the second ground of our claim to Gwalior, viz., the treaty with Ambajee, on which alone the Governor General rests, it fails us in two instances: 1st, Ambajee held the fort as a servant of Scindiah. The fort was Scindiah's, and Ambajee his amildar. The clause in the 9th article of the treaty will therefore deprive us of it. 2ndly, Ambajee has broken his treaty, and we have determined that he shall not enjoy any of the advantages for which he had stipulated. The Governor General will, I know, bring forward an ingenious argument, on which he will claim the fort; but I am afraid that it will be too ingenious, and too much abstracted from all the circumstances of the case, to elicit the other parts of the proceeding.

The question, in my opinion, stands thus. Is it consistent with good faith to insist that the stipulations in our favor shall hold good, not against Ambajee, but against Scindiah, when the ground of the 9th article of the treaty of peace, that upon which we claim the independence of the Rajahs, was the necessity of preserving the Company's faith? Where is the necessity of preserving the Company's faith with Ambajee, who has broken his treaty?

I think it rather doubtful whether, in a case of this kind, we can adhere

to one part of the treaty, and not to another, although I believe it is done in many instances. That is to say, the powerful party adopts the measures required by its own dignity, interest, and safety. This, I think, will be the Governor General's theme. But at the expense of what other party are those measures adopted? at the expense of that party who broke the treaty, but not at the expense of Scindiah, a power independent of both. The fair way of considering this question is, that a treaty broken is in the same state as one never made; and, when that principle is applied to this case, it will be found that Scindiah, to whom the possessions belonged before the treaty was made, and by whom they have not been ceded by the treaty of peace, or by any other instrument, ought to have them.

In respect to the policy of the question, it is fully canvassed in the enclosed letter. I would sacrifice Gwalior, or every frontier of India, ten times over, in order to preserve our credit for scrupulous good faith, and the advantages and honor we gained by the late war and the peace; and we must not fritter them away in arguments, drawn from overstrained principles of the laws of nations, which are not understood in this country. What brought me through many difficulties in the war, and the negotiations for peace? The British good faith, and nothing else.

I think that all those questions will be settled as they ought to be; in the mean time, I am making arrangements to settle Holkar. The war against him must be carried on to the northward, and from Guzerat. It will not answer to allow the subsidiary forces to quit the Deccan. We must take Chandore, and his possessions in Candesh, and open a communication through the hills, between the Taptée and Nerbinda, with the corps which will advance towards Indore from Guzerat. This will keep him to the northward, where Gen. Lake must beat him. I see that he calls himself '*the slave of Shah Mahmoud Ghazy.*'

You appear to think that Holkar's omission to answer Gen. Lake is a cause of war; but you think nothing of the insolence of his letter to me. Indeed, it is civil to me personally, but the most insolent production I have ever seen towards Gen. Lake. I conclude that you have sent a copy of it to Bengal, and the Governor General must decide what is to be done. But I think that Holkar, finding that he has furnished the Deccan and Hindustan, and has no chance of getting on much longer without coming in contact with the British troops, is going to Ajmeer, to join his master, Shah Mahmoud Ghazy, who, by the by, has lately been dethroned in Caubul.

I am going to reinforce Guzerat as much as I can, which, with a garrison for Bombay, will weaken me a little. But, as the active operations will not be in this quarter, and the peace of the Deccan is secure, that will not signify at all.

I think you might quiet Bragge's\* spirit, by pointing out to him the scrupulous good faith with which I have acted in this quarter. I have given them all their territories, and restored every furthing of revenue collected since the 1st Jan.; and have paid all the expenses. You may tell Bragge that the Governor General has only received the treaty, and

\* A nickname for one of Scindiah's ministers.

here, I found that the banditti, who, I imagined, had dispersed, were still assembled in a very formidable body, on the Nizam's frontier, near Perinda. They had beaten one of his Highness' armies, and had taken its guns, and they were plundering the country in all directions. I therefore determined to destroy them. With this view, I marched from the army on the 3rd Feb., with all the cavalry, the 74th regt., and 2 battalions of sepoys. I marched again on the 4th 22 miles, again on the 4th at night, and came upon them on the 5th in the morning, and entirely destroyed them; taking from them the guns which they had taken from the Nizam, their camp, baggage, camels, and all their plunder. This was the greatest exertion I ever saw troops make in any country. The infantry was in the attack, although we marched 60 miles between the morning of the 4th and 12 o'clock at noon of the 5th Feb.; and yet I halted from noon till 8 at night of the 4th. I afterwards pursued them, and run them down to the neighbourhood of Beejapoor and the Kistna, where they dispersed entirely. I then returned to the army near Perinda; and from thence came to Poonah, where I arranged several matters depending with the Peshwah's government. From Poonah I came to Bombay, to meet Col. Close, who is sick; and I have been here a week.

Malcolm has, I see, written to you; and I shall only tell you that he has concluded the treaty of defensive alliance with Seindiah. I think it possible that we may have to attack Holkar, but in the present state of our power that can hardly be called a foreign war.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 18th March, 1804.

The intelligence which I have received lately from the northward, and the enclosed letter which was sent to me by Major Malcolm, render it probable that your Excellency will have sent orders to the Commander in Chief to attack Jeswant Rao Holkar. It is therefore necessary that I should make a disposition to co-operate with his Excellency as far as may be in my power; although, from circumstances which I shall state hereafter, I apprehend that I shall not be able to do much in the Deccan. Holkar has no force, and no possessions in the Deccan, excepting Chandore, and a small territory in Candeish, Uniber, and its district, and half of the pergunnah of Sogaum, south of the Godavery, of which Seindiah holds the other half. The fall of the fort of Chandore, which must, I imagine, be regularly attacked, will deprive Holkar of all those possessions.

In the present state of affairs in the Deccan, I imagine that it would not be prudent to march the British troops into Hindustan. All that can be done, therefore, after taking possession of Chandore, will be to open the communication between the troops in Hindustan and those in the Deccan, through the hills between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda.

The troops in Guzerat, however, may co-operate very essentially with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and I have determined to reinforce them. My objects in taking this step, without waiting for your Excellency's orders, are, 1st, to be able to detach a corps towards Indore, keeping in Guzerat a sufficient body of troops to preserve its tranquillity: 2ndly, to provide for the possible desire of your Excellency, that the sub-

sidiary force for Dowlut Rao Scindiah should be in Guzerat: 3rdly, Guzerat is in many respects the weakest of the British possessions on this side of India, at the same time that it is the most exposed, and best situated for annoying an enemy. I therefore propose to send into Guzerat one battalion of the Bombay army now serving at Poonah, and another battalion from Goa, which I propose to replace by the battalion of the Bombay army stationed at Hullihall, in Soonda, holding this post by a detachment.

If I should learn from the northward that your Excellency has given orders that Holkar may be attacked, or that that Chief has committed hostilities against the Hon. Company, or their allies or dependents, I propose to order another battalion of the Bombay army into Guzerat, from Goa, which I shall relieve at Goa by a battalion of Coast Native infantry, from my division of the army. In this manner, since the peace with Scindiah, Guzerat will have been reinforced by 4 battalions; and one regiment of Europeans will have been drawn from thence to send to Bengal.

N.B. I beg leave to draw your Excellency's notice to the seal of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's letter; in which he styles himself '*the servant of Shah Mahmoud Ghazy*,' who, I believe, was King of Caubul.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Nagle.*

Bombay, 18th March, 1804.

Lient. Col. Adams's letter of the 16th inst., enclosing a sick certificate, upon which the Colonel has allowed you to proceed to Bombay for the benefit of your health, has been received and laid before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who has observed that the certificate is not granted by the surgeon of your corps, who must be best acquainted with the state of your health; and that no mention is made of your application for leave having met with the approbation of your immediate commanding officer. For these irregularities the Major General disapproves of the leave granted to you to repair to Bombay; and he directs me to desire that you will not come to Bombay, but return and join your corps, from which, if a proper certificate be forwarded in the regular manner, due attention will be paid to it.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poonah.

Bombay, 19th March, 1804.

You did quite right to refrain from saying any thing about the money for Goklah; and I beg you will not say any thing upon that subject, until you hear further from me.

I am very much obliged to you for the detail into which you have gone, respecting the motives of Byajee Naig's journey to Bombay. Tell him that I can have no objections to his coming here, excepting those founded upon the inconvenience which the Peshwah may feel from the want of his services; but that, if he chooses to come here, I shall be glad to see him.

As the Peshwah may be somewhat jealous of stationing the troops near Poonah, you may mention that I have drawn them there in order to show the Loghur man that I am in earnest, and to be ready to attack his fort, if he should not accept the terms which I have offered him.

P.S. I did not say that I would make arrangements when I should see Col. Close. I said that I had much to say to Col. Close, and that it was necessary that I should go to Bombay to see him.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poonah.

Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

I enclose a list of villages which have been made over to Appah Dessaye, as he says; and he has asked for the assistance of the British troops to take possession of them. If you should find, upon inquiry, that they really have been made over to him, and the troops can put him in possession of them, without a contest with some of the great southern chiefs, or the Rajah of Kolapoor, you might write to Gen. Campbell, to request his assistance for Appah Dessaye, if he should happen to pass in the neighbourhood of them, and it should be convenient to grant it.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a receipt for duties levied on grain coming into my camp; and, as levying such duties has occurred frequently, and is the source of much inconvenience to the troops, I beg that you will be so kind as to take measures to get it prevented.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Bombay, 20th March, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th inst. So long as the troops remain in the field, I beg leave to recommend that the Mysore horse may be kept with them, as being very useful, and indeed necessary in this country. In case of war with Holkar, I think that we might possibly carry with us a large body of Marhatta horse. The Marhatta chiefs, however, are to a man so very capricious, that I do not think we ought to depend upon that assistance, which we must do if we do not keep the Mysore horse.

When I wrote to you on the 16th Feb., that I would consider of the mode of keeping up a body of light cavalry, I understood, from a perusal of the notes on the war, that the Governor General had imagined that the assistance which we received from the government of Mysore was given at the expense of that government; and I intended, when I should meet Col. Close and Mr. Webbe at Poonah, to concert with those gentlemen the mode of rewarding the government of Mysore, in which I proposed to include a plan for keeping up in the Mysore service, at all times, an additional body of horse. I have since found that I had misunderstood the meaning of the notes; and that, in fact, the reimbursement of the expense to the Rajah's government, which was always intended, had actually taken place in some degree. There was an end, therefore, of the plan which I had in contemplation. The only plan that I can suggest is for the Company to take into pay a body of horse. They can be got for 25 rupees each horseman, upon an average; but, I believe, when they receive only this sum, they muster tattoos, which is the common practice of the Marhatta armies. From 30 to 35 rupees each horse is the sum paid to the best horsemen. There is no doubt of their utility in time of war; but I think they may be hired when war may break out, and be nearly as useful as those kept constantly in pay. At least, I am certain that the superior utility of the latter will by no means compensate for the additional expense.

Purneah will of course discharge the supernumerary horse at the end of the war; in which measure he will experience no difficulty or inconvenience.

nience, as he has, in general, the families of the horsemen in Mysore. He knows where their families reside, as they are under the immediate superintendence of the village amildars. The horsemen themselves will be in the same state when they shall be discharged; and, moreover, the regulations of the Mysore government, formed since the campaign against Dhoondiah Waugh, are so strict respecting the removal of horses from one village to another, and the travelling of horsemen through the country, that no danger will be incurred by discharging these men. The persons thus discharged will always be at the disposal of the British government. The Mysore government can always hire them again in a short time, and with great facility. Supposing that you should take a body of horse into the Company's constant pay, it is probable that you would prefer a part of this body now serving with me. And you would thus deprive Purneah of an additional resource in time of war, which he would otherwise be able to supply; and you will gain nothing by the constant expense. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that it is best not to enter into this plan.

Although the Marhatta chiefs are capricious, and not entirely to be depended upon, I think they are to be kept in a disposition so favorable to us, by a constant course of civil communication and good offices, as that you will be able to command their services with their troops for payment. I parted with two that I had with me in great good humour, and well disposed towards the British government. I have recommended them strongly to the Peshwah; but there I am afraid that I have failed. However, I am about to write a dispatch to the Governor General on the subject of the southern jaghiredars, in whose concerns with the Peshwah we must interfere, or we shall never have complete tranquillity; and the settlement of this question, in any way, will insure for the British government a large body of Marhatta horse at all times.

You will have observed from my last letter, that I have contemplated the possibility of hostilities with Holkar, and have made arrangements to provide for that event. I have accounts from Hindustan of a date as late as the 26th Feb., and no act had then been committed on either side. The only cause of complaint that Gen. Lake had was, that Holkar had not answered his letter; although he had complied with his desire to refrain from attacking those under the Company's protection. Major Malcolm's last public dispatches of the 3rd inst., which, however, are of a date prior to that of his private letter, render the probability greater that Holkar will remain in peace.

It appears that he has suggested to Scindiah that they should forget their mutual injuries, and join to attack the English; and that Scindiah told him that he could not break his faith with the English; and, at all events, could not trust him, Holkar. I think it possible, therefore, that upon hearing that Scindiah had connected himself with us, he will have adopted a line of conduct which may enable the Governor General to save him.

I rather think that you and the Governor General agree in opinion on the subject of the affairs of Malabar. He says, 'examine and report the state of the province before you commence your military operations:'



define the evils, and propose a system of government which shall afford a remedy, towards the establishment of which system the military operations may be directed.'

It would be useless to commence military operations upon any great scale, unless the civil officers should be prepared to take possession of the country, and to re-establish the civil government as the troops shall conquer it. If the civil government were not re-established in this manner, the rebels would rise again as soon as the troops would pass through the district; and the effect of the operations of a large body of troops would be much the same as that of a small body. But if the civil government is to be re-established in this manner, it would be better to establish that system which is found to be good, and is to be permanent, than that which is known to be bad, and which it is intended should not last.

Supposing that the bad system were first introduced, it must be followed afterwards by the good one; and supposing that the bad system did not produce a rebellion of itself (which I acknowledge I do not think it would, as rebellion in Malabar is to be traced to causes entirely independent of all systems of civil government, excepting as they are connected with a strong or weak military force), the change from the bad to the good system would produce a degree of convulsion, and, possibly, momentary weakness, which it is always desirable to avoid. It is particularly desirable to avoid it in this instance, as it will not be difficult, by an examination of all that has passed in Malabar, to fix upon the general principles according to which that province ought to be governed, and to frame a system accordingly, in the time which must elapse before the troops can be employed in re-settling the province.

To the Rajah of Kolapoor.

Bombay, 20th March, 1801.

You will have learned from various reports, that, after I had concluded treaties of peace with Senah Sahib Soubah, and the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I returned to the southward, and entirely defeated and dispersed a band of freebooters, who had assembled and were committing depredations within the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan.

Among those freebooters were Viswaz Rao Ghautky, Mulwa Dada, and other chiefs, who had received the orders of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to withdraw with their troops, and join his army at Burhampoor, as peace had been made. When I arrived in their neighbourhood, I gave time to those chiefs to disperse and go away; but they did not think proper to obey the orders of their master, or to attend to my warning; and the consequence is, that they have been beaten and dispersed. Viswaz Rao Ghautky is the brother of Sirjee Rao Ghautky; and I have every reason to believe that the buckshee and troops in the service of the latter were in the action with my troops; although Sirjee Rao himself was then residing at the Peshwah's durbar. Viswaz Rao Ghautky has fled to Kolapoor, and Sirjee Rao Ghautky has gone there from Waly.

I am perfectly aware of the family connexion between you and those brothers; and it is not the custom of the British government, and it is certainly not my wish, to perpetuate enmities, or to deprive those of an

asylum who are inclined to live in tranquillity; therefore I do not call upon you to give up those brothers, as I might be justified in doing. But as you have given them an asylum, I give you notice that the British government will consider you responsible for their conduct; and that if they assemble troops again, which can be intended only to disturb the peace of the territories of other powers, you will be to blame, and you will be called upon to answer for the injuries which they may do. As a friend, I give you this warning. It is time now that the nations of India should enjoy some peace; and you may depend upon it, that the British government will not suffer the peace to be disturbed by any body, or by any power, with impunity.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 21st March, 1804.

I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 7th inst., and informed your Excellency of the particulars of the conferences which I had had with the Peshwah and his ministers during the time I was at Poonah; one of the subjects of those conferences was, the Peshwah's design to attack the southern jaghiredars, and I deferred to lay my sentiments on that subject before your Excellency, till I should have had an interview with Col. Close.

Since I had the honor of addressing your Excellency, I have written a letter to the Rajah of Kolapoor, of which I enclose a translation, which lays the ground for any further proceeding that your Excellency may

G. O.

Bombay, 21st March, 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley is concerned to have been under the necessity of occupying the public time and attention by the investigation of a subject of such small comparative importance as is contained in the charge brought by Capt. — against Lieut. — of the — regt. But it appears by the evidence and sentence of the General Court Martial that nothing would satisfy Lieut. — but an apology from his commanding officer, whose orders he had disobeyed, or a trial by a General Court Martial.

In the course of this trial, and of his defence, Lieut. — has avowed principles of action upon which it is not possible that any military service can be conducted, and which tend to subvert the discipline and subordination of the army.

The first of them is, that he was directly responsible to the commanding officer of the — regt. for an obedience to the orders of Capt. —, his immediate commanding officer, in respect of the duties required from the followers of the detachment of the — regt. under his (Lieut. —'s) command. The next, that he was not bound to obey the orders of Capt. —, acknowledged to be his commanding officer, unless those orders should receive the sanction of the commanding officer of the garrison to which both belonged. The commanding officer of the — regt. had nothing to do with the duties ordered from the followers detached with that part of the — regt. under the command of Lieut. —; and as for the second principle, there is no officer who will read the reprimand who will not perceive that it is entirely inapplicable to the military service.

Major Gen. Wellesley has always been most anxious to avoid occupying the public time and attention by the investigation of trivial subjects; and for this reason he has repeatedly ordered the officers, acting under his command, to endeavor to reconcile the trifling differences which might happen; and it has been Major Gen. Wellesley's wish to assemble a General Court Martial only for the trial of serious military offences, such as, he is happy to reflect, have not occurred during the service which he has conducted.

But the same erroneous principles of action which caused the disobedience for which Lieut. — was put in arrest, indeed by another equally erroneous, the necessity of abiding by the decision of the officers of a corps, who could have no knowledge of the transaction on which they were called to decide, frustrated all Capt. —'s endeavors to reconcile the difference between Lieut. — and Capt. —, and he here stands convicted by a respectable Court Martial of "disobedience of orders and irregular and improper conduct."

Major Gen. Wellesley warns Lieut. — of the danger of those erroneous principles on which he has acted, and of trusting to litigation in points of military service; and he hereby publicly reprimands him.

think proper to order for the settlement of the southern provinces. The operations of that chief being brought to a conclusion, the whole question respecting the southern jaghiredars lies between the Peshwah and them; and the British government can easily settle it.

The first point which it is desirable to obtain is, the Peshwah's formal consent that the British government should interfere between his Highness and the southern jaghiredars. If this should not be effected, the settlement will be imperfect; intrigues will be carried on by the Peshwah and his ministers, to derange the settlement made; and other sirdars of the Empire, possibly some who have rendered services, and to whom the British government may wish well, will be urged to excite disturbances in the countries allotted for the payment of the troops employed by the jaghiredars. By obtaining his Highness' consent to the arrangement, persons of that description, or others, possibly really in rebellion, and not employed by him, will be deprived of the use of his Highness' name, which is the common instrument used by every freebooter in the Empire, who takes up arms against his Highness' authority, or that of the persons acting under the authority of his government.

After that is done, the best mode of settling the questions between the Peshwah and the jaghiredars is that alluded to in the third instance, in my address to your Excellency of the 7th inst., viz., 'to interfere in a certain degree; to ascertain the extent of the service to which the Peshwah is entitled from the southern jaghiredars; to oblige them to afford it, and, on the other hand, to protect them from the oppression of the Peshwah's government, and to guarantee to them their possessions, so long as they shall continue to serve the Peshwah with fidelity.'

The modes proposed in the first and second instances, in my address of the 7th inst., viz., 'to concur with the Peshwah in destroying the southern jaghiredars,' or 'to leave them and the Peshwah to their fate, and allow both parties to settle their disputes in the best manner they can, without interfering at all,' will infallibly occasion a contest, which will, in its consequences, affect the peace of the territories of the Hon. Company and of the Rajah of Mysore.

If the first mode be adopted, and the settlement of the country, after it shall have been taken from the jaghiredars, is to rest with the Peshwah's government, it will not be so advantageous to the British government as that which exists at present; and if the second mode be adopted, the contest will be long, the issue uncertain, the resources of the country will be destroyed, the communications between Mysore and the troops at Poonah interrupted, vast bodies of freebooters will be collected in the southern provinces of this empire, and the British government will at last be obliged to interfere, to provide for its own security and the peace of the territories of the Hon. Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore.

The mode proposed in the fourth instance, viz., 'to make the jaghiredars at once independent states, under the protection, arbitration, and guarantee of the British government,' is one which would possibly provide more effectually for the security of the Hon. Company, and their allies and dependents, than any other that could be devised. But it must be founded upon the fact, that the Peshwah has broken his treaty with the

Hon. Company, in instances in which it was in his power to perform it; and upon a knowledge of the personal characters and dispositions, and military resources of all the southern jaghiredars, which I am afraid we do not entirely possess.

The mode in which I have recommended to settle this question arises out of the treaty of Bassein, and the present state of his Highness' government and power. The measure is pressed upon the British government by considerations relative to the safety and peace of the Company's territories, as well as the advantage of the Peshwah, the increase of his power, and of the means of his government to assist the British government in any future war; and it will be a preparatory step to the independence of the jaghiredars under the Company's protection, if circumstances should ever render that event necessary or desirable. I have little doubt but that the southern jaghiredars, particularly the family of Pursheram Bhow, will readily come into this arrangement; and, in my opinion, if affairs should settle to the northward, the best period to complete it would be during the rainy season.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace.*

Bombay, 21st March, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will give orders for the 2nd batt. 12th regt. Native infantry being equipped with Bombay artillery gun carriages, tumbrils, &c., if possible, and then direct the officer commanding it to march to Poonah, and encamp in the lines of Col. Colman's brigade there, under whose orders he will consider himself.

The Major General further desires that Capt. Noble or Capt. Brown may be sent to Poonah, with instructions to examine all the gun carriages and tumbrils in the park there, and to select all such as have new and good wheels, or wheels in a better state than those in the field, in order to their being exchanged for equal numbers of those in the field whose carriages or wheels are not in such good condition. When the selection has been made, Col. Colman will order the carriages, tumbrils, &c. to be sent out to your camp, and you will return the others to him by the same cattle.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Colman.*

Bombay, 21st March, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that you will give orders for the march of the 84th regt. and of the detachment of the 1st batt. 7th regt. Bombay Native infantry from Poonah to Bombay, by way of Panwell, and also for the march of the 1st batt. 3rd regt. Bombay Native infantry from Poonah to Surva, by way of Panwell, Panaira, &c. Major Earl will receive further instructions concerning his route. A brigade of 6 pounders, with their tumbrils and the artillery men and gun lascars attached, to be sent with each of the 84th and 1st batt. 3rd regt. Major Speus will arrange for victualling those corps and detachments on the march to their respective stations.

The Major General is desirous that the worst of the Bombay 6 pounder gun carriages and tumbrils now at Poonah should be sent with those corps, and requests that you will communicate with Lieut. Col. Adams on this subject, and receive from him such carriages and tumbrils of that description as may be with his detachment and have gone through the campaign, and may be in worse condition than others in your park, so that the carriages and tumbrils with the best wheels, particularly the tumbrils for which new wheels were made at Poonah, may remain there.

The 2nd batt. 12th regt. Madras Native infantry has been ordered to march to Poonah to encamp in your lines. The Commissary of stores with Col. Wallace's force (or another artillery officer from it) is ordered to proceed to Poonah, where you will allow him to examine all the gun carriages and tumbrils in your park, and to select all the carriages, &c., which have new and good wheels, or wheels

in a better state than those in the field, in order to their being exchanged for equal numbers of those in the field whose carriages or wheels are old, or not in such good condition. When the selection has been made, you will give the necessary orders for the carriages, &c., being sent out to camp, from whence Col. Wallace will order in the other carriages by the same cattle. The Major General further requests that you will order the pontoons, their carriages, &c., to be repaired, according to the enclosed report of the committee upon them, of which report he wishes to have a duplicate.

Although these Bombay corps have been ordered to march from Poona, all the departments are to remain there as at present.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 22nd March, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, and 12th inst. My last letter will have detailed my plans in case of war with Holkar, which, however, I think not to be probable at present. We must attack him, however, if he does not refrain from his plunder of Scindiah's territories: but Holkar appears to me to wish to avoid the contest at present; and so does Gen. Lake, possibly from a desire to give his troops some repose, and not to expose the Europeans to the hot winds in Hindustan. However, the letters which I shall receive from you, in the next three or four days, will throw some light upon this subject, and will determine the measures which I shall take.

The army in Guzerat will be reinforced by 3 complete battalions, 2 of them 900 men each. It will be stronger by 4 battalions than it was during the war.

I have recommended your prize money exactly according to your wishes to the Governor General; but I have forgotten Mr. Elphinstone, both with respect to prize money, to which he is fully entitled, and to his salary as secretary, from the time he joined me at Ahmednuggur. The first shall be settled by me, if ever I receive the Governor General's orders on the subject of the division of the prize, which he appears to have forgotten, as well as to take any notice of the battle of Argaum, the siege of Gawilghur, or the battle of Munkaiseer; all of which make me very uneasy, particularly when I know what has been done for the army in Bengal. In respect to Mr. Elphinstone's salary, I shall recommend it as soon as I receive an answer to any letter that I have written to Bengal since the month of December last.

Affairs in Persia are going on very badly, I should think. First of all, Manesty and Lovett exchanged situations, without order or authority. After announcing this arrangement to government, they have changed back again; but Manesty has gone on to Teheran as an ambassador, I suppose from his own ships, and Lovett is gone to Bengal. Skippers are appointed to act as Residents at Bussora and Abusheher;\* and the Residents are considered (a favorite word in the diplomacy of the present day) as 'absent by leave,' of whom is not stated!

I have received your letter without a date, but written, I suppose, on the 13th. My last letter will have convinced you that you have not written a line too much, at least to me, on the subject of Gwalior; and you will have observed that I have not received one of the letters, which

\* The two principal ports in the Persian Gulf.

you supposed that I had received previous to the 7th. But I wonder how you could imagine that you could write too much to me on any subject.

I have not time to tell you all that I have done at Poonah. Amrut Rao's affairs are settled. The Peshwah has the fort of Poonadur; and Amrut Rao goes to Benares after the rains. I shall have the fort of Loghur, which I propose to give Kundee Rao Rastia, by which I shall secure the road to Poonah, through the Konkan. I have proposed a plan to the Governor General for the settlement of the affairs of the southern jaghiredars. These are the outlines of the arrangements made. The Governor General is deceived respecting the Peshwah's inclination to agree to the peace, as he is respecting many other points connected with that subject. I enclose the order for the forts.

*The D.A.G. to the Officer commg. at Asseerghur.*

Bombay, 22nd March, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will deliver up the fort of Asseerghur, with all its guns, stores, &c., to the officer who will be sent, on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to receive it from you; and you will proceed with the detachment under your command, at present composing the garrison of Asseerghur, by way of Adjunttee, to join the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan. Major Malcolm will procure and send you passports through the territories of the Maharajah.

P.S. You will give a return of the ordnance and stores along with them to the officer sent on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and send a duplicate of it to Major Malcolm.

*(A similar letter to the Officer commanding at Powanghur.)*

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Bombay, 23rd March, 1804.

I enclose a memorandum and a translation of it for Kundee Rao Rastia. I request you will give the memorandum to Col. Close's Parsee servant, and desire him to deliver it in person to Kundee Rao Rastia. I should wish him to deliver the memorandum in private, although you will observe that it is a matter of no very great consequence, whether the Peshwah sees it or not. I should wish the Parsee to get an answer from Kundee Rao Rastia.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Noble, Commiss. of Stores.*

Bombay, 23rd March, 1804.

I have laid your letter of the 18th before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, who has given the following orders upon the several points mentioned in it, viz.:

*Gunny bags for ammunition and shot.* New gunny bags to be indented for for both.

*Ammunition barrels and boxes.* To be new covered with packing gunny and wax cloths.

*Ammunition and powder boxes.* If barrels can be got at Bombay they shall be sent; if not, boxes shall be sent of the proper size: but those now in use to be repaired at all events.

*Gun carriages, tumbrils, and platform carts.* Let them be surveyed, and the repairs required given to them. The unserviceable Bombay tumbril wheels to be exchanged for others at Poonah. The Poonah wheels to be set up. The tumbrils and limber boxes to be new caulked and lined. Some of the Bombay tumbril wheels will answer for bandies. Axletrees to be repaired. Capt. Brown of artillery to proceed to Poonah, and make new wheels for tumbrils, guns, and bandies, according to a list which must be given to him, specifying the numbers of each sort required, and what are most immediately wanted.

*Gun and musket ammunition.* The gun ammunition to be refixed, and good powder got from Poonah. Let the musket ammunition be carefully examined, and the bad be exchanged at Poonah. Large quantities of musket ammunition shall be sent to Poonah.

*Ordnance, &c. &c.* The equipments for the guns, such as yokes, handspikes, sponges, &c. &c., to be set to rights by degrees.

The General requests that the above works may be begun immediately, and that you will apply to Col. Wallace for committees, and for any assistance that may be necessary.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace.*

Bombay, 23rd March, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has ordered a general survey and repair of every thing in the Commissary of stores' department, and exchanges to be made at Poonah when necessary and practicable; and he requests that you will order committees for the surveys, when Capt. Noble shall report that he is ready for them, and give such other assistance as you may deem necessary.

The Major General further requests that you will direct Capt. Brown to proceed to Poonah to make up new wheels, according to instructions which he will receive.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Colman.*

Bombay, 23rd March, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has directed the Commissary of stores in camp to indent on the stores at Poonah for gunpowder, musket ammunition, &c., and he requests that you will authorise the indents to be complied with.

Capt. Brown of artillery has been directed to return to Poonah to make up more wheels for the guns, tumbrils, and carts in the field. The Major General requests that you will assist him in getting the master carpenter whom he formerly employed. He hopes that this work will not interfere with the repair of the pontoons and their carriages.

The Major General has ordered the superintendent of the camp bazaars to take charge of that belonging to the troops at Poonah; and I request that you will direct the officer, who at present superintends there, to send me a list of the public servants employed by him.

The regulations of the camp bazaars prohibit the levying of duties upon any article brought into or sold in the bazaar, or in the shops established in it. A licence to sell arrack and intoxicating drugs is farmed to a man for a certain rent daily, and he is prohibited from selling arrack to any European, or to any Native, to carry away from the shop.

*The D.A.G. to Major Graham.*

Bombay, 23rd March, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley directs me to acquaint you that Amrut Rao has signified his wish to be accommodated with a dwelling in the pettah of Ahmednuggur, instead of Bingar, and has pointed out a house in that pettah, which belonged to a former killadar of Ahmednuggur, represented to be now unoccupied, and such as would suit him. The Major General is desirous of complying with Amrut Rao's wishes in this respect, but upon the express condition that he is not to introduce any troops whatever into the town, and to bring in only the persons of his family and his actual menial servants; and the General requests that you will, in communication with the Rao, fix upon a time for your waiting upon him to communicate the General's compliance with his request, but upon the above stated condition; and that you will, upon this occasion, and upon all others, show him every mark of respect and attention.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Major Malcolm, containing the names of rajahs and other feudatories of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with whom treaties have been made, or communication was held during the war, by the officer commanding in Guzerat. I propose hereafter to have the honor of forwarding, to be laid before

your Excellency, the copies of the treaties made with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

I learn from letters from Col. Murray that, during the war, he concluded engagements with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte, in Guzerat, which require that they should be independent of the government of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

Accordingly, I request that you will include the names of those Rajahs in the account which you will communicate to Scindiah's durbār, by order from his Excellency the Governor General, of those feudatories of Scindiah's government with whom treaties have been made during the war, by which they are rendered independent of Scindiah, under the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

Col. Murray had an intercourse, and received assistance in various ways from the Rajahs of Barreah, Kairah, Ballasinnore, Mullaow, Kundjiree, Umyalla; and I beg that you will inform Scindiah's government that those people will be entitled to the benefits of the 10th article of the treaty of peace.

To Major Shawe.

Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

I have written several letters to the Governor General, and you, upon the subject of a variety of important points in this country, to which I have hitherto received no answer, I conclude, because the Governor General has been occupied by other more important considerations. However, the time is now fast approaching, in which my ignorance of the Governor General's intentions and wishes, on many points, to which I have alluded in my letters to you and to him, since the beginning of January, will be very inconvenient; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to review those letters and let me have an answer.

All matters of detail depend upon the Governor General's general arrangements, and there are many essentially necessary for the comfort and efficiency of the troops depending upon their distribution. I cannot commence one of them, or give any answer to one of the many references regarding them, which I have received from Fort St. George, till I receive your answers to my letters written since the 1st Jan., or some intimation of the Governor General's intentions.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 12th and 15th, and, in answer thereto, have to inform you that I have desired the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah to return the names of the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte as persons rendered independent of his government by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace; and the Rajahs of Barreah, Kairah, Ballasinnore, Mullaow, Kundjiree, Umyalla, as persons for whose indemnity provision is made in the 10th article of the treaty of peace.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

You will observe by my letter of this date, that I have desired that the



treaties with the Rajahs of Lamawara and Sounte might be communicated to Scindiah, and that their names might be returned to his durbar, as those chiefs rendered independent of his government by the operation of the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

It is necessary, however, that you should send me copies of the treaties as they were written in the native language, with the signatures annexed, and the English copies, which I wish you to send with the Native copies, in order that I may transmit them to be laid before the Governor General. I wish, also, to have the names of the other Rajahs who will come under the 10th article of the treaty of peace.

To the Adj. Gen. of the Army.

Bombay, 25th March, 1804.

I have the honor to transmit to you the proceedings of the general invaliding, pensioning, and discharging committee, held in the division of the army in advance under my command.

I have at the same time to report to you that many of the men wounded at Assyc, and of the sick sent into the field hospital at Adjuttee, who were recommended by the regimental committees to be invalided or pensioned on account of wounds received, or for other causes, and who could not be brought before the general committee, are not included in these proceedings, although all men who had lost a limb, concerning whose ease there could be no doubt, are passed in these proceedings, according to the recommendation of the regimental committees.

The battle of Argaum and siege of Gawilghur having taken place subsequent to the general orders for assembling, invaliding, and pensioning committees, none of the men wounded on those occasions have been examined either by regimental committees or by the general one. There are, therefore, still many men upon the strength of corps in this division of the army not included in the proceedings of the committee herewith transmitted, who are fit objects for the non-effective lists; and in order that the real effective strength of these corps may be ascertained, I beg leave to recommend a special committee may be ordered to be assembled for the examination of the men above alluded to, as soon as they can be brought into any collected state, or a body of troops passes near to the hospitals where they are, sufficient to form a competent committee for the purpose. None of the men of the 2nd, 3rd, and 2nd 18th were brought before the general committee, on account of their being at a great distance from camp.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Adams.*

Bombay, 26th March, 1804.

The object in collecting troops at Karly was to have taken the fort of Loghur, in case the present killadar of it had refused to surrender it to his Highness the Peshwah. He has entered into a treaty this day, engaging on his part to evacuate the fort with his garrison on Monday next the 2nd of April; and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has engaged that he shall be permitted to go wherever he chooses, and carry off all his private property now in the fort, under which denomination is to be understood every moveable in the place, excepting ordnance, military stores, and provisions.

The Major General requests that you will remain in the neighbourhood of Karly, with your own detachment and the Bombay troops from Poonah, until the above treaty shall have been fulfilled; and in the meantime that you will have the 1st batt. 10th regt. ready to proceed to Loghur, so as to be there at 7 o'clock in the morning of the 2nd April, in order to receive the fort from the

killadar, and to afford protection to the property which he will carry out of it, as well as to such articles as he may not have the means of removing immediately.

The Major General also requests that you will enter into a friendly correspondence with the killadar, informing him that you are sent into the neighbourhood to be at hand to receive the fort from him, and to afford protection to his property, and that you will remain near Karly yourself, with the main body of the army, and propose sending Major Dallas with a battalion to Loghur on the morning of the 2nd of April or Monday next, and requesting the killadar to deliver over the fort to Major Dallas, and to trust to him for the protection of his property, in the same manner as he would do to yourself if you advanced with the whole army.

The killadar's name and style of addressing him, written in the Marhatta language, is enclosed, for the guidance of the mounshee whom you will employ.

As soon as you will learn from Major Dallas that he has got possession of the fort, the Major General requests that you will order the officers commanding H. M. 84th regt. and the detachment of the 1st batt. 7th regt., and the 1st batt. 3rd regt. to march on to Panwell, &c., according to instructions which they have already received, and that you will return with the 78th and 1st batt. 4th regt., and the ordnance, artillery, &c., which joined you at Poonah, to that place, and put yourself under the orders of the officer commanding there for the time, leaving Major Dallas at Loghur with his battalion and guns.

Besides the killadar of Loghur, the widow of Nana Furnavees is in the fort, respecting whom Major Gen. Wellesley will write to you fully to-morrow by the post. In the mean time she is to be taken under the protection of the British government.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 24th inst., in which you convey to me the expression of a confident hope of his Highness the Peshwah, that I shall form such arrangements as that thieves, who have taken refuge in the woods, shall be prevented committing further devastations.

I have long observed and lamented the state of the police in the territories of his Highness the Peshwah; and particularly the fact, that his Highness' ministers and favorites are the patrons and the sharers of the profits gained by the thieves in their plunder of those whose necessities obliged them to travel through the country. I have frequently had occasion to punish those who had had the insolence to plunder, and even to murder, the dealers attached to the British army; but I never considered it to be a part of my duty to provide for the police of his Highness' territories, although I have more than once conveyed my advice to his Highness' ministers respecting their management of the country, which advice had for its object the suppression of robbery.

One of the resources which I recommended to his Highness' attention was to pardon those of his subjects who had offended him, and to return their houses and property, as the first step towards the establishment of tranquillity; because I conceive that so long as his Highness detains in the hands of his government the property of a great proportion of his subjects, those subjects must plunder for their subsistence; and I see no means in the hands of his Highness' government to protect those who may be inclined to exert themselves to gain a subsistence by honest means.

As the expectation that I should interfere in the police of the country has now, for the first time, been brought forward officially, I beg

that you will state distinctly to his Highness the Peshwah, that I have no means in my power to provide for the police of his territories. The British troops cannot be dispersed in small bodies for the purposes either of revenue or police. These are branches of the civil government in which the British government are bound by treaty not to interfere. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that his Highness should adopt measures to have a force of his own for the ordinary purposes of his government, in order that he may not be obliged to have recourse to British assistance upon every trifling occasion. I request you to put this letter into the form as an official memorandum, and convey it to his Highness.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 23rd. You must have no scruple in acting at once for the benefit and safety of your corps, whenever you are fully convinced, from the evidence given to the persons appointed to inquire into the circumstances of any robbery, that those attached to your camp have been plundered or ill treated.

In this instance I have no doubt but that Carribul and Manygee were both guilty of the murder. Accordingly I request that they may be hanged; and let the cause of their punishment be published in the bazaar by beat of tom-tom, or in any other mode by which it may be supposed that it will be rendered more public.

The patel of Bateulgaum, in the usual style of a Marhatta patel, keeps a band of plunderers for his own profit and advantage. You will inform him that if he does not pay for the horses, bullocks, and articles plundered, he shall be hanged also. You will make him acquaint his village with this determination, and allow time for the answer to return; and you will hang him if he does not pay the money at the time fixed upon. It is impossible to get on without these punishments in the Marhatta country. The Peshwah has no authority; and if he had, he would not exert it for the advantage of our troops.

I have lately been a little anxious about the fort of Loghur, which I imagined I should have been obliged to take by force. But I made a treaty yesterday with the killadar's vakeel, which will save us that trouble; and in a few days I hope to be able to relieve you from the necessity of staying any longer in a part of the country in which you experience difficulties on account of forage. Barclay wrote to you yesterday on this subject. I expect daily to receive orders from Bengal respecting the prize money.

To Lieut. Col. Adams.

Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

Capt. Barclay wrote to you yesterday to inform you that I had made an arrangement with the killadar of Loghur for the delivery of that fort to the British troops, for the use of his Highness the Peshwah.

The particulars of this engagement are, that the fort shall be delivered over to the British troops sent to take possession of it on the 2nd April; that the killadar and garrison shall be allowed to carry away their private property, not including guns, military stores, or grain; that the killadar shall be taken under the protection of the British government; that he

shall be allowed to take his property and family, and lodge them upon the island of Salsette; that he shall have an escort of British troops to protect them upon the road to Salsette; and that he shall hereafter be under the British protection and guarantee, so long as he shall conduct himself as a friend.

Besides the killadar of Loghur, the widow of the late Nana Furnavees is in the fort of Loghur, and is provided for under this arrangement. This lady is to reside in the Peshwah's territories, under the protection and guarantee of the British government. She will, I imagine, choose Poonah as the place of her residence, but that point is not yet settled. I have been thus particular in detailing the objects of the arrangements made for obtaining possession of the fort of Loghur, in order that you may more clearly understand the instructions which I am about to give you, in order to carry these objects into execution.

Upon your arrival at Karly, you will be so kind as to write a letter to the killadar, with which you will send the enclosed from his carkoon at this place. You will inform the killadar that you are the officer appointed to receive charge of the fort; and that as the 2nd April quickly approaches, it is desirable that he should send you a person, with whom you can conduct all the arrangements preparatory to the evacuation of the fort by his garrison. If he should omit to send you an answer immediately, or to depute a person to your camp, you will again write to him: inform him that the time presses; that I have ordered you not to take possession of the fort, excepting by force, on any day subsequent to the 2nd April, without receiving further orders from me. If he should send a carkoon to your camp, you will propose all the measures which you may think necessary, in order to obtain possession of the fort on the day stipulated; and you will particularly inform this carkoon that you have my orders not to take the fort under the arrangement concluded with Ambajee Punt, the killadar's carkoon at Bombay, on any day excepting the 2nd April; and that if the cession should be delayed beyond that day, it is my intention to attack that fort, or to insist upon terms in a new arrangement by no means so advantageous to the killadar as those concluded yesterday. It is probable that the carkoon will object to the evacuation on the 2nd April, that Dhoondoo Bullall, the killadar, has no means of moving his baggage; that the widow of Nana Furnavees has no tents; that a house is not provided for her reception at Poonah, &c.

In answer to these excuses you will say, that I have no objection to the killadar remaining in the fort till a convenient time shall have elapsed to enable him to remove his property; or to the lady remaining till all the preparations shall have been made for her removal to Poonah, and her accommodation in that city; but that the garrison, excepting unarmed attendants, must evacuate the fort on the day stipulated, and our troops must be put in possession of the gates and other points which will secure to us the fort.

Let the carkoon know that my anxious wish is to conduct this transaction in a manner that will be satisfactory and honorable to Dhoondoo Punt, and to the widow of Nana Furnavees; but I will not sacrifice essential objects to that wish, nor admit of any trifling in engagements solemnly

entered into. If the carkoon should make any objection to the delivery of the fort, founded on the mutiny of the garrison and their want of pay, you will absolutely reject such objection; and tell him that Dhoondoo Punt must abide by the consequences of this state of his garrison.

If you should be able to make all the arrangements for the peaceable possession of the fort, you will send Major Dallas there with his corps on the 2nd April, to take possession; giving him a caution to beware of treachery in his march through the woods or villages in the neighbourhood. When he shall get possession, I most anxiously recommend him to conciliate Dhoondoo Bullall, the lady, and all the inhabitants of the fort, as far as may be in his power; and not to commit any act not immediately necessary for the security of the fort and the troops, and by no means to consider the killadar and lady as prisoners.

If the arrangement for the delivery of possession should not be made on, or previously to, the 1st, so that you cannot take possession on the 2nd, you are to cease all communication with the killadar and his carkoon, and you will report the state of affairs to me at this place. Upon your arrival at Karly, but particularly if the pioneers should have joined you, you will prepare materials for a siege. You will also look about you, and endeavor to ascertain the best mode of approaching the fort, particularly on and after the 2nd April. If you should not have possession on that day, you will push your reconnaitring parties as close as may be practicable, and let them be numerous, and all out nearly at the same time.

If possession should not be delivered to you on the 2nd April, apprise Col. Wallace thereof, who has orders to march with the remainder of the army to Karly, and I propose to join it myself.

If you should obtain possession on the 2nd, you will give orders to Major Dallas to comply with the killadar's requisitions for escorts to his property down the ghauts to Salsette. He is also to furnish an escort for the lady to go to Poonah, if she shall be prepared to set out; and to act in every respect in conformity to the spirit of the arrangement made with Ambajee Pundit, as above explained. Before the killadar leaves the fort he must give into your hands an order for the fort of Kellinjah, which is likewise to be ceded. This fort is near Wahy on the Kistna.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 27th March, 1804.

I have frequently had occasion to observe the diligence, zeal, and other good qualities of Lieut. Frissell, particularly on a late occasion, when he had charge of the Residency at Poonah. I think it probable that his Excellency the Governor General will appoint him to be an assistant at Poonah, in conformity with your request; and that the appointment has been delayed only because his Excellency's attention has been occupied by other important affairs.

However, as I have been obliged to draw away from Poonah 2 gentlemen appointed to assist you, as you and the public have already derived great advantage from the use of Lieut. Frissell's talents, and above all, as he has had charge of the Residency, I request that you will consider him as an assistant on the establishment from the date of your letter to his Ex-

cellency the Governor General, in which you stated that you recommended Lieut. Frissell to his Excellency, till you shall receive further orders from the Governor General.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poonah.

Bombay, 29th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 26th. It is absolutely necessary that before you write to Gen. Campbell, or before the troops are employed on any service for the Peshwah, measures should be taken to ascertain distinctly the Peshwah's right, who is in possession, &c., and that care be taken not to interfere with the Rajah of Kolapoor, or with any of the great southern jaghiredars. I refer you to a letter which I wrote in the end of Jan. to Mr. Frissell on this subject. Gen. Campbell has not the means of making the inquiries necessary in such a question as that referred to you; and at all events, it ought not to be referred from the Residency to any military officer.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 29th March, 1804.

I have received your letters to the (no date), but I believe the 20th inst.; upon which I have no remark to make. Shawe's letter must have been very satisfactory to you in many respects, and I hope that you will have dispatched another letter to Edmonstone without delay.

I do not like the Delhi journey. It will delay the final settlement of affairs in Hindustan, and will impede the settlement of many questions, on which a decision must be made before the Governor General can quit India. However, I fear that the plan of the journey will be carried into execution: I anticipate a favorable decision of the Gwalior question, from the change of ground which the Governor General has made, on which to place the question. He first founded all his arguments on the treaty with Ambajee; in the second letter to Gen. Lake, he founds them on the treaty with Ambajee, and that of the Ranah of Gohud; and in the instructions to you, the treaty with Ambajee is laid aside, and the treaty with the Ranah of Gohud is alone brought forward. In my opinion that treaty affords good ground for your arrangement about Gohud, but none for Gwalior. I believe also that I have moved the Governor General a little about his treaties with the Rajah of Berar's feudatories.

To Major Graham.

Bombay, 29th March, 1804.

It is difficult to say what ought to be done with Holkar's man in Sogaum. The best mode of proceeding with him, is to give him no cause to complain; and on this point I recommend that you should look sharply after your own Marhatta amildars, who are not unlikely, under our protection, to lay about them more than we can intend or justify. There is no calling any Marhatta to account without an army; but I shall bear this complaint in mind; and the conduct of Bunda Aly Khan shall not be unpunished, when the army shall move to that quarter. You may as well circulate the report that the army is coming there.

As I observe that we have but little country left, and that little close to the fort of Ahmednuggur, I think that you might discharge nearly the whole of the provincial force.

I am much obliged to you for the revenue reports and accounts. We must make some arrangements to feed the poor. To issue grain *gratis* will not answer. It will draw numbers of people to Ahmednuggur, and will thereby increase the distress. The best thing to do would be to undertake some useful work, such as the completion of the *glacis* of the fort, to perfect it, to knock down that bad work in front of the gateway, and to make a good modern *flèche* in lieu thereof, and pay the workmen in grain. This might answer, and I shall write to the engineer to desire him to give me his sentiments on the subject of the work to be undertaken. I have no objection to your proposal about Heura. It is a nice little fort, and might be very useful as a point of communication between Ahmednuggur and Aurnungabad.

I wish you would give 100 rupees to the jemidar of cavalry, who behaved so well in the Gundapoor district, as a reward for his good conduct. I only wish he had kept the guns. Do not give up the sirdeshmookey of Puttun till you hear further from me.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 30th March, 1804.

I have received your letter of the (no date), in which you acknowledge the receipt of mine of the 14th and 15th. I hope that you will have received mine of the 17th, in time to delay the discussions on the subject of Gwalior, which it appears by another letter that you intended to bring forward. However, I have but faint hopes that I shall succeed in inducing the Governor General to alter his intentions; as, by a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Edmonstone, it appears that he insists upon the confirmation of all the treaties made with the feudatories of the Rajah of Berar; some of which were signed at Cuttack, not less than 10 days after the intelligence of the treaty of peace.

I have to observe also upon those treaties, that they have been negotiated and concluded, not with the real Rajahs or feudatories, but with their rannees or ministers. The real Rajahs are, and have always been, in confinement at Nagpoor. The Governor General has, however, offered compensation to the Rajah of Berar for the loss he will sustain by the transfer of these Rajahs from his authority. But this will not satisfy him, as I know that his object was to establish his own authority in those countries.

My dear Malcolm, we shall have another war, and the worst of it will be, that all these questions will not bear inquiry. It is not even denied that the treaties were signed many days after the treaty of peace was known at Cuttack; but all that is nothing; the previous *verbiage* is thought sufficient to bind us, as if the signing of a treaty was not that which concluded and bound the parties; and as if, in the treaty of peace with Ragojee, we had not so far insisted upon this point as to continue our operations till he had ratified his treaty. I declare that I am dispirited and disgusted with this transaction beyond measure; however, I can say no more on it. The orders are called final; but my public letters, written in February, show my opinion of it.

There is good news about the China fleet, in which this settlement is much interested.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 1st April, 1801.

I have received your letters to the 24th March. Your breeze about Gwalior and Gohud went off tolerably well. My reason for wishing to avoid all discussion on the subject was, that it was carried on in such a tone, that I feared something would be said, which would render it impossible for the Governor General to concede, which I think still that he may be inclined to do. God send that he may, for the subject will not stand discussion.

Goorparah was with me this morning; he said that Scindiah was not so well satisfied with his communications with Gen. Lake, as he was with those which he had had with me. I told him that both acted under the orders of the Governor General, and that the communications of both ought to be the same; but I said that the fact was, that Scindiah used Ambajee Inglia, or one of his people in his communication with Gen. Lake; that Ambajee had destroyed Scindiah, and deceived Gen. Lake, which was the cause of the difficulty of the present moment, in respect to the ninth article of the treaty of peace; and that it was probable that Gen. Lake entertained doubts of his sincerity in every communication which he made on the part of Scindiah; and that where there was no confidence nothing could succeed. Accordingly, I recommended that he should appoint another agent. Goorparah said that he would recommend the change, and desired me to write to you upon the subject. However, it is possible that Scindiah may wish to delay the change, for the same reasons that he wishes to delay to take possession of Dhoolpoor, &c.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 1st April, 1801.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 20th March. The general rule respecting the trial of criminals, for offences committed even in camps in the Company's territories is, that they should be made over to the Company's civil tribunals; and I understood from Mr. Duncan, that a mode of trying criminals has been ordered by the government of Bombay, and that it will be put in execution whenever any criminals shall be arrested and sent to the Resident or collector for trial. According to this mode of procedure, the trial and punishment of an offender will not be quite so quick as we might wish, but it will be certain and regular: at all events, it is the mode ordered by government, and must be put into execution.

However, I think that Bhels, and people of that description, whose profession is plunder, and who come armed into the camp for that purpose, ought not to be considered and treated as common robbers. They are public enemies and rebels against all authority, and I recommend that when one of them is caught in the camp, whether it be situated in the Company's territories, or in those of the Rajah, he may be shot by the nearest rear guard, if he should be taken in the act of robbery. If something of this kind be not done, the robberies and outrages of the bheels will reduce the troops to the greatest distress.

If a robbery should be committed in the camp when it is situated in the territories of the Guickwar, Mr. Duncan and I are both of opinion that the criminal ought to be tried and punished according to military pro-



cess, under the orders of the commanding officer. The country is the Rajah's and the Company's civil authority has no power within it. The Rajah's civil power, to which, according to our notions, the trial of criminals ought to belong, has no authority in our camps; it cannot be admitted there, and, therefore, can have no jurisdiction. Accordingly, if a robbery be committed in the camp, when situated in the Rajah's territory, the criminal must be tried and punished by military process. Of course this power must be used with discretion; care must be taken not to shock the feelings by violent or unusual punishments, nor to interfere, in any manner, with persons employed in the collection of the revenue or the administration of the government.

I enclose a copy of Major Malcolm's answer on the subject of the behaviour of Scindiah's servants in Guzerat.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 2nd April, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th March. I also received that of the 26th Feb., and wrote an answer to it on the 16th March. But I have not yet received your letter of the 29th Feb.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 3rd April, 1804.

I have just received your letters of the 23rd and 25th. By the last accounts from Hindustan, I judge that Holkar will remain quiet; and that the Governor General will be able to leave him unmolested, of which I have reason to believe he is desirous. At all events, I am very certain that Holkar will not be attacked previous to the next rains.

We have concluded the subsidiary alliance with Scindiah; which event, and the possibility of a war with Holkar, induced me to take measures to strengthen Guzerat immediately with two battalions, one from Poonah, and another, consisting of 900 men, 700 of them old soldiers, from Goa: and I have it in contemplation to send into Guzerat another battalion from Goa; I shall, however, wait to send it till I shall receive orders to do so from Madras, unless the war with Holkar should be certain.

You must dispose of the troops in such a manner as you may think most expedient, bearing in mind the disposition which I originally proposed to Mr. Duncan, and the fact that your enemies are all to the northward at present. I shall take away from you, for Bombay, the 5 companies of the 84th regt.

In case of a war with Holkar, you must, besides the corps in front of Surat, have a disposable corps of two or three battalions, as a reserve, in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda. With your Europeans, and the remainder of your force, and the Rajah's cavalry, I should wish you to penetrate towards Indore, where you would be joined by a large proportion of Scindiah's army, and very probably I should be in communication with you with a corps from this quarter. According to this plan, we ought to be hanged if we do not get the better of Holkar in a very short time.

A reserve is necessary in Guzerat to keep Canojee in check, and to prevent Holkar from detaching to your rear. I mention these ideas to you now, not because there is any probability of a war, but that you may turn your mind to the system of operations which I prefer, if there should be one.

In the mean time, you will do well to take every measure in your power to establish the Company's authority in the districts supposed to be disturbed, as the more firm we are at home, the greater safety will attend our forward movement into the enemy's country, if ever that should be necessary.

To Major \* \* \* \*

Bombay, 3rd April, 1804.

Capt. Wilks has transmitted to me a copy of a letter which you addressed to him on the 10th March, and a copy of his answer of the 23rd March, from which I am concerned to observe that you have mistaken the nature of your situation at Bangalore.

It never entered into my contemplation to confide the military defence of Bangalore to a havildar and 12 sepoys, placed under your superintendence; or to require from them more than to preserve the Company's property which was, and may still be, in the fort. The duties required from you were to keep up the communication between the Presidency and the advanced stations of the army; to see that stores for the troops did not delay on the road; and above all, to give countenance to the servants of the *Native government of Mysore*, in its communications with the Company's servants and subjects travelling on the high road between Madras and Seringapatam, and the frontier; and also to take care that the government should be treated with the respect which it deserves.

The way in which you have performed these duties is, first, to take possession of the fort as a military post, which was never intended; and then to quit your situation, (I conclude by permission of the Commander in Chief, but without attending to my orders of March, 1803,) and to leave to the havildar and the guard to carry into execution all your oppressive orders regarding the military post, the result of which must be to degrade the government in the eyes of those over whom its authority must be extended. The consequence of those orders (which were not communicated to the amildar, although directed against him personally) was, that there was a dispute between that part of your garrison stationed at the gate, and the amildar's attendants, upon the occasion of his attempting to enter the fort. I hope I shall not be accused of insulting the havildar's guard, when I say that they owe their safety and their lives at this moment to the moderation of the amildar, to whose conduct you have been pleased to apply the term 'infamous.'

It is no part of my duty to defend the officers of the government of Mysore, or I should find it an easy task upon the present occasion; but it is so to confine the attention of the officers under my command strictly to their duty: accordingly, I have to direct that you will recall your orders regarding the gate at Bangalore: indeed, unless the amildar should wish you to take charge of it, I do not see that you have anything to do with the gate; and to confine your attention and the services of your sepoys entirely to the objects specified in the 2nd paragraph of this letter.

I observe that you have not sent your returns of the garrison of Bangalore for the last 2 months: I conclude, because you have been absent.

To Capt. Wilks.

Bombay, 3rd April, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 23rd March. I shall never consider

it a trouble to interfere in supporting the authority of the government of Mysore; and accordingly, I have written a letter to Major \* \* \* \* this day, of which I enclose you a copy. As you have desired it, I have not dismissed him from his situation, which I certainly should have otherwise done. But I have said enough to prevent a recurrence of the inconvenience complained of.

Col. Close is quite well, and he and Webbe go to Poonah on the day after to-morrow. From thence Webbe will go to Ougein. I hope to leave this in a few days for Mysore.

To Lieut. Col. Adams.

Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd inst. I beg you to accept my acknowledgments for the manner in which you have carried into execution the instructions which I gave you, with a view of obtaining possession of Loghur. Every thing has been conducted to my satisfaction; and I observe in this instance the same zeal and judgment of which I have frequently enjoyed the advantages during the campaign.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 1st. I am afraid that you will find rice to be but bad food for the horses of the cavalry, and I have endeavored to get some gram here for you. I think that I shall be able to send off to the stores at Poonah 3 or 4000 loads of some kind of gram in a few days. I think that Capt. Monteith would do well to send his bullocks to a great distance towards the Nizam's country to get grain.

I am preparing the orders and arrangements to break up, which I hope to be able to send you in a day or two. I shall also write to you a few lines about the prize money, although I have not yet received the Governor General's orders upon that subject.

To Major Graham.

Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

I enclose a letter from Bunda Aly Khan, and a copy of it. I mean to pay the expense of the subsidy in Scindiah's villages, all the time we held them, and give him the clear revenue. Arrange this matter accordingly.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

I had the honor to inform your Excellency in my letter of the 7th March, that the Peshwah had called upon me to resent an affront which he received from the killadar of Kellinjah, when he was on a late excursion to the river Kistna, at Wahy. The fort of Kellinjah is of no very great strength, I imagine, and belongs to the family and adherents of the Nana Furnavees. The widow of Nana Furnavees resides at Loghur, where the greatest part of Nana's treasure is supposed to be lodged, and the killadar, Dhoondoo Bullall, is the principal of all Nana's adherents. Loghur is a fort of extraordinary strength, situated immediately on the road between Poonah and Bombay, and it can command the communication between those two places.

Dhoondoo Bullall, the killadar of Loghur, had made a proposal some years ago to Mr. Duncan, that he might be permitted to retire with his

property to Bombay, to reside there under the Company's protection; which proposal having been referred to the Peshwah, his Highness refused to consent to it. It has been renewed at different periods, and in different channels since that time; but since the conclusion of the peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, Dhoondoo Bullall made proposals to Mr. Duncan which indicated a wish to depart from those heretofore made, and which went to his permanent establishment in his fort, and to the adoption of a son, by the widow of the late Nana Furnavees.

Affairs were in this situation when I arrived at Poonah, and was pressed by the Peshwah to resent the insult offered to him at Kellinjah. On the other hand, I had no reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of Dhoondoo Bullall during the war. He had it in his power to interrupt the communication with Bombay, and to do great mischief in that manner; but his conduct was strictly neutral; and in the different letters which I had occasion to write to him, I gave him assurances, that so long as he should conduct himself as a faithful servant of the Peshwah, he should not be molested by the British troops.

The unexpected alteration of the proposals of the killadar of Loghur created some suspicion in my mind; and I determined, when I went to Poonah, to bring him to a decision, in respect to his future plans; and to adopt a mode of securing the communication with Bombay, which should not depend entirely on the promises, or the forbearance of Dhoondoo Bullall. The insult to the Peshwah at Kellinjah, which could not be passed over at all events, held out a fair opportunity of settling every thing, respecting the important fort of Loghur, upon a firm basis.

In the conference with the Peshwah's minister, reported to your Excellency in my address of the 7th March, your Excellency will observe that he agreed to the terms which I intended to propose to Dhoondoo Bullall; those were, that the killadar should be allowed to remove with his property to Bombay, that the widow of Nana Furnavees should reside in the Peshwah's territories where she should think proper, under the protection of the British government, and that she should enjoy a pension from the Peshwah, under the guarantee of the British government.

It was besides agreed, that the person to be appointed killadar hereafter by the Peshwah, should be a person trusted by the British government.

According to this arrangement, I informed Dhoondoo Bullall, that the Peshwah had serious cause to complain of him; that his Highness had been grossly insulted at Kellinjah; that the British government would not suffer this insult to pass unnoticed; and that he must either satisfy his Highness on that subject, as well as respecting his conduct in future, or he must surrender the forts of Loghur and Kellinjah. I informed him at the same time, that if he should be inclined to surrender his forts, the proposals which he had made to Mr. Duncan some years ago should be accepted; and that he should be permitted to reside at Bombay with all his property, under the protection of the British government.

At the same time that I sent these proposals, I ordered a detachment from the army, consisting of the 78th regt., and 2 battalions of Native infantry, to march towards Poonah; and they have since advanced towards

Loghur, under the command of Lieut. Col. Adams, with a battering train, and the detachment heretofore at Poonah.

A negotiation was commenced shortly after these proposals were made; which, after much Marhatta tergiversation, and some insolent and extravagant proposals, all tending to delay the final settlement, was concluded by a treaty on the 26th March, of which I have the honor to enclose copies in the English and Marhatta languages.

According to the terms of this treaty, the fort of Loghur was delivered up to the British troops on the 2nd inst., and Dhoondoo Bullall and his property are on their way to Bombay, escorted by a British detachment. The widow of Nana Furnavees, who has chosen Culwah, opposite to Tannah in Salsette, as the place of her residence in future, accompanies him.

Upon consultation with Col. Close, it appears most desirable to give the fort to Kundee Rao Rastia, as he is the only person in the Peshwah's service who possesses certain means of paying the garrison; and as Bassein and other possessions in the Konkan are in his hands, all of which are at the mercy of the government of Bombay, there are ample means of controlling him, in the use which he might have it in his power to make of this fort. But besides these advantages attending this disposal of it, there is every reason to believe that Kundee Rao Rastia is attached to the Peshwah's cause, and fully aware of the benefits of his Highness' alliance with the British government. I have therefore requested Col. Close to recommend to the Peshwah to give this fort to Kundee Rao Rastia.

I beg leave to draw your Excellency's attention to the favourable circumstance attending this arrangement. Besides the security which it gives to the communication between Bombay and Poonah, by placing in the hands of a friend a post reported by Lieut. Col. Adams to be of extraordinary strength, the family and adherents of Nana Furnavees are taken under the protection and guarantee of the British government, a circumstance highly honorable to the national character.

It is supposed (on what grounds I am not able to say) that the killadar of Loghur possesses large treasures. The Peshwah and his ministers assert it positively; and there can be no doubt, but that the cause of the former proposal of Dhoondoo Bullall to Mr. Duncan, and his motive at present, for giving up his fort, arise from a desire to save his property. Whatever that property may be, it will add to the resources and capital of this opulent island.

In the course of the various revolutions in the government of Poonah, many soucars and others possessing property, took refuge at Loghur, where they remained till this time. I know that some, and, I believe, almost all, of these persons will come to Bombay in the train of Dhoondoo Bullall, and will settle here with their property, adding again to the resources of Bombay.

This island now becomes, by the possession of Loghur by the Peshwah, the only place of security in this part of India for property, and for those who are the objects of the Peshwah's enmity and vengeance; a circumstance equally honorable to the character of the British nation and advantageous to their interests, and affording the strongest proof of the

confidence which the natives repose in the justice and wisdom of our policy and our laws. It may happen that the Peshwah will claim some of the persons, who may come into Bombay upon this occasion, as his subjects, under his treaties with the Hon. Company.

In the course of the conversations which I have had with different natives, on the subject of their settling in Bombay, I have apprised them of the nature of the engagements of the British government with the Peshwah; but I have told them that it never was intended that those engagements should be made the instruments of the Peshwah's vengeance, or deprive those of an asylum, who, in a long course of political contests, had, at some time or other, been his opponents; that, of course, every case would be strictly inquired into, and that no person, who should take refuge on the island of Bombay, should be given up, respecting whom it was not proved that he was a decided enemy of the Peshwah. According to this principle, I have requested Lieut. Col. Close to inquire particularly into the case of every person demanded by the Peshwah's government, before he should require him from the government of Bombay.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

When I had occasion to call Mr. Elphinstone and Mr. Strachey from the Residency at Poonah, I requested the Governor of Bombay to send to Poonah Mr. Goodwin, a gentleman who, I had heard, had distinguished himself at the College at Fort William; as, in the absence of Lieut. Col. Close and of Mr. Waring, whose return was not to be expected, there was no gentleman at that Residency to assist Lieut. Frissell.

Upon my arrival at Poonah, I found that Mr. Goodwin was a senior civil servant to Mr. Waring, whose appointment was only that of an assistant; and I was informed that, according to the rules of the service, Mr. Goodwin, if appointed to act as an assistant, would have charge of the Residency in the absence of Col. Close. I therefore determined to send him on to one of the other durbars, at which assistance was equally wanted; and, in the mean time, till an opportunity of his moving from Poonah should offer, he has given whatever assistance was in his power to the Residency at Poonah. I have now requested Mr. Webbe to take Mr. Goodwin to Ougein, and to consider him as an Assistant with that Residency till your Excellency's orders should be received.

The Residency at Poonah is greatly in want of assistance; in fact, it was given in charge to Lieut. Frissell, who does not belong to the diplomatic branch of it, on the late occasion of the absence of Lieut. Col. Close and Mr. Waring. In consequence of this circumstance, and of a letter which I received from Lieut. Col. Close, of which I enclose a copy, I wrote to Lieut. Col. Close to request that he would consider Lieut. Frissell as an assistant at Poonah, from the date of his address to your Excellency on that subject. I have the honor to enclose a copy of my letter to Lieut. Col. Close, upon this occasion. I hope that your Excellency will approve of these arrangements.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 6th April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received

from Mr. Elphinstone, containing fresh complaints from the ministers of the Rajah of Berar, of the conduct of Gungaram Pundit, the Soubah's amildar in the Berar country. This conduct, in which Gungaram Pundit appears determined to persevere, notwithstanding my repeated remonstrances, is entirely inconsistent with the spirit of peace, and with the letter and spirit of the treaty of Deogaum. If the Rajah of Berar should retaliate, the Soubah of the Deccan will lose all the advantages which he might derive from a sole possession of the rich countries ceded by the treaty of peace; and the consequences may be a renewal of the war. In that case the British government may be reduced to the necessity of making a choice between seeing the reduction of the power of its ally, or commencing a war in which the Soubah of the Deccan will have been the aggressor. I therefore most earnestly urge you to use your influence at the court of Hyderabad to induce the Soubah of the Deccan to perform the stipulations of the treaty of peace.

In my opinion, Gungaram Pundit ought to be seized and punished for his conduct; and, until that measure is adopted, no amildar will obey the orders which he may receive.

As the Berar country is at present managed by the Soubah's officers for the benefit of the allies, I request you to inquire, and report to his Excellency the Governor General, whether Rajah Ragotin Rao has interfered and given orders inconsistent with the principles of peace, and with the instructions which I gave to Rajah Mohiput Ram.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Bombay, 7th April, 1804.

I had yesterday the honor of receiving your letter of the 20th, and two letters of the 22nd March.

I must first take the liberty of expressing my acknowledgments for the handsome manner in which you have been pleased to notice my services, in your dispatches to H. R. H. the Duke of York and to His Majesty's ministers.

In the course of the operations intrusted to me, I certainly had difficulties to encounter which are inseparable from all military service in this country, but I enjoyed an advantage which but few have had in a similar situation. I served under the immediate orders of an officer, who was fully aware of the nature of the operations to be performed; and who, after considering all that was to be done, gave me his full confidence and support in carrying into execution the measures which the exigency of the service might require. Under these circumstances I was enabled to undertake every thing with confidence; and if I failed, I was certain it would be considered with indulgence. I declare that I cannot reflect upon the events of the last year without feeling for you the strongest sentiments of gratitude, respect, and attachment; and to have received these marks of approbation has given me more real satisfaction, than all that I have received from other quarters.

As soon as I received the account from Major Kirkpatrick of the event at Hyderabad, I took measures to send up additional quantities of grain from hence to Poonah, as I thought it probable that you would be desirous of sending to Hyderabad the grain which had been prepared in the Ceded

districts for the troops. I have not yet called for that grain, as in fact we have as much at Poonah and Ahmednuggur as we can well require; and I wished still to leave the bullocks in the Ceded districts, in order that they might have a chance of forage for some time longer, and might come fresh to the troops, if their services should be required at a late period in the season.

I rather think that Holkar will remain quiet. He has opened a negotiation with Gen. Lake; and Gen. Lake has spoken to his vakeels with great firmness, but with moderation and indulgence. The vakeels at first were very exorbitant in their demands, and, as usual, rather insolent, but before they departed they acknowledged that Holkar was unequal to the British government. They in a manner threw themselves upon Gen. Lake's mercy, and said that he, Holkar, would retire to his own territories as soon as they should return to camp.

I think it probable, not indeed certain, that there will be no interruption of the peace; although it is possible that the negotiations with Holkar may be protracted to a late period in the season, notwithstanding that Gen. Lake has placed them on such a basis as to render their early conclusion the most probable event. In a few days I shall understand the subject more clearly, and I shall determine either upon keeping the troops here during the rainy season, or upon sending them back. This I must do immediately, as they want clothing and other necessaries which they must have at an early period; and the place must be fixed at which each corps can meet what it may want.

As soon as I shall be able to determine whether to break up or keep the troops together, I shall write to Major Gen. Campbell respecting the bullocks in the Ceded districts.

In answer to your letter of the 20th March, I have to inform you that I determined to pay Goklah and Appah Dessaye after the month of February, when I marched the Marhatta troops back to Poonah.

I have handed Amrut Rao over to the Resident at Poonah. The Mysore troops have never been more than a temporary burden on my finances, as when the convoys have arrived, they have regularly repaid the advances which had been made to them.

I have also to observe that the advances made to the Peshwah's troops are in a train of repayment to the Resident at Poonah, from the revenues of the Ahmedabad district in Guzerat, amounting to about 6 laes of rupees *per annum*. I believe that the Peshwah does not owe us more than 6 laes of rupees on this account. The future demand, therefore, upon the finances of the British government, for the troops in this country, will be only for the troops belonging to it.

From what I have above mentioned respecting Holkar, you will observe that I cannot say exactly what will be the number of troops to be paid in this country after April; but I propose to desire the Paymaster to send his estimates regularly every month to the Paymaster Gen., according to the regulations of the service.

Till I see one of these estimates, I cannot ascertain exactly the amount of the monthly expense. I think, however, that a sum amounting to about one lac of pagodas *per mensem* ought, if possible, to be sent for the



service of the division under my command, if their numbers should not be reduced. It is true that we may not require the whole of that sum. It is possible, and, from what has passed already, more than probable, that we shall be able to procure at Poonah, for bills on Bombay, Benares, and Calcutta, money to defray the greater part of the expense of the troops stationed in this country; which mode would possibly be the cheapest, and certainly the most convenient, to the government of Fort St. George. But the supply is so very uncertain at present, that Col. Close cannot engage to furnish the funds required. I had a full discussion with him on this subject before I received your letter, of which that was the result.

However, I know that there are several causes which must produce an increase of the money to be got at Poonah for bills; and I have but little doubt that in a short time Col. Close will be able to procure so much in that manner, as to be entirely independent of any to be sent from the Carnatic.

I shall desire the Paymaster to send an account of the expenses incurred on account of the auxiliary troops serving during the war. The account, however, must be balanced by the revenues received by the Resident at Poonah from the Ahmedabad district. Indeed, the payments made to the Peshwah's troops stand in our accounts to the debit of the Resident at Poonah. I shall take care that, with the account, shall be sent such information respecting the amount of the revenues received by the Resident, as will show the real state of the transaction, and of the balance still due.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have received a letter from Major Shawe, from which I learn that the Governor General has approved of, and has adopted my sentiments respecting the necessity of obliging our allies to place their military establishments on an efficient footing. This is in my opinion a very important point. Mr. Webb and Col. Close went away the day before yesterday; the latter much recovered.

I have taken from the Peshwah the important fort of Loghur, by capitulation with the killadar. But I propose to send you to-morrow copies of my late dispatches to the Governor General, which will show you the arrangements I have made in the last month, and those which I have proposed to the Governor General for the future settlement of various points in this country.

At a Meeting of the British Inhabitants of Calcutta, held on the 21st Feb. 1804, an Address was proposed by Mr. Speke, the chairman, and unanimously voted to be presented, on the 29th Feb., to his Excellency the Governor General.

The Chairman then read and presented to his Excellency certain resolutions of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, of which the following is an extract, connected with the subject of the Address; with the request of the settlement, that his Excellency the Governor General would be pleased to communicate to Major Gen. Wellesley the desire of the settlement, as expressed in that resolution.

Resolved, That a sword of the value of £1000 be presented to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the name of the British inhabitants of this settlement, as a testimony of the sense which they entertain of the services rendered by him to the East India Company, and to his country.

His Excellency the Governor General was pleased to signify his compliance with the above solicitation of the settlement in the following terms:

Gentlemen : This honor is peculiarly acceptable to the warmest sentiments of my heart. The zeal of fraternal affection and of private friendship cannot furnish expressions of approbation equal to those which the services of Major Gen. Wellesley demand from my public duty. He will receive this honor with every degree of satisfaction which private regard can add to public sentiment.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 8th April, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 9th March, with the resolution of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, passed at a meeting held the 21st Feb., presenting to me a sword of the value of £1000, which resolution was transmitted to me by your Excellency.

I have expressed my sense of the honor conferred on me by the British inhabitants of Calcutta, in a letter to the chairman of the meeting in which they passed their resolution, which I have the honor to enclose, and I request your Excellency to give orders that it may be forwarded to Mr. Speke.

To Peter Speke, Esq.

Bombay, 8th April, 1804.

His Excellency the Governor General has transmitted to me a resolution passed at a meeting of the British inhabitants of Calcutta, on the 21st Feb., for presenting to me a sword, as a testimony of the sense which they entertain of the services which I have had an opportunity of rendering to the East India Company and our country.

The approbation of gentlemen, with many of whom I have the honor of being personally acquainted, for whom individually I have the highest respect, and who have been distinguished, during the eventful administration of his Excellency the Governor General, by their sentiments of zeal for the public interests, is extremely gratifying to me; and I request you to express to the British inhabitants of Calcutta, the satisfaction, respect, and gratitude, with which I receive this honorable testimony of their approbation of the conduct of the troops who served in the Deccan under my command, and of their kindness towards myself.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 8th April, 1804.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the 75th regt., a detachment of the 88th, and a detachment of the 61st, sailed from hence on the 5th inst., for Bengal. These troops had been embarked at Surat in the end of February; but in consideration of the recommendation of Adm. Rainier, and of his giving it as his opinion, that, in consequence of the expected change of the winds, they would arrive in Bengal, if they should not sail till the middle of March, at as early a period as if they should sail immediately, I consented to the detention of the ships till the troops which I proposed to send from Poonah should have approached Bombay. Afterwards, the crew of the *Centurion*, the ship appointed by Adm. Rainier to convoy the fleet of transports, became very unhealthy, and Capt. Rainier was obliged to land the men for their recovery. None of the other men of war in Bombay harbour were fit for sea, or likely to be so for many days; and it became necessary to arm one of the transports in order to give protection to the fleet. This took some time, and, upon the whole, the fleet could not sail till the 5th inst. There is every reason to hope that they will have a short passage to Bengal.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 9th April, 1804.

Mr. Duncan has shown me your letter to him on the subject of Powar of Dhar; I entirely agree in opinion with you on that subject.

Powar is a Marhatta chief, of the same nominal rank in the Empire as Seindiah and Holkar; but he is not so powerful as either, and latterly he appears to have considered himself as inferior to the former, and served in Seindiah's army at the battle of Assye. After that battle he fled to Dhar, and opened a friendly communication with Major Walker, and since the peace he has come to Baroda without leave.

We have no right to interfere in favor of Powar under the 9th article of the treaty of peace; and in your letter to Mr. Duncan you have pointed out clearly the inutility of attempting it under the 10th article.

If we are not to interfere in favor of Powar in consequence of either the 9th or 10th article of the treaty of peace, the question is whether we ought to interfere on any other ground more general.

I have always been of opinion that we have weakened Seindiah more than is politic; and that we shall repent having established such a number of these little independent powers in India, every one of whom will require the support of the British government, which will occasion a constant demand of employment of troops, a loss of officers and men, and a claim of money.

In respect to Powar, he is naturally, and in consequence of the local situation of his capital in the neighbourhood of both Holkar and Seindiah, the weakest of the weak. For that reason I objected to making a treaty with him; because I knew he would render us no service in the war adequate to the expense of supporting him in a state of independence in peace, which operation would have required an army. That opinion is not changed by his having gone to Baroda; and all that I can recommend for Powar is, that if Seindiah's durbar should be brought into tolerable temper, a general recommendation of this chief should be given in by the Resident, founded upon his connexion with the Guickwar, with whom the British government is so closely allied.

In respect to the idea of supporting Powar's independence, as a member of the Marhatta Empire, that in my opinion is equally absurd with taking up the cause of Cashee Rao Holkar. There is nothing new.

P.S. Houghton sailed the day before yesterday. He told me that the Governor General had received positive orders from the Court of Directors on no account to send officers home with dispatches at the public expense. I mention this to you, as I fancy it will make some alteration in your plans, for I don't believe that you are overburthened with money to pay your own expenses. From what Houghton says, and Shawe writes, I suspect that the Governor General is inclined to remain in India even after next January.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 10th April, 1804.

I received only last night your letter of the 7th inst. I did not know of the inconvenience suffered by the Sheer Shahy mohurs, or I should have regulated the issue of them. Indeed I did not know that we had such a coin.

In the first place you must order Major Robertson to exchange for rupees, or other coin, every Sheer Shahy mohur now in the hands of the troops; in the next place, let Major Robertson send me a report, stating the number of this coin he has, when he received them, and at what rates of exchange; in the third place, you must send me an official report, stating that these coins will not circulate at a higher exchange than 13 rupees.\*

In future, when there is any coin in the treasury not likely to circulate at a rate as high as the other coins, it ought to be issued only in small sums at a time; and only in the same proportion to each individual that that coin bears in the treasury to the other coins. I gave an order on the subject on the 27th Oct., and another on the 4th Dec. last, to which I refer you.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 10th April, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 1st inst., and I entirely agree in opinion with you regarding the 10th article of the treaty of peace. Accordingly, I beg you to say nothing about the persons in Guzerat whose names I sent you in my letter of the 25th ult.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq., Poona.

Bombay, 10th April, 1804.

I received only last night your letter of the 6th. In respect to the countries to the southward, I have only to refer you to my letter to Mr. Frissell, of the 30th Jan., for my sentiments regarding the mode of proceeding to be adopted when the Peshwah calls for assistance. Col. Close must be the best judge whether it is proper to assist the Peshwah's amildar to take possession of the countries now held by the Putwurdun family, Rastia, the Rajah of Kolapoor, Goklah, Appah Dessaye, the Goorparah family, &c. &c., all of which are included in the list transmitted to me by you.

This very list is the strongest proof that can be given of the propriety of the advice which I gave to Mr. Frissell in my letter of the 30th Jan.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose copies of orders issued by me, which require your Excellency's confirmation.

The first, relating to the officers heretofore in Scindiah's service, were issued to provide a regular mode of paying and of disposing of them, and the last to provide for the duties of the subsidiary force at Poona. I fixed upon the officers to perform those duties, who had distinguished themselves during the war, and whose talents were most likely to be useful. Capt. Noble, Mr. Gilmour, Lieut. Bellingham, and Major Robertson, had filled the same situations with the division of the army under my command, and had conducted the service of their several departments in a manner highly advantageous to the public interests. Lieut. Bellingham was employed confidentially by me in the care and arrangement of my papers, in which situation he has given me entire satisfaction; and is deserving of a public reward for his services.

\* See letter to Major Kirkpatrick, 14th Oct. 1803.

The staff appointed for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah is the same as that appointed for the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

I enclose a letter for Col. Wallace, in which I have desired him to send a detachment to obtain possession of Kellinjah, along with the Peshwah's troops, of such strength as you may think necessary for the purpose.

If the Peshwah has any troops, in my opinion one company will be sufficient. If he should not have any, the number must be increased. The principal object in sending them is to hold the fort till the Peshwah can take possession of it, and to give security to the killadar and his garrison, and their property.

Orders are gone to Major Dallas, to give the fort of Loghur to any person that shall arrive there with a letter from you, pointing out that he is the person to receive it. I hope that you will soon have arranged that point with the durbar. I think of moving the army towards Loghur, in the valley of the Poonah river, in order to get forage, &c., at a cheaper rate.

It is reported here, that the Peshwah has lost Poonadur already. What truth there is in this report, I cannot say.

To Major Graham.

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

I have taken into consideration the various reports which I have received from you, of the miserable state of the lower classes of the inhabitants of Ahmednuggur, in consequence of the dreadful scarcity of provisions in that part of the country; and I proceed to give you my sentiments on that subject, and directions regarding the mode of providing for their relief.

The delivery of the provisions *gratis* is, in my opinion, a very defective mode of providing against the effects of famine. It is liable to abuses in all parts of the world, but particularly in India; and at Ahmednuggur, the consequence of its adoption would be, that crowds of people would be drawn there from other parts of the country, in which the distress is equally felt; and they would increase the distress at Ahmednuggur to such a degree as to render all the efforts to remove it from its immediate inhabitants entirely fruitless; and it might at last reach our own troops and establishments. The principle, therefore, of the mode in which I propose to relieve the distresses of the inhabitants is not to give grain or money in charity.

Those who suffer from famine may properly be divided into two classes; those who can, and those who cannot, work. In the latter class may be included old persons, children, and the sick women; who, from their former situation in life, have been unaccustomed to labor, and are weakened by the effects of famine.

The former, viz., those of both sexes who can work, ought to be employed by the public; and in the course of this letter I shall point out the work on which I should wish that they might be employed, and in what manner paid. The latter, viz., those who cannot work, ought to be taken into an hospital and fed, and receive medical aid and medicine at

the expense of the public. According to this mode of proceeding, subsistence will be provided for all; the public will receive some benefit from the expense which will be incurred; and above all it will be certain, that no able-bodied person will apply for relief, unless he should be willing to work for his subsistence; that none will apply, who are able to work, and who are not real objects of charity; and that none will come to Ahmednuggur for the purpose of partaking of the food which must be procured by their labor, or to obtain which they must submit to the restraint of an hospital.

I enclose a memorandum of the work which I should wish to have performed at Ahmednuggur. This work must be carried on under the superintendence of the engineer, by the persons you will send to him who may be desirous of partaking of the subsistence which, according to this plan, will be afforded to them. You ought to have a sufficient number of persons to attend the engineer, and to ascertain the number of people who go to work; and each person ought to receive for the day's labor half a seer of grain and two pice, to be issued daily.

I wish you to provide a building in the pettah of Ahmednuggur, for the reception of those who cannot work. Objects of this description, suffering from want, ought to be removed immediately to this building, where they must be attended by a medical gentleman. This gentleman shall provide them with the necessary quantity of food to be drawn from you; and he shall be paid for his trouble at the rate of 50 pagodas per month.

The next point to be considered is the mode in which grain is to be procured for the subsistence of these people. There is at present, at Ahmednuggur, a quantity of damaged jowarry, but which I take to be by no means sufficient to enable you to carry on this plan for any considerable length of time. It will answer, however, for a certain space of time, till you shall be enabled to procure additional quantities from the districts of the Soubah of the Deccan. You will exert yourself to the utmost to procure the grain required; and, in the mean time, orders will be sent to Ahmednuggur to place the jowarry at your disposal. From this grain, and from what you will purchase, you will supply the surgeon with what he may require for the hospital ordered to be established by this letter.

You will pay the surgeon for his attendance upon this hospital, and you will keep a separate account of the expense of the whole establishment; whether for labor, or for food for the infirm, or for attendance and medicines for the hospital. Orders conformable to this plan will be sent to the proper officers at Ahmednuggur.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose an order directed to the killadar of Kellinjah, situated near Wahy, on the Kistna, to deliver up that fort to the British troops. You will be so kind as to prepare a detachment of Native infantry of the strength that will be pointed out to you by Lieut. Col. Close, to proceed to Kellinjah with the Peshwah's troops to receive possession of the fort. You will instruct the officer commanding this detachment to send to the killadar on his arrival in the neighbourhood of

the fort, and apprise him that he has been appointed to receive charge of it, and to escort the killadar and his baggage to any place of security that he may think proper to point out. At the same time, he will communicate to him the enclosed order, and transmit the letter from me, likewise enclosed, of which you have a translation. The officer will desire the killadar to send a carkoon to arrange the mode and time of the evacuation; and he will inform him that he has my positive directions not to take possession of the fort, unless he obtains it within four days after his arrival in its neighbourhood.

If the fort should be evacuated within the period specified, the officer commanding the detachment will put the Peshwah's killadar in possession; and he will take the old killadar and his garrison, and all their property, under his protection, and escort them in safety to Poonah, from whence you will send them forward to Bombay, or to any other situation that they may prefer. The officer commanding the detachment is to understand clearly, that these persons are not prisoners, and he is to treat them with the utmost kindness. If the fort should not be delivered up in the time specified, the officer commanding the detachment is to break off all communication, and to report to you. He is to put his detachment in a place of security, if there should be such a one in the neighbourhood; if not, he is to withdraw towards Poonah. In that case you are to commence your march forthwith towards Kellinjah with the remainder of the army and the heavy guns, which by that time will have joined you from Loghur, and you will lose no time in getting possession of the place by force. Unless there should be any reason for it, you will not grant a capitulation to the killadar of Kellinjah, if you should be obliged to go against that fort with the army.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 11th April, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 2nd inst. I wrote to you fully on the day before yesterday respecting Powar; and I agree entirely in opinion with you that you ought not to interfere in his affairs. He has no claim upon us whatever, excepting that of relationship to the Guickwar, which is one that ought to have operated in preventing him from joining our enemies: but it did not; and it ought not now to be brought forward for his protection, unless to interfere in his favor should be perfectly convenient. I had given a passport for Sirjee Rao Ghautky's pagah to return to Burhampoor.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 30th March. I am well pleased with the proposal of the Rajah of Lunawara. It must, however, be more specific as to numbers, and as to the sum he will pay for these troops, and the length of time which he will retain them, before we can venture to adopt any measure founded upon it. You might, therefore, hold a little more conversation with the vakeels upon the subject, and bring them to a point; and, if possible, let them make their proposals in writing. At all events, read to them the memorandum which you will take of the conversation. I can then refer the subject to the Governor General.

In the mean time, however, if it should be necessary, you will have no scruple about occupying Lunawara, if we should attack Holkar; and leave the question regarding the payment of the troops open for future discussion and decision. The war with Holkar becomes every day more improbable. He has opened a discussion with Gen. Lake, and his army is not in a situation to undertake any thing.

To Major Shawe.

Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 16th March, and I rejoice to find that the Governor General approves of the sentiments expressed in my letter of the 26th Feb. I wrote that letter only to justify the suggestions which I had made to Major Kirkpatrick, that he should take into consideration the state of the Soubah's army. I am glad to learn that the Governor General has received satisfactory letters from the King's ministers; but I anxiously hope that he will not be induced to stay in India beyond the time which he had fixed for his departure.

As all the correspondence with the Residents goes to the Governor General, I have not troubled him with complaints of the conduct of the Soubah's servants, as that conduct affects the treaties of peace. But it is as bad as it can be, and shows that the Soubah of the Deccan, when he feels that he is strongest, is equally faithless and rapacious with a Marhatta. I judge, from the last letter from Gen. Lake's camp, that Holkar will retire from Ajmeer. In that case, I shall send the troops to the southward, and shall embark for Mangalore, having nothing to detain me in this country. I am obliged to you for your letter of the 4th March. I was in hopes that I should have received the Governor General's orders upon the subject to which it relates before I should break up the army; but I think that very improbable at present.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, the vakeel of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who negotiated with me the treaty of peace, has an interest in Soondoor, situated to the southward of the Toombuddra, and his family occasionally reside at that place. They travel between Soondoor and Petwar, in the territories of the Rajah of Solapoor, a village belonging to Goorparah, and he has desired me to request that they may not be molested on the road. I therefore request your protection for them.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 13th April, 1804.

I have received your dispatch of the 4th. I said to Goorparah that I was not aware of the treaties which had been made by Gen. Lake, and did not know in what manner Gwalior and Gohud might be affected by them; that therefore I could give no opinion upon the subject, excepting that the Governor General would strictly execute the treaty of peace. I then recommended that all discussions should cease between you and Bappoo Vitell.

I do not know what is intended by a recognition of treaties with the feudatories by Scindiah's government, as alluded to in your letter to



Webbe of the 2nd. The treaty of peace says, that the feudatories who have made treaties shall be independent, and lists of their names are to be given to Scindiah, in order to show who are and who are not to be independent. What is the use of requiring Scindiah's recognition of the treaties, excepting to occasion a discussion on a subject on which none is necessary, and which is mischievous? If he should refuse to recognise any treaty, what becomes of the feudatory? To be independent or otherwise, will not the demand and refusal to recognise the treaty create a doubt upon that point? I see no benefit in multiplying the subjects of discussion.

Arsito Jah justifies the Soubah's servants who have behaved ill in Berar, and he demands that the Rajah shall not be permitted to keep troops in the districts under Nernulla and Gawilghur. I am disgusted beyond measure with the whole concern; and I would give a large sum to have had nothing to do with the treaties of peace, and if I could now get rid of all anxiety upon the subject. All parties were delighted with the peace, but the demon of ambition appears now to have pervaded all; and each endeavors, by forcing constructions, to gain as much as he can.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 14th April, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 11th, and I am rejoiced to find that Kundee Rao Rastia is pleased with the acquisition of the fort of Loghur. I beg you to write to Major Dallas to give the fort up to Kundee Rao Rastia whenever you may think proper.

I conclude that you propose to have some communication with the Peshwah on the subject of the arrangement with Dhoondoo Bullall, and the appointment of Kundee Rao Rastia to be the killadar.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 15th April, 1804.

I have just received your letter of the 13th. I have given no orders respecting the currency of the gold mohurs. Some coins of that description have been issued since I left camp, at a rate at which they would not pass in Poonah, or in the country. Complaints on this subject reached me through various private channels, and I ordered that all the gold mohurs might be called in, and that none might be issued till I could receive a report upon their value in the market, and could issue orders accordingly, as to that at which they should be paid to the troops. The coins, respecting which a complaint was made to me, were not, I believe, received from the Resident at Poonah, but from the Resident at Hyderabad; and so far from their passing for  $12\frac{3}{4}$  rupees, they do not pass at Poonah for 11 rupees: so that, giving you information upon the subject, the durbar has, as usual, said what is not true.

It is now above a week since I wrote to camp upon this subject, and most probably I shall get the answer to-morrow. If I should, I will pass the order regulating the rate of the issue immediately, and thus the inconvenience complained of at Poonah, respecting these coins, will be removed. But, by a private letter received this day, I have some reason to apprehend that the troops are likely to lose again a part of their pay, given to them in rupees, because the shroffs at Poonah have lowered their

you have enclosed the copy of one you had written to Mr. Elphinstone, regarding the disputes between the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Rajah of Berar, respecting the boundary between those states. I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written this day to Mr. Elphinstone, upon that subject, and the copy of one which I wrote to him on the 16th March.

I am happy to find that the Soubah of the Deccan is willing to consent to an arbitration to settle the boundary; and to send a person, on his part, to the frontier, to meet one deputed in like manner by the Rajah of Berar. It may happen, however, in consequence of my letter to Gungaram and that to Mr. Elphinstone, of which the enclosed is a copy, the question regarding the boundary may have been already settled. I beg leave to suggest to you, that the person now to be deputed from Hyderabad should have directions to return immediately, if, upon his arrival at Ellichpoor, he should find that Mr. Elphinstone and Gungaram Pundit have settled the points in dispute.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

Major Kirkpatrick has transmitted to me a copy of his letter to you of the 8th inst., in which he proposes a mode of settling the disputes regarding the boundary between the Rajah of Berar and the Soubah of the Deccan.

I agree in opinion with Major Kirkpatrick, that this question would be best settled under the superintendence of an European gentleman; but, under present circumstances, as I had the honor of pointing out to you in my letter of the 16th March, I cannot command the services of any gentleman who is qualified to fulfil the duty; and therefore I must request you to arrange the arbitration according to the mode proposed in that letter.

I think it better that you should decide, in case the arbitrators should differ, than that the question should be referred to me, because you are upon the spot, and you have the means of obtaining information, which I should want. The decision will also be given at an earlier period, which appears to me to be an object; if, however, you should not think that necessary, I beg you to refer the subject to his Excellency the Governor General.

P.S. I propose to send to Major Kirkpatrick a copy of this letter. I send you a copy of one which I have written to him.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose English and Marhatta copies of the treaties concluded by Col. Murray with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte, respecting which I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 25th March. I have transmitted copies of these treaties to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and I shall deliver the originals to the Governor of Bombay.

P.S. I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter from Col. Murray, which has likewise been transmitted to Major Malcolm, with a letter, of which I also enclose a copy.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

As I find that you are much distressed for forage, which is enormously dear, I think it would be desirable to move the army towards Panowullah, and then up the valley of the Poonah river towards Loghur. You will get forage there much more easily, and at a much cheaper rate than at Poonah, where you might leave such of your carriages as are in want of repair, and 2 battalions, viz., the 18th and 12th.

I have written to Ahmednuggur to desire that arrangements may be made for bringing down the captured guns to Bombay, and that you might be informed what number of bullocks would be required for that purpose. As soon as you shall receive the necessary information from Capt. Lucas or Capt. Fisher, I request you will send to Ahmednuggur, to bring down these guns, as many of the Bombay bullocks as may be fit for any service; and make up the deficiency of the numbers from the bullocks in Capt. Young's department.

I have ordered the disabled men down to Bombay. Let Robertson look out for feeding them on the road, in case the surgeon should require his assistance.

Let me know if I can do any thing for you at Bombay. I have in contemplation an arrangement for the relief of the distress of our followers. Let me know whether they suffer materially.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose English and Marhatta copies of the treaties concluded by Col. Murray with the Rajahs of Lunawara and Sounte. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Col. Murray, in which he explains more particularly from what Rajahs and others he received assistance during the war; and who are entitled to the protection of the British government, under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. I rather imagine that it would be more advantageous to these persons not to give a list of their names to Scindiah's durbar, but to protect them when occasion may require. To give the list may be attended by many bad consequences to those whose names are included in it, and who, it may be expected, will not be so correct in their conduct as not to afford a pretence for attacking them. On the other hand, those who will know that their names are included in a list of this description, as persons who are protected by the Company, are not likely to be very good subjects to Scindiah.

Another inconvenience which will attend the delivery of this list will be, that it may be fairly argued by Scindiah's ministers that it includes all who are entitled to the Company's protection, under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. The complaints which I lately forwarded to you regarding the conduct of Scindiah's servants towards the people employed in the destruction of Powanghur, show that this may not be the case; and, upon the occurrence of every fresh complaint of this description, there will be a discussion with Scindiah's ministers, which, in the present state of the Company's connexion with that prince, will be very unpleasant. Upon the whole, I do not think that to give the list will be attended by any good consequences; and I have above shown that it may

be inconvenient; therefore, unless you should receive orders from his Excellency the Governor General upon the subject, I wish you to withhold it; but to attend to the conduct of Seindiah's government towards the persons who are the objects of the 10th article of the treaty of peace, and to remonstrate immediately if you should find it to be inconsistent with that article.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Bombay, 17th April, 1804.

I enclose a memorandum which I have received from a man who was very useful to Col. Stevenson and me at the siege of Gawilghur. I do not think that it will be necessary to communicate this memorandum to the Rajah's ministers; but you will act upon that point as you may think proper: I wish you, however, to hint to them that, having protected the Rajah's servants and adherents in Berar, I expect that he will not injure any persons from whom I may have received services during the war.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Bombay, 18th April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose an extract from the orders of the Governor General, authorising me to grant a pension of 6000 rupees *per annum* to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder. I also enclose a sunnud for that pension, which I beg you to deliver to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder.

I request you to make arrangements for the payment of the pension at Nagpoor, or in any other place at which it may be convenient to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder to reside.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 18th April, 1804.

I have considered for some days past the question put to me in your letter of the 9th, which I received yesterday, viz., whether you shall give up Asseerghur, if Gen. Lake tells you privately that Hindustan has been evacuated; but that he cannot report it officially without orders from the Governor General. The consequence of reporting it officially is that Seindiah, by the treaty of peace, is to have certain forts; and, although the evacuation is certain, Gen. Lake refuses to make the report, because he fears to interfere with the Governor General's arrangements. Ought I not to entertain the same fears? Ought I not to entertain them to a greater degree, knowing that Gen. Lake and you do not choose to act? Has any thing occurred to give me a reason to believe that I may act with confidence in a case in which you and Gen. Lake entertain doubts? So far for the question abstracted from other considerations. I have given the Governor General my opinion, in very strong terms, upon the consequence which I apprehend from his pushing one of his favorite projects, and I have told him that he must expect a war with Seindiah. If this war occurs, it must be carried on with disadvantage, if we have not Asseerghur; and will not the Governor General have some reason to complain of me, if, foreseeing that war, I should urge you to give up Asseerghur on an occasion in which you and Gen. Lake entertain doubts? In fact, to adopt this measure is tantamount to an anticipation of his final opinion on the subject of Gwalior.

I am aware that to retain Asseerghur is a breach of treaty, and that it is a measure which will much annoy Scindiah's government. But this is as much the affair of the Commander in Chief and yourself as it is mine; and where you doubt, I can have no confidence, and cannot venture to act.

These are my deliberate sentiments upon the subject. I see clearly that Asseerghur ought to be given up, but I cannot venture to give an opinion upon it.

Confound these red boxes and the gentlemen in Bengal! The delays they occasion will send us to the devil.

P.S. I wish you would mention to Mr. Mercer that I have never received the letter, of which Capt. Johnson acknowledges the receipt, of the 4th March, nor indeed any other letter from the Commander in Chief. I write to Capt. Johnson to know what has become of that letter.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 18th April, 1804.

I enclose a letter for Webbe, which I beg you to peruse and forward to him, if he should have quitted Poonah.

I have received the report upon the mohurs. The truth of the matter is, that they have not been issued to the troops at a rate higher than that at which they ought to exchange in the bazaar. They have been paid to the troops as 14 Company's rupees. A Company's rupee passes in the bazaars in the country generally for 4 pice less than a Chandore rupee. You gave us the mohur at 13 Chandore rupees, which, valuing a Company's rupee at 51 pice, is one pice more than 14 Company's rupees. We issue Chandore rupees at the same rate as Pondicherry rupees or Rajah's rupees; the difference between them and Company's rupees, according to that rate, is 3 pice. Thus 13 Chandore rupees, according to that rate, would be 13 Company's rupees and 39 pice, or about a quarter of a rupee less than 14 Company's rupees. From this statement you will observe that the Pay Office is not very far in the wrong.

I enclose with this an extract of a letter from the Superintendent of supplies, from which you will observe that the exchange of a new mohur, in Poonah, is not more than  $12\frac{1}{2}$  Chandore rupees; that of some old mohurs not more than 11 Chandore rupees; and that of others not so much. All these were received at 13 Chandore rupees. This will not answer for the troops; it will occasion perpetual disputes, whether I arrange the issue by striking an average, or by issuing each kind according to its particular value. The first thing to do, therefore, is to take no more of these inconvenient coins from the shroffs, excepting a few of those which are quite new. The next is, if possible, to exchange all the mohurs, now in the hands of the Paymaster, which are of an inferior value, and to get other coins from the soucars in lieu thereof. I shall be much obliged to you if you will consider this subject, and let me know whether this plan is practicable.

I had already ordered that the mohurs should be withdrawn from the troops. I have now ordered that they may be withdrawn from the bazaar people. If I can receive your answer before the next issue of pay, I will order that none may be issued, if you should find it practicable to give

other money in lieu thereof. If you should not find it practicable, I must regulate the issue in such a manner as that the troops and bazaar people will not be losers; at the same time that there shall be no disturbance in the country. The loss must, however, fall upon the Company. Upon this point, I think a remonstrance might be handed in to the Peshwah, regarding the unaccommodating spirit of the regulation of the bazaar of Poonah, by which the Company must eventually suffer very great loss.

P. S. I have just received your letters of the 16th. Send down Holkar's officer to Bombay.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 19th April, 1804.

The killadar of Loghur was with me this morning, and informed me that the order I before sent to you for the surrender of the fort of Kellinjah was not perfect, and required another order, which I now enclose. I trust that this order will arrive in time to enable Capt. Gurnell to get the fort on the day he shall have appointed. Send it to him by express, and desire him to take particular care of all the killadar's property. There is no occasion for your marching, unless the killadar of Kellinjah should refuse to give up the fort, after he shall have received the enclosed order. He has a carkoon here, and I am certain he will give it up.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 19th April, 1804.

The enclosed letter will show you that, after the fullest experience, we do not understand these Marhatta matters. The order sent to Kellinjah was as positive as words could make it; but it was never intended that it should be obeyed. However, the matter is now settled.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 20th April, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 10th, 13th, and 14th. I long ago drew the attention of the Governor General to the subject of your memorandum; and I learn from a late letter from Major Shawe, that it is likely to be taken up in the manner I have proposed. When it will be taken up I cannot determine. Your letters of the 13th and 14th contain much important intelligence. The most important of any is that Gen. Lake cannot quit Hindustan, and depends upon the exertions of the troops to the southward to defeat Holkar.

The troops to the southward shall do every thing that is possible. But the General forgets the nature of our tenure, and our present state in the Deccan; the distance we are from Holkar; and the difficulty, amounting almost to an impossibility, of subsisting an army to the north of Poonah, owing to famine. I can certainly take Chandore, at least I think so; and I will do every thing else that I can. But I cannot venture to move the troops from the Deccan; and even if the measure were safe, I doubt whether it would be practicable, in the present state of general distress, to move even a small detachment to the northward of the Taptée: indeed I may say that I am certain that it would not be so.

The operations of the war with Holkar will rest between Gen. Lake, Col. Murray, and the troops in Bundelcund. Col. Murray is fully prepared to move at an hour's notice. I should have no difficulty about a plan for the war, if I had an idea what the Governor General intended to

do respecting a subsidiary force for Scindiah. But the total silence in Bengal upon every point that has been referred for consideration, renders it impossible to produce with confidence any plan. Supposing that matters remain as they are, it is my opinion that Gen. Lake ought to move upon Holkar with all celerity, leaving in Hindustan a large proportion of his infantry, with some of his cavalry, if he should find that Holkar returns, as in that case his force will immediately begin to fritter away. Having thus provided for the security of Hindustan, he should follow Holkar, and push him as hard as he can. Holkar, in retiring, will either go towards Ougein or towards the northern boundary of Guzerat; and here will occur the difficulty respecting Scindiah's subsidiary force. Scindiah's troops ought to be joined by a British detachment, to be formed near Ougein, and then Murray's corps might remain on the Myhie; but as we know nothing about Scindiah's subsidiary force, Murray's corps ought to go towards Rutlaum, at which place it might be joined without difficulty by Scindiah's army. From Rutlaum it can operate upon Holkar whether he may attempt to escape by Guzerat, or by Ougein, and Indore.

But if Gen. Lake be tied down in Hindustan, it stands to reason that we have no means of pushing Holkar, or of bringing the war to a close, unless I should be able to get to the north, of which, at present, I do not see the smallest prospect. Indeed, unless Gen. Lake follows Holkar, our situation will be very unpleasant, either in Guzerat or at Ougein. If we should draw Murray out of Guzerat, to join Scindiah's army, Holkar will soon overrun that province; and, on the other hand, if Scindiah's army be not supported by a British corps, they are not equal to the contest with Holkar. If the General should vigorously push Holkar, the war will not last a fortnight; if he should not, God knows when it will be over. As for my part, I do not think it quite clear yet that we shall have a war. Before I form any opinion, I wish to see what Holkar will do when Gen. Lake shall move. If he should return, he may rally to all eternity, but there is an end of him. These intrigues with Patans, &c., are the natural consequence of the sudden growth of our power, and have but little to do with the main question.

You have acted quite right in giving up Asseerghur. I wish that you would communicate my opinion upon the plan of the operations in general to Gen. Lake. Of course you must not send him a copy of this letter.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 21st April, 1804.

You have done quite right about Capt. Gurnell, and in giving Webbe his horses.

You must send me an extract from the registers of the regiments, describing the 9 horses which you drafted, and a description roll of the 9 horses received, specifying by what regiments, and then I shall issue an order which will bring all into shape, and consistently with the regulations of government.

To Major Walker, Resident at Baroda.

Bombay, 21st April, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 12th April, and

I am very sensible of the trouble you have taken with Amrut Rao's claim on the Guickwar government, which I recommended to your attention, and of the civility of the Dewan towards myself, for which I request you to make him my acknowledgments. After I had written to you, I had a full communication with Amrut Rao's vakeel on the subject of this claim; and although I cannot say that I convinced him that it had no foundation in justice, he had nothing left to urge in its favor. The vakeel is not now with me, but in case I should see him again, I shall request Amrut Rao not to send to claim this debt; and if I should not see the vakeel, and Amrut Rao should again send on the subject of the debt, I beg to recommend that his messenger may be sent back to him again as soon as may be practicable, with a refusal, in civil terms, to pay any thing.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report received from Lieut. Col. Lang, of the defeat of a body of freebooters in Berar, by the troops under his command. Lieut. Col. Lang has been employed in Berar since the month of Jan. last, in command of a body of troops to support and establish the authority of the officers of the Soubah of the Deccan in that province; and he has conducted himself throughout the service with great activity, discretion, and propriety. I have the honor to enclose herewith the copy of a letter which I have written upon this occasion to Mr. Elphinstone.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a report which I have received of the defeat of a party of freebooters in Berar, by Lieut. Col. Lang. The chiefs of these freebooters, viz., Denajee Desmaoh, Nayeram Pundit, and Ismael Khan Patan, have fled into the territories of the Rajah of Berar; and, of course, Lieut. Col. Lang, in conformity to the orders he has received, has not followed them. I request you to apprise the Rajah's ministers of these circumstances. You will observe to them that I should be fully justified in insisting upon the seizure, by the Rajah of Berar, of those 3 persons, in order that they might be delivered up to me to be punished as they deserve. But I refrain from making this justifiable demand, and I only request that the Rajah will take care that they do not collect troops and enter Berar again; as, if they do, his government shall be considered responsible for the mischief they may cause, and the British troops must enter his country. The Rajah of Berar has been frequently apprised of my determination to revenge the injuries done to the inhabitants of the country, on those who encourage their troops to commit these enormities; and if the freebooters fly to and receive an asylum in his country, I must consider him as the person who encourages them.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have addressed this day to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, which will point out the present state of the Deccan, and the means in my power of assisting his Excellency, in case he should be obliged to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar.



To Lieut. Gen. Lake.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

It is with great reluctance that, at a time like the present, I trouble you upon a subject relating only to myself; but I hope that the extraordinary circumstances which have induced me to trouble you will be my excuse.

Above a year and a half have now elapsed since my promotion to the rank of Major General was announced in India, and since Lieut. Gen. Stuart, unsolicited by me, in a manner most gratifying to my feelings, recommended to the government of Fort St. George, that I should be appointed to the staff of that Presidency. Since that period accounts have reached England that I had been appointed to the staff in the manner to which I have above alluded, and that I had the command of a body of troops employed in this country. From recent appointments made, I judge that the staff in India must have been under discussion lately, and that my appointment must have drawn the attention of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, and of His Majesty; but I find that no confirmation has been made or notice taken of this appointment.

Under these circumstances, however flattering in other respects, it has become of an ambiguous nature; there is reason to doubt whether it meets with the approbation of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief; and it is not impossible but that his Royal Highness may appoint another officer to the situation which I fill; and, at all events, I do not conceive it to be creditable, and I am not desirous, to remain in a military situation in His Majesty's service, my appointment to which has not been approved by his Royal Highness and by His Majesty. I am therefore upon the whole very anxious to return to Europe; and I have to request your Excellency's permission to do so. If I should obtain it, I propose to resign the appointments which I hold under the government of Fort St. George, when an opportunity shall offer for my return.\*

\*Lieut. Gen. Lake to Major Gen. Wellesley.

Camp, Nuwace, 12th May, 1804.

I have this day been honored with your letter of the 23rd ult., and am extremely sorry to perceive that some unpleasant sensations have arisen in your mind respecting your staff appointment in India, from a supposition that it has not been approved by His Majesty, and H. R. H. the Commander in Chief. Upon this subject I can form no opinion, as I have received no directions from the Duke of York respecting it, nor have I indeed received any dispatch from his Royal Highness of a later date than the 14th June, 1803. I can only assure you that, however reluctant I may feel to part with your services, advice, and exertions to carry on the operations we are at present entering into, I will not from any selfish motive withhold the permission you request to proceed to Europe, at whatever time you may wish to avail yourself of it. Believe me, I shall regret most sincerely your departure, and hope Gen. Stuart will order Major Gen. McDonald to take the command of the troops, if unfortunately you deem it necessary to quit your gallant army, who will, I am certain, be equally sensible with myself of the loss they sustain by your absence.

I will write again immediately respecting Holkar, who has crossed the Chumbul, and is retreating with the greatest precipitation. The cavalry, of which his army is entirely composed (his infantry and artillery having been sent to Jawud some time since), are very few in number, without food, pay, and every necessary of life, are quitting him daily, and coming into my camp by hundreds; from the accounts they give, I think his army will soon be totally dispersed. Col. Monson is near Boondy, but this robber flies so quick that there is no possibility,

Upon the occasion of making this request, I beg to assure your Excellency that, in case you should grant it, I do not intend to avail myself of your leave as long as I can be of the smallest service to your Excellency's operations, or as I can forward the objects of the Governor General's policy in this country; unless I shall find an officer has actually been appointed to fill the situation which I hold upon the staff.

To Gen. Lake.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I learn from Major Malcolm that you are desirous of receiving accounts of the strength and position of the troops in the Deccan, in order that you may send me instructions in what manner to co-operate with you, in case you should be under the necessity of attacking Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

There are at Poonah one regiment of dragoons, the 19th; and 3 regiments of Native cavalry; the 74th and 78th regts., and 7 battalions of Native infantry, with a due proportion of artillery. There is, besides, one battalion of Native infantry in garrison at Ahmednuggur. All these corps are weak, having suffered much during the war, and they have had neither time nor opportunity to recruit or refit.

The subsidiary force, serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, is posted as follows: 2 regiments of Native cavalry, the 94th regt., and 4 battalions of Native infantry, in the neighbourhood of Jaffierabad; and 2 battalions of Native infantry in Berar, near Oomrawootty; the whole with a due proportion of artillery. These corps are strong: they were stronger than the common establishment of the army of Fort St. George at the commencement of the war; and they did not suffer so much as the others in its operations.

In Guzerat there are 2 regiments, the 65th and 86th; and 6 battalions of Native infantry, one of these battalions 1600 men. Of these, the 2 regiments and 4 battalions are encamped at Cupperwungee, beyond the river Myhie, about 70 miles north of Baroda. The remainder are, one

bility, I fear, of coming up with him. He has laid waste the whole country; however, he is totally off from this quarter.

I am sorry to find, by a letter of yours to Major Malcolm, that you have received no letters from me. I wrote several, and in particular one in answer to yours, recommending Lieut. Col. Wallace and others, informing you that I had appointed these officers to the situations you proposed; at the same time assuring you that nothing could afford me more satisfaction than obeying any commands of yours.

Lieut. Gen. Lake to the Marquis Wellesley. (*Extract.*) Camp, Nuwace, 12th May, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a letter (private) from the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, with my answer to that officer, for the information of your lordship, and am extremely sorry to find that he is so uneasy at the thought of his appointment in India not being approved by His Majesty, or the Duke of York. It is not in my power to give him any information upon the subject, as my letter to him will show.

I shall feel most exceedingly the loss of his abilities and exertions, should the war continue with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, both in his military and political knowledge of affairs in this country. I have not an idea that the King and Duke would have objected to his appointment, and if he does not know they have, from any private channel, I cannot believe they have done so. Your lordship will perceive I have granted him permission to proceed to Europe whenever he wishes it; I have done it with the greatest reluctance, as, however great the loss I should sustain by his absence, I would not for the world do any thing that could militate against his feelings. I hope and trust your lordship will approve what I have done.

battalion at Surat, and one at Baroda. A battalion landed about a week ago at Surat from Goa, and another on its march from Poonah will join Col. Murray's camp on the Myhie.

I now proceed to detail to your Excellency my ideas regarding the operations of these troops, in case there should be a war with Holkar.

The possessions of this Chief, in the Deccan, are but very limited: they consist of the district of Umber, situated between Jaulna, Aurungabad, and the Godavery; half of the district of Sogaum, south of the Godavery, (the other half belongs to Scindiah;) the fort of Chandore, and a few districts in Candeish. The operations of the troops in the Deccan ought, in the first instance, to be directed to obtain possession of these districts and of the fort of Chandore, which, I imagine, must be regularly attacked.

I should have no doubt of being able to accomplish these objects at a very early period, if I had not received within these last 2 days very distressing accounts of the state of the countries through which the troops must march to the northward; and in which they must be stationed while these operations are carrying on.

Your Excellency is, I imagine, aware of the scarcity which prevails throughout the Deccan, and which has produced a famine. By a report which I have received from the commander of the Mysore horse, whom I had sent with his corps to forage in districts on the Nizam's frontier, which were supposed not to have suffered equally with those farther to the westward, I learn that the distress is extreme; that he can scarcely procure forage or grain for his horses; that that which is procured is at an enormous expense; that he had been some days without food, and that he had lost 100 horses in one day. The horses of the British cavalry have been for some time eating rice at Poonah, a food which, it is well known, is unwholesome for them; but as that is the only grain which Bombay could supply, and as the grain for horses and cattle could always, till now, be procured in the country, it is the only grain in the magazines which I have collected at Poonah and Ahmednuggur for the troops. Under these circumstances, I very much doubt whether I should not incur the risk of destroying the equipments of the army, and, of course, of failing even in these operations, if I were to attempt to move them from Poonah, where forage can always be procured, at least till a very advanced period of the rains, when the new grass will have begun to spring up, and the new crops will appear above ground. But if the war should begin with Holkar, your Excellency may depend upon it that I shall do every thing in my power to support your operations, and that nothing but the state of the country, which I have above described, shall stop me.

After passing Chandore, the country is a desert to the Taptee; it is inhabited by a half civilized race of Putans and Bheels; and it has been the scene of the depredations of the armies of Scindiah and Holkar for some years. After crossing the Taptee, the road to Ougein and Indore passes over mountains to Chooly Myhissur, on the Nerbudda, where, I imagine, the country again becomes fertile. The distance from Poonah to Indore is, I believe, 600 miles, through a country in which there is a famine; and which, from the above description, you will observe, either

from extraordinary circumstances or by nature, cannot afford subsistence for an army for one day. If it were possible to reach and to obtain possession of Chandore immediately, which there is reason to doubt, I do not think that it would be proper to move the British troops out of the Deccan. Holkar's strength consists in freebooters, and the moment the British troops would pass Chandore, an army of this same description of people would be collected on the Soubah's frontier, and in the neighbourhood of Poonah, at least as numerous as that which is in Hindustan. A body of this description was collected at the close of the last war, which nothing but the British troops, by extraordinary exertion, could disperse.

If the troops in the Deccan should not be advanced into Hindustan, Scindiah's army ought to be reinforced by the subsidiary force to be attached to that Chief, and placed in a forward position to the northward of Ougein. The corps under Col. Murray, with the exception of 2 battalions, to be left as a reserve in Guzerat, ought to be moved forward, reinforced by the Guickwar cavalry. These two armies upon Holkar's rear, while your Excellency would push him in front, must destroy him in a short space of time. But, if the operations are not to be active till I can arrive in Hindustan to take part in them, and if it should be decided that the British troops are to quit the Deccan, it would be best to delay the commencement of the war, if that should be possible, at least till the month of August.

In detailing the state of the troops under my command, my ideas of the operations to which they might be equal, and the state of the countries through which they would have to pass, and in which they would be stationed, I have delivered an opinion upon the general plan of the war; a liberty which, I hope, you will excuse. All that I can say is, that, notwithstanding the difficulties to which I have above alluded, nothing will give me greater satisfaction than to contribute personally in forwarding any plan upon which your Excellency may determine.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I enclose a letter for Gen. Lake, which I beg you to peruse and forward, together with the sealed private letter, which relates to my *not* confirmed appointment to the staff.

Bisnappa Pundit is in very great distress, and I do not know to what quarter to move him. He cannot subsist at Poonah on account of the dearness of grain and forage. I really do not believe I can venture to move the army from Poonah. You witnessed our distresses in the last year. I kept the army alive and together by grain. In this year there is less forage, and no grain; and there will probably be more rain.

The Governor General has sent the treaties of partition to the Peshwah, and Soubah of the Deccan, to which the former, in my opinion, will not agree; and I doubt much whether the latter will.

P.S. Make a copy of the enclosed letter to be sent by another occasion, in case the first should miscarry.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 23rd April, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor

General. I request you to notice in a particular manner to the durbar the fresh instance of the good conduct of Salabut Khan, as stated in the report from Lieut. Col. Lang.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 24th April, 1801.

I shall be able to let you know exactly, in 3 or 4 days, what number of new, what number of old, and what number of worn gold mohurs we have received from the Residency. We have got them from no other quarter, and I conclude that the paymaster has not exchanged new for old. I do not see what end is to be answered by a comparison between the mohurs now in the treasury, and the Bombay mohurs. The question is, what will the former fetch in the bazaar, or in the country? The result of that question must determine the rate at which I must issue them to the troops.

A comparison of their value with the Bombay mohurs will not decide the rate at which they ought to be sold; as even the Bombay mohurs, the value of which is, in your opinion, so correctly fixed, are not current at Poonah for that value. At your instance, I was obliged to lower the rate at which they were issued to the troops twice, before I marched from Poonah, in the year 1803. If the Bombay mohur is to be the standard, the first operation ought to be to fix its value, and then it will not be difficult to compare with the Bombay mohur any other gold coin. However, supposing that the value of the Bombay mohur was fixed, and the relative value of our mohurs ascertained, still that value would not be the fair sale price for these mohurs to the soucars, who gave them to you. They gave them at 13 Chandore rupees; and if they are an inconvenient coin to us, (which a mohur is, at all events,) they ought to take them back at that price, if they can take them back at all. If they cannot take them back, or if they will not take them back, at that price, I must issue them to the troops at a lower rate of exchange, as I did the Bombay mohurs in the former year. The purchase of mohurs by Mr. Frissell, to send to Mr. Forbes, at 12½ rupees each, is not a fair criterion to judge of the value of the mohurs in the bazaar. He was a purchaser; the soldiers, and the dealers in camp, are sellers, who must sell or starve; and the demand of the number which Mr. Frissell bought must have increased the price.

You will be able to judge of the Peshwah's disposition respecting Calpee, &c., by his conduct regarding the partition treaty, and can bring forward the Ahmednuggur question accordingly.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 25th April, 1801.

I have received your letter of the 22nd; you will have observed that I had received Mr. Edmonstone's dispatch of the 30th March.

The districts remaining in our hands to be ceded to the Peshwah are not of the value of 60,000 rupees, but I do not know of any others that could be ceded to him.

I suggested some time ago, to the Governor General, the propriety of reckoning the value of the lands ceded by Amrut Rao, and the amount of Amrut Rao's pension, as gains by the Peshwah during the war; but I

have received no answer to this suggestion, and I cannot venture to desire you to rely upon this point. There can be no doubt but that in this respect, and in his late gains of forts, &c., the Peshwah is in a more powerful state than he has ever been in before.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 25th April, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th inst., and I insert in the margin the dates of all the letters received from you of a date posterior to the 1st Feb.

Gungaram Pundit may have given over the districts ceded by the 5th article of the treaty of peace, since the 1st April; but the arrangement respecting those districts was concluded in the beginning of February, and he was then ordered to deliver them up. He omitted to do so, till he found that his disobedience of orders was not likely to be supported at Hyderabad, and retained the districts for six weeks at least. I cannot, therefore, acquit him of disobedience of my repeated orders. As far as I am personally concerned, it is a matter of indifference to me whether he is punished or not; but if it is to be a principle of British policy to introduce among the Native powers, the allies and dependents of the British government, the principles of good faith and political moderation; and if it is intended effectually to check the depredations of the Marhatta powers not connected with the British government, and of all freebooters, it is necessary to begin by preventing the nominal servants of our allies from infringing the treaties of peace, and from committing hostilities, and carrying on petty warfare under the shadow of the British power, in direct disobedience of orders. This object can only be effected by punishment, where it is deserved.

In respect to villages and districts in Berar, seized by the Rajah's servants, I know of none, excepting those for which Rajah Mohiput Ram gave sunnuds. If the result of an inquiry into the subject should be, that they have possession of such villages for which they had not sunnuds, it will be easy, by a correspondence with Mr. Elphinstone, to procure their release of them. I beg to observe, however, that the Peshwah has some villages in Berar which are held by the Rajah's servants, for which, of course, they have no sunnuds from any authority acting on the part of the Soubah of the Deccan.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 27th April, 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 24th, enclosing one of the 22nd from Capt. Gurnell; and I beg you to express to Capt. Gurnell that I am well satisfied with the manner in which he has carried into execution your orders for obtaining possession of the fort of Kelinjah.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 27th April, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 23rd. I do not see what can be done at present respecting Severndroog, and it is certainly best to endeavor to obtain possession as you have done, by negotiation. I learn from Capt. Kennedy, however, that Severndroog is not strong: if your negotiation

should not succeed, it will not be difficult to obtain possession of it by force at the opening of the season.

I think that you will do well to bring in carkoons, and settle affairs between the Bheel Rajahs and the Peshwah. You shall have the guns for the Peshwah. Indeed, it is rather extraordinary that they have not been sent before this time.

I have in some manner mislaid the book of accounts, which I had received at the Sungum, of the revenues of Ahmednuggur. It is possibly still at the Sungum, and if it should be so, Mr. Frissell will give it to you. If not, I beg you to write to Major Graham for the accounts of the revenue which you require. The killadar is very anxious about the cowle from the Peshwah.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 28th April, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th inst. Since the arrival of the army in the neighbourhood of Poonah, in the year 1803, a great part of its expense has fallen upon the resources of the government of Bombay; and, combined with other causes, has reduced this settlement to a degree of poverty which is very inconvenient and disadvantageous in all its financial transactions, and may be attended by the very worst consequences. It is accordingly my duty to relieve this government from the expense of the army at as early a period as may be practicable. This can be done only by drawing specie either from Bengal, or from the Company's provinces in the Peninsula, to defray the expense. There appears to be no prospect of obtaining specie from Bengal; and I must therefore depend upon that which will be sent from the territories under the government of Fort St. George.

I conclude that the government of Fort St. George must have made provision for the payment of the peshcush and the pensions due at Hyderabad, to the amount of 9 lacs of rupees; and I do not think that I should be justified in consenting to divert from the purposes of the army, and from the relief of this settlement, such a sum of money; more particularly, as it is probable that the government of Fort St. George will have provided other means of defraying this charge.

The sum for which Major Malcolm has drawn upon you stands upon other grounds. The government of Fort St. George knew nothing about that charge, and could have made no provision for it; and I conclude that the expense of the 2 corps at Hyderabad must be defrayed out of the sums sent from the Company's territories for the general service of the army. Accordingly, I request you to retain at Hyderabad the sum of money which will be necessary to discharge the bills which Major Malcolm has already drawn upon you; and to defray the expense of the 2 corps stationed at Hyderabad for the month of May, and to send to Ahmednuggur, by Perinda, the money which will remain of the sum of 3 lacs and 5000 pagodas, lately sent from the Ceded districts, by Major Gen. Campbell.

I am much obliged to you for having ordered the rice to Col. Hali-burton. I have desired him to send to the magazine at Ahmednuggur for a supply.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 28th April, 1804.

Much inconvenience is experienced at Bombay from the drafts made upon their treasury, and from the rate of exchange at which we draw upon Bengal; which I believe is higher in proportion to the rate at which bills are drawn upon Bengal at this place, than is supposed by Mr. Frissell, from a mistake which he has made in his reasoning upon that subject in a letter to Mr. Forbes. There is a sufficient sum at present in our treasury to pay the troops for May; and I expect from Hyderabad a sum sufficient to pay them in June, which will be followed, I hope, by another sum to pay them in July. That being the case, I think that it would be advisable, in reference to the state of finance at Bombay, to cease to give bills to the soucars at Poonah, either upon Bombay or Bengal, for a month or two. We shall in this manner apply a temporary remedy to the distress experienced here, and we shall be able to re-establish the exchange on its former advantageous rate.

I have received your letters of the 25th, and I will speak to Mr. Duncan on the subject of the purchase of stores by the marauders \* of Severndroog. I must consider the case of Manowly and Chiekoree.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Bombay, 28th April, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 16th inst., and I see clearly the embarrassment in which you must be, on account of the manner in which you have received the requisition from the Residency at Poonah, to give assistance to the Peshwah's servants in Savanore.

I foresaw this embarrassment in Jan. last, and wrote to the Resident at Poonah letters, of which I now enclose you extracts: but I observe that instead of giving you detailed information, to which you could recur upon every point that might arise, Mr. Waring has only copied from my letter what I wrote to the Residency, to avoid the inconvenience which you now experience. I conclude that now that Col. Close has arrived at Poonah, you will receive such information as will enable you to act.

I am obliged to you for having sent the money. I was in hopes that I should have been able to break up the army before this time; but the conduct of Holkar in Hindustan has been rather ambiguous; and although I could do nothing to injure him, I have thought it proper not to disperse the troops till I shall receive the orders of the Governor General. I still hope, however, that I shall be able to send the troops away, so that they may be across the Kistna before the rivers swell.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 29th April, 1804.

In my opinion it will not answer to make an advance to Goklah, unless the Peshwah should desire it, or consent to it; and his Highness must fix the amount of the sum to be paid, and the number and description of troops to be kept by Goklah. The sum which he now demands is double the amount of what was paid to him the last campaign. After having ascertained that point, the question which remains will be, whether such a sum of money can be afforded out of our funds. Adverting to this demand, and to that for the payment of Amrut Rao and the pensioners, I

\* Pirates on the coast of the Konkan.



much fear that it will not be possible to discontinue to draw bills upon Bengal, and upon Bombay, according to the terms of my letter of yesterday : I shall, however, be glad to hear from you upon this subject, before I make up my mind.

This settlement is really in the greatest distress. Our bills upon Bengal and Bombay distress it equally, and nothing can relieve it, excepting to discontinue our drafts for a time, which I had hoped might have been effected by the arrival at Hyderabad of a large sum in specie from the Company's territories in the Peninsula.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 30th April, 1804.

Since I had the honor of addressing you last, appearances have changed in respect to Holkar. At that time, I had learnt that he had opened a negotiation with Gen. Lake by means of agents, who had, in fact, thrown their employer upon the General's mercy; but in the beginning of this month, Gen. Lake received a letter from Holkar, which demonstrated an intention of proceeding to hostilities. Holkar's army is so badly composed, and his power and even his existence appear to depend so much upon his avoiding a contest with the British armies, and his conduct shows so plainly that he is fully sensible of the state of his affairs, that I think there is reason to expect that he will have retired from the position which he had taken up near Ajmeer, so soon as he shall have heard of Gen. Lake's movement to the westward on the 6th of this month. If this should be the case, it will remain with the British government to determine the line of conduct which is to be adopted respecting Holkar; and at all events, unless some blow should have been struck long before this time, it is probable that nothing will be done till towards the month of August.

At whatever period hostilities may commence with Holkar, it will be necessary that your corps should move into Malwa. You will observe, therefore, the necessity of keeping it prepared, at least till the exact state of affairs in Hindustan shall be known; and when you break it up for the rains, you will take care to occupy such positions as will be most useful to enable you to advance with celerity into Malwa, as will at the same time cover Guzerat from invasion, and as will enable you to collect in strength whenever that may be necessary. It appears to me, that all these objects will be attained by the disposition proposed in your letter of the 23rd inst.; and accordingly I recommend to you to adopt it when you find it necessary to break up.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 1st May, 1804.

I have received application from Bappojee Goneish Goklah that I should request you to interest yourself at the Peshwah's durbar, that effectual and permanent provision might be made for the support of the body of troops under his command; and as Bappojee Goneish Goklah always conducted himself to my satisfaction during the late war, I now forward his request.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 1st May, 1804.

Having fully considered the contents of the paper transmitted with

your letter of the 25th April, on the subject of the Rajah of Kolapoor's claim to Chickoree, I deem it most proper to decline giving my opinion upon it, and to request you to forward it to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General. Some time has now elapsed since I referred the whole question regarding the southern jaghiredars, and the Rajah of Kolapoor, to his Excellency; and as I am entirely unacquainted with his Excellency's sentiments upon that reference, I cannot venture to recommend that any measure be adopted which may afterwards prove inconsistent with what he may order.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 1st May, 1804.

Many days have elapsed since I have heard from you. I enclose a letter which I received yesterday from Manesty, which will show you how he is getting on.

To the Governor General.

Bombay, 2nd May, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have thought it necessary to write to Major Graham, containing orders to make provision for feeding the poorer classes of the inhabitants of Ahmednuggur, who were suffering from famine. I am sorry to inform your Excellency, that notwithstanding the arrangements directed in that letter have been carried into execution, nearly 50 people in that town die daily: the distress in all parts of the country is extreme.

The commander of the Mysore horse, who has gone in search of food within the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, informs me that his horses are entirely unfit for service from want of food; that several have died; and that he fears the troops will disband, unless removed to a country which suffers less from famine.

In the camp near Poonah, all, excepting the fighting men, suffer great distress: by great exertion grain is procured, but it sells for  $2\frac{1}{2}$  seers for a rupee; a price which was exceeded only for 2 or 3 days, and was not equalled for more than a week, during the siege of Seringapatam in the year 1799. This price bears so heavily upon all the public and necessary followers of the army, and upon the officers, that I much fear that I shall be obliged to make issues of grain from the magazines for the consumption of the followers, as well as for that of the fighting men. These issues will increase the drain on the magazines to a very great degree; and as, in the present state of the country, it does not appear practicable to undertake any military operation to the northward till the next harvest, I very much doubt whether it will not be proper to send towards the Company's frontiers all the troops excepting the subsidiary force, and thus to decrease the consumption near Poonah, as far as may be in my power. The cavalry, in particular, ought to be sent away, as their consumption is very great; at the same time, that the only grain which I can give them is supposed to be unwholesome for the horses.

The forage is very scarce in all parts of the country, excepting between Poonah and the Bhore ghaut, where I have stationed the army for the present. But even there, it is of a bad quality, and it is expensive. I should probably be enabled to relieve the troops from many of the

distresses which they suffer, if I could receive any intimation of your Excellency's plans in the present crisis. Till I receive this required information, I am apprehensive that any steps which I may take for the relief of the distresses of the army may prove inconsistent with your Excellency's objects.

To Lieut. Frissell.

Bombay, 2nd May, 1804.

In the transaction of public business, there is nothing so unpleasant, or which takes up so much time unnecessarily, as for those who are obliged to correspond upon it to draw nice logical distinctions upon words, or to give them a meaning that they never were intended to convey. In my letter of the 28th, I said that you had been in an error, and that our exchange had been more unfavorable at Poonah than it ought to have been. At Bombay, 103 Bombay rupees are got for a government bill upon Bengal for 100 sicca rupees, being a premium of 3 *per cent.* on a Bombay government bill. It appears that you imagined that, for 100 rupees at Bombay, a bill was given on Bengal for 103 sicca rupees: there was your error, and the consequent loss on the bills drawn at Poonah upon Bengal.

It is useless to write any more on the subject. Should bills be again drawn at Poonah, the government of Bombay will furnish you with an account of the rates of exchange at which they draw their bills, and you can regulate their rates accordingly.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 2nd May, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 24th April. You do not give me any intelligence relative to Holkar's motions, which are so important at this moment; particularly as, according to them, I have still to determine whether or not to throw another corps into Guzerat. The letter from Mr. Edmonstone of the 8th April is terrible, and I am by no means satisfied with it.

To Major Malcolm.

Bombay, 3rd May, 1804.

I have received yours of the 25th April. No news yet of Holkar's motions, although it is said that there was a battle 13 days ago.

I enclose you two notes, one of which will show that your friend ——— is in a scrape, and the other may be of use in your negotiations with Scindiah.

G. O.

Bombay, 3rd May, 1804.

In consequence of the following orders from his Excellency the Governor General in Council, Major Gen. Wellesley has determined that the corps and individuals who were present with the division of the army under the immediate command of Major Gen. Wellesley, or with the subsidiary force serving with the Subahdar of the Deccan, during the siege of Ahmednuggur, or at the battle of Assye, or during the siege of Asseerghur, or at the battle of Argaum, or during the siege of Gawilghur, are to share in the property captured.

The detachment stationed at Toka, under the command of Capt. Campbell, during the siege of Ahmednuggur, the detachment under the command of Capt. O'Donnell in the affair at Korget Coraygaum, and that under the command of Capt. Baynes in the affair at Umber, are likewise to share in the property captured during the war.

Prize rolls are to be made out by officers commanding corps according to those orders, and forwarded by the corps composing the division under the immediate command of

Major

To Major Graham.

Bombay, 5th May, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 29th April; and I am concerned to find that the number of persons employed at work and fed at Ahmednuggur exceeds so far the number which I had thought it possible would have offered themselves. I think it probable that many may have come in from the neighbouring country. If that should be the case, and if the value of the grain, and the money given, should exceed the money price of labor in the country, it will be necessary first of all to strike off the money, and afterwards as much of the grain as may leave just sufficient to keep life and soul together, till the value of the quantity given may be no more than the money price of labor.

I have desired Col. Close to give you an answer regarding Jumander Bittall; but I am sure the Company's troops have enough to do without protecting Cavy Jung. However, if you apprehend any inconvenience from the occupation of the fort at Nushin by Jumander Bittall, he must be driven out; although, if the Company's troops are to be employed in re-occupying their tannahs, when the jaghiredars lose them, the Company ought to enjoy the benefit of the revenue of the country.

I do not see any reason for detaining Lowe, or for interfering about Mondergaum.

Major Gen. Wellesley to the D. A. G. in Mysore, and by the corps in the subsidiary force to the D. A. G. with that force.

The prize rolls are to mention the name of every officer and man entitled to share according to these orders; and opposite to the names of those not now present with the corps or company to which he belonged during the war, is to be a note stating what has become of him. These prize rolls are to have an abstract of the total numbers of each rank at the back of them.

The D. A. G. in Mysore, and with the subsidiary force, will compare those rolls with the returns, and see that the rolls are correct, when they will certify them by their signature respectively. Capt. Colebrooke will forward the rolls to Major Gen. Wellesley as soon as he shall have received and examined them.

The D. A. G. in Mysore will make out a prize roll of the officers and others attached to the staff of Major Gen. Wellesley's division; the D. A. G. with the subsidiary force, a roll of the officers and others attached to the staff of the subsidiary force serving with the Sorbahdar of the Deccan; officers commanding brigades, a roll of the brigade staff; and Commissaries of stores, a roll of the Europeans not belonging to corps in camp attached to the ordnance department. The officers commanding the companies under the command of Capt. Campbell, Capt. O'Donnell, and Capt. Baynes, respectively, are each to send their rolls to the officer under whose command they were at Toka, at Korget Coraygaum, and at Umber. These officers will examine them, and see that they are correct, and will then certify and forward them to Major Gen. Wellesley. No man is to be included in more than one prize roll. Deserters are not to be included in any prize roll.

G.O.G.G.

Fort William, 12th April, 1804.

1. The Governor General in Council is pleased to direct that the following extract of a letter from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, to the Governor General, dated Camp, Jaffierabad, 17th Jan. 1804, be published in General Orders: (*See this letter*, p. 983.)

2. The Governor General in Council, having received from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley a report of treasure and other articles, being the public property of the enemy, captured by the troops under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley during the progress of the late splendid and memorable successes of the army in the Deccan against the confederated Marhatta chieftains, amounting to 11,52,196½ Hyderabad rupees, deems it to be the duty of the Governor General, conformably to the general principle established by the General Orders of the Governor General in Council of the 8th Oct. 1803, directing a distribution of prize money captured by the army under the personal command of his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India, to anticipate the sanction of His Majesty and of the Hon. the Court of Directors for the distribution of this sum, as a testimony of the applause and gratitude with which the British government views the exemplary valor, discipline,

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 6th May, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your private letter of the 3rd inst., and as I think it necessary that the subject to which it relates should be referred to his Excellency the Governor General, I adopt this mode of replying to it.

In a letter which I wrote to Lieut. Frissell, on the 30th Jan., I had the honor of submitting certain regulations for your consideration, as a guide for the conduct of the Residency, in the employment of the troops to assist the Peshwah's amildars in taking possession of his Highness' countries; as I was perfectly aware that his Highness and his servants would be desirous to take advantage of the resistance to be afforded, to obtain possession of that which might be deemed his right, and to oppress sirdars of the Empire, and others whom it might be the policy of the British government to support. I wished, also, by means of these regulations, to free the military officers who might be employed from detailed investigations, and trouble, and responsibility in matters in which they had no concern, and in cases in which they could be considered only as executive instruments.

In a letter which I wrote to Lieut. Frissell on the following day (the 31st Jan.), upon the subject of an application to be made to Gen. Campbell, for assistance to the Peshwah's amildar, in the countries south of the Kistna, I recommended that he should adhere to the rules proposed in my letter of the preceding day, and that he should take care not to interfere

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discipline, zeal, and firmness displayed by the army under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley, during the recent arduous and glorious campaign.

3. The Governor General in Council accordingly authorises and directs Major Gen. Wellesley to make an immediate distribution of the sum above mentioned to the troops under his command, in such proportions as may be conformable to the usage of the British service in similar cases. Major Gen. Wellesley will determine and name in public orders the several corps, divisions, or detachments of the army employed under his special command in the Deccan, which are to participate in this distribution.

4. Major Gen. Wellesley will also determine and publish the general rules by which the shares of the respective officers and soldiers are to be apportioned, and will report his proceedings in the execution of those instructions to the Governor General in Council, and to the Governors in Council of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Bombay. All ordnance, ordnance and military stores, taken by the troops composing the army under Major Gen. Wellesley during the war, are to be reserved entire for further instructions.

5. The Governor General in Council will not fail to afford to the zeal, gallantry, and energy of the army (employed in services of arduous labor and peril, and remote from their Sovereign and their country) the most liberal and prompt encouragement which may appear compatible with the right of the Crown and the Company, and with the due principles of discipline, public order, and just economy.

6. The Governor General in Council, in consideration of the severe hardships and fatigues experienced by the officers of the army under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley, during the protracted time they have been in the field on active service; and also in consideration of the heavy expenses to which the officers of the army employed under the command of Major Gen. Wellesley, during the recent arduous operation in the Deccan, have been subjected by the repeated loss of their field equipments, combined with the inadequate amount of prize to be distributed amongst them, deems it equitable, and consistent with a liberal and wise policy, that this government should award compensation to those officers, with a view to alleviate in some measure the hardship of their case, without establishing a precedent for incurring an unnecessary and improper expense in future.

The Governor General in Council is therefore pleased to authorise a donation for the officers who have been serving with the troops employed under the command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley during the late war in the Deccan against the Marhatta confederates, equal to 6 months' full batta of the rank in which they have been respectively serving during the war.

with the Putwurdums, the Rajah of Kolapoor, Goklah, &c., when he should apply to Gen. Campbell.

In a letter which I wrote to you on the 23rd Feb., on the occasion of a communication from Bappojee Guncish Goklah, of a message from the Peshwah, proposing to give him the possessions of the family of Purshe-ram Bhow, I canvassed the state of the southern countries fully, and pointed out particularly the manner in which the interests of the Hon. Company would be affected by a contest in that quarter; and in two letters which I have addressed to the Governor General, one dated the 7th and the other the 21st March, copies of both which are in your possession, I have referred the whole question regarding the southern jaghiredars to his Excellency's decision.

It appears by the list of places of which the Peshwah wishes that his amildar should be put in possession, that it includes every strong fort in the southern districts, excepting Darwar; that every sirdar of any consequence in the empire, who holds possessions in those countries, is to be deprived of them by the British troops; and that, of course, such sirdars will become the determined and active enemies of the British government.

Among those whose names are included in the list, is the Rajah of Kittoor, who is to be *dispossessed*! It is useless to point out the services of this person for a number of years, but particularly when I was marching to Poonah, which services would possibly have entitled him to the exertions of the British government to obtain a remission of tribute. But the operations which I have conducted have led me into his country, and I beg leave to deprecate a contest with him, excepting in a case of very evident necessity, in which the whole force of the government can be employed. Like Wynaad, Koorg, Bullun, Bednore, and Soonda, Kittoor is situated in, and immediately to the eastward of, the range of western ghauts. It is, equally with them, difficult for troops; it is inhabited by a similar race of people, and the operations of the war in it would possibly be attended with the same losses and disasters. The country is situated on a defenceless point of the Company's frontier. The fort of Hullihall has no garrison, because I have been obliged to draw the troops from thence to complete the corps at Goa; and the possession of that fort would give the Rajah of Kittoor a secure communication and entrance into Canara and Bednore, both provinces entirely defenceless; and the former, that upon the resources of which Bombay, Poonah, and the army, depend entirely for subsistence. These facts, however well founded, are not generally known, and point out clearly the necessity of avoiding to attempt to *dispossess* the Rajah of Kittoor of his country, till adequate means can be found to insure the object, and to guard against the modes of annoying us which he has in his power.

The letters to which I have above drawn your attention show my sentiments upon the subject of dispossessing the southern jaghiredars, and as it is under reference to the Governor General, I cannot venture to decide upon it.

If I were called upon to decide, however, I should absolutely refuse giving the Peshwah any assistance to forward these views in the southern

countries, till he should collect a body of troops to serve with the British troops, according to his treaty; and I should take measures to make known this refusal to the southern jaghiredars, in order to remove all suspicion from their minds.

If I should be obliged to determine otherwise, I should think it necessary to suggest to the government of Fort St. George to take more effectual measures to defend Mysore and the Ceded districts, to throw a garrison into Hullyhall, in Soonda, and to reinforce Gen. Campbell, to enable him to undertake the offensive operations required from him; and, above all, to equip him for sieges. As all the sirdars in the southern countries would be concerned in this warfare, the communication of the troops in this part of India with Mysore would be destroyed; but as nothing is to be expected from the Peshwah, or the Soubah of the Deccan, I should be at a loss to find out a mode to replace that advantage.

When you write to the Governor General upon this subject, it would be desirable to point out to his Excellency the advantage which is ultimately to result to the British government, or to the Peshwah, from this general confusion in the southern countries; to state to him whether the Peshwah has any means of carrying on the war in that quarter; whether he has any means of retaining possession of the countries after they shall have been given to him, supposing the result to be successful; and whether, now that Goklah and Appah Dessaye have been allowed to depart, there is any body of Marhatta troops whatever to co-operate with the British troops upon any occasion in which their services can be required. While writing upon this subject, I beg leave to point out to you the necessity of great caution and secrecy in your inquiries and measures, at least till you have received the orders of the Governor General, consequent to the different references which have been made to him since the month of January last, as I have received intelligence, from more than one quarter, of a communication among the southern chiefs; and particularly, that measures had been taken to reconcile the Rajah of Kolapoor and the chiefs of the Putwurdun family. These measures may possibly be attributed to the reports in circulation of the intention of the Peshwah, supported by the British government, to attack the southern chiefs.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 6th May, 1804.

I have no objection to the payment of Amrut Rao's people, in any manner you should think proper. I am afraid that to use the grain in the magazine will do but little good to the country; as we shall still require much for the cavalry and cattle.

I enclose a return of the Sheer Shahy mohurs now in the treasury in camp, which have been received from the Residency. It appears that the troops cannot pass them in the country at the rate of exchange (13 Chandore rupees) at which they were received from the Residency; and I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will endeavor to prevail upon the soucars to take them back, and to give other coins in lieu of them. If you should not be able to prevail upon the soucars to exchange the mohurs at that rate, they must be issued to the troops at the reduced rate at which they can exchange in the bazaar at Poonah.

I shall be obliged to you if you will send to Col. Wallace a copy of your answer to this letter, in order that no time may be lost in paying the troops.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Col. Murray. In conformity to the intention communicated in that letter, I have ordered the 1st batt. of the 1st regt., with the exception of that part of the corps still in Malabar, to embark at Goa on the vessels which you have sent to transport the corps to Guzerat.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received intimation from his Excellency the Governor General, that he has given directions to the Commander in Chief to attack Jeswant Rao Holkar; and his Excellency has ordered me to make arrangements to co-operate with, and support the operations of, the Commander in Chief.

It is impossible for me to say what the operations of the Commander in Chief will be, but Holkar's power appears to consist principally in a considerable army in the field; and I imagine that his Excellency's operations will, in the first instance, be directed to defeat that army; or, if Holkar should avoid an action by flying, to press upon him so closely as to oblige his troops to disperse. This operation can be aided very materially from Guzerat, and I proceed to point out to you in what manner.

Marquis Wellesley to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Barrackpore, 16th April, 1804.

1. I have the honor to transmit, for your information, the copy of a dispatch which I have this day addressed to his Excellency the Commander in Chief. (*See the Wellesley Dispatches, Marquis Wellesley to Gen. Lake, 16th April, 1804, vol. iv. p. 57; and also 25th May, 1804, p. 67, and the Notes of Instructions enclosed.*)

2. My letter to the Commander in Chief will apprise you of my determination to commence hostilities against Jeswant Rao Holkar, from Hindustan and the Deccan, at the earliest practicable period of time; and I hereby authorise and direct you to co-operate with his Excellency the Commander in Chief in the manner which may appear to you to be best calculated to make an early impression upon the power and resources of Holkar, and to afford the most effectual aid in facilitating the operations which the Commander in Chief may pursue, under my orders, against Jeswant Rao Holkar, from Hindustan. You will not, however, wait for the receipt of orders from the Commander in Chief, or for the notification of the commencement of hostilities by his Excellency, or Dowlat Rao Scindiah; but you will, without delay, proceed to act against the resources and power of Holkar in the Deccan; and you will direct such operations from Guzerat against Indore, and the possessions and interest of Holkar in that quarter, as may appear to you to be advisable.

3. You will hereafter receive my detailed instructions with regard to the plan for the reduction of Holkar's predatory power. In the meanwhile, I think it necessary to apprise you, that I have fully considered the suggestions contained in your dispatch of the 18th March, (received the 6th April,) and that I entirely approve the disposition of the troops under your command, which you have detailed in that dispatch, as well as the plan of military operations which you have suggested in the event of hostilities with Jeswant Rao Holkar.

4. This letter will be left open for the perusal of the Resident at Hyderabad, in order that he may be apprised of the probability of your taking the field against Jeswant Rao Holkar, and may be prepared to afford you such aid as you may require from the subsidiary force, or in furnishing supplies for the army.



In the course of a few days, the troops under your command will be reinforced by the arrival at Surat of another battalion, the 1st of the 4th, from Goa, excepting a detachment which is still in Malabar. There is, however, no occasion for delaying your operations till the arrival of this battalion; they may be commenced immediately, and this battalion may be reckoned upon as one of those to be allotted to the internal defence of Guzerat.

In my opinion, besides the corps necessary for the defence of Surat, and the troops at Baroda, it will be also necessary to leave in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda, a disposable force of 2 battalions: this corps, to be placed under the command of such officer as you may select, must be considered as a reserve to your corps. They will be able to defeat any body of predatory troops that might pass round your corps; they will be of material service in keeping the country in your rear in a state of tranquillity; they will protect your communications; and they will give confidence to the Guickwar government.

The remainder of the troops under your command, according to my computation, and considering the 1st batt. 6th regt. of the strength of 1600 men as 2 battalions, will be 2 regiments of European infantry, and 5 battalions of Native infantry. But as the 1st of the 4th are not strong, and have many recruits, you may possibly find it necessary to leave behind you another battalion, and to take with you only 4 battalions.

If the operations of his Excellency the Commander in Chief should be directed to the defeat and dispersion of Holkar's army according to the mode which I have supposed at the commencement of this letter, your object will be to post yourself in such a manner as to stop Holkar, and embarrass and impede his flight as much as possible, and if you can, to engage him.

If the Commander in Chief should commence his operations in a short time, it does not appear to me to be probable that Holkar, who is now, I believe, about Ajmeer, will retire to the south westward, or towards Guzerat; but he will, probably, move towards Ougein. I have no ground, however, for this conjecture, excepting the knowledge that the rains will commence in June, and the probability that Holkar will be disinclined to trust himself in a country in that season of the year, in which his operations would be confined by the course of the rivers, the nature of the country, &c. If he should move towards Ougein, it will be your business to join Scindiah's army at the earliest practicable period; and at all events, to move with celerity upon Holkar, and attack him whenever you shall have an opportunity. You will take with you as large a body of the Guickwar cavalry as can be furnished to you.

I write to the Resident at Scindiah's durbar, to desire that heavy iron guns may be prepared at Ougein, in case, in the course of your operations in Malwa, you should find it necessary to attack any place regularly; and I recommend that the iron 18 pounders, which are, I believe, at Baroach, may be brought with their stores to the most forward station in Guzerat before the rains commence, in order that they may be ready at your call, in case such an operation should be necessary. I recommend, however, that, unless you find that the Commander in Chief should adopt

that plan of operations, you should not think of attacking any strong place, excepting such as may necessarily fall in your way, till Holkar's army shall have been defeated.

I understand that he has some strongholds in Malwa, particularly at Rampoor, or Brampooor, to which he has lately sent his infantry and guns; but it will not be difficult to obtain possession of them, and to make a final conquest and settlement of his country, as soon as his army shall have been beaten and dispersed; and to employ our troops in sieges till this object shall have been effected will only give Holkar leisure for his predatory operations, will enable him to distress the troops by operating on their communications during such sieges, and will delay his final defeat.

But I repeat that your plan of operations must, in this respect, be conformable to that of the Commander in Chief. It is difficult to point out the place to which you ought in the first instance to direct your march. Dounurpoor, by Lunawara, it appears would most effectually cover Guzerat; on the other hand, Rutlaum, by Dohud, would bring you nearest to Ougein, and to that part of the country to which it is my opinion that Holkar will, in the first instance, direct his flight. Your local knowledge may possibly enable you to fix upon a station in the Banswarrah country, from which you will have a ready communication to either flank, accordingly as circumstances may render it necessary.

You will commence your march as soon as may be practicable. In the course of your operations, you will give every protection to the inhabitants of the country, and you will encourage them, as far as may be in your power, to assist you with provisions, and the Rajah's zemindars, &c., to protect your convoys and aid you with their troops. You will be cautious, however, not to enter into engagements with any of them.

It is probable that the greatest part of Holkar's territories will be given over to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and you will therefore avoid entering into engagements with any of his tributaries, without previous communication with the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. You will make such temporary arrangements of the countries which may come into your hands as will be most convenient to your own operations, bearing in mind that it is desirable that you should not weaken your force, at least till Holkar's army shall have been defeated, or in a great measure dispersed.

I propose to communicate a copy of this letter to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and to request that a person may be sent on the part of Scindiah to reside in your camp, and who shall have authority in the country to call for such supplies as you may require. You will be so kind as to correspond with the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Before you will have received this letter, I shall have joined the army, when I shall carry on the operations which may be necessary to deprive Holkar of his possessions in the Deccan. But you will have heard that there is a famine in the Deccan, and I much doubt whether I shall be able to give any aid to the operations of the Commander in Chief north of the Taptee.

I propose to suggest to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that the troops of that Chief should take possession of Chooly Myhissur, Indore, &c. &c., without loss of time.

To the Resident with Dowlat Rao Scindiah.

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

You will have received copies of the letters from his Excellency the Governor General, addressed to his Excellency the Commander in Chief and myself, containing directions that hostilities should be commenced against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. I propose to join the army immediately, and to do every thing I can to destroy the power and resources of that Chief in the Deccan; and I have the honor to enclose a copy of the instructions which I have sent to Col. Murray. I beg you to be so kind as to forward a copy of this paper to his Excellency the Commander in Chief, and to give me such information of his Excellency's plans as you may be able to afford.

I beg you will also endeavor to communicate with Col. Murray, and to prevail on Scindiah's ministers to send to the Colonel a person who shall have full power to draw forth the resources of the country, in proportion as the Colonel may have occasion to call for them, and to take possession of such of Holkar's districts in Malwa as Col. Murray may think proper to give over to his charge. It will be proper, however, that this person should be particularly instructed to avoid interfering with Col. Murray's arrangements in any districts which the Colonel should not think proper to deliver over to his charge. You will observe by the enclosed instructions that I have desired Col. Murray to endeavor eventually to join Scindiah's army. I do not know of what that army consists, or where it is situated; but, although I have no doubt that Holkar's strength will fritter away as soon as he shall be pressed by the Commander in Chief, I conceive that it would be desirable that Scindiah's army should be reinforced by a body of British troops. It would be most desirable if that body were distinct from that under the command of Col. Murray, as more numerous means of annoying Holkar would thereby be afforded; but even under present arrangements I think that the war cannot last long.

I request you to urge the durbar to have in readiness, at Ougein, 4 iron guns, 18 or 24 pounders, with 500 rounds of powder and shot for each gun, in case Col. Murray should have occasion to call for that assistance. I beg leave to suggest to you to urge Scindiah's ministers to attack Chooly Myhissur, on the Nerbudda, and Indore, without loss of time; I imagine that they will be able to get possession of these places without difficulty. They will observe the liberal manner in which his Excellency the Governor General proposes to dispose of Holkar's possessions, supposing them to be conquered; and they will, of course, exert themselves to bring the war to a speedy and honorable conclusion.

In communicating with Scindiah's ministers on the subject of the disposal of Holkar's possessions, I beg you to take care not to give them any hopes that Scindiah shall have Umber. This place is situated north of the Godavery, between that river, Aurungabad, and Jalnapoor. It is in the midst of the possessions of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, by whose father, I believe, it was ceded to the Marhattas at the peace of Kurdlah; I imagine that the Governor General could not have adverted to its situation when he wrote on the 16th April.

To Major Shawe.

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Col. Colman, and which I beg you to lay before the Governor General when you shall have an opportunity. I have nothing to say upon the subject of the letter, excepting that Col. Colman conducted himself in a very satisfactory manner when in command of the troops at Poonah during the war.

You will have seen by my letter to the Commander in Chief, a copy of which went to the Governor General, the state in which we are in the Deccan. The accounts which I receive are every day worse. Mr. Welbe has been much distressed in passing through the country with his small escort, and has been obliged to make forced marches to get water, without forage or grain. The subsidiary force are living upon the borders of Berar, and cannot venture to move to the westward. I have received a letter from Col. Close, in which he desires me to take measures for supplying the troops with grain, without making purchases in the country, as we shall use the seed grain. I do not usually make complaints; I struggled through difficulties in the last year, the report of which, through another channel, created much alarm in Bengal. But in this year I really fear that I shall not be able to keep the army together. I shall join the army immediately.

I have ordered another corps into Guzerat from Goa; and I send a corps from the army to Hullihall, in Soonda. This corps will go to Goa eventually: but as nothing can happen to Goa, at least till the month of August; and as there is a good deal of alarm among the southern chiefs, occasioned by the Peshwah's threats to deprive them of their country, and an appearance of a general concert to leave Hullihall without a garrison would be ruinous, I think it best that the corps should garrison Hullihall, at least till the season shall open.

You will see, by Malcolm's letters, that there is a good deal of ill temper at Scindiah's durbar. The newspapers are full of the complaints both of Ragojee Bhoonslah and Scindiah. I send to the Sec. of government, this day, an answer on the subject of the Governor General's desire to return the money contributed by the inhabitants of Burhampoor.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Bombay, 7th May, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received intimation from the Governor General that he has ordered Gen. Lake to attack Holkar, and he has desired me to co-operate with him.

In conformity with the plan communicated to you in my letter of the 17th March, of which you approved, I have ordered that part of the 1st batt. 4th regt. stationed at Goa, into Guzerat; and I propose to send to Hullihall, in Soonda, one of the battalions now at Poonah. I think it will be better that the battalion should remain at Hullihall till the opening of the season. It will not be wanted till that period at Goa; and by being stationed at Hullihall, it will check any freebooter plan that might be founded upon the knowledge of the weakness of our post at Hullihall. However, I shall order the battalion to consider itself liable to the requisition of Sir W. Clarke; and of course it can be ordered at once to Goa, if you should think it proper.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter that I have written to Gen. Lake, which will show you our situation and our prospects in the Deccan. Indeed, they have become worse since I wrote that letter. However, I shall join the army immediately, and I shall see what I can do. In the mean time I have sent instructions to Col. Murray, of which I enclose a copy, and a letter to the Resident with Scindiah, of which likewise you have a copy. If Gen. Lake would make a good dash at Holkar, the war could not last a fortnight; but if he should stand upon the defensive in Hindustan, it will last for a length of time. If it should happen that Holkar passes into the Punjaub, which is a line of conduct that I have not taken into consideration in the enclosed letter to Col. Murray, for obvious reasons, Col. Murray and Scindiah's army will deprive him of all he has in Malwa, in the same manner as I shall in the Deccan; and I propose to instruct Col. Murray upon this subject hereafter.

I shall be obliged to you, if you will desire that the clothing for all the corps with this division of the army may be sent to Ahmednuggur; and that for the subsidiary force to Hyderabad, from whence it can be forwarded. I think I shall be able to send the 2nd of the 12th to Hullihall, in Soonda, so that the clothing of that corps may be sent there. As all the corps are in want of clothing, and as I saw clearly that they could not receive their clothing probably before the end of the rains, and that, whatever might be the result of Gen. Lake's negotiations with Holkar, the troops could not get into quarters in this season, I applied to Mr. Duncan for cloth from the warehouse here, and I have sent up as much as will make a comfortable plain jacket for each man. These will be made before the rains set in. I hope you will approve of this arrangement, as I really could not venture to expose the troops to the rains without clothing. Some of them have only white jackets; and to every corps in the line clothing is due from the year 1800. I have given no cloth to the cavalry, as they have cloaks, and are not so much exposed to the weather as the infantry. The 74th regt. have their new clothing, and the 78th regt. are tolerably well off; and their new clothing is making up; so that, upon the whole, I hope that we shall do.

Between the cotton trade and the army, the precious metals have disappeared at Bombay, notwithstanding all the money introduced since the war. But I hope that we shall continue to receive supplies of money from the provinces under the government of Madras.

To Capt. Wilks.

Bombay, 9th May, 1804.

Since I wrote to you last, I have received letters from the Governor General, which give every reason to believe that we shall have an immediate contest with Holkar, and I am therefore about to join the army again without loss of time.

I cannot say when the operations against Holkar will commence, or how far we shall be concerned in them; but the fact that we are to attack Holkar, and the present state of the Peshwah's military force, will show that I cannot, at present, allow Bistnapah to return to Mysore. However, if I should find that the operations are delayed for any length of time, or

if, by the state of the country, I should be obliged to delay commencing them, I shall send Bistnapah towards the Kistna, where he will have a better chance of finding subsistence than he has in his present situation. I learn by letters from him that he is in very great distress; but I have told him that I shall either join the army, or give him leave to go to Mysore, before the rains set in; and I have offered him all the assistance which he might think I could afford. These assurances, as they will give him hopes, will, in some degree, relieve his feelings. I request you to apprise Purneah of these circumstances, and tell him to send money to Bistnapah. In the mean time, I shall take care that he shall not want until his money shall arrive.

I flattered myself that I should have had the pleasure of seeing you before this time, but I am much disappointed. However, if Gen. Lake attacks Holkar vigorously, and with activity, the war will not last a fortnight. My share of it will be very trifling. If the General should stand upon the defensive, the contest will be long, and may lead to unpleasant consequences. Webbe was to leave Aurungabad on the 3rd.

To Major Graham.

Bombay, 9th May, 1804.

I beg that you will inquire judiciously into all the circumstances of the robbery you have mentioned; report the evidence, and your opinion of the guilt, to me; and I shall send orders to hang the patel and the plunderers. We must keep these rascals in order, or they will drive us out of the place. I beg you to do as you wish about the wall of the pettah. You have done right about the Bheels. I think that this would be a good opportunity to clear all the aqueducts leading either to the fort or pettah of Ahmednuggur. I wish you to communicate with the engineer on this subject, and let some of the work people be employed on the work.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 11th May, 1804.

I have written to Capt. Young, at Panwell, to request him to take the bales of cloth to pieces, and forward them to you; but you may as well allow the elephants to come on till they shall meet his messenger to stop them, lest he should still be unable to send the cloth. You have done quite right about the carriages. Allow Capt. Campbell, Capt. Langlands, and Major Swinton to come to Bombay.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 12th May, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 9th inst. Since I have had any knowledge of Marhatta affairs, I have been of opinion that it was necessary that his Highness the Peshwah should settle his country; and I have repeatedly taken the liberty of suggesting, recommending, and urging different modes of accomplishing this object. I have also been fully sensible of the necessity of making a settlement with the serinjaunmy sirdars; and above two months have elapsed since I have drawn the attention of his Excellency the Governor General to that subject.

I cannot interfere in it without his Excellency's orders, because I am ignorant of the principle on which he would choose to act in this instance; and I cannot interfere in any manner without adopting a distinct line of

policy respecting these southern jaghiredars, upon which I cannot venture. I have also to observe, that if I should interfere, I must support my negotiations by a commanding body of troops, unless I should choose to run the risk of involving Gen. Campbell singly in a contest with all the southern chiefs; and I cannot venture upon this course of operations until I shall have been made acquainted with the plans of his Excellency the Governor General for the campaign against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

I have forwarded, to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General, a copy of my letter to the Commander in Chief of the 23rd April, in which I have pointed out the circumstances which prevent the march of the troops under my command to the northward at present; and I conclude, that when he shall receive that letter, he will send me orders to undertake the settlement of the Peshwah's affairs with the southern jaghiredars during the rainy season; or possibly before he shall have received it he will have made me acquainted with his sentiments respecting the jaghiredars, and I may find it possible to undertake the operation during the rainy season, under the circumstances which must prevent me from marching to the northward, till the season shall have been far advanced, and the new crops will begin to appear. But the question respecting the southern jaghiredars is one of increasing difficulty, and it is not possible to settle it without the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, regarding the principles to be adopted.

At present, and for nearly a year and a half, a large British army has been employed in the Peshwah's territories; and as his government has been in a state of security, at least since the month of September last, it might have been expected that some measures would have been adopted, by means of which its operations could have been carried on independently of the British troops, who must, at some time or other, be allowed some leisure, in order that the corps may be refitted, recruited, and re-equipped with arms, clothing, and other necessaries, of which they are entirely in want.

It now appears that the Peshwah is not supported by a single Marhatta sirdar or horseman, that he does not enjoy any revenue, and that he has no means whatever of supporting his own authority. The records at Poonah will show that he lately applied to me to take measures to catch thieves who had taken refuge in the jungles; and it now appears that, in order to enable the Peshwah to carry on his government at all, the country must be conquered again by the British troops. I do not mean to urge the difficulty of this operation, but I allude to these circumstances, in order to show the possibility that the Governor General might determine to adopt a mode of settling the question with the jaghiredars which would not occasion a necessity of employing the British troops to the southward at the present crisis.

In respect to the list of talooks, of which the Peshwah requires that the British troops should put his amildars in possession, it contains the names of all the strong forts, excepting Darwar; and of districts belonging to every chief, particularly a large tract belonging to Madhoo Rao Rastia.

In respect to Goklah, he naturally refuses to give up the districts which are to support his troops, till other means of support shall have been

assigned to him, upon which subject the Peshwah will not, or has not, satisfied him. At the same time, Goklah was the only chief on whom his Highness could rely, and his the only body of troops whose services he could command, either to support the ordinary operations of his government, to overawe the southern jaghiredars, or to perform his treaty with the Company. This sirdar, and these troops, have slipped through his hands. Goklah has crossed the Kistna, and is gone to the southward; and his Highness now calls upon the British government, not only to support him against his foreign enemies, and to guard his person, but to perform these services without the assistance which he is bound to afford, to support the ordinary operations of his government, to undertake an extensive service against certain of his subjects, whose allegiance, by common management, might have been secured, and, at last, to punish and destroy the chief who has served for years with the British troops, whose conduct has always been satisfactory, and whom I left at Poonah 2 months ago in a disposition to undertake any service for the Peshwah's government, provided he should be treated with common justice.

All these facts are so strong, they prove so much incapacity in the Peshwah's government, and point out so clearly the aversion to it of all the principal chiefs, and show the probable grounds of that aversion, that I think it much to be doubted whether his Excellency the Governor General will choose to give his support to his Highness' authority.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 13th May, 1804.

The Governor General having communicated to me his intention to order Gen. Lake to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar, I have ordered the 1st batt. 4th regt. from Goa into Guzerat. It appears, however, that at this season of the year, it will be necessary to land the corps in the neighbourhood of Bassein, and to march it to Surat; a necessity I wish you to announce to the Peshwah's government, and to procure an order addressed to the soubahdar of Bassein, to receive the corps with hospitality, to supply their wants, and to forward their march. Be so kind as to send a duplicate of this order to Mr. Duncan. No time ought to be lost, as we may soon expect the corps.

I shall join the army immediately, and leave this in 2 or 3 days. I wait only till my baggage gets round.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 13th May, 1804.

The last letters which I have received from Gen. Lake's camp rather indicate an intention to delay the attack upon Holkar till the rains shall have commenced, as there is a great want of water in the countries which Holkar would probably make the seat of war. I calculate upon receiving the plan according to which Gen. Lake will carry on the war, in the course of 3 or 4 days; and then I shall be able to tell you, more decidedly than I can at present, the particular line which you ought to follow. In the mean time, I think that at present you will do well not to pass the frontier, lest you should be exposed singly to Holkar's operations. I shall be enabled in 2 or 3 days to relieve you from the state of uncertainty in which this letter will necessarily place you.



To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 14th May, 1804.

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. The Peshwah's districts in Ahmedabad, or, in other words, the Ahmedabad farms, have been in the hands of the Guickwar government for some years. The rent from them was 500,000 rupees, and 50,000 rupees annually as durbar kurch, payable to the Peshwah. But some of the pergunnahs belonging to the farm, of the yearly value of 165,000 rupees, have been ceded to the Company by the Peshwah, under the treaty of Bassein; and the remainder of the sum due annually, including 50,000 as durbar kurch, is 385,000 rupees. There is now due to the Peshwah, by the Guickwar government, a sum of money amounting to 459,000 rupees, on account of this farm; which sum of money the Guickwar government would at this moment find means to pay, if the Peshwah would renew their lease of the farm.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter and an account that I have received from Mr. Duncan, which will explain more clearly the state of this transaction. Two objects are to be accomplished in the arrangement under contemplation of the Peshwah's pergunnahs in Ahmedabad; one is to provide the means of paying Goklah's troops, the other to provide for the peace of Guzerat, by preventing the establishment of one of the Peshwah's amildars in Ahmedabad.

In respect to the means of paying Goklah's troops, I am decidedly of opinion that the interest and honor of the Company's government equally require that Goklah should be provided for; and I see no means by which that sirdar can be provided for at present excepting by a money payment. This can be made only by the Company's assistance; and the revenue of the Peshwah's districts in Ahmedabad will be ample security for the repayment of the sums advanced. If the Peshwah were to make over to the Company his interests in Ahmedabad, it would only be for the period during which it would be necessary to make a money payment to Goklah; and till the Company should receive the sums now due, and which may hereafter become due, beyond the revenue received for money paid on the same account. After the Company shall have collected the money which it may have advanced, the pergunnahs will fall again into the hands of the Peshwah. His Highness will then dispose of them as he may think proper, most probably not to the Guickwar government.

If the Guickwar government should hold the farm under the Company's security and guarantee, we are equally certain of realizing its resources, as if it were in the hands of the Company's servants. By taking the pergunnahs into the hands of the Company, therefore, at present, we do not increase our security for the repayment of the advances made or to be made; we leave the disposal of the pergunnahs hereafter to the chance of future negotiations; and we incur the risk of having a disturbance in Guzerat, whenever his Highness may think proper, and place the management of the pergunnahs in Ahmedabad in the hands of strangers. I am therefore clearly of opinion that we ought, in the first instance, to settle that the pergunnahs in Ahmedabad shall be let for a term of years to the Guickwar government.

You will observe, by the enclosed account, that the value of the per-

gunnahs is far short of the sum stated by the Peshwah. However, upon this part of the subject, as well as upon the term of years for which the pergunnahs shall be held, I shall request you to correspond with Mr. Duncan or Major Walker. The pergunnahs ought to be let under the security and guarantee of the Hon. Company, and the rent of them to be disposed of in such manner as the Peshwah may order from time to time.

In respect to the sum of 459,000 rupees due from the lands for the late farm, which, you will observe, there are means of realizing, I will request you to decide whether that money shall be paid to the Peshwah, or whether it shall be applied to the liquidation of his debt to the Company. It is probable that the necessity will not long exist for continuing to Goklah a money payment, and therefore the Company will have the means of paying themselves from the future revenue of the farm. There is no doubt but that to pay this sum to the Peshwah immediately will materially facilitate the arrangement for the Guickwar government, which, as I have already observed to you, I consider important in respect to the future peace of Guzerat. I also think that it might forward other objects, and therefore I am of opinion that it would be most for the general advantage to pay the sum of 459,000 rupees into the Peshwah's hands.

I request you also to arrange with the Peshwah the sums which are to be paid from time to time to Goklah; and to procure from his Highness orders upon the Guickwar government to pay into the hands of the Company's servants, from time to time, the revenues of the Ahmedabad farm, until the advances made shall be cleared off. After the first year, or sooner, if the money payment to Goklah should be discontinued, the account might be settled, and an order taken for a specified sum to be paid in a certain number of years. In this manner the account will stand clear.

To Capt. Browne.

Bombay, 14th May, 1804.

I received only last night your letter of the 9th. The order given out respecting prize money was formed upon the necessity of drawing a line somewhere; and there appeared to be no difference so striking as that between those troops who had, and those who had not, been engaged with the enemy. The orders were formed upon this principle and the circumstances attending the cases of individuals were not adverted to.

You will do me the justice to believe that I should be happy to have an opportunity of serving you, and I certainly think your case is attended with peculiar circumstances, well deserving consideration. I shall therefore wish you to state it publicly, and I can only tell you that what you may write shall not be read with any bias against you.

P.S. In your public letter, rely particularly upon your being part of the army, under the orders of nobody at Poonah, receiving your orders directly from me, and employed in a service essential to the army, from which you derived no advantage.

To Gen. Lake.

Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a letter, which has been given to me by the Governor of Bombay, from a man who has made himself exceedingly

useful to the troops in Guzerat. On this ground I take the liberty of recommending him to your favor and protection.

To Major Shawe.

Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 20th April. When I wrote to you on the 25th March, many points were undecided, respecting which I have since received orders; but that which bore most heavily upon me was the want of orders respecting the position of the subsidiary forces.

The troops are all in want of clothing and arms. Some of the corps had no coats; and it was impossible for me to answer the daily applications which I received from the public officers at Madras, for information to what places the supplies of the articles should be sent, without having the Governor General's instructions regarding the subsidiary force; the time at which I should establish that with the Peshwah, and return to Hyderabad; that with the Nizam, and many other matters connected with this subject.

Let it be recollected that we are at the distance of 1000 miles from Madras, between 600 and 700 farther on than the troops of that Presidency ever were before. The communication must be kept up by land carriage entirely, and difficulties of all kinds, which tend to interrupt it, must be provided against.

You will thus see the reasons for which I am anxious to receive the earliest intimation of the Governor General's intentions, in order that I may make the details correspond with his plans. Luckily, some arms have arrived here from Madras, some of which I have got; and I have also procured cloth for clothing the troops, which they will make into coats for themselves. These arrangements, the difficulty of procuring even a few thousand rupees to pay my own bills at Bombay, and the necessity of waiting 3 or 4 days to allow my baggage to get round to Panwell, have detained me here since the 7th, the day on which I received the Governor General's orders respecting the war with Holkar.

Every day's post brings me fresh accounts of the misery in the Deccan, on account of the famine; and I am convinced that I shall not be able to move in a northerly direction. If I were acquainted with the Governor General's plan respecting the southern jaghiredars, I think my time in settling with them, till I could march to the northward, would be well employed.

This subject becomes every day more pressing. The Rajah of Kolapoor has again extended himself, and he is now close upon Goa, where he would be a most unpleasant neighbour. I refer you to Sir W. Clarke's dispatches upon this subject. But supposing the state of the Deccan is as I suppose, and that it will be impossible for me to march to the northward, I cannot enter upon the southern questions till I shall know the Governor General's opinion. The manner in which you purpose to give me that opinion, upon the points as they shall arise, will answer my purpose as well as detailed instructions.

I really believe it will be necessary to send money round to Bombay from Bengal. The distress is grievous. Sometimes the treasury does not contain 1000 rupees. Col. Murray is living from hand to mouth.

The importation of money has lately been very great; but the inland trade, by means of which so much money was procurable for bills, is at an end, in consequence of the wars and the misfortunes of the Deccan; all the money of the settlement is now vested in the cotton trade, and goes to Guzerat and the countries to the northward.

I have done every thing in my power to bolster up the credit of this government. I have stopped my bills at Poonah for the present, excepting for small sums for the convenience of individuals; I have prevented Heshmut Jung from laying violent hands upon the specie coming from the provinces under Fort St. George; and I intend to put a stop to a financial plan of the government of Fort St. George to raise money at Poonah by bills from Bengal, at the same rate as they are drawn at Madras, which is much more disadvantageous than that at which we now draw them in concert with the government of Bombay. But nothing but money from Bengal will answer.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th inst. I agree in opinion with you, that it will not now be proper to urge the minister to punish Gungaram Pundit on account of his misconduct in Berar.

I am obliged to you for the money, as well as for the pains you have taken respecting the rice. I beg that you will continue to forward to Col. Haliburton's camp any rice that you may be able to procure.

I am much concerned to hear of the minister's indisposition, which, however, I trust, will not be of long continuance. I beg leave to take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the ratification of the treaties of peace by the Soubah of the Deccan, and upon the signature by his Highness to the treaty of partition.\* There are some villages in the Puttun pergunnah still held by the Company, which I have desired Major Graham to give to Rajah Mohiput Ram. They are the deshmoockey villages of Puttun.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

I have received and perused your letter of the 12th inst. relative to the fortifications of Kaira. I am of opinion that that post is of importance; that it was proper to retain it; and that, although it may not be possible to place in it, immediately, a garrison for its effectual defence, it will be necessary to keep the fort in repair, and to place in it the ordnance and stores which may be deemed necessary for its defence. I should imagine that the small garrison there, at present, would very sufficiently secure the ordnance and stores.

In respect to the description of ordnance that should be sent to Kaira, I have to observe that it is impossible to form an opinion of the description of ordnance required for any work, without inspecting it; or without receiving from the officer who has inspected it a report of its dimensions,

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 633: the Partition Treaty, concluded at Hyderabad, 28th April, 1804.

of the nature of its foundation, and of the materials of which it is constructed.

Capt. Williams, the only officer who has surveyed Kaira, appears to be of opinion, that the large towers in the fort will answer for 12 or 18 pounders; and that in the small towers 3, or 6, or 9 pounders would answer; and that each tower would hold 2 or 3 pieces of ordnance. They must be very large towers to be capable of admitting that number of guns to be worked in them at the same time; and I must observe that, if they have not the capacity to admit of more than one gun being worked at the same time, they ought not to have more than one gun in them.

In respect to the size of the guns most fit for Kaira, I have to observe that our information is very deficient; and I am inclined to be of opinion with Major Gen. Nicholson, that the revêtement would not bear those pieces of a heavy calibre; but I observe that Capt. Williams mentions one well-built work, which it is probable would bear large ordnance.

Upon the whole, therefore, I recommend that at present two 18 pounders may be sent for the heavy work above alluded to; and that 7 six pounders, and 4 three pounders, may be sent for the 11 towers capable of receiving ordnance, being one piece for each tower. This supply will answer for the present; and Col. Murray may be desired to have a more accurate report made of the state of the works of Kaira, when an opportunity may offer; after which a greater number of pieces of ordnance, and of larger calibre, may be sent to him, if he should require them.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 15th May, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 12th, with the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry on the murderers. There is no doubt whatever of the case; however, I should wish to consider the subject before I give any further orders. In the mean time let the gentleman and lady be kept in irons. I shall leave this for camp the day after to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Bombay, 16th May, 1804.

I intended to have given bullocks to the Peshwah, with the guns; and a certain number have been kept at Ahmednuggur purposely for him. These were selected from the largest and best of the bullocks taken from Scindiah; they were all of one color, white, and of the same caste. I wish, therefore, that Capt. Richardson had left these cattle at Poonah, according to the orders I believe he received.

Even as circumstances are at present situated, it appears to me that it would be best to delay giving the bullocks to the Peshwah, till those which were originally intended for him shall return from Panwell; and I doubt very much whether we should be able to find in the karkhana another set equally good.

I shall possibly meet Capt. Richardson on the road, and I shall desire him to send back the bullocks immediately.

To Capt. Wilks.

Bombay, 16th May, 1804.

I have just received your letter of the 6th inst. My last letter will

have explained to you the present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and I think it probable that it will have determined you to send off the treasure, &c. The recruits for the cavalry might join the convoy. Maunsell's battalion shall go back. A rahdarry will go to you this day for the convoy. The only reason for which I wished to keep secret the possibility that I should remain some time longer in the Marhatta territory was, that I understood that the report of my speedy arrival at Seringapatam had had very good effects in Malabar; and I wished to give Col. Montresor an opportunity of relieving the posts in Wynaad. I imagine that he has by this time effected that object; and that it is no longer necessary that we should lose any advantage, in order to keep secret the state of affairs in the Marhatta empire. I shall leave this place to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 16th May, 1804.

I have written to Capt. Wilks, to apprise him of the state of affairs here, which has obliged me to keep the army in the field; and I requested him to send money for Purneah's troops. The 130 troopers may be part of the escort of this treasure, and they may as well come by the usual route of Meritch.

I shall leave this place to-morrow.

To Lieut. Col. Close.

Bombay, 17th May, 1804.

In answer to your letter of the 13th, which I received yesterday morning, I have to inform you, that 2 lacs of rupees will be sent to Poonah for the use of the Residency from Bombay in a very few days. The good effects of ceasing to draw bills upon Bengal at Poonah appear already, as I am informed; and I am very desirous, if possible, to avoid drawing bills at Poonah again, till the exchange shall have become more favorable: I therefore request you to apprise Mr. Duncan from time to time of your wants, and he will endeavor to supply them. If he should not be able to supply them, I shall request you to do so by drawing bills upon Bombay, rather than bills upon any part of the territories under the government of Fort William; and to draw bills upon Bengal only in case of the last extremity. I propose to address you to-morrow on the subject of the letter from the Accountant Gen. at Fort St. George.

To Col. Close.

Bombay, 17th May, 1804.

My letter of this day will inform you that you will get the 2 lacs of rupees which you required, so that we shall avoid drawing the bills, which is a great object to Mr. Duncan. If you should want money before it may arrive, Capt. Frissell has in his hands nearly 2 lacs of Chandore rupees belonging to the prize fund, of which you may make use; and you can replace it when the money shall arrive from hence. I shall leave this place to-day. I congratulate you upon your promotion, and upon the ratification of the treaty of partition\* by the Peshwah.

To Col. Murray.

Bombay, 17th May, 1804.

I have been conversing with Mr. Duncan on the means of supplying

\* See Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 634: Treaty of Poonah, concluded 14th May, 1804.

inland trade was the support of these operations, it might be proved by the state of the trade of the port of Calcutta with the ports of Bombay, Surat, &c., on the western coast.

Till within little more than a year, the government of Bombay drew upon Bengal to great advantage. They generally received 107 and 108 Bombay rupees at Bomhay for a bill for 100 sicca rupees. Since the last year, from a variety of causes, the exchange has fallen. One of these causes has been the increasing disturbances in the Marhatta Empire; another was the great fire at Bombay; a third was the late war, which for a moment interrupted the commercial intercourse between the provinces under the government of Fort William, and the great cities in the Marhatta Empire; and a fourth was, that in consequence of the authority which I received from the Governor General, I drew bills upon Bengal which were negotiated at Poonah; and although endeavors were made to draw those bills at the same rate of exchange with the bills drawn by the government of Bombay, the fact that bills of exchange were to be procured from two quarters, instead of from one, had a tendency to depreciate the value of the bills of both, and to expose the drawers to the effects of a combination among the soucars, all of whom are connected by caste, if not in trade, and thus, to lower the rate of exchange. The knowledge, that by drawing bills at Poonah, notwithstanding the utmost care of the Resident, by whom the transaction was managed, we should always be liable to these evils, had induced me to determine to grant no more bills upon the government of Bengal till I should be obliged by necessity to adopt this measure. Notwithstanding these causes tending to produce a depreciation of the value of bills by exchange drawn by the government of Bombay, they have not yet fallen below *par*; and there was reason to hope that, as soon as the drain of money to Guzerat for the purposes of the cotton trade should have ceased, and the soucars should have seen that they had no chance of procuring bills at Poonah, the exchange would have risen.

Upon a calculation made of the value of Arcot rupees, in respect to Chandore rupees, the currency at Poonah, and the rate at which the latter are issued to the troops, it appears that the terms upon which your Lordship proposes to draw upon Calcutta are less favorable to the money holders by one *per cent.* than the bills now granted by the government of Bombay. It is therefore probable that your Lordship's bills would not be taken, particularly as the holder of the money must wait about a month after he shall have paid his money into the Poonah treasury, before he will receive his bills from Madras. If, however, we should be able to raise the value of the bills drawn by the government of Bombay one *per cent.* above *par*, those drawn by your Lordship will immediately come in competition with them. The difference between the two will be in favor of the Bombay bills, from the disadvantage of waiting for a month for those drawn by your Lordship, which may be reckoned at about one *per cent.*; so that if your Lordship's bills on Calcutta should be introduced into the market at Poonah, the utmost advantage that can be expected at Bombay in the drawing of bills upon Bengal will be one *per cent.*, instead of 7 or 8 *per cent.*, as it was 2 years ago.

Besides this inconvenience at Poonah, the negotiation of your Lordship's bills upon Calcutta may affect the state of the exchange between Bombay and Poonah, which is now at par, and will possibly rise in favor of Bombay.

Your Lordship's bills upon the Court of Directors are upon more favorable terms to the money holders than those granted by the government of Bombay, but it is not probable that they will produce any money. First, because a month must elapse after the money is paid at Poonah before the bill can be returned from Madras; and next, because the gentlemen at Bombay who might have money to dispose of in that manner must employ agents both at Poonah and at Madras: at the former, to pay the money into the treasury at Poonah; at the latter, to produce that certificate of the payment of the money, and receive the bill at the office of the Accountant Gen. of Fort St. George. The loan will not, in my opinion, produce any money from the settlement of Bombay, because the government paper of Bombay can be purchased at a cheaper rate. To allow money to be received by the Resident at Poonah, on account of bills upon the Court of Directors, or of this loan, may be advantageous to those of the officers of the army serving in this country who may have any money to dispose of in such a manner; but this advantage must be deemed only a private one at best: it is very improbable that it will be enjoyed by many, and will bring but a small sum of money into the treasury; and will not compensate for the evil of introducing the financial plans of the government of Fort St. George, in places in which those of the government of Bombay alone have been hitherto in operation.

From what I have above stated, it will appear to your Lordship that the plan, however well intended, is likely to create competition between the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to be attended by all the effects of competition between borrowers, viz., to increase the demand of those who have any thing to lend. It will not affect your Lordship's financial arrangements, as those are founded upon large revenues and resources, and framed upon principles entirely different from those of the government of Bombay; and they are independent of the expected supplies of money at Poonah; but it will affect the financial arrangements of the government of Bombay, and, through them, those of the Indian empire; and therefore I conclude the plan ought to be relinquished. Under these circumstances, I have taken the liberty of requesting the Resident at Poonah to suspend the publication of the advertisements forwarded to him by Mr. Smith till he shall have received your Lordship's further orders.

When at Bombay, I gave much attention to the mode of supplying the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah with money hereafter, in consequence of orders which I received from Lieut. Gen. Stuart; and I had much conversation upon the subject with the mercantile gentlemen there, particularly with Mr. Forbes,\* a gentleman of great respectability, who is at the head of one of the principal houses, and who has frequently come forward in aid of government when his assistance has been required. I

\* Now Sir Charles Forbes, Bart.



should have been able to arrange the supply of the funds for the support of the subsidiary force, so as to have precluded the necessity of sending money from the territories under your Lordship's government, if I could have stated precisely the monthly demand of cash at Poonah for the public service; but, in the present state of affairs, the demand is very uncertain, and no private merchant could have ventured to contract to supply an uncertain amount. On the other hand, no merchant would undertake to supply a part of the funds required at Poonah. He must supply the whole sum required at that place, or he is liable to a competition with government in procuring the funds, in which competition he must be a loser. However, I have no doubt whatever but that, when affairs shall become more settled, and the amount of the demand upon the British government, payable at Poonah, shall have been defined, the government of Bombay will experience no difficulty in arranging with the merchants there a mode of defraying the expense more consistent with the general advantage than to draw the specie from the provinces under your Lordship's government.

To Col. Close.

Chowke, 18th May, 1804.

I arrived here this morning, and shall continue my march to-morrow. I took the opportunity, on my arrival at Panwell, to see Nana's widow, in consequence of the receipt of your letter of the 7th inst., which was put into my hands by a person belonging to Byajee Naig, as soon as I landed. I had a very long conversation with her, at which no person belonging to Dhoondoo Bullall was present. She had a Moorish woman interpreter, and as I heard her give orders to her interpreter in the Moorish language, and receive her reports in the same, I must consider the conversation of the first authority. The result of it, in my opinion, is, that she will not go to Poonah; and, certainly, she cannot be forced to go there contrary to her inclination.

I began by explaining that, as I was passing through Panwell, I had paid her a visit to ascertain from herself her real wishes and intentions regarding the place of her future residence. I said that I had heard she had wished to go to Poonah; and I told her that if that was her wish, I would take her there with me, and would see her settled in honor and security. She answered, that the Peshwah had expressed a wish that she should go to Poonah; but that she could not go there unless her carkoons were to be in security, as to their lives, their persons, and their property. I told her that if she meant, by her carkoons, all the adherents of Nana, I could not converse about them; but if she meant her household servants, I would take a list of them, and would ascertain the Peshwah's intentions respecting them: that she might, in the mean time, set out with me, and that if the Peshwah should not act as she might wish respecting her servants, she should return, and stay where she pleased, or she might send them away, or, in short, she could act as she might think proper.

After some conversation upon this subject, in which she declined to set out with me, she repeated the names of her carkoons, which are as follow: Junardan Punt, who had charge of the janda khana in Nana's time;

Apoojee Punt, who had charge of the lady's own personal affairs; Ball Kishen Bhow, who was killadar of Loghur 30 years ago, and is now a servant about the house; Nagoo Punt, who had charge of the provisions in Nana's family; and Guingurdur Punt, her own brother. After having given this list, she said her pension was not sufficient, and that the Peshwah had sent her word that she should have 25,000 rupees *per annum*. I told her that I had had a great difficulty in prevailing upon the Peshwah to give her 12,000 rupees, for which the Company were the guarantee; but unless the Peshwah should desire me to promise that she should have 25,000 rupees, in which case care would be taken that the money would be forthcoming, I could not guarantee such a payment merely upon her saying that the Peshwah had promised it. I then pointed out to her that, in her situation as a widow, 12,000 rupees must be considered a handsome provision.

There was much conversation upon this subject, and other matters connected with, or provided for, under the treaty, such as her property, &c.; and, at last, I summed up the result of the conversation, and told her that, if I should be able to prevail upon the Peshwah to promise security to the 5 persons she had mentioned, I expected that she would set out for Poonah, and that an escort should be in readiness to attend her. She answered that, besides this, the killadars of Loghur and Kellinjah, and the son of the former, must be allowed to accompany her and live with her. I answered, that they might go where they pleased; and that, so long as they should conduct themselves with propriety, they would be considered under the Company's protection. She then said that her menial servants and their menial servants also must be secure. I told her, of course. She then reverted to the increase of her allowance, and said that she should never be secure until she should be permitted to adopt a child; and desired that her brother, Pursheram Punt, might be released from his confinement in Sevaghur. In answer, I said that I could not interfere in these matters, but that the latter request should be mentioned to the Peshwah.

Upon the whole, I am convinced that she will not come to Poonah; but it is as well to prevail upon the Peshwah to allow us to engage for the security of the 5 persons, at all events; and to promise an increase of pension, if she would reside at Poonah, and then possibly she may be prevailed upon to comply. She is very fair and very handsome, and well deserving to be the object of a treaty.

After this conversation, I spoke rather sharply to Dhoondoo Bullall, and told him that he would forfeit the Company's favor if he should interfere with the Baye, or should thwart her wishes in any manner whatever. She must have overheard what I said. I have this day written to her to desire that she will not move from Panwell until she shall have heard of the result of my application upon her business to the Peshwah, and I desired her to consider herself in perfect safety at Panwell, and not to allow herself to be frightened. I wrote this, because Byajee Naig's son, who was with me at midnight, after I had quitted her, told me that endeavors had been made to terrify her. Write to me by the Karly road. I shall be at Karly on the 20th.

To the Governor General.

Camp, 19th May, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum which I have received from Capt. Moor, the garrison storekeeper of Bombay, whose request I take the liberty of laying before your Excellency, although I have reason to believe that it has already been recommended by the Governor of Bombay, as the service which occasions it was rendered to the army in the field, and I have reason to be satisfied with Capt. Moor's exertions. This officer is garrison storekeeper of Bombay; and it appears that the duty which he performed for the service of the army was one entirely foreign from that required from a person in his situation. It does not appear necessary that I should consider the reason which induced the Governor of Bombay to employ Capt. Moor in this manner, excepting to observe that the arrangement ensured the three great objects of secrecy, expedition, and economy.

As Capt. Moor performed these duties, it will be proper that he should be rewarded in proportion to the trust reposed in him, to the qualities he has displayed in executing this agency, and to the benefit which the public have derived from employing him. As he was employed in this agency before the month of July, 1803, at which period your Excellency's orders were received, that the mode of rewarding agents, by commission on the account of their purchases, should be discontinued by the government of Bombay; and as there does not appear any other mode of rewarding Capt. Moor adequately, I beg leave to recommend that he may be allowed a commission upon his agency in the last service, in the same manner as upon his agency in the expedition to Egypt.

To Major Irton.

Camp at Cundolla, 19th May, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th inst. I referred your letter, on the subject of the claim of the troops stationed at Hyderabad to share in the distribution of the property captured during the war, to his Excellency the Governor General; and his Excellency was pleased to decide that they ought not to share. In the course of a few days I propose to publish to the army the detailed orders which I have received from the Governor General upon the subject.

Translation of a Marhatta letter from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley to Dowlat Rao Scindiah, dated 9th Sulfun, answering to the 20th May, 1804.

(After compliments), I have received your letter. (Its contents recapitulated), I am much flattered by the confidence which you are pleased to express in me, but there was no occasion to refer yourself to my opinion on a question in which you have already received the opinion of his Excellency the Governor General, through the Resident at your durbar. Mr. Webbe is the proper channel for your communications with the British government, and in him you may have full confidence. However, as you have desired to have my opinion on a question in which you are concerned, which arises out of a treaty that I negotiated, I shall not refuse to give it to you.

The point on which you have desired to have my opinion is, whether you ought to confirm the treaties made with certain Rajahs and others,

lists of whose names have been presented to you by Major Malcolm, and among whom is included the name of Boot Poonjie, the Ranah of Gohud.

The 9th article of the treaty of peace says positively, that treaties made by the British government with Rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, are to be confirmed; and that the Maharajah is to renounce all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made, and declare them independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajah of Jeypoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his amildars, or have been applicable as *serinjaumy* to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties.

It appears that the territory of the Ranah of Gohud was held by Rajah Ambajee Inglia, who made a treaty with Gen. Lake, by which he ceded that territory to the Company. There is no doubt but that the territory held by Rajah Ambajee Inglia was not of the nature described in the 9th article, viz., situated to the southward of those of the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues were collected by you or your amildars, or were applicable as *serinjaumy* to the payment of your troops, and that the treaty with Rajah Ambajee Inglia must be confirmed under the 9th article of the treaty of peace. The fact that Rajah Ambajee Inglia broke his treaty afterwards does not affect the question. By breaking his treaty with the Company, he forfeits all the advantages which he would have derived from it; but it cannot be admitted that it is in the power of Rajah Ambajee Inglia, by breaking his faith, to deprive the Company of the advantages they were to enjoy under the treaty. Besides this right to the territory of Gohud and Gwalior, obtained by treaty, the Company's troops, and those of the Ranah of Gohud, conquered it; the Company made a treaty with the Ranah of Gohud, by which the territories in question were ceded to the Ranah.

In the course of the discussion between your ministers and Major Malcolm, upon this subject, of which I have read the accounts, I observe that they rely much upon an assertion, that Boot Poonjie is not the Ranah of Gohud, and that there is no such person as the Ranah of Gohud. In fact Boot Poonjie is the lineal descendant of the Ranah of Gohud, and his name and his territories are mentioned repeatedly in the treaty of peace.

It is also asserted by your ministers that I understood, at the time I negotiated the treaty of peace, that you would not lose Gohud and Gwalior. I certainly understood that your loss of those places would depend upon the treaties which should have been made with Gen. Lake; and upon the occasion of a difference of opinion respecting the meaning of the 2nd article of the treaty of peace, your ministers having urged, that if the word Joudpoor were inserted in the treaty of peace as a part of the boundary, you would lose Jeypoor and Gohud, your ministers proposed that the Chumbul river should be the boundary; that every thing to the northward should belong to the Company, and every thing to the southward to the Maharajah. I replied that they positively could not lose Jeypoor and Gohud by the 2nd article of the treaty, although they might by another

(meaning the 9th article), and I positively refused to insert any thing in the treaty that should tend to defeat the arrangements which might have been made by Gen. Lake with the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Gohud, or others. There can be no doubt upon this fact. Every day after I had conversed with your ministers, the whole conversation was written down; and what passed upon that occasion proves, in the clearest manner, the sentiments of the parties who made the treaty. I doubt not that your ministers will recollect this conversation, and that I drew a map for them, upon the same occasion, in which I pointed out the relative situation of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, and Gohud.

But the intentions of two parties who agree to a treaty can be known only by a reference to the treaty itself, which must be considered an instrument, of which the meaning is the same throughout. In my opinion, the meaning of the treaty of peace is, that every thing to the northward of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, and Gohud, should belong to the Company: that those territories, and the scrinjaumy, really belonging to you to the southward of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, and Gohud, were to continue in your possession; and that the future state of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, Gohud, Gwalior, &c., was to depend upon the nature of the treaties made by Gen. Lake.

My language to your ministers upon this subject has been uniformly the same. I said, whenever they spoke to me, that the possession of Gohud and Gwalior must depend upon the treaties which had been made with Gen. Lake; and I think I have shown you in this letter, that the treaties which affect the possession of Gohud and Gwalior ought to be confirmed under the 9th article of the treaty of peace.

Under these circumstances, you cannot suppose that the Company can or will relinquish their just demand that you should confirm the treaties which affect Gohud and Gwalior, as well as the other treaties: you are bound to confirm them by the 9th article of the treaty of peace; and, without being guilty of a breach of faith towards the Ranah of Gohud, the Company cannot avoid insisting upon your performing your engagement. I most anxiously recommend you to perform it.

This transaction may be attended with greater loss to your government than you were aware of at the time you engaged to perform it; and it may have reduced your power to a degree much lower than I contemplated when I negotiated the peace, or than the Governor General ever intended. If you should feel the pressure of your difficulties, state them to the Resident at your durbar, and he will report them to the Governor General; and rely upon it that the British Government will not fail to adopt every measure, which is consistent with justice and propriety, to relieve the difficulties of a state with which its interest is so closely connected. But it is necessary, in the first instance, to perform the treaty of peace.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Worganum, 21st May, 1801.

I hope you will excuse the liberties I take so frequently in recommending to your favor officers of the army, but their services give them undoubted claims upon me; and I judge, from the manner in which you have always disposed of the patronage of the army, that you are desirous to promote and reward those who merit it.

It is reported in this quarter, upon what grounds I do not know, that it is your intention to abolish the office of Gram Agent Gen., and to establish the gram agencies with corps, in the same manner as heretofore. In consequence of this report, Lieut. Young of the 19th dragoons has requested me to apply to you to appoint him gram agent to the 19th. This officer was recommended to me by Lord Cornwallis, and came out at the same time that I did. He has always done his duty in his regiment to my satisfaction, particularly in the late war, during which he has had charge, in the 19th, of this same department. I beg leave, therefore, to recommend him to you.

I have sent out to have the country particularly examined to the northward, and if I should find it to be practicable, I shall march to attack Chandore, as soon as the troops shall be clothed, and shall have received their arms, which will be in about 10 days. I have put all the carriages into repair again, and we shall be well equipped. I have a large quantity of dry grain of different kinds from Bombay.

There is no news, excepting that the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan have ratified the treaties of peace, and have agreed to the treaty of partition. This treaty gives Berar, and Scindiah's possessions between the Godavery and Adjuttee, to the Soubah of the Deccan; Ahmednuggur to the Peshwah; and all the rest to the Company.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Worgaum, 21st May, 1801.

You have seen the Governor General's dispatch to me, dated the 21st April, containing his orders addressed to Gen. Lake and myself, to commence hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar. In the present exhausted state of the Deccan, I very much doubt whether I shall be able to move from the neighbourhood of Poonah till the new grass shall have appeared above ground; and, in that case, I think that it would not be proper to announce my intention to attack Holkar's possessions in the Deccan. However, I do not mean to lose any advantage by this kind of secrecy; and therefore I trouble you with this letter.

If the result of certain inquiries, which I have set on foot throughout the country towards Chandore, should be that I can march the army there, I shall set out from Poonah as soon as I shall have clothed and armed the troops, which will be in about 10 days. In that case I shall require the co-operation of the subsidiary force, under Col. Haliburton, and the Soubah's contingent; and I may possibly draw to the westward Lieut. Col. Lang's detachment, which is at present in Berar. If I should be obliged to delay my march to the northward, I shall leave Col. Haliburton where he is for the present, as well as the Soubah's contingent. I fancy that no very great preparations will be required to draw out the Soubah's contingent at any time.

Holkar has not now any troops in the Deccan; and if I should be able to march immediately, the conquest of his possessions will not be difficult. If I should not be able to march till a late period, it will be desirable that the contingent should be complete, as it may be expected that, as soon as he shall be attacked in Hindustan, he will prepare for his defence in this quarter. As soon as I commence hostilities, I propose to desire Col.

Haliburton to take possession of the town and district of UMBER. The fort is of no strength: in my opinion, the killadar will give it up, when he shall receive my orders to do so, and the Colonel can take possession of it as he marches to the rendez-vous. I propose that UMBER should be given over to the Soubah's servants.

From the perusal of this letter, you will be the best judge whether it will be necessary to announce to the Soubah's servants the intention of attacking Holkar in the Deccan, in order to make it certain that the Soubah's troops will be prepared.

To Col. Close.

Worgaum, 21st May, 1804.

I believe that while you were at Bombay I wrote to Chintomeny Rao, to desire that he would give up the person of Baba Phurkia, and send him to the Peshwah, and I promised that Baba Phurkia should preserve his life and his honor. The vakeel has returned from Meritch, and says that Chintomeny Rao is ready to act as I have desired; but the Peshwah has sent orders that Baba Phurkia may be kept in confinement at Meritch, where he now is. What is to be done on this subject?

Since I wrote to you last, I have received a letter from the widow, in which she desires to have Manowelly, where, she says, she has a palace. This is true, I believe. She also desires to have her house, stables, and garden, at Poonah; and she wishes to be allowed to keep certain lands and villages for which she has sunnuds from different people. I have desired her to let me have a list of all the lands and villages; and of the names of the persons from whom she has the sunnuds, which I will send to you. In the mean time it would be well to speak to the Peshwah about the house in Poonah, and the village of Manowelly. I think that the manner in which you propose to settle the Ahmedabad affair will answer well. I shall be in camp to-morrow.

To Capt. Wilks.

Camp at Worgaum, 21st May, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 10th inst., and I enclose a copy of the orders which have been sent to Capt. Stuart, who is the officer commanding at Bednore at present. Purneah will probably be able to let you know the consequences of these orders.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

The rate at which you announce, in your letter of the 20th inst., that you have drawn on Benares, is exactly that at which the government of Bombay drew their bills on the 16th inst. In fact, as there is a difference in the rate of exchange between Benares and Calcutta, amounting to 2 per cent., these bills are considered to be equivalent to bills drawn on Calcutta at *par*.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

I joined the army this morning. Your letters of the 20th and 21st have reached me.

Upon the subject of the arrangement with Nana's widow, the thing to be done is to obtain security for her carquoons, and possession of her house and gardens at Poonah, and her palace at Manowelly. The treaty pro-

vides for other essential objects, such as the residence of Dhoondoo Punt with her, the security of her person and of her property. If the Peshwah chooses to increase her allowance, that is his own affair. As for Dhoondoo Punt, we have nothing to do with his demands; nor, indeed, with those of the lady, excepting in consequence of the Peshwah's desire that she should reside at Poonah; for the gratification of which desire he ought to make some sacrifice.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

Since I wrote to you on the 13th, I have learned that Gen. Lake marched in the beginning of May, and intended to take possession of Rampoor, a post which, I imagine, is to the southward of Jyenagur. You may therefore proceed to carry into execution, as soon as you please, my instructions of the 7th inst.

By the last accounts, Holkar's army appears to have been at Ranjgur Pultam, and Meer Khan at Bhilsah: the former situated on the borders of Rutlaum; the latter on the borders of Bopal; and neither very far to the northward of Ougein. Bappojee Scindiah (Dowlut Rao's sirdar), who is between them, does not much like his situation. He has been directed to communicate with Gen. Lake, and to obey his orders; and if he should be unable, on account of the position of the enemy, to effect that object, he has been desired to join himself with you. He will, most probably, adopt the latter course. All this will show you that Rutlaum, and towards Ougein and Indore, is your point; and I recommend you to join Bappojee Scindiah as soon as possible, if you should find he is not gone towards Gen. Lake.

You have now a great game in your hands, but all will depend upon your management of the Natives with whom you will have to co-operate. I have only to recommend to you to conciliate them as much as possible; to treat them with the greatest kindness and attention is the only mode of drawing from them any assistance. At the same time you must not lose sight of the fact that they are Marhattas; that there is not one of them who can be implicitly trusted; and that, most probably, all are in correspondence with the enemy's camp. You must not allow them to perceive that you distrust them. You will excuse me for saying this to you. I have acted successfully as I now recommend to you; and my conduct and this recommendation are the result of long experience. I have not yet received Gen. Lake's plan of his campaign.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Panowullah, 22nd May, 1804.

I return Shawe's letter, which has annoyed me as much as it can have annoyed you. That plan of abusing and bullying the Marhattas will never answer, even supposing it should be possible to prevail upon any gentleman to conduct the public business in that manner. The fact is, that till lately the Governor General has never read real statements of conversations; and he is exceedingly offended with the freedom with which the Natives canvass all public subjects, and which has now, for the first time, been brought before him. The only remedy is to state to him results of arguments instead of their details; for I must be of opinion with Arsito Jah that 'it is not possible to close people's mouths as the



gates of the city are closed.' I propose to give Webbe a hint upon this subject.

Scindiah wrote to me upon the subject of Gohud and Gwalior, and I have drawn up an answer to his letter. It is not yet translated, but I hope to be able to send it to Webbe this evening, or to-morrow morning. Although I am convinced I should not have made the peace if I had insisted upon Gwalior, I wish that I had had that point clearly explained before the treaty was signed.

I have joined the army, which I have completely clothed, armed, and equipped. The clothing will be finished in a few days, and by that time I shall have reports of the real state of the country to the northward respecting forage. The corps are, I am sorry to say, very weak, but in good order. I am obliged to detach one of them to Goa, where an army is locked up.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th inst. My letter of the 7th inst. will have apprised you of the orders which I have received from the Governor General relative to Jeswant Rao Holkar, and of the nature of the measures which I had adopted in consequence.

I have now joined the camp; the troops will be clothed, and will have their arms in a few days. The Europeans have new tents, and the carriages are better than they ever were. To all this I add, that I am sanguine in my expectations that I shall be able to march at an early period in the rains, which I am determined to attempt, if the accounts of the country that I shall receive should give any encouragement. I believe I must wait till the rains for water. I want nothing at present. The cattle with the rice would do best to remain for some time longer in the Ceded districts. They would die, if they should march at this season. I shall write to Gen. Campbell for them in due time. If the war should last, which I think very improbable, I shall want everything, particularly arms, horse accoutrements, ordnance carriages, carts, &c.

I conclude that the clothing will be sent to Ahmednuggur. The other articles mentioned might be sent by sea to Bombay, from whence I can have them transported to Ahmednuggur. Both infantry and cavalry will want recruits. I hope, however, that the war will not last. Some time may elapse before Holkar may be caught; but not much, I hope, before we may leave our allies to pursue him.

Gen. Lake marched about the beginning of the month; although, in a letter, of which I enclose a copy, he appears to intend to stand upon the defensive. Col. Murray also will have marched by this time.

Holkar had moved to the southward by the last accounts; and the commander of Scindiah's army was apprehensive that he should be placed by this movement between Holkar and Meer Khan, and that he should be cut off from Gen. Lake. But he has orders to join Col. Murray, which I acknowledge I prefer. I have desired Col. Murray to watch Holkar's movements towards Ougein, and yesterday to march to that quarter.

I am much obliged to you for the attention you pay to our wants. One lac and 25,000 pagodas will not pay us and the subsidiary force; but

I shall always be able to pick up something at Poonah and Bombay. The greater part of the money which the Governor intended, on the 8th inst., to send to Masulipatam by sea, will be wanted to answer political demands at Hyderabad; such as peshensh, pensions, &c., due to the amount of 10 lacs of rupees. I wrote to Major Kirkpatrick about these demands some time ago, and referred him to the government of Fort St. George for the discharge of them. However, I am convinced that you and the Governor will not forget us; and I shall always be able to get some money for bills upon Bombay and Bengal. I shall be able to arrange the payment of the batta to the officers of the army, in the manner that you and the Governor wish. I think that if I had permission to issue treasury notes in payment of this donation, it would give great satisfaction to the officers, and would create no inconvenience. Therefore, the smallest sums would answer best, and they might bear date from the day on which they should be issued here.

You will have seen a letter which I wrote to Lord W. Bentinck on the 18th, on the subject of a financial plan of Mr. Smith. In this letter I have endeavored to throw some light upon the financial plans of the government of Bombay, with which this plan of Mr. Smith materially interferes; at the same time, that it will be of no use to the government of Fort St. George. You will see also that I have endeavored to arrange a mode of going on at Poonah without drawing money from the territories under Fort St. George. This endeavor failed on account of this new warfare, and particularly because Major Malcolm drew upon the Residency at Poonah for the sums he wanted at Scindiah's darbar. Till the payments under the treaty of peace, &c., can be regulated, it will be impossible to fix the demands at Poonah; but when that is done, I shall be able to arrange with the merchants of Bombay a mode of supply which will be convenient to the public.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Panowallah, 23rd May, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose Lieut. Col. Close's dispatch to you of the 12th inst., which was referred to my consideration by the Hon. the Governor in Council.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Governor of Fort St. George, on the subject of the financial plan proposed by Mr. Smith; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay my request before the Governor in Council, that all proceedings in conformity to this plan may be suspended until Col. Close shall have received the further orders of the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council of Fort St. George.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Panowallah, 23rd May, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st inst., containing the copy of a petition from Sr. San Martinho de Arango, late an officer in the service of the Marhatta states. In my opinion, it is necessary that Sr. de Arango should prove, in a satisfactory manner, the truth of the allegations in his petition; that he was in the service of the Marhatta states; that he held the rank of Captain; enjoyed 300 rupees a

month; and quitted the service in consequence of the proclamation of his Excellency the Governor General at the period stated. If he should prove those facts, it will be proper to pay him 300 rupees *per mensem*, from the period at which he quitted the service of the Marhatta states, to the 30th Dec., the date of the treaty of peace, and to send him to Goa.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

After having taken fully into consideration the papers enclosed with your public dispatch of the 11th inst., and made inquiries at Bombay on the subject of them, I determined to write a letter to the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, of which I enclose a copy. Accordingly I have to request that you will suspend your operations under Mr. Smith's letter of the 28th April until you shall hear from his Lordship.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 23rd May, 1804.

I send 60 bullocks for the Peshwah. They are of the same size, caste, and color, and are good cattle, but much out of condition. However, that will not much signify for the Peshwah. They are in good health; and a little good forage, and protection from the weather, will bring them about. The drivers who go with them are Mysore men; they will not stay with the Peshwah, and if they would, I could not spare their services. They must, therefore, be sent back; but I see no objection to their staying a few days till his Highness shall have tried other people to take charge of the cattle.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Panowullah, 24th May, 1804.

Major Malcolm has informed your Excellency, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had written to me on the subject of his claim to the possession of the fort of Gwalior, and of the district of Gohud. I have the honor to enclose a translation of the letter which I received from that Chief on this subject, and a translation of my answer.\*

\* See p. 1188.

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, 24th May, 1804.

Major Spens will settle all accounts up to the 31st inst. of the Bombay dooley bearers, who have been hitherto under his charge and were lately employed in bringing down the sick and wounded men from Adjutee, and he will hand them over to Mr. Gilmour, with a roll of their names, a statement of their pay under the Bombay regulations, and a certificate of the last pay which he issues to them. The doolies are to be delivered over, at the same time as the bearers, to Mr. Gilmour. The artillerymen and guns attached to corps of infantry in the line are to be sent to the park this afternoon, where they will remain until further orders.

A Committee to assemble in the rear of Mr. Gilmour's tent at 5 o'clock this afternoon, to survey the doolies under his charge, and the Bombay doolies lately returned from Adjutee, to ascertain the repairs required, and estimate the materials necessary for that purpose; after which the doolies are to be sent to Capt. Noble to be repaired.

The elephant and camel forage guard is reduced to 1 havildar, 1 naig, 12 *sepoys*, and the bullock grazing guard is reduced to the same strength till further orders. They are both to be sent to the karkhana at *reveille* beating on halting days, and on marching days at the same time as heretofore.

Lieut. Col. Lang having been detached with a considerable part of the Hyderabad subsidiary force, on the 1st Jan. last, on service on the frontiers of Berar, he is authorised to draw the allowances granted to a Brigadier, from that period to the date of his appointment to the command of a regular brigade in the subsidiary force.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 25th May, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 24th. I understand from it, that the Peshwah objects not only to the future arrangement proposed for the Ahmedabad farm, but to the account of the former agreement between his Highness and the Guickwar state, as furnished by Major Walker.

As well as I can recollect, the account of the amount of the revenue payable by the Guickwar state for the Ahmedabad farm, as furnished by Major Walker, agrees with the account given by Ragonaut Rao in conversation upon this same subject. You may possibly recollect what he said. However, supposing that the Peshwah should persist in his objections to Major Walker's account, the question becomes one of difference between his Highness and the Guickwar state, which must be decided by the British government, in the same manner as any other question of a similar nature. By placing the question regarding the old account on this ground, we may immediately begin the discussion on the grant of the new farm. The only inconvenience which will result from this mode of settlement is, that which always results from postponing difficulties to future times and occasions, instead of meeting them as they occur. But the inconvenience is not to be balanced against that of keeping unsettled the question of the Ahmedabad farm; and I acknowledge that I am of opinion that the arrangement for the future disposal of that farm will be very likely to afford the means of settling the dispute for the past. If, therefore, you cannot prevail upon the Peshwah to agree to the truth of the account furnished by Major Walker, you might inform him that the question becomes one of arbitration for the British government, and that it would be considered and decided in course; in the mean time you might propose to him to agree to the new arrangement for the farm, receiving the balance due upon the old arrangement, as acknowledged by the Guickwar state. It may be settled that the Guickwar state shall hold the farm for ten, or a term of years, for a rent that shall be deemed equitable by the British government, after a full examination of the value of the districts; and you might refer to Major Walker for the materials which would throw a light upon the subject. These materials, and the discussions with the Guickwar government upon them, and the future arrangement of the farm, will very possibly discover the truth regarding the former agreement. According to this mode of proceeding our object will be gained, and the Peshwah will eventually have as good a revenue from his lands and rights in Ahmedabad, as he could have under any other arrangement; and very possibly we may be able to settle the dispute regarding the old farm.

I received a letter from Gen. Stuart some time ago, in which he informed me that the government of Fort St. George were desirous to have an account of the expense of the auxiliary troops during the war. The manner in which this transaction stands at present is, that the paymaster of the army has paid sums of money to the Peshwah's troops, and you have received sums of money from the Peshwah's Ahmedabad farm to defray that expense. These sums of money have, with others, been transferred to the paymaster of the army; but the transaction is not so clear as it

ought to be in this matter. In my opinion, the advance to Goklah and Appah Dessaye ought to stand in the paymaster's books as so much paid on your account to those sirdars. You will charge the payment to the Peshwah, giving him credit for the sums received from the Ahmedabad farm. So far the account will be settled with the Peshwah; and it will always show the state of the Peshwah's debt to the Company. The statement of your payments to the paymaster, beyond the amount for which he will have given you my bills, will show the manner in which you have disposed of the sums received from the Peshwah's Ahmedabad farm.

I enclose documents of the sums paid here to Goklah and Appah Dessaye, specifying the amount for each month. Besides this, you paid some money to Goklah, I believe, in July and August, before he joined me; and also one month's pay both to Goklah and Appah Dessaye, in the month of March, 1804, when they came to Poonah with me. I shall be obliged to you if you will add to these the sums paid by you to both sirdars, and acquaint me with the amount which you have received on account of the Ahmedabad farm, that I may let the government of Madras know the state of this transaction. I shall also be obliged to you if you will inform me whether you approve of the mode in which I have proposed to settle this business.

Besides this, there is another account to be settled, relating to the advances made to Amrut Rao. These advances are on two accounts; on account of his treaty with the Company, and on account of payment of his troops. The payments consequent on his treaty with the Company must stand in my name till the day on which I made him and his adherents over to you, under the orders of the Governor General. His troops were taken into the Company's service as 3000 of the 5000 which the Company were bound to provide for under the modification of the treaty of Bassein. The payment of these troops ought to be charged as so much expended on your account.

The enclosed memorandum of the payments made at the office to Amrut Rao does not specify on what account. But I have detailed statements and accounts signed by Amrut Rao's vakeel, which will show clearly the state of the transaction. I will send you a translation of these, if I can get them made before this letter goes; if I cannot, I will send it to you to-morrow. Let me know whether you approve of the proposed mode of settling this matter.

I think it will be best for Webbe to take no notice of the employment of Scindiah's troops at Nussersabad, excepting to urge that they may be sent into Malwa to oppose the common enemy. Scindiah will be ready enough to notice to Webbe that he has employed them for the service of the Peshwah, and to claim a remuneration for his expenses; and there is no occasion for us to stand a fresh discussion with Scindiah's durbar.

P.S. I enclose a memorandum for Goorparah. He says that the Peshwah's order did not include every thing belonging to him; this paper does.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 25th May, 1804.

The letter from the lady did no more than acknowledge the receipt of mine. A few minutes before I received it, I got another letter from her, in which she complained bitterly of the conduct of Byajee Naig's son, in insisting upon reading to her the letter I had sent, and reading her answer. I think that Byajee Naig's son does no good at Panwell, and that he ought to be recalled. I think that he has not given a true account of the state of affairs there.

I have settled that the dragoon is to have his provisions from Major Spens.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 26th May, 1804.

I enclose a copy of a translation of a paper which Lingum Pundit put into my hands yesterday, as an account of what Goklah wished to have done for him by the Peshwah. I pointed out to Lingum Pundit the unreasonable nature of the contents of this paper; and after some conversation upon this point, I said that it was ridiculous to come to me with such a paper, as it must be well known that I never should interfere to obtain even a hearing to demands of a nature so exorbitant.

After some argument, it was at last agreed that this was the object of Goklah's ambition, but that he would be satisfied with less. I then asked what territory Goklah had in his hands, and they acknowledged to a certain number of districts, the value of which, according to their account, did not amount to one fourth the sum at which they had been given to the late Peshwah, by Tippoo. There we had another argument: I insisted upon it, that if Goklah intended to do justice by the Peshwah, (and unless he did, I should have nothing to do with his affairs,) it would be necessary, either that he should allow the Peshwah the full value of his districts, and render him proportionate service; or, if the districts were not worth the value so stated in the treaties, he should resign the districts, and receive a money payment for his service.

I told him that I had gone upon this same principle with Amrut Rao, and that the result had been, that Amrut Rao gave up the country. I then pointed out to Lingum Pundit the distressed situation of the Peshwah's countries. I desired him to point out a district which Goklah could get, for which he would not have to fight; and I brought to his view the ruined state of each district after it would have been fought for, and the improbability which existed, that Goklah would for years get any thing for it; and at all events, I pressed him to say whether, under such a state of things, the Peshwah had any reason to hope that Goklah would give him any service.

I contrasted this statement with that which would exist, supposing that Goklah should receive a money payment, and I strongly pressed that he should defer to a future period the discussion of his claim to a provision in land, and that he should now take payment for his service in money. Lingum Pundit said that the Peshwah had promised money, but had given none; and that Goklah would starve if he depended upon the performance of his Highness' promise. I then told him that the Company would engage for the regular payment of the money, provided that Goklah would *bond*

*fide* relinquish Savanore, excepting Noolgoond, his old family jaghire. Upon this ground, Lingum Pundit is going over to speak to you. He then pressed that Goklah should be employed to the southward; and said that the scarcity was so great, that he could not serve upon the same pay if he came to the northward. In answer, I told him that I could not go into that question at all; and that all I knew was, that if he received the Company's money, he must serve wherever he might be ordered. Here the conference ended.

I think that you will be able to get Goklah's service upon the old bargain of 75,000 rupees monthly.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th. I will go over to Poonah on any day that you will fix for the entertainment for the Peshwah. The sooner the better, as I hope to be able to march to the northward; and, at all events, I must go to Poonah to inspect the corps there, and the bridge carriages, &c.; and I should wish, if possible, to make only one trip there. However, let all this be settled according to the convenience of the Peshwah and yourself. In respect to the entertainment, it is my opinion that you ought to preside at it. Your doing so may have permanent good consequences: my doing so can have none that will last beyond the period of my stay in this quarter.

Mr. Duncan has forwarded a complaint of the conduct of the Soubahdar at Basscin; however, I think it will turn out that there is no cause for it.

To Gen. Lake.

Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst., for which I beg leave to return you my thanks. I assure you that I have no intention of resigning the situation which I hold under the government of Fort St. George, in order to avail myself of your permission to return to Europe, until the service on which the troops are entering shall be brought to a conclusion.

I have never received any letter from you; but I concluded that you had been so much occupied, as to have wanted leisure to answer the letters which I addressed to you, or that your letters had been intercepted. I was very sensible of the favors conferred upon me and the officers who had served under my command, in the promotion of Lieut. Col. Wallace and others, whom I had the honor of recommending to your notice. I now enclose the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you from Bombay, which may not have reached you.

To Gen. Lake.

27th May, 1804.

\*\*\*\*\* The account you give of the state of Holkar's army is very satisfactory. I have served a good deal in this part of India against this description of freebooter; and I think that the best mode of operating, is to press him with one or two corps capable of moving with tolerable celerity, and of such strength as to render the result of an action by no means doubtful, if he should venture to risk one. There is but

little hope, it is true, that he will risk an action, or that any one of these corps will come up with him. The effect to be produced by this mode of operation is to oblige him to move constantly and with great celerity. When reduced to this necessity, he cannot venture to stop to plunder the country, and he does comparatively but little mischief: at all events the subsistence of his army becomes difficult and precarious, the horsemen become dissatisfied, they perceive that their situation is hopeless, and they desert in numbers daily; the freebooter ends by having with him only a few adherents; and he is reduced to such a state as to be liable to be taken by any small body of country horse, which are the fittest troops to be then employed against him.

In proportion as the body of our troops, to be employed against a freebooter of this description, have the power of moving with celerity, will such freebooter be distressed. Whenever the largest and most formidable bodies of them are hard pressed by our troops, the village people attack them upon their rear and flanks, cut off stragglers, and will not allow a man to enter their villages; because their villages being in some degree fortified, they know well that the freebooters dare not wait the time which would be necessary to reduce them. When this is the case, all their means of subsistence vanish, no resource remains excepting to separate; and even this resource is attended by risk, as the village people cut them off on their way to their homes.

You will have been informed by Mr. Webbe that Col. Murray has moved before this time.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have great hopes that I shall be able to move, and to make the siege of Chandore in the course of the month of June. Every thing is ready. The troops have been clothed and equipped, and I wait only for a fall of rain to insure water.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Camp at Panowullah, 27th May, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a letter addressed to your Lordship by the house of Forbes and Co., at Bombay, together with one to myself, and a private letter from Mr. Forbes, on the subject of a proposal from the house to purchase the Company's sandal wood at Madras, and to pay the money into the treasury at Poonah.

I am unable to give any opinion on the mercantile part of Mr. Forbes's proposal, as it refers to prices of sandal wood at Madras and in China, with which I am entirely unacquainted; but it will be very advantageous to the provinces under your Lordship's government to save the export of so large a sum in specie as 5 lacs of rupees; and it will be very convenient to the army to have the command of that sum at Poonah. Upon the occasion of addressing myself to your Lordship upon this subject, I cannot avoid adverting and drawing your Lordship's notice to the public spirit of Mr. Forbes, who seeks opportunities to render his private speculations, as a merchant, useful to the public service. By this conduct, he has upon a variety of occasions, and particularly in the last year, given most material aid to the cause of the British government on this side of India.



To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Panowallah, 27th May, 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th inst., upon the subject of the landing of the troops from the Ternate, at Bassein.

Among the papers enclosed, I observed the copy of a letter from Mr. Denton, in which he complains of the conduct of the soubahdar of Bassein; upon which subject I should have made an immediate representation to the Peshwah, did I not observe a letter from Lieut. Frederick to Capt. Nicolls, in which Lieut. Frederick notices the polite conduct of the soubahdar towards him. However, polite conduct towards one officer affords no excuse for conduct of a different tendency towards another; although it affords some ground to hope that the state of the officer who complains was not understood; and this requires further explanation. I therefore request that inquiry may be made, whether Mr. Denton went on shore in his uniform as an officer; the hour at which he reached Bassein; whether he was forcibly detained in the choultry, contrary to his inclination; or if he stayed there as a place of shelter, till he should have an opportunity of seeing the soubahdar?

If I should find that Mr. Denton, when known to be an officer, was treated with impoliteness or indignity, I shall consider it to be my duty to remonstrate with his Highness the Peshwah in the most serious manner; and I make no doubt but that the soubahdar will receive the punishment which he deserves, as in this instance he will have disobeyed the positive orders of his Highness, given to him at my earnest request.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Panowallah, 28th May, 1804.

Since I had last the honor of addressing you, I have received a private letter from Gen. Lake, written after he had received mine of the 23rd April, in which he tells me that Holkar's army is in the greatest distress; that his men were deserting daily, and were coming to the British camp by hundreds; that Holkar had fled to the southward and crossed the Chumbul; and that Col. Monson, with a British corps, was at Boondy. These accounts are corroborated in a very satisfactory manner by the akbars from Scindiah's camp, and from Hindustan. From the position of Holkar's different detachments and their movements, I judge that they intend to enter Bundeleund; when Col. Murray shall have moved, they must either do that, or cross the Nerbudda, or fight; and by all accounts Holkar has determined to avoid risking an action. However, if his force fritters away in his flight, which if he is pursued it will, the object is equally answered. He will end by being too weak for Scindiah's army of horse, and then he must be destroyed.

In my last letter I mentioned generally our wants in this quarter; if the war should last, I shall send a detailed list of them in a few days. I have strongly urged Gen. Lake to continue his pursuit of Holkar, even although he should have no hopes of bringing him to action. If he does this, I have not a doubt but that the business will soon be over. Indeed, if the Governor General had allotted a subsidiary force to Scindiah, it would probably have been over by this time.

P.S. I have received a letter from Mr. Duncan, of the 26th, in which he tells me that the *Anne*, extra ship, supposed to have been lost, had arrived: 3 China Indiamen had also arrived at Bombay, having left England on the 13th Feb. The Recorder of Bombay came out by this occasion. Mr. Duncan had not received any particular intelligence when he wrote; but he says that the appearances of invasion had not diminished when these ships sailed from England.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Panowullah, 29th May, 1804.

I can easily conceive that you must have been rendered very uncomfortable by every thing that has been written in Bengal relative to affairs in Scindiah's durbar. However, we will talk more upon that subject when we meet. If there is water forward, I shall march immediately; if not, I must wait for a little rain.

Three ships have arrived from England, in one of which Recorder Macintosh is come out. They sailed the 13th Feb. I have no news that is not contained in the enclosed letters and papers received from Osborne. I have added notes, that you may understand the letters.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Panowullah, 29th May, 1804.

The bearer, Williehomed, one of the bullock owners who brought rice from Hyderabad to the army, states that his agreement was to deliver the rice at Aurungabad for a certain sum; and that, if it was carried beyond that place, he should be paid more hire.

The particulars of his agreement are not known; but he arrived in camp at Cheseekair on the 1st Nov., which is 4 marches from Aurungabad; and his grain was all taken off his hands, and a receipt granted to him at Dewtanah, the 15th Nov.

He would have reached Aurungabad in 4 marches from Cheesekair, and returned to Goondy on the Godavery in 6 days more. His rice could not have been weighed sooner at Aurungabad than it was in camp, viz. 5 days; consequently, he could not have returned from Aurungabad to Goondy till the 16th. Dewtanah is only one march from Goondy, which he reached on the 16th Nov., and was not at all delayed by the change of the place of delivering the grain. But he was long detained at Dharore, for which some recompense may be thought due.

To Capt. Wilks.

Camp at Panowullah, 30th May, 1804.

I have this instant received your letter of the 22nd inst. I sent Bistnapah a rahdarry for Maunsell's battalion, and the guns some time ago, and I conclude that they have marched. I do not know that Bistnapah has kept with him even the 100 men you mention. The 2nd batt. 12th

G. O.

Camp at Panowullah, Tuesday, 29th May, 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley will see the 3 regiments of Native cavalry out in brigade at daylight to-morrow, in front of the cavalry line. He requests that commanding officers will peruse the Memorandum concerning field movements which he gave them last year (see G. O., Poona, 23rd May, 1803, p. 459); and that they will caution their men against talking in the ranks.

Captains of the day will in future report in person to Major Gen. Wellesley when they come off duty.

regt. has marched to Hullihall, and I have desired the commanding officer to apply for the clothing. I was obliged to send this battalion to the southward, in order to relieve a Bombay battalion at Goa, which I have sent into Guzerat, to reinforce Col. Murray's corps.

I have clothed, as well as armed and equipped, the whole army. They are in high order and in good spirits, and, please God, when the rain shall set in, I shall commence my operations. The rain may do some injury to my cattle, but there will be no water in the country for the army till the rain shall supply it. Our prospect, from the furnished state of the country, is bad, but I have resources which will save us. There is no occasion for delaying the convoy to send the clothing for the 1st of the 3rd or the pioneers. If you can find means of moving it, let it go to Gen. Campbell's division; and I will arrange to have it brought forward with grain, at a more advanced period of the season.

I have given directions that the Mysore peons might be relieved from the road by Meritch by Poonah by runners hired at Poonah.

I hear from Gen. Lake that Holkar is in the greatest distress, his troops deserting from him daily, and coming by hundreds into Gen. Lake's camp. Gen. Lake was in Jeypoor, I believe; and Col. Monson, with a British detachment, at Boondy. Holkar had fled with great celerity from the latter to the southward, and had crossed the Chumbul. From the position and movements of the different detachments of his army, I judge that he is going into Bundelcund. Col. Murray must have marched before this time. He has a very strong corps of infantry and some cavalry, but he is weak in the latter. If Scindiah's army, however, cannot join Gen. Lake, which is supposed to be doubtful, they will join Col. Murray, and then Holkar must quit Malwa entirely. Besides Col. Murray's corps, there is a reserve in Guzerat, which will keep all secure in that quarter. In short, every thing promises fairly excepting the famine in the Deccan; and that I have provided against, as far as it was in my power.

It is said that Scindiah is going to Ougein, which shows confidence, at least, in his and our strength: and I see by the akbars that he has given orders to certain bodies of his troops to take possession of Chooly Myhissur and Indore, in conformity with suggestions which I had made to him.

P.S. You will of course tell Purneah how much gratified I am by his continued attention to his troops.

G. O.

Camp at Panowallah, 30th May, 1804.

The corps of infantry in camp will make out indents on the Commissary of stores for arms wanting, in exchange for unserviceable arms now with the corps, and to complete them to the effective strength in the field.

The 19th light dragoons and 74th regt. and the artillery are to indent on the Commissary of stores for new private tents, in proportion to their effective strength in the field. These indents are to be sent in for countersignature this afternoon.

All the public hired carriage bullocks with the army are to be mustered at half past 5 o'clock in the morning of Friday, the 1st June next.

The cavalry grain bullocks, by Capt. Cunningham, in the rear of the cavalry lines.

The bullocks in the grain department, by Capt. Young, in the rear of head quarters.

The bullocks in the store department near Major Robertson's tent, by Capt. Monin; and the bullocks in the provision department, by Capt. B. Campbell, in the rear of the 1st batt. 4th regt.

To Major Graham.

Camp at Panowullah, 30th May, 1804.

I have received your letter of the 27th, and I have no doubt of the right of Cavy Jung to Nushin. You will therefore make such arrangements with his agents, as you may think proper, for the security of that place, and for his enjoyment of the revenue of the district.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Panowullah, 30th May, 1804.

I have received your letters of yesterday. I entirely agree in opinion with you about applying for further sunnuds for Goorparah; Soondoor is of no consequence in revenue. It is a place of some strength within the Company's territories, and just affords security to the family that possesses it.

Since I received Webbe's letter, in which he mentions that Nusserabad was to be given over to Ballojee Koonger, it has appeared to me that it would be proper to go still farther, in respect to Scindiah's operations against that place, than I proposed in my letter to you. However, I have omitted to write either to Webbe or to you upon the subject; because I think that we are not yet all agreed about the facts. If the Peshwah, or his servants, have called upon Scindiah to assist them in taking possession of Nusserabad, as would appear by your letters and your conversation with Munkaiseer, detailed in your letter to Webbe, of the 29th inst., it is not worth while to enter into a discussion with Scindiah on that subject at the present moment; and the best mode of proceeding would be, to prevail upon Scindiah to draw off the battalions for the purpose of the war in Malwa.

The Peshwah and Scindiah choose at times to consider themselves in the relation of master and servant; and I do not think it is quite clear what the notions of our government are upon that subject. Until these notions are defined, I do not think it advisable to enter into a discussion with either government, in which the principal topic will be this relation; and on that ground, as well as because I think it desirable not to multiply our subjects of discussion with Scindiah just now, I should prefer to settle the Nusserabad question in the manner above proposed.

But Webbe writes to me that Nusserabad is to be made over to Ballojee Koonger, which entirely alters the state of the question. In that case, Scindiah is not acting at Nusserabad by desire of the Peshwah, or of his ministers or servants; in fact on behalf of another person, who the Peshwah says is not his servant; but who has been the servant of both the Peshwah and Scindiah, and who, we have reason to believe, is more attached to Scindiah than to the Peshwah. At all events, as far as I can judge from Munkaiseer's conversation, the Peshwah has not assigned Nusserabad to Koonger and Scindiah. Interference to obtain possession of the place for him cannot be considered in any other light than as an act of hostility. If Webbe's information should be correct, I think that he ought to do more than I first proposed, and to remonstrate strongly with Scindiah upon the subject of his employing his troops in this manner, and to insist upon his delivering to him an order immediately addressed to their commanding officer to withdraw.

If this subject should strike you as it does me, I shall request you to

forward a copy of this letter to Webbe, and let me know it, and I will also address him officially upon the subject.

P.S. I shall leave this place for Poonah the day after to-morrow, at daylight. I have never received any answer from you about Baba Phurkia. Has Lingun Pundit delivered my letter about Goklah?

*The D.A.G. to the Officer commg., Ahmednuggur.*

30th May, 1804.

In consequence of the scarcity and dearth of grain at Ahmednuggur, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has deemed it absolutely necessary to issue grain from the public stores to certain descriptions of allowed followers there. He accordingly directs that you will sanction the issue of rice, at the rate of half a seer per day, from the 1st June next until further orders, upon regular indents, to the actual numbers present of the undermentioned descriptions of allowed followers, and on no account exceeding the established numbers of each, viz.:

Bullock drivers of the 2nd batt. 3rd regt.

Artificers, in the department of the Commissary of stores, attached to the 2nd batt. 3rd regt.

Puckalies

Lascars, in the department of the Commissary of stores.

.. with the camp equipage of the 2nd batt. 3rd regt.

Dooley bearers, with the 2nd batt. 3rd regt.

.. with the detachment of the 84th regt.

Servants, in the departments of the Asst. Paymaster and Storekeeper.

The indents to be signed by you, instead of being sent to camp for the signature of the Dep. Q. M. Gen.

This rice is to be paid for by a stoppage, at the rate of one single faanam for one pucca seer, or 111 pagodas 12 faanams per garce; and for this purpose every officer, or head of a department, will certify on the back of his abstracts the quantity of rice drawn by him for the same month; and the storekeeper will make out, for the Paymaster's office at Ahmednuggur, a separate register of the quantity of grain issued during the month to allowed followers, that such quantity may be compared with that certified on the back of the abstracts of the individuals, and the deductions may be made accordingly.

You will instruct the Paymaster at Ahmednuggur not to discharge any abstract, for pay or allowances from the 1st June, until this issue of rice may be countermanded, that has not a certificate on the back of it, in the prescribed forms, of the quantity of rice drawn during the same month.

Major Gen. Wellesley cannot grant such unlimited allowance of rice to the officers at Ahmednuggur, for their servants; but he will allow them to indent on the stores at Poonah for 15 seers of rice for each man, for the undermentioned numbers of servants, which will subsist them during the month of June, viz.:

Captains, for 10 servants each, 150 seers.

Subalterns, for 5 servants each, 75 ..

Assist. Surgeons, for 5 servants each, 75 ..

These indents must be sent to camp for the Major General's own countersignature; and the officers indenting must send their own carriage to Poonah for the rice. It is to be certified on the abstracts, and paid for at the same rate, and in the same manner, as the rice allowed to be issued at Ahmednuggur to the other descriptions of allowed followers.

*To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*

Camp at Panownallah, 31st May, 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th inst., with which you have transmitted one of the 20th, from the Resident at Baroda.

It is very proper that endeavors should be made to induce Annud Rao Powar to join the corps of British troops under Col. Murray; and if Annud Rao should join Col. Murray, he will be entitled to the consideration of the British government. I beg leave to recommend, however,

that the gentleman in Guzerat should cautiously avoid contracting any engagement with Anund Rao Powar. The family of Powar was formerly equal with those of Scindiah and Holkar in its rank in the Marhatta Empire; and it shared in the conquests made in the same proportion with those families and with the Peshwah. But in the course of time the family of Powar has fallen to decay; and in our recent transactions in the Marhatta Empire, we found Anund Rao, the head of the family, a chief of no consequence, and serving in Scindiah's army with a small body of horse at the battle of Assye.

It is my opinion that Anund Rao Powar cannot be considered in the light of an independent chief, because Scindiah and Holkar are so considered, and because the family of Powar were formerly of the same rank in the empire with those of Scindiah and Holkar. Those Chiefs are considered to be independent for a variety of reasons, which it is not necessary at present to detail; but principally, I imagine, because their acts had, for a series of years, been uncontrolled by the Peshwah (the servants of whose government they were formerly) or by any other power; and they were to all intents and purposes, in fact, independent. This reasoning will not apply to Anund Rao Powar; he was formerly, like every other Marhatta chief, a servant of the Peshwah. We do not know of his independence, and we found him serving in Scindiah's army. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that we ought to avoid making any engagement with him, the formation of which must be an acknowledgment of his independence.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th May, in which you have enclosed copies of letters received from Mr. Crow, the magistrate at Surat, containing complaints of the conduct of Lieut. —, of the 1st batt., 3rd regt. In consequence of those complaints I have given directions that Lieut. — may be put in arrest, for a crime, of which I enclose a copy; and I have sent orders to Col. Murray that he may be brought to trial before a General Court Martial, which is now sitting in Guzerat; and I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay my request before the Governor in Council, that Mr. Crow may be directed to order the witnesses of the facts related in his letters to attend this General Court Martial, when their attendance may be required.

These frequent complaints against the officers of the army have given me the most serious concern; and I trust that the Governor in Council will do me the justice to believe that I shall exert the power which is in my hands to restrain and punish these disorders and irregularities. As, however, the complaints are frequent, and have been made against many individuals, it is to be apprehended that the only power which is in my hands, viz., that of trial by court martial, will fail to produce the wished for effect, of deterring others by the example of the punishment of the prisoner who is now to be tried. If this should be the case, I beg to recommend that, in future, those officers of the army who may be guilty of riots, or who may oppose the execution of the laws, by acts of violence and outrage, or who may insult the magistrates, may be suspended from

the service by authority of government, or may be brought to trial before the Recorder of Bombay.

I am concerned to say that frequent complaints have been forwarded to me by government, of instances of all these crimes; and it will be ruinous, as well to the authority of government, as to the discipline of the army, if, owing to the defects of the military tribunal, or to any other causes, they should hereafter be unpunished. I conclude that, under the regulations for the civil government of Surat, all Native inhabitants of that city, whether belonging to the military profession, or followers of the military, are liable to the jurisdiction of the magistrate. I am desirous of receiving information upon this point, before I notice these disorders in the G. O. to the army.

To Capt. Wilks.

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 24th May. When I was at Bombay, finding that the letters were longer on the road to and from Madras than was necessary, and that the communication was not a daily one, I recommended to the Governor to make it so; and to use the camp tappall between Poonah and Hurryhur, and thence the Mysore tappall to Madras for this purpose. He attended to my recommendation and made arrangements accordingly, and the Postmaster at Bombay wrote to Mr. Piele. This arrangement was entirely independent of the relief of the runners on the road; and was done in order to let Purneah's peons go back to Mysore. I shall send them orders from hence, to return to Mysore as fast as they shall be relieved.

Orders will go to Hurryhur regarding the clothing. I learn from Hindustan that Holkar's sort of Rampoorra has been taken by assault, with small loss on our side.

To the Resident with Dowlat Rao Scindiah.

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I have observed for some time accounts in the ackbars that a body of the troops in the service of Dowlat Rao Scindiah are employed in the reduction of the Peshwah's fort of Nusserabad, in Candeish; and, from the private correspondence which I had with Col. Close upon the subject, it appears that Scindiah's assistance had been required by Dhoondoo Punt, the officer acting on the part of the Peshwah in Candeish. Although the demand of assistance by this officer, and the grant of it by Dowlat Rao Scindiah, appeared to be irregular, and might lead to demands and discussions hereafter, regarding compensation, which might be unpleasant, I did not think it necessary to notice the transaction any further at present, than to request you to urge Scindiah to recall the troops from Nusserabad, and to employ them against the common enemy in Malwa; because the Peshwah and Scindiah have been in the habit occasionally of considering each other as master and servant, and the Governor General has given no instructions regarding the manner in which that relation, when brought forward, shall be considered; and because I thought it desirable to avoid to enter upon any fresh discussion at Scindiah's durbar, till the question regarding Gohud and Gwalior should be decided. But I observe, in a late private letter from you, that Ballojee

Koonger is to be put in possession of Nusserabad, and that that fort is attacked with a view to that object.

Ballojee Koonger was originally the servant of Scindiah, then of the Peshwah, and lastly of Scindiah again, particularly during the late war. The attack upon the fort cannot be considered to be made by desire of the Peshwah, or of his ministers or servants, under these circumstances, and it becomes an act of hostility. If, therefore, you should find that the fort of Nusserabad is attacked with a view to give it to Ballojee Koonger, I request you to remonstrate immediately against the act, as one of direct hostility; to insist upon the troops being recalled, and to procure an order for this recall, addressed to their commanding officer. But if you should find that the fort is attacked in consequence of the requisition of Dhondoo Punt, it will be sufficient to observe upon the irregularity of the whole transaction, without the knowledge of the British government, and to require that the troops should be sent into Malwa, at least till his Excellency the Governor General shall have given orders regarding the manner in which the relation of master and servant between the Peshwah and Scindiah shall be considered when that topic is brought forward.

To the Envoy at Goa.

Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that the 2nd batt. 12th regt. marched from this place towards Hullihall, in Soonda, 27th May.

The object of sending this corps to the southward is eventually to replace at Goa the troops which I have been obliged to draw from thence to reinforce the army in Guzerat: but as it is not to be expected that you can be attacked, at least till the month of Aug. or Sept.; and as the fort of Hullihall is without a garrison, the troops having been withdrawn to reinforce Goa; I have given orders to the commanding officer of the 2nd batt. 12th regt. to halt at Hullihall, in Soonda, and to form the garrison of that post, until he shall receive a requisition from you to proceed to Goa.

It is scarcely necessary that I should observe upon the importance of Hullihall, in Soonda, as a post. It is impossible to conjecture for what length of time the troops in the Marhatta territories may be employed to the northward of Poonah, or the effect which this employment may have upon the operations of the jaghiredars, polygars, and other chiefs to the southward, against each other, or against the Hon. Company and their allies. While we have a post at Hullihall, there is nothing to be apprehended in the provinces of Soonda or Canara; but when the troops are withdrawn from Hullihall, there is nothing to prevent an enemy from overrunning those provinces and Nuggur. To these observations, which will show you how desirable it is to leave the troops, if possible, in Hullihall, I have to add, that Canara is the province from which the grain has been supplied, in this season, for the consumption of Bombay, Poonah, and the army; and that it is more than probable that its produce will be required in the next season for the same purposes.

Under these circumstances, I have to request that you will proceed with caution, in drawing the 2nd batt. 12th regt. from Hullihall to Goa; and



that you will not order them to march to the latter, unless you shall be convinced that their services will be required, and that no risk will be incurred by leaving Hullahall without a garrison.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I enclose the copy of a letter which the Resident with Scindiah has written to me.

All the accounts from Hindustan agree that Holkar's army is in the greatest distress. He has fled in front of Col. Monson, with a corps of 3 Native battalions and some Hindustanee horse. His troops desert him by hundreds, and, Gen. Lake informs me, go to his own camp; and I judge, from the direction of Holkar's march, and the position of his detachments, that he means to make a dash into Bundelcund. A British detachment of 2 Native battalions, under Lieut. Col. Don, has taken Rampoor by assault, with but small loss on our side. The whole garrison were destroyed. Bappojee Scindiah was likely to join Col. Monson. The operations of the war being in this state of forwardness, and it being not impossible that Holkar may speedily be destroyed, particularly if there should be a corps in Bundelcund capable of opposing him in front, while Col. Monson and Bappojee Scindiah will press upon his rear; and if he should be already so far reduced as that Bappojee Scindiah can venture to act against him singly, I am more than ever anxious that you should have near you the means of carrying on sieges in Malwa.

I conclude that you have ordered forward your heavy guns, according to your intention and my wishes. There is but a small chance of your getting the assistance of any heavy guns from Ougein, notwithstanding my requisition. If, upon your entrance into Malwa, you should find that Holkar has fled into Bundelcund, or to such a distance from you, as that by no direct operation upon his army, or by no operation upon his rear, while Col. Monson will be in his front, you can form any hope of contributing to his destruction; or if you should not receive any orders to the contrary from the Commander in Chief, I recommend that you should consult with the vakeel, who will have been sent to you on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, regarding the best mode of destroying Holkar's power and resources in Malwa, and that you should proceed to put Scindiah in possession of any places which belong to Holkar, in concert with his vakeel. If, however, Holkar should be near you, or should have any body of troops near you against which you can strike a blow, or if you should receive any orders from the Commander in Chief, I refer you to my instructions of the 7th May. Some rain has fallen here, and I propose to march immediately.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Poonah, 1st June, 1804.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Sir W. Clarke. It is my opinion that it will be very inconvenient should Sir W. Clarke quit Goa at present; and I have told him that I did not propose to recommend to the Governor General that his request might be complied with. I have ordered a battalion to Hullahall, in Soonda, which will march to Goa eventually. I propose to send to the Governor General

a copy of my letter to Sir W. Clarke upon this subject, and of some other letters which I have lately written.

Famine rages in the Deccan. But some rain has fallen, and I propose to march, and endeavor to get to the northward. We lose 50 persons every day at Ahmednuggur, where we feed to the number of 5000. What must it be where the people are not fed? I have come over here to be present on the 3rd, at a feast given by Col. Close to the Peshwah.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Langford, Hurryhar.*

Camp at Panowullah, 1st June, 1804.

I have received your letter, reporting that boatmen can be hired in the neighbourhood of your post for the 10 boats intended to be kept up there for the public service; and I am directed by the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley to desire that you will engage 4 men for each boat, as soon as they are ready to be launched, who are to be kept in constant readiness, day and night, for the public service. You will pay each man 2 sultany or canterai fanams for every day that he is actually employed in working the boats, and 1 fanam for every day that he is unemployed, but in readiness. The General also authorises you to entertain 2 chucklers, for keeping the leather of the boats in repair; and a conicopoly, at 10 pagodas per month, for paying the men and keeping the accounts.

Mr. Gordon has been directed to make you an advance of 50 pagodas, for this purpose, with the first issue of pay to your detachment. The boats on all the rivers are to be under the superintendence of Capt. Cunningham, D. Q. M. G., Mysore, in the same manner as they were last year; and you will transmit your accounts to him, and will receive further advances of cash under directions from him.

*(The same to Capt. Genny, commanding at Deogherry; Lieut. Christie, Sungoly; Lieut. Kettle, Googherry; and Lieut. Allen, Erroor.)*

To the Governor General.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1804.

I had the honor of receiving your Excellency's orders of the 16th April, on the 7th May, and immediately ordered from Goa the 1st batt. 4th Bombay regt., in conformity with my intention which I had announced to your Excellency, and which had met your approbation. This battalion,

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, 2nd June, 1804.

The bullock department belonging to the Bombay government, serving at Poonah under charge of Capt. Douglas, is to be abolished without delay, excepting as hereafter stated. (30,000 rupees to be indented for the payment of all outstanding balances.)

Those bullocks and their servants, gone into Guzerat, are to be handed over to the Commissary of bullocks to the northward. Those still remaining at Poonah, and those lately detached from it, with their servants, excepting 100 draught bullocks with their servants, are to be sent down to Bombay, liable to the further orders of government.

Capt. Douglas to send returus, &c., with the cattle. The camels with the drivers under the charge of Capt. Douglas are to be handed over to Capt. Young, who will take care of those camels and feed them, and charge the expense to the government of Bombay, in the same manner as he does that of the other camels and bullocks in the service of the Bombay artillery and 78th regt.

The 100 draught bullocks and their drivers ordered to remain at Poonah are to be in charge of Major Spens; these bullocks are to be attached to the guns with the corps at Poonah. Each bullock during the rains, and until they shall be in proper condition, is to receive 2 pucca seers of grain daily besides his forage. Major Spens will have sheds built for them. Major Spens will send his bills for building the sheds, and his monthly bills for feeding the cattle and the pay of the drivers, to Major Gen. Wellesley, for his counter-signature.

Lieut. Col. Wallace will command the line of infantry with Major Gen. Wellesley's division, having attached to him the staff of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah. Capt. Johnson is, however, still to keep charge of the departments of which he has been at the head under the orders of Major Gen. Wellesley.

Lieut. Col. Colman, heretofore in command of the brigade of the Bombay army stationed at Poonah, is to join Major Gen. Wellesley's division, with Brigade Major Schuyler, and to command the 5th brigade.

of which a large detachment was still in Malabar, sailed from Goa in due course, and arrived, part of it at Bassein, and part of it at Bombay, since the 20th inst., and it is now on its march to Surat.

I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of the instructions which I gave to Col. Murray, as soon as I received your orders, announcing your intention that Holkar should be attacked, and a copy of my letter of the same date to the Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which you will observe the plan according to which I proposed to co-operate with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, in the reduction of the power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Since I wrote these letters, having received private information from the Resident with Scindiah, stating that Holkar had moved to the southward and eastward towards the frontier occupied by Bappojee Scindiah, the commander of the army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in Malwa; and that it was to be apprehended that Bappojee Scindiah, unable to defend himself against Holkar, would find it impracticable to effect a junction with his Excellency the Commander in Chief, or any of the detachments of his army, I desired Col. Murray to direct his march towards Ougein, and to make a junction with Bappojee Scindiah the first object of his attention. Within these few days I have received further information of the state of the war in Malwa, from his Excellency the Commander in Chief, from the Resident with Scindiah, and from other quarters, particularly of the capture of Rampoom, by the detachment under Lieut. Col. Don, and of the flight of Holkar to the eastward, and of the distresses and desertion of his army.

I think it probable also that Bappojee Scindiah may have joined himself with Col. Monson's corps, and that both together may have pushed Holkar forward with such vigor as to have increased the distress and dissatisfaction in his army, and consequently, his loss by desertion, to such a degree as that he can no longer be formidable. Under these circumstances I have urged Col. Murray to get forward his battering guns, and to commence, in concert with the vakcel, who will have been sent to him from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to put that Chief in possession of Holkar's territories in Malwa, unless he should see an opportunity of co-operating with Col. Monson, or any detachment of the Commander in Chief's army, in the destruction of the army commanded by Holkar himself, or he should have an opportunity of striking a blow against any of Holkar's detachments, or he should receive any orders from the Commander in Chief; in all of which cases I have referred him to my instructions of the 7th May.

From the 7th May, the day on which I received your Excellency's instructions, to the 17th, my time and attention were occupied at Bombay by a variety of points relative to the supply of money for Col. Murray's corps, and to the supply of money, clothing, arms, and accoutrements and stores for the troops under my command in the Deccan. By the exertion and arrangements of the government of Bombay, Col. Murray will march into Malwa with a supply of treasure amounting to 10 lacs of rupees. From the state of uncertainty in which affairs have been since the month of Feb. last, it was impossible to inform the officers of the government of Fort St. George to what quarter the supplies of clothing, &c., should be sent for the different corps, and the troops were in want of every thing.

However, they have been clothed, armed, and equipped since I received your Excellency's orders, and are now fit for any service which can be undertaken by their numbers.

I have ordered one corps, the 2nd batt. 12th regt., from Poonah, to Hullihall, in Soonda, which corps I intend should eventually replace at Goa the 1st batt. 4th Bombay N.I., which has recently arrived from thence. But your Excellency will have observed, in my reports and my correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, the state of confusion and uncertainty in which affairs are in the southern parts of the Marhatta Empire, and you will probably approve the directions given to Sir W. Clarke, in the letter of which I transmit a copy, to avoid, if possible, to draw the 2nd batt. 12th regt. from Hullihall, in Soonda.

Besides this reduction of the force under my command, for the purpose of defending the Company's possessions and Goa, I have detached one battalion of Bombay infantry, as I before informed your Excellency, from the Deccan into Guzerat, and have sent the 84th regt. and another battalion of Bombay infantry into Bombay, by which that important settlement is secured. But I have still force sufficient to accomplish every thing in the Deccan which it is in my power to undertake.

My former dispatches will have apprised your Excellency of the state of distress to which the inhabitants of the Deccan were reduced by want of provisions, and of the measures which I had adopted to relieve this want. At the Company's possession at Ahmednuggur, I am concerned to say, that the distress and the evils of famine must increase till the next harvest; and that at Ahmednuggur, where 5000 people receive provisions daily under the plan heretofore laid before your Excellency, 50 people die daily. However, as I find that the operations of the war are advanced in Hindustan, I am anxious to commence them in the Deccan, and I was in hopes that I should have been able to march as soon as a sufficient quantity of rain should have fallen to insure a supply of water: but the accounts which I receive of the state of the country to the northward, of the absolute want of forage and grain, and the reports which I have received from Lieut. Col. Haliburton, of the state of his supplies, in which he declares it to be his opinion, that, if he should be moved to a greater distance than he is from Berar, the difficulty which he experiences in procuring supplies of provisions must increase, and that his corps will be reduced to great distress, have induced me to doubt the expediency of undertaking any operation to the northward at present, lest I should entirely destroy the equipments and efficiency of the army. I propose, however, to send on a heavy train of cannon, and if it should be possible to effect any thing, I shall follow it.

The delay occasioned by the famine in the Deccan will not, I hope, be of any material consequence in the end. It does not appear to be possible for Holkar to bring his army into the Deccan, and his possessions in this quarter must be in the power of the British government. In this state of affairs I am anxious to receive your Excellency's sentiments regarding the settlement with the southern jaghiredars, which I might now undertake.

I have the honor to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a correspondence which I have had with the Resident at Poonah, on the subject

of a financial plan which had been transmitted to him by Mr. Smith, the Accountant Gen. of Fort St. George, including the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George. I have likewise the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Resident with Scindiah, on the subject of an attack made on the Peshwah's fort of Nusserabad, in Candeish, by Scindiah's troops.

To the Sec. of Gov., Fort William.

Poonah, 3rd June, 1804.

Major Kirkpatrick will have informed you that the dawk runners who were carrying the letters which left Calcutta on the 11th May, were robbed at Warrungaul, near Hyderabad, on the 26th May. The packets were recovered, but one of the letters had been opened, and the papers torn and destroyed. Your dispatch to me of the 10th May was in the packet, and it was opened, and one of the papers is missing; I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will send me a duplicate of that dispatch.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Chinchore, 4th June, 1804.

After the receipt of my letter of the 1st, you will have been surprised

G. M. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Monday, 4th June, 1804.

A Royal salute to be fired at noon in honor of His Majesty's birthday.

G. A. O.

4th June, 1804.

1. In order to relieve the distress of the camp for want of grain, and that of the followers on account of its high price, it is intended to supply the bazars with rice from the stores in the depôt.

2. The mode in which this must be effected is to bring rice from the depôt to the army by means of the grain dealers, and to sell it to the bazars at a reasonable rate.

3. The commanding officers of corps and heads of departments must take care that the public followers of their corps and departments are supplied by arrangements which they will make; the former with the cutwahs of their regimental bazars, and the latter with the cutwahl of the grand bazar.

4. The rice must be drawn from the depôt by an order from the superintendents of the bazars, specifying the rate at which the rice is to be delivered to the bearer of the order.

5. The superintendent will take care not to give an order for rice to any dealer, who cannot give security that he will bring the rice for sale to the camp bazar. The security must be for a sum double the amount which the quantity of rice ordered would sell for in the bazar of Poonah, or the country.

6. The superintendent will settle the rate at which the rice is to be delivered at the depôt to the grain dealers upon the basis of the rice being afterwards retailed in the bazar at the rate of 6 seers for the rupee.

7. The grain dealers are not to pay for the rice at the depôt, but they will pay for it into the hands of the superintendent of bazars, when they shall have sold it.

8. The storekeeper of the depôt will, in his accounts of issues of rice to the order of the superintendents of bazars, state particularly the rate at which it appears by the order that the rice should be paid for, and the date of the order.

9. He will send to the superintendents at the end of every month an account of the quantity of rice issued during the month under his order, specifying to whom issued, and at what rate to be paid for, and the date of the order.

10. The superintendent will at the end of every month pay to the Paymaster, on account of the Hon. Company, the sum which he will have received from the dealers. He will give in an account at the same time, specifying the sum received from each dealer, for what quantity of grain, and he will support this account by that which he will receive from the grain keeper and the depôt as a voucher.

11. The superintendent will regulate the issue of this rice to the bazars, in the usual manner, in proportion to the consumption of each corps; and commanding officers of corps must take care, by the exertion of their influence over the regimental cutwahs, that the public followers are supplied in the first instance.

to see, in my letter of the 2nd to the Governor General, that I could not move.

The reason for which I was obliged to alter my determination was, that I lost many cattle on the 31st May, 1st and 2nd June. I received dreadful accounts of the want of forage, and also the reports from Col. Haliburton of his state, and prospects of supplies. All these induced me to determine to wait, at least for a time, as a measure of prudence, if not of necessity.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Chinchore, 4th June, 1804.

I have just got a letter from Col. Murray, in which he tells me that Kaleb Khan, a Patan, who has a jaghire in Candeish, has offered to join Col. Murray with his troops, provided he is allowed to keep his lands. This point will, I believe, belong to the Peshwah; and I request you to find out the quality of the land possessed by Kaleb Khan, and to let me know what the Peshwah will wish to be done about this man. Whether he joins Murray or not, the result of his holding lands in Candeish must be obedience to the Peshwah's orders, and devotion to his service.

P. S. We killed another fox after you left us.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Chinchore, 5th June, 1804.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd May. I hope that the money is now upon the road, as neither Lieut. Col. Haliburton nor I have more than will pay the troops their arrears for the last month.

You will render a most acceptable service to Col. Haliburton, by sending on the 7000 bullock loads of rice which you mention, and you may enable us to commence our operations at an earlier period than I have expected.

I am happy to find that you have consented to hire the 5000 bullocks offered; and I beg you to hire for the trip to Aurungabad, or any other place within the Soubah's territories, the 2000 bullocks offered, or any others that may offer upon the same terms, for which you may have loads of rice.

The 8000 bullocks offered at Balcondah will be a most acceptable supply, and it would be very convenient to pay for this rice at Hyderabad, as Col. Haliburton is, at the present moment, in some degree pressed for money. However, if that should be inconvenient to you, or to Rajah Mohiput Ram, or to Surreput Ram, I will take care that Col. Haliburton shall have the money in camp to pay for the rice before he can receive it.

I am much obliged to you for having sent forward the carriages with Capt. Dalrymple.

Since I addressed you a private letter on the 21st May, I find that Col. Haliburton has requested Rajah Sookroodoor to attack Umber, in consequence of receiving intelligence from Major Malcolm, that the Governor General had given directions that Jeswunt Rao Holkar should be attacked. There is no longer any reason to conceal from the Soubah's government this intention to attack Holkar, as to announce it will certainly occasion preparations. I beg you to announce it whenever you may think proper.

I had hoped that I should be able to march immediately, and intended to march about the 8th of this month. But the accounts I received from Col. Haliburton on the 2nd inst., of the state of his supplies, the general distress throughout the Deccan for want of forage and grain, and the great mortality among the cattle, have induced me to determine to delay my march for some time longer.

It is fortunate that I have come to this determination, as I find, by accounts received this day from Col. Haliburton, that he was obliged to draw off still nearer to Buswunt, in Berar, above the ghauts, the district from which he has been supplied hitherto, and from which alone he can expect to receive regular supplies in future.

G. O.

Camp at Chinchlore, Tuesday, 5th June, 1804.

As some days may elapse before the troops will quit this ground, officers commanding brigades and corps will give particular orders respecting the preservation of cleanliness in the lines of the encampment.

The quarter masters of regiments of dragoons, Native cavalry, and European infantry, and quarter master sergeants of Native infantry, are particularly responsible for the cleanliness of the lines of the encampment of their respective corps.

The necessaries must be made in front of the quarter guard, and rear of the rear guard, and people must be prevented from easing themselves in the ravines, holes, &c., which may be in the encampment.

Parties of camp lascars of corps must be employed daily under the quarter master or quarter master sergeants of corps in cleaning the lines, removing or burying the carcases of cattle and offal.

The general cleanliness of the lines of this camp is under the superintendence of the D. Q. M. G., and quarter masters of brigades. A party, consisting of a jemadar and 20 pioneers, to be in readiness in the pioneer lines daily, to attend the provost on his requisition, who is particularly responsible for the cleanliness of that part of the camp not immediately in the lines of corps under the quarter master. The provost will see that all dead carcases, offal, &c., are buried. The quarter masters of brigades will occasionally inspect the state of the lines occupied by their brigades, and will report to the D. Q. M. G. if they should perceive any inattention to this order either in the quarter masters of corps or in the provost.

The superintendent of bazaars will give orders to the cutwahi to have regular necessaries made for the bazaar, and such other orders as may be required to preserve cleanliness in this part of the encampment.

The field officer of the day will be so kind as to notice to the D. Q. M. G. any neglect of cleanliness which he may observe in any part of the camp in going his rounds.

As it generally happens that the morning is fair, Major Gen. Wellesley recommends that the officers commanding corps should avail themselves of that opportunity to remove the tents from the ground on which they usually stand, so as to allow it to dry. People should be employed, however, to watch the weather, so that the tents may be pitched again before the rain commences.

There is to be a field officer of the day till farther orders. The pickets on halting days are to mount at 8 in the morning instead of at *reville*, as at present. The pickets are to be brought to the parade by a commissioned officer, whether European or Native, from each corps. When arrived at the place of parade, they are to be received and formed by the adjutant of the day.

The daily guards of corps are to be brought to the general parade by a commissioned officer, and formed by the adjutant of the day: those of the right wing on the right of the pickets, those of the left wing on their left. The pickets and daily guards are then to be marched off according to the order for mounting guard, by the field officer of the day.

In case the weather should be bad, the daily guards are not to come to the general parade, but relieve the guards from their own parades. The pickets also are to be marched off to the relief without loss of time. A captain to mount with the pickets, as formerly; and a subaltern of the 78th to mount with the outlying pickets of that corps; and a subaltern officer of Native infantry, taken from a general roster, to mount with the Native details of each brigade, on the outlying picket.

A subaltern officer of Native infantry from each brigade to mount with the Native details of the brigade on the inlying pickets; and a subaltern officer of each European regiment, with the detail of it, on the inlying picket.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Chinchore, 7th June, 1804.

I enclose a letter that I have received from Munro, which will give some information regarding affairs in the Ceded districts, which probably had not before reached you. The first part of the letter relates to a man introduced to me by Goorparah. The latter part is that which is interesting. I beg you to return this letter.

The Peshwah had some fine villages in Berar, which he had given in jaghire to Sereedhur Pundit, Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, and others, the ministers of the Rajah of Berar. When the province of Berar was ceded by the treaty of peace, I prevented the ministers of the Soubah of the Deccan from interfering with these villages, which I left in the hands of the ministers of the Rajah of Berar, where I found them. Sercedhur Pundit has mentioned to Mr. Elphinstone, that he has heard from Poonah that designs are entertained to deprive him of his enaum or jaghire villages held under the Peshwah in Berar, and he wishes that I should speak to the Peshwah in his favor. No names are mentioned; and it is more than probable that this is an attempt to obtain from the Peshwah a fresh confirmation of the grants. However, it is certainly desirable, under present circumstances, to keep the Rajah's ministers in good humour with us; and I shall be obliged to you if you will inquire quietly into the business, and interfere in their favor, if you find that a design is entertained to deprive them of their advantages in Berar.

To Lieut. Col. Gore.

Camp at Chinchore, 7th June, 1804.

I have just received your letter of the 25th May. I was much concerned to hear of Mr. M'Roberts' death, and I beg you to recommend for the situation whomsoever you may think best, provided it is not Mr. —, with whom I am acquainted. Col. — has, before now, favored the 33rd with officers of whom he did not entirely approve; but I think it as well that, if we can do so, we should choose for ourselves, particularly medical men. Mr. Christie is a very able man, but, of course, the 74th will not part with him; indeed, he is now senior assistant surgeon of that regiment, and I think has a better chance of promotion than he would have in the 33rd. At all events, supposing him to be removed to the latter, I could not allow him to quit the army. I do not understand how you manage Ensign —'s sale of his Ensigney; however, I conclude it is all right.

We cannot enlist Major Davison's band at the rate proposed. In

G. O.

6th June, 1804.

The corps which furnishes the adjutant of the day, will send its drums and fifes to the parade of the piquets and guards on halting days, and the band of the 78th regt. will play while they are marching off.

G. A. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Thursday, 7th June, 1804.

In order to ascertain the quantity of rice necessary to be thrown into the bazaars, for the supply of the public followers and officers' private servants, without allowing any surplus which might induce the inhabitants of the country to resort to the camp bazaars, officers commanding corps, heads of departments, and officers not attached, are requested to send to the superintendent of bazaars the numbers of public followers and private servants attached to corps, departments, and officers above specified. In this account puckalies, recruit boys, &c., who are not allowed rice by the Company, may be included, but not the Native troops.



respect to a purchaser *vice* Capt. West, you must settle that matter as you think proper. According to Knox's account, there are now 3 companies for sale, viz., Gaff's, Collington's, and West's. He has made his arrangements for the purchase of Gaff's, and he is the senior Lieutenant; he has therefore good ground to expect that he should be first recommended, and stand first as Captain. If Gaff has resigned his commission, I see no reason for delaying to recommend Knox for the company; and I wish you to send in the recommendations, and afterwards you will recommend the officers next in succession who will purchase the 2 other companies for sale. This mode of proceeding will be entirely consistent with justice to all parties. If Capt. Gaff's commission is not to be sold, Knox must then decide whether he will take Capt. West's or Capt. Collington's; and if he does not choose to do so, then the next in succession must be recommended.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Chinchore, 7th June, 1804.

I have received your private letter of the 30th May. My last public letter will have shown you that I had determined to delay my operations against Chandore, in consequence of the want of supplies in Col. Haliburton's corps, and the distressed state of the country in general; but that, as Col. Haliburton had authorised the attack of Umber, the design to commence operations against Holkar could no longer be concealed, and therefore that the best measure to be adopted was to call upon the Soubah to provide his contingent.

I now intend to send the battering train to Ahmednuggur, and thence to Aurangabad; and to desire Col. Haliburton to move as soon as he shall have a sufficient supply of provisions for his followers: he has plenty for his fighting men; and I propose to join his division either with the whole or a part of this, according to the prospect I may have of being able to feed them upon the march, as soon as I shall hear that Col. Haliburton is ready to advance. Holkar has no force in the Deccan, and he can bring none to interrupt us.

The jaghiredar system is known to be so bad, that it is a waste of time to notice its defects. It is particularly defective in times of scarcity, and when the troops are to be employed upon distant expeditions, as the jaghiredars have no money, and the troops get no pay, and desert to the enemy, or return to their homes. The remedy for this evil is certainly that which you propose, viz., to supply the jaghiredars with small sums of money occasionally; but the supply must be given with the knowledge and consent of the persons employed on the part of the Soubah's government, otherwise it will never be repaid: however, if, in the course of this service, I should see occasion to make advances of cash, and I should be able to afford it, I shall certainly make them.

In respect to the person to be in charge of the Soubah's forces, I acknowledge that I have no objection to Mohiput Ram. It appears that he possesses the confidence of the Soubah's government; and although I have had some reason to complain of him occasionally, I believe that upon the whole any other person would have given at least equal ground for complaint. He may therefore as well remain at the head of the army.

You will have heard that I had put Capt. — in arrest, in consequence of a complaint of Rajah Mohiput Ram; and I have assembled a General Court Martial for his trial. I should have sent you the papers upon this subject, only that I did not wish to make it the subject of public correspondence and remark, till the General Court Martial should decide upon it. As Capt. — had been employed upon some important occasions both by Col. Stevenson and me; and as I mentioned him more than once in a favorable point of view to the Governor General; and as I entertained a good opinion of him, I requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to reconsider his first complaint; and if he had no ground for it, excepting a trifling misunderstanding, which might occur between friends at any time, I should take no further notice of it; but that, if he should persist in it, Capt. — must be brought to trial. He did persist in making very serious complaints of Capt. —, whose explanations were by no means satisfactory, and he is now, I believe, before a General Court Martial.

I am obliged to you for the good intelligence you send me about money. I hope you will have sent the 6 laes of rupees to Ahmednuggur.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Chinchore, 8th June, 1804.

I wish you to take an opportunity of mentioning to the Governor General, that, having a very strong desire to return to Europe, I applied lately to the Commander in Chief for leave to quit this country when circumstances will permit it; and Gen. Lake has given me his permission to go whenever I may think proper.

My principal reason for wishing to go is, that I think I have served as long in India as any man ought, who can serve any where else; and I think that there appears a prospect of service in Europe, in which I should

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Friday, 8th June, 1804.

The rice thrown into the bazaars, under the orders of the 4th inst., is for the general benefit, and it is not intended to preclude any body from enjoying it, but it is intended principally for the followers of the army, both public and private; and accordingly Major Gen. Wellesley desires that measures should be taken by commanding officers and heads of departments, in order to secure to the followers what they should require. It appears, however, that the sepoys consider that they have an exclusive right of pre-emption in the bazaars, and that they have already been guilty of acts of riot and outrage, because they found that the orders and arrangements of commanding officers of corps under the particular directions of Major Gen. Wellesley were found to give a preference to the followers of the army, for whose subsistence, till then, no provision had been made. The sepoys forget that they receive daily an allowance of rice *gratis*, and that at all events they have no right of pre-emption, excepting under an order, and that Major Gen. Wellesley will not suffer violence, or outrage, or riot, on any account whatever. He now desires that orders may be given to the guards, in the different bazaars, to take up immediately any sepoys or any body that may be found rioting or endeavoring to force the sale of grain and provisions. Any person guilty of such outrages shall be punished, and the allowance of rice to any sepoys, who may be found guilty of riot, shall be stopped. Major Gen. Wellesley requests that commanding officers of corps will be very particular in explaining these orders to the sepoys, and particularly the causes for which the arrangements were made which were ordered on the 4th inst.

Major Gen. Wellesley particularly calls the attention of the adjutants to the regulations for mounting guards. The guards are to be paraded and marched off, according to these regulations; excepting in the inspection of the adjutant of the day, which, as the guards are inspected by the adjutants of corps, and by the officers of the guards to which they belong, is not immediately necessary; and the inspection of so many men by one officer would take up too much time. That inspection, therefore, need not be made in this camp.

be more likely to get forward. Another reason is, that I have been a good deal annoyed by the rheumatism in my back, for which living in a tent during another monsoon is not a very good remedy; and a third is, that I do not think I have been very well treated by the King's government.

It is now about 2 years since I have been a Major General, and nearly as much since I was appointed to the staff at Fort St. George, by Gen. Stuart. Since that time, it has been perfectly well known that I have led a body of British troops into the Marhatta territories; and supposing that I had no other pretensions to be placed on the staff, I might have expected a confirmation of Gen. Stuart's act, under those circumstances. The staff in India had been under consideration, and another officer had been appointed to it. This last reason for wishing to go to Europe is the only one which I have stated to Gen. Lake, although it is the least strong; as I am very certain that I shall have been appointed to the staff, as soon as it was known in England that I had reached Poonah with the army; and Gen. Lake has consented to my departure.

If the war with Holkar had not broken out, there would have been no difficulty in the business; and I should have been able to go in October, being the first period at which I could sail. As affairs are situated, I think it probable that the Governor General will have no objection to my departure, and this is the principal reason for which I trouble you. In the present state of affairs, I can do but little in the Deccan, and that little may as well be done by any body else. The siege of Chandora, when it can be undertaken, is a military operation of but little importance; and the operations of the troops from Guzerat are already beyond my guidance.

Under these circumstances, I wish that the Governor General would allow me to relinquish the command in the Deccan. If I should be able to go to England in October, it must be supposed that I have money matters to arrange in Mysore, and at Madras; particularly at the latter. My accounts of the late war, although sent up regularly every month, have not yet been passed. I am, therefore, very anxious to receive your answer to this letter, at an early period, in order that I may arrive at Madras, if possible, early in September. I need scarcely add, that, if the Governor General should have any desire that I should remain in this country, or should think that I can be of the smallest use to his plans, I shall remain with pleasure.

To Col. Close.

Camp, 8th June, 1804.

I return Wobbo's letter, from which it appears that the Nasserabad question is involved in all the obscurity that is possible. However, there appears to be an end of it.

I send you a letter and memorandum, and translations of them, received from Joor Baye. What shall I answer about money for the lady? If she will not come to Poonah, I suppose she may go to Chitwah; but I can arrange that she shall be supplied at Panwell, if it should be thought best to keep her there during the rains, supposing that she should determine not to go to Poonah.

that I shall be able to attack Holkar's possessions in Candeish before the rains are over.

Lieut. Col. Haliburton was in the district of Jalnapoor, north of the Godavery; but he has been obliged to fall back towards Urumah in Berar, to secure provisions for his camp. However, I trust I shall be able to weather through the rains.

I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to order forward the rice and bullocks, which have been so long in readiness at my call. Let them cross the Kistna, and come by the road of Culburga to Perinda, and thence to Ahmednuggur. I shall be obliged to you if you will send a small escort with them. If the officer in charge of them should find the Kistna full, I recommend that he should not keep the bullocks collected at the ghaut, but allow them to lay down their loads, and then either cross the river, or separate in different villages in the neighbourhood, either on the north or south bank of it. He may then have the rice bags passed over, and as soon as he shall have got them all over, he may call in his bullock men with their bullocks and carry them off. My reason for suggesting this measure to you is, that I know well that such a number of bullocks collected in any one place for the length of time that will be necessary to cross over with this rice, will suffer distress; and it is probable that, if the bullocks are separated, their owners will be able to get some shelter for them in the villages, by which their lives will be saved in case of a violent fall of rain. If the officer should adopt this plan, he ought to keep the principal owners or their head servants by him, in order to know where he can find the bullocks when he may require them.

I shall keep you informed of every thing that occurs. Col. Murray has marched with a detachment from Guzerat into Malwa towards Ougein; and Seindiah's army has, I believe, joined Col. Monson. The southern jaghiredars are all in tranquillity, but their conduct must always be closely watched. I have lately sent the 2nd batt. 12th regt. to garrison Hullihall in Soonda, and eventually to replace at Goa the corps of Bombay Native infantry, which I had drawn from thence into Guzerat.

There is no occasion for the escort with the bullocks and rice hurrying on the march to Ahmednuggur.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Chinchore, 9th June, 1804.

Since I wrote to you last I have received very bad accounts of the state of the countries to the northward; and particularly of Lieut. Col. Haliburton's resources and supplies. He had been obliged to draw nearer to Berar, in order to save the troops from the greatest distress. I have also been obliged to draw grain from the depôt formed at Poonah, a measure, however, to which I had long expected to be reduced; but at the same time the necessity for it exists, and consequently, in case I should march, there will be much work for the cattle. I am sorry to say they are sadly reduced in condition, and die in numbers, owing to the late rains. However, I do not yet give up all hopes of marching, at least with a part of my corps, and of being able to make the siege of Chandore during the rains. I shall immediately send on the battering train to Ahmednuggur,

if not to Aurungabad, and shall try to march as soon as Col. Haliburton is prepared.

The depôt at Poonah is large, and will hold out till the harvest; I have another at Ahmednuggur, and I have more supplies coming up from Bombay. God knows how the unfortunate inhabitants of Poonah and of this wretched country are to live through the rains. Since they have commenced, the most common grains have sold there for 2 seers for a rupee; and even at that price they are with difficulty procured.

You will have before you, in a public form, the mode in which the rice is issued from our depôt. It sells in the camp for 6 seers for a rupee, which is well enough, considering that the remainder of the country is starving. But I am forced to restrict the sale of rice to the followers of the army, otherwise all the starving wretches in the country would flock to camp for subsistence, and would soon reduce us to the same state with themselves. Gram and all common grains are at 2 seers for a rupee. In short, such is the state of the country, that it will require some ingenuity to keep the troops together, and in an efficient state, till the rains are over. There is nothing new from Hindustan.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Chinchore, 9th June, 1804.

I am rejoiced to hear that you are so near us again. I will go to see you at Poonah if you cannot come here; but you can have no idea what a fine healthy camp I have got.

What do you mean to do? Do you stay with me, or go to Mysore, or go to Bombay and to sea? If you adopt the last plan, I shall be obliged to you if you will let me have some of your finest camels. Forbes writes to me from Bombay that you have got 2 Mocha Arab horses, but does not like them much, although one of them costs 1000, the other 950 dollars. However, Forbes is not a good judge of horses, for, if I recollect right, he joined in opinion with the wags who did not admire the Wahahy.

To Capt. Harvey.

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

I received only last night your letter of the 25th April, and I assure you that the respect and regard which you profess for your late friend, Col. Harness, have tended to increase the good opinion I had already entertained of your character.

I am much concerned to hear that detailed and accurate accounts of the circumstances attending the sickness and death of Col. Harness had not been sent to his regiment; and I certainly should have written to Mr. Christie or yourself, if I had not had reason to believe that one of the officers of the staff, attached to Col. Harness, would have given you those details. Col. Harness was taken ill a day or two before the battle of Argaum, on the 29th Nov.; and he was so unwell upon that occasion as to be delirious when the troops were going into the action, and I was obliged to order him into his palanquin. After the battle of Argaum, the army made some rapid marches towards Ellichpoor, in order to prevent the enemy from taking a new position under the protection of the fort of Gawilghur, which did Col. Harness no good; and on our arrival at Ellichpoor, he went into that place for the benefit of his health. He

remained there during the siege of Gawilghur, and I saw him afterwards as the army was marching through Ellichpoor towards Nagpoor, and he was much recovered.

Peace having been concluded with the Rajah of Berar, the army returned to the westward through Ellichpoor, and I saw Col. Harness again much recovered; but he appeared to have a shortness of breath, which I attributed to weakness; particularly as he had no complaint at that time; yet he said that he did not find himself sufficiently recovered to join the army, a measure to which I earnestly urged him. A few days afterwards I heard of his death. It appears by the papers which I enclose that his disorder was in the heart. He was attended by Mr. Gilmour, the head surgeon of the army, and by Mr. Baird, the surgeon of the hospital at Ellichpoor. Every attention was paid to him, and he had every comfort about him which he could have had. But these gentlemen appear to be of opinion that the disorder was one of long standing, and of a nature not to be got the better of in any situation. I had heard for some time before Col. Harness' death that he intended to quit the army, and I gave particular directions that his papers might be examined, to see if he had signed his resignation. I enclose a copy of a paper which was found a considerable length of time after his decease. It was immediately sent to me, and I forwarded it to the Commander in Chief, with a request and recommendation that Col. Harness' commission might be sold. I have received no answer to this application; but I see that Col. Harness' commission is given to another officer, and therefore I conclude that the Commander in Chief had determined not to attend to my recommendation. You will see that this paper is dated in December, and that Col. Harness died in January.

I enclose the copy of an order to Col. Wallace, regarding the disposal of Col. Harness' effects, and a statement of the measures taken in consequence of those orders.

It is probable that nothing can tend to diminish the regret and grief of Mrs. Harness for the loss she has sustained, and she must have been well acquainted with the merits of the person who is the subject of this letter. But it may be satisfactory to her to know that, in the late arduous contest in the Deccan, Col. Harness filled an important station in the army, that he conducted himself upon every occasion in a manner most satisfactory to me and honorable to himself, and that his death was lamented by the whole army, and by no person more than by myself.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that a person, by name Dermanauth Naig, of Puttun, is detained or in confinement at Hyderabad. He belongs to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; that Chief is interested about him; and I shall accordingly be much obliged to you if you will exert your influence that he may be released; unless what may appear to you good reasons should exist for keeping him in confinement.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the —, relative to the

offer made by Kaleb Khan Patan to Mr. Crow. The lands held by that person are situated in Candeish, south of the Taptee, and are not in that part of Holkar's territories which will go to Seindiah, in the event of a successful termination of the contest. They are situated in the territories which will go to the Peshwah. This being the case, I have consulted the wishes of the Peshwah regarding Kaleb Khan Patan's offer, and the result is, that I consider myself authorised to instruct you as follows: You will inform Kaleb Khan, that the object of the British government, in its preparations for hostilities against Holkar, is to obtain security for the peace of the British territories, and for the territories of the allies, which Holkar had determined to disturb; that the British government has no desire to increase its possessions; and that, therefore, there will be no objection to adopt an arrangement with him of the nature of that which he has proposed, provided he serves cordially in the war, and provided he engages to serve the Peshwah with zeal and fidelity hereafter. You will then call upon Kaleb Khan to give you a list of the talooks which he possesses, stating the value of each. If they do not exceed the value of one lac and 50,000 rupees annually, you will tell Kaleb Khan that he may keep them, on the ground of giving the service of a proportionate body of men. If they should exceed that sum, however, you must avoid to engage that Kaleb Khan shall keep the whole of them. You will in that case give him assurances that he shall have a handsome provision at the end of the war, in the service of his Highness the Peshwah; and if he should press you to come to particulars, you will tell him that he shall have a jaghire of the value of one lac and 50,000 rupees annually.

I acknowledge that I think it very doubtful whether Kaleb Khan will ever join you under any circumstances; particularly with a body of men even of one fourth of the numbers he has stated. All the Natives are in the habit of exaggerating the numbers of their troops; the Patans, of all others, are the most prone to falsehood and deceit of every description. The Patans are better and more expensive troops than the Marhattas, and all Holkar's possessions in Candeish would not defray the expense of the body offered by Kaleb Khan. It is not impossible, therefore, that the offer was only made to try his ground, and to have a plea for a favorable consideration hereafter, in case the war should be concluded successfully. The mode proposed, however, of conducting the negotiation, will be attended with many advantages, and cannot cause future inconvenience.

I hope soon to hear that you have marched into Malwa, according to my letter of the 22nd ult. I have no news for you from this quarter. My prospects are very bad indeed.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Lieut. Shawe, of the 74th regt., and I beg leave to recommend him to your favor and protection. He is an officer with whose conduct I have had every reason to be satisfied, and he was wounded at the battle of Assye.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I have recommended your bro-

ther, Lieut. Shawe, to Gen. Lake, to be appointed a Captain in the 74th regt., in the room of Major Sutherland, appointed Major of the Newfoundland Fencibles. I think it will be advisable for you to urge the Commander in Chief to promote your brother; and therefore I give you this intelligence.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the dimensions of all the pieces of ordnance with this division of the army which require new carriages; and a list of stores required here, which cannot be procured at Bombay, and which must come from Madras. I recommend that all the carriages which will probably be made at Seringapatam might be sent at an early period of the season to Mangalore, and there embarked for Bombay: from whence I shall bring them up to Poonah or to Ahmednuggur.

I recommend that the other articles of stores may be sent by sea from Madras to Bombay; excepting the tents, which will probably be made in the northern Circars, and might come by land to Ahmednuggur, as they would receive damage at sea, unless more care is taken in stowing them in the ship than can be expected. In this return of stores I have not included arms or accoutrements for the infantry. However, unless the arsenal at Bombay should be replenished, particularly with the former, it will not be very capable of supplying our demands. With these articles of public stores it would be very desirable to receive the horse accoutrements belonging to commanding officers of corps of cavalry. But upon this point I shall communicate with those officers.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. —, Bombay.*

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

In consequence of the reports in circulation in this camp, that the value of the camp equipage of the 1st batt. 2nd regt. Native infantry, which you received on succeeding Lieut. Col. Mackay in the command of that corps, had not yet been paid to him, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley deemed it incumbent on him to take measures for the security of Lieut. Col. Mackay's interest in that camp equipage, on the occasion of its being transferred from you to Major Mealy, and caused an inquiry to be made on the subject, the result of which is that a short time ago the value of the camp equipage had not been paid. He has therefore directed Major Mealy to lodge the money which he has to pay you on account of the camp equipage in the Paymaster's treasury, until an answer be received from Lieut. Col. Mackay's agents at Madras, to a letter written to them on the subject.

*The D.A.G. to Major Mealy.*

Camp at Chinchore, 10th June, 1804.

In consequence of a report in camp that the value of the camp equipage which Lieut. Col. G—— received on his succeeding Lieut. Col. Mackay in the command of the 1st batt. 2nd regt., and which has lately been transferred from him to you, has not yet been paid to Col. Mackay or his agents, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has taken measures to ascertain that point; and he directs me to desire that, when you find it convenient to pay the value put upon the camp equipage, carriage, &c., received from Lieut. Col. G——, you will lodge the money in the Paymaster's treasury in camp, to wait the General's further orders concerning the disposal of it.

To Capt. Wilks.

Camp at Chinchore, 12th June, 1804.

I have just received your letter of the 3rd, and I am obliged to you for your intention of sending up the clothing, although I have clothed all the



troops. I have already, at the suggestion of Bistnapah, ordered the relief of the parties of horse at Goorgherry and Sungoly.

No news, excepting that Major Malcolm is arrived at Poonah, and is by no means well.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Chinchore, 13th June, 1804.

I enclose 2 letters from your newswriter at Bombay. I should have gone to Poonah this morning, if the weather had been fair; but I shall go the first fair moment that occurs.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Chinchore, 15th June, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 26th and 27th May, and 1st and 2nd June. I have no doubt but that you will be well supplied with money, in consequence of the arrangements made for that purpose by Mr. Duncan. You must be the best judge of the benefit of Terwaddy's contract; but I should have thought it a convenient arrangement.

The Joudpoor and Oudepoor Rajahs are in direct communication with the Commander in Chief. The former has made a treaty with him. I refer you to my instructions upon this point. Ahmedabad is not and will not be ours.

Beware of all engagements with the tributary Rajahs, without communication with the Residents at the durbars of Sehidiah, the Guickwar, and the Peshwal. These are the 3 principal powers in that part of India.

Communicate the offer from the Kutch Rajah of Burhampoor to Major Walker and to Mr. Duncan.

If Canojee's brother is to have personal liberty, I am afraid we shall have no hold of him, or security for his good behaviour, unless his personal liberty should be confined to the island of Bombay or Salsette; and that we should keep him nuzzerbaud, or, in other words, in sight of an

G. A. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Tuesday, 12th June, 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley desires that the regiments of cavalry may parade on horseback twice at least in each week, weather permitting; and that, whenever a regiment is paraded on horseback, it may perform some of the movements ordered for the practice and discipline of the cavalry. Commanding officers of regiments will take care that whatever movements they perform, or formations they make, are strictly conformable to the regulations. Major Gen. Wellesley also recommends that on the days on which, on account of the low state of the horses, the regiments of cavalry are not ordered to be taken out to exercise on horseback, the regiments may be out and exercised on foot, particularly in their wheelings and facings, and in those movements which will give them an understanding of the English words of command, as it is obvious that, until the sepoy is accustomed to understand the meaning of those words of command, they cannot obey any commands given to them.

G. A. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Thursday, 14th June, 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley will see the line of Native infantry out at exercise at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning, the weather permitting. Corps to parade in open column of companies, the right in front; the 5th brigade to close up to the 4th; piquets and quarter guards to join, sentries excepted.

G. A. O.

15th June, 1804.

A salute of 11 guns to be held in readiness in the park, to be fired on Col. Montesor's arrival at head quarters. Capt. Limond will post sentinels with banderols to pass the signals.

hircarrah: however, Major Walker will give you an answer upon this subject.

I can give you no hopes of the 84th. It is the only corps which garrisons Bombay, and I cannot venture to ask Mr. Duncan to send it to you. I have long considered our game, as it affected our situation at Bombay, to be very desperate; and particularly as we know that the French are strong in European India, and their squadron, when joined with that of the Dutch, not inferior to our own, we ought to beware to weaken that settlement too much.

The allied troops generally plunder for themselves, and carry nothing to account. We carry every thing to the public account, and government gives order for the disposal of the captured property; and, in consideration of a variety of circumstances in the late war affecting the allies as well as ourselves, the Governor General did not order that any thing should be given to the allies. However, this depends entirely upon the government. The plan which you must pursue is, to have an account taken of every article of property captured, and a valuation made. You must report on the subject, and the government will order the disposal of the property. This is the mode in which I have proceeded.

I am afraid that you can get no artillery; however, I will inquire upon the subject from Mr. Duncan. Scindiah is most anxious for your approach to Ougein; he will, I believe, join you himself. I have been obliged to relinquish all hopes of marching for some time; the country is entirely destroyed, and I do not think a company would find subsistence in it, much less an army.

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Saturday, 16th June, 1804.

Major Gen. Wallesley requests the attention of officers commanding corps of infantry to the following instructions, when several battalions are required to march in line:

1. When the battalion is in line, the post of the commanding officer is in the rear of the centre.
2. When the line is ordered to advance, each battalion is to march by its own centre, in the same manner as if it were alone. The commanding officer of each battalion is to fix upon an object perpendicular to the centre of his own battalion, upon which the officer who leads the battalion is to march.
3. The *bavildar* or sergeant in the centre of the battalion between the colors is to follow exactly the steps of the officer or non-commissioned officer who leads the battalion.
4. After the battalion shall have advanced a certain distance, the commanding officer will be able to see whether it approaches, or recedes from, the battalion which will have been named as that which leads the line. If he should find that the due distance is not preserved, he is to alter the direction of his march, and point out another object to the officer or non-commissioned officer who shall lead the battalion, to which the leader will gradually alter his direction, and his steps will be strictly followed by the non-commissioned officers placed between the colors.
5. All changes of directions of a battalion marching in line, particularly if they are great changes, are equivalent to a wheel of the battalion on its centre, a movement of a very complicated nature, which requires time and great accuracy.
6. It follows, therefore, that in no case whatever must the pace of the battalion be hurried whilst the alteration of the direction is making; or that, when it becomes necessary to alter the direction to any great degree, it would be best to mark the time till the alteration is completed, and then to bring up the battalion to its place.
7. It must sometimes happen that the alteration of the direction of the march of the other battalions is so great as that it cannot be made by the wheel of the battalion each upon its centre: when the alteration of the direction of a battalion is from any cause of this magnitude, it ought to be made by the *échelon* march of divisions.
8. When the commanding officer of a battalion in line finds it necessary to alter the direction of its march, he should apprise thereof the commanding officer of the next battalion on the flank most distant from the leading battalion.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp at Chinchore, 15th June, 1804.

I enclose the letter from Shawe. I received the original from Bombay this morning.

Murray must be at Ougein by this time. He marched from Beer-poor on the 2nd. He has got plenty of money, but he now complains of want of men, of Europeans particularly, as he has only 2 complete regiments, and he asks for the 84th regt., which is the only corps at Bombay! I am glad to find that I shall have you here soon. Col. Montresor will be here this afternoon.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Young, agent for public cattle.*

15th June, 1804.

In consideration of the high price of provisions at present, and the smallness of the pay of the cavardie men attached to the Hon. Company's elephants, which is only 5½ rupees per month, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley authorises you to draw an additional sum of 1½ rupee monthly, as a gratuity, for each cavardie man present in camp, and to pay the same to them from the 1st of June until further orders.

You will explain clearly to the cavardie men that the gratuity is given for the particular reasons above stated, and is not to be adduced as any precedent, but will be discontinued whenever the General may have reason to be dissatisfied with their conduct, or when the price of provisions becomes so low that he shall consider their net pay as sufficient for them.

To Major Malcolm.

Camp, 16th June, 1804.

I send letters just come in from Shawe, and others from Webbe. I shall still wait for the public dispatch, which I ought to get to-morrow. Send back the enclosed by the bearer. When will you and the Colonel come out?

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Chinchore, 18th June, 1804.

I conclude that you will have received the Governor General's notes of the 25th May;\* and I proceed to inform you of the measures which I shall take in consequence of them.

1st: I propose to request Mr. Duncan not to stop Col. Murray's march into Malwa.

2ndly: To send H. M.'s 78th regt. to Bombay; and to get from thence the battalion of the 7th regt. reinforced to 1000 men. By the arrival of this battalion I shall be able to relieve 2 of the Coast battalions; and I propose to march 2 of them to the southward, with the 19th dragoons and the 4th regt. of cavalry, and the greater part, if not the whole, of the Coast artillery. I shall only put these corps in motion towards Mysore, expecting that you will give orders as to their destination.

3rdly: I propose to order 2 of the battalions of the Nizam's subsidiary force to march towards Hyderabad; which will enable you to order either those 2 battalions, or the 2 battalions now at Hyderabad, into the Company's territories.

The weakest of the corps shall go from that place; and the 1st of the 4th, and the 1st of the 10th, from hence. I shall leave here the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry, as both together they do not make more than one regiment of the strength which the Peshwah ought to have.

You have thus the outline of my plan for sending away the troops. By

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 68: Notes of Instruction of the Governor General to the Commander in Chief, Major Gen. Wellesley, and the Governors of Fort St. George and Bombay.

marching the 4 corps, ordered to go immediately to the southward into Malabar, or Canara, or Goa, it will be possible to bring up the Bombay corps in the month of August, and thus to effect the relief at a very early period indeed. But I shall write to you in detail upon all the points connected with the Governor General's notes as soon as possible. I only now give you notice of the outline of my plan for carrying into execution the order of the Governor General. I shall proceed to Mysore as soon as possible.

I am afraid that this arrangement of the subsidiary force at Poonah will alter those which I had made for it, and that Lieut. Bellingham will lose his office: that being the case, therefore, if you should not already have appointed an officer to fill Capt. Cunningham's office, I shall be obliged to you if you will appoint Lieut. Bellingham to be D. Q. M. G. in Mysore.

I omitted to mention, that as all the corps are weak, and as the siege of Chandore must still be undertaken, I propose to leave the subsidiary force at Poonah the 74th regt. till your orders shall be received.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Chinchore, 18th June, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received from his Excellency the Governor General notes which are to form the basis of instructions to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, to his Excellency the Commander in Chief and myself, dated the 25th May; in which I observe that his Excellency has given orders that the troops should not be moved from Guzerat into Malwa.

The movement of Col. Murray's corps has been made into Malwa, by this time, under my instructions to Col. Murray of the 7th May, a copy of which was laid before you; and it is to be apprehended that many bad consequences may result from withdrawing that corps from Malwa at present. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of delaying to carry into execution that part of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General, till you shall receive his Excellency's further directions. In respect to the other part of the notes, it appears to be the intention of his Excellency the Governor General, that the subsidiary force of Poonah shall be composed of Bombay troops, and that those in the service of the government of Fort St. George shall occupy Malabar, Canara, and Goa.

It is obviously necessary that the government of Fort St. George should in the first instance be enabled to relieve the Bombay troops in those provinces, which can be done at an early period only by placing at their disposal some of the corps now at Poonah. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting the following plan to you: that the 78th regt. should be sent to Bombay, and that the 1st batt. 7th regt. should be sent to Poonah. As the corps to form the subsidiary force with the Peshwah must be each 1000 strong, this corps might be completed to that number by drafts from the 2nd of the 9th, or the Fencible battalion. The arrival of the 1st batt.

G. A. O.

Camp at Chinchore, 18th June, 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley will see the whole line of infantry out at exercise at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning, weather permitting.  
(Other arrangements as on the 14th.)

7th regt. at Poonah will enable me to send 2 battalions belonging to the government of Fort St. George to the southward; and with these and 2 others, which I purpose to order from the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the relief can be commenced in Canara and Malabar immediately.

I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether you approve of this suggestion, and whether it will be carried into execution? I also request to be informed what is the earliest period at which vessels can be sent to the coast of Malabar and Canara to bring up the corps from those provinces.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Chinchore, 19th June, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th inst., with

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, Tuesday, 19th June, 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley will present the new Union colors to the 1st batt. 4th regt. Native infantry on the parade at 6 o'clock this evening, if the weather permits.

Upon the arrival of Major Gen. Wellesley in front of the battalion, the 1st grenadier company, together with the commanding officer of the corps, and the officers who are to receive the new colors, will move out to the front. These officers will bring with them the old colors. When Major Gen. Wellesley shall deliver the new colors to the commanding officer, the battalion will present arms, the officers salute, and the drums beat a march. The grenadier company, advanced in front to receive the colors, will at the same time present arms, the officers salute, &c.

After the colors shall have been received, the grenadier company will move off towards the battalion. Upon its arrival at the right of the corps, it will file off from its left and march down the line. The front rank to march between the line of officers and the front rank of the battalion, and the rear rank between the front and rear ranks, the officers with the colors in front of the line of officers.

When arrived at the left of the battalion, the front and rear ranks are to wheel to their left, and to return along the line of the battalion, the front rank between the front and rear rank of the line, and the rear rank in the rear of the line, to their places in the line. The officers with the colors are to return along the front of the line to their places.

The battalion will present arms, the officers salute, and drums beat a march, when the company with the colors arrives upon the right; and will shoulder arms, &c., when the officers and colors take their places in line. The battalion will then break into an open column of companies, right in front, and march past the General to its lines.

The following corps to prepare to march at a short notice: 19th dragoons, 4th Native cavalry, 1st batt. 4th regt., 1st batt. 10th regt. N.I., the pioneers, with the exception of 5 complete companies (which is to include the detachment at Ahmednuggur) under Capt. Barclay.

The 6 six pounders, and their tumbrils, arrack carts, and carts to contain arrack for the 19th light dragoons and artillery, for 2 months, to accompany these troops.

Capt. Young will allot 1250 draught cattle, with their drivers, to do duty with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah.

(Major Robertson, as agent for public cattle, to have charge of them.)

Capt. Young will likewise deliver over to Major Robertson the charge of the elephants attached to the 7th regt., and of the camels, &c., belonging to the government of Bombay, with accounts of their rations and food of the cattle, mode of payment, and of the people.

The following is to be the establishment of carriage cattle in the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah till further orders:

5000	carriage bullocks,	including spare,	in the grain department.
1000	do.	do.	do. in the store department.
300	do.	do.	do. in the department of Commissary of provisions.

The officers at the heads of these departments respectively will receive orders detailing the articles which those bullocks are to carry.

(1500 loads of rice, carried on as many bullocks, ordered to accompany the department.)

G. A. O.

19th June, 1804.

Two salutes, of 15 guns each, to be held in readiness in the park to-morrow, to be fired on the departure of Col. Close and Major Malcolm.

which you have sent the copy of the petition of Sr. Christovão da Costa Maquiras to the Hon. the Governor in Council. It is my opinion that that person has no claim whatever upon the bounty of the British government, under the proclamation of his Excellency the Governor General, of Aug. 1803; and accordingly, I beg to recommend that he may be disposed of in such manner as the Hon. the Governor in Council is accustomed to dispose of vagabond Portuguese, by taking care to prevent his return to the territories or the service of the Marhattas.

To Major Shawe.

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

I received, only the day before yesterday, your letters of the 23rd and 25th May, and the Governor General's letters of the 26th; and yesterday the Governor General's of the 30th.

I am carrying into execution, in some degree, the instruction of the 25th May, reducing as far as possible the expense without diminishing the efficiency of the troops; and, in the course of 3 or 4 days, I shall send to Bengal a full account of all my measures, and of the reasons which have induced me to adopt them. Col. Murray is, I hope, already in Malwa, and I have not recalled him, for reasons which I think will be thought sufficient. The Governor General will also have an account of the plan of operations for the troops in the Deccan in this campaign.

I hope to be able to quit the army on the day after to-morrow. I must have an interview with the Peshwah, and then I shall not stop any where, till I shall arrive at Calcutta; excepting for a day or two at Madras. I go by that place, first, because I shall lose but little time in doing so; and next, because I should not have the means of giving the Governor General the information which he will require, without seeing Gen. Stuart. I shall be at Calcutta, I think, by the 1st Aug.: if the Governor General should have gone up the country, I shall join him most expeditiously by dawk. Give orders that a palanquin may be made for me; let it be very light, with the panels made of canvass, instead of wood, and the poles fixed, as for a dooley. Your P'engally palanquins are so heavy, that they cannot be used out of Calcutta. I shall be much obliged to you if you will urge the Governor General not to alter the arrangement for the command of the subsidiary force at Poonah till I shall have seen him.

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

A Committee to assemble at Lieut. Col. Chalmers' tent at 5 o'clock this afternoon, to examine a number of the Hon. Company's draught bullocks on the Madras establishment, reported to have become unfit for service through age. The Committee will cause such bullocks as they deem unfit for the service to be marked with the letter R in their presence.

The 19th dragoons and 1st batt. of artillery are to be completed with doolies with Carnatic bearers from the supernumerary Carnatic bearers now employed: 100 of the best of the doolies are to be lodged in the stores at Poonah, to be employed hereafter in the removal of the hospital from Ellichpore; and the remainder to be sent with the bearers to Bombay.

The camp dawk is to be considered in the charge of the Resident at Poonah, from the 1st June; and all expenses will be paid by the Resident from that period. The accounts, and all information, &c., to be delivered over to the Postmaster at the Residency.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Clinchore, 20th June, 1804.

Since I addressed you last, I have received the Governor General's instructions of the 30th May, in which I am ordered to proceed to Bengal.\* I should imagine that the object in calling me to Bengal is to communicate with me upon several subjects connected with military affairs in this country; and as I cannot speak with information or confidence upon any subject, without being acquainted with your sentiments and those of the Governor of Fort St. George; and as I shall lose but little time by going to Madras, and certainly derive advantage from it, I purpose to go by that place through Mysore. I write, therefore, this day to Lord W. Bentinck, to request that he will order that palanquin boys may be posted on the road for me from Seringapatam, and that a vessel may be prepared to sail with me to Calcutta. I hope to be at Madras in the middle of July.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th inst.; and I shall avail myself of the means which you have adopted for my convenience. I should be happy to have an opportunity of meeting you, only that I think it necessary to go to Madras; and I believe my journey will be more expeditious through Mysore than through the Soubah's territories. I hope to hear from you if you should be of opinion that I can be of any service to you in Bengal.

I have commenced carrying into execution the Governor General's instructions of the 25th May, in some degree; and in order to enable Gen. Stuart to draw from Hyderabad the 2 battalions now stationed there, without inconvenience to you, I have ordered 2 battalions, the 1st of the 6th, and 2nd of the 9th, from Col. Haliburton's camp towards Hyderabad; and I have desired Col. Haliburton to draw the 2 battalions of the 11th out of Berar to his own camp. I am preparing a dispatch for you, which will point out my ideas regarding our operations in the Deccan. I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that the money coming from Masulipatam may be sent forward as soon as it may arrive at Hyderabad.

\* Marquis Wellesley to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. (*Extract.*) 30th May, 1804.

6. Under these circumstances, my expectation is, that you may be enabled, immediately after having issued your orders for the execution of the plan contained in my instructions of the 25th May, 1804, to proceed to Fort William (by whatever route may appear to you to be most convenient) for the purpose of communicating with me and with the Commander in Chief upon the various and important political and military questions now depending in India, and bearing an intimate relation to your political commission and military command. I therefore authorise you at such period of time as may appear to you to be most convenient to proceed directly either by land or sea to Fort William, and I have ordered the commissioners in Cuttack, and the Residents at Hyderabad and Poona, to make every practicable preparation for your conveyance by land, and the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay to provide armed vessels for your passage, to be stationed at Bombay and at Masulipatam, in order to receive you at either of those ports according to your determination, which I request you to signify at the earliest period of time to those authorities respectively.

7. In the event of your preferring the journey by land, you will also be pleased to make the necessary communication to the Resident at Hyderabad, to the commissioners at Cuttack, and to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay.

It is desirable that it should be divided into two equal sums, each having an equal proportion of the different coins. Let Col. Haliburton know when you will send it off, in order that a detachment from his corps may meet the sum for his use, at any place on the road to Ahmednuggur that you may appoint; and the remainder might proceed on to Ahmednuggur. This will save time, and the detachment at Hyderabad the trouble of making a march to Col. Haliburton's camp.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

Your Lordship will have received from his Excellency the Governor General the copies of his orders to me of the 25th and 30th May; and Lieut. Gen. Stuart will have laid before you the outline of the measures which I proposed to adopt in consequence of the receipt of the former. From the nature of the subjects on which it is his Excellency's wish to communicate with me personally, I judge that I shall appear before him with very defective information, unless I should be previously made acquainted with your Lordship's sentiments, and those of Gen. Stuart. I therefore propose to go to Madras on my way to Calcutta, that I may pay my respects to your Lordship, and receive your orders; and because I think I shall lose but little time, and shall derive great advantage by this deviation from the direct route. I propose to go through Mysore: I shall therefore be much obliged to your Lordship if you will direct the officers of the police at Madras to send bearers for me on the road to Seringapatam, and if you will give directions that a vessel may be ready to transport me from Madras to Calcutta, or the mouth of the Hoogly. I hope to reach Madras in the middle of July.

To Capt. Wilks.

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

I beg you to inform Purneah, that in consequence of orders from the Governor General, I have broken up the army, and have established the subsidiary force at Poonah; and that I propose to commence my march to Seringapatam on the day after to-morrow. I shall proceed by Hurryhur, &c., and I shall lose no time upon the road. I have also ordered Bistnapah into Mysore; but I cannot tell whether he will join our troops near Meritch, and cross the Kistna at Erroor, or cross it lower down by Beejapoor.

I shall be obliged to you if you will ask Purneah to give orders that I may be supplied on my march through Mysore.

To Major Graham.

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your private letter of the 16th inst., containing a copy of the evidence against the freebooter impostor Seyd Sultaun Aly. I know nothing about that person; and I do not believe that he has ever been even a menial servant of mine. I desire that he may be publicly whipped in the pettah of Ahmednuggur, for having made use of my name to plunder the country; and that he and his followers may be put in irons, and employed for 6 months at hard labor upon the works of Ahmednuggur.

I desire that you will make inquiry into the circumstances of the



murder committed between Coraygaum and Soopah; and if you should find that the persons who are now in confinement in the main guard at Ahmednuggur are guilty of it, I beg you to give orders that they may be hanged in a public place.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Chinchore, 20th June, 1804.

In consequence of the arrangement settled with you, I have given directions to the camp post master to hand over to the post master at the Residency the camp dawks, which are to be paid by you from the 1st inst. It is my opinion, that it will be necessary to keep up the line of communication between Poonah and Hurryhur, by Mcritch; and as long as the hospital shall remain at Ellichpoor, the line of communication with that place. But the line with Major Gen. Campbell's camp by Beejapoor may be discontinued; as it is probable that his division will have marched to the Company's territories.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Chinchore, 22nd June, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th inst. The arrangement which you have made for sending on the treasure which you say had arrived at Hyderabad is very satisfactory, viz.,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees to Col. Haliburton's camp, and 6 lacs of rupees to Ahmednuggur.

When the sum of money, which you mention left Masulipatam for Hyderabad on the 1st inst., shall arrive, I request you to have it divided into two equal sums, each containing an equal number of the same description of coins, of which one sum is to go to Col. Haliburton's camp, the other to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops in this quarter. I request you to fix a place on the road, to which Lieut. Col. Haliburton shall send a detachment to meet the money intended for his use. He will thereby receive it at an earlier period, and the detachment from Hyderabad will be saved the trouble of making a very long march.

I am concerned to hear of your disappointment in the hire of cattle. Gen. Campbell has informed me that he has dispatched 4000 bullocks loaded with rice to Hyderabad; and I request you to send them to Col. Haliburton's camp. I also request you to forward to Col. Haliburton's camp, or to Aurungabad, any quantity of grain that may be collected at Hyderabad, whether from Masulipatam, by order of the Commander in Chief, or by your own exertions in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad. I shall apprise Col. Haliburton of the resources still existing in the Soubah's forts.

I am much obliged to you for the offer of elephants, in the postscript of your letter; but this part of the equipment of the troops is in the most efficient state, and the assistance proposed will not be required.

To Major Graham.

Camp at Chinchore, 22nd June, 1804.

When I was at Poonah, in the end of February last, you sent me a

G. O.

Camp at Chinchore, 21st June, 1804.

Ryloo, head guide, Chiunia, second guide, 4 private guides of the corps, and the 8 Marhatta guides, are to do duty with the subsidiary force; and the other 6 guides to join the troops ordered to be ready to march.

report on the revenue of Ahmednuggur, made up in a book, which I have by accident mislaid, and I request you to send me another copy of it.

You will be so kind as to send me your accounts to the end of June; and afterwards to send them and make your reports to the Resident at Poonah, from whom you will receive further directions.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Chinchore, 22nd June, 1804.

Jeswant Rao Goorparah has requested me to give him a letter to you. His object is to have a ground for troubling you with his master's affairs in Chumargoonda, &c., should it be necessary to give you any trouble; and I have only to request that you will listen to him.

To Gen. Lake.

Camp at Chinchore, 24th June, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you, that in consequence of the orders which I have received from the Governor General, dated the 25th May, I intend to send, without loss of time, into the Company's territories, the 19th dra-

G. O.

Camp at Poonah, Sunday, 24th June, 1804.

The following corps, &c., are to compose the subsidiary force serving with H. H. the Peshwah, under command of Lieut. Col. Wallace:

5th and 7th regts. Native cavalry.  
Detachments of Madras and Bombay artillery.  
H. M. 74th and 78th regts.  
1st batt. 2nd regt. Madras N. I.  
2nd batt. 3rd do. do.  
1st batt. 8th do. do.  
2nd batt. 18th do. do.

Lieut. Col. Haliburton, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Subahdar of the Deccan, and Lieut. Col. Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, will each place themselves under the authority of the Resident at the darbar of the powers, in whose service the troops under their command are employed, according to the orders and regulations of government upon this subject. Col. Murray and the troops in Malwa will receive further orders for their guidance from the authorities at Bombay.

Upon the occasion of quitting the army, in consequence of the orders of the Governor General, Major Gen. Wellesley once more returns his thanks to the officers and troops for their uniform good conduct since he has had the honor of commanding them. In the space of little more than a year, those in this quarter in particular, now composing the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Subahdar of the Deccan, and those which are under orders to march to the southward, have been tried in every mode in which it is possible to try troops, and have uniformly manifested that patience under fatigues and severity of climate, that activity and perseverance in labor, and bravery and discipline in action, which are the characteristic qualities of the best soldiers: their success, and the honor which the troops have acquired, are proportionate to the good qualities which they have displayed: on which qualities, Major Gen. Wellesley has always had the fullest reliance in every emergency of the service. He now recommends to them an adherence to the principles which have brought them with honor through so many difficulties, as the certain pledge of future success.

Major Gen. Wellesley has frequently reported the good conduct of the troops to the Commander in Chief and the Governor General, and has recommended them to the notice of their Excellencies. He will not fail to recommend individuals who have had opportunities of distinguishing themselves, whenever an occasion may offer; and he assures all that he shall ever remember and reflect with satisfaction on their conduct and services, and that in every situation in which he may be placed, he will be happy to forward their views.

Major Gen. Wellesley has delayed to give orders for the division of the property captured during the war, according to the instructions of the Governor General, only till he receives all the prize rolls: he expects those of the 11th regt. from Berar in the course of a few days, when orders will be sent on that subject and regarding the batta for the officers.

Major Gen. Wellesley takes this opportunity of expressing his approbation of the conduct of the troops serving under the government of Bombay in Guzerat during the late war.

goons and 1st regt. of cavalry, and 2 battalions of Native infantry, and the Mysore horse from this camp, and 2 battalions from Hyderabad. I had already sent one battalion from hence to Hullihall in Soonda, eventually to replace at Goa the battalion of Bombay Native infantry which I had ordered from thence into Guzerat, to reinforce Col. Murray.

I shall send the 78th regt. to Bombay, and shall draw from thence a battalion of Bombay Native infantry; and then there will remain in the territories of the Peshwah, all assembled near Poonah, excepting one battalion at Ahmednuggur, 2 regiments of Native cavalry, the 74th regt., and 6 battalions of Native infantry; and in the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, 2 regiments of Native cavalry, the 94th regt., and 6 battalions of Native infantry, of which force, the cavalry and 4 battalions are collected to the northward of the Godavery, and 2 battalions will be at Hyderabad. A battering train is prepared at Poonah; and as soon as the state of the country will permit, the Soubah's subsidiary force collected north of the Godavery, and the cavalry, the 74th regt., and 2 battalions from the force collected near Poonah, will proceed to the attack of Chandore.

In consequence of the orders of the Governor General, I have established the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, and have placed that, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under the authority of the Residents, with the powers with which these troops are serving respectively; and I am about to proceed to Madras, in obedience to his Excellency's orders of the 30th May.

I have not recalled Col. Murray from Malwa; on the contrary, I have urged Mr. Duncan, under whose orders he falls, to allow him to continue his operations in Malwa according to my instructions of the 7th May, a copy of which the Resident with Scindiah will have transmitted to your Excellency. I am of opinion that no inconvenience will result from these arrangements; on the contrary, the troops will be relieved from great distress and inconvenience; and the relief of the troops in Malabar and Canara, proposed by the Governor General, will be accelerated by these measures.

To Lieut. Col. Hill.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

As soon as the troops, departments, &c., shall be prepared to move, you will march to the southward, by a route which is enclosed.

You will be so kind as to take care to keep up the most strict discipline among the troops and their followers, and to pay for every thing you may receive or require. In passing Meritch, or any other fortress, you will avoid approaching it so closely, or encamping so near it, as to occasion any alarm.

You will be pleased to report to me, and to head quarters, your progress on the march.

You will have with you 500 bullock loads of rice, to be issued to the Native troops at the rate of half a seer *per diem* each man; gram for the cavalry horses for one month; and pay for the troops for the month of June. You will be so kind as to avoid issuing the pay till a late period in July; but I shall take measures that you may receive a further sum of money on your march.

In case you should have reason to apprehend that you cannot reach Hurryhur till the month for which you will have gram shall have expired, a sum of money amounting to 1000 star pagodas is sent, which you will advance to Lieut. Young, in charge of the gram department, to make purchases of gram where it can be got. You will march upon the tappall road, and you will take care to communicate daily with the tappall stages, so as to get any letter that may be addressed to you.

There are boats upon all the rivers to transport the troops.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter which I have addressed to you and the Resident at Poonah, upon the subject of the future operations in the Deccan, in which both will be concerned. Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I cannot omit to express the extreme satisfaction which I have had in the various communications which the service has required that I should have with you.

To the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

In consequence of the orders of his Excellency the Governor General contained in his letter to me, and notes of instructions sent therewith,\*

*\* Extracts from a Memorandum given by Major Gen. Wellesley to the Bombay government relative to the formation of the Subsidiary force at Poonah.*

4. The subsidiary force is to consist of 6 battalions, each consisting of 1000 rank and file, 1 company of artillery, and 1 company of 100 pioneers, with their proper complement of ordnance and warlike stores.

10. The next subject for consideration is the equipment of these corps for the field. The commanding officers of Native corps on the establishment of Fort St. George carry the camp equipage and regimental stores for their corps; an arrangement which is certainly convenient to the service, and, as far as I am able to judge, economical. However, it is one which could not be introduced into the establishment of the government of Bombay, without reference to the Court of Directors. It will therefore be necessary to continue the present mode of carrying the camp equipage at the expense of the public; but I recommend that the tents should be carried upon camels, instead of upon bullocks. This arrangement will be an economical one eventually, and will be attended by other advantages. A camel will carry 3 of the tents used by the Bombay army, with their poles, with great facility.

12. The corps on the Bombay establishment are very deficient in regimental establishments to supply the troops with water. It would be a much better arrangement to give the adjutants of corps an allowance of 26 rupees per month, to supply 2 packalies men and 2 bullocks with bags for each company; the watermen, bullock bags, &c., to be mustered once a month at the same time with the corps, and the bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps and the letter W, to distinguish them from all others.

13. There is another establishment also much wanted with the corps of the Bombay army, and that is, one of bullocks to carry spare ammunition and outcroaching tools, &c., of which I enclose a list, which the corps ought always to have with it; to carry which, 24 bullocks. It would be proper to give an allowance *per mensem* to the adjutants, or any subaltern officer of corps, to provide bullocks and drivers for this service. These bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps and the letter A, and to be mustered with their drivers once a month with the corps.

14. In respect to carriage for the sick, I am fully aware of the difficulties under which the government of Bombay must always labor in this part of their equipments. I should recommend, therefore, that the establishment of doolies with each Native corps should be only 4; but that waggons should be made at Bombay to carry 20 men of each corps, besides those for whom doolies will be provided. Gen. Bellasis will be able to make a pattern waggon: if it could be done with convenience and without great expense, the

waggon

copies of which you have got, dated the 25th May, I have broken up the army, have ordered some of the troops to the southward, and have made arrangements with the government of Bombay to commence the proposed relief of the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George, stationed in the Peshwah's territories.

I have, by this day's orders, established the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and have placed the subsidiary force serving with the Subahdar of the Deccan under the authority of the Resident at Hyderabad, and have relinquished my authority over the troops which composed both those corps, and all the political powers with which I have been trusted by his Excellency the Governor General. The season will soon come round, in which the military operations in the Deccan will be renewed, and it is probable that you will be desirous to possess my opinion regarding the object to which they ought to be directed, and I proceed to give it to you.

The object to which the military operations ought to be directed, is to

waggon ought to be upon springs, and at all events covered from the weather. Their wheels and axletrees ought to be strong, and they ought to have a greater capacity of turning than the waggon which Gen. Bellasis lately sent to Poonah. It is not a matter of much consequence what number of men each waggon is made to contain, although possibly 6 men would be the most convenient number.

15. I enclose a statement of the establishment for each department, formed upon the model of that of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and they appear to me to be necessary. When the Bombay Native infantry shall form the subsidiary force, it will be necessary to add an establishment of armourers to the department of the Commissary of stores, as those corps have no battalion armourers, and the repairs to their arms are always performed in the public stores.

16. In case Gen. Stuart should not find it convenient to leave at Poonah the ordnance at present there, the ordnance which should be in the Peshwah's territory for the service of the subsidiary force are; 2 iron 18 pounders, 2 iron 12 pounders, 2 brass 12 pounders, 18 brass 6 pounders, two 5½ inch howitzers, with their proportion of tumbrils, and 5 spare tumbrils for stores, and 30 platform carts, and an artificer's cart, and 11 arrack carts.

17. The Commissary of stores at Poonah has a general state of stores which he ought to carry (exclusive of stores for the heavy guns, which can be but seldom required, and must be the subject of a distinct arrangement when required), and these will require 1000 bullocks, including their complement of spare cattle, 1 to every 6 bullocks.

18. But supposing that they could be replaced, or that they would stay, it is notorious that the worst mode of procuring bullocks for the public service is to hire them; and the best is to have an establishment of bullocks and drivers, the property and in the service of the public, provided the persons composing it really know or are taught and are forced to perform their duty.

19. I am therefore induced, by every consideration, to recommend that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay, to the extent at least that will be necessary to carry the stores for the subsidiary force.

20. The establishment should be in regular karkhanas. The drivers entertained for these bullocks should be accustomed at an early period to bring in their forage. The bullocks of each karkhana should be picketed in a separate line; they should receive their grain at the same time, and in the presence of the officer who will have the temporary charge of the department at Bombay. This officer ought also to see the forage which the drivers bring in for the cattle, and that the bullocks are rubbed down and cleaned every night. The drivers ought to be taught the mode of saddling and of loading and driving cattle, and every thing which relates to the duty of a bullock driver. Unless those who have charge of the cattle understand these duties, the cattle are destroyed, and the public are obliged to incur the expense of replacing them.

21. I recommend that the troops of the subsidiary force should be fed whenever they may be on actual service, and, when rice is not sold in the bazaar of the camp at 12 pucca seers (each of 2 lbs.) for a rupee, in the manner in which I fed the troops during the late war.

deprive Jeswant Rao Holkar of his possessions in the Deccan, and to deliver them to the Peshwah's officers, according to the orders of the Governor General of the 16th April. The principal of these possessions is the fort of Chandore, which must, I imagine, be attacked regularly. I have accordingly prepared a battering train at Poonah, which is now in readiness to be sent to the northward.

I recommend that the subsidiary force serving with the Soubahdar of the Deccan may be immediately prepared and equipped for active service, and joined by the Soubahdar's contingent. The corps at present encamped

war. They received their batta in money, and each man besides received half a seer or 1 lb. of rice *gratis* (daily). As rice was seldom at so low a price as a rupee for 6 seers, the public gained by this arrangement in the mere expense of the rice issued to the troops; and the expense of half the carriage which would have been required to carry rice to last the troops for an equal length of time, supposing that a seer of rice had been issued to each man instead of batta; and I had the further advantage of not overburthening the army with cattle. I therefore strongly recommend this system.

23. The number of bullocks which I have attached to the grain department of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah is 5000, although there are none in the grain department with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

24. The reason for which I have departed from the model of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam in this instance is, that there is a famine in the Deccan at present, the effects of which may be felt for some time; and I could not depend upon the Marhatta brijarries in the same manner as I know that the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam may upon those belonging to his Highness' territories. I have, however, lately suggested to Col. Close the expediency of giving the Marhatta brijarries a trial, from which Mr. Duncan will be able to judge whether they can be depended upon.

25. At all events, whether they can or not, I conceive that the quantity of grain for the carriage of which I have above provided, is far more than will be necessary upon any future occasion. In ordinary times, when the subsidiary force will not move, it is probable that no establishment of grain bullocks will be necessary; particularly if Col. Close should find that he can command the services of the Marhatta brijarries upon the plan proposed, or upon any other plan. If he should not be able to command their services, a bullock establishment, to carry rice to feed the winter of fighting men at the half allowance for 30 days, will be necessary. But as it is possible that the plan proposed in respect to the Marhatta brijarries will answer; and as in all events, supposing it should not, it is probable that some of the Mysore and Madras bullock owners and maistries attached to the grain department may be prevailed upon to stay, I do not now propose that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay, for the grain as well as the store department; although, if it should be necessary to keep bullocks permanently to carry grain, in consequence of Col. Close being unable to depend upon the brijarries, it will be necessary hereafter to form such an establishment.

26. In that case they ought to be formed regularly at Bombay in the manner recommended for those of the store department.

27. The number of European troops will be so small, that there will be no difficulty at any time in arranging for the carriage of their provisions.

28. The number of draught bullocks, which I have allotted for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, as appears by the enclosed papers, is 1250, besides 100 belonging to the Bombay establishment at Poonah, which I placed under the charge of the Commissary of grain at Poonah.

29. After making a liberal allowance for all the carriages to be drawn, and allowing the usual number of spare, this number is 350 more than the number of carriages will require.

30. However, the service in the Marhatta country will require great celerity and independence of movement; and it cannot be performed unless the commanding officer have the command of good cattle, in high condition, to draw his carriages. He may be obliged to be in the field during the monsoon: it must be expected that some cattle will die in that season, and yet the military operations must be continued.

Besides the ordnance and store carriages, for which provision has been and must be made, I have recommended that waggons should be constructed for the carriage of the sick: these may require 4 or 6 bullocks each, and will increase the demand from 100 to 120 bullocks.

31. It is therefore my opinion that the number of draught bullocks with the subsidiary force ought not to be less than 1300.

near the Godavery, under the command of Lieut. Col. Haliburton, will be joined by the 11th regt. from Berar, under the orders which I have already given, and will still consist of 2 regiments of cavalry, one of European infantry, and 4 battalions of Native infantry, notwithstanding the march of the 1st batt. 6th regt., and 2nd batt. 9th regt., towards Hyderabad.

The heavy train prepared at Poonah ought to be sent forward to Ahmednuggur, and thence to Aurungabad, as soon as the weather may permit; the stores for the train may be carried by the grain bullocks attached to

32. I know the Mysore people, who attend the draught bullocks, now with the subsidiary force, will not stay in the Peshwah's territories after the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George shall come away; indeed it would be unreasonable to expect that they should stay. Their families live near Seringapatam, and they can purchase food and all the necessaries of life in Mysore at one sixth of the price at which the same articles can ever be procured at Poonah.

33. Supposing, therefore, that it should be convenient to the government of Fort St. George to hand over to the government of Bombay the bullocks now at Poonah, it would be necessary that the government of Bombay should entertain persons, and form an establishment of servants to attend upon the cattle.

34. I proceed now to detail the mode in which I recommend that that plan should be carried into execution, in reference to an establishment of draught bullocks for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah.

35. The number of karkhanas which will be required will be 13, to be numbered accordingly. In my opinion, the best place at which to collect the drivers and other servants, and to train them to their business, will be the head quarters of the subsidiary force. There are already a certain number of Marhatta drivers in the Mysore karkhanas, left at Poonah, which might be the foundation of the establishment.

36. An establishment of servants and drivers should be formed for 13 karkhanas.

37. By degrees they may draft into these karkhanas the Marhatta drivers belonging to the Mysore karkhanas; and when they shall find the drivers, &c., sufficiently trained and steady both in the mode of taking care and of driving the cattle, they may send the Mysore drivers away to Seringapatam, and keep Marhatta servants and drivers only in charge of the bullocks.

38. It will not be possible to hire, in the Marhatta territories or at Bombay, servants and drivers of bullocks at the same rate of wages as those receive who belong to the Company's establishment in Mysore. On the other hand, it is very desirable for the government, as well as for the officers of the army, that the wages of labor prevalent at Bombay should not be paid in the subsidiary force.

I recommend, therefore, that it should be left to the authorities at Poonah to settle the rate of the wages of the different descriptions of servants and drivers who are to form this establishment of draught bullocks. But care must be taken to fix the wages of the drivers of the karkhana of carriage bullocks for the department which must be formed at Bombay at the same rate, otherwise it will be necessary to raise the wages of the attendants and drivers belonging to the draught karkhanas to the Bombay standard.

39. It will be impossible to form the carriage karkhanas in camp; there are no carriage bullocks in camp on that establishment, and there is no model; and as the camp will be moving, it will not be possible to train the servants and drivers so well as they can be trained at Bombay.

*Extract of a Minute by Lieut. Gen. Stuart, relative to the disposition of the troops under the Madras government.*

The extent of the force necessary to be maintained under the Presidency of Fort St. George should be regulated in my judgment by this rule; that it shall be sufficient to enable government to assemble a body of troops for the formation of a respectable army in the field, and to retain at the same time an amount of force in each province capable of occupying the requisite military posts and garrisons, and of supplying a field detachment for internal service, or for the purpose of reinforcing the army in the field, if it should receive a check.

There are 6 divisions of the army under Madras, exclusive of Goa:

Mysore,	Northern division,
Malabar,	Carnatic,
Ceded Districts,	Southern division,

the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, which, after having laid down their loads, can return to receive rice at Poonah or Ahmednuggur.

As soon as Lieut. Col. Haliburton shall hear that the heavy train has left Poonah, and has crossed the Beemah, he ought to move to the westward, towards Aurrungabad, if his corps should be in a state of equipment; if it should not be so, he ought to move as soon as he shall be ready, and join the heavy train at Aurrungabad.

If Col. Haliburton should be able to move as soon as he shall hear of the march of the heavy train, a detachment, consisting of 2 regiments of cavalry, the 74th regt., and the 2 battalions of Native infantry with the pioneers, and a large proportion of the artillery, and the Peshwah's contingent of cavalry, ought to march from Poonah towards Aurrungabad, soon after the heavy train shall have marched. If Col. Haliburton should not be ready immediately, this detachment ought to march from Poonah whenever the accounts shall be received that Col. Haliburton is ready: the 2 detachments will join at, or in the neighbourhood of Aurrungabad, and ought to proceed in concert to the siege of Chandore, and to the other operations which may be necessary, in order to put the servants of his Highness the Peshwah in possession of Holkar's territories in the Deccan.

From the preceding detail, you will observe that my idea is, that the objects in the Deccan are to be effected by the joint operations of detachments from the two subsidiary forces serving with the Sonbahadar of the Deccan and the Peshwah, and by the contingents of those powers, and that those troops are to be put in motion, and are to join in concert, and in consequence of a previous communication. This cannot readily be effected, if the subsidiary forces should each continue, as at present, to act under the authority of the Resident at the durbar of that power in whose service each subsidiary force is employed: I therefore take the liberty of recommending that the Resident at Hyderabad should place the troops under Col. Haliburton, under the authority and at the requisition of the Resident at Poonah, for the purposes of the proposed service; and should desire that officer to attend to all directions which he may receive from the Resident at Poonah: as the service to be performed is in the territories of the Peshwah, the objects, when attained, are to be made over to the Peshwah's officers, and the Resident at Poonah is stationed much nearer the scene of action than the Resident at Hyderabad. It will be necessary, however, that the Resident at Poonah should communicate constantly with the Resident at Hyderabad, and with the British authorities at Scindiah's durbar, at Fort St. George, Bombay, and in Mysore, in order that he may be able to form a judgment regarding the necessity of withdrawing some or all of the troops from the proposed service.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1801.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a letter which I have addressed to you and the Resident at Hyderabad, upon the subject of the future operations in the Deccan, in which both will be concerned. Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I cannot omit to express the entire



satisfaction which I have had in the various communications which the service has required that I should have with you.

It is very evident that the confidence of the Peshwah in the British government is increasing daily; and I am sanguine in my hopes that in a short time such a change will be produced in the state of his Highness' country, and the power of his government, as will render the former a valuable possession to him, and the latter an addition of strength to the British government.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you, that in consequence of the Governor General's instructions of the 25th May, I have broken up the army in the Deccan, and have established the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah; and have placed that force, and the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, under the authority of the Residents at the durbars of those powers respectively. I have the honor to enclose extracts of orders which I have issued respecting the troops in Guzerat.

I have requested the Resident at Poonah to send to Bombay the 78th regt., in case you should consent to the arrangement proposed in my letter of the 18th inst.; viz., to send the 2nd of the 7th to Poonah, reinforced to 1000 R. and F.

Upon the occasion of relinquishing the command of the troops in this quarter, and consequently of giving up the immediate communication which I have held with your government upon all points connected with the public service, allow me once more to return you my thanks for the many instances of your confidence, favor, and kindness, which I have received since I have conducted the service in this part of India. Although at a distance, I shall ever be anxious for the honor and prosperity of your government, and I shall be happy to have any opportunity to evince my zeal in your service.

I propose to take an early occasion of addressing you on the subject of the relief at Poonah, of the troops in the service of the government of Fort St. George; and of the establishment of the troops of Bombay, as the subsidiary force to his Highness the Peshwah.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

I have to draw your attention to the state of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, in respect to its supplies of provisions. Some time has elapsed since the brinjaries who accompanied the troops when they marched from Mysore have returned thither, and the bazaars have been supplied by the exertions of the dealers attached to them. These are also Mysore people; they have made much money during the war, and they are very desirous to return to their homes, as they have but little expectation of profit at present, and the expense of feeding their cattle is very great. It is my opinion that it will not be possible to prevent a very large proportion of them from returning with the troops now about to march.

Under these circumstances, it will be necessary to endeavor to obtain a

substitute for the service of the subsidiary force. It does not appear to me that it will be possible to prevail upon the brinjarries in the Peshwah's territories to attend the camps as dealers on their own account; and supposing them to be inclined to enter into the trade, that they have property to enable them to carry it on. To give them money or grain in advance will not answer. They are notoriously dishonest, and they would run away with the former, and would sell the latter in any place at which they could find a more ready or a more advantageous market than the camp.

I should therefore recommend to you to hire 4000 or 5000 of the brinjarry bullocks, to carry grain from the depôt formed at Poonah, or Ahmednuggur, to the camp, on account of the Company, where it will be thrown into the bazaars, by order of the commanding officer, or otherwise disposed of, as may be found most advantageous. If this mode of supply be adopted, and I think there is reason to apprehend that, for some time, no other mode will answer, it will be necessary to take care to keep the depôts full at Ahmednuggur and Poonah, and when the harvest shall be reaped, to throw into them a quantity of grain.

P.S. I enclose a copy of a letter to Major Graham.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

I learn from Mr. Strachey, that he has some reason to believe that he shall be appointed to a situation in the Judicial department of Fort William; and he is desirous of availing himself of the opportunity afforded by my journey to the southward to see that part of the country on his return to Fort William. Under these circumstances, I request you to give Mr. Strachey permission to be absent from the Residency at Poonah.

To Col. Close.

Camp, 24th June, 1804.\*

I have omitted to mention to you, that I have requested Mr. Duncan to commence the relief ordered for the Bombay troops as soon as possible, by sending to Poonah the 2nd batt. 7th Bombay regt., completed to 1000 R. and F. If Mr. Duncan should comply with this request, of which I will apprise you, I beg that the 78th regt. may be sent to Bombay.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

The orders which have been issued will have made you acquainted with the arrangements made for the establishment of the subsidiary force, and the equipment of the troops under your command.

I have written a letter to the Residents at Poonah and Hyderabad, on the subject of the operations of the troops; and a letter to the Resident at Poonah, on the subject of the supplies of provisions for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, copies of which will be sent to you hereafter.

You will observe, in the G. O., that ample provision is made for the

\* On the 24th June, 1804, Major Gen. Wellesley resigned the military and political powers vested in him by the Governor General on the 26th June, 1803, and proceeded, by Seringapatam, and Madras, to Fort William, in conformity with the Governor General's instructions.

carriage of grain in the grain department; and I have to inform you that the depôt at Poonah now contains about 22,000 bullock loads of rice, and that at Ahmednuggur 6000 bullock loads. Besides this quantity there are about 5000 bullock loads at Panwell, which will probably be sent up to Poonah when the present rains shall cease; and I have applied to Mr. Duncan to send up an additional quantity of 10,000 bullock loads, and this will be sent in the course of the season.

I recommend that you should continue the system adopted by the G. O. of the 4th inst., for the food of the followers of the army, as long as the grain of the country and flour remain above the price of one rupee for 6 seers. As soon as the price of grain shall fall, this system ought to be abolished.

By this time there ought to be, at Ahmednuggur, a sum of money amounting to 6 lacs of rupees, one half of which is to be sent to Col. Haliburton, according to the orders already given; the remainder will come here for your use. Another sum, amounting to  $10\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees, has been sent from Hyderabad;  $4\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees to Col. Haliburton's camp, and 6 lacs to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops stationed in this quarter. This last sum of money is upon platform carts, and you will be so kind as to make arrangements for bringing it to your camp.

The draught bullocks allotted to your corps are 300 more than the carriages you have will require, including the heavy ordnance; viz., two 18 and two 12 pounders, and the spare cattle for each piece of cannon, according to the regulations of government. It is scarcely necessary that I should point out to you the necessity of making every exertion to keep these cattle in condition. In fact, the existence of the detachment under your command may depend upon the state of this part of your equipment.

I cannot close my letter to you upon this subject, without earnestly recommending to you the strictest attention to the discipline of the troops, and to keep them and their followers in order. In this distant station, as the troops can but seldom come under the eye of the superior officers of the army, it will require the most constant and regular attention to preserve their discipline and order; and it is certain, that in no part of India will those qualities be required in a greater degree than in the detachment serving with his Highness the Peshwah. The licentiousness of the followers of the troops, particularly when those troops have been successful, is an evil of the greatest magnitude, and of quick growth. I therefore anxiously recommend the conduct of these people to your attention; and that you should suppress at once, by decided measures, any attempts which they may make to depart from the rules of good order, and to shake off the restraint under which they have been hitherto held.

I also recommend to your attention the state of all the public establishments, and the establishments kept by commanding officers of corps, for the carriage of the camp equipage and stores. There is a tendency in the service, particularly when troops are employed at a distance, to admit abuse, which, if not checked in time, must be attended in every instance by the most inconvenient consequences; and which can be checked only by a constant attention on the part of the commanding officer.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Poonah, 24th June, 1804.

It has already been arranged that no bills shall be drawn on Bengal or Bombay in favor of the soucars at Poonah, excepting in consequence of a previous communication with, and at the desire of Mr. Duncan; and you have accordingly made known to Mr. Duncan the monthly demands upon your Residency, exclusive of payments to the troops, for which provision has been made by the government of Fort St. George, to the following amount: viz., 6 lacs and 20,000 rupees, now at or near Ahmednuggur, one half of which sum is ordered to Poonah, the other to Col. Haliburton's camp, for the service of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan;  $10\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees which left Hyderabad about the 15th inst.,  $4\frac{1}{2}$  of which have been ordered to Col. Haliburton's camp, the remainder to Ahmednuggur, for the use of the troops in this quarter; and  $10\frac{1}{2}$  lacs of rupees, which left Masulipatam on the 1st inst., one half of which sum I have requested Major Kirkpatrick to send to Ahmednuggur for the service of the troops here; the other half to Col. Haliburton's camp.

But besides the bills given to soucars, other bills have been drawn on Bombay in favor of the officers of the army for small sums. These bills are always drawn according to the rate at which the government issue the different descriptions of coins; and the exchange is entirely independent of that in the money market.

I have positively ordered the Paymaster never to draw them, excepting in favor of officers and the sutlers attending the corps, in order to afford to the former a mode of paying their bills at Bombay, and to the latter an opportunity of remitting their money to that place. It would be inconvenient to the officers of the army to stop the drawing of these bills; and, as the road to Bombay is not safe, if the sutlers had not this mode of remitting their money, they would no longer attend the camps. At the same time it is a convenience to the public, that the treasury in camp should be the medium of remitting this money to Bombay; and it is a cheap mode of procuring money to pay the troops. Upon the whole, therefore, I think it advisable that it should be continued.

The bills have hitherto been countersigned by me; hereafter it will be proper that they should be countersigned by you; and the Paymaster in camp may give credit for the amount, as so much received on account of bills drawn by him on the government of Bombay. If you should approve of this arrangement, I shall make the governments of Bombay and Fort St. George acquainted with it.

To Lieut. Col. Brunton.

Camp at Seroor, 26th June, 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letter enclosing the copy of a bill for loss of exchange on bills drawn on Bombay.

When the troops arrived at Poonah, everything was in the greatest confusion, and some time elapsed before the common mercantile intercourse between that city and Bombay was re-established. In addition to this inconvenience, the soucars at Poonah and Bombay knew well, that, as there was a large body of troops at Poonah belonging to the Madras and Bombay establishments, a large sum of money would be required; and

they became exorbitant in their demands of premium on bills of exchange, whether drawn on Bombay at Poonah, or on Poonah at Bombay. In this manner the premium on bills of exchange came to the rate stated in the bill you enclosed; and, indeed, Mr. Duncan was obliged to acquiesce in incurring the same loss on bills which he purchased at Bombay, drawn on soucars at Poonah for the purpose of paying the Bombay troops. Notwithstanding this great loss, we were obliged to draw the bills, as no money could be procured at Bombay, excepting mohurs, which we were obliged to issue to the troops at a depreciated rate of exchange, thereby incurring a greater loss than by drawing the bills.

In the state of uncertainty of the times, and the doubt on men's minds respecting the result of the war, till the battle of Assye, every man was suspected; and we did not know how long we should be able to keep up the communication between Bombay and Poonah: I therefore took care to keep the treasury full at Poonah by taking up in bills on Bombay all the money that could be got, even at this loss. The sums procured in this manner defrayed the extraordinary expenses of the war, and those of the Bombay troops, for which no other provision was made. The transaction was always managed by the Resident at Poonah; the Paymaster and I having nothing to do with it, excepting to sign our names to the bills. The loss certainly appears, and is, very large; but there ought to be a set off against it about 2 *per cent.* on the issue of the Chandore rupees to the troops. Those of my division received them according to the Mysore nerrick, at the same rate as Rajah rupees, or Pondicherry rupees, which are about 2 *per cent.* better than the Company's rupees.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Tiraleo, 27th June, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th inst., upon the subject of an application from Col. Murray, that provision might be made for the silladar horse who might be wounded in the service; and for the families of those who might be killed. It is not reasonable to expect that persons of this description, who have no means of subsistence, excepting those afforded by military service, will risk their lives, or being disabled, unless made certain of a provision hereafter. The want of this provision is the great defect of all the Native military services; and is the cause of the frequent instances of misbehaviour before an enemy of the country troops. The truth of this observation is proved by the fact, that the troops in the service of Hyder Aly, and his son Tippoo, and those now in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, for whom provision is made, in case they should receive wounds, and for their families, in case they should be killed, have uniformly behaved better in battle than any other Native troops of whom we have a knowledge. I therefore strongly recommend to government, that the measures proposed by Col. Murray may be adopted. It would be necessary, however, in the first instance, to submit the claims of those disabled by wounds, and of the families of the horsemen who may be killed in the service, to the decision of a committee of officers, in the same manner as the claims of persons actually in the military service of the Hon. Company.

With the same view of rendering more efficient this body of cavalry

attached to Col. Murray's corps, I beg leave to suggest to the Governor in Council the expediency of paying for the horses which may be killed, or rendered unfit for service by wounds received in action. This is another measure which has been practised by Hyder and Tippoo, and the present Mysore government, and with the best effects. There are two modes of paying for these horses. One, which has always been practised by the Mussulmann and Hindn government of Mysore, is to pay the horsemen 200 rupees for every horse killed or disabled, whatever may be his value: the other is, to register a description and value of the horse when the horseman is entertained; and when the horse is killed or disabled, to pay for him at the rate at which he shall be valued in the register. I rather believe that the horsemen would prefer the latter mode, and it will, probably, prove equally cheap to the Hon. Company, as but few of their horses can be valued at a higher rate than 200 rupees. If this measure should be adopted, a committee ought to be assembled to ascertain the claims of the horsemen. When all these measures shall be adopted, the silladar horse with Col. Murray ought to be a most efficient body.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Camp at Tiruloo, 27th June, 1804.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th June, for which I return you many thanks. My public letter of the 24th will have made you acquainted with the mode by which I propose to carry on the operations in the Deccan during my absence. With this, you will receive a dispatch to the Governor General, which will make you acquainted with all the arrangements made, and the reasons for which I adopted them.

I have received a letter from Col. Haliburton, from which I learn that he still fears that he shall not be able to move till after the monsoon. It is most desirable that the operations against Chandore should be begun in August, so that they may be concluded before the rivers fall; otherwise, as all our disposable troops will be employed at this siege, a very small body of the enemy would be able to do a great deal of mischief in the country. The siege of Chandore\* once concluded, and the troops at liberty to act where they may be required, no mischief can happen.

I shall write to Col. Haliburton upon this subject, but I now mention it to you, that you may urge the durbar to exert themselves to induce the brinjarries to attend Col. Haliburton. As he will have grain in July, the want of carriage for it will be the only impediment to his march.

P. S. It is but justice to the Governor General, and to you, to mention that I have had no private correspondence with him on any subject. I have done you justice in my public correspondence, upon subjects which must, at all events, have attracted the notice of the Governor General.

To Major Maqaulay.

Camp at Tiruloo, 27th June, 1804.

I have only this day received your letters of the 24th and 28th March. They had been sent to Cannanore, and Mr. Baber detained them. I re-

\* Chandore was taken on the 12th Oct., by the army under Lient. Col. Wallace, in the absence of Major Gen. Wellesley.

joice at your success in the defeat of the intrigue, the particulars of which you relate.

In consequence of orders from the Governor General, I have broken up the army in the Deccan; I have established the subsidiary force at Poona, and sent some of the troops to the southward, and I am now on my way towards Seringapatam. I do not apprehend any inconvenience from these arrangements. I have provided for the operations of the war against Holkar, and if they can be begun before the end of August, all will answer. The Bombay troops are to be relieved in Malabar by those belonging to Fort St. George. The former are to be the subsidiary force at Poona.

To Capt. Wilks.

Camp at Tiruloo, 27th June, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th inst. In consequence of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General, of which the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George has sent you an extract, I have ordered the Mysore troops under Bistnapah Pundit to march towards Mysore. I cannot, at present, say exactly by what route Bistnapah will enter Mysore, or the period at which he will arrive on the frontier; but I hope to be able to give you information on these points in the course of a few days.

I expect to meet the convoy on the road, and shall give them instructions; and I shall bring away with me the detachments of troops stationed between the rivers Kistna, Gutpurba, and Malpoorba. I hope to have the pleasure of meeting you soon at Seringapatam, and to have a conversation with you and the Dewan regarding the future disposal of the silladar horse.

To the Governor General.

Camp at Tiruloo, 27th June, 1804.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's orders of the 25th and 30th May; and I proceed to detail the mode in which I have carried into execution your Excellency's instructions, together with my reasons for adopting the measures which I have carried into execution, or have recommended to others.

2. Before your Excellency's instructions of the 25th May arrived, Col. Murray had marched towards Ougein, according to the orders which I had given him, as reported to your Excellency in my former address.

It is probable that he had arrived in Malwa before I received your Excellency's orders; or, at all events, he would have arrived in that province before any orders written in consequence of the receipt of your Excellency's instructions could reach him.

3. When I received your Excellency's instructions, Holkar's army and that of Hurry Naut Sing threatened Ougein. Scindiah was apprehensive of the consequences to his capital by their being in its neighbourhood; and his ministers were earnest in their solicitations for assistance, and were anxiously looking for the arrival of Col. Murray, which they had been taught to expect.

4. To have withdrawn him from Malwa at that moment would have exposed Scindiah in a defenceless state to Holkar; more particularly as

his own army, under Bappojee Scindiah, had joined Col. Monson, in consequence of the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, and was near Kota; would have damped the spirit of Scindiah's durbar; and as the Colonel's retreat would have had the appearance of a flight from Holkar's forces collected near Ougein, it might have been attended by inconvenient consequences in Guzerat.

5. It did not appear that Col. Murray was likely to meet with the difficulties which your Excellency apprehended, when you gave orders that he should not advance; and your Excellency was not aware that I had provided for the irruption of any freebooter into Guzerat, during Col. Murray's absence, by the formation of a reserve, which I desired him to establish, in my instructions of the 7th May.

6. Upon the whole, therefore, as to have withdrawn him would have been attended with inconvenience, and to detain him in Malwa was not likely to be attended by those difficulties which you apprehended, I determined to suspend that part of your instructions; and I wrote a letter to Mr. Duncan, in order to provide against his carrying them into execution, of which I enclose a copy.

7. It does not appear that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has, at present, any force in the Deccan; it is not probable that he will be able to prevail upon his troops to move into Candeish, which is at present a desert; or that he will have any means of opposing the operations of the British troops in that quarter. But there is no immediate prospect of being able to commence those operations till a very late period in the rainy season.

8. On these grounds it was desirable to diminish the number of the troops, in order to get rid of the expense, to save the grain that was consumed by those troops, and to relieve some of them from the distressing situation in which they were placed in consequence of the famine. I was also aware that, till I should send the troops from the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan and the Peshwah, the government of Fort St. George could not commence the relief of the Bombay troops in Malabar, and Canara, and at Goa; which must be the first step towards the final relief of the troops of the government of Fort St. George, in the territories of the Peshwah.

9. I determined, therefore, to send away from the Peshwah's territories all but the subsidiary force and the 74th regt., and from those of the Soubah of the Deccan 2 battalions, leaving there likewise only the subsidiary force. In order to provide for the duties at Hyderabad, I have ordered 2 battalions from Lieut. Col. Haliburton's camp; and I have ordered the 11th regt. out of Berar to reinforce Col. Haliburton, whose corps is destined to co-operate in the attack on Chandore, whenever the state of the country and of its equipments will permit it to advance.

10. In order to complete with Native infantry the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, I have requested Mr. Duncan to send to Poonah from Bombay the 2nd batt. 7th regt., completed to 1000 R. and F.; and I have proposed to reinforce the garrison of Bombay by the 78th regt.: this corps, unless Mr. Duncan shall consent to this arrangement, must form part of the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, till some of the battalions in Malabar or Canara can be relieved.



11. I have also left with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, 2 *regts. of cavalry*, instead of one; as both are weak, and do not consist of more men than the Peshwah ought to have in one regiment.

12. The troops withdrawn from the territories of the Peshwah are the 19th dragoons, 4th *regt. of cavalry*, detachment of 1st *batt. of artillery*, 2 battalions of Native infantry (one had already marched to Hullihall in Soonda, according to my former report), the pioneers, excepting a detachment for the subsidiary force, and the Rajah of Mysore's horse; and from the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, 2 battalions of Native infantry. The 78th *regt.* will likewise be drawn from the Peshwah's territories, if Mr. Duncan should consent to send to Poonah the battalion which I have required; and there will remain only the 74th *regt.* more than the troops which the Company are bound to furnish his Highness.

13. I have discontinued all establishments and expenses of every description, not immediately required to render the troops efficient.

14. I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, in which I have made them acquainted with the mode in which I think the operations against Holkar's possessions in the Deccan ought to be carried on; from which your Excellency will observe that there will be a very large force of British troops for active operations in the field, a reserve of nearly 4 battalions at Poonah, a garrison in Ahmednuggur, and 2 battalions at Hyderabad. I likewise enclose copies of several letters to Col. Close and Col. Wallace, upon the subject of the supplies for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and various matters connected with the service.

15. I have likewise the honor to enclose copies of orders which I have issued upon this same subject.

16. The establishments are not reduced so low as they might be hereafter. There is a grain establishment at Ahmednuggur, and another at Poonah, both under European superintendence, which might be managed by the Commissary of grain to the subsidiary force. But he must have managed these departments by means of Native servants; and in time of famine, a Native could not have been trusted with the charge of grain.

17. The store departments at Ahmednuggur and Poonah are also larger than is absolutely necessary in ordinary times. The captured ordnance, and the stores for the heavy train, are at Ahmednuggur; and the stores belonging to the separate detachment which marched up from Bombay under Col. Murray are at Poonah. But when there shall be time and leisure to move to Bombay the ordnance and stores which may be super-numerary to the quantities required for the service of the subsidiary force, that measure ought to be carried into execution; and then the store establishments may be reduced.

18. The establishment of carriage cattle in the grain department will appear large, but that number is absolutely necessary, at present, to insure the subsistence of the troops; and they must be kept up in the Peshwah's territories till it shall be possible to make an arrangement with the brinjarries for the supply of the troops, upon which dependence can be placed.

P.S. In enumerating the troops which will remain in the Peshwah's territories, I have omitted 30 men belonging to the 84th regt., who have done the duty of additional gunners at Ahmednuggur; likewise a company of Bombay Native infantry, stationed in posts on each of the rivers, Kistna, Gutpurba, and Malpoorba, and one company of Coast Native infantry in a post on the Werdah. These posts have been useful in keeping up the communication with the southern countries; and I think that they ought to remain, at least till the Peshwah's affairs with the southern chiefs shall be settled.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Tiralo, 27th June, 1804.

I enclose a dispatch, which I request you to forward to Major Kirkpatrick with the letter to his address, as soon as you shall have perused it. We get on well, and I expect to be at or near Meritch on the 30th.

I have received a letter from Col. Haliburton, from which I learn that he does not expect to be able to move till after the monsoon. This will be ruinous to us. At that time the rivers will have fallen, the whole country will be open, all our disposable troops will be employed in the siege of Chandore, and a very small body of the enemy will do a great deal of mischief. This must not be, if possible. I have mentioned the subject in the enclosed letter to Kirkpatrick, and I shall write to Col. Haliburton upon it. You must have our troops at liberty by the end of August, and then nothing can happen in the Deccan.

To Col. Murray.

Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

I received, some days ago, your letter of the 8th, and I was prevented from replying to it by the multiplicity of my occupations at the time I received it. I trust that this letter will find you established in Malwa, and in perfect communication and harmony with Scindiah's durbar. You will have heard that the Governor General has ordered me to break up in the Deccan, and to establish the subsidiary force with the Peshwah. I have done so, and have sent you the orders of the 24th inst., by which you are placed under the authorities at Bombay.

I am concerned to hear of the sickness of your Europeans; and particularly so, as there does not appear any prospect of being able to increase your force in Europeans, or in cavalry: Mr. Duncan may possibly send you some artillery, respecting which I have written to him. You have a larger body of European soldiers than the Commander in Chief, or than I have ever had; and Col. Monson has driven Holkar before him out of the territories of the Rajah of Jeypoor, of Boondy, and of Kota, without a single European soldier or horseman, excepting the irregular horse of the country. You will be joined by a large body of Scindiah's cavalry.

From your frequent allusions to this subject, I should be induced to believe that you do not deem your force sufficient to perform the service on which you are employed, if I was not aware of the circumstances to which I have above referred; and it is, therefore, necessary, that I should request you to explain yourself fully to Mr. Duncan upon it. Your explanation of your sentiments ought to be full; as, by allusions to your weakness, and expressing your hopes that you will be reinforced, you

expose the government to the severe responsibility of omitting to reinforce you on the one hand, if it should be necessary; or of reinforcing you, on the other, if it should not. I have written to Mr. Duncan on this subject.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

As the best mode of making you acquainted with all the measures which I have adopted, in consequence of the Governor General's orders of the 25th and 30th May, I have the honor to enclose a copy of my dispatch to him of yesterday's date. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th inst. I hope soon to pay you my respects at Madras; but, notwithstanding that, I shall take an opportunity of addressing you upon the subject adverted to in your letter.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.\*

Camp at Niggeree, 28th June, 1804.

I have not yet been able to send you the copies of my letters to the Resident, which I promised you, but I shall send them as soon as I shall have a leisure moment.

I have got on well; but nothing can be more erroneous than Capt. Johnson's route. He was wrong 8 miles between Poonah and Kichaire, and between that place and this about 20 miles!!! He did not even measure the route correctly from his own map. The road is very good, and Hill will get on well.

I beg you to let me hear any reports that may reach you about your own situation. You need be under no apprehension. You may depend upon it that I will take care that you shall not lose it. I believe that in my public dispatches I have alluded to every point to which I should wish to draw your attention, excepting one, which I will mention to you, that is the secrecy of all your proceedings.

There is nothing more certain than that, of 100 affairs, 99 might be posted up at the market-cross, without injury to the public interests; but the misfortune is that, where the public business is the subject of general conversation, and is not kept secret, as a matter of course, upon every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that occasion on which it is necessary. There is an awkwardness in a secret which enables discerning men (of which description there are always plenty in an army) invariably to find it out; and it may be depended upon that, whenever the public business ought to be kept secret, it always suffers when it is exposed to public view. For this reason secrecy is always best, and those who have been long trusted with the conduct of public affairs are in the

\* A characteristic trait of this officer is recollected by those who served with the army in the Deccan (see p. 961). At the siege of Gawilghur he had been charged with the execution of certain details, necessary to the capture of that place. A heavy gun had been directed to be conveyed by night to an important point, and its transportation over the most rugged mountain so long baffled all endeavors, that the artillery officer, in despair, reported the accomplishment of it to be impossible. 'Impossible, Sir!' exclaimed Col. Wallace, who had all his life maintained the most rigid adherence to obedience, 'Impossible! Let us see!' He then called for a light, pulled the instructions from his pocket, and, having read them, said, 'Oh, no! not impossible; the order is positive.' The result evincing the efficacy of the order; and also afforded another proof that implicit obedience, when accompanied by devoted zeal, will in general overcome every difficulty.

habit of never making known public business of any description, that it is not necessary that the public should know. The consequence is that secrecy becomes natural to them, and as much a habit as it is to others to talk of public matters; and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as they may think proper.

I mention this subject to you because, in fact, I have been the means of throwing the public affairs into your hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them as you ought. This is a matter which would never occur to you, but it is essentially necessary. Remember, that what I recommend to you is far removed from mystery: in fact, I recommend silence upon the public business upon all occasions, in order to avoid the necessity of mystery upon any.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Camp at Bellowra, 29th June, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of the instructions which I have given to Lieut. Col. Hill, who commands the detachment of troops on their march from Poonah. The road by which Lieut. Col. Hill will march is by Meritch, and the different posts of Erroor, on the Kistna; Goorgherry, on the Gutpurba; Sungoly, on the Malpoorba; Deogherry, on the Werdah; and Hurryhur. He may arrive on the Kistna about the 12th or 13th July; so that your orders addressed to him at Erroor, or at any of the other posts, will reach him. He will require money in the beginning of August, to the amount of about 30,000 pagodas; and I dare say that, if he should enter Mysore by Hurryhur, the Dewan will supply him with that sum, if you will make Capt. Wilks acquainted with your wishes. The rice, reduced to 1000 bags, will last Col. Hill two months; and the provisions, till the dragoons shall enter the Company's territories. He will get gram on his advance to the southward. But I shall write to the commanding officer at Hulliball in Soonda, to endeavor to procure some there, and to send it to meet Col. Hill at Sungoly on the Malpoorba.

In a letter which I received last night from Mr. Duncan, he informs me that he shall send the Native battalion to Poonah. He also tells me that the earliest period at which vessels can be sent to the southward, to bring up the troops, will be the 28th Aug. I conclude that you will write to him to let him know which of the posts you intend to have relieved first, and the period at which you expect that the Coast troops will arrive to make the relief; in order that he may make his arrangements to send down vessels to bring up the Bombay troops.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Bellowra, 29th June, 1804.

I received my sword this morning, and am much obliged to you for it.

Mr. Duncan has consented to send the 2nd batt. 7th regt., so that the 78th regt. may go to Bombay whenever you please. They had better take advantage of the first fair weather. Correspond with Mr. Duncan on this subject. By sending the tents of the 78th regt. down upon the elephants of the 74th, Col. Wallace could send the camels of the 78th to carry up the tents of the hattalion.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Hill.*

Camp at Rajahpore, 30th June, 1804.

I have received your private letters of the 26th and 27th, and your public letter of the 27th, and have laid the whole before the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley. He does not approve of your application for Brigadiers' allowances, or for a brigade major and brigade quarter master, and will not allow of any of them. He was surprised that you should have made a request to him to put on new allowances, never granted but in time of actual warfare, after you had seen the orders breaking up the army, and striking off almost every appointment and establishment that could be dispensed with. He added, that your reminding him of Col. Kennedy's continuing to exercise the duty of a Brigadier might oblige him to do away that office, but would not warrant his creating 3 new ones.

The letter to Major Robertson, directing him to send only 1000 bags of rice with your detachment, must have missed him, owing to his coming in to Poonah. If he should send the 1500 bags, as originally ordered, the General desires that you will send back 500 of them.

The General says you may forward Capt. Hain's application yourself to head quarters; and I return it for that purpose. I see it is addressed to the Commander in Chief. I thought that was the proper address, as he has the power of granting leave (with the approbation of government); but Col. Agnew noticed that as an irregularity, in a late application for leave to go home on sick certificate. You may therefore think it necessary to refer to the orders on that head, and to see if some certificate should not accompany the application.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Meritch, 1st July, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that Hurry Pursheram, commonly called Baba Saheb Putwurdun, one of the family of Pursheram Bhow, paid me a visit yesterday, in my camp at Rajahpore, which I returned this morning on my road through Tasgaum. He took the opportunity of this visit to talk to me in private. He said that he was entirely at the mercy of the British government, and it must rest with them either to destroy him, or to allow him to retain his possessions. I desired him to explain himself; he then said he heard that the Peshwah was offended at his conduct, and that he was at the mercy of the British government. That all he was desirous of was to serve the Peshwah's government, as in former times; and that all he hoped for was the favor of his Highness and the British government, in proportion to his zeal and fidelity.

In answer, I told Baba Saheb that it was perfectly true that the Peshwah was offended with him, and that his Highness certainly had reason to complain of his conduct; however, it was possible that his Highness might be induced to forgive and forget what had passed; but that it must be in the confidence that he should have no cause to complain in future; and that that confidence must be founded on acts,—not professions of service. I therefore urged him earnestly, if he had any regard for his own honor and situation, to endeavor to reconcile himself to the Peshwah, and to serve him hereafter with zeal and fidelity. I pointed out to him the state of the Peshwah's government at the present moment; I observed that it was stronger in his Highness' own opinion, and in reality, than that of any Peshwah had ever been; and I hinted to him, that it was not to be supposed that the British government, which had done so much for the Peshwah, would cease its endeavors in his support, till his power and authority should be completely established and acknowledged in all parts of his territories. I observed that the Peshwah was not, in fact, so bent upon revenge as people supposed; that I had found him to be an indulgent

master, when he had reason to believe that his servants were in earnest in their profession of repentance and future good conduct; and that he might depend upon it that there was nothing that the British government wished so much, as to see his Highness surrounded by his sirdars, and his government supported by its natural strength, and the chief men of the Empire in the enjoyment of their rights and possessions. In answer, Baba Sahab said that he wished and intended to serve the Peshwah according to ancient custom; and I told him that I should consider what he had then said and so frequently repeated, as binding upon him in any future discussion which might take place upon this subject. I observed that I had no instructions to discuss the subject at this time, and did not know what the ancient custom was; but that it appeared that the intention expressed by Baba Sahab was fair, and would be satisfactory.

Baba Sahab then asked me what should be done about Baba Phurkia, whom he had kept in confinement at Tasgaum. I told him that the Peshwah had intended that Baba Phurkia should go to a place in the Konkan, belonging to the Phurkia family, where he was to live in security as long as he should not molest the Peshwah's government; that I did not recollect the name of the place, and did not know the particulars of the arrangement, but that he ought to refer himself to Poonah upon the subject. In the mean time I told Baba Sahab that it was incumbent upon him to keep the person of Baba Phurkia in security.

Baba Sahab then alluded to his affairs with the Kolapoor Rajah. I told him that he ought to consider those affairs as the concern of the government, and not his; and when he would really be the servant of the government, it was probable that the government would see the necessity of settling them. He then said that he had a brother whom it was the wish of the family to send to Benares to reside there, and I referred him to you for passports, letters, &c. &c. He asked me with whom he should communicate at Poonah, in my absence, on the different points on which he had spoken to me; and I referred him to yourself, and have given him a letter to you.

The conversation then became more general, and, in the course of it, it was very obvious that Baba Sahab is extremely apprehensive of the consequences of his omission to serve the Peshwah. He said that I should see Appah Sahab and Madhoo Rao Rastia on my road to Seringapatam; and that the latter was particularly desirous of the forgiveness of the Peshwah, and he pressed to know what could be done in his ease. I answered that the British government could have but one wish upon this subject, and that was to see the Peshwah surrounded by all his sirdars; but I recommended to Baba Sahab to be satisfied with the trouble he would have in his own case, and to leave Madhoo Rao Rastia's affairs to his own exertions.

The circumstances that I have above detailed, which passed at the meeting with Baba Sahab, appear to hold out a favorable opportunity of settling the Peshwah's affairs with the Putwurdun family, and eventually with all the southern chiefs; and I proceed to give you my opinion regarding the mode in which that settlement ought to be effected. In respect to Baba Sahab, it is my opinion that, if he should open himself to

you upon the subject, you ought to urge the durbar to accept his offers of service; and if he should require that the British government shall guarantee the security of his person while he shall be at Poonah on the service of the Peshwah, and his possessions while he shall serve his Highness with fidelity, it is entirely consistent with the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General to give that guarantee. As the arrangement which there is a prospect of making with Baba Saheb will be made in concert and communication with the Peshwah, and as his Highness is well aware that the British government will not permit him to break engagements into which he may enter with his subjects or servants, through their mediation, it is probable that he will have no objection to this guarantee, and it is desirable that it should be given with his knowledge and consent. If the arrangement should be made with Baba Saheb, as I hope it will, it is probable that offers to the same purport will be made by the other southern chiefs; and I anxiously recommend that you should encourage them all, and urge the durbar to accept them; and that you should give the sirdars the Company's guarantee for the security of their persons and their possessions, on the ground of their faithful services to the Peshwah's state.

In case the conversation which I have above detailed should lead to an arrangement with Baba Saheb or the other southern chiefs, it will be necessary to ascertain exactly the amount of the serinjaumy, enaum, or jaghire possessions, to which each chief has a right from former grants; and to insist that each shall absolutely resign all other lands of which he may have possession, that belong to the Peshwah, for which he may have no sunnuds.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. de Meuron.*

2nd July, 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your packet of the 19th ult., and have submitted the same to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley.

The Major General approves of your having sent a steady corporal of artillery in charge of the invalids sent up to Chittledroog; and he authorises the payment of that man's batta, or issue of provisions to him while absent on that duty.

Directions will be given for the issue of family certificates to the recovered men of the corps composing the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah; and orders have been sent to Hurryhur to send the men of the 2nd batt. 12th regt. to Hullihall, in Soonda, the present head quarters of that corps, and to detain the pioneers, as the corps is on its march to the southward. The families of those men ought to be informed of these circumstances, and advised to proceed and join their friends, as family certificates cannot be granted to them, the corps having quitted the field.

The orders conveyed in my letter of the 27th May, regarding deserters, are to be understood in this manner: Whenever a deserter is brought into Seringapatam, belonging to a corps not in the garrison, he ought to be forwarded immediately from post to post to the head quarters of his corps, whence the necessary reports will be made; but when a deserter is brought in belonging to a corps in the garrison, he is to be confined in a public guard, and a report made to Major Gen. Wellesley by the officer commanding the garrison.

In answer to Lieut. Cleghorn's objection to comply with your order regarding a plan and estimate of the repairs required for the artillery barracks at Seringapatam, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will call upon Mr. Cleghorn to state distinctly whether or not he understands that to be a duty strictly regimental, and in which he is prohibited from acting by the letter from the adjutant of the corps of Engineers, the copy of which he delivered to you on the 14th June.

*The D.A.G. to the Officer commy. at Haldihall.*

Camp at Erroor, 2nd July, 1804.

If the garrison storekeeper has so much grain in store in Haldihall, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will direct his servant there to send off as far as to the amount of 700 or 800 bags of it to Sungoly, to be lodged in store there, and wait the arrival of the 19th dragoons and 4th regt. cavalry, now on their march from Poonah to the southward.

If there be not so much grain in store, the General desires you will order the garrison storekeeper's servants to purchase it immediately, and send it out to Sungoly as above. He will require the assistance of the amildar, both in purchasing the grain, if that be necessary, and in procuring cattle to carry it over to Sungoly; and the General requests that you will send and inform the amildar of these orders, and desire him to give what assistance may be in his power towards the execution of them.

Lieut. Young, of the 19th dragoons, has charge of the grain department. You will correspond with him, and learn the time of the arrival of the detachment at Sungoly, and apprise him of the quantity of grain sent there for him.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Hill.*

Camp at Erroor, 2nd July, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley instructed you to keep a look out for the tappalls, and ordered that tappall peons should be sent along with you for that purpose; notwithstanding which he has seen several packets and letters for you, which have been allowed to be carried past your detachment. He therefore desires that you will employ the people furnished you for this purpose so effectually in future that no more tappalls may pass you unexamined; otherwise you must miss whatever orders may be sent to you, of however great importance they may be.

The General further desires you will give the strictest orders, and see that they are obeyed, that all departments and individuals whatever of your detachment shall pay for the grain, forage, &c., which they may require and obtain in the country; and also that the cattle may not be suffered to graze upon the new grain. The country is now suffering the utmost misery from famine, and no ground must be given for saying that the present crop is injured by the march of a British detachment.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Young, agent for public cattle.*

Camp at Erroor, 2nd July, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has directed me to inform you that he had observed, while in camp near Poonah, that the draught cattle were by no means in such good condition as they used to be, although they had been less worked lately; and that he has received a report from Lieut. Col. Hill, stating that, owing to the exceeding weak state of the cattle of every description, and in every department, together with other causes, he had not reached his ground on the 26th June until late in the evening, and had been obliged to leave some guns and tumbrils in the pass all next day.

The General has always considered the establishment of draught bullocks as a most essential one in the army, and has given it every support in his power, and he will not suffer it to fall to the ground from any cause whatever. He has therefore resolved, if the cattle continue to fall off, to recommend to the Commander in Chief to appoint another officer to the charge of them, without going into any inquiries, or stating any other reason than that the cattle have fallen off; and of this he has directed that you should be apprised.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Nuggur Manowly, 3rd July, 1804.

Since I addressed you on the 1st inst., on the subject of the conversation which I had with Baba Sahab Putwurdun, I have received the orders of the Governor General of the 3rd June, on the subject of the settlement to be made with the southern jaghiredars. I conclude that you will have applied to his Highness the Peshwah for his consent to the interposition of the British government in his affairs with the southern chiefs.

I think it probable that I shall see Appah Sahab and Madhoo Rao Rastia on my journey through the province of Sayanore; in which case



of the value of their conquests, as if they were to tend to the decrease of the military establishments and their expense. They have adverted only to the fact that, by the success of their arms, they have diminished the number of their external enemies; and they have imagined that, in proportion as they have become secure abroad, they ought to have the means of reducing their armies at home. This appears to be particularly the error of the Court of Directors.

They have not adverted to the fact that all government in India, excepting perhaps that in Bengal, is held by the sword; that, in order to carry on their foreign wars, they have been obliged to weaken the means of their internal government, that is to say, the power of the sword in their own provinces, by which, till this last war, they have invariably suffered; and that the conclusion of the most successful foreign war in India, that by which the most formidable enemy may have been subdued, if it gives an accession of territory, must bring with the territory a necessity to increase the army; because the government must be established in the new territory, and supported, as well as in the old, by the power of the sword. The want of knowledge, or rather of recollection, of these facts, is the cause of all the complaints of high military establishments and expenses, and of all the difficulties in which you must have found yourself, from the want of troops.

This want, however, it is to be hoped, will not hereafter be so severely felt. For the last 5 or 6 years, great exertions have been made, and the Company's power has been vastly extended, without any very great increase of their military resources. What has been done has been by great military activity and exertion; for I believe it will be found, upon an examination of the Company's military establishments, that, excepting in cavalry, they are but little larger than they were in Lord Cornwallis's time, and not so strong in European troops. Accordingly, every thing has been on the stretch, and every nerve has been exerted, to support the authority of government in its extended provinces, as well as to provide the means of making foreign conquests. But now I believe that we can conquer no more, at least on the establishment of Fort St. George; and the troops and military resources of this presidency will be applicable to the defence of the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to provide for the peace of the country.

I have never had much apprehension of the attack of an European enemy in India, and least of all in this war; because the enemy appear to have turned their resources to that kind of naval equipment which, it must be obvious, they could not use in an attack on this country.

In respect to the internal peace, I have great hopes of it, from the operation of the systems of government adopted in the latter end of Lord Clive's time. All arguments founded on theory are in their favor; and we have also in their favor the practical example of a long course of peace and increasing prosperity in the provinces under Fort William, administered by the same system; and that of the peace and tranquillity of the provinces under the government of Fort St. George (excepting always Malabar) in the late war, being the only foreign war in which the Company have ever been engaged, during which the people in all their provinces

in the Peninsula from which their troops were withdrawn were not in rebellion. It is true that the circumstances and events of the war were favorable to internal peace, and all ought not to be attributed to the system of civil government lately established. But, on the other hand, a Marhatta war is one during which, above all others, the country is likely to be disturbed, as the Marhattas have their agents and intrigue every where; and therefore I think it but fair to attribute the general tranquillity, excepting always in Malabar, throughout the late war, to something more than chance, or than to the circumstances and events of the war itself. Still, however, the sword is the main support of the government; and it is necessary now to provide a military establishment adequate to defend the Peninsula against a foreign European enemy, and to preserve the internal tranquillity: and I have adverted particularly to the state of the civil government, as in my opinion that must influence in a great degree, not only the amount of the force in each of the military divisions, but the mode in which that force ought to be disposed.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to point out that place on the great extent of coast, for the defence of which you have to provide, on which it is most probable that the French would make an attack. After providing for the defence of Goa on the western coast, and Masulipatam and Fort St. George on the eastern, that distribution of the army which would best provide for the support of the internal government, and would preserve tranquillity, would probably answer best to defend the Peninsula against the attack of an European enemy. I shall proceed, therefore, to state my opinion upon this part of the subject.

In the countries in which the new systems of government have been introduced, there can be little occasion (or at least it is probable that in a short time there will be little occasion) for the constant interference of the military in the support of the civil government and of the police. In those districts it will be possible to collect the troops allotted to the division in one or two great stations. This arrangement will be advantageous to discipline; it will be attended by the advantage of giving you the ability to move the troops, at once, to any point on the coast which may be threatened or attacked; you will always have a force ready to move to suppress insurrection or rebellion; and supposing that it should be necessary to keep troops in these districts, at all times, for the support of the civil government, those which you might withdraw from a great station, in which some troops would be left, would not be missed, as they have been heretofore, when the troops, being scattered in numerous small posts, have been withdrawn from the whole, and all have been left unoccupied in time of war, when to hold them would appear most important. But although I thus recommend the assembly of the troops in each division where the new systems of government have been established, generally in one large station, I am by no means an advocate for the destruction of the forts. You have my opinion already upon that subject; and I shall only mention here that the forts in these countries ought either to be made over to the civil government, or held by small detachments made from one corps at the principal station.

In the countries in which the new system of civil government has not

been introduced, I fear that the old mode of distributing the troops must still continue. But even in these, I should recommend, as a general principle, to draw the corps together as much as possible, and to make detachments only in case of very evident necessity. If this principle can be carried into effect in every division of the army, and I conceive that it might in some degree, it will give you in each division a small disposable force. This may not be equal to all the demands which may arise, but it will give you some strength everywhere; and considering the great extent of coast you have to defend, and of the Company's territories under the government of Fort St. George, I should prefer that to the concentration of your force in one position.

In the present state of the army equipments, I conceive that, for the purposes of defence against an European enemy, or even of preserving internal tranquillity, and suppressing insurrection and rebellion, there is but little occasion to have the troops constantly in the field. Both Native and European troops have their camp equipage always in readiness; and I can speak with certainty of Seringapatam, and I should think it probable, of other principal stations of the army, that the time which would be required to bring in the cattle belonging to the ordnance, and for the carriage of the camp equipage of corps, would be sufficient to procure the bullocks which might be necessary to carry any stores that might be wanted, and the provisions for the European troops. The cattle for the carriage of the gram for the horses of the cavalry can always be procured as soon as the grain.

Even if you were to form a field force, it is probable that you would not give it a gram department; and, therefore, when it would move, it would depend upon its bazaars and the country for its supplies, as must the troops when they move suddenly from these great stations. The only advantage in point of equipment that the field force would have would be carriage for the sick; but even some of that is always to be procured: and it is to be supposed that the troops moving suddenly, for which event the field force would be provided, would leave their sick behind them in their station. The objections to the central field force are, that with the expense of an army in the field, they become, in a short time, not much better than troops in a cantonment. The field force at Hyderabad, and those at Cawnpore and Futtyghur in Bengal, are examples of the truth of this observation. Those troops are in barracks, and the officers in bungalows; and it is as difficult to move them, as it is to move a similar number from a garrison, and a proportion of them must be left to take care of the cantonment.

But in respect to an invasion by the French, I should suppose that your mode of defence would be to collect, as speedily as possible, a body of troops in the neighbourhood of the spot on which the French might land, with directions to watch and circumscribe their movements as much as possible, to cut off their communications with the country, and to prevent them from receiving supplies of cattle, provisions, &c. Supposing the landing to be made in the Carnatic, and the number of men the French should land to be as large as any they have been able to bring out to India, I should imagine the disposable troops in the eastern division of the

Carnatic, collected, I would suppose, at Wallajahbad, to be fully equal to the service proposed for them. It is probable that the central field force, unless reinforced by the disposable troops in the other divisions, would not be equal to more; and the troops at Wallajahbad would have the advantage over them, that the enemy would feel them at an earlier period than they would the field force.

On the other hand, supposing the enemy to land on the western coast, the measures to be pursued would be the same. The troops would collect in Malabar in their neighbourhood; they would be joined by those from Scringapatam; and they would certainly be felt before the field force could approach.

When preparations are to be made for a great foreign war, such as the late war with the Marhattas, the mere readiness of the troops is nothing, in comparison with the preparations required for the departments of the service. You could march the troops from the most distant garrisons before these would be ready, and therefore here again the field force would be of no use. I acknowledge that I have altered my opinion upon this subject: but the state of the country has altered much since I formed it; the equipments of the army have been much improved; I have gained more experience and knowledge of the real benefits of these field forces; and I acknowledge that I am sanguine in my expectations, that the improvements of the civil government have established tranquillity in the districts in which they have been made, upon a basis more firm than has hitherto existed.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Conway.*

Camp at Nuggur Manowly, 3rd July, 1801.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has directed me to transmit to you the accompanying copies of translations of letters from the killadar and serishtahdars of Gonnair Polliam to the Dewan of Mysore, regarding your conduct at Bagunbully, and towards those serishtahdars and other inhabitants of that village, in consequence of your having been robbed there.

The custom of holding polygars, or head men of districts or villages, answerable for the property of travellers which might be stolen within their bounds, arose from the custom of those polygars allowing thieves by profession to reside within their bounds, and travellers on that account placing themselves and property under the protection of the polygars, and paying them for the protection they received; after which, if the travellers were robbed, they claimed the value from the polygars, or head men. But it is doubtful whether this custom was ever practised by officers commanding detachments of troops, in whose camps many followers reside, over whom the polygars, or magistrates, could not possibly have any control, and for whose conduct they could not be responsible; at any rate, the custom cannot apply to the officers of the present government of Mysore, and you cannot claim the benefit of it, as it does not appear that you placed yourself under the protection of the amildar, or that he took any measures to protect you from robbery in consequence of your requisition. Your seizing the officers of the government, therefore, under pretence that they are responsible for the robbery committed, treating them in a degrading manner within their own jurisdiction, and preventing them from the exercise of their offices by an imprisonment of 2 days, is considered as an outrage of the public authority: and your not paying for the 500 seers of grain received from the inhabitants, because the value of the property stolen from you had not been made good by the officers of the government, is considered unjustifiable. It is necessary that you should cause payment for that grain to be made without delay; otherwise the Major General will consider it to be his duty to represent the whole of this affair to the Commander in Chief, in order that the injured may obtain redress through the interposition of

his Excellency's authority for what has occurred; and that orders may be given on the subject, which will show that officers, in command of detachments of troops passing through the Mysore country, are not to treat the magistrates and other officers otherwise than as their conduct and their situation in the country merit.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Padshappoor, 4th July, 1804.

I enclose the copies of the letters to Appah Sahib and Mohiput Ram. I have every reason to hope that I shall see Appah Sahib at Hoobly. I get on well, and the weather continues fair.

To Capt. Wilks.

Camp at Padshappoor, 4th July, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that the Rajah's troops will enter Mysore by Hurryhur. I have desired that they may proceed from the Kistna, which river they are now crossing, by detachments, in order that they may be relieved from the distress which they suffer, at the earliest possible period; and that they may not delay and consume the forage at the different rivers, from which our troops would be distressed in that article.

To Col. Close.

Camp near Singoly, 5th July, 1804.

Appah Dessaye came to me this day to pay a visit. He told me had gone as far as Gokauk, on his way to Poonah, and that there he received a letter from Suecoo Punt, his vakeel, who informed him that you had said there was no occasion for his coming in immediately, and that he might wait a short time.

I pointed out to Appah Dessaye, in strong terms, the necessity that he should obey the Peshwah's orders, and hinted that those who had not been in the habit of obeying them hitherto, appeared now to be inclined to be obedient. I think you will do well to write to Appah Dessaye, to rectify the error into which Suecoo Punt has fallen, respecting your orders about Appah Dessaye going to Poonah. I shall see Goklah to-morrow, and I shall urge him forward; I believe Appah Sahib and Madhoo Rao Rastia next day.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Camp at Yadwar, 6th July, 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th June, in which you have enclosed the copy of one from Messrs. Forbes and Co., containing their offer to pay immediately the money which they had agreed with the government of Fort St. George should be paid for certain quantities of sandal wood, when they should be received; provided interest should be paid for the money at the rate of *3 per cent. per mensem*, from the time they should advance it, to that at which they shall receive the sandal wood.

Such ample provision has been made for the payment of the troops, that it is my opinion they will not require the money till after the month of August, when it is supposed that Messrs. Forbes will have received the sandal wood. However, I beg leave to refer you to Col. Close upon this subject. If the money should be immediately wanted from Messrs. Forbes, it can be only on account of the distance from which that must be carried which was expected from Hyderabad, and of the difficulty of moving in the Deccan at present.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Hill.*

Camp, 6th July, 1804.

In order to save time, and to allow the cattle of all descriptions with your detachment to be provided with forage with more ease, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that you will send one battalion of sepoys across the Kistna first, with all its establishments, &c.; and direct the officer commanding it to proceed on by himself, and cross the Gutpurba and Malpoorba, and halt somewhere in the neighbourhood of Sungoly, until the whole detachment will be collected there again.

When 1 batt. of sepoys has passed the Kistna, as above, send over a corps of cavalry, with all its equipments, and let it proceed alone to Sungoly. Then the other regiment of cavalry; and latterly the artillery unattached to corps, and the last batt. of sepoys.

You will send such detachments of the pioneers, and proportion the grain and provision departments with corps, as you may think proper.

The officer commanding at Erroor will deliver over to you a deserter from the 73rd regt., whom you will carry to the southward, and send on to the nearest station on the road to the head quarters of his corps, whenever you may quit that route.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Langford, at Hurryhur.*

Camp at Yadwar, 6th July, 1804.

Through some neglect or disobedience of orders, the 2 regts. of cavalry which are coming to the southward were sent off from camp with only 15 days' stock of grain instead of 30, and they must inevitably be distressed for grain before they come into a part of the country where they can get any considerable supply, unless it can be sent up from Mysore to meet them. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley therefore requests that you will speak to the amildar of Hurryhur on this subject, and urge him to procure cattle forthwith, to carry forward some of the grain in store at Hurryhur, or to purchase and send it on, if that should have been all expended. There should be no time lost, in order to collect a large quantity, as 50 bullock loads would be a day's food; and even 20 bullock loads at a time would be of service. Send a sepoy with each squad, and direct him to proceed as far as Erroor, on the Kistna, or till he meets the cavalry.

(*The same to Capt. Vernon, at Hullihall.*)

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace, Poonah.*

Camp at Yadwar, 6th July, 1804.

Lieut. Col. Hill has reported to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, that on the 1st inst. there was only 8 days' grain in camp for the 2 regts. of dragoons and Native cavalry proceeding to the southward; also, that a wastage had then taken place of 9 per cent. on the quantity sent from the army, owing to the greater part of the bags being in an unserviceable state. The Major General requests that you will call on Capt. Monteath for a report of the measures which he took for supplying the above 2 regts. with grain, agreeably to the orders of the 19th June, and also for a report of his reasons for sending the grain in unserviceable bags; and forward those reports to him, that they may accompany one which he proposes making to his Excellency the Commander in Chief on the subject.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Howden, reporting his having charge of 850,000 rupees, dispatched from Hyderabad for Ahmednuggur, on the 24th June. The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley concludes that this is part of the 10½ lacs of rupees, mentioned in his letter to you of the 24th June as to be dispatched from Masulipatam on the 1st of that month; and he imagines that this sum has been dispatched from Hyderabad before Major Kirkpatrick had received his letter, requesting that he would send half of the money coming from Masulipatam to Lieut. Col. Haliburton, for the use of the Hyderabad subsidiary force; and the other half to Ahmednuggur, for the service of the Poonah subsidiary force. But however that may be, the Major General now requests that you will send from Ahmednuggur to Lieut. Col. Haliburton's camp one half of the money which Lieut. Howden brings from Hyderabad, and order the other half down to your own camp.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace.*

Camp at Yadwar, 6th July, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has directed me to transmit to you the accompanying copy of a letter received to-day, from the Adj. Gen.'s office, regarding the individuals directed by the Commander in Chief to be removed from the collective

strength of the army, in consequence of the proceedings of the invaliding, &c., committee having been confirmed by his Excellency.

As those men could not be sent away from the army at the time originally intended by the Commander in Chief, and as the invalids and pensioners cannot subsist in camp, or in the hospital at Bombay, upon their net pay, nor the discharged men reach the Company's territories without some assistance, the Major General requests that you will direct the officers commanding the corps to which those men did belong to keep them upon the strength of their corps, and to draw full pay and field allowances for them, until those men who will march under this order will arrive in Mysore or the Company's territories, and those who will be sent from Bombay will embark.

Such men as are now in camp must be sent off immediately, under an escort of a havildar's guard, to join Lieut. Col. Hill, whom they will overtake at some of the rivers, and they will proceed with him until he will cross the Toombuddra; when the invalids will proceed direct to Madras, the pensioners to the stations where they wish to reside, and the discharged men whither their inclinations may lead them.

The Major General also requests that you will make application to the Hon. the Governor in Council of Bombay to send the invalids and pensioners of the Hon. Company's troops, on the establishment of Fort St. George, now in hospital at Bombay, round by sea to Madras by the first opportunity.

Lieut. Col. Hill will receive similar orders regarding the men belonging to the corps with him.

The officer commanding corps will report to the Adj. Gen. of the army the period at which these invalids, pensioners, and discharged men arrive in Mysore, or on the Company's territories under the presidency of Fort St. George, from which date they will strike them off the strength of their corps.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Hoobly, 7th July, 1804.

I enclose a letter for the Secretary of Government of Bombay, which I request you to peruse and forward. Some time ago, I received from the house of Messrs. Forbes and Co., at Bombay, a proposition to purchase from the government of Fort St. George a quantity of sandal wood, for which they were to pay 5 lacs of rupees into the pay office at Poonah, as soon as they should receive the sandal wood. The government of Fort St. George have accepted the proposition, and Messrs. Forbes and Co. have made arrangements to send vessels to receive the sandal wood at Fort St. George and Mangalore. Still, some time will elapse before it will be received; and Messrs. Forbes and Co., supposing it would be a convenience to the military operations that the money should be lodged at Poonah immediately, have offered to send it there, provided they receive for it the usual interest of  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per mensem, from the time they shall pay the money, until that at which they shall receive the sandal wood. I have referred the government of Bombay to you for an answer on this subject.

To E. Strachey, Esq.

Camp at Bludgherry, 8th July, 1804.

I enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have received from his Excellency the Governor General, from which you will observe that it is his Excellency's desire that the British government should interpose its arbitration for the purpose of settling the differences between the Peshwah and the southern jaghiredars; and that I should appoint a person to conduct the inquiries and negotiation connected with the proposed settlement.

2. I have fixed upon you for the performance of this service, and I proceed to give you my instructions.

3. The persons who are the objects of the Governor General's orders are not properly jaghiredars. They are the serinjaumy sirdars of the Poonah state; and it is peculiarly the case with serinjaumy lands, that the possession of them may be changed annually. The chiefs in question, however, have held their lands of this description for many years; and they have other possessions under the Poonah state, some in jaghire, others in enaum, and others held only as comavisdars or amildars of the government.

4. Serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of troops employed in the service of the state, and it stands to reason that the condition of the tenure of serinjaumy lands is, that the holder should render service to the state; but the chiefs in question have long been in the habit of rendering no service to the Peshwah, under various pretences; the principal of which is, that the Rajah of Kolapoor has attacked them, and has plundered their possessions; and that their troops are employed in the defence of the territories from the revenues of which they are to be supported.

5. In order to deprive the serinjaumy sirdars of this pretence for a failure in their engagements, I some time ago wrote a letter to the Rajah of Kolapoor, of which I enclose a translation, and I have lately apprised his vakeels, that the British government will not permit him to attack the Peshwah's territories; and I have proposed to them that the Rajah should refer to the arbitration and decision of the British government, all his disputed claims on the Peshwah and his sirdars; and that till the British government shall have leisure to decide on them, hostilities should cease on all sides.

6. The Governor General has lately directed that a remonstrance to the same purport, with a letter from myself, of which the enclosed is a translation, should be made to the Rajah of Kolapoor by Sir W. Clarke; and I am sanguine in my expectations that the Rajah will accept the offered mediation of the British government. At all events, whether he does or not, this appears to be a favorable period for effecting a settlement with the southern chiefs.

7. The principal of these chiefs are Appah Saheb and Baba Saheb, the sons of Pursheram Bhow; Chintomeny Rao Pandoorung, the nephew of Pursheram Bhow; Madhoo Rao Rastia, and Punt Prittee Niddee. There are others of inferior note, depending on these, who will, of course, follow their example.

8. In my opinion, the best mode of arranging these affairs is, to commence settling with Appah Saheb, who is commonly supposed to be the head of the Putwurdun family. I have accordingly written to that chief, to inform him that I was desirous of communicating with him on business of importance, and had requested you to go to him; and I have desired him to write to you at Deogherry, on the Werdah, and to fix the time and place at which you will meet him.

9. I have the honor to enclose with this a letter of introduction for Appah Saheb.

10. When you shall see Appah Saheb, I recommend you to apprise him



of the extreme displeasure of the Peshwah, that he should have omitted to serve him in the late war, or to take any steps in his service since the conclusion of the peace. You will point out to Appah Saheb the nature of his situation under the Poonah state; and you will observe to him that the Peshwah has just and urgent claims upon his services. You will apprise him of the favorable opinion which the Governor General entertains of him and the sirdars of his family, and of the wishes which his Excellency therefore has formed to settle, by the mediation of the British government, all existing differences between the Peshwah and his principal subjects, that his Highness may enjoy the benefit of their services to which he has a just claim, and that they may enjoy in peace and security the benefits which they hold under the Poonah state. You will then inform him that I have sent you to confer with him on an arrangement to be founded on that basis, and you will desire to know his sentiments upon the subject.

11. Appah Saheb will probably bring forward a variety of claims upon the Peshwah's government, and of complaints of injuries which he has received from his Highness. You will reply to these, that, till he renders service for the serinjaumy lands which he holds under the Peshwah's state, no claims can be taken into consideration; that his complaint cannot be listened to till he shall place himself in the situation of a faithful servant; and that if his complaints are of such a nature that he cannot serve the Peshwah without disgrace to himself, (which he has before hinted,) he ought to resign the Peshwah's lands, and to give his Highness those means of supporting his government.

There is one claim in particular which Appah Saheb will bring forward, viz., to hold the Savanore country till its revenues shall have discharged a debt pretended to be due to Pursheram Bhow for expenses incurred at Seringapatam.

You will answer to this claim, that the debt must have been discharged long ago; but that, at all events, supposing it is not, he cannot be permitted to allot to its payment the revenues of the serinjaumy lands, which every body knows are invariably applied to the payment of military service actually rendered.

12. If Appah Saheb should urge that he cannot serve the Peshwah, because the Rajah of Kolapoor has attacked him, and will continue his attacks, you will apprise him of the measures which I have adopted to insure at least a cessation of hostilities on the part of the Rajah, and those which have been adopted by order of his Excellency the Governor General. You will point out to Appah Saheb, that in his situation of a servant of the Poonah state, he cannot be permitted to wage war against the Rajah of Kolapoor; that if he has any complaints to make of that Chief, he ought to state them to his sovereign, the Peshwah, who would consult with his allies upon the subject; and that, according to this mode of proceeding, justice would be done. You will observe to Appah Saheb, however, that the first object to be obtained is, that he should place himself in the situation of a servant to the Peshwah, and really serve his Highness in return for the serinjaumy lands which he holds under his Highness' government.

13. If you should find that Appah Saheb is disposed to serve the Peshwah, you will lay open the following propositions, as the articles of an agreement for settling all differences between the Peshwah and his family, and for defining their respective claims and benefits hereafter.

i. There shall be a mutual oblivion and pardon of all injuries on both sides. The British government will guarantee the security of the persons of Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, so long as they shall serve the Peshwah with fidelity, and refrain from intriguing or holding any communication with his Highness' enemies.

ii. Appah Saheb, his brothers, relations, and adherents, shall hold the lands of which they have possession by virtue of sunnuds, or legal grants from the state, whether as serinjaumy, or enaum, or in jaghire; and the British government will guarantee to them the possession of all those lands as long as they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully, and shall hold no communication with his Highness' enemies. In order to ascertain the lands, the possession of which the British government are to guarantee to Appah Saheb, and his brothers, relations, &c., a list of them is to be given in by Appah Saheb, which list is to be referred to his Highness the Peshwah, who will make such objections as he may think proper to Appah Saheb's retaining any particular portion of those described in the list. Appah Saheb is to reply to the Peshwah's objections to his list: and the British government is to decide between the parties. In the mean time, till the decision shall be made, Appah Saheb is to remain in possession of the lands.

iii. The condition on which the Hon. Company will guarantee to Appah Saheb, &c., the possession of their lands is, that they shall serve the Peshwah zealously and faithfully. In consideration of the injuries which the country has received from long wars, and having been frequently plundered, and lately a famine, Appah Saheb, &c., shall not be required to produce, at any time, more than two thirds of the forces; for the support of which they will retain the serinjaumy lands. But that reduced number must be produced whenever it may be called for, otherwise the guarantee in the 2nd article shall be null and void. Also one third of the number of the forces Appah Saheb, &c., are bound to supply, are always to be at Poonah, under the command of one of the members of the Putwurdun family. The person who shall command this force shall be under the guarantee of the Company, in respect to the security of his person. The number of troops which Appah Saheb will have to furnish, according to this arrangement, shall be ascertained and decided by the British government, in the same manner as the quantity of lands which Appah Saheb, &c., are to hold till the decision shall be made. Appah Saheb, &c., are to supply for the Peshwah's service that body of troops which they will allege they ought to furnish according to the present arrangement.

iv. Appah Saheb, &c., are to restore to the Peshwah's government all lands, &c. &c., which they may hold, for which they have no sunnuds. In this article are included all lands of which they may be the comavisdars or amildars, unless the possession of such lands should be material to their safety, or to enable them to collect the revenues of their serinjaumy, enaum, or jaghire lands: in which case, the British government will in-

terest themselves with the Peshwah, that the comavisdars may be continued to the Putwardun family, provided they give security that the Peshwah shall regularly receive the revenue.

14. You will call upon Appah Saheb to give you a list of the lands described in the 2nd article, which the Company are to guarantee, and to communicate to you the sumuds or other grunts by which he holds them; and to make known to you the amount of the services done to the state for those lands. I request you to investigate these papers minutely, and then to refer them to Col. Close, with your opinion and report upon them.

15. I propose to send Col. Close a copy of this letter, and to request him to communicate with the Peshwah's durbar, and gain all the information of which they are in possession, relative to the points into which you will have to inquire, particularly the opinion of the Peshwah and his minister, regarding the lands for which Appah Saheb may allege that he and family have claims; and the amount of the force which he will pretend they ought to furnish for those lands.

16. I beg you to correspond with Col. Close upon every point which may occur in your mission; and to attend to any suggestions that you may receive from him.

17. If the result of your investigation into the subject of the lands to which Appah Saheb shall lay claims for himself and family, and the services which they are to render in return for them, should be, that the difference between the Peshwah's statement and Appah Saheb's be trifling; or if, the difference in the statements being great, you should have been able to ascertain clearly which party is in the right, you will decide between them without further reference; and draw a treaty according to the tenor of the propositions in the 13th paragraph of this dispatch, in the 2nd article of which you will include the denomination of the lands, the possession of which the British government shall guarantee; or if the list should be too long, you will place in a schedule to which the article may refer, and you will include in the 3rd article the amount of the services which Appah Saheb and his family are to render.

18. If you should think it proper not to decide these questions yourself, you will refer them to his Excellency the Governor General; but you will still draw and sign the treaty according to the propositions in the 13th paragraph, binding Appah Saheb to abide by the decision of the British government whenever it should be made, and to sign hereafter an article specifying the lands to which, according to that decision, the Company's guarantee is to extend, and the amount of the service which Appah Saheb and his family are to render.

19. After having settled with Appah Saheb, you will know from the tenor of that settlement, and from your inquiries from him, whether it will be necessary that you should have distinct and separate interviews, and make separate settlements with his brothers and relations. In case it should be so, you ought to go to them, and I enclose letters for each.

20. If you should find Appah Saheb entirely disinclined to come to the proposed or any other settlement with the Peshwah, you will take your leave of him, and there will be no necessity for seeing his relations. I

request you, in that case, to give him notice that he shall not be permitted to attack the Rajah of Kolapoor: and that he must beware of his measures towards the Peshwah's government

21. After having settled, or failed in your settlement with the Putwurdun family, you will go to Madhoo Rao Rastia, and pursue the same course with him. If, however, you should fail in your negotiations with the Putwurdun family, and with Madhoo Rao Rastia, there will be no occasion for your going to Prittee Niddee. If you should succeed with both, or either, you will pursue the same course with Prittee Niddee, for whom likewise you have a letter.

22. If you should not go to Prittee Niddee, you will go to some place on the frontier and report to the Governor General, and wait his further orders.

23. You will be so kind as to report your proceedings regularly to his Excellency the Governor General. I shall be glad to hear from you as long as I may be in this part of India, and I will assist you to the utmost of my power with all the information which I may have.

24. You will be so kind as to communicate by means of a tappall with the post on the Kistna, or any other that may be convenient to you; you will transmit your letters to the Governor General by Poonah.

25. You will keep an account of your expenses on this mission, which will be paid by the public.

You will communicate your wants of money to Col. Close, who will take measures to supply you; and in case you should be able to procure any money for bills, you may draw upon Col. Close, or Mr. Duncan, at Bombay.

26. I have appointed Mr. Assist. Surgeon Scott to attend your mission, and have ordered a company of the 2nd batt. 12th regt. under a European officer, from Hullihall, in Soonda, as your escort, to meet you at Sungoly, on the Malpoorba. I have also directed that 20 of the Mysore horse may attend you.

To Col. Close.

Bindegherry, 8th July, 1804.

When I passed Darwar in the last year, it appeared to the Commander in Chief and myself to be an object of the greatest importance that I should arrange matters with Bappojee Scindiah in such a manner as that I might leave the fort of Darwar in his hands; as the person whom the Peshwah has desired that the British army should put in possession of that fort, Ball Kishen Gungurdhur, had not communicated with us. I therefore opened a communication with Bappojee Scindiah, the result of which was, that he engaged to remain faithful in his allegiance to the Peshwah, and not to impede the communication of the British army with the Company's territories, and he sent his son to my camp as a hostage for the performance of his engagements.

I expected that his son, Ricknaje Scindiah, would have been permitted to return to Darwar when I should return to Mysore; and although I do not recollect any positive promise to that effect, certainly, the tenor of the arrangement gives ground for belief that it was intended that Ricknaje Scindiah should return; accordingly, I request that he may be

allowed to return to Darwar, unless the Peshwah should think proper to provide for him in his service.

I am happy to inform you that I have every reason to be satisfied with Bappoojee Scindiah; he behaved well during the war, and on my moving to the southward, he treated me with the greatest civility; and as an extraordinary instance of liberality in a Marhatta killadar, I mention that he invited me, and I went to an entertainment inside of the fort.\*

To Col. Close.

Camp at Deogherry, 9th July, 1804.

I have received a letter from Mr. Webbe, of the 26th June, in which he sent the memorandum of a conference which he had had on the preceding day with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his ministers. The object of this conference was to prevail upon Mr. Webbe to urge me to take measures to protect the districts south of the Godavery, which had been ceded to Scindiah by the peace, from disturbances created by persons in the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. I made inquiries respecting these alleged disturbances before I left Poonah, and the result was, that they did not exist. A person had taken possession of the principal place in Cavy Jung's jaghire, from whence he was driven by Major Graham, and his baggage plundered. This person, however, made use of the name of the Peshwah, as I believe I informed you when I was at Poonah.

I know of no disturbances in the countries south of the Godavery, but it is very desirable that Major Graham should protect Scindiah's districts from plunderers, as far as may be in his power, particularly as Scindiah is prevented by the treaty of peace from sending troops into those districts himself. Robberies are certainly very common, but the amildars of towns and districts must take their own measures to protect the inhabitants from robberies.

When I was at Poonah, I apprised you that I had told Mr. Webbe that Scindiah's officers in So-gaum should be put in possession of Holkar's share of that district. My reason for making this arrangement, liable to the future orders of the Governor General, was, that I thought he was more likely to keep the district in tranquillity, if he should hold it entirely, than if it were to be held with the officer either of the Peshwah, or of the Nizam.

I request you to make your arrangements accordingly, when you shall take possession of So-gaum. This is a place of no strength, and it may be taken at any time by a body of British troops. I intended to have taken it by means of the detachment which I proposed to send to Aurrangabad with the heavy guns; and I would recommend the same arrangement now, if that detachment should consist of 4 or 5 companies, should have field pieces, and should be well commanded. If it should not be so equipped and commanded, it is better that the attack should be deferred till Col. Wallace shall march up with the detachment destined for the siege of Chandore.

\* This mark of confidence of Major Gen. Wellesley in the killadar of Darwar was a matter of surprise to every one, even to the killadar himself, who, in retreating afterwards that he had not taken advantage of it, said, 'For I am still a Marhatta!'

The possession of So-gaum was another subject of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's conference with Mr. Webbe.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

Deogherry, 9th July, 1804.

Mr. Elphinstone has transmitted to me a copy of his letter to you, of the 20th June, relative to the claim of the Rajah of Berar to collect the revenues of the districts ceded by the article of the treaty of Deogaum, from the date of that treaty. You will observe from the extract of my letter to Mr. Elphinstone, of the 19th Jan., that I gave the Rajah reason to hope that he should collect these revenues from the date of the peace; and I wrote a letter to Rajah Mohiput Ram, stating my wishes upon this subject: but exclusively of these reasons, which I hope will induce you to urge the Soubah of the Deccan to restore to the Rajah the sums which have been collected from the districts, it appears but fair that he should have the revenues from the date of the peace; particularly as the delay in fixing upon the districts, and afterwards in giving possession of them to the Rajah's servants, could not be attributed to the Rajah.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Halburton.* Camp near Mooty Bednore, 10th July, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley desires me to inform you, that when Rajah Sookroodoor took possession of Umber, he seized the person of Wamaunjie Hurry, who had been amildar on the part of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, together with all his property, and he keeps the man still in confinement. As the Rajah took possession of the place under your authority, the Major General requests that you will interfere, and prevail upon him to release the late amildar from confinement, and also to deliver up all his private property.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

I wrote to you from Poonah to apprise you, that in consequence of the orders of the Governor General I had broken up the army, and had put some of the troops in motion to the southward, and intended myself to move on the 25th. I hope you will have been induced to withdraw on the receipt of that letter, as I find, from a letter from Gen. Stuart, dated the 12th June, which I received only this day, that he trusted to me to give you notice of the period at which I should think you might withdraw the troops which you command into the Company's territories. It is my opinion that you may withdraw them whenever you may think proper, and that no inconvenience will result from the measure.

All is quiet in this country, and I have every hope that I shall be able to effect a satisfactory arrangement of the Peshwah's affairs with the southern chiefs.

P.S. I have been delayed by the rain the last 2 or 3 days, but I shall be at Hurrybur to-morrow.

To Col. Close.

Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

Since I wrote to you on the 9th, I have continued my march to the southward, and have seen all the principal persons in this part of the Marhatta Empire, by all of whom I have been received in such a manner as to convince me that the settlement of the Peshwah's affairs with the chiefs in the southern districts will not be difficult.

Appah Dessaye waited upon me between the rivers Gutpurba and Mal-

poorba. His army was at Gokmuk, as he said, for the purpose of crossing the river on its way to Poonah; but he said that Succoo Punt, his vakeel at Poonah, had informed him that it was your opinion that there was no necessity for his being in a hurry to advance; and that you would let him know at what period his services would be required. I told him that Succoo Punt must have misunderstood you, and that he would do well not to discontinue to pass his troops over the river. Appah Dessaye assured me of his entire obedience to the Peshwah, and he made no complaints. But I understood from him, that he had been reconciled to Sirjee Rao Ghautky: he brought the son of Sirjee Rao, by name Hindon Rao Ghautky, to visit me, and since I saw him I have received a letter from him, in which he has desired me to give him a passport for Sirjee Rao Ghautky to go to Burhanpoor. I told Appah Dessaye that I should not give this passport unless I should learn that Dowlut Rao Scindiah was desirous of seeing Sirjee Rao Ghautky, and that the Peshwah would permit him to pass through his territories, and that the Kolapoor Rajah had such a reliance upon his future good behaviour as to allow him to depart from his territories.

The Dessaye of Kittoor met me on the 6th in the morning, at Sungoly, on the Malpoorba. He complained sadly of the difficulties of his situation: he said that both Goklah and the sirsoubah claimed his tribute, and both plundered his country to obtain it; and he promised to pay it to whichever of the parties I should name. He also complained that Appah Dessaye's troops plundered his country. I have prevailed upon Goklah and the sirsoubah to arrange this affair in a manner which I shall detail in this letter; and I have written to the Dessaye of Kittoor a letter, of which I enclose a copy.

Goklah called upon me on the evening of the 6th. He complained of the distress of his troops; and endeavored to justify, on that ground, his march to the southward, contrary to the orders of the Peshwah. I, of course, resisted this justification, and pointed out the just grounds which the Peshwah had for being displeased with him. He then adverted to the arrangement which had been made for him, as communicated by Lingam Punt, and expressed his satisfaction at it, and declared his intention to march to Poonah immediately. I told him to recollect that the condition of the arrangement was, that he should relinquish the Savanore country, his claim and exactions upon the Dessaye of Kittoor, and every thing which he held in these countries, for which he had not a positive grant from the Peshwah, and his Highness' positive permission to retain. He said that he should certainly; but observed, that he should be of no use at Poonah unless he should be able to bring with him his army; and also said that the army would certainly disband if he were to give up the country before the orders were discharged which he had drawn upon the amildars, and had given to the horsemen and sowars, for the pay of the troops for the last four months. He said that, during that time, his Highness the Peshwah had made no provision whatever for their payment, excepting to give them an order upon the Rajah of Solapoor, who would refuse to pay unless compelled by a force much larger than that of which he had the command.

After a long discussion upon the subject of these orders, I was convinced that Goklah could not keep his army together unless some arrangement was made for discharging them; and that, whatever he might promise, he certainly could not relinquish the Savanore country till they should be discharged. In this manner you would be obliged either to stop the payment of his troops during the campaign, or to submit to his retaining the Savanore country contrary to his agreement.

In either case the settlement of the country under one authority would be delayed; and the sirsoubah on the one hand, and Goklah on the other, would each draw from it whatever they could get, to the loss of the Peshwah, and the certain destruction of the resources of the country for a long period of time. I therefore deemed it best for the Peshwah's interest to propose to Goklah, that I should endeavor to prevail upon the sirsoubah to take upon himself to discharge the orders within a reasonable space of time, on the positive condition that he should withdraw his troops, amildars, &c. &c., from the whole country in 15 days from the date at which the agreement should be made. Goklah agreed to this proposal; and an agreement has been settled between the sirsoubah and him, of which I enclose a copy.

In the same agreement it is settled that Goklah is to have the tribute of Kittoor, for the last year, according to the old arrangement; and that the sirsoubah, who wants possession of the Kittoor country, and expects that the Company will give him possession, shall have the tribute in this year, and afterwards according to the orders of the Peshwah.

You will readily believe that I did not recommend this arrangement without the fullest conviction of its necessity; and I beg that you will explain all the circumstances of the case to the Peshwah's ministers. I fear that the arrangement will not be satisfactory to his Highness, as I find that he and his servants expected that the Company's armies should be employed in the settlement of his Highness' government. Upon which point you will observe the instructions of the Governor General, in his letter of the 3rd June; but it is to be observed, of the arrangement, that, from this time, his Highness may expect the resources of Savanore, if he will proceed upon any principle of steadiness with the sirsoubah. If this arrangement had not been made with Goklah, the Peshwah never would have rooted out his officers and troops.

Bappojee Schindiah, the killadar of Darwar, met me outside of his fort, on the morning of the 7th, and invited me to an entertainment within it. In the course of the conversation which passed, he expressed his attachment to the Company and the Peshwah. He wishes that his son may be sent back to him; upon which subject I have given him a letter addressed to you, of which I now enclose a duplicate.

I arrived at Hoobly on that day, and there met the sirsoubah's earkoon, Ramchunder Tantea, with the Peshwah's pagah. His business there was to get possession of old Hoobly, a ruined village, before which he had been for about 6 weeks. Old Hoobly is a possession of the Phurkia family; and before I had been in the neighbourhood half an hour, the persons within the fort sent out a letter from the Peshwah, addressed to the sirsoubah, desiring him to give old Hoobly and its dependencies to Bappoo Phurkia, his Highness' brother in law. His people were within the fort



at the time, and were resisting the attack of the sirsoubah, also made by the Peshwah's orders, and with his troops. I recommended to both parties to desist from hostilities, and to write to Poonah for an explanation of the Peshwah's real intentions respecting this place. This fact exemplifies, in a strong manner, the modes of proceeding of the Peshwah's government, and the difficulty of the task of settling the country, which is to be under its immediate authority.

I gave the sirsoubah a letter to the killadar of Misserycotta, a small place immediately upon the borders of Soonda, which the killadar refused to give up, although Appah Sahib, to whom the fort belongs, has given him orders to evacuate it. If I should find that he does not evacuate the fort, I shall send orders to Lieut. Col. Hill, as he will pass, to put the sirsoubah in possession, which will be a matter of no difficulty.

This point being arranged, and the sirsoubah getting possession of the Savanore province, by the arrangement with Goklah, and of the tribute of Kittoor, there will remain only the districts in possession of the great chiefs, which must be the subject of further arrangements.

Madhoo Rao Rastia came from Sirhitty, across the Werdah, to meet me at Deogherry on the 9th, and I saw him on the morning of the 10th; after a short time, he expressed a desire to converse with me in private. He began with a general discourse on the strength which the Peshwah's government had acquired by his Highness' alliance with the Company, and general professions of his attachment, and of his desire to be considered a friend by the Company's servants; and the result of his conversation was the expression of a strong desire to serve the Peshwah on the old footing.

I answered, that nothing would give the British government greater satisfaction than to see the Peshwah surrounded by his principal subjects. I observed, that as these held lands under his government, it was but reasonable that they should serve him, or resign their lands; but that if they did serve him with fidelity and zeal, it was reasonable that they should enjoy, in peace and security, the benefits which they then held. I said that the British government's wishes were confined to an arrangement between the Peshwah and his subjects on those principles.

Madhoo Rao Rastia said, that he had advanced to the Peshwah's state above 40 lacs of rupees, and that, in return for the money so advanced, the districts of Bauggreccotta, Badamy, and Jellahull had been given over to him many years ago, as *camavisdar*; that the sirsoubah of Savanore had sent him orders, requesting him to give up those districts, and he wished to know what arrangement could be made regarding them. I answered that it appeared that the possession of these districts was attended by claims of debts due by the state, and other circumstances upon which I had no information, and into which I could not enter at that period; but I said, that if Madhoo Rao Rastia chose to refer the question regarding the possession of those districts to the Company, I would undertake to have it decided, and would send a gentleman to converse with him on the subject, who should have full information and instructions.

Madhoo Rao Rastia replied, that he had no objection to go to Poonah, to settle his affairs there, if I would give him a letter to you; and he said

that all he wished was to be allowed to serve the Peshwah, and to have the Company's countenance and friendship. I answered, that as the Company's countenance and support would be a lasting benefit to him, it would be necessary that he should understand clearly that, in return for it, he must really serve the Peshwah with zeal and fidelity.

The Dewan, who was present, observed, that in former times the sirdars of the Marhatta state afforded ample service in return for the benefits they enjoyed under the Peshwah's government: but that since the government had lost its power the country had been in confusion, and had been destroyed in various modes; and that a country which formerly supported any given number of troops, could not now support anything like that number.

I said that nobody knew the state of the whole country, from the Taptee to the Toombuddra, better than I did, as I had been with armies in all parts of it, and that I was perfectly aware of the truth and justice of the Dewan's observations; that, at all events, the Company's governments were strong, and a few horsemen, more or less, could make no difference to them or to the Peshwah; that both powers were liberal, and did not desire to make a strict bargain for services, the value of which would depend upon the zeal and fidelity with which they should be rendered. Madhoo Rao Rastia then desired that I would give him a letter to you, which I have done; and one addressed to himself, in the nature of a cowl of protection to go to Poonah.

Appah Sahib had gone to Jaumkoondy, on the Kistna, at about the time I quitted Poonah, and he missed me on the march. I have therefore determined, in conformity with the orders of the Governor General, to send Mr. Strachey to him, and, eventually, to the other serinjaumy sirdars in this part of the Marhatta Empire; and I now enclose to you a copy of the instructions which I have given to Mr. Strachey for his guidance.

You will observe, by the Governor General's orders upon this subject, that his Excellency is desirous not to be obliged to have recourse to force to make this settlement; and I am of opinion that no time can be more favorable to effect it than the present. As far as I can judge from their professions, the southern chiefs are inclined to settle their affairs with the Peshwah's government, on the principles proposed in my letter to Mr. Strachey; and the march of the troops to the southward for the relief will have the effect of accelerating the negotiations.

It is also very obvious that the settlement cannot be delayed to a later period, without doing great injury to the Peshwah's government. In fact, till it is effected, his Highness possesses no authority beyond the limits of Poonah; and instances have lately come to my knowledge of successful resistance to the authority of the sirsoubah of the Carnatic, by the amildars of an open village. Were the British government to interfere to support his Highness' authority any further than I have done on my passage through the country, viz., by advice of bringing the different parties to an agreement for their mutual benefit, an army ought to be collected which would at once establish the authority of the sirsoubah, and would keep the country and the Company's frontier in tranquillity till the government of the sirsoubah would come into operation.

But even before this measure can be recommended, it would be necessary to come to an understanding with the Peshwah, regarding the duration of the power of the sirsoubah, as, if he goes on in the old mode of appointing a new sirsoubah and new officers, before those previously appointed have got possession of the forts and the territories, as in the case of Floobly, mentioned in this letter, the work for the British troops will be endless. The only remedy for this state of affairs is to effect a settlement with the southern chiefs; by which there will be an unity of authority in the empire, and some strength to carry the measures of government. I beg you to let Mr. Strachey know the result of your application to the Peshwah, for his consent that the British government should settle his affairs with the southern chiefs, and to correspond with him upon the points referred to in the 15th and 25th paragraphs of his instructions, and upon any other point to which you may think it proper to draw his attention.

You will observe that I have referred to the settlement with Madhoo Rao Rastia, in the enclosed letter to Mr. Strachey, and particularly to Rastia's camavisday tenure of Banggrecotta, Badany, and Jellahall. It is probable that Rastia will negotiate his affairs with you; and, in that case, I beg leave to suggest to you the expediency of examining particularly the real state of the case of the debt said to be due by the Peshwah's government; to ascertain whether any real debt ever existed; its amount; whether the lands were granted to discharge it; and whether it ought to have been discharged by this time from the lands. If you should find that Mr. Strachey undertakes the negotiation of the settlement with Rastia, I request you to communicate to him the result of your inquiries upon those points. At all events, supposing that Rastia should have no claim to hold the lands, founded upon a loan of money made to the Peshwah's government, I deem it advisable that he should continue to hold them as camavisdar, on the condition stated in the last part of the 13th paragraph of the instructions to Mr. Strachey; as Badany is a place of some strength, which can be taken only by a regular siege, that will require a heavy equipment. It would also be desirable to procure for Mr. Strachey all the information that can be obtained regarding the debt alleged to be due by the state to the Putwurdun family.

While I was between the rivers Kistna and Gutpurba, a person, by name Hybut Rao Guickwar, came to me on the part of the Rajah of Kolapoor, and I had a full conversation with him and Soubarrow Ghautky respecting the Rajah's affairs. They earnestly urged me to enter into an examination of the Rajah's claims upon the Peshwah and his sirdars; and I told them that such an examination would be an useless waste of time, unless the Rajah should consent to leave the decision of the whole case to the British government. I observed, at the same time, that whether the Rajah was right, or otherwise, the British government would not allow him to disturb the public peace by attacking the Peshwah or his sirdars. At length they agreed to take to the Rajah a proposal to agree to the arbitration of the British government, and I enclose a copy of the paper which I have given to Soubarrow Ghautky upon this subject. At all events, I told the vakeels that the Rajah must not invade the Peshwah's territories;

and you will observe, in the instructions to Mr. Strachey, that I have desired him to forbid Appah Saheb to attack the Rajah.

In the same conference with the Rajah's vakeels, they earnestly urged me to settle a mode by which the blockade of the Rajah's ports might be raised. After long discussion upon the subject, in which I insisted upon the payment of the money due to the Company and to the British merchants at Bombay, on account of former piracies, as the only condition on which their request could be granted, I agreed to defer to enforce those claims to a future period, and that the ports should be opened on the conditions stated in the enclosed draft of a treaty. I also enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan on this subject.

The fact is, that the blockade of the Rajah's ports by a Company's cruiser has always been inconvenient and expensive; and in time of war it is attended by the risk of losing the cruiser, which is never of sufficient strength to fight an action with one of the enemy's privateers. The capture of the cruiser stationed on the coast to prevent piracy would be a most disgraceful event, and would tend to the increase of the evil which the measure of stationing the cruiser upon the coast is intended to prevent: this treaty, therefore, appears to be a desirable mode of putting an end to piracy for the present; and if it should be broken by the Rajah, which appears not to be very easy, his breach of his engagement will afford ample ground for the government to get rid effectually of an evil, the existence of which, in the present state of its power, is not creditable. If the Rajah should agree to the proposed mode of settling his political affairs, I propose to authorise Mr. Strachey to sign the treaty on the part of the Company, or to sign it myself, and refer it to the Governor General.

To Sir W. Clarke, Envoy at Goa.

Camp at Akowla, 11th July, 1804.

I received this morning your private letter of the 6th, and this afternoon your dispatch of the 5th. It was unfortunate that these papers did not reach me at an earlier period, as I dispatched only yesterday, to the Rajah of Kolapoor, the vakeel who had been in my camp since April, 1803, with propositions to the Rajah which, if agreed to, will settle all questions in which he is concerned.

Nothing can be more scandalous than the system of piracy which has long been carried on on the coast of Malabar; and I am convinced that the measure which I have proposed to the Rajah is an expedient which will answer the purpose expected from it, only for a time. I indeed doubt much, whether the Rajah of Kolapoor or the Bhoonslah have the power, supposing them to have the inclination, to prevent piracy; and that object is, in my opinion, to be effected only by severe instantaneous punishments of pirates on their coasts, and in sight of their own people; and if it should still be persisted in, by sending strong armaments within all the creeks and rivers, with orders to destroy boats, vessels, the fortifications which protect them, and even the habitations of the pirates. In this manner the business would be done effectually, otherwise nothing less than the occupation of the whole coast by the Company's troops would answer the purpose.

The Governor General is aware that the Rajah of Kolapoor has occupied Raree, and he knows the situation of that port in respect to Goa. I have reason to believe that his attention has been drawn to these circumstances before he wrote his instructions to you, of which you have sent me a copy. It is probable that, as he has not noticed them in that paper, and as he has expressed his desire and hope to remain at peace with the Rajah of Kolapoor, he was desirous to defer to notice this act of ambition on the part of the Rajah, till the season should be more favorable to military operations in this country, and till circumstances will allow of the notice given of the Rajah's conduct being attended by military dispositions and arrangements which will scarcely fail to procure the Rajah's respect for the Governor General's remonstrances, or will enable his Excellency to enforce obedience to his orders, if the Rajah should hesitate respecting the line of conduct which he should adopt.

In the present state of the Company's power, the Rajah of Kolapoor cannot be considered a formidable enemy; but it may be observed of him, as well as of others, that he is formidable, or otherwise, in an inverse proportion to the arrangements made for bringing the Company's power into action. The contest with him would be long, and possibly some of its effects doubtful, if he were to be attacked by a small force; and very probably it would be but momentary, if the circumstances of the time should permit the government to bring to act upon the Rajah the disposable forces which must be in his neighbourhood.

The considerations which most probably have had their weight with the Governor General would have induced me to decline adopting any measures in respect to the Rajah of Kolapoor at the present moment, even if the season were favorable, and I had not reason to believe that the Governor General had determined that he would not notice at present his conduct in the territories of the Bhoonslah.

I have the honor to enclose you copies of two papers which I have sent to the Rajah by his vakeel, with a view to the settlement of his political and his maritime concerns. In respect to the first, I have intimated to the Rajah distinctly, that he would not be allowed to disturb the peace of the Deccan; and that, at all events, he must not enforce his claims by arms: his conduct at Raree will come under the Governor General's cognizance, if he should sign this treaty. In respect to the second, I certainly wished to force the Rajah to pay for the piracies of which he had been already guilty; but I am well convinced that he has not the means of paying one fifteenth part of the sum claimed by the Company, and the British merchants of Bombay.

The question is, whether the mode proposed by the agreement will prevent piracy? My opinion is, that after the soncar, who is to be security, shall have paid the value of one or two captures, he will declare that he can be security no longer; and for this reason, I deem the measure only an expedient which will afford leisure to the government to consider of others which will be more permanent. Still, if the soncar should withdraw his security, it will be in the power of the government of Bombay to blockade his ports again; and in the mean time, the inconvenience, the expense, and the risk of that measure, which after all is not effectual, will

be avoided. If I had received your letter before I had dispatched the vakeel, I should have insisted upon payment for the vessels lately captured; and I shall still write upon the subject to him, and to the Rajah.

I have the honor to inform you, that I have appointed Mr. Strachey to a mission to the southern Marhatta chiefs, in consequence of orders from the Governor General, the object of which is to settle their affairs with the Peshwah. I request you to communicate with Mr. Strachey, by Erroor.

I have to mention to you, that Nepanneekur (mentioned in your letter to your servant) is Appah Dessaye, who served with the army in the last war. He is related to Ghautky.

To the Governor of Bombay.

Camp at Mooty Bednore, 13th July, 1804.

I have the honor to enclose you English and Marhatta translations of a treaty which I have proposed to make with the Rajah of Kolapoor, with a view to enable you to raise the blockade of the Rajah's ports on the coast of Malabar. I did every thing in my power to induce the Rajah to pay the money which he owes to the Company, and to the British merchants residing in Bombay, on account of former piracies. I was not able to effect this object, because the Rajah has no means whatever of defraying the expense. This treaty decides nothing upon these claims; on the contrary, I explained particularly to the Rajah's vakeels, that the British government delayed to enforce them only till the Rajah should be able to discharge the debts which were so justly due.

I have requested that the Rajah should send you a copy of the treaty signed by himself, with this letter, and that he should at the same time propose, for your approbation, the person who is to be security for the payment of the value of any vessels which may be hereafter taken on the coast. If he should comply with these requests, and you should approve of the security which he may offer, I hope that you will raise the blockade of his ports.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Whitelocke, at Chittledroog.*

13th July, 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley arrived at Hurryhur yesterday afternoon, and proceeded in the evening by dawk to Seringapatam.

He has directed me, Brigade Major Campbell, and Lieut. Close, to proceed by Chittledroog and Sera, with all possible expedition, to join him at Madras. As the escort remains here, and we have no passports, and Capt. Langford has none, the Major General directed me to write to you, and to request that you would send passports for the gentlemen going to Madras, by Chittledroog. But as we should lose a day or two by waiting for them here, we propose proceeding to-morrow; and I beg that you will be so good as send them to me at Mayaconda, where we shall halt, or allow us to wait upon you and receive them on the 15th.

Address of the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, commanding the troops in Mysore, &c., on his return from the field.

Seringapatam, 16th July, 1804.

We, the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam, have reposed for 5 auspicious years under the shadow of your protection.

We have felt, even during your absence, in the midst of battle and of victory, that your care for our prosperity had been extended to us in as ample a manner as if no other object had occupied your mind.

We are preparing to perform, in our several castes, the duties of thanksgiving

and of sacrifice to the preserving God, who has brought you back in safety, and we present ourselves in person to express our joy.

As your labors have been crowned with victory, so may your repose be graced with honors. May you long continue personally to dispense to us that full stream of security and happiness, which we first received with wonder, and continue to enjoy with gratitude; and, when greater affairs shall call you from us, may the God of all castes and all nations deign to hear with favor our humble and constant prayers for your health, your glory, and your happiness.

Answer of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley to the Address of the Native inhabitants of Seringapatam.

In every situation in which I have been employed, it has been my uniform wish and endeavor to conduct the public affairs intrusted to my management, according to the orders and intentions of the government which I am serving, and under whose protection you are living.

I have always been particularly interested in the welfare and prosperity of the inhabitants of Seringapatam, and have been anxious that they should enjoy the full benefit of the security which the laws and regulations by which the British government is administered afford to every individual.

The attention which I have given to your affairs, in every situation in which I have been placed, has been a part of my duty, and a necessary consequence of my desire that you should not cease to feel the benefit of the Company's government; and it is very gratifying to my feelings to find that my conduct has been satisfactory to you.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 17th July, 1804.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency's orders of the 3rd June, relative to the chiefs in the southern part of the Marhatta Empire. It did not reach me, however, until after I had had an interview with Baba Sahab, the son of Pursheram Bhow, at Tasgaum, and with Chintomeny Rao and Baba Sahab, his nephews, at Meritch.

2. I judge from what passed at these interviews and at one which I had with Madhoo Rao Rastia, and from the manner in which I have been received by all the chiefs throughout the southern part of the Empire, that the present moment is favorable to undertake the proposed settlement of the Peshwah's affairs with these chiefs; and I have, therefore, appointed Mr. Strachey, who had accompanied me from Poonah, to make it.

3. I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch to Col. Close upon the subject, which contains all the information which I can give your Excellency, and a copy of my instructions to Mr. Strachey.

4. I have likewise the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Sir W. Clarke.

To Lieut. —.

Seringapatam, 17th July, 1804.

I have received your letter, in which, among other things, you reproach me with having withdrawn from you my confidence. A man must have been stout indeed in his confidence in any body who would continue to repose it, after having received such complaints as I have received against you. In respect to your money concerns, I do not wish to inquire into

them, and I shall not notice them, excepting to observe, that a person trusted as you were ought to have refrained from such practices when you held a public trust.

It is not the fact that you did Major ——'s duty without receiving his salary. You received the allowance for the duty you did, and your own allowance for the duty done by another person in the field.

I shall close upon this subject by telling you, that it is useless to go into long proofs of matters entirely irrelevant to the charge brought against you. You have been accused, on oath, in a public trial, of having received, through your moonshee, 1200 rupees on corrupt grounds. The moonshee positively received the money. He must be prosecuted in the Phousdarry, and convicted of a breach of trust and duty, otherwise you must resign your office of ——. I cannot go on with a man against whom there will be such a public imputation as there will be against you, if the moonshee should not be convicted of having taken and applied this money to his own use. I enclose answers to the memorandums sent.

P.S. The letter for Col. Hill shall go to-morrow: send the enclosed letters, marking, in Marhatta, upon each upon what subject it is.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 17th July, 1804.

I have received your letters of the 6th and 8th, and I send an answer to Nana's widow. Her pension must be paid by the Company, if the Peshwah should not pay it; but she must give up her lands to the Peshwah. You have done quite right with Amrut Rao, but warn him not to plunder the Nizam's country.

You will have received my letter of the 11th, about the affairs in the southern districts, in which every thing is detailed. I conclude that you will have sent Mr. Strachey copies of the papers in your public letter of the 8th.

Goklah will certainly go to Poonah.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 18th July, 1804.

1. On my journey from Poonah, in obedience to your Excellency's orders, I have passed by this place, in order that I might have a personal communication with the Dewan and the acting Resident, regarding the distribution of the cavalry belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, which have been serving under my command.

2. The total number of cavalry in the service of the Rajah is now 4000, of which 3000 have been with me; the original number of 2000 having been reinforced at the commencement of the late war. The result of long discussions regarding the disposal of this body of troops has at last been, that their number shall be gradually reduced to 2000; and that one year shall elapse before those to be discharged shall be dismissed from the service.

3. As I had experienced the benefits to be derived from these troops in the service of the Rajah, I was desirous that some mode should be adopted of retaining the whole; I found that the Rajah could not maintain a greater number than 2000, without breaking through the rules of economy, which have been laid down by the Dewan, with a view to



enable the Rajah's government to afford the assistance which the British government may demand from the Rajah in time of war, under the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, or without applying to the payment of the troops those funds which have hitherto been employed by the Dewan, in the construction and repair of tanks, water courses, roads, bridges, and other works, which will tend to the improvement and increase of the agriculture and resources of the country.

4. The number of 4000 horse will therefore be reduced to 2000 in the course of one year; and this number is 500 more than the ordinary peace establishment of the Rajah's government.

5. As your Excellency will probably be desirous to take into your consideration the situation of the Rajah's government, and to ascertain how far that government has performed the stipulations of the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore, I proceed to give your Excellency an account of the ordinary resources and expenses of that government, and the extraordinary expenses it incurred during the war; with such other information regarding it, as may be useful to enable your Excellency to review its situation. I have had a full communication upon the whole of this subject with the Dewan and the acting Resident, and I write from authentic documents.

6. It appears the Rajah's gross revenue is about 24 lacs of canterai pagodas. It has been raised to this sum by the superior management of the Dewan, by his attention to the repair of tanks and water courses, and the construction of roads and bridges; by the encouragement which he has given to strangers to resort to and settle in Mysore; and by his general endeavors to improve the agriculture of the country, and the situation of the people under the government of the Rajah.

7. The expenses for the repairs of tanks and water courses, and the construction of roads and bridges; for the public buildings for the Rajah's accommodation, and other public works; the remissions for unfavorable seasons, and the military and civil expenses of the government, are liable to fluctuation. But the Dewan, at an early period of his administration, determined to provide means to enable the Rajah's government to comply with any requisition which the British government might make for assistance in war, under the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore; and he has saved annually a sum of money amounting to one lac of star pagodas. He has made this saving the criterion, by which he has endeavored to regulate his disbursements, and he has considered the sum resulting from that saving to constitute the fund for answering any eventual demand under the 3rd article of the treaty.

8. The peace establishment of Mysore, at the end of 1802, consisted of 1500 cavalry, 3000 regular infantry, in battalions, (to which number 1000 were added during the war,) 2500 peons in constant pay, at 2 canterai pagodas each, per month, (to which number 400 were added during the war,) and 12,000 Candachar peons, liable to do duty at their respective villages (to which number 1000 were added and called out during the war).

9. The Candachar peons constituted the ancient military force of the country; and the necessity of providing against their becoming the

instruments of commotion compelled the Dewan, in the first year of his government, to entertain so large a number as 20,000, which has been gradually reduced on better information and improved arrangement.

10. They receive a village pay of from 2 to 3 rupees per month, according to local circumstances, half in money, and half in lands; and  $3\frac{1}{2}$  rupees in addition, when called out from their respective villages within the limits of Mysore; with batta when sent on foreign service.

11. The present establishment is fixed on the principle of having, at least, one individual of every family of the ancient military class in the pay of the state; and the family is permitted to relieve this individual according to its convenience. This arrangement appears well calculated to insure the allegiance of the whole; and in case of emergency, 20,000 men of this irregular description of force might be assembled at a few days' notice.

12. As every Candachar peon is a cultivator, the Dewan is anxious to limit their services to local duty; which consists in being ready to obey the call of the officers of police, and take their tour of duty in the village fort to which they are attached.

13. The 2500 peons, kept in constant pay, do duty with the regular infantry in the more important forts and stations, or in the personal guard of the Rajah, the Dewan, or the principal officers of the government; they are select men, of respectable character, who have seen service, and are considered to be entirely trustworthy. They also are occasionally indulged with the privilege of relief, according to their domestic convenience.

14. The regular infantry are composed of the sepoys, who were formerly in the service of Tipoo Sultaun; they are paid at the same rates, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the Company's Native infantry; they are commanded by the sirdars of the state, and are a regular, orderly, and obedient body, and their discipline of a description to render them useful on service, in aid of the Company's troops.

15. I have the honor to enclose a detailed account of the extraordinary expenses\* incurred by the government of Mysore, occasioned by the late war. This account, together with the preceding detail of the Rajah's resources, and his ordinary expenses, will enable your Excellency to form a judgment, whether the government of the Rajah of Mysore has complied with the stipulation of the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore.

16. Till the late treaties of peace shall have had their full effect, and the Marhatta Empire shall have recovered its tranquillity, after the long and violent convulsions by which it has been disturbed, particularly until the Deccan shall have recovered in some degree from the effect of the existing famine, the Dewan proposes that the peace establishment of Mysore shall be 2000 horse, 4000 regular infantry in battalions, 2500 peons in constant pay, and 12,000 Candachar peons; being an increase, beyond the peace establishment of 1802, of 500 horse, and 1000 regular infantry.

\* This account was afterwards corrected by Major Wilks, the acting Resident, and transmitted, together with his report.

17. Upon the occasion of bringing under your Excellency's review the state of the Mysore government, and of the expenses it incurred in the late war, I cannot avoid adverting to the material assistance it afforded upon that occasion. In consequence of the regularity of the system of government established by the Dewan, and the improvements of the country, its resources were so much increased as to enable him to provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equipment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsistence of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore, and of the department of the army, or for the large quantities of grain required by the cavalry and by the brinjaries, &c. All these supplies, which amounted to about 60,000 bullock loads of grain, principally rice, 60,000 head of sheep, &c., were furnished with a facility hitherto unknown in this part of India. The Dewan has since continued to forward supplies to the army under my command as fast as the brinjaries have been found to take them up; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of the corps \* under Major Gen. Campbell, he has lately forwarded large quantities of grain into Canara, in order to enable the collectors in that province to export larger quantities for the supply of Bombay and Poona.

18. Besides the troops employed with me, to whose services I have frequently drawn your Excellency's notice, the Dewan had a respectable corps of troops on the Rajah's frontier, from the time I marched from the Toombuddra till I returned, which he commanded in person as long as the war lasted; and a detachment of those troops, under Khan Jehun Khan, distinguished themselves in the destruction of a band of freebooters, who had assembled in Savanore, and threatened Mysore.

19. I now take the liberty of congratulating your Excellency upon the success of all your measures respecting the government of Mysore, and upon the practical benefits which the British government has derived from its establishments. I cannot avoid, at the same time, expressing an anxious hope, that the principles on which that government was established, and has been conducted and supported, will be strengthened and rendered permanent.

From the Governor General's Minute on the affairs of Mysore, 5th October, 1801.

It now becomes necessary to consider, whether the expenses actually incurred by the Rajah of Mysore, in co-operating with the British power during the late war against the confederated Marhatta chieftains, equal the amount of the sum which the Rajah might be justly required to pay, under the provisions of the 3rd article of the subsidiary treaty of Mysore.

With a view to the decision of this question, the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley passed through Seringapatam for the purpose of obtaining complete information with regard to the extent of the Rajah of Mysore's resources, of the fixed disbursements of his government, and of the extraordinary expenses incurred by the Rajah of Mysore for the prosecution of the war.

The result of Major Gen. Wellesley's inquiries at Seringapatam is distinctly stated in the annexed dispatch from that officer, under date 18th July.

The dispatch from Major Gen. Wellesley, to which I have referred in this minute, contains a just and most honorable testimony of the zeal, judgment, and fidelity which regulated the exertions of the government of Mysore in co-operating

\* The *corps de réserve* in the Deccan of the Toombuddra and Kistna rivers.

with the British power, and of the degree in which those exertions contributed to the successful prosecution of the war. In my judgment, therefore, the government of Mysore must be considered to have afforded to the British government and its allies in the late war, a degree of aid, greatly exceeding that which the British government and its allies could have derived from a mere pecuniary contribution on the part of the Rajah of Mysore, equal in amount to the extra charges actually incurred by the Rajah of Mysore on the occasion of the late war.

Under the operation of the treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam, in the course of 5 years, that country has acquired a degree of prosperity which could not possibly have been attained under any other system of political connexion, and has been enabled in some degree to repay, by the efficacy of its assistance in the hour of emergency, the benefits which it has derived from the protecting influence and power of the British government.

I discharge a satisfactory part of my duty in availing myself of this occasion to record the high sense which I entertain of the merits and services of the Dewan, Purneah. To the extraordinary abilities, eminent public zeal, integrity, judgment, and energy of that distinguished minister, must be ascribed, in a considerable degree, the success of the measures which I originally adopted for the settlement of Mysore, and the happy and prosperous condition of that flourishing country. The merits and services of the Dewan have been peculiarly conspicuous in the promptitude and wisdom manifested by him in the application of the resources of Mysore to the exigencies of the public service, during the late war with the confederated Marhatta chieftains; and I deem it to be an act of justice to acknowledge, that the expectations which I formed, in selecting Purneah for the important office of minister of Mysore, have been greatly exceeded by the benefits which have resulted from his excellent administration.

To Lieut. Col. Hill.

Seringapatam, 18th July, 1804.

I have the honor to inform you that the killadar of Misserycottah has refused to deliver up his fort to the Peshwah's government, notwithstanding that he has received the orders of his immediate employer, Ramchunder Purnsheeram, to deliver it up to the sirsoubah of the Carnatic, employed in the province of Savanore by his Highness the Peshwah.

I have the honor to enclose a letter, addressed to the killadar of Misserycottah, in which I have called upon him, once more, to deliver up his fort to the Peshwah. You will be so kind as to send him this letter when you shall approach his fort; and you will allow him half an hour to consider whether he will conform to the orders he has received or not. If he should not evacuate the fort within that space of time, you will attack him forthwith. If the killadar should evacuate the fort, he is to be allowed to depart in peace with his garrison; and when the fort shall be in your possession, you will deliver it to Cashee Rao Ball Kishen, or to Ramchunder Tantea, or any other person employed on the part of the sirsoubah to receive charge of it.

Misserycottah is situated on the frontiers of Soonda, about 12 miles distant southerly from Hoobly. As well as I recollect, it is a mud fort, of some extent, but of no strength; and is commanded by the high grounds in the neighbourhood, and there is cover close to the gateway. It has now 200 peons in it. I have directed the sirsoubah to prepare ladders for you to enable you to scale the walls. If you should be obliged to attack the place, I recommend that you should make several attacks, particularly one upon the gateway; that you should surround the place with your cavalry, to prevent the garrison from escaping; and that you should keep up a fire of cannon upon the place from all quarters.

Hullihall in Saonda will be about 30 miles from you, in which place, in case they should be necessary, there are heavy guns.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Burn, in charge of capt. property. Venkattygherry, 24th July, 1804.*

I have submitted your letter of the 3rd inst., with its enclosures, to the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, and am directed by him to inform you that he approves of the scheme of a lottery, which you have proposed, for disposing of the remainder of the jewels captured at Asseerghur; and he authorises the officers in charge of the captured property in general to carry the scheme into immediate execution. It ought to be advertised in the newspapers at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta; and the lottery should be drawn at Bombay. The Major General will write on the subject to the Hon. the Governor of that Presidency, and will recommend it to his patronage.

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Burn.*

*Venkattygherry, 24th July, 1804.*

The General set out post from Hurryhur for Seringapatam immediately after I received your letters of the 3rd inst., and before he could read them. I sent the whole packet after him, and have received his answer, in terms of which I have written you an official letter to-day. He took no notice of Capt. Fraser's having offered to conduct the business of the lottery; when I overtake the General again, I will explain the matter more fully to him, and will lose no time in communicating his answer to you. I conceive that my letter, directing your stay at Poenah, will insure the passing of your abstracts: if I am allowed to write you more fully on that subject, I will. In the General's letter he says, "Let him advertise it at Bombay, &c." I have therefore mentioned all the Presidencies. I know you have objections to having agents and accounts with all the Presidencies, but I conceive that you must advertise the scheme at all; and unless the tickets are instantly taken up at Bombay, I think some should be sent to the other two Presidencies.

*To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.*

*Fort St. George, 27th July, 1804.*

Before the troops took the field in the late war, the Dewan of Mysore frequently represented to me the circumstances under which the Rajah's government labored in respect to the mode of supplying straw for the Hon. Company's bullocks in Mysore. Under the notion that a part of the straw of the country belonged to the sircar, and that it could not be used or disposed of, it was originally settled by the Resident, Col. Close, that the Company's bullocks should have the straw which they might require for nothing. This notion was, however, erroneous; the fact is, that in Mysore, as well as in other countries, the straw belongs to the ryots, the government receiving the full revenue for the land in money, excepting in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and some others of the rice countries, in which the government receive the revenue in kind, and, of course, their share of the straw as well as of the other produce.

At Seringapatam, however, and in these rice countries, as the demand for straw is constant, the price is high, and the whole produce would be sold; and it is not reasonable that the Rajah should give that for the support of the Company's bullocks for which he would receive a valuable consideration. On the other hand, in the dry grain countries, it is obvious that the notion under which the arrangement was made, by which the cattle have been supported hitherto, was erroneous; and that the expense of their support falls upon the ryots, or, in cases in which they cannot afford the expense, upon the Rajah's government.

Notwithstanding this inconvenience, the Dewan, with the same desire

to forward the service, which has uniformly marked his conduct, was willing to postpone the consideration of the claim of the Rajah's government, that the straw should be paid for till the circumstances of the times should be such as to afford leisure for a consideration of the subject, and he pressed it upon my attention on my late visit to Seringapatam.

There appears to me no doubt of the justice of the case: even if it were true that the straw belongs to the Rajah's government, it ought not to be taken for nothing, unless it were certain that it could not be disposed of, and if not used by the public cattle, must rot. But as the straw belongs to the ryots, there can be no doubt upon the subject.

I have the satisfaction to inform you, that in case the measure of paying for the straw should be adopted, the expense to the public will not be great. The price of straw in Mysore is one rupee for 4 bullock loads; which quantity will feed a bullock during 48 days. But as the bullocks are kept in Mysore in the neighbourhood of the hills, and the hill grass is cut for their consumption, they require straw but seldom, excepting when they are in the field. Accordingly I beg leave to recommend that authority may be given to the agent for public cattle to pay for the straw which he may require for the bullocks in the Mysore country, at the rate of one rupee for 4 bullock loads.

The bullocks now coming from the territories of the Peshwah will pass through a country which has been much exhausted by the march of convoys, in which the straw belongs to the ryots, and it is difficult to procure it. I have desired the public agent to give receipts for all the straw which he will receive on this march to Seringapatam; and I beg leave to recommend that, in consideration of the exhausted state of the country, authority may be given that the receipts may be taken up, valuing the straw at a rupee for 3 bullock loads.

*Memorandum submitted to Lieut. Gen. Stuart, regarding the relief of the troops in Malabar, and settlement of affairs in Wynaad.*

The 80th regt. and 2 battalions of Native infantry are to march into Malabar, to relieve the Bombay troops in that province; and it is proposed that they should march through Wynaad from Seringapatam for that purpose. It does not appear to be possible that this detachment should remain any time in Wynaad, as the troops must be eventually relieved upon the coast by part of those which will compose it, and the nature of the operations for this detachment becomes a question of some importance.

There is reason to suppose that some of the inhabitants of Wynaad are disposed to submit to the authority of government; and it is possible that they might come in when this detachment will appear in the district. But it is doubtful whether this partial submission will eventually tend to the complete establishment of the authority of government in the district; as it may be expected that after the detachment shall have marched into Malabar, and there will be no longer in the district a sufficient body of troops effectually to protect the well disposed, they will suffer for their loyalty. On this ground, therefore, it is supposed to be advisable to defer taking any measures for the establishment of the authority of government

in Wynaad till a sufficient detachment can be spared to secure tranquillity, and effectually to protect those who may be well disposed.

On the other hand, there is reason to expect that the knowledge that the troops have returned from the territories of the Marhattas, and that the garrison of Seringapatam is full, will have much effect in producing tranquillity in Wynaad; and it may be hoped, that when the detachment shall march into that district, such a general disposition to submit to the authority of government will be found there, as will enable the body of troops allotted to the district to protect the well disposed.

At all events it is desirable to march the detachment through Wynaad from Seringapatam. The Bombay troops in Wynaad must be relieved by Coast troops; and it is probable that a detachment nearly of the strength of that which will march in, must effect the relief, and time will be saved by their entering from the eastward, instead of from Malabar. As the troops will march from Wynaad, it is as well to endeavor to effect a settlement as they pass through. If it should succeed, it will save the necessity of forming another detachment; if it should not succeed, some inconvenience will be felt by individuals; but the difficulty of a settlement in future will not be increased; and upon the whole I conceive that the chance of, and benefit to be derived from, success, are greater than the risk and evil to be apprehended from failure.

From a knowledge I have of the seasons in that part of India, I am of opinion that the troops ought not to enter Wynaad much before Christmas. Indeed, if the eastern rains should be late in Mysore, it would be advisable to defer the march of the detachment from Seringapatam till January.

Nothing can be done towards the settlement of the country without the presence of the collector; he ought to meet the detachment at Seringapatam with his catchery, and to enter the district with it.

The detachment ought to be lightly equipped; two 6 pounder field pieces would probably be sufficient, but I recommend that 4 small mortars, which I had in Bullum, in 1802, may be sent with it. They may be of service, and are easily carried. I also recommend that a sufficient supply of provisions, to last the troops which will remain in Wynaad one year, with carriage for it, may be got in readiness at Seringapatam, and sent in with the detachment. By taking this opportunity of throwing a supply into that district, the necessity of relieving the post in Wynaad before the opening of the next fair season will be avoided; and if the detachment should be pressed for provisions, they will have this stock to resort to.

The march of the troops from Seringapatam, is by Mysore to Kamkanecotta, on the borders of Wynaad; the distance is 60 miles; from thence to Manuntwaddy, where the post is, 20 miles. The country is not very close from Kamkanecotta to a river 9 miles on the road to Manuntwaddy. For the last 11 miles, the country is more close; and there is a spot, about 7 miles from Manuntwaddy, in which the road passes through paddy grounds flanked on each side by thick jungle, where the troops, the 1st batt. of the 8th regt., which were in the district in 1802, were always attacked. As far as I could learn, however, it was possible to avoid pass-

ing through this defile by going to the right. At all events, if it should be possible to communicate with the troops at Manuntwaddy, so that they might move towards the defile from their side, at the time the troops would march towards it from the eastward, the enemy would not remain in it.

Capt. Heitland knows the country well, and if he should be sent in with the troops, will point out all the roads. After the troops shall have been in the country a short time, the collector will probably be able to judge whether he has any chance of effecting a settlement. If there should be none, the sooner the troops march into Malabar the better; as they will avoid consuming the provisions allotted for those to remain in Wynaad.

If there should be any hope of effecting a settlement, it would be desirable to detain in the district the 80th regt., and the 2 Coast battalions, for a short time; and the Bombay battalion, which will be relieved in Wynaad, and possibly that which the 2nd Coast battalion is intended to relieve in Malabar, and the Bombay European regiment might be sent away to Bombay. In this case it would be necessary to throw into Wynaad further supplies of grain and provisions from Seringapatam, so as to secure the easy subsistence of the troops.

If the collector should be able to make any settlement, I beg to recommend that he may be authorised to raise secondary troops. This measure will tend to re-establish tranquillity in two modes: 1st, it will increase his means of protecting the peaceable and well disposed inhabitants; and 2ndly, it will decrease the number of those who would otherwise certainly oppose the authority of government.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort St. George, 1st Aug. 1804.

I have the honor to inform you, that when in the field during the late war, I had occasion to employ soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan in a confidential manner, upon more than one occasion; but particularly on a mission to Jeswunt Rao Holkar: and although he did not reach the camp of that Chief, owing to the march of his army towards Ajmeer, the soubahdar conducted himself with great propriety; and afterwards, by extraordinary skill and activity, rejoined me with his escort, having passed through the countries occupied by the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

Kawder Nawaz Khan lost the 2 surviving male relations he had, in the battle of Assye; viz., a brother and a son. His other relations had before fallen in the service; and he has been long distinguished for his good qualities as an officer, and has rendered essential services. He is now worn out, and incapable of rendering any further services in his regiment; and I therefore take the liberty of recommending that he may be pensioned on the full pay of his rank, and that he may have an allowance for a palanquin. As he has been an example of zeal, activity, intelligence, and bravery in the army, I am anxious to recommend that he should be made an example of the generosity of government, and of its desire to reward meritorious servants.



To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort St. George, 2nd Aug. 1804.

I have the honor to inform you, that if you should have no objection to the measure, I propose recommending to the Governor General, to give a gratuity of one month's pay to the persons belonging to the Public Bullock department, who served with the troops under my command, during the late war. These persons marched from Seringapatam with the troops; they served throughout the war in a country in which grain, when cheapest, was in the proportion of 12 to 1 dearer than in Mysore; they always did their duty without grumbling; and I do not recollect an instance of desertion. They were necessarily present in the actions which were fought; some of them were killed, and others desperately wounded.

Upon the occasion of laying before you my intention to recommend this description of the public servants of the army to the favor of his Excellency the Governor General, I cannot avoid drawing your notice to the benefits which have resulted from the establishment to which they belonged. It must be recollected, that in former wars, the utmost exertion which it was possible for the army to make, was to draw its train of artillery to Seringapatam. It was not possible, and never was expected, that the guns and carriages which were drawn there, should be brought away again; and accordingly, notwithstanding the undoubted talents and the great reputation of the officers who have at different times led British armies to that place, it has invariably happened, that by far the greater part of the train and carriages have been left behind when the army marched away. Those who have seen the mode in which those armies made their marches, and were acquainted with the system under which cattle were, and must necessarily be, procured for the service, will not hesitate to allow, that the slowness of all our operations, and the necessity to which I have above alluded, of leaving our guns after they had been drawn above 300 miles, were to be attributed entirely to the faults of the system under which the cattle were procured for the service.

But although I am addressing myself to an officer whose experience reaches beyond the times to which I have alluded, it is only necessary that I should advert, in proof of my assertion, to the circumstances of the late war. From a variety of causes, it was necessary, at the commencement of the war, to hire cattle to draw the train from Madras to the frontiers of Mysore; and you will recollect the difficulties under which you labored; and that in fact you could not have brought your carriages to the frontier without the assistance of the public cattle sent to join you; and that if the circumstances of the times had required that the whole army should have advanced to Poonah, you would probably have thought it proper to have taken with you those carriages only for which you might have had a sufficient number of the public draught cattle.

All the carriages attached to the division under my command were drawn by the public cattle; and I shall advert to a few facts, to point out the difference between this part of the equipment of the troops in the late and in former wars.

We marched to Poonah from Seringapatam, the distance being nearly 600 miles, in the worst season of the year, through a country which had

been destroyed by Holkar's army, with heavy guns, at the rate, upon an average, of  $13\frac{1}{2}$  miles a day; and if the 12 days on which we halted upon the Toombuddra for orders be included, we arrived at Poonah in 2 months from the time we marched. On this march we lost no draught cattle. I remained in the neighbourhood of Poonah, in a country which deserves the name of a desert, for 6 weeks; and then marched again with the train, in the same state, as to numbers, as when it left Seringapatam, and the troops and cattle were in the field during the monsoon.

It is needless to advert to the distance marched during the war, or to recapitulate the events, all of which must show the efficient state of the equipments; but it has been frequently necessary for the troops to march, for many days together, a distance from 15 to 20 miles daily; the heavy artillery always accompanied them, and I always found that the cattle could go as far as the troops. Upon one occasion, I found it necessary to march a detachment 60 miles in 30 hours, and the ordnance and provision carriages, drawn by the Company's bullocks, accompanied this detachment. Instead of being obliged, as the Commanders in Chief of armies in former wars have been, to leave guns and carriages behind, such was the state of efficiency of this department throughout this severe service, that I was able, but with little assistance, to draw away the guns which the troops took.

After all this service, in which so much country has been marched over, the number of cattle which have died is, I believe, really not greater than it would have been at the grazing ground; and the department is at this moment in a state of great efficiency. It would not be difficult to prove, that in point of actual expense, this establishment is cheaper to the public, than to hire cattle in the old mode; but the consideration respecting a public establishment of this description, is not referrible entirely to cheapness.

It must be obvious to every man, that in a war, such as the late war, there could be no success, unless the officer commanding the troops was able to move, at all times, with the utmost celerity of which the troops were capable, and to continue his movements so long as was necessary. Rapid movements with guns and carriages cannot be made without good cattle, well driven, and well taken care of; and without adverting to what passed subsequently, it is more than probable, that if I had had the service of such cattle only, as served Lord Cornwallis and Gen. Harris in former wars, I should never have reached Poonah, and that I should have been obliged to find my way back without the wheel carriages, in the best manner I could.

I therefore take the liberty of recommending this establishment of cattle to your protection. It is founded upon the most efficient and most economical principles, and will never fail the army, so long as it is superintended and conducted as it has been hitherto.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort William, 15th Aug. 1804.\*

I have the honor to enclose a letter which has been sent to me by Mr.

\* For an account of the reception at Calcutta of Major Gen. Wellesley by the Governor General, see the Calcutta Gazettes Extraordinary, 3rd and 16th Aug. 1805; or the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 671.

Mackenzie, with the desire that I should present it to your Lordship: but it reached me after I had taken my leave of you.

Your Lordship must be the best judge of the necessity of the reform proposed by Mr. Mackenzie. From the accounts which I received when in Mysore, I am induced to believe that the expenses attending the general inoculation of the Natives with the cow pox are greater than were expected; and that they are likely to increase in proportion to the success of the endeavors to propagate this mild disease. In case it should be your Lordship's opinion that the reform proposed ought to be adopted, I beg leave to recommend Mr. Mackenzie to your favor. He has been strongly recommended to me by Gen. Mackenzie of the 78th regt.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort William, 15th Aug. 1804.

Your Lordship will have been made acquainted, by Gen. Dowdeswell, with the misfortunes which Col. Monson had met with on the frontiers of Malwa. It appears that the Colonel has made his retreat to Rampoor; but I am not able to form a judgment whether his corps is in such a state of efficiency as to enable him to recommence his operations as soon as he shall be joined by the reinforcements which have been sent to him. However, the Governor General is convinced that nothing will put an end to this warfare, excepting active offensive operations, carried forward to the heart of the province of Malwa, if it should be necessary: and I judge from the Commander in Chief's letters that he is of the same opinion; and accordingly arrangements are now in progress for collecting a force, and other means adequate to the object in view. Under these circumstances, I think that the Governor General has determined not to go up the country, being convinced that the Commander in Chief will not be able to meet him; that the troops must be diverted from active operations, in order to cover and secure his journey; and that his presence in the northern provinces can answer no end, in proportion to the inconvenience which must result from drawing away from the military operations the attention and superintendence of the Commander in Chief, and from an alteration of the disposition of the troops. He has not yet announced this intention, but I consider it as certain.

I apprised the Governor General of your desire to meet him, and he expressed the greatest anxiety to be able to accomplish that object, and to do any thing to assist your views in your government; but however desirous he may be to have the pleasure of seeing you, he appeared to think that there were many reasons for which you should not, at present, quit Madras. He stated one reason in particular referrible to the Indian government at home, which had occurred to yourself when you had in contemplation a visit to Bengal, on your arrival in India. The Governor General tells me that he has written to you fully on all the points which you referred to his judgment.

Col. Murray has marched to Ougein. The Commander in Chief is much displeased with him, and attributes to his retreat Col. Monson's misfortunes.

It appears by a return which I have received from the Adj. Gen.'s office at Bombay, that on the 1st June, Col. Murray had 5800 men present and fit for duty. This return excludes of course sick of all descrip-

tions. How he could have lost 3000 men, in less than one month, remains to be accounted for.

The Governor General has determined not to accept of the peshcush which I informed you that the Soubah of the Deccan had agreed to relinquish. Your Lordship will recollect that we thought it was desirable that he should not accept it; although we thought it probable that the Governor General would not be able to refuse it. I write to you, by this post, a letter of recommendation for Mr. Mackenzie.

To Major Gen. Dowdeswell.

Fort William, 16th Aug. 1804.

I return Col. Clinton's memorandum. I entirely agree with Col. Clinton\* that an establishment of horse artillery, such as he proposes, would be highly useful to the army, and I concur in all the principles he has laid down. The artillery attached to regiments of cavalry is not an arm for general use; and, as he observes on its present establishment, is likely to embarrass a regiment by providing for its security, or being liable to be lost. But still with these inconveniences it has given the British cavalry such a superiority over that of the Natives, that I should part with it with much reluctance.

The ordnance carriages of the army in general ought to be drawn by bullocks. They are the cattle commonly used in draught in the country, and if, by accident, they should be lost, they can be easily replaced. I have found them fully able to march as far, and with as much celerity, as infantry on march.

The horses commonly used in India are not very hardy animals; they lose their condition, when worked, as they must be, in drawing guns, unless more attention is paid to feed and take care of them, than can be expected in such a large establishment as must be formed, in order to draw all the guns and carriages of the army under the superintendence of one or even two European officers. My ideas, therefore, respecting an improvement in the mode of moving artillery in India have never gone further than to have attached to the guns with the corps in line a sufficient number of horses to draw them upon extraordinary occasions, of forced marches, and of moving into action.

The principles upon which I go are, that the bullocks are fully equal to the ordinary work, and that they are more hardy, and can be more easily replaced than the horses: but they are not so active, are more difficult to manage, and take up more space in a column than horses; and therefore ought to be replaced by horses, upon occasions in which it would appear desirable to move the artillery with extraordinary celerity and accuracy, and not upon a beaten road.

In respect to the details of my plan, I have considered them only in reference to the establishments of Fort St. George. They would possibly not answer in this part of India, and it would be useless to trouble you with them. Col. Clinton's plan is free from the objections which exist to drawing all the ordnance of the army by means of horses, and from those which exist to the formation of a large establishment for that pur-

\* The Adj. Gen. of the forces in India, afterwards Lieut. Gen. Sir H. Clinton, G.C.B.

pose. He would have much European superintendence, and it is probable his horses would be taken care of, and would preserve their condition. The horse artillery would also be an extraordinary arm in addition to the artillery usually with the corps in line; which would undoubtedly give the Commander in Chief great advantages in action.

In respect to the details of the plan, I should recommend the employment of discharged troopers or sepoys as the drivers; for unless the common people of Hindustan have more spirit than those Natives who have come under my observation, I should doubt whether many would be found to drive a gun into action.

To the Governor General.

Fort William, 22nd Aug. 1804.

1. I have the honor to enclose a copy of the order which I issued to the troops lately under my command, relative to the distribution of the property taken during the war, in conformity with the directions which I had received from your Excellency.

2. There are certain officers who have claims to the gratuity of a superior rank to that which they hold in the army, whose names I have the honor to lay before your Excellency in the enclosed paper.

3. The claims of the D. A. G. and D. Q. M. G. in Mysore, and belonging to the subsidiary force, to Major's gratuity, are founded upon the fact, that officers in these situations received the gratuity of that rank, when a reward of this description was given to the army by Lord Cornwallis, and upon the fact that the regulated allowance to these officers is made up of Major's pay and hatta.

4. The claim of the Staff surgeons is of the same description, and Major Malcolm's claim is, that Sir John Kemmaway received Lieut. Colonel's gratuity upon the same occasion.

5. The gratuity given by Lord Cornwallis affords no precedent, which can apply to the cases of Capt. Beauman and Capt. Burke commanding the artillery; of Capt. Johnson, the chief engineer; and of Capt. Heitland, of the pioneers; and these claims must therefore stand upon their own grounds. If these officers had been employed immediately under the Supreme government, or under that of Bombay, the established regulations would have allowed them to draw the batta of Major, and they would have been entitled, under your Excellency's orders, to the gratuity of Major. But although I am desirous to forward the wishes of these officers, having had repeated occasions to report their good conduct and services to your Excellency, it is proper that I should apprise you, that under the established regulations of the government of Fort St. George, they draw only the batta of their regimental rank of Captain.

6. Capts. Munt, Browne, and Dickson commanded corps, the Lieut. Colonels of which were in the command of brigades. If these officers had been employed immediately by the Supreme government, or the government of Bombay, they would have been entitled to the batta, and, consequently, to the gratuity of Major; but under the established regulations of the government of Fort St. George, an officer in command of a corps, a superior officer belonging to which is on the spot, although not exercising the command, is not entitled to the batta of a superior rank.

P.S. Do not communicate my sentiments on this subject to any of your news (or, in other words, private letter) writers. You will have your gratuity. I shall be able to arrange the Mysore affairs as we wished they should be; and to settle all matters respecting your Residency, their expenses, &c. &c., on a proper and permanent footing. I shall write to you fully upon this subject hereafter. In the mean time I apprise you that durbar kurch has drawn the notice of our masters, and this point must be regulated.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort William, 29th Aug. 1804.

The Governor General has desired me to inform your Lordship that it is his intention to send orders to Fort St. George, as soon as they can be prepared, to authorise you to add 5 regiments to that establishment. His Excellency, however, is desirous that no measures should be taken in consequence of this intimation of his intention till you shall hear further from him.

He intends that the troops of the government of Fort St. George should occupy the territories and posts as detailed in his notes of instructions dated the 25th May, excepting Goa, which place he intends to occupy by Bombay troops. According to this arrangement, Scindiah's subsidiary force will be permanently formed of Bengal troops.

This addition to the establishment of Fort St. George will probably appear large; but it is not so large within 4 battalions as that required by Gen. Stuart; and the establishment will not be larger than that which existed in the end of the year 1802.

After a full review of the military establishments since the year 1796, when they were first formed upon the model on which the army stands at the present moment, it appears clearly that all the additions which have been made to the armies of Fort St. George and Bombay, including this addition of 5 regiments, have been paid for by subsidies, or by revenues granted for the express purpose of supporting troops. I enclose a copy of a memorandum which I have given to the Governor General upon this subject, which will explain fully my sentiments upon it.

It is difficult to say upon what principle the establishment of 1796 was formed. However, it was certainly not sufficient for any purpose, even in the limited state of our territories under Fort St. George at that time; as, besides the regular regiments, there were 4 extra battalions, which have since been formed into the 12th and 13th regts., and there was a Madras battalion and several corps of sebandies in the northern Circars.

Even thus increased, it was certainly not an establishment adequate to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to maintain internal tranquillity at the same time; as in the first place, it is a well known fact that it was with the utmost difficulty that an army was assembled in 1798 and 1799 that could go to Seringapatam; and in the second place, when that army was drawn together and marched into Mysore, a rebellion broke out in the provinces south of the Coleroon, and another in those north of the Kistna.

The reduction of our great Native enemy, therefore, which was the result of that war, could not be urged as a reason for the diminution of

the military establishments to be stationed in the old territories, when it appeared that the moment the troops marched out of those territories, the inhabitants were in rebellion. I therefore conclude that the establishment of 1796 was adequate only to the preservation of internal tranquillity in the Carnatic; and that when additions of territory were made, additional troops were required. But supposing the establishment of 1796 to have been an adequate peace establishment, which circumstances have proved it was not, I think the facts stated in the enclosed memorandum show that all the corps raised since (including the 5 new regiments) have been paid for by the means provided.

If the new levies had not been made, the Company's old territories would have been lost, or the Company must have failed to perform their part of the treaties, by which they have gained such large subsidies.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort William, 29th Aug. 1804.

The Governor General has desired me to inform you that he proposes to authorise the government of Fort St. George to add 5 regiments to that establishment, as soon as the orders can be prepared for that purpose; but he is desirous that no measure should be adopted to carry these orders into execution till they shall be received. I have written likewise to Lord William upon this subject.

Of all the difficult negotiations in which I have ever been concerned, this has been the most difficult; and, after all, I fear that the orders which will be sent to Fort St. George will contain only an authority to increase the establishment to the number of 5 regiments, if the measure should be thought necessary. In that case you will have a contest of a disagreeable nature in the Council; of the probability of which I have apprised the Governor General; and I still hope that I shall be able to prevail upon him to make the order positive. The orders will, at the same time, authorise the 4 extra battalions still wanting to complete the establishment which you will require.

The Governor General intends that the Bombay troops shall still occupy Goa. His reason for this arrangement is that, in fact, the Bombay army could not afford to supply Scindiah's subsidiary force, and at the same time allot a sufficient force for the garrison of Bombay. It would therefore have been necessary to add to it, to carry the orders of the 25th May into execution, and it appeared to me, upon the whole, that that army was the least able to bear an increase, from the great want of officers and men to complete the army which they have at present. I was also at all times of opinion that it would be most convenient to supply Scindiah's subsidiary force from Bengal. Under this new arrangement the Bombay army had 2 battalions more than were required; and as the Governor General was determined not to allow of an increase of more than 5 regiments, it was best to arrange that Goa should be placed under the government of Bombay.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a memorandum which I have given to the Governor General, which will show you the topics upon which our discussions on this subject have turned. I have besides proved to him, in the clearest manner, from the events which occurred in the old

territories under Fort St. George, when the army took the field in 1798-99, that the military establishment of 1796 was never adequate to give protection against a foreign enemy, and to preserve internal tranquillity; and therefore that when additions were made to the territory, and a fresh subsidy was paid by the Rajah of Mysore, additional troops were necessary to support the civil government in the new territories, and to defend and support the government in Mysore; and that if the new levies had not been made, the Company must have lost their old territories or their new, or must have broken their treaty with the Rajah.

Affairs are standing still in the northern provinces. Gen. Lake is at Cawnpore, and Col. Monson at Rampoora, where he has been joined by the reinforcements. Holkar had not moved towards him. This campaign has been terribly unfortunate, but I hope that the plan which the Governor General has lately recommended to the consideration of Gen. Lake will prove successful.

*The D.A.G. to Major Campbell, H. M. 94th regt.* Fort William, 29th Aug. 1804.

The Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has received your letter of the 24th July, enclosing an extract of the G. O. by the Commander in Chief in India, announcing your promotion by His Majesty to a majority in the 94th regt., with rank from the 4th July, 1803.

The Major General desires me to inform you that such promotion entitles you to share in the prize money granted to the army which served in the Deccan last war, as major; and to draw major's batta, as the gratuity allowed by the Most Noble the Governor General to the officers of that army.

Before the Major General received the notice of your promotion, he had issued orders for dividing the whole sum of money that had been realised from the property captured, and there is no fund at present in the hands of the prize agents from which they could pay you the difference between a captain's and major's share, and that must accordingly be deferred until another division takes place; but, in the meantime, the Major General has authorised the paymaster of the subsidiary force to pay you major's gratuity, or the difference between that and captain's gratuity, if you have already drawn the latter.

I have the honor to enclose a duplicate of the order to the paymaster on this subject.

*(A similar letter to Major West, H. M. 74th regt.)*

*The D.A.G. to the Paymaster of the Hyderabad subsidiary force.* 29th Aug. 1804.

Capt. J. Campbell, of the 94th foot, having been promoted by His Majesty to a majority in that regiment, with rank from the 4th July, 1803, is entitled to a major's batta, as the gratuity given by his Excellency the Governor General to the officers who served in the Deccan during the late war; and the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley accordingly authorises you to pay him major's batta as that gratuity, or the difference between that and captain's batta, if he has already drawn the latter.

*(Copy of the same with reference to Major West, H. M. 74th regt.)*

*The D.A.G. to Lieut. Col. Swinton, H. M. 74th regt.* Fort William, 31st Aug. 1804.

Major Gen. Wellesley desires me to inform you that he had recommended to the Governor General to allow some of the officers of the army, lately under his command in the Deccan, to draw the gratuity according to the rank next above their regimental rank; and that he had not included your name in the list, because he imagined that you would draw lieutenant colonel's batta, as commanding the 74th regt. from the date of Col. Wallace's promotion in the 10th regt. light dragoons, which would entitle you, under the orders of the 1st inst., to draw the gratuity according to the same rank. If, however, from the late publication with us of the orders promoting Col. Wallace, you had not drawn lieutenant colonel's batta



during the war, and, consequently, could not draw the gratuity as such under the orders of the 1st inst., the General would have procured the necessary authority for your drawing it. But he has just seen the orders for your promotion, with rank from the 1st Dec. last, which will entitle you to lieutenant-colonel's prize money, and gratuity also. The prize agents will not be able to pay you the former immediately; but if you find any difficulty in obtaining the other, the General requests that you will state it, and he will get it removed.

To Col. Close.

Fort William, 4th Sept. 1804.

I have received your letters as far as the 3rd Aug. I attached to Mr. Strachey a party of Mysore horse, and could have attached an engineer to him, if I had received your letter in time, but it did not reach me till many days after I had arrived here.

Affairs in Malwa have gone on very badly indeed, and a great effort is necessary to regain our character, and to place matters on the footing on which they should be. This effort will shortly be made, according to a plan contained in a letter which I wrote to the Commander in Chief, dated the 23rd April, a copy of which you have got. Since my arrival here, a detailed memorandum of that plan has been made out, of which Gen. Lake approves, and he takes the field with his army in order to carry it into execution, and to prosecute the war seriously.

I wish that it had been in my power to go into Guzerat when I first heard of Murray's retreat, or that I could now get there in time to co-operate personally in the plan which is to be carried into execution; however, I hope to be permitted to leave Calcutta soon, and I shall be prepared to join either Col. Murray or Col. Wallace, according to circumstances. The report that I have this intention may have a tendency to revive confidence, and I think you will do well to announce it to the Peshwah's durbar. I wish you also to write to Webbe and to Mr. Duncan, and announce to them the probability that I shall be able to come round, with the same view of inspiring confidence at Scindiah's durbar and at Bombay. If I can procure it, I will send you a copy of the memorandum which was sent to the Commander in Chief; the object of the operations will be to close Holkar in between a certain number of British corps stationed on the frontiers of Bundelcund, Hindustan, and in Malwa, and to hunt him with the Commander in Chief's army.

The Commander in Chief cannot carry the whole plan into execution, as he will not have a corps at Ougein, and another (Murray's) on the frontiers of Guzerat. It is more probable, therefore, that the result of the operations will be that Holkar will bring some troops across the Nerbudda and Taptee, and that he may enter the Deccan. However, the body which he could bring will not be of any very great strength, as it is certain that he would lose his infantry and guns; and it is not very probable that the Rohillas, and other northern nations composing his cavalry, will follow him a second time into the Deccan.

It will be necessary, however, that Wallace should be prepared to take up the hunt, so soon as it shall come within his reach, and that he should follow Holkar with the greatest celerity. If Holkar should determine to come out of Malwa into the Deccan, he will come, most probably, by the Scindwah ghaut; he may come down by Burhampoor, or he may go

farther to the eastward, pass the Nerbudda, about Hoosingabad, and enter the Deccan by the Gawile hills and into Berar. It is not very probable that he will come by either of the two last mentioned routes without allowing time for Col. Wallace to have notice of his intention, and to take measures to stop, or to have a fair start at him, if he should come through.

I should therefore recommend, after the siege of Chandore and any other operations of that kind that may be necessary are concluded, that Col. Wallace should take up a position for his camp nearly central in Candeish, from which he will be able to communicate with celerity with Webbe, and gain an early knowledge of Holkar's movements and intentions towards the Deccan. By this proposed position in Candeish, Col. Wallace will still be enabled to give countenance and protection to the Peshwah's officers and servants, in taking and keeping possession of Holkar's territories in that province. If Holkar should cross the Nerbudda to the southward he will certainly come into Berar, possibly, in the first instance, into those territories still belonging to the Rajah of Berar. If he should cross the Nerbudda, as here supposed, Col. Wallace ought to move along the valley of the Poorna into Berar, and be prepared to follow Holkar even into the Rajah's territories. Whenever the Colonel comes to operate upon Holkar, the mode of doing so is to keep up the pursuit: if possible, not to allow him to make a halt, and to run him as hard as may be practicable, consistently with the objects of marching on every day, and keeping the cattle in condition.

I will take care that orders shall be sent to Murray, or whoever may command the corps which will be near Onguin, to communicate constantly with Col. Wallace, to hurry Holkar through the countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptée, and after he shall have passed the Nerbudda, and particularly if he should go by the eastern route, to seize Scindwah and all the other places belonging to Holkar situated in those countries, and to hand them over to Scindiah.

P. S. I enclose the memorandum\* and the Commander in Chief's answer, noted in the margin. Be so kind as to send a copy of these papers to Webbe.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort William, 6th Sept. 1804.

Accounts have been received this day from the Commander in Chief, from which it appears that Holkar, with his whole army, had drawn near to Col. Monson, at Rampoor; and that he was encamped, on the 20th Aug., at Merwah, about 6 coss from Rampoor.

Col. Monson had been joined by reinforcements of cavalry and infantry; of the latter of which he had 7 battalions. He retired, however, on the evening of the 21st, towards Kooshulghur, where he expects to join Scindiah's infantry and the Jeypoor army.

I judge, from the private letters, that the Commander in Chief is not very well satisfied with this movement; indeed he complains of it. But

\* This memorandum to the Commander in Chief was written by the Governor General. See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iv. p. 180.

he desired Col. Monson, in a letter written on the 13th Aug., to fall back towards Jeypoor, if he should find it difficult to procure provisions near Rampoorra.

Col. Monson was not then pressed by Holkar, and it is probable that the Commander in Chief did not intend that the order should be obeyed, if Holkar should approach him; as, in all the letters written lately to the Governor General, he expresses an anxious hope that Holkar will approach Monson, and a *certainty of a successful action if he should do so.*

I think it probable that the Commander in Chief will be at Agra in a day or two from this time.

This fresh retrograde movement of Monson is much to be regretted. He has already caused the desertion of a part of Frith's corps of cavalry, irregulars; and it is to be feared that the same spirit may reach the regular infantry. These retreats must also discourage our allies. On the other hand, it is to be hoped that they will encourage Holkar to stand a general action, for which the Commander in Chief has prepared, by ordering into the field the 76th regt., and 5 battalions, besides Monson's corps, and 8 regiments of cavalry, of which 3 are dragoons.

I have no other news for your Lordship. I hope to be able to leave this place soon. A garrison has been left in Rampoorra. I hope that Col. Murray will now see no necessity for retiring again, as Holkar has gone so far to the northward. I shall be obliged to your Lordship if you will communicate to Gen. Stuart the circumstances which I have above related.

To Capt. Wilks.

Fort William, 9th Sept. 1804.

I enclose the copy of a letter that I have written to the Commander in Chief, which will apprise you of the situation of affairs to the northward, and which may render it probably necessary for me and the Mysore horse again to take the field. I shall be obliged to you if you will make Purneah acquainted with this possible necessity, and request him to make arrangements to enable the Mysore horse to take the field at a short notice.

Your letter of the 19th Aug. reached me this morning. I am decidedly of opinion that we ought to be very cautious in our interference with the servants of the Rajah's government; and I have always proceeded upon that principle. In the case of Govind Rao, in particular, I requested Purneah to fix upon the person who should be sent to the southern chiefs, and the allowance which should be given to the person upon whom he should fix. Accordingly, this allowance has been paid from that time by Purneah.

I think, however, that it is not inconsistent with the principle not to interfere with the Rajah's servants, to give rewards to those of them who may serve the Company usefully and with fidelity; particularly if care be taken, as it will be in these instances, to bring forward the government of Mysore as much as possible; and to provide that the rewards given shall go through the hands of the Rajah's government, and shall be dependent upon the continuance of the faithful services of the receiver, and in a great measure upon the pleasure of the Dewan.

Purneah, like other men, has his faults. He is particularly jealous of the intercourse between the servants of his government and the European gentlemen, and of the favors which the former may receive from the Company. This jealousy arises principally from ignorance of the European character, and partly from being insensible of the strong impressions in his own favor, which his conduct, his character, and his abilities have made upon all the persons who have at present any power in India. But I am of opinion that we should not act as we ought, if we were to allow that jealousy to prevent us from giving those rewards which are justly due, and which policy urges us to give as strongly as justice and gratitude.

The persons who are the objects of these rewards are aware that I have recommended that they should receive them. By accident, Webbe employed Govind Rao to write the letter to Purneah, in March last, in which I apprised Purneah that I had recommended Bistnapah and Govind Rao to the Governor General for marks of the Company's favor. I informed Govind Rao, when I sent him with Mr. Strachey, that he and Bistnapah would receive a reward for their services, and that the Governor General only delayed ordering them to be given till he should make certain other arrangements. The consequence, therefore, of now withholding the rewards would be, that these persons would believe that government were insensible of their services, and that I had deceived them; besides that, we should thus be guilty of an act of gross injustice and ingratitude. Under all these circumstances I must therefore decline to attend to Purneah's wishes. You may explain all this to him, and tell him that, in fact, the business had gone so far, before I received his letter, that I was apprehensive, if I should urge the Governor General not to give these rewards, he would suspect Purneah of being insensible of the merits and services of the persons in question towards the Company, or that Purneah was himself jealous of their services.

The Governor General is well satisfied with the services rendered by the Rajah in the war. He thought it best that I should write him a public letter to the same purport as yours to me, upon the subject of the Rajah's resources and expenses, in order to save time and enable him to review the Rajah's situation before I should leave Calcutta. I expect this will be done immediately. At all events I shall urge it forward, and will bring back with me the settlement of this affair.

To Col. Close.

Fort William, 9th Sept. 1804.

I have just received your letter of the 16th Aug. You will have known that I agree in the opinion which you have therein given respecting the Bombay troops. I had already prevailed upon the Governor General to keep Col. Wallace in the command of the Poonah subsidiary force, and Agnew as his staff.

I shall now arrange the other points to which you have drawn my attention.

You will have heard of Monson's reverses: I tremble for the political consequences of these events; and I have, therefore, written this day to Fort St. George to urge the General to prepare a regiment of dragoons

and one of Native cavalry to go forward with me, and the Mysore horse. I shall leave this for Madras, I hope, in a few days, and I purpose not to allow the grass to grow under my feet.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort William, 9th Sept. 1804.

I informed Lord W. Bentinck on the 6th, that Col. Monson had retired from Rampoorra on the 21st Aug., towards Kooshalghur. His progress was impeded by a river which had swelled, and Holkar came up with him with his army on the 24th. An action was fought between the two armies on that evening, in which some loss was sustained by Col. Monson. We know that 4 officers were killed, and Col. Monson slightly wounded.

After the action, Col. Monson continued his march; but I cannot say whether on the night of the 24th, or on the morning of the 25th. It appears by the account, however, that Holkar's cavalry had followed him, but had not been able to make any impression upon him; and Col. Monson was at Kooshalghur on the 26th, intending to continue his march towards Agra. A detachment, consisting of 2 regiments of cavalry, and 4 battalions of sepoy, had marched from Agra to support him; and the Commander in Chief, with the army, left Cawnpore on the 31st Aug., or on the 1st of this month.

From the accounts which have been received, I judge that Holkar attacked Col. Monson with his infantry, and his powerful artillery, on the 24th; and if this should be the case, and that the Colonel has effected his retreat in safety, in front of his cavalry, it is an event very honorable to the troops, although possibly it may be disastrous in its consequences in other respects. The succession of reverses in this contest with Holkar, although in reality none of them are of any consequence, and although it is probable that they may all be attributed to the mistakes of the persons charged with the conduct of the service, may have very unpleasant effects upon our general political situation.

I have just had another conference with the Governor General on the subject of the increase of the army of Fort St. George, the result of which is, that I have hopes that he will send orders this day for the augmentation, for which I before apprised you that he would dispatch an authority. The Governor General, however, appears to be of opinion, that preparations ought to be made to provide against the worst consequences of the late reverses, and that we should be strong again in the Deccan: he has expressed a desire that I should return there, and in the mean time, that I should suggest to you the measures which, in case of the recurrence of the worst, would be desirable.

In my opinion, all that can be necessary, will be to send forward cavalry: viz., a regiment of dragoons, a regiment of Native cavalry, and the Mysore horse; and a battalion of infantry to accompany them till they shall be in reach of the corps at Poonah; which battalion might then return to its station. All that is necessary at present, is to order that the corps which you would propose to send should be in readiness.

I shall write to Capt. Wilks respecting the Mysore horse. While writing upon this subject, I take the liberty of suggesting to you, that it may

possibly be most convenient, in every respect, to send forward the corps of cavalry now in the Ceded districts. I shall keep you informed of events as they come to my knowledge. In the mean time, I propose to return to Madras as soon as a ship shall be ready to take me.

To Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

Fort William, 11th Sept. 1804.

Since I wrote to you on the 9th, farther accounts have been received from Agra; but they are still very imperfect, as far as they relate to the operations of Col. Monson's corps since the 21st Aug.

The attack of the 24th was occasioned by Col. Monson's detention at the Banas river; and the operations of the enemy appear to have been directed against the piquets which were his rear guard on the southern bank of the river; and the 2nd batt. 2nd regt., which had been sent to the support of the piquets. These corps had at one time possession of Holkar's guns, but were overpowered by superior numbers, and suffered in their retreat across the Banas. The detachment marched on the night of the 24th, and reached Kooshalghur on the night of the 25th, the distance about 40 miles. They halted there on the 26th, and marched again at night. They halted on the 27th again, and either on that day, or the following night, were attacked again, and suffered some loss.

There are various reports respecting the amount of their loss, to which I do not give credit; as on the 30th, the officer commanding at Agra wrote that the corps of Col. Monson's detachment were arrived there. Officers had come into Agra on the 29th, who reported that the detachment had been entirely destroyed on the 27th; but it was obvious that they were none of them in the action on that day; and it is certain that the corps came into Agra on the 30th. What the nature of the action of the 27th was, and what the loss, I cannot say.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Fort William, 12th Sept. 1804.

Some time has elapsed since I have written to you, but you will readily believe that I have had much to do; and I had nothing to say to you which could interest you.

I have spoken to the Governor General regarding your situation when the Coast troops shall be relieved at Poona; and he has determined that you shall continue to command the subsidiary force, and Agnew to retain his situation of D. A. G.

I have not yet had an opportunity of speaking to him regarding the other officers belonging to the Coast army, attached to the staff of the subsidiary force, but I will do so; and I have no doubt but that I shall be able to arrange that to their satisfaction. At all events, if I should not be able to fix them with you, I shall have no difficulty in providing for them elsewhere. I do not wish you to talk upon this subject; but if you should hear of any anxiety respecting their staff situations when the relief shall take place, I authorise and request you to say that you know I am not inattentive to their views.

You will have heard reports of poor Monson's reverses, but as I am on the spot, you will be glad to hear the truth from me; and as they give some important military lessons to us all, I do not regard the trouble of

writing them to you. When it became necessary to attack Holkar, Monson was detached from the grand army with 3 battalions and their guns, and a body of cavalry, under Lieut. Lucan. Holkar, who was then near Ajmeer, with an army composed only of horse (and as Gen. Lake was at no great distance from Monson), retreated towards Malwa.

After quitting the river Jumna, and passing through the flat countries depending on Agra, the first country going to the southward is a mountainous tract called Jeypoor, governed by the Rajah of that name, who had been tributary to Seindiah and Holkar previous to the late war, and who had been relieved from his tribute by the operation of the treaty of peace. Joining to the territories of Jeypoor is that of the Rajah of Boondy, of the same description; and joining to Boondy is the territory of the Rajah of Kota. These last two Rajahs had been, and are still, tributary to Seindiah; and Holkar has claims upon them which they hoped to get rid of by the British assistance, in consequence of their conduct in the war; at all events, they were desirous to obtain for a time the British protection against the demands of Holkar.

Between Boondy and Jeypoor is a small territory and fort called Rampoor, which, at the commencement of the war, belonged to Holkar. This territory had formerly been part of the Jeypoor territory, and had been seized by the Holkar family in some of their former contests with the Rajah of Jeypoor. The whole of this country between Agra and the province of Malwa, which joins to the Kota territory, and which is entered through a pass called the Muckundra ghaut, is intersected by rivers and nullahs, which are either full throughout the western rains, or are filled at times by those rains, and become impassable for troops. Of these, the principal is the river Chumbul, which runs between Kota and Boondy, and the river Banas, which runs between Rampoor and Agra.

When Holkar fled in front of the army of the Commander in Chief, Col. Monson followed him successively to Boondy and Kota, the Rajahs of which countries were very desirous to have the protection of the British troops against his exactions, and promised supplies and every thing which Col. Monson could want. At the same time that Col. Monson advanced, a detachment under Col. Don, consisting of 2 battalions, was sent to take Rampoor, of which place it got possession by storm; and this detachment afterwards joined and reinforced Monson's corps, which then consisted of 5 battalions.

In the month of June, the Commander in Chief withdrew his army into cantonments, leaving Monson's corps in the Kota country. Monson, towards the end of that month, passed through the Muckundra ghaut into Malwa, accompanied by the troops of the Rajah of Kota, and some of Seindiah's, under Bappojee Scindiah, and attacked, and took by storm, the hill fort of Hinglisghur; and after this operation, he took up a position in Malwa, recommended to him by the Rajah of Kota, at some distance from the Muckundra ghaut, in which the Rajah told him he was likely to get supplies, and from which Monson expected to be able to communicate with Col. Murray, at that time on his march from Guzerat towards Ougein.

After his retreat in front of the Commander in Chief, Holkar had first

threatened Ougein, and afterwards had gone to Mundissoor, a town belonging to Scindiah, situated to the north west of Ougein, and on the left of the Chumbul. Between the middle and latter end of June, he took and plundered this town; and at that time the river Chumbul was between him and Col. Monson, who was encamped about 5 coss from the river, on the right bank.

Towards the beginning of July, Holkar passed the Chumbul with his army. Col. Monson learnt that he was doing so, and intended to attack him. He moved towards the place at which he heard Holkar was, and found that the whole army had crossed the river; nearly about the same time, he understood that Col. Murray, who had made 2 marches towards Ougein from Guzerat, had recrossed the Myhia; and upon the whole, Monson, having only 2 days' provisions, thought it best to retreat. Accordingly, he sent off his baggage early on the following morning, the 8th July, I believe, towards the Muckundra ghaut; and he followed with the infantry at about 9 in the morning, meaning to reach Muckundra that night, the distance about 17 miles. He left Lucan, with his irregular horse and Bappojee Scindiah's horse, to cover his rear, and to follow as his rear guard. After Monson had marched a few miles, he heard that Holkar had attacked, with his cavalry, his rear guard of irregular horse; and shortly afterwards, he received intelligence that the rear guard was destroyed, and Lucan taken prisoner. He arrived at Muckundra unmolested, and took up a position that covered the ghaut; but which, like all others that I have seen, had many passages practicable for cavalry.

On the next day, or the next but one, Monson was attacked by the whole of Holkar's cavalry, in 3 separate bodies, who, however, could make no impression upon him; and they were beat off. Towards evening he heard that the infantry was arrived at a camp within 2 or 3 coss of the Muckundra ghaut, with their guns, 175 in number; and he determined to retreat again. He accordingly marched to Kola, the Rajah of which place urged him to stay there, but could not supply him with provisions; and then Monson marched on the following day, and crossed the Chumbul in boats, provided by the Rajah, which he sunk after he had crossed.

The rain began about the 10th July, and became incessant, and rendered Monson's marches much more difficult than they would otherwise have been; particularly in that country, which is a black cotton ground. At last, after he had crossed the Chumbul, he was obliged to spike his guns and leave them behind, and he continued his march, getting but little provision on the road until he reached Rampoor. He was followed, but not much harassed, by a body of Holkar's horse, which overtook him at a nullah, which being full, stopped him. He twice beat up the camp of this body of horse, and then I believe they quitted him. On his arrival at Rampoor, Monson was joined by 2 battalions with their guns, and a body of Hindustany horse, under Major Frith, which had been sent from Agra to reinforce him, and he immediately began to collect provisions at Rampoor.

The rains, which had been so distressing to Monson, likewise impeded Holkar, some of whose guns remained to the southward of the Muckundra



ghaut. His progress to the northward was likewise impeded by Monson having destroyed the Rajah of Kota's boats on the Chumbul. However, at last he advanced, and towards the 20th Aug. again approached Monson at Rampoor.

By this time, Monson had collected only about 12 days' provisions, and the Commander in Chief, foreseeing the difficulty in which he might again be involved, desired him on the 20th Aug. to retire towards Jeypoor, if he should think it probable that he might be distressed for provisions.

Monson, however, remained till Holkar approached him within 6 coss with his whole army, and on the 21st Aug., in the evening, commenced his retreat towards Agra, by Kooshalghur, leaving Jeypoor on his left hand. He left 15 companies as a garrison in Rampoor. He arrived at Banas river on the 23rd, and found that it was full: on the 24th, in the morning, it fell, and became fordable, and he passed over his baggage and a battalion; and between 12 and 3 o'clock, he passed over three more battalions, leaving the piquets and one battalion to support them on the southern bank.

Holkar's troops had appeared in the morning, and were seen crossing at different fords on the right and left flank; and towards evening, Holkar's infantry and guns appeared in front. They attacked the piquets, but were repulsed; and the piquets and battalion took 8 guns; but afterwards our troops were overpowered by superior numbers, and were obliged to retreat across the river to the main body, in which operation they lost many men, being attacked on their rear, and also by the horse, who had crossed the river and moved up its bed.

Monson retreated from Banas river on the night of the 24th, leaving his baggage, and arrived at Kooshalghur, about 40 miles distant, on the night of the 25th. He was followed throughout the march by Holkar's horse, who, however, were not able to make any impression upon him. He halted on the night of the 25th and the 26th at Kooshalghur, and on the 26th at night marched towards Agra. Something happened on the 27th, of which I have not received an account; but on the 30th, Monson and his detachment arrived at Agra.

The Commander in Chief has taken the field, and it is to be hoped that he will have an early opportunity of wiping away the disgrace which we have suffered.

It is worth while to review these transactions, in order that we may see to what these misfortunes ought to be attributed, that in future, if possible, they may be avoided.

In the 1st place, it appears that Col. Monson's corps was never so strong as to be able to engage Holkar's army, if that Chief should collect it; at least the Colonel was of that opinion. 2ndly: It appears that it had not any stock of provisions. 3rdly: That it depended for provisions upon certain Rajahs, who urged its advance. 4thly: That no measures whatever were taken by British officers to collect provisions either at Boondy or Kota, or even at Rampoor, a fort belonging to us, in which we had a British garrison. 5thly: That the detachment was advanced to such a distance, over so many almost impassable rivers and nullahs, without any

boats collected, or posts upon those rivers; and in fact, that the detachment owes its safety to the Rajah of Kota, who supplied them with his boats.

The result of these facts is an opinion, in my mind, that the detachment must have been lost, even if Holkar had not attacked them with his infantry and artillery.

In respect to the conduct of the operations, it is my opinion that Monson ought to have attacked Holkar in the first instance. If he chose to retire, he ought to have supported the rear guard with his infantry, and to have sent the irregular horse away with the baggage.

When he began to retreat, he ought not to have stopped longer than a night at Muckundra; because he must have been certain that the same circumstances which obliged him to retire to Muckundra, would also oblige him to quit that position. The difference between a good and a bad military position is nothing when the troops are starving.

The same reasoning holds good respecting Monson's halt at Rampoor, unless he intended to fight. As he had been reinforced, he ought to have fallen back till he was certain of his supplies; and having waited till Holkar approached him, and particularly as Holkar's army was not then in great strength in infantry and guns, he ought to have vigorously attacked him before he retired. When his piquets were attacked on the Banas, he ought to have supported them with his whole corps, leaving one battalion on the northern bank to take care of his baggage; and if he had done so, he probably would have gained a victory, would have saved his baggage, and regained his honour.

We have some important lessons from this campaign. 1st: We should never employ a corps on a service for which it is not fully equal. 2ndly: Against the Marhattas in particular, but against all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of provisions. 3rdly: Experience has shown us, that British troops can never depend upon Rajahs, or any allies, for their supplies. Our own officers must purchase them; and if we should employ a Native in such an important service, we ought to see the supplies before we venture to expose our troops in the situation in which they may want them. 4thly: When we have a fort which can support our operations, such as Rampoor to the northward, or Ahmednuggur, or Chandore, in your quarter, we should immediately adopt effectual measures to fill it with provisions and stores, in case of need. 5thly: When we cross a river likely to be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it; as I have upon all the rivers south of Poona, and as you have, I hope, upon the Beemah and the Godavery.

In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, they must be decided and quick; and in all retreats, it must be recollected that they are safe and easy, in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps. But attention to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent a British corps from retreating.

These misfortunes in Hindustan will, I fear, take me back to the Deccan. Indeed, I shall leave this immediately, and orders have been already given that cavalry may be prepared to reinforce the troops with you.

P.S. Of course I mean this letter \* only for your own perusal, and that of your particular friends.

To Col. Murray.

Fort William, 14th Sept. 1801.

Mr. Webbe has transmitted to me copies of your correspondence with him, and I receive letters occasionally from Mr. Duncan, in which he communicates to me the substance of your private reports to Lieut. Gen. Nicolls, from the tenor of all which information I am induced to judge that your corps is not in the state of equipment in respect to provisions in which I hoped it was, and in which it ought to be in the situation in which you are placed. But I cannot form any determined opinion upon the subject, as in some of your letters, particularly those written to Mr. Webbe, you do not mention your distresses or your fear of the want of provisions; and you have proposed two offensive expeditions, through that gentleman, for the consideration of Scindiah's government.

The object for which the corps under your command was first advanced from Guzerat was, that it might operate upon the rear of Holkar's army, and watch and endeavor to impede its movements, while his Excellency the Commander in Chief should push him in front. A variety of circumstances prevented the operations upon Holkar, which I anticipated when I sent you your orders of the 7th May; you have marched to Ougein for the protection of that city and Scindiah's territories, and Col. Monson, who had been sent forward from the Commander in Chief's army, has been obliged to retire in front of Holkar, in consequence of a want of provisions.

The Commander in Chief marched from Cawnpore on the 2nd of this month, and proposes to collect his army at Agra, which object he will possibly have effected by the middle of this month. Our last accounts of Holkar's infantry, which is the only important part of his army, leave it to the southward of Jeypoor; and I think it most probable that Holkar will keep it there, with a view to force the Rajah of Jeypoor to pay a contribution; and that he will lay waste the country between Jeypoor and Agra with his cavalry, in order to impede, if possible, or, at all events, to distress the march of the Commander in Chief towards Jeypoor. It is probable that in this season he will not be able to do much in that way; but, on the other hand, the Commander in Chief may experience difficulties in his absence from the Company's territories, such as materially to retard his progress.

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\* The compiler takes the liberty to add, as notes, to this and the following letter, an opinion and an illustration of them.

Sir Robert Peel, in speaking of the Duke of Wellington, said that he considered him the most powerful writer in the English language, and that the letter upon Col. Monson's retreat was the best military letter he had ever read, and quoted the line from Horace:

'Scribendi recte, sapere est et principium et fons.' *De Arte Poetica*, l. 309.

*Extract from a Letter from Major Gen. Sir Charles Napier, K.C.B., after the battle of Meeanee, dated Hyderabad, 20th Feb. 1843.*

'The Duke's letter on the retreat of Col. Monson decided me never to retire before an Indian army. If I have done wrong, abstractedly (for success, like charity, covers sins), the Great Master led me into it; but my own conviction is that I have done right; and that my admiration of him, and study of his words and deeds, as the great rules of war, have caused this victory.'

Notwithstanding his partial successes against Monson's corps, I doubt much whether Holkar will venture a general action with the army of the Commander in Chief. He is more likely to draw off to the southward, as the Commander in Chief will advance, and to operate upon your corps. Indeed if he had not such a tempting bait as the contribution to be levied on the Rajah of Jeypoor, I should suspect that he would move towards your quarter, and endeavor to operate upon you as he has upon Col. Monson, as soon as he should have heard that the Commander in Chief was collecting his army. Under these circumstances the situation of your corps becomes a consideration of some importance; and as I have had some experience in the warfare of these Marhattas, my sentiments upon it may not be disagreeable to you.

There are two modes in which the Marhattas carry on their operations. They operate upon supplies by means of their cavalry; and after they have created a distress in the enemy's camp, which obliges the army to commence a retreat, they press upon it with all their infantry and their powerful artillery. Their opponent, being pressed for provisions, is obliged to hurry his march, and they have no fear of being attacked. They follow him with their cavalry in his marches, and surround and attack him with their infantry and cannon when he halts, and he can scarcely escape from them.

That, therefore, which I consider absolutely necessary in an operation against a Marhatta power (indeed in any military operation in India) is such a quantity of provisions in your camp as will enable you to command your own movements, and to be independent of your magazines, at least for that length of time which may be necessary to fulfil the object for which you may be employed.

The next object to be considered is, the strength of your corps. Experience has shown us that the Marhatta cavalry are not very formidable when opposed to our infantry; that of Holkar, in particular, made no impression upon Monson's detachment in its long retreat. All the impression was produced by the infantry and cannon, the weather, and want of provisions. The infantry is the strength of Holkar's, as it is of every other army, and to that I conceive your corps to be fully equal.

It is probable that the Commander in Chief will not be at Kota till towards the end of October, and supposing that Holkar should adopt the plan of operations which I have detailed in the commencement of this letter, he will be near you about the beginning or middle of that month. You ought therefore to have at least a month's provision in your camp. If he should bring his infantry and cannon near you, you ought to throw your baggage into any fortified village, or throw up a few redoubts to cover it, in any place in which there may be water, where you will leave a guard to take care of it, and march to attack his infantry. If you should beat that, the cavalry will not hold together.

You must by all means avoid allowing him to attack you with his infantry. There is no position in which you could maintain your camp against such powerful artillery as all the Marhattas have. If you should not hear of their approach until they are close to you and coming to attack you, it would be better to secure your baggage in any manner, and

move out to attack them. Do not allow them to attack you in your camp, on any account.

Holkar may, however, possibly keep his infantry out of your way, surround you with his cavalry, and entirely cut off your communication. You have then only to beat up his cavalry camps as frequently as you may hear of their situation. Do not allow the enemy to lie near you with impunity, and you will soon clear the communication. Send constant accounts towards Kota of your situation; and if you should hear of the infantry camp, move upon it with celerity and attack it. In this consideration of the subject, I have supposed that you will have no cavalry. If you should have any, you will, of course, use it in attacks upon the enemy as often as may be practicable; and if you should support those attacks by your infantry and your cannon, you may be certain that they will be successful.

If your provisions should fail you, and you should hear that Holkar's infantry is near you, you ought to attack them before you think of any thing else. If you should be obliged to draw off towards your magazines, make your regular marches at the regular hours; beat up the cavalry corps as frequently as you can; if the infantry, or any part of them, should approach you, attack them with vigor. Even if you should lose a day or two by it in the time of your arrival at your magazines, you will probably gain time in the period of your relief from your distresses, as the cavalry will cease to hang upon your flank when the infantry are beaten. Burn all the baggage which you cannot carry on. But if you should have provisions in your camp in sufficient quantities to enable you to fulfil the objects for which your corps is employed, there is nothing which can oblige you to retreat.

I do not know what orders you may have received from the Commander in Chief. His intention is, I believe, that you should act as I proposed in my letter of the 7th May. At all events, whatever his intention may be, you must have a store of provisions in your camp, or you will not be in safety, much less be of any use to his operations.

To J. Stevens, Esq.

Fort William, 17th Sept. 1804.

I did not receive your letter of the 15th Aug. till the day before yesterday. I had already taken the liberty of mentioning your name to Lord W. Bentinck, when I was at Madras, and I have this day written to his Lordship to recommend your wishes to him, and have enclosed your letter.

Whether you will succeed in attaining this object, I cannot pretend to say; but as I know that Mr. Duncan intends to appoint you the first Judge in Guzerat, I recommend that you should not, in the first instance, refuse that appointment, particularly as the removal of yourself and your family to Malabar will not be more difficult or inconvenient than your removal from Bombay.

Pray present my compliments to Mrs. Stevens.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Calcutta, 17th Sept. 1804.

I have the honor to forward to your Lordship a letter with its en-

sure, addressed to me by Mr. Stevens, of the Bombay Civil service, whose name I believe I mentioned to you when I was at Madras.

The object of this gentleman is to be appointed Chief Judge in Malabar, as successor to Mr. Richards; a situation for which I believe him to be perfectly qualified. I knew him when he was superintendent of the northern division of Malabar, in which situation he must have acquired great experience of the affairs of that province; and he was always highly respected, and well spoken of. Mr. Richards, however, will be able to give you an accurate knowledge of his qualifications.

In respect to Mr. Duncan, I believe that your Lordship is aware that he will recommend officially to fill the situations in Malabar, any of the servants of the Bombay government whom you may select; I know that he has a good opinion of Mr. Stevens, and that he intends to appoint him Chief Judge in the newly acquired territories in Guzerat. Mr. Stevens, however, as you will observe by his letter, prefers to serve in Malabar.

I have the pleasure to inform you, that the Governor General determined yesterday to appoint Gen. Dowdswell a supernumerary Major General on the staff of this Presidency, and his appointment will, I believe, appear in orders to-morrow.

No accounts have been received from the northward from any authority, since I last wrote to Gen. Stuart. The private reports in circulation at Calcutta make matters very bad; however, all agree that the troops behaved well; that Holkar's cavalry made no impression upon them; that the disaster is to be attributed to the incapacity of the commander, and want of provisions; and that there has not been hitherto any defection of allies or dependents, that might not have been expected in the event of such a retreat.

I understand from Capt. Sydenham, that he has sent you a copy of the letter which I wrote to Col. Wallace upon the subject of Monson's campaign, which will explain the whole story, and my sentiments upon every part of it. Gen. Lake is advancing towards Agra, and it is supposed that Holkar has come through the Beana ghaut, and is in the plain between the hills of Jeypoor and the Jumna. I did not communicate to your Lordship any of the intelligence which came from England lately, as I knew that you would have received it from the *Bengal* and *Asia*, long before my letter could reach you.

To Major Shawe.

Fort William, 17th Sept. 1804.

I return the papers received from Mr. Duncan. I have long been of opinion that Col. Murray ought to be relieved from his command; and his letter to Mr. Duncan, of the 19th July, renders it absolutely necessary now either to reinforce him with regular cavalry, which is impossible; to withdraw his corps entirely from Malwa, which, unless it be to supply it with provisions, would be fatal to the operations of the war; or to relieve him in the command by another officer. If one of these measures be not adopted, the government, and not Col. Murray, will be responsible for the misfortunes which may happen.

I therefore recommend that Mr. Duncan may be ordered to send Major Gen. Jones to relieve Col. Murray without loss of time; and Col. Wood-

ington, who is here, ought to be sent round to Bombay to join the corps of troops in the field. He is a gallant, forward officer, and they want some of that description.

I shall be at Barrackpore in the morning. I send with this Col. Ochterlony's journal.

To the Governor General.

9th Oct. 1804.\*

I take the liberty of drawing your Excellency's attention to my situation in command of the troops in the Deccan in the late war, and to the inadequacy of the allowances which I received as a Major General of the staff of the army of Fort St. George, and to the trust reposed in me; or to the increased expenses which I was obliged to incur, by the necessity of augmenting all my establishments, and of forming them on a scale more consistent with the character with which I was invested by your Excellency, than with the situation of a Major General commanding a division of the army.

These extraordinary expenses were necessarily incidental to the extended nature of my military command, and of my arduous political duties, which embraced the direction of the army throughout the whole extent of the Deccan, together with all the details of every important political negotiation connected either with the prosecution of the war in that quarter of India, or the conclusion of general peace; and I trust that your Excellency will be of opinion that I have a just claim to be reimbursed the charges which I was compelled to defray in the discharge of my public duty beyond the amount of my allowances.

To Lieut. Col. Woodington.

Fort William, 13th Oct. 1804.

I submitted your letter, regarding the line adjutant, to Lord Wellesley this morning, and he desired me to refer it to Mr. Duncan, which I have done. I also took the opportunity of speaking to him respecting your prize money, and the other subjects connected therewith referred to in your memorandum. He said that all the questions respecting prize property captured at Baroach had been decided some time ago; and he observed, what you had said in answer to 2 questions sent to you by Mr. Duncan, that the enemy had not taken possession of the property of the British merchants, of which, therefore, it must be concluded, that it never passed from their hands. It appears, therefore, that it would not be proper to call upon the British merchants to give you a remuneration by way of salvage; and all the circumstances do not exist which would afford a ground for the Governor General to order that a gratuity on the part of the public might be given to the troops employed at Baroach. The

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\* Extract of a Minute of the Governor General, 10th Oct. 1804.

The services and situations of those several persons are distinctly detailed in Major Gen. Wellesley's dispatch of the 9th March, and appear to me to render the grant of those pensions in the highest degree equitable and expedient. I accordingly propose, that those pensions, amounting to 2700 rupees *per mensem*, or 32,400 rupees *per annum*, be granted in the manner recommended by Major Gen. Wellesley, and that the necessary orders be accordingly issued for the purpose of giving effect to this arrangement

Governor General said, however, that if you would lay before him an account of the public property captured during the war, he would give orders regarding its disposal without loss of time. If you should have such an account, you will do well to send it to me; if not, it ought to be prepared as soon as possible.

P.S. I could not get the letter which I mentioned. I am not quite certain that it may not be in the secret department, and if it should be so, it cannot be seen without an order from the Governor General.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort William, 18th Oct. 1804.

I have had the honor of receiving your Lordship's letter of the 23rd Sept.

You will have observed that the augmentation of the army of Fort St. George is only 4 regiments, instead of 5, the number which I announced to you in my letter of the 29th Aug.; and I sincerely wish your Lordship may find that augmentation to be sufficient, and to provide for all the calls for troops, after the Bombay army shall have been withdrawn from the territories under your government; although I apprehend that you will not, and that you will still require some extra battalions. By the addition of the 4 regiments, the establishment of Fort St. George will consist of about the same number of regular battalions that it had in the year 1802, before the Marhatta war; and of the same number of troops that you have had within the territories during the Marhatta war, including in that number Gen. Campbell's corps, the Bombay troops, and extra battalions.

There is nothing new from the north westward. Gen. Lake has collected a very strong and well appointed body of troops, with which he was to march from Agra, on the 1st of this month, to attack Holkar, who was at Muttra. We expect to receive the accounts of the action to-morrow, or next day; and I will forward them to your Lordship by express.

I have been, and am still detained here, by the rain. The bearers are, however, laid upon the road, and I intend to set out as soon as I shall hear it is practicable to travel through the province of Cuttack. I fear that I shall have but an uncomfortable journey.

P. S. Your Lordship will be glad to hear that Governor Farquhar is still here, and proposes to go by land to Madras in company with me. The *Betsy* remains here, and I imagine cannot go to Madras, even though the embargo is taken off. The *Seaflower* was sent with dispatches to Prince of Wales' Island, when accounts were received that Adm. Linois was in the Bay of Bengal.

\* Memorandum on the Treaty of Bassein.

As the author of the 'Observations on Marhatta Affairs' does not

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\* For the Treaty of Bassein, see the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 627. The treaty of Bassein is here referred to from this memorandum having been written upon it, by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, when at Calcutta, in October, 1804, in answer to a paper entitled 'Observations on Marhatta Affairs,' sent to the Governor General from England by the President of the Board of Control, Lord Castlereagh.



appear to me to have viewed the policy of the treaty of Bassein in the light in which I have viewed it; and as I conceive that much of his reasoning upon the subject is to be attributed to the erroneous view, in my opinion, of the political state of India at the time the treaty was made, I deem it necessary to advert shortly to the political situation of the great powers in India, at different periods in which any important change has taken place, since the peace of Seringapatam, before I proceed to consider the amendments to the treaty of Bassein, which have been proposed.

In the consideration of all questions of Indian policy, it is necessary to extend our views beyond those powers immediately possessing territory. It is well known that the French have never ceased to look to the re-establishment of their power in India; and although they possess no territory on the continent, they have at all times had some influence in the councils of the different Native princes, and sometimes great power, by means of the European adventurers introduced into the Native armies. There can be no doubt but that the French government would avail themselves of an instrument, such as the influence or power of these adventurers would give them, to prosecute their favorite plan in India; and it is equally certain, that whether at peace or at war with Great Britain, the object of every French statesman must be to diminish the influence, the power, and the prosperity of the British government in India. I therefore conclude that, in the consideration of every question of Indian policy, or in an inquiry into the expediency of any political measure, it is absolutely necessary to view it, not only as it will affect Indian powers, but as it will affect the French.

When I establish this principle, I do not mean that the assertion that the French interest has been affected, is to be admitted in justification of every political measure of the government. It is necessary only that it should be recollected by those who are to judge of political affairs in India, that French power and French influence are important parts of every political discussion by the governments abroad; and it will appear, by the view which I shall take of the political situation of the great powers in India, at different periods, that French influence was powerful; that to have omitted to guard against the French would have been ruinous to the Company; and that the necessity of guarding against French influence was one of the principal causes of the treaty of Bassein.

In order thoroughly to understand the relations in which the different powers in India stood to each other, at the period at which the treaty of Bassein was concluded, and to be able to comprehend the objects and benefits of that treaty, it is necessary to advert to the situation in which they stood at the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792; to trace their progress from that period.

The 3 great powers, the English, the Peshwah, and the Nizam, having each received injuries from Tippoo Sultaun, joined in the war, the result of which was that peace; and the object of the British government was, if possible, to preserve the power of each in the situation in which it was left by the pacification.

Lord Cornwallis, who foresaw the difficulties and dangers to which the

alliance would be exposed, from the claims of the Marhattas upon the Nizam, endeavored to establish the alliance upon a more firm basis, by interposing the arbitration of the British government in their disputes. But the Marhattas, who knew that their claims were without just foundation, that they depended entirely upon their superior strength, and that the result of an arbitration by the British government must be unfavorable to them, declined to accept the offer made by Lord Cornwallis.

I conceive this to be the real history of the refusal of Lord Cornwallis to allow the Marhattas to subsidize 2 British battalions, as mentioned by the author of the 'Observations,' if such a proposal was ever made to him. His Lordship found that, without giving the British government any additional strength or security, the Peshwah's general wished to have the assistance of the British troops in the support of the Peshwah's internal government; and his Lordship was not desirous of being involved in the internal disputes of the Marhattas, without having some corresponding political advantage.

The result of the refusal of the Marhattas to allow the arbitration of the British government was exactly what his Lordship had foreseen. In the course of a very few years, the Marhattas attacked the Nizam for the purpose of enforcing their unjust claims. The British government of that day did not interfere, and the Nizam was obliged, in a treaty signed at Kurdlah, on the —, to cede half his territory, to pay a great sum of money, and to give up to the Marhattas his prime minister, Mushirc ool Moolk, and to appoint another minister recommended by the enemies who had reduced his power to that low state. His Highness was obliged to consent to send out of his territories the 2 British battalions, which had continued with him since the peace of Srirangapatam.

In the contest which had just taken place between the Marhattas and the Nizam, the troops principally employed, and whose gallantry had been most conspicuous, were the corps of infantry in the service of Scindiah on the one side, and those in the service of the Nizam on the other. Both these corps were commanded, and, in general, officered by Frenchmen and other foreigners. The corps in the service of the Nizam, commanded by M. Raymond, had, in particular, distinguished itself in an extraordinary manner, although unsuccessful.

After the experience of the war which had just terminated, the Nizam, seeing that he could not rely upon the assistance of the British government against the Marhattas, determined to increase this corps of infantry to the greatest extent that his finances would admit, and to render it as efficient as possible. With this view, a large territory was granted in jaghire to M. Raymond, from the revenues of which he was to pay the troops under his command; and the number of troops, and of French officers to command them, were vastly increased.

In a short time after the peace of Kurdlah, the Peshwah Madhoo Rao Narain died, and a scene of intrigue and confusion ensued at Poonah, the object of which was the succession to the musnud of the Peshwah, and the possession of the power of the Poonah state. It is useless to the consideration of the question under discussion, to endeavor, and it would be impossible to succeed in detailing the events which occurred on that occa-

sion. The result was the establishment in the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah of all the power of the Peshwah.

The predecessors of this chief had conquered the territories in the Doab, of the Jumna and Ganges, and those on the right of the Jumna. He was in possession of the person of the King, and of his power, by virtue of his office of Vakeel ool Moolk; and thus was established, in the hand of one Marhatta, all the territory and all the power on the west side of India, extending from Hindustan to the Toombuddra, along the frontiers of the Company, the Nabob Vizier, the Nizam, Tippoo Suldaun, &c. &c.

I have already observed that Scindiah had in his service a corps of infantry, commanded and generally officered by Frenchmen. This corps had conquered the territories in Hindustan, had rendered essential service in the war which preceded the peace of Kurdlah, and had been the principal instrument in the establishment of Scindiah's power at Poonah. This corps, commanded and officered by Frenchmen, may therefore be fairly stated to have been the principal instrument and support of the enormous power thus established on the western side of India.

On the other hand, a similar corps, officered in a similar manner, was the principal, indeed the only, support of the state of the Nizam. The difference between the two was, that that of Raymond was the most powerful; and Raymond had most influence in the councils of the prince whom he was serving, owing to the destruction of the power and authority of the Nizam in his own territories, occasioned by the disgrace suffered at Kurdlah.

In this situation the Governor General, Lord Wellesley, found the political affairs when he assumed the government in the year 1798. As Lord Cornwallis had foreseen, the state of the Nizam was nearly destroyed by the Marhattas. The policy of the British government had obliged the Nizam to support his tottering authority by the service of a body of troops, commanded by French officers, in whose hands was the only power of the state. The Peshwah's power was lodged by another train of events in the hands of Scindiah, who possessed, besides, all the power of the north and west of India, and whose principal support and instrument was a corps of a similar description, likewise commanded by Frenchmen.

It is useless to detail the measures adopted by Lord Wellesley to remedy the evils which resulted from this state of the governments of the allies of the Company in the war with Tippoo Suldaun, of which he saw the probability in the year 1798. It is sufficient here to observe, that his Lordship relieved the Nizam from the state of dependence in which he was held by the commanding officer of the French corps in his service; the French officers were dismissed, British troops were subsidized in lieu of the corps which the French officers had commanded, and the British government enjoyed the advantage of the assistance of the Nizam in the war which ensued with Tippoo Suldaun.

The measures by which the Governor General proposed to relieve the government of the Peshwah from the state in which it was held by Scindiah, failed to produce their effect; his Highness' government was in

Seindiah's hands, and the British government derived no assistance from this branch of the alliance.

After the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, on the 4th May, 1799, a new combination of politics appeared in India. The Native power, against whose enmity it had been necessary to provide, by an alliance with the Peshwah and the Nizam, was no more; and the Governor General was to determine the relation in which the British government should stand in respect to the powers which remained. These were that of the Nizam, and that of the Marhattas. It was obviously the interest of the British government that the power of the Nizam should continue to exist in a state of independence.

If there had been any reasonable ground for hope that his Highness' state could continue in independence, there might possibly have been no occasion for an alteration of the treaty by which the Company was then allied with his Highness; but it could not exist in that state, unless the Peshwah should consent to admit the mediation and arbitration of the British government in the question on claims which his Highness had upon the Nizam.

The Governor General therefore offered to allow the Peshwah to participate in the acquisitions made by the destruction of the power of Tippoo Sultaun, provided his Highness would admit the arbitration of the British government in his disputes with the Nizam, and would receive a subsidiary force. The Peshwah declined to accept this offer, and the acquisitions made in the war were divided between the parties concerned in carrying it on.

The state of the Nizam's government, after this refusal of the Peshwah, must still have pressed upon the consideration of the Governor General. By the treaty of 1798, his Highness was precluded from the employment of the British subsidiary troops against the Marhattas, or against certain tributaries of his, who were likewise tributaries of the Peshwah; and it was obvious that, however advantageous the treaty of 1798 had been to his government in many respects, his Highness was still in the situation, in respect to the Marhattas, in which he had been in 1797; with this difference, however, that he had no longer the support and services of the corps commanded by the French officers.

It became necessary, therefore, for the Governor General to decide respecting the Nizam's government, whether he would allow it to fall into the hands of the Marhattas; whether he could allow it to revert into the hands of the French adventurers, from whom he had relieved the Nizam in the year 1798; or whether he would, by an alteration of the treaty of 1798, extend the objects of the alliance, and render it defensive against all powers whatever; and in this manner undertake the defence of the Nizam against the vexatious claims which it was certain that the Marhattas would make upon him.

It is scarcely necessary that I should advert to the consequences which would have resulted from the first. The Marhattas would shortly have exercised the power of the Nizam's government, whose territory at that time extended to the southward of the Kistna and Toombuddra, along the frontier of the newly established government of Mysore. They would

soon have found the means of making claims in his name, or in that of the Peshwah, on the Rajah of Mysore, or the Nabob of the Carnatic, or even the Company; and the consequence would have been a war with that restless power, of which the seat would have been the territories of the Company, or their allies, and the sources from whence the means to carry on the war were to be drawn. The second mode would have been in direct contradiction to the opinion of parliament and the nation, and of every man who had given an opinion on the Governor General's conduct in his transactions with the Nizam's government in the year 1798. It would have introduced Frenchmen, French interests, influence, and power, into the heart of India, after they had been expelled by the Governor General.

There remained only to take the Nizam under the protection of the Company; and this measure was adopted by the general defensive treaty of 1800; although every man who knew any thing of the politics of India foresaw that the consequences of this measure might be, sooner or later, a war with the Marhattas.

The probability of such a war was foreseen by the former Governor General, Sir J. Shore, in a minute, in which he discussed the question regarding a closer alliance with the Peshwah; and it is supposed that Lord Wellesley saw clearly, that the only mode of avoiding that war was to induce the Peshwah to become a party to the alliance, and to submit his claims to the arbitration of the British government.

Consistently with this opinion, it was the duty of the Governor General to repeat his offers of alliance as frequently as opportunities might occur; and accordingly they were repeated upon different occasions.

I cannot agree in opinion with the author of the 'Observations,' that the offers to admit the Peshwah as a party to the general defensive alliance were not accepted, because the Governor General insisted that a body of British troops should be posted in his Highness' territories.

In the first place, it does not appear that the Governor General insisted upon that object as a *sine quâ non*. He may, for reasons into which I shall hereafter enter, have thought it desirable that a body of British troops should be at Poonah, but he did not insist upon it. However, I shall consider this point upon the facts stated by the author of the 'Observations.'

Till the end of the year 1800, Scindiah was at Poonah with an army. It was obvious that he would not willingly consent to the defensive treaty, because it must have put an end to all his prospects of ambition in the Deccan; and the Peshwah would not consent to it, because he would have been exposed to the tyranny of Scindiah, from the time at which he should sign the treaty, to that at which the British troops should arrive at Poonah.

When circumstances obliged Scindiah to quit Poonah with his army, he appointed the Peshwah's ministers, who still continued to negotiate with the British Resident; and it is a fact, well confirmed, that the Peshwah did not know even of the existence of a negotiation, much less the nature of the objects offered to his acceptance and refused by his servants.

The result of this statement and reasoning is, that the policy of a connexion with the Marhattas did not arise 'from the connexion subsisting previously to the conquest of Mysore, between the Company, the Mar-

hattas, and the Nizam, by the treaty concluded in 1790, at Poonah; but subsequently to the conquest of Mysore. It originated, 1st, in the necessity of preserving the state of the Nizam in independence: 2ndly, in the unjust claims of the Marhatta nation on the Nizam: 3rdly, in the certainty that those claims would be asserted in arms; and that the Nizam must submit, unless he should protect himself by raising an army to be officered by European adventurers, principally Frenchmen: 4thly, in the necessity of preventing the Nizam from entertaining these adventurers, and of affording him protection, at least equal to that which he could have procured for himself by those means, even at the risk of a war with the whole Marhatta nation.

In this view of the question, I have entirely omitted the enlarged considerations which must be obvious to every statesman who discusses it. I have likewise omitted to advert to the peculiar situation of the British power in India, which requires that the funds, applicable to the defence of the country, should be applied to commercial purposes; and therefore renders it necessary that the local government should derive means of supporting armies different from those usually resorted to. I have considered nothing but that which was absolutely necessary for security in the first instance, and for peace in the second.

There can be no question respecting the Marhatta claims, or that they could have been enforced with arms, or that the Nizam must have yielded, unless protected by the French, or by the Company. The question is, whether the best mode of preventing the war was to prevail upon the Peshwah to become a party to the defensive alliance.

It is not necessary that I should consider the particular circumstances of the times, at the different periods at which proposals were made to the Peshwah to become a party to the defensive alliance. It will be sufficient for the purpose under consideration, to state that the consequence of the conclusion of the defensive arrangements with the Peshwah, at any period since the year 1799, must have been to join against Scindiah a great proportion of the Marhatta nation. It is possible, that under these circumstances Scindiah might have acquiesced in the arrangement; but supposing that he should have gone to war to oppose it, the war would have been one of far less extent and difficulty than that in which the Company must, sooner or later, have been involved with the whole Marhatta nation, by the necessity of supporting the Nizam. The seat of it would have been the territories of our enemies, instead of our own, and the sources from which we were to draw the means of carrying it on.

But the question is not properly referrible to the admission of the Peshwah to the defensive alliance, at any period antecedent to the treaty of Bassein, but to that treaty itself. In order to be able to form a judgment whether the circumstances under which it was negotiated afforded the best chance of preserving the peace of India, it is necessary to advert to the situation of Marhatta affairs from the years 1798 and 1799.

Dowlut Rao Scindiah appears to have possessed the power, to which I have referred in the former part of this memorandum, from the time at which he placed the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, on the musnud. He was involved, however, in a contest in Malwa, with the females of the family of

his predecessor, Madajee Scindiah; and after the death of Tuckojee Holkar, he was desirous of influencing the disposal of the succession of that chief, in such a manner as to forward his own political objects. In pursuance of these views, he murdered Mulhar Rao, the son of Tuckojee Holkar, at Poonah. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, the natural son of Tuckojee Holkar, fled upon that occasion, and after a variety of adventures in the territories of the Nizam, and of the Rajah of Berar, he first joined the Bhyes, and then plundered them. He afterwards, in the year 1800, attacked and defeated a detachment of Scindiah's army at Ougein.

These events obliged Scindiah to quit Poonah towards the end of that year. He defeated Holkar in a pitched battle, fought at Indore; and in 1801 and 1802 drove him out of Malwa into the Deccan. Holkar then attacked the Peshwah, and having a large body of troops, he defeated the army of the Peshwah, joined by a detachment of Scindiah's troops, at Poonah, in the month of October, 1802. The Peshwah fled, and took refuge under the Company's protection at Bassein, having, previous to the battle of Poonah, signed an agreement which contained all the principal objects of the treaty of Bassein.

In this crisis, all the Marhatta powers pressed the Governor General to interfere in their affairs. Scindiah repeatedly urged the Governor General to settle the Peshwah's affairs, and begged that his Highness and himself might enjoy the benefit of the Company's friendship. I believe it might be proved, that Scindiah was fully informed of every point in the negotiation of the treaty of Bassein. His vakeel, Ballojee Koonger, was the Peshwah's dewan at the time, and he knew every thing.

Holkar's declared intention, and apparent object, was to establish a new government at Poonah, under one of the sons of Amrut Rao, as Peshwah. The government at Poonah would, under this arrangement, have been administered in its military branch by Holkar, and in its civil by Amrut Rao. These persons both repeatedly requested the Company's countenance for themselves; and, in fact, the arrangement failed, because Amrut Rao saw that the British Government was determined to oppose it, and to support Bajee Rao. At all events, Holkar and Amrut Rao requested the Company's mediation in the disputes with the Peshwah, and urged the Governor General to interfere to settle the affairs at Poonah.

Although it cannot be asserted that the Peshwah is a powerful prince, there is a large party in the empire attached to his person, all of whom were anxious in the expression of their wishes that the British government should interfere in his affairs. The Peshwah's right to the musnud is universally acknowledged, although his authority is, from circumstances, imperfect, and his orders but ill obeyed; and his cause, supported by the British government, was certainly popular in the southern parts of the empire.

The southern chiefs, who are naturally the principal support of the government of Poonah, had not submitted to Holkar. They were in arms, waiting for the arrival of the British troops, as the instruments of the interference of the British government in the Peshwah's affairs; and they joined the British army when it arrived in their neighbourhood. There was no probability that Holkar would make any serious opposition to the

march of the Company's troops to Poonah. He had not made his peace with Seindiah; indeed, neither party thought of it; and he would have opposed himself singly, in an unpopular cause, to all the great powers in India.

Under all these circumstances, and allowing for the treachery of the Marhatta character, there was every reason to believe, that the close of the year 1802 was the most favorable period that had ever occurred, or that could occur, for the admission of the Peshwah as a party to the defensive alliance without a war.

I have already stated my reasons for thinking that this measure was the only one that could be devised, in order to avoid the war which sooner or later must have occurred with all the Marhatta powers, in the support and defence of the Nizam; and the author of the 'Observations' has pointed out with great truth and accuracy the sentiments of the Court of Directors, and of the Government at home, on the subject of the admission of the Peshwah to the defensive alliance.

It is true, that the Court of Directors do not appear to have had a very distinct knowledge of the objects of the defensive alliance; and, like the author of the 'Observations,' supposed that it was founded upon the triple alliance of 1790, to defend the allies against Tippoo, who was no more. However, whatever may have been the reasons of the approbation of the Court of Directors, and of the authorities at home, they approved the measure, and ordered the Governor General, according to the author of the 'Observations,' to carry it into execution. Surely it will not be denied, that if the Governor General had passed over the opportunity which offered at the end of the year 1802, he would have been guilty of the most flagrant disobedience of orders and dereliction of his own principles and measures, repeatedly reviewed by himself, and by the first authorities in India and in England. If the Governor General had omitted to take advantage of the opportunity which presented itself at the close of the year 1802, I think the most probable result would have been a war with the Poonah state, under the government of Holkar and Amrut Rao; and it is not improbable but that the war might have extended to the whole of the Marhatta states.

The British government might, on this plan of proceeding, have collected their armies, and have remained upon the frontier to watch the course of the proceedings, as recommended by the author of the 'Observations;' or they might have passed over, as unworthy of notice, every thing that was doing at Poonah, and have delayed to take any steps, till the moment at which they or their allies should be attacked.

I cannot exactly discern the object in assembling the army upon the frontier, if it was to do nothing. The most expensive article in India is an army in the field, and the most useless is one destined to act upon the defensive. An army, in a state of preparation to act offensively when opportunity shall offer, is indeed useful; and I believe no army ever seized so favorable an opportunity as that which marched to Poonah in March and April, 1803. But the author of the 'Observations' says that we ought to have concerted our arrangements with Seindiah; that we ought to have offered a disinterested mediation and to have acted in



concert with Scindiah at one time, and at another with the Rajah of Berar.

I have already shown, and the author of the 'Observations' acknowledges, that the British government were encouraged, nay, strongly urged, by all the principal Marhatta powers, and among others by Holkar himself, to interfere in the settlement of the Peshwah's affairs.

In respect to a concert, the author of the 'Observations' forgets the difficulty and length of every communication to be made with the chief who was to be party to the concert. Supposing that it had been possible to bring Scindiah into our measures, the direct object of which was to take the Nizam out of his reach and to deprive him of all objects of ambition in the Deccan, it would still have taken six months before the Commander in Chief of the army could receive the orders of the Governor General to advance to Poonah, even if the diplomatic agent, charged with the negotiations with Scindiah, should have had occasion to make only two references to the Governor General.

But in this case, the objects of the British government, of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, would have been entirely different. That of the British government would have been to restore the Peshwah to the exercise of his authority, independently of any of the feudatory Marhatta chiefs, in order that his Highness might perform his treaty with the Company in favor of the Nizam: that of Scindiah would have been to restore the government to the Peshwah, in order that he might usurp and exercise its authority, and revive the old claims and objects of ambition in the Deccan: and, as far as it is possible to form a judgment of the course of politics of any Marhatta, the Rajah of Berar favored Holkar's usurpation at Poonah, and the establishment of the new government to be founded upon it.

Supposing that it had been possible, by placing the treaty of Bassein on a broader basis, as proposed by the author of the 'Observations,' to induce Scindiah to agree to its only important stipulation, viz., that of the mediation and arbitration of the Marhatta claims, in the Peshwah's name, upon the Nizam, it would have become a question of considerable importance to the British government to decide, whether that chief should be allowed to resume his situation at Poonah, and to usurp all the power and authority of the Peshwah's government.

It must be recollected that Scindiah's usurpation of his power must have been preceded by the defeat of Holkar's army in the Deccan. Scindiah's power was already established in the whole of Hindustan and Malwa. The reduction of Holkar's force, and the re-establishment at Poonah of Scindiah's power, would then have replaced Marhatta affairs in the situation in which they had been since the death of Madhoo Rao Narain, from which they had been relieved by a variety of unforeseen events. One powerful Marhatta Chief, with a French force as his principal support, would have possessed all the territory, influence, or power, from the sources of the Ganges to the Toombuddra; the situation of affairs which all Indian politicians have deprecated, since the British nation have had any thing to do with Indian politics.

It is therefore very probable, that the British government and Scindiah

would not have agreed in a detailed concert for the settle Peshwah's government, and it is certain that they would not have agreed with the Rajah of Berar.

In this diversity of opinions and objects, the negotiations would have been protracted possibly more than a year. In all military operations, but particularly in India, time is every thing; and I am decidedly of opinion, that if we had not seized the opportunity which was taken, the march to Poonah would never have been effected.

If the British government had hesitated in the measures which it should have adopted, Amrut Rao would have consented to the arrangement proposed for his son. This boy would have been placed upon the musnud with the title of Peshwah. The southern chiefs would soon have submitted to Holkar. Although immediately belonging to the Peshwah, they are generally connected with Amrut Rao, and that party in the state which favors his pretensions: and Holkar had already detached troops, and adopted other measures to reduce them; and he would have extended his authority to the frontiers of Mysore.

We should then have seen at Poonah the Peshwah's government administered by the ablest Marhatta in the civil affairs of the empire, and served by a most formidable army, commanded by the most enterprising chief. This army, however, would have had no means of support, for the revenues of the Peshwah's country are already assigned to the jaghiredars and chiefs in the southern districts, who, if they had not been certain of British assistance, would have submitted to Holkar, and would have joined his army with their troops. Holkar would have been under the necessity of keeping his army together, and after the southern chiefs would have submitted, he must have attacked the Nizam or the Company in order to support his troops.

It was well known that when Holkar was at Poonah, he was collecting documents to enforce the pretended claims of the Poonah stato upon the Nizam; and that every discontented pretender of every description from the territories of the Company, or the Company's allies, was received with distinction, and encouraged to hope for the assistance of Holkar's armies, in enforcing his pretensions to portions of those territories.

While the British government would have been wasting its time and resources, according to the plan of the author of the 'Observations,' with an army upon the frontier, and in a vain attempt to frame a concert with Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, Holkar would have attained the greatest degree of strength.

We have seen that the Rajah of Berar favored Holkar's usurpation at Poonah. Scindiah certainly was adverse to it; but I doubt much whether Scindiah could have done anything against Holkar. Scindiah certainly would have done nothing without bringing his brigades to Poonah. The country had been already destroyed in a great measure by Holkar, and the destruction would have been completed if Scindiah had attempted to move. It may be said that he moved his brigades afterwards into the Deccan, for the purpose of opposing the British government, and that he might equally have moved them to Poonah, to destroy the power esta-

blished by Holkar's usurpation. But in answer, I observe, that an operation of this description is very different when opposed by British troops, and when opposed by such an army as Holkar's. The former do not, and indeed have not the means, of destroying the country. To destroy the country is the only mode of warfare of the latter, and it is certain that this mode would have been adopted by Holkar to prevent Scindiah from entering the Deccan.

If it be true, as I have supposed, that the concert preferred by the author of the 'Observations' could not have been formed; if the Rajah of Berar favored Holkar's usurpation at Poonah, and if Scindiah could not have advanced his troops into the Deccan, it is my opinion that the result of the negotiations would have been a combination of all the Marhatta states to attack the Company and the Nizam.

In the negotiations for the proposed concert, the British Government must have kept aloof from the new government at Poonah. Neither our principles, nor our practice, permit us to encourage, by marks of favor or kindness, an usurpation, while we are negotiating with other powers the means of destroying it. But in this instance the state of our negotiations must have been known to those against whom they were to be directed. There is no secret in a Marhatta durbar, and it may be depended upon that this secret, above all others, would have transpired. Then would have commenced a counterplot, conducted by certainly the ablest Marhatta in the empire, I mean Amrut Rao.

In considering a question of this kind, respecting the remote consequences of any particular line of policy which never was adopted, it is not possible to do more than to state the general principles and opinions of the parties concerned, their conduct upon other occasions, and to draw from those premises a conclusion respecting their conduct in the supposed case.

There can be no doubt whatever that the great object of every Marhatta statesman has been to combine their force to attack the British government; and if they had ever been free from disputes among themselves, they would have carried that plan into execution. The person whom I believe, of all the Marhattas, to have been the most determined enemy to the British government, and who was the soul of this plan, was the Rajah of Berar. This person would have been the centre of the negotiations for the concert, supposing that the Governor General had adopted the plan of the author of the 'Observations;' and, on the other hand, he would have been the instrument of Amrut Rao's counterplot to support his own usurped authority.

We have seen the Rajah of Berar, under circumstances very unfavorable, negotiate a peace between Scindiah and Holkar, for the purposes of a combination against the Company. The question is, whether, supposing the British government had not brought back the Peshwah to Poonah, and had followed the plan of the author of the 'Observations,' he would not have had in his hands materials which would have enabled him to effect that pacification with greater ease than he effected that under which the combination was formed in the summer of 1803.

The loss which Scindiah sustained by the subversion of the Peshwah's government was power and influence. He lost no territory in conse-

quence of Holkar's victories. Those which he had in the Deccan remained with him till he went to war with the Company.

On the other hand, Holkar had claims to the possession of his family in Malwa, and to certain portions of territories which Madhaje Scindiah had conquered in Hindustan. In the pacification, which was effected through the mediation of the Rajah of Berar in the summer of 1803, with a view to the combination against the Company, all these territories and claims were ceded by Scindiah to Holkar.

We have already seen that Scindiah, singly, would have found himself unable to do any thing against Holkar in the Deccan; and, on the other hand, the British government, according to the plan of the author of the 'Observations,' would have done nothing excepting in concert with Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar. We have seen that Scindiah's object in restoring the Peshwah's government would have been again to usurp its authority, and to assert its claims, and revive the old plans of ambition in the Deccan. Our's would have been to make the Peshwah so independent of all the Marhatta powers, as that he would have been able to perform his treaty with the Company in favor of the Nizam; that of the Rajah of Berar would have been to establish and support the new government formed by Holkar's and Amrut Rao's usurpation. These discordant views were to be reconciled by negotiation, before the British government could have taken any step to overcome Holkar; and these negotiations must have been attended by all the tediousness which is the usual consequence of references to Calcutta.

Amrut Rao and the Rajah of Berar would, in the mean time, have endeavored to bring about a peace on the basis of Holkar's cession of his territories and claims in Malwa, &c., of Scindiah's acknowledgment of the new Peshwah, and the state of affairs established at Poonah; and of a combination of the whole Marhatta nation to enforce their claims upon the Nizam, the Nabob Vizier, and the Company.

We have seen that the negotiations for the concert with Scindiah would have turned upon the degree of power which Scindiah was to have at Poonah, after the Peshwah's government should be restored. The object of the British government would have been that the Peshwah should be independent; that of Scindiah to have the whole power of the state in his hands, and he would have been aware that the British government would never consent to that arrangement.

In this state of affairs he would have had to choose whether he would co-operate with the British government in restoring the Peshwah's government, in rendering it independent of himself, and in removing all its vexatious claims upon the Nizam; or whether he would leave the power at Poonah in the hands of Holkar and Amrut Rao, keeping peaceable possession of what he had in Malwa, Hindustan, and the Deccan. In either case the power at Poonah would have been lost to him; and he would have derived no advantage from the arrangement with the British government, excepting the gratification of his enmity against Holkar. On the other hand, by the pacification with Holkar, and the combination with the British government, he would have adopted a favorite and popular plan among the Marhattas, in the execution of which he would have

played the principal part; and if it had been successful, he would have been the greatest gainer.

I have no doubt respecting the choice which Scindiah would have made; and I declare that I conceive that peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and a combination upon the basis supposed, would have included more interests, and would have been more practicable, than that which was formed in the summer of 1803.

If the British government had remained warned, and a tacit spectator of events in the Marhatta Empire, the result would probably have been the same. Holkar would certainly have been obliged to spread his armies into the Nizam's country for subsistence, and we must eventually have been at war. But as we should not have been actively employed in negotiations for a concert against the new government at Poonah, it is possible that Amrut Rao might not have thought it necessary to commence his administration by combining all the Marhattas against us. Nothing, however, would have been able to destroy the new government; and whenever the peace between Scindiah and Holkar should have been effected, the British government and its allies would have been attacked.

In the consideration of this part of the question, I have omitted purposely to introduce any reference to the French. It must not, however, be forgotten, that at the time the Governor General decided on the part which he would take in the Marhatta affairs at the end of the year 1802, he had every reason to expect the arrival of the French in India; and I leave those who shall peruse this Memorandum to judge, how much this event would have increased the difficulties of a protracted and complicated negotiation, against which one of the parties would have been plotting with Amrut Rao and Holkar.

I may, therefore, conclude that the treaty of Bassein, and the measures adopted in consequence of it, not only afforded the best prospect of preserving the peace of India, but that to have adopted any other measures would have rendered war with Holkar nearly certain, and war with the whole Marhatta nation more probable than it could have been under any other course of events.

Having now considered the general policy of admitting the Peshwah as a party to the treaty of general defensive alliance, and the policy of concluding the treaty of Bassein at the time at which it was concluded, and of the measures which were adopted in consequence of that treaty, I come to consider the particular articles of that treaty, to which the author of the 'Observations' objects, and the nature of his objections to them.

I have already pointed out that the object of the Company in concluding any arrangement with the Peshwah, was to secure the Nizam against the vexatious claims which might be made upon him, either by the Peshwah or by one of the great chiefs acting in his name, and under the authority of the government at Poonah. It is obvious that the Company's object could not have been gained, unless the Peshwah should agree, either to give up entirely the claims upon the Nizam, or to admit the mediation and arbitration of the Company in deciding on the justice of those claims.

To have insisted on the Peshwah relinquishing his claims entirely

would have been an unjust and arbitrary proceeding, which would probably have occasioned the loss of the whole treaty. The only mode, therefore, which remained, was to insist upon establishing the mediation and arbitration of the Company, as the mode of deciding all questions of disputes and claims between the two powers.

The Company were bound to the Nizam to settle the questions and claims existing on the part of the Peshwah or his Highness' government. It does not appear practicable for the Company to be bound in a defensive alliance with both governments without stipulating to arbitrate their disputes; and this will appear more clearly, when the events are recollected which have occurred since the year 1792.

In respect to the article by which it is required that a body of troops should be stationed within the territories of the Peshwah, this will appear the more necessary, when the situation of the Peshwah's government, in relation to the other great Marhatta powers, is considered. The object of these powers, as stated by the author of the 'Observations,' was to get possession of the Peshwah's government at Poonah. The attainment of this object, it is very evident, must have defeated the great view which the British government must have had in admitting the Peshwah at all to become a party to the general defensive alliance.

As soon as Seindiah, or Holkar, should have established themselves at Poonah, they would immediately have revived the old claims upon the Nizam: and the Peshwah without power would have been unable to execute his own treaty. The question then upon this part of the subject comes to be, whether the Peshwah is more likely to be able to maintain his independence, in relation to the other great chiefs of the Empire, by having the troops stationed in his territory, or by having the force subdivided by himself stationed in the territories of the Company. Upon this point I have to observe, that in order to defend the Peshwah against the attempts of either of those chiefs, to establish an influence at his durbar by means of an armed force, it would be necessary to bring the troops from a great distance, and they would have to arrive and operate in a country in which no magazines or establishments would have been formed for them.

I can have no doubt respecting the expediency, as a military question, of establishing the subsidiary force within the Peshwah's territories. As a political question, I consider that, inasmuch as the subsidiary troops, being on the spot, would provide a force ready at all times to support the Peshwah's power, to have them in that situation would be more likely to prevent attempts to influence his durbar, by force of arms, which must occasion war, than to station them in the Company's territories.

In respect to the notion of the author of the 'Observations,' that by extending the basis of the treaty of Bassein, it might be hoped to include some of the other great Marhatta powers, I have to observe, that the object is to make the Peshwah powerful in his own government, so that he may be able to keep his treaty with us.

I have already shown that there was no ground for hope that any of the great chiefs would consent to any arrangement which would place the power at Poonah out of their reach; and nothing short of such an arrange-

ment would answer our purpose. It would not be desirable that any of them should become parties to the defensive alliance, if the great object of our policy should be defeated by that measure.

In this view of the question, it is scarcely necessary to advert to the assertion of the author of the 'Observations,' that a subsidiary alliance such as that formed in 1768 with the Nizam is most applicable to the situation of the Peshwah and his territories. The independence of the Peshwah's power is our object; and that we must effect by whatever means we may have in our power; but if it were necessary to the argument, I could point out that the Peshwah is a power much nearer to us, and who touches us upon many more important parts than the Nizam does.

When considering this objection to the 4th article of the treaty of Bassein, it is necessary that I should advert to the objection of the author of the 'Observations,' that, by placing the troops in the territories of the Peshwah, it is necessary to increase the number of European troops in India; and that Great Britain cannot afford to supply the number of European troops required for the service in India. The 4th article does not specify that European troops shall be stationed in the Peshwah's territories; and, therefore, the objection does not apply to the treaty of Bassein. It is perfectly true that in the important services in which the Company's troops may be engaged, on the part of the Peshwah, European troops may be necessary: but as those services must equally have been performed, if the troops had been stationed in the Company's territories, European troops would equally be necessary. But the author of the 'Observations' has not supposed that an increase of European troops would be required on the ground, that their services might be necessary in the Peshwah's territories; but on a general calculation of certain proportions of European to Native troops in India in general.

In the 1st place, the increase of European troops would be necessary on this ground also, whether the subsidiary force were or were not stationed in the territories of the Peshwah; the Native army must still have been increased (unless, indeed, it should be proposed to take the Peshwah's subsidy, and not furnish him with any troops), and the number of European troops must likewise have been increased, in order to keep up the due proportion. But in the 2nd place, this calculation of proportions of European to Native troops is entirely erroneous, and does not exist in the mind of any man who has ever conducted or considered the details of any service in India. If the proportion does exist, on what calculation is it founded? In what part of India is it practically carried into execution?

In almost all services in India, it is necessary certainly that there should be some European troops; but the number, in proportion to the Native troops employed on the same services, must vary according to the nature of the service required, and the description of the enemy against whom it is directed. For instance, in the wars against Tippoo Sultan, the proportions of European to Native troops were about one third in the first, and one fourth in the second. In the late war against the Marhattas, the number of Europeans employed in proportion to Natives was not more than one tenth or one eleventh.

I certainly agree with the idea of the author of the 'Observations' so far, that a body of 8000 or 10,000 Native troops ought never to be assembled without some Europeans, for very obvious reasons; but as there are few such collections of troops in India, I should conceive that I founded my calculations upon erroneous principles, and deceived those to whom I should communicate them, if I should, upon this opinion, state that the European troops ought to be in the proportion of one eighth or one tenth to the Native troops throughout the Indian establishment. Thousands of Native troops must necessarily be employed in garrisons in the interior, and on various duties, in which it would be very inconvenient to employ Europeans; and, on the other hand, Europeans are absolutely necessary in certain garrisons, stations, and services, in some cases, in equal proportions: in others, one third of the number of Natives.

The only safe mode, therefore, of forming an opinion respecting the number of European troops required in India, is to call for and examine details: and if this mode should be adopted, it will be found that the treaty of Bassein does not add, and does not render it necessary to add, one European infantry soldier to the establishments in India. In respect to the increase of the European troops in India in general, it is my opinion that it will be found that they are not more numerous at this moment than they were in 1790, 1791, and 1792. According to the detailed distributions which I have seen, the number of regiments of European infantry, now required for the continent of India, is 20, including those of the Company's regiments: viz., 6 for Bengal; 10 for Madras, including one for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad; and 4 for Bombay, including one for Goa. This is the peace establishment. In the years 1790, 1791, and 1792, there were of King's infantry in India 9 regiments, 2 regiments of Hanoverians, 6 Company's regiments in Bengal, 4 at Madras, and 2 at Bombay; making altogether 23 regiments. The artillery at the different Presidencies were nearly of the same strength with the artillery at present. At all events, if an increase of European troops is necessary, which in my opinion it is not beyond 20 regiments complete, of 1000 rank and file, the necessity of this increase must not be attributed to the treaty of Bassein.

In respect to the proposal that the treaty of Bassein should be altered in this article, viz., that the troops should be removed from the Peshwah's territories, I have reason to know that his Highness would be exceedingly alarmed, if the proposal were made to him, and that it is more than probable he would move with the troops.

I have now to consider the objections of the author of the 'Observations' to the 12th and 17th articles of the treaty of Bassein; by the first of which the Peshwah is bound to abide by the Company's mediation and arbitration in all cases; and by the last, not to commence any negotiation, without giving previous notice to the Company's government.

In order to understand clearly the object of these articles, it is necessary to consider the nature and constitution of the contracting parties, to examine their political objects and systems, to see by what rules or systems of policy they are respectively bound, and in what manner affected by their respective connexions with other sovereign authorities.



European governments were, till very lately, guided by certain rules and systems of policy, so accurately defined and generally known, that it was scarcely possible to suppose a political event, in which the interest and conduct of each state would not be as well known to the *corps diplomatique* in general, as to the statesmen of each particular state. The Asiatic governments do not acknowledge and hardly know of such rules and systems. Their governments are arbitrary, the objects of their policy are always shifting; they have no regular established system, the effect of which is to protect the weak against the strong: on the contrary, the object of each of them separately, and of all of them taken collectively, is to destroy the weak; and if by chance they should, by a sense of common danger, be induced for a season to combine their efforts for their mutual defence, the combination lasts only so long as it is attended with success, the first reverse dissolves it; and, at all events, it is dissolved long before the danger ceases, the apprehension of which originally caused it.

There cannot be a stronger proof of this defect of policy in the Asiatic governments than the dissolution of the combination of the year 1790, between the English, the Marhattas, and the Nizam, by the attack of the Marhattas upon the Nizam in the year 1795.

These observations apply to the government of the Marhattas, more than to any other of the Asiatic governments. Their schemes and systems of policy are the wildest of any. They undertake expeditions, not only without viewing their remote consequences upon other states, or upon their own, but without considering more than the chance of success of the immediate expedition in contemplation.

The Company's government in India, the other contracting party to their alliance, is one bound by all the rules and systems of European policy. The Company's power in India is supposed to depend much upon its reputation: and although I do not admit that it depends upon its reputation, as distinguished from its real force, as appears to be contended by some, I may say that it is particularly desirable for a government, so constituted as the Company's, never to enter upon any particular object, the probable result of which should not be greatly in favor of success.

Besides this, the Company's government in India is bound by acts of parliament not to undertake wars of aggression, not to make any but defensive alliances, and those only in cases in which the other contracting party shall bind itself to defend the possessions of the Company actually threatened with hostilities.

The Company's government in India are also connected with His Majesty's government, and, as an Asiatic power, are liable to be involved in wars with European powers possessing territories in India, whenever His Majesty shall be at war with those powers.

The picture above drawn of the state of politics among Asiatic powers, proves that no permanent system can be adopted, which will preserve the weak against the strong, and will keep all for any length of time in their relative situations, and the whole in peace; excepting there should be one power which, either by the superiority of its strength, its military system, or its resources, shall preponderate and be able to protect all. ~~This is~~

proved by the last 14 years. The Company has been the preponderating power : and, by the 2nd article of the treaty of Bassein, has, in so many words, taken the Peshwah under its protection.

I might contend that the stipulations of the 12th and 17th articles are only consequences of the protection promised and really afforded. But in my opinion, these stipulations are the necessary consequence of the alliance between a power such as the Peshwah's, and one such as the Company's ; bound by rules of policy, acts of parliament, and by the acts of His Majesty's government.

It would be impossible to define the various claims and grounds for war, existing not only between the Peshwah and the Nizam, but between the Peshwah and all the other powers of India.

The Marhattas claim the Choute of all India, and all the claims of this description centre in the Peshwah's authority. Besides this general claim, there are others of various descriptions and denominations upon every power, of all of which there are records at Poonah ; and it is a mistake to suppose that the Peshwah, however weak in point of troops and resources, will not find persons in the Marhatta Empire ready and willing to enforce these claims in his name.

All the warfare which would be the consequence of bringing forward these claims, will be prevented by the stipulation that the Company should mediate and arbitrate in every case.

But the author of the 'Observations' says, that the benefit to be derived from the 12th article ought to have been left to the operation of the British influence in the Peshwah's councils, and ought not to have been the subject of a treaty.

To this objection to the article in question, the best answer is to state the fact : viz., that notwithstanding the right which we have acquired by treaty to mediate between the Peshwah and other powers, and the influence which we have in his councils by that stipulation, and a variety of events which have occurred since the treaty of Bassein was concluded, it is not so easy as the author of the 'Observations' imagines, at all times to prevent the evils which must result from the Peshwah enforcing his claims.

The author of the 'Observations' says, that if the Peshwah should, contrary to our advice and opinion, commence an unjust war, he ought not to be supported by the British government. This is perfectly true : but the object of the 12th article is to prevent the possibility of unjust wars, and to preserve the Peshwah's government from the destruction which must be the consequence of his entering into any war without the Company's assistance. This article is the bond of peace to India. It is this which renders the treaty really defensive, and makes the Governor General responsible for every war in which the British government may be engaged. If this article were not in the treaty, the Peshwah would be the responsible person.

If the general mediation on the part of the Company be necessary to insure peace, there is certainly no occasion that the Peshwah should be in communication with other independent powers. All his foreign affairs must be transacted and ultimately settled by the Company, and any other communication must be intended only for sinister purposes.

tories would appear, therefore, to be the first object for the attention of the government of Bombay.

4. The subsidiary force is to consist of 6 battalions, each consisting of 1000 rank and file; one company of artillery; and one company, or 100 pioneers, with their proper complement of ordnance and warlike stores.

5. After the 1st batt. 7th regt. shall have arrived at Poonah, the number of troops to be furnished will be 5 battalions, or 5000 men. And the artillery at present at Poonah, being 91 R. and F., to be completed to one company, and the Madras pioneers to be relieved by others belonging to the government of Bombay.

6. Gen. Stuart will let Mr. Duncan know at what period he will be able to have the Coast troops in Malabar or Canara, and at Goa; and what corps and what stations will be first relieved; and Mr. Duncan will be able to send vessels for them according to the intelligence which he shall receive on this subject from Gen. Stuart.

7. After the arrival of the corps at Bombay, the first thing to be done will be from the number of men that shall arrive, to complete as many battalions as possible with disciplined men.

8. The battalions on the coast of Malabar have only lately been completed with men; they were all weak before they received the last levies; and as there are no arms upon the coast, it is not very probable that much progress will have been made in the discipline of the recruits. I earnestly deprecate the sending into the Peshwah's territories more than 100 men in each battalion, who shall not be thoroughly trained as soldiers. It is to be expected that this corps will be immediately and constantly employed; to compose it of recruits may have the worst effects in respect to the national interests and reputation; besides the disgrace and inconvenience of the desertion of a large body of men, which will be the certain consequence of not composing the battalions which will serve the Peshwah almost entirely of old soldiers.

9. It will be necessary, therefore, in the first instance, to draft the old soldiers from one of the battalions which will first come up, to complete the others; and to place all the recruits of all the battalions, in the battalion from which the drafts will be taken.

10. The next subject for consideration is the equipment of the corps for the field. The commanding officers of Native corps on the establishment of Fort St. George carry the camp equipage and regimental stores for their corps; an arrangement which is certainly convenient for the service, and, as far as I am able to judge, economical. However, it is one which could not be introduced into the establishment of the government of Bombay, without reference to the Court of Directors. It will therefore be necessary to continue the present mode of carrying the camp equipage at the expense of the public; but I recommend that the tents should be carried upon camels instead of upon bullocks. This arrangement will be an economical one eventually, and will be attended by other advantages. A camel will carry 3 of the tents used by the Bombay army, with their poles, with great facility.

11. In respect to the camp equipage for the officers, I recommend that they should be obliged to show at muster their tents, and the carriage

and attendants for them once a month. If this regulation should be made, the government ought to regulate the size and description of tents which the officers of each rank ought to have, and the carriage and attendants for them.

12. The corps on the Bombay establishment are particularly deficient in regimental establishments to supply the troops with water. During the late war, the bullocks which carried water for the 78th regt. were supplied by the public departments; and the number expended for this service, for want of the care of the watermen and bullock-drivers, is beyond all calculation; and the 78th was ill supplied with water after all. It would be a much better arrangement to give the adjutants of corps an allowance of 26 rupees *per mensem*, to supply 2 puckalie men and 2 bullocks with bags, for each company; the watermen, bullocks, bags, &c., to be mustered once a month, at the same time with the corps; and the bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps, and the letter W, to distinguish them from all others.\*

13. There is another establishment also much wanted with the corps of the Bombay army; and that is, one of bullocks to carry spare ammunition and intrenching tools, &c., of which I enclose a list which the corps ought always to have with it. It would be proper to give an allowance of — *per mensem* to the adjutants, or any subaltern officer of corps, to provide bullocks and drivers for this service. These bullocks to be marked with the number of the corps, and the letter A; and to be mustered with their drivers once a month with the corps.

14. In respect to carriage for the sick, I am fully aware of the difficulties under which the government of Bombay must always labor in this part of their equipments: I would therefore recommend that the establishment of doolies, with each Native corps, should be only 4; but that waggons should be made at Bombay to carry 20 men of each corps, besides those for whom doolies will be provided. Gen. Bellasis will be able to make a pattern waggon: if it could be done with convenience and without great expense, the waggons ought to be upon springs, and at all events covered from the weather. Their wheels and axletrees ought to be strong, and they ought to have a greater capacity of turning than the waggons which Gen. Bellasis lately sent to Poonah. It is not a matter of much consequence what number of men each waggon is made to contain, although possibly 6 men would be the most convenient number.

15. The Governor General will probably send his orders hereafter, regarding the commanding officer and the staff of the subsidiary force; in the mean time, it is desirable that the whole should be left as they are. The establishments for each department, of which I enclose a statement, are formed upon the model of the establishments for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and they appear to me to be necessary. When the Bombay Native infantry shall form the subsidiary force, it will be necessary

\* Upon reference to the regulations of the government of Bombay, I observe, that when a corps takes the field, a bullock is allowed to the puckalie for each company; for which he is paid 4 rupees *per mensem*. Is that pay the hire of the bullock, or in what light is it considered? I always considered that the hire of a bullock at Bombay was 12 rupees; and I know that the puckalies of the 78th regt. had the use of the public bullocks. A. W.

to add an establishment of armourers to the department of Commissary of stores; as those corps have no battalion armourers, and the repairs of their arms are always performed in the public stores.

16. Gen. Stuart will possibly leave it optional with Mr. Duncan, to retain or to send down to the Carnatic the ordnance now with the Madras corps, when they shall be relieved. If he should leave the ordnance, the whole will require new carriages; and it will be easy to get, from the commanding officer of artillery, the dimensions of the guns, in order that new carriages may be made. I recommend that their wheels and axletrees should be of great strength and solidity. In case Gen. Stuart should not find it convenient to leave at Poonah the ordnance at present there, the ordnance which should be in the Peshwah's territories, for the service of the subsidiary force, are, 2 iron 18 pounders; 2 iron 12 pounders; 2 brass 12 pounders; 18 brass 6 pounders; 2 brass  $5\frac{1}{2}$  inch howitzers; with their proportion of tumbrils; and 5 spare tumbrils for stores; 30 platform carts, and an artificer's cart, and 11 arrack carts.

17. The Commissary of stores at Poonah has a general state of stores, which he ought to carry (exclusively of the stores for the heavy guns, which can be but seldom required, and must be the subject of a distinct arrangement when required), and there will be required 1000 bullocks, including their complement of spare cattle, of one to every 6 bullocks.

18. The bullocks which the Commissary of stores has at present are hired cattle, on the principle of the Madras establishment. It is not very probable that the owners and masters of the cattle will remain at Poonah, when the troops belonging to Fort St. George shall be withdrawn. Indeed, I know that some of them, and indeed all those in the store department, have determined to come away with the troops; and I have already given it as my opinion, that they cannot be replaced in the Peshwah's territories or at Bombay.

19. But supposing that they could be replaced, or that they would stay, it is notorious that the worst mode of procuring bullocks for the public service, is to hire them; and the best is to have an establishment of bullocks and drivers, the property and in the service of the public; provided the persons composing it really know, or are taught, and are forced to perform their duty.

20. I am therefore induced, by every consideration, to recommend that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay, to the extent at least that will be necessary to carry the stores for the subsidiary force. I shall consider hereafter the propriety of extending still further that establishment, and of forming one also of draught cattle.

21. If the establishment should be formed, it should be in regular karkhanas, according to the system recommended in my letter to the Sec. of Gov. of the 4th Nov. 1803. The drivers entertained for these bullocks should be accustomed, at an early period, to bring in their forage. The bullocks of each karkhana should be picketed in a separate line. They should receive their grain at the same time, and in the presence of the officer who will have the temporary charge of the department at Bombay. This officer ought also to see the forage which the drivers bring in for the cattle; and that the bullocks are rubbed down and cleaned

every night. The drivers ought to be taught the mode of saddling, and of loading and driving cattle, and every thing which relates to the duty of a bullock driver. Unless those who have charge of the cattle understand these duties, the cattle are destroyed, and the public are obliged to incur the expense of replacing them.

22. I recommend that the troops of the subsidiary force should be fed, whenever they may be on active service, and when rice is not sold in the bazaar of the camp at 12 pucca seers (each of 2 lbs.) for a rupee, in the manner in which I fed the troops during the late war. They received their batta in money, and each man, besides, received half a seer, or a pound of grain.

As rice was seldom at so low a rate as 6 seers a rupee, the public gained by this arrangement, in the mere expense of the rice issued to the troops, the expense of half the carriage which would have been required to carry rice to last the troops for an equal length of time supposing that a seer of rice had been issued to each man instead of batta; and I had the further advantage of not over-burdening the army with cattle. I therefore strongly recommend this system.

23. The number of bullocks which I have attached to the grain department of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah is 5000, although there are none in the grain department with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

24. The reason for which I have departed from the model of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, in this instance, is, that there is a famine in the Deccan at present, the effects of which may be felt for some time; and I could not depend upon the Marhatta brinjarries in the same manner as I knew that the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam can upon those belonging to his Highness' territories. I have, however, lately suggested to Col. Close the expediency of giving the Marhatta brinjarries a trial, from which Mr. Duncan will be able to judge whether they can be depended upon.

25. At all events, whether they can or not, I conceive that the quantity of grain, for the carriage of which I have above provided, is far more than will be necessary upon any future occasion. In ordinary times, when the subsidiary force will not move, it is probable that no establishment of grain bullocks will be necessary; particularly if Col. Close should find that he can command the services of the Marhatta brinjarries upon the plan proposed, or upon any other plan. If he should not be able to command their services, a bullock establishment to carry rice, to feed the number of fighting men at the half allowance for 30 days, will be necessary. But as it is possible that the plan proposed in respect to the Marhatta brinjarries will answer, and as at all events, supposing it should not, it is probable that some of the Mysore and Madras bullock owners and maistries attached to the grain department may be prevailed upon to stay; I do not now propose that a bullock establishment should be formed at Bombay for the grain, as well as for the store department; although if it should be necessary to keep bullocks permanently to carry grain, in consequence of Col. Close's being unable to depend upon the brinjarries, it will be necessary hereafter to form such an establishment.

26. In that case they ought to be formed regularly at Bombay, in the manner recommended for those of the store department.

27. The number of European troops will be so small, that there will be no difficulty, at any time, in arranging for the carriage of their provisions.

28. The number of draught bullocks which I have allotted for the service of the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, as appears by the enclosed papers, is 1250; besides 100 belonging to Capt. Douglas's old department, which I placed by the orders of the 2nd June under the charge of Major Spens.

29. After making a liberal allowance for all the carriages to be drawn, and allowing the usual number of spare, this number is 350 more than the number of carriages will require.

30. However, the service in the Marhatta territories will require great celerity and independence of movement, and it cannot be performed unless the commanding officer has the command of good cattle in high condition to draw his carriages. He may be obliged to be in the field during the monsoon. It must be expected that some cattle will die in that season, and yet the military operations must be continued. Besides the ordnance and store carriages, for which provision has been and must be made, I have recommended that waggons should be constructed for the carriage of the sick; they may require 4 or 6 bullocks each, and will increase the demand from 100 to 120 bullocks.

31. It is therefore my opinion, that the number of draught bullocks with the subsidiary force ought not to be less than 1300.

32. I know that the Mysore people who attend the draught bullocks now with the subsidiary force, will not stay in the Peshwah's territories after the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George shall come away. Indeed it would be unreasonable to expect that they should stay. Their families reside near Seringapatam, and they can purchase food and all the necessaries of life in Mysore, at one sixth of the price at which the same articles can ever be procured at Poonah.

33. Supposing, therefore, that it should be convenient to the government of Fort St. George to hand over to the government of Bombay the bullocks now at Poonah, it would be necessary that the government of Bombay should entertain persons and form an establishment of servants to attend upon the cattle.

34. My letter to the Sec. of Gov. of the 4th Nov. 1803, communicated my opinion regarding the plan to be adopted to form a bullock establishment under the government of Bombay; and I proceed now to detail the mode in which I recommend that that plan should be carried into execution, in reference to an establishment of draught bullocks for the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah.

35. The number of karkhanas which will be required will be 13, to be numbered accordingly. In my opinion the best place at which to collect the drivers and other servants, and of training them to their business, will be the head quarters of the subsidiary force. There are already a certain number of Marhatta drivers in the Mysore karkhanas left at Poonah, which might be the foundation of the establishment.

36. I recommend that Mr. Duncan should correspond with Col. Close upon this subject, and that he should desire that Major Robertson may be instructed to form an establishment of servants and drivers for 13 karkhanas of draught bullocks. It is very probable that there may be at Bombay some old head bullock drivers, whose services Major Robertson might require at the head of the karkhanas to be formed; and if Col. Close should ask for them, they ought to be sent.

37. In this manner the establishment of servants and drivers may be formed upon the best model that we know of; and they will have the advantage of having trained cattle to attend to, and of seeing how the business is carried on. If the government of Fort St. George should require the cattle, they can be sent down with ease; and, as I observed in my letter of the 4th Nov. 1803, when drivers and attendants are formed and trained, there is never any difficulty in procuring cattle.

38. It will not be possible to hire in the Marhatta territories, or at Bombay, servants and drivers of bullocks at the same rate of wages as those receive who belong to the Company's establishments in Mysore. On the other hand, it is very desirable for the government, as well as for the officers of the army, that the wages of labor prevalent at Bombay should not be paid in the subsidiary force. I recommend, therefore, that Mr. Duncan should leave it to Col. Close and Major Robertson to settle the rate of the wages of the different descriptions of servants and drivers who are to form the establishment of draught bullocks, but he must take care to fix the wages of the drivers of the karkhanas of carriage bullocks for the store department, which must be formed at Bombay, at the same rate; otherwise it will be necessary to raise the wages of the attendants and drivers belonging to the draught karkhanas to the Bombay standard.

39. It will be impossible to form the carriage karkhanas in camp. There are no carriage bullocks in camp on that establishment, and there is no model; and as the camp will be moving, it will not be possible to train the servants and drivers so well as they can be trained at Bombay.

Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley relative to the state of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's government.

Fort William, 2nd Nov. 1804.

The late letters from the Resident at the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah show that the affairs of that Chief are in a very desperate state, and that but little, if any, assistance can be expected from him in the prosecution of hostilities against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, even if the Company's government should relieve his pecuniary distresses by such advances of money as it might be practicable to make at present.

Indeed it is probable, and as the large bodies of horse which Scindiah had undoubtedly in the last war are no longer to be found, I suspect that the majority of his followers have already joined the standard of Holkar. Measures are now in progress which must end in the destruction of Holkar's power, however constituted, whether Scindiah is enabled to join in the effectual prosecution of the war or not. But after Holkar's power shall be destroyed, and particularly if he should escape alive, it will be necessary to re-establish the authority of Scindiah's government in Malwa, or there will be no peace.



This must be done in 3 modes. 1st; By the assistance of a body of British troops. 2ndly; By advances of money, to enable Scindiah to collect about him again the old adherents of his family. 3rdly; By a public declaration from the British government that they are determined that Scindiah's authority should be re-established in Malwa; and that those Rajahs and others who had heretofore paid him tribute (excepting always those freed from tribute by the operation of the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum) should pay the arrears of tribute due, and all that might become due hereafter.

In respect to the 1st mode, the subsidiary force for Scindiah will answer the purpose as soon as Holkar's power shall be destroyed. It ought to be placed under the direction of the Resident at Scindiah's durbar, in the same manner as the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan are under the Residents at the durbar of those princes respectively.

In respect to the 2nd mode, the attention of the Resident ought to be called, as soon as possible, to endeavor to devise the mode of procuring the money for Scindiah's use. The Resident should be accurately informed of the object of government in making the advance, and should be allowed to use his discretion respecting the amount to be advanced. No money ought to be advanced after the government of Scindiah shall become settled in Malwa, or that he shall recover any of the arrears of tribute due by the Rajahwary. The Resident at Scindiah's durbar might see an opportunity of making an advance of money with advantage before Holkar should be defeated; and he ought to have a discretionary power to make such an advance. But the principal object of the advances to be made ought in my opinion to be to settle Scindiah's government, and to re-establish tranquillity in Malwa.

In respect to the 3rd mode, it is my opinion that nothing ought to be made public on the subject till the war with Holkar shall be concluded, that is to say, till Holkar's power shall be completely and really destroyed. It is very obvious that these Rajahs or their servants do not understand and are not aware of the benefits which they enjoy from their connexion with the Company. They suspect that government entertain some design which they have hitherto concealed; that hereafter their situation will not be better than it was under the Marhattas; and that they will have less chance than they had formerly of avoiding to pay their tribute.

The connexion between the petty states and the Company must strengthen their governments: but the servants of all these governments are interested in preventing the growth of their strength; as, the moment they become strong, the peculations, exactions, and tyranny of their servants must cease. There is always a profit to the servants of one of these governments in the irregular payments to a Marhatta chief, however injurious and distressing they may be to the governments themselves.

The connexion between the Company and these governments has therefore hitherto been an object of suspicion to the Rajahs themselves, and odious to their servants. On the other hand, it has answered none of the objects which were in view when it was formed. Holkar has passed through the territories of the only one of the principal Rajahs with whom

the Company is connected. He has not been opposed effectually; it is doubtful whether he has been opposed at all, or whether the Rajah of Jeypoor has not assisted him with money, &c. It does not appear, therefore, to be desirable to extend these alliances; and I doubt whether it would not be better for the Company to have nothing to do with any of these Rajahs. But whether the policy of forming the connexion was wise or otherwise, it appears that the Company have no right now to interfere to prevent Scindiah's government from collecting the tribute due to him from those Rajahs who have omitted to connect themselves with us. The object of any future treaty with the Rajahs not already connected with us, supposing such treaty to be advisable, can be only the tribute due to or claimed by Holkar: but Scindiah's tribute must be secured.

Indeed I doubt whether it would be proper to treat for the exemption of the payment of Holkar's tribute, after the promise made to Scindiah that he should have the whole of Holkar's possessions north of the Taptée. It would be desirable, however, to take no decided steps, and to avoid publishing any opinion on the subject until the war with Holkar shall be concluded. I have already shown that the Rajahs themselves are not aware of the benefits which they receive from their connexion with the Company, and do not feel confidence; and that their servants would prefer the former state of their master's government to that of independence in which they have been placed by their treaties with the Company.

But one of the instruments of confusion, the most powerful of the means which they have had of resisting the payment of the tribute, has been the collision between the houses of Holkar and Scindiah. This they would lose by the destruction of Holkar's power; and it is obvious that they would be interested in the support of it, and would probably take an active part in the war against us, if they were to learn that the result of that war was to be the immediate payment of their tribute, with all its arrears, to Scindiah's government.

The mode then to be pursued would appear to be, to apprise the Resident at Scindiah's durbar of the intention of government that Scindiah should collect the whole tribute from the Rajahs not already connected with us, as soon as the war with Holkar should be concluded, and to leave it to his discretion to inform Scindiah's ministers of this intention, or not, as he may think proper.

The advantage which Scindiah's government will derive from the right to collect the tribute from the Rajahwary will be, that he will have employment for an army, which the tributes will give them the means of paying. He will immediately appoint a sirdar to collect the tributes, which sirdar will gather a body of troops for that purpose; and then subsistence and employment will be given to a large number of the military class.

It is possible that the Company may be obliged to give Scindiah assistance to collect the tributes, and this point ought to be left to the discretion of the Resident. But he will see how desirable it is, for many reasons, that the Company's troops should not be involved in these hostilities, and that Scindiah should have no other assistance than the Com-

pany's name, and the public declaration of their intention that he should have the tribute.

While writing on this subject, I beg to suggest that, after the strength of Holkar's army shall be broken, either by a defeat or by a vigorous pursuit, a detachment of light troops may be appointed, under the command of Capt. Gardner, or any other active partisan, to pursue and get possession of Holkar's person. Besides the payment of the expenses of the detachment, Capt. Gardner ought to have a large reward if he should succeed. The nature and strength of the detachment to be employed on this service, and indeed the whole question, might be referred to the Commander in Chief; particularly whether it ought to have guns, or Company's troops, or a small body of regular cavalry with galloper guns.

As Scindiah's government is in such a state of weakness, it may be depended upon that, unless some measure of this description be adopted to get possession of Holkar's person, he will remain at large, tranquillity will never be established in Malwa, and the whole business will be renewed.

Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the Freebooter system in India.

Fort William, 2nd Nov. 1804.

The letters which have been already laid before the Governor General have apprised him of the extent and danger of the freebooter system in India, and of the causes of the evil. The remedy would appear to be to find some employment for the numerous military classes in India. It is not reasonable to expect that persons of that description will adopt habits of industry; and unless they have some military employment, they must remain a burthen upon the public. They will not enter into the Company's service, as the system of restraint necessary for our discipline and subordination is equally irksome to them with the habits of industry required for their subsistence in a civil capacity.

The only remedy therefore is to find for them employment, in the present system of India, of the same description which they have had heretofore; and of this remedy it may be said, that it will cure the evil by two modes. 1st; By giving employment to a number of persons, who must otherwise prey upon the public, as these persons will certainly render some service, particularly against troops of the same description with themselves. 2ndly; By giving strength to the governments in alliance with or depending upon the Company.

These governments are the Soubah of the Deccan, the Peshwah, Scindiah, the Guickwar state, the King. In respect to the Soubah of the Deccan, it is my opinion that, in consideration of the advantages which he gained by the last war, he ought to be required to support a body of silladar horse, which should be gradually increased to the full number he is required by treaty to furnish to co-operate with the Company's troops in war. He will naturally object to the measure, and will propose that, in order to carry it into execution, he may be assisted to confiscate jaghires, &c.

But it may be observed to him that a body of troops of this description,

which will strengthen his government so effectually, must prevent the disorders which have either really caused the diminution of his revenues, or have afforded to his aumils motives for withholding payment; that he will be able to curb his aumils and managers, and enforce the payment of the circar dues; and that, in fact, in a very short time, this body will pay its own expenses. At all events, the Soubah of the Deccan ought to be obliged to have some silladar horse supported by the state, and paid with regularity; and the number might be increased in proportion as the benefits of the measure could be felt.

The Peshwah cannot afford to keep any troops himself, but the measures already in progress under Mr. Strachey's charge will support a large body of troops of this description in his Highness' territories. As soon as the war with Holkar shall be concluded, the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah ought to be moved to the southward to enforce these measures, and in order to force the Rajah of Kolapoor to a settlement.

The memorandum given to the Governor General this day respecting Scindiah's government, points out a mode of giving employment and subsistence to troops of this description. Besides this, Scindiah ought to be urged constantly to keep up the number of troops required by treaty.

The finances of the Guickwar state are so deranged, that I fear they cannot afford to keep any troops. However, Mr. Duncan's attention ought to be drawn to this object, and he should be desired to fix, in concert with Major Walker, the military establishments which the Guickwar should support hereafter. A part of the sum of money to be allotted for the support of the King ought to be laid out for the support of a body of troops, and these ought to be silladar horse. Besides these measures, which will provide for the subsistence of 30,000 or 40,000 men, and which will give a disposable force of those numbers to act against persons of a similar description, who are now living by plunder, others may be adopted in the Company's territories, to . . . . .

[The remaining part of this Memorandum is wanting, it having been mislaid in the Political Department at Fort William, as appears by a letter from Major Shawe.]

Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the Military establishments of India.

Fort William, Nov. 1804.

1. On the 11th Feb. 1801, the Court of Directors wrote orders that the military establishment of Fort St. George should consist of 7 regiments of European infantry and 14 regiments of Native infantry, including 3 regiments for the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

2. They ordered at the same time 3 European regiments and 8 regiments of Native infantry for the establishment of Bombay, under the notion that all above 4 of the latter would be paid for by the subsidies from the Rajah of Travancore, and the Nabob of Surat.

3. I shall advert hereafter to the European establishment for those governments. It does not appear that the Court of Directors have had before them any detailed statements of the want of troops when they gave these orders; but they have given them in an arbitrary manner, without

considering at all the circumstances of the country to which they were intended to be applied.

4. In respect to the establishment of Fort St. George, it was not increased by these orders beyond that ordered in the year 1796, excepting to supply the subsidiary force for the Nizam. The establishment ordered in 1796 was 11 regiments, and one for the Nizam, if he should require one; that of 1801 was 11 regiments, and 3 for the Nizam. Yet in 1799 an addition was made to the Company's territories of Coimbatore, of the districts bordering on the eastern ghats (besides Canara and Soonda, for which provision was supposed to be made from the Bombay establishment); and the Company engaged, in consequence of a subsidy of 7 lacs of star pagodas from the Rajah of Mysore, to defend his territories and support his government.

5. As the Court of Directors have not condescended to particulars, it is impossible to say whether they adverted to the necessity of defending Mysore or not; but whether they did or not, 3 regiments were certainly necessary for the purposes of Mysore and Coimbatore, in addition to the old establishment necessary for the Carnatic and the Nizam's subsidiary force.

6. After the letter of Feb. 1801, was written, the treaty of 1800 was concluded with the Subah of the Decan, by which a large territory was ceded, in perpetuity, in commutation of subsidy. The principle on which this territory was ceded, was that the Company should receive nearly double the amount of the sum paid as subsidy, in order to defray the expense of defending and governing the territory ceded: it cannot be denied that this territory would require troops.

7. Subsequently to the dispatch of this letter from the Court of Directors, the civil government of the Carnatic was transferred to the Company. The Nabob's troops were discharged, and the duty which they had performed devolved upon those of the Company. This was a fresh demand for the services of troops, for which the advantages gained provided the means of payment.

8. These last two demands may be fairly stated to have occasioned a necessity for 2 regiments; and in this manner has the establishment of Fort St. George amounted to 19 regiments.

9. In respect to the establishment of Bombay, the Court of Directors have decided that 2 battalions in Malabar, and 2 battalions in Canara, are fully sufficient. That establishment has certainly never been sufficient, as the Court might see by referring to their records. But the Court have admitted of 8 regiments on the Bombay establishment, and fortunately it has been possible to post a large portion of the force in Malabar.

10. Since these orders have been written, the following additional demands have been made upon the establishment of Bombay: viz., 2 battalions for Goa; 4 battalions, if they should be of their present strength of 700 men, and if 1000 men, 3 battalions for the Guickwar state. Only one regiment has been raised to make up this deficiency, so that there remain 3 battalions to be provided for.

11. Besides this deficiency, the subsidiary force at Poonah is paid for, and to be supplied either by the government of Fort St. George or Bom-

bay ; and the territories ceded by the Quikwar, the Peshwah, and Scindiah in Guzerat, which altogether are of the value of 50 lacs of rupees, would appear to deserve some troops to take care of them.

12. Reckoning that these territories require only one battalion, the total deficiency of Native infantry, for the payment of which provision is made (excepting for the 2 battalions at Goa, and one in the territories in Guzerat, for which 12 lacs at Baroach may be considered a fair equivalent), will amount to 10 battalions.

13. I shall now consider the subject in reference to the detailed wants of each establishment, the only mode in which a question of this kind can be fairly considered.

14. The Quikwar subsidiary force must be 3000 men, or 3 battalions of Bombay troops ; there must be 2 battalions of Bombay troops at Surat ; and one battalion of Bombay troops at Baroach ; 6 battalions of Bombay troops at Poonah ; 4 at Bombay ; and 2 at Goa : making the total of Bombay troops 18 battalions, or 9 regiments.

15. The battalions of Bombay infantry ought to be 1000 men in time of war at all events. Hereafter I shall give a memorandum regarding the mode of arranging the Quikwar subsidiary force.

16. Gen. Stuart's distribution of the army at Fort St. George will require 54 battalions, from which, if 2 battalions to be posted at Goa, and to be found, according to this plan, by Bombay, are subtracted, there will remain 52 battalions. He has now 38 battalions, and if he should be authorised to raise 5 more regiments to make up for his deficiencies of Bombay troops, the deficiency in his distribution will be 4 battalions. These may be extra battalions until the orders of the Court of Directors shall have been received.

17. It is desirable that the orders for completing these 5 regiments should be given as soon as possible, as in their present state the extra battalions are useless ; and in the season of operations Gen. Stuart will be deficient—in fact, all the Bombay troops which will have been relieved ; and the 5 Madras battalions, still remaining at Poonah, whose return cannot be expected till the end of the year : making a total deficiency of 15 battalions in an army of 48 battalions, or nearly one third.

18. In respect to Europeans, the difference between the Court of Directors and Gen. Stuart is not very great. They have given 20 battalions, and therefore we cannot tell on what they have founded their calculation. But since they have made it, one regiment has been given to the Nizam, for which he makes provision, and the Ceded districts certainly require one, and may be fairly estimated as supplying the means of paying one. Gen. Stuart's estimate is 11 regiments, including Goa. If Goa is to be supplied by Bombay, the number demanded by Gen. Stuart is reduced to 10 regiments, which is only one regiment more than is allowed by the Court of Directors, adding one for the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, and one for the Ceded districts, both of which are paid for.

19. The Court of Directors have fixed 3 regiments of Europeans as the establishment for Bombay, including one for Goa. There ought to be 4, of which number 2 ought to be at Bombay, one at Goa, and one to the northward.

20. In respect to cavalry at Fort St. George, the original establishment in 1796 was 4 regiments; since that time the Nizam has paid for 2 regiments, and the Peshwah for one regiment. There are now 8 regiments, so that the increase of the establishment is one regiment since the year 1796. Of all the increases of establishments which have been made, and which are now necessary, this is the only one which appears to me not to have been paid for by subsidies from the Native powers, and this may be fairly counted as provided for by the revenues of Coimbatore, &c.

21. It may be urged against this statement, if no increase has been made to the army, not provided for, how came the military expenses of Fort St. George to be still such a burthen on the finances? I answer, because Fort St. George has now the burthen of defending Malabar, which Bombay formerly had.

In case this Memorandum should be approved of, it would be desirable to acquaint Mr. Duncan of the alteration of the arrangement respecting Scindiah's subsidiary force and Goa; and to adopt Gen. Stuart's distribution for the territories of Fort St. George, and to order the increase of the establishment.

Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the rank of Colonel, from 4 new regiments being raised for the Presidency of Fort St. George. Fort William, Nov. 1801.

When the 4 new regiments shall be raised at Fort St. George, Lieut. Col. Wallace will be superseded, particularly by 2 officers, Lieut. Cols. Haliburton and Maclean, doing duty in the subsidiary force serving with the Subah of the Deccan, and at this moment immediately under his command.

It will therefore be desirable to send orders to the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, to appoint Col. Wallace a Colonel in the army of Fort St. George, of the same date with Cols. Haliburton and Maclean.

I observe that Col. Carlisle, of the Artillery, is dead, and Lieut. Col. Bell, of the Artillery, will consequently be promoted to be a Colonel. He is a Lieut. Col. of the year 1801; and consequently junior, not only to Lieut. Col. Wallace, but to many other officers, both of the King's and Company's service, under the government of Fort St. George. The Lieut. Colonels in the King's service, senior to Lieut. Col. Bell, will have claims to promotion under the orders recently received from England, and they will supersede by this promotion Lieut. Colonels of the Company's army senior to them.

Either the orders above referred to must not be construed as applicable to the promotions in the Company's artillery, or cavalry, or engineers, as they will create much discontent in the Company's army, and fresh complaints and references from the officers, all of which ought to be avoided; or the orders from England ought to be applied to the Lieut. Colonels in the Company's, as well as in the King's service, in instances in which the Company's Lieut. Colonels of one branch of the service should supersede those of another. It is my opinion, that the last would be the best mode of settling the question. It would remove all discontents and jealousies respecting the operation of the orders from England, and would leave

every officer of the King's and the Company's army in the situation, in respect to rank, in which he would have been placed by his promotion to the rank of Lieut. Colonel.

If this plan should be adopted, it would be necessary for the Commander in Chief to send orders to Gen. Stuart, to desire him to give local temporary rank to Lieut. Colonels of the Company's army, as well as of the King's, when any of the former should be superseded by the promotion of Lieut. Colonels of any particular branch of the service.

Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, as to Colonels of Artillery, when Major Generals, being competent to be placed on the Staff of the Army.  
Fort William, Nov. 1804.

Shortly after I quitted Bombay, in the month of May last, a question was agitated at the Council, regarding the propriety of leaving the command of the artillery in the hands of Major Gen. Bellasis; and the propriety of placing that officer on the Staff; upon which subjects, Mr. Duncan having required my opinion, I gave it to him, as nearly as I can recollect, to the following purport:

I do not recollect any regulation in the King's service, which prevents officers having the rank of General officers from doing duty with their regiments. It is not customary to require that they should do regimental duty, and leave of absence is generally given to them; but I apprehend that, unless they had that leave of absence, they would be obliged to join and do duty with their corps equally with other officers. They are returned 'absent by His Majesty's leave.'

The regulations of the Company's army are different. They say positively, that a General officer is not to join the corps to which he may be regimentally attached; but it is my opinion, that this regulation was never intended to apply to the officers of the corps of artillery.

In the first place, the commandant of the artillery has duties of far greater importance to the public in all the Presidencies, in India, than attach to the Colonel of any regiment. He is a member of the military board, he is at the head of all the ordnance departments, acting under the orders of his Presidency. The arsenal, the laboratory, the ordnance carriages, and the ordnance on the works at the Presidency in particular, are under his immediate superintendence; and all these are duties performed by the Master General of the Ordnance in England, and appear not unworthy of the attention of a General officer in the Company's army at each of their Presidencies.

But the annexed extract from the orders of the Court of Directors, of Jan. 1796, shows that the Court contemplated the possibility that a General officer might be commandant of the artillery; and accordingly, they have provided an allowance for him, when he should not be on the staff. I therefore conclude, that the duties of commandant of the artillery are not unworthy of the rank of a General officer; and that the Company's orders and regulations contemplate the possibility that a General officer may be employed in that situation.

It may be said, that if a General officer is employed in the situation of commandant of artillery, he may be placed under the command of a Ge-



neral officer on the staff, junior in rank to himself as a General officer. In answer, I observe that he holds his situation as commandant of the artillery only as colonel. This brevet of Major General gives him no rank and no authority over any part of the army with which he is not posted as a Major General by the orders of government. This brevet only makes him eligible to command in the army, or any part of it, when government may call for his services by placing him on the staff; but does not give him a right to command a man over whom he is not specially appointed, and whom he did not before command under his commission of colonel.

I might urge that it is not very probable that the government would place the commanding officer of the artillery and his duties under the inspection of any General officer of the line, and, therefore, that the case in question could not occur. But I consider the principle to be sound, that no General officer has any authority as a General officer till he is placed upon the staff; therefore, that no public evil, or even momentary confusion, can result from placing a senior General officer commanding the artillery, or colonel of a regiment, under the command of a junior employed upon the staff. The feelings of the senior may be affected upon seeing the junior preferred to him upon the staff; but those feelings cannot affect the general question; and, at all events, the senior may, if he should think proper, resign his situation.

I now come to consider the second branch of this discussion, viz., the propriety of appointing General officers of the artillery to the staff.

I do not know that there is any rule upon this subject in the King's service; but I have read accounts that His Majesty had refused to appoint officers of the artillery to the general staff of the army, or to confirm appointments of that kind, when made by authorities abroad. There is one instance in particular, of Gen. Phillips in America.

The reason of the exclusion of the officers of the artillery and engineers from the General staff in European armies, I consider to be, that these officers are supposed to be, and in general are in reality, educated at the public expense in the scientific branches of the military service. It is supposed that the public gain more by employing them in those branches, than in any general duty for which others would answer equally well; and therefore government, which ought to consider only the public benefit, have determined that they shall be so employed.

These facts, and this reasoning, do not apply to the service in this country. It is true, that the officers of the artillery and engineers are scientifically educated; but it seldom occurs, that such an army, with such a corps of artillery and engineers, is collected in the field, as to render expedient the employment of a General officer of artillery or engineers with their respective corps. The consequence, therefore, of the application of the rule or practice of the European armies to the service in this country, would be, that General officers of the artillery and engineers would never be employed.

The number of General officers on all the establishments in India is but small in comparison with the size of the armies, and the number to be placed on the staff; and certainly it cannot be sound policy to adopt a rule

unnecessarily, the effect of which must be to diminish the number of those from whom a choice must be made.

But it is my opinion, that the orders of the Company allow the General officers of the artillery and engineers to be on the staff; and this is proved by an extract from their letter of Jan. 1796; from which it appears, not only that a General officer of the artillery might be on the staff, but that, being on the staff, he might retain the command of the artillery.

Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, relative to the Army under the Commander in Chief, in his operations against Jeswant Rao Holkar. Fort William, 5th Nov. 1804.

The state of the equipments of the army of the Commander in Chief appears to be such, that there are but slender hopes that he will be able to push his operations against Holkar so vigorously as to bring his army to a general action, and to drive it away from the Company's frontier in a reasonable space of time, namely, 2 or 3 months. The deficiency in the equipments is in provisions, in which, from all that I can learn, his Excellency depends entirely upon the Dooab.

In this state of affairs, besides the capacity of the Dooab to supply the provisions, and the means of carrying them required for the active prosecution of the war, it is necessary;

1st; That the inhabitants should be willing to supply the provisions, or, that there should be a power in the country to oblige them to supply the provisions.

2ndly; That the communications with the Dooab should be open and always secure.

There is no doubt whatever, I believe, of the capacity of the Dooab to supply every thing. It appears, however, to be very certain that the inhabitants are not inclined to give the assistance to the Commander in Chief which the country can afford; and indeed their disturbances and rebellions have impeded the arrival of convoys of provisions from the countries beyond the Ganges.

These disturbances may be attributed partly to the nature of the people; partly to the want of civil government; but principally to the efforts of the enemy, through the medium of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor.

In respect to the last cause of the disturbances of the Dooab, I have to observe, that the papers transmitted in the Commander in Chief's dispatch of the 21st Oct. do not prove the facts stated; either that Runjeet Sing did endeavor, through his vakcel, to excite disturbances in the Dooab; or that he gave protection to Holkar's baggage and bazaars under his fort of Bhurtpoor. If he has been guilty of the former of these acts, or of both, his conduct has been most dangerously hostile to the British government. If of the latter only, it has been of a very suspicious nature; but it is not quite certain that he may not have been induced to adopt that dubious line of conduct to save his own country; and very probably, if Holkar's army had been defeated, he would have taken and destroyed the camp to which he had given protection.

In my opinion the remedy for the evils in the Dooab consists in the following measures:

1st; In establishing the civil government.

2ndly ; In dividing the Dooab into military divisions, and allotting to each a sufficient military force.

The military divisions might be as follow.

1. The upper part of the Dooab, including Delhi, and all the Company's possessions north of the Nabob Vizier's. 2. The lower part of the Dooab, including Agra as far as Allahabad ; and the Nabob Vizier's territories. 3. Bundeelund. 4. Benares, Chunar, Gornuckpoor. 5. Bahar. 6. Bengal. 7. Presidency, including Cuttack, Midnapoor, &c.

Care to be taken, in making the military divisions in the Dooab, that a magistrate's or collector's division may not be in two military divisions, so that every collector and magistrate may know to whom to apply for military assistance when it may be wanted.

These measures will re-establish tranquillity, will bring affairs into such a shape as to secure it, and insure punishment to those who endeavor to disturb it ; and in this manner will secure the resources of the country for the army of the Commander in Chief. They will also afford the means of defense for all parts of the Jumna, when that river shall become for ble, if previous to that time Holkar's army should not have been driven out of Hindustan.

These arrangements also will give the ability to furnish convoys for the supplies going to the Commander in Chief's army, and will thus insure the second object ; viz., the communication between the army and the Dooab.

In order to carry these arrangements into execution, it is necessary to prevail upon the Commander in Chief to reduce his force. It should not be stronger than is absolutely essential to beat Holkar's army. An additional benefit which will result from this measure is, that it will be more easy to supply its wants.

In respect to the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, if he has been guilty of the conduct imputed to him, he is the most dangerous enemy that the Company could have. In fact, he has identified himself with Holkar ; and the species of assistance which he has given him has entirely altered, in my judgment, the nature of Holkar's power.

The line to be taken with the Rajah of Bhurtpoor must depend upon circumstances. If the country was in a state of tranquillity, and it was possible to fit out and support two armies in advance from the Dooab, I should recommend that an army should be prepared to attack the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts, whilst the Commander in Chief's army should be employed in the pursuit and defeat of Holkar's army. But that appears impossible at present ; and the measures to be adopted respecting the Rajah must be guided by circumstances.

Our first object must be, at all events, to beat Holkar in the field ; our next to introduce a sufficient force from the Jumna into Malwa, in order to establish a fixed authority in that province ; and our third, to destroy the Rajah of Bhurtpoor. The question is, whether it be possible to send a force into Malwa, either in pursuit of Holkar, or after having beaten him, without taking possession of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts ?

This question must be decided, in a great measure, by the conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor. If Holkar should be beaten in Hindustan, and

the Rajah should either have joined his army, or if it should turn out that he has excited the disturbances in the Dooab, and given protection to Holkar's baggage; and he does not destroy or take that baggage when Holkar may be beaten, or give some proof that he does not intend to act with hostility against the Company, it will be very evident that Holkar's power in Hindustan will not be destroyed when his army is defeated. The Rajah's forts must be taken before the troops can move into Malwa; unless it should be possible to fit out and equip properly at the same time, a second body of troops for the operations directed immediately against the Rajah of Bhurtpoor.

If Holkar should not fight in Hindustan, but should fly into Malwa, the question will be nearly the same, and the decision whether the troops ought to follow him into Malwa must depend upon the same circumstances. It will be rather more urgent, however, than in the former case, to follow him into Malwa, and to delay the operations against the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts, if that should be possible, as it may be depended upon that, if they should be commenced, Holkar will return again immediately, and commence the old Marhatta operations upon the communication between the army and the territories in the Dooab.

In short, the question regarding the Rajah of Bhurtpoor is, in my opinion, a very delicate one, unless two corps can be now equipped and supported from the Dooab, one for active operations, the other for sieges.

If that cannot be done, and it appears that it cannot, it is my opinion it would, upon the whole, be best to wink at the conduct of the Rajah of Bhurtpoor, till circumstances shall be more favorable, and enable the government to attack him with vigor.

The next point to be considered is the orders to be given to Col. Murray. It is very evident that much time will elapse before the troops can advance from the Jumna into Malwa; that Col. Murray can do no good where he is; that he cannot advance to the northward, and that if he could advance, he could be of no use; and that he could re-equip his troops with more ease, and less expense, and would be in greater safety, if he were to draw nearer to the frontiers of Guzerat. He could also defend that country. It is my opinion, therefore, that he ought to be desired to draw off gradually towards the frontiers of Guzerat.

To Major Shawe.

Government House, 3rd Nov. 1804. 3, P.M.

I enclose a memorandum which contains the result of my inquiries of this day, respecting Gen. Lake's mode of conducting his supplies, and an account of that which I have always adopted in detail, as far as is necessary.

In truth, no person here knows how Gen. Lake is supplied, any more than if his army was in Japan.

Memorandum submitted to the Governor General by Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, detailing the system for regulating the supplies of an Army in the Deccan, a copy of which was sent to the Commander in Chief, &c. Fort William, 3rd Nov. 1804.

After every inquiry I have been able to make, I cannot learn the mode in which the system of supplies is conducted by the Commander in Chief.

I rather believe, however, that the whole rests in the hands of Capt. Morrison, who is superintendent of supplies of the army.

Without local knowledge, it is impossible for me to say whether that mode is a good one; I shall, however, detail that in use with all the armies in which I have commanded in the Deccan, and which has succeeded in enabling me to go to a very great distance from the sources of supplies.

There are in every army four descriptions of persons or animals, to be supplied with food, viz.,

i. European soldiers. ii. Native troops. iii. Horses of the cavalry. iv. Followers of all descriptions, including horses, cattle, servants, &c., of officers, departments, soldiers, &c.

1st. To feed the European soldiers, a Commissary of provisions is appointed. The quantity of provisions necessary for the number of men for any given period of time (2 or 3 months) is issued to him from the public stores, or he purchases them, according to the orders which he may receive. Carriage is allotted for this provision, either carts or bullocks, &c. In this quantity of provision, the Commissary of provisions has only 5 days' grain, and the carriage allotted for that quantity; and he indents on every fifth day on the Commissary of grain for that grain which will be necessary for the European troops for the following 5 days. The object of this arrangement is to keep the account of the grain clear, and that it may always be known what length of time the quantity of grain in camp will serve for the whole army.

2ndly. The Native troops receive grain only.

When the army is assembled, a quantity of grain which will last the troops, including the Europeans, a given period of time (2 or 3 months), is issued from the public stores to the Commissary of grain. Carriage is allotted for it; viz., bullocks, either the property of the Company, or hired for the purpose, and under the immediate charge of the Commissary of grain. When the Commissary of grain makes an issue, he replenishes it, either by drawing again upon the stores, if he can communicate with them, or by purchases in the country, or the bazaar, according to the orders which he may receive from the officer commanding the army.

3rdly. The horses of the cavalry.

When the number of horses to be fed is ascertained, a quantity of grain is issued from the public stores to the Gram agent general, to last them for a given number of days; viz., 40, 50, or 60. The quarter masters of the regiments of cavalry have under their charge a bullock for each horse in the regiment, which bullock carries grain to last the horse 15 days. He receives this grain from the Gram agent general. The Gram agent general has under his charge and superintendence bullocks in sufficient number (either hired, or belonging to the Company) to carry the remainder of the grain. When he makes an issue to the quarter master, he replaces it either by drawing again upon the stores, or by purchases in the bazaar or the country, according to the orders which he may receive from the commanding officer of the army.

4thly. Followers of all descriptions.

These persons live by the daily purchases they make in the bazaar, the

supply of which becomes an object of the greatest importance. What follows is the mode of supplying the bazaar which I have seen practised. The bazaars are placed under the charge and superintendence of an officer called the superintendent of supplies, and in him the whole business of the internal police and supply of the camp rests. The following modes are adopted to supply the grain required for it.

1st. Brinjarries. These are a class of carriers who gain a livelihood by transporting grain or other commodities from one part of the country to another. They attend armies, and trade nearly in the same manner as they do in common times of peace. They either purchase grain themselves in the country with their own money, or with money advanced to them by the Company, and sell it in the bazaar at the rates of the day on their own account, or they take grain at the Company's stores at certain reduced rates, and sell it on their own account in the bazaars; or they take up grain in the Company's stores, and carry it with the army, and receive a sum of money for every march they make, and the grain is sold in the bazaars on account of the Company; or they hire their cattle by the month to the Company, and take up grain from the public stores and carry it with the army, where it is sold in the bazaars on the account of the Company. It is the business of the superintendent of supplies to settle all these various accounts, and to see that the brinjarries get fresh loads as fast as they empty them, and to know always, as nearly as possible, the quantity of grain which this description of people have got.

2nd. Biparries. This is another description of dealers. They do not go in large flocks like the brinjarries, and to such distances, to look for grain. They are generally attached to the camp bazaar, and they go out to the villages and towns in the neighbourhood of the camp, and purchase grain, and bring it in immediately for sale. These are a more civilized, industrious, and useful people than the brinjarries; they are much more active, and if the country is open, the supply which they bring is more plentiful.

3rd. The Biparries of the country. These are of the same class with the second, only not immediately attached to the camp. They bring grain to the camp from the neighbouring villages, when ordered by the amildars and government, or excited by their own interests; but their attendance is not so constant. Besides these three principal descriptions, there are others, but they may all be classed under one of the three general heads.

From this statement it is obvious, that when the communication between the army and the country is not free, that alone upon which the bazaar can depend is the brinjarries, who are generally assembled in large numbers, and attend it when the campaign is opened. It frequently happens, as was the case with me in the last campaign, that the brinjarries desert the army. The communication with the country may be cut off from many causes; the enemy, the swelling of a river, bad roads, rainy weather, &c. On the other hand, the army may outmarch the supplies which might be expected from biparries, &c. In any of these cases, it is usual for the commanding officer of the army to order the Commissary of grain to issue to the superintendent of supplies any quantity of grain that

may be required to supply the consumption which falls upon the bazaar. The Commissary of grain makes his purchases again from the bazaar when it fills. The Gram agent general also issues, by order, grain to the superintendent of the bazaar when that article is wanted for officers' horses and cattle. He frequently issues it by order, to the agent for the public draught bullocks, when the supply of grain in the bazaar is not sufficient for the cattle in his department.

In this manner, the army can never be in want. The camp stores are always kept complete, and supply the bazars occasionally; while the bazars, in more plentiful times (which, under good arrangement, must occur frequently), supply the camp stores.

Memorandum on the system adopted for regulating the Intelligence Department in the Army under the Command of Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Fort William, Nov. 1804.\*

One of the great difficulties of war in this country is to obtain intelligence of the enemy's movements and intentions sufficiently early to take advantage of them. The following modes of procuring intelligence were adopted in the late campaign in the Deccan, and were generally successful.

1. Three distinct departments for intelligence were formed in camp, the head of each of which communicated directly with Major Gen. Wellesley. To each department was attached such a number of intelligence hircarrahs, as rendered it certain that one would come into each department from the enemy's camp on every day.

2. The heads of the intelligence departments reported immediately on its arrival, the intelligence received, and questioned the hircarras particularly regarding the hour at which he had quitted the camp. His intelligence was then compared with that brought in by the other hircarrahs, as received from other quarters, and a tolerably accurate opinion was generally formed of the facts reported.

3. Great care was taken that the persons employed in one department should not be known to those employed in the others, and that they

\* The Governor General to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. 9th Nov. 1804.

1. Adverting to the situation of public affairs at the present period of time, I deem it expedient, on the occasion of your return from the Residency to the Deccan, to renew the civil and military powers with which you were vested by my orders of the 26th June, 1803.\* You will accordingly consider yourself to be vested, as before, with the chief command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies serving in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, or of any of the Marhatta states or chiefs, subject only to the orders of the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, or of his Excellency Gen. Lake.

2. You will also consider yourself to be empowered and directed to assume and to exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British government in the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, of the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta states and chiefs.

3. You will be guided by the express directions contained in my letter of the 26th June, 1803, in all cases to which they may specially apply in the actual situation of affairs. In all other cases you will regulate your conduct by a just application of the spirit and intent of those instructions to the circumstances under which you may be required to act.

4. Copies of this letter will be transmitted to the government of Fort St. George and of Bombay, and to the several Residents at the Native Courts, requiring their attention to these orders.

\* See p. 561.

should not communicate. The hircarrahs were highly rewarded, besides receiving monthly pay, particularly when they brought any intelligence on which an operation could be founded; and were punished and turned out of the service when they brought any which was known to be false.

4. The intelligence departments were kept, one by the Dep. Adj. Gen., one by Mr. Elphinstone, who acted as Persian interpreter, and one by Govind Rao, a servant of the Rajah of Mysore, who was used in the communications with the Native sirdars.

5. Besides these departments for intelligence, a constant communication was kept up and encouraged with the Native vakeels. They came every evening to Major Gen. Wellesley; he communicated with them personally, and learned all that they had heard in the course of the day.

6. A correspondence was also kept up with the amildars of the country, and measures were taken constantly, by means of the Mysore sirdars and horsemen, and their communications with the heads of villages, &c., in the neighbourhood of camp, to find out the reports of the country, and every thing which could throw light upon the enemy's designs.

To Major Malcolm.

On board the *Bombay* frigate, 14th Nov. 1804.

I am just about to sail. I have given Sydenham a letter from the Governor General, in which I have recommended Kistna, and I have desired him to send you a copy of it. The names of the villages to be granted to Kistna, and the value, are wanting. You must send the necessary information to Shawe or Sydenham, and the blanks will be filled up before the letter will be given to the Governor General.

To the Governor General.

On board the *Bombay* frigate, 14th Nov. 1804.

1. I have hitherto omitted to lay before your Excellency the services of, and to recommend to your notice, Kistna Rao, the principal servant of the Mysore Residency, who attended me during the late war.

2. This person was employed under Major Malcolm in the last war against Tippoo Sultaun, and performed services of the greatest importance, in the superintendence and in settling the accounts of the brinjarries who accompanied the Major from Hyderabad. He was afterwards employed by the Resident in Mysore, from the year 1799 to the year 1803, during the whole of which time he conducted himself much to the satisfaction of the different gentlemen who filled the office of Resident.

3. He accompanied me to the field by the permission of the Resident, and I employed him confidentially in many of the negotiations with which I was intrusted, particularly those with Amrut Rao and his adherents; the result of which was to deprive the confederated Marhatta Chiefs of the powerful assistance which they would have derived from that party in the state, and to gain it for the Hon. Company and their allies.

4. When peace was concluded, I sent Kistna Rao with Major Malcolm to the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and he there performed services of equal importance, and in a manner equally creditable to himself and beneficial to the public, with those which he performed in camp under my immediate direction.

5. Kistna Rao is a person of good birth, being descended from a family



of rich soucars in the Cuddapa country, who lost all their property in the course of the revolutions by which the government of that country has at different times been affected. His salary in the Company's service is but small, and the important nature of his services, and the fidelity with which he has performed them, appear to merit a reward from government.

6. I therefore beg leave to recommend Kistna Rao to your Excellency's favor; and as the mode of rewarding him which will be most agreeable to his feelings, and least expensive to the Hon. Company, I beg leave to recommend that the revenues of the villages named in the margin, and situated in the Ceded districts, may be given to him. It is not supposed that the amount of their revenue will be more than 5200 rupees. This is an average revenue, and sometimes will produce 500 rupees more or less.

To Major Shawe.

On board the *Bombay* frigate, 15th Nov. 1804.

I received yesterday your letter of the 12th, and I have since considered the intelligence which it contains regarding the movements of Holkar and the Commander in Chief. His Excellency having been able to divide his army, must have been in some state of equipment; and it is possible that the result of the present operations may be to drive the infantry corps to a distance; and Holkar, with the cavalry, being pressed by the Commander in Chief's division, may be obliged to follow them.

If we should have luck, and the British divisions are really well equipped with provisions, it is possible that both Holkar's divisions may be defeated. His division of infantry will want intelligence, as the cavalry will be at a distance, and Gen. Fraser may be able to approach them; and the division of cavalry, when pressed by the Commander in Chief in the Doab, may find it difficult, if not impossible, to escape. However, we must look to the other side of the question, and consider not only what it is desirable should happen, but that which may happen, however disagreeable.

Holkar's object is certainly to cross the Ganges; to create a disturbance in Bundelcund, and to penetrate through the northern provinces to Benares. I do not think that he can effect that object with the Commander in Chief's division in his neighbourhood; but we must suppose that there are many of the patans in Bundelcund inclined to support and assist him; and it is not impossible but that the means of crossing the Ganges are already arranged for him.

Nothing more can be done to oppose Holkar's operations in the field than has been already done. All that remains, is to adopt such measures for the security of Benares, as shall preclude the possibility of danger to that city; supposing that affairs in the Doab should take a turn so different from that which we have reason to hope they will, and that Holkar should be able to cross the Ganges, and to penetrate Bundelcund and Gorruckpoor without being destroyed by the Commander in Chief, which is hardly possible.

The object at Benares is to prevent a body of horse from doing any mischief, or levying a contribution upon that city, in the few days which may elapse between that on which Holkar and that on which the Com-

mander in Chief will arrive there. It is evident, that the small corps of infantry which is stationed at Benares can do nothing offensively against this body of horse. It cannot defend itself, unless collected in a body; or if divided, unless assisted by fortified works. If collected in one body, it is obvious that it will provide but ill for the defence of the city, unless the city is so situated as to be under the command of some ground in its neighbourhood. There must be many roads into the city, by which horse can penetrate, all of which it must be necessary to guard; but if the troops are separated to guard these avenues, it must be obvious that no part of them will be sufficiently strong; indeed, none of them may be able to defend themselves, unless placed in fortified works.

What I should therefore recommend, under present circumstances at Benares, would be :

1st: To collect a magazine there, which will last the troops allotted to the defence of the place a certain time.

2ndly: To construct a redoubt on each of the great roads leading to Benares, capable of holding 40 or 50 men, with a gun: it should be, of course, in the most commanding situation that could be found, and near water; and provisions for the garrison for 8 or 10 days should be lodged in it.

3rdly: A camp ought to be intrenched for a battalion, in which should be the grain, magazine, &c., that might be collected for the use of the troops.

In this manner, Benares would really be secure from danger for the few days which Holkar may be supposed to precede the Commander in Chief. Whether the corps destined for the defence of Benares be stationed at Mirzapoor or not, it would be desirable to adopt these arrangements at Benares. They will secure that city in case of an attack of this description. The intrenchments will be ready for the troops, which I conclude will cross the Ganges from Mirzapoor, as soon as it shall be known that Holkar has crossed into Bundelcund. I trust that care will be taken to support Gen. Fraser's division beyond the Jumna; that is an object which will require constant care and attention.

The pilot leaves us this day.

To Major Shawe.

On board the *Bombay* frigate, 20th Nov. 1804.

I expect to land at Madras to-morrow, and I write to you at present, in order that I may be able to send off my letter immediately after I shall land.

There are some points upon which I omitted to speak to the Governor General, to which I beg you to draw his attention, and let me know his wishes.

1st: Mr. Duncan gave me a memorandum regarding a proposal which he made to the Governor General on the 6th Feb. 1804, that he might be permitted to reward the services of Sr Miguel de Lima de Sousa by the grant of an enaum in some one of the pergunnahs ceded by the Guickwar to the Company. Mr. Duncan has stated the nature of the services of Sr Miguel de Sousa, in the letter above referred to, and there is no occasion for my repeating them; I have only to say that it is very desirable, for many reasons, referrible as well to our affairs in Guzerat as to those

at Goa, that they should be rewarded; and, at all events, that Mr. Dunean should have an answer. As he gave me a memorandum upon this subject, and as I shall have many matters to settle with him, it is desirable that he should have the answer, if possible, before I reach the western side of India, or as soon as may be convenient.

2ndly: With the memorandum regarding Sr Miguel de Sousa, he gave me another regarding the pension to Mehdy Aly Khan's son. This is a subject upon which every body knows that Mr. Duncan is very anxious: and it is very desirable that he should receive an answer. I spoke to the Governor General regarding it soon after I arrived in Bengal.

3rdly: Besides this, there is a demand from the late Mehdy Aly Khan for his expenses in Persia, upon which Mr. Duncan wrote to the Governor General in Council on the 8th March, 1801, to which letter he has received no answer. It is very desirable that the Governor General should decide upon this subject.

4thly: When I arrived in Bengal, I spoke to the Governor General regarding the claim of the Guickwar government, that the extra expenses incurred in the war by that government should be defrayed by the Company. It appears that the claims of that government, as stated by Mr. Duncan, were of two distinct descriptions: one, for the reimbursement of the expenses incurred for troops, levied to replace the subsidiary force when it marched to Lunavara, at the commencement of the war, under the command of Col. Murray; the other, for the expenses of the Guickwar troops themselves, when they marched with Col. Murray, towards the conclusion of the war, to Dohud.

When I spoke to the Governor General upon the subject, I did not know of the first claim, and I find, by a letter from Mr. Duncan, that the decision of the Governor General has been passed only upon this claim. In my opinion the Guickwar government has no ground for this claim. This government was bound to give assistance in the war, by the spirit of its alliance with the Company, and the subsidiary troops, in particular, ought to have been employed. It is not consistent with the nature of the alliance between the parties, that the Company should bear the expense of the troops levied to perform the internal duty, which the subsidiary troops performed in time of peace, when the circumstances of the times required that those troops should be employed against a foreign and a common enemy.

The claim, however, for the remuneration of the expenses incurred by the Guickwar government in the expedition to Dohud, stands upon different grounds. Although the spirit of all our treaties with the Guickwar state requires that they should assist us in war against foreign powers, the words of those treaties do not contain such a provision; and it must be recollected that those who made those treaties were of opinion that the Guickwar government were not bound to assist us; and the claim of compensation for expenses incurred by troops for internal purposes in lieu of the subsidiary troops, must have been made upon the same principles, and shows that the Guickwar government, and Mr. Dunean, and Major Walker, conceived our connexion with that state to be nothing more than a contract for the hire of a few thousand troops.

The Guickwar government gained nothing by the war, notwithstanding that it afforded this assistance, of which it is to bear the expense. It is my opinion, that if we force the Guickwar government to adopt, in its connexion with us, the spirit of our defensive treaties with the other powers of India, we ought also to hold out to them the same advantage, and either to give them a share of the benefits resulting from successful war, or to pay the expenses incurred by the actual prosecution of external hostilities. When I spoke to the Governor General upon this subject, he was of my opinion, and said that the subject should be revised. From what Mr. Duncan has written, however, I rather believe that he has decided only on the 1st claim; but if he should have decided on the 2nd, I shall be obliged to you if you will urge him to reconsider the subject, and to decide that the Company shall defray the expense of the expedition to Dohud, if he should approve of the principle which I have stated in this letter.

I took Malcolm on board at Ganjam, and he is going with me to Madras. I learn from him that Webbe is very unwell, and I acknowledge that I much fear that he will be obliged to come away from Scindiah's durbar. I have frequently mentioned to the Governor General and to Sydenham the necessity that the latter should join his Residency at the earliest period. Webbe's illness renders his arrival there a matter of the greatest urgency. Only conceive the inconvenience to which the public interests may be exposed, and the difficulties which I shall have in managing that durbar, if Webbe should be obliged to come away, and the Residency should be left in the charge of a man so young and inexperienced as Mr. Jenkins.\*

As the Governor General intends that Mr. Webbe should go home in the ship with him, and as Webbe is determined not to stay in India an hour after Lord Wellesley, it is desirable that he should be relieved at an early period; if it is not intended that the Residency should fall into the hands of a gentleman who certainly cannot now be deemed capable of managing the business: but when I find that Mr. Webbe is sick, and that he may be obliged to come away, and when I know that the Governor General does not require Sydenham's services in Bengal, I cannot avoid urging, in the most earnest manner, that he may be sent off at the earliest period. If he should sail for Bombay by the first opportunity, after you shall receive this letter, he will arrive there in a very short time, and I shall probably be able to forward him on to Ougein, so that he will arrive there by the end of January. If he should not leave Bengal early in December, his passage to Bombay will be very tedious, and his arrival at Ougein be delayed to a very late period indeed.

I do not believe that the Governor General wrote orders to Col. Murray to draw off towards Guzerat, as he intended. Holkar is now established on the Jumna, and it appears probable that he will not leave that river till he shall be beat in a general action, in which his power may be entirely destroyed. It is not probable that Col. Murray's corps can co-operate in

\* Sir R. Jenkins, G.C.B., since Chairman of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

the action which will be fought upon this occasion, even if it should be possible to equip it well, and to compose it as it ought to be, as it is not to be supposed that that corps can march to the Jumna.

By drawing Col. Murray's corps towards Guzerat, it may be re-equipped with greater facility and at less expense; it will always be in safety; and it will defend the territories in Guzerat, and preserve their tranquillity. It will always be ready to advance, in case an opportunity should offer of moving it forward with advantage.

Against withdrawing Murray's corps there is only the effect which that measure might have upon Scindiah's durbar. But, as well as I recollect, Webbe wrote long ago to Col. Murray, that he might do whatever would be most convenient to himself, without reference to Scindiah's interests or wishes. At all events, Webbe might be left to judge whether the corps should be withdrawn or not; and I rather think that this is the course which I shall adopt.

5thly: I do not recollect whether any thing was done respecting Major Macaulay. There is not a doubt but that the mode in which he brought forward his proposition regarding the tobacco was unguarded. But Major Macaulay is an honest and deserving servant of the public; one who, I know, is attached personally to the Governor General, and to the good principles of government in India; and it is evident that he has felt the censure which he has received. The explanation which he has given of his conduct is satisfactory, and there is nothing against him, excepting that he did not at first sufficiently explain the transaction which he brought under the view of the Governor General. That being the case, he no longer deserves the censure of the government; and, as it is certain that these censures never fail to damp the zeal and cool the attachment of the public servants of the government, and as the attachment of a man such as Macaulay must always be of use, I most anxiously recommend that some measure may be adopted to soothe his feelings. In fact, if it be true that Macaulay did not deserve the censure, and received it only because he made an erroneous or imperfect statement of a transaction in which he had been concerned, which I believe to be the case, to recall or cancel the censure is only a matter of justice.

From the length of this letter you will observe that I have but little to do, and that we have moderate weather. We have really had the best passage I have ever had at sea.

P.S. We landed this morning, all well.

To Col. Close.

Fort St. George, 21st Nov. 1804.

I have just time to write a few lines to inform you that I arrived here this day, and that I propose to leave as soon as the bearers can be posted for me. I shall go to Seringapatam, and thence either by the route of Darwar or Meritech to Poonah; or, if I should find the country is not in tranquillity, I shall go to Mangalore, and thence by sea to Bombay. I shall be with you about Christmas, by one route or another.

To Gen. Lake.

Fort St. George, 23rd Nov. 1804.

An application has been made to me, by a respectable officer of the 33rd

regt., that I should request you to appoint his brother, Mr. H. Young, a Cornet in the 19th dragoons. His family is a respectable one in Ireland, and particularly patronised by Lord Cornwallis, and I therefore take the liberty of recommending Mr. H. Young to your protection.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Government House, 23rd Nov. 1804.

Gen. Stuart has written to me, and has informed me that he had desired you to appoint an officer to fill Major Barclay's office of Dep. Adj. Gen. in Mysore, in consequence of his promotion.

As the rule that a field officer shall not hold an office upon the staff is not a standing regulation of the service, under the government of Fort St. George; as it may be altered; and, above all, as Major Barclay has long assisted me, and as it would be very inconvenient to me to be deprived of his assistance at the present moment, I hope that you will do me the favor to allow him to continue in his office till Sir J. Cradock shall arrive, and shall decide whether the principle which would deprive Major Barclay of his office is to be adopted under this government. I have to mention to you that I have reason to believe that Gen. Stuart would have allowed Major Barclay to retain his office, so long as I should require his assistance, if he had remained in India.

Major Cunningham, lately D. Q. M. G. in Mysore, took charge of the remount lots of horses for the cavalry in the year 1803, at Mangalore; and he has lately desired me to offer his services to take charge of those now expected at the same place. As I have reason to believe that many of the officers of the cavalry are sick, and the services of all are required, I beg leave to recommend that Major Cunningham may have charge of those lots of horses intended for the remount of the cavalry employed in the Deccan. If you should approve of this arrangement, and will give me leave, I will send Major Cunningham instructions by which route to bring the horses to the regiments, and will take care that he is supplied with forage and grain upon the road.

To Lieut. Col. Montresor.

Fort St. George, 24th Nov. 1804.

I understand that you are ordered to march by the route of Beejapoor and Punderpoor to Poonah, in the command of the detachment of troops now collected at Bellary; and I have the pleasure to enclose you a letter for Madhoo Rao Rastia, a Marhatta chief of some importance, to whom the territory belongs through which the first part of your route will lie, and copies of a proclamation to the inhabitants of the whole country, and translations of those papers.

Madhoo Rao Rastia resides near Bauggrecotta, on the Gutpurba; and you will do well to transmit to him the letter to his address when you shall approach the Kistna, and you will use the proclamations upon such occasions as you may find them necessary.

Besides these papers, I write to the Resident at Poonah to furnish you with orders from his Highness the Peshwah addressed to his servants on your road, and to send hircarrahs of the sircar to meet and conduct you to Poonah.

As I have served much in the Marhatta territory, and from experience

must have acquired some knowledge of the people, I take the liberty of suggesting to you to preserve the most strict discipline among your troops and their followers; and to make them pay for every thing which they may want. You will do well to keep up and encourage by mild treatment a constant intercourse with the Natives of the country through which you will pass, as the best means of drawing from them the resources which the districts can afford.

In the enclosed letter and proclamations you will observe that I have called upon those to whom they are addressed to supply your wants: however, I must apprise you that the best mode of drawing supplies from the country is to have it generally believed that you are not in want of supplies; and then, if money is produced, whatever you may require, and can be afforded, will be given.

The route by which you will march from Beejapoor is that by which Capt. Moor travelled to Poonah from that city in the year 1792; and an account of it is given in the book entitled 'Moor's Narrative.' You will find, at this season of the year, a greater plenty of water than he found, and green forage everywhere. When you shall approach Poonah, you will have to descend the little Bhore ghaut, unless you should be able to find the road which passes into the valley of the Beemah, to the northward of that ghaut. I do not recollect the names of the stages, but I know there is a good road which branches off at Baramootty, or Morishwar, and is only one march longer than that by the Bhore ghaut, and I recommend it, as the ghaut is very bad, and may break your carriages.

Proclamation to all Killadars, &c., of the Talooks of Beejapoor, Punderpoor, Aklooss, Baramootty, Morishwar, Rajahwary, &c.

A detachment of the Company's troops is marching to Poonah, on the business of his Highness Sreemunt Bajee Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behaader. This is to require you to give every assistance to Col. Montresor, the commanding officer of the said detachment, and by no means to molest him. He, on his part, will take care that the strictest discipline shall be preserved, and that payment shall be made for every thing that is required.

To Madhoo Rao Rastia.

A detachment of the Company's troops is marching to Poonah, on the service of his Highness Bajee Rao Pundit Purdhaun Behaader, under the command of Col. Montresor. They will pass by the road of Beejapoor and Punderpoor; and I have desired the Colonel to preserve the strictest discipline on his march, and to pay for every thing he shall require; and I request you to give the Company's troops every assistance which you can afford.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Fort St. George, 24th Nov. 1804.

I have received your letter of the 26th Oct. I omitted to inform you that I had arranged that Campbell should retain his situation, and Lieut. Hamilton and Capt. Johnson, as well as Agnew. The others will be replaced by officers of the Bombay establishment, whenever I may think

that the change can be made with propriety. The officers removed from the subsidiary force at Poonah will be provided for elsewhere. All this is settled.

When I was in Bengal I knew that the promotion of Col. Haliburton would supersede you, and I did every thing in my power to prevent this event. Gen. Lake had received orders from England to give the local rank of Colonel to such officers of the rank of Lieut. Colonel as should be superseded by the operation of the regimental rise of the officers of the Company's army to the rank of Colonel; and I proposed that you should be appointed a Colonel in the army of Fort St. George without delay. Gen. Lake, however, refused to adopt this arrangement, as he said that, although he had received orders from the Commander in Chief upon the subject, he had not received the King's warrant to authorise him to give the rank of Colonel to any officer. I acknowledge that I do not exactly understand the validity of this objection; but it comes from the first authority, and nothing can be said against it. In the mean time, Col. Haliburton is promoted, and you are superseded in your command; which, at the present moment, must be unpleasant to you, and inconvenient to the service. However, as it could not be avoided, and I did every thing in my power to prevent it, I am convinced that you will, with your usual zeal, exert yourself to prevent it from being so detrimental to the service as might be expected, and that you will do every thing in your power to assist Col. Haliburton.

I shall be with you in a very few days after you will receive this. I set out for Seringapatam on Monday, when my palanquin boys will be on the road, and I shall not lose any time afterwards.

To Gen. Lake.

Fort St. George, 24th Nov. 1801.

Since my arrival at this place I have been informed that Col. Montresor, of the 80th regt., sent in his resignation of his commission before he embarked for Prince of Wales' Island, where he died; and as I understand that Major White, the senior Major of the 80th regt., has not long been promoted, and his commission of Major has not yet been confirmed, I take the liberty to draw your notice to Lieut. Col. Elliott, the senior Major of the 33rd regt., to purchase Col. Montresor's Lieut. Colonelcy, in case your Excellency should give permission that it should be sold. Lieut. Col. Elliott is a deserving officer, of great zeal and experience in his profession, and one who will be an acquisition to any regiment to which he may be appointed.

To Major Shawe.

Fort St. George, 24th Nov. 1801.

I enclose a memorandum from Capt. Hayes, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will endeavor to arrange the points to which it relates. He has conducted himself much to my satisfaction. He is going off this morning. The Governor does not go with him, but stays here to settle his accounts.

We have sad intelligence here of the state of health of poor Webbe. Indeed I am much afraid that we shall lose him. He has an intermittent fever, which prevents him from attending to business, and the Doctor



says that he has entirely lost his appetite, and does not rest. For God's sake send Sydenham off as soon as possible. There is no other mode whatever of providing for that Residency. Malcolm, although in some degree recovered, is neither in health nor strength sufficient to enable him to bear the journey, or the fatigues to which he would be liable at that durbar. He cannot go into the sun at all. I hear that the troops in the Deccan are miserably unhealthy; but the campaign there has been most successful. My palanquin boys will be laid on the road on Monday, and I shall set out on that evening.

I do not like matters here, but I cannot write upon them without going into details, for which I have not time at present. The government is in the greatest distress for want of money; a want which, I am told, exists equally on the other side of India.

To Col. Close.

Fort St. George, 26th Nov. 1801.

Upon talking over, with Lord W. Bentinck, the state of our money resources in the Deccan, I think there is reason to believe that there will be a deficiency of 4 lacs of rupees to pay the troops the 1st Feb., by which time the revenues of Fort St. George will come in: I think that it will be advisable to endeavor to procure that sum from the resources of Bombay and Poonah; and if you still continue the system proposed by me of raising all the money you require in communication with Mr. Duncan, I shall be much obliged to you if you will communicate to him this want, and take measures to supply it.

P.S. I leave this place to-night.

To Capt. Sydenham.

Seringapatam, 1st Dec. 1801.

I arrived here last night, and expect to be able to set out again in the course of 4 or 5 days. I have received no intelligence from the army in the Deccan since the capture of Gaulna, and none from Bengal since I left it. Webbe is still very unwell, and is so weak as to be unable to walk from his bed to his couch; I trust, therefore, that you will not have delayed your departure for Bengal. It is absolutely necessary that you should arrive at your station at Scindiah's durbar at an early period. I have not leisure at present to enter into the details of affairs at Madras.

Tell the Governor General that I spoke to Lord William about sending away the Meuron regiment. He agrees with me that we could spare that corps more conveniently than any other; but we cannot spare that corps until it be replaced by another European regiment to come to the Madras establishment. If this war with Holkar should ever be finished, I shall prevail upon Mr. Duncan to send a corps from Guzerat or Bombay, which will enable Lord William to send away the Meuron regiment.

To Major Wilks.

Seringapatam, 1st Dec. 1801.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of this date. It is my opinion that the ordnance at Nuggur cannot be better disposed of than in the forts of Mysore and Bangalore.

The military stores at Bednore are of no use for the Company's service, and I will give directions to the officer commanding at Bednore to hand

them over to Ram Rao, excepting such of them as may be necessary for the garrison.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Seringapatam, 1st Dec. 1801.

I arrived here about 10 o'clock last night, having met your son and Capt. Brown on the Madras side of Ooseotta. When passing Arcot, I took an opportunity of looking at my old friends the 19th light dragoons and the 4th regt. of cavalry, and I am happy to tell you that both these corps looked remarkably well. The horses of the 4th are lean, but their coats were smooth and clean. I acknowledge that I should have been much pleased if it had been possible to allow this corps to rest and refresh for 6 months at Arcot. I sent them into the Carnatic because I was aware that they required rest, and I knew that the men had not seen their families since the corps marched with the grand army to Seringapatam in February, 1799.

Allow me to recall to your recollection Mr. Gilmour, the superintending surgeon with the subsidiary force at Poonah, for one of the superintending surgeons in Malabar, *vice* those of the Bombay establishment, when they shall be removed.

Major Walker did me the favor to express a desire that I should look at the 8th regt. at Arcot, with which I complied. I never saw a more promising corps, or one so perfect in its exercise, or so good in its general appearance, for the time during which this corps has been embodied. It really does the Major much credit.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 2nd Dec. 1804.

1. I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I arrived here on the 30th Nov., and I propose to set out from hence to join the army in the Deccan as soon as the officers of the staff shall have arrived.

2. As I find that Major Malcolm's health is re-established, and I imagine that his services will not be required immediately in Mysore, where his duties are ably performed by Major Wilks, and as I shall derive the greatest benefit from the assistance and advice of Major Malcolm in the affairs which I may have to arrange, I have requested him to accompany me to camp, and Major Wilks to continue in charge of the Residency in Mysore, till your Excellency's further orders shall be received.

To Major Wilks.

Seringapatam, 4th Dec. 1804.

I enclose Capt. Lang's answer to Capt. Barelay's letter relative to the complaints made against him on his march from Chittledroog.

To Major Armstrong, Mil. Sec. to the Gov. General.      Seringapatam, 4th Dec. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 16th Nov., for which I am very much obliged to you. I think there is reason to hope that Gen. Lake will shortly bring the war to a conclusion. I send the copy of a long letter which I have received from Murray, and of the letter enclosed in it. I do not know what to do about this corps of his. I know that it is useless and dangerous for him to carry into execution the plan which he proposes, viz., to advance towards Kota; and yet, as the Commander in Chief

says that he has entirely lost his appetite, and does not rest. For God's sake send Sydenham off as soon as possible. There is no other mode whatever of providing for that Residency. Malcolm, although in some degree recovered, is neither in health nor strength sufficient to enable him to bear the journey, or the fatigues to which he would be liable at that durbar. He cannot go into the sun at all. I hear that the troops in the Deccan are miserably unhealthy; but the campaign there has been most successful. My palanquin boys will be laid on the road on Monday, and I shall set out on that evening.

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has ordered him to advance, I do not see how I can interfere. My intention was to order him to draw towards Guzerat, if the Resident with Scindiah did not think it desirable that he should stay in his territories. It appears that Col. Murray has determined to quit Ougain, but he advances to Kota by the orders of the Commander in Chief.

I have received Mr. Elphinstone's dispatches to the 4th Nov. The only danger which I apprehend is the meeting of the parties at Hoossingabad. I wish the corps in Bundeleund was better composed and provided.

All the officers are not yet arrived, but I shall set out as soon as they come, which will be, I believe, about the 8th. I shall take with me 3000 Mysore horse in very good order.

The Governor General will receive, in a few days after this letter, a most able and satisfactory report on the affairs of Mysore drawn up by Major Wilks. I recommend that he should send a copy of this paper to Fort St. George, and to order that it may be recorded at that Presidency. There is some little difference between that paper and my report, which may require an alteration in the Governor General's minute on the affairs of Mysore, but only in the details. The principles remain the same, but since the army has returned, it appears the account of the expenses of the war to the Rajah is larger than I supposed. His surplus revenue is also rather larger.

Extracts from the Report on the interior administration, resources, and expenditure of the government of Mysore, under the system prescribed by the Orders of the Governor General in Council, dated 4th Sept. 1799; by Major M. Wilks, acting Resident at Mysore, 5th Dec. 1804.

Major Wilks, acting Resident at Mysore, to Lord W. C. Bentinck, Governor in Council, &c., Fort St. George. Seringapatam, 5th Dec. 1804.

A variety of causes have prevented the successive Residents at the Court of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore from preparing, for the consideration of the government of Fort St. George, the detailed reports on the interior administration, the resources, and expenditure of the government of Mysore, which were prescribed in the orders of his Excellency the most noble the Governor General in Council, dated 4th Sept. 1799.

During a considerable portion of the time in which Col. Close filled that important office, his attention was necessarily engrossed by the means of establishing and consolidating the authority of the new government; and subsequently, a long series of severe ill health deprived the public of the useful information which, during that interval of leisure, might otherwise have been expected from his well known talents.

The successors of Col. Close have hitherto been prevented by other avocations of extensive national importance, from a residence in Mysore of sufficient continuance to admit of any considerable attention to the detail of such a report.

When to this state of things is added the turbulent character of the numerous Mahomedans, then inhabiting Mysore, who were necessarily excluded from the liberal provision which had been extended to the principal officers of the late administration, the task of establishing the new government was of no ordinary difficulty; and its early and successful accomplishment must, next to those measures of a general nature which directed the great arrangements of that period, be attributed to the energy, the talents, and cordial co-operation of the uncommon men who were selected for the execution of the civil\* and military† duties; and to tho

\* Col. Close, Mr. Webbe, Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

† Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

fortunate choice of a Dewan,\* who, to a mind of singular vigor, added an extensive acquaintance with the resources of the country, and an intimate knowledge of characters; and was thus capable of collecting and combining at once all that had been useful in the establishments of the late government.

The province of Bullum was never effectually conquered, until military roads were opened through the forest towns by the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley, in the year 1801-2.

The authority of Hyder Aly, or of Tippoo Suldaun, over this province, was extremely precarious, and the presence of an army was always necessary, to enforce the payment of the revenue; the rates of the land tax had accordingly fluctuated, but have been fixed by the present government at a standard which appears to be acceptable to the landholders. No part of Mysore has been more tranquil than Bullum, since the period that the actual authority of the government was for the first time introduced into that province in 1801-2.

The cordial and efficient support afforded by the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley to the government of Mysore, on all occasions, even during his absence, has not only prevented inconvenience, but has perhaps been essential to the prosperity of the country. I am far from intending an unbecoming compliment to that officer, at the expense of others, in stating a doubt, whether the same extent of support may be always afforded by his successors; because the actual duties of that command can never be made to prescribe the parental description of care with which the Hon. Major Gen. Wellesley has guarded the authority of the government of Mysore.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 5th Dec. 1804.

I am much concerned to have to inform your Excellency that I received last night, through a private, although authentic, channel, accounts of the death of Mr. Webbe, in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 9th Nov.

Your Excellency is so well acquainted with the merits of that gentleman, manifested by a long course of able and zealous service to the public, under your Excellency's administration, that it is unnecessary that I should take up your Excellency's time by an attempt to enumerate them; but I cannot avoid expressing the sorrow which I feel, on private as well as on public grounds, to have to announce to your Excellency this misfortune at such a crisis as the present. I take the liberty of expressing a most anxious wish that Capt. Sydenham may be sent to take charge of the Residency without loss of time.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 5th Dec. 1804.

I have sent off by express this day to the Governor General an account of the death of poor Webbe, and I hope that Sydenham will have left Calcutta before you will receive this letter. I now enclose a list of the villages which ought to fill up the blank in my letter to the Governor General of the 14th Nov., and a letter from Malcolm on the subject of Kistna's claims.

To E. Strachey, Esq.

Seringapatam, 5th Dec. 1804.

I have perused the copies of your letters which you sent to me, and

\* Purneah, a brahmin, who was formerly the minister of finance under Tippoo Suldaun; he was selected by Marquis Wellesley as a proper person to fill the important office of prime minister to the Rajah of Mysore.

your dispatch of the 25th Nov. I am fully satisfied that you did every thing in your power to bring your negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion; and I am convinced that they failed from causes which were not foreseen when you were dispatched on your mission, and which you could not control. The result of your mission, however, although not exactly what I could have wished, has been attended by many circumstances of public advantage. We have gained an accurate knowledge of the sentiments and intentions of all the southern chiefs; we know the real points of difference which exist between them and the Peshwah, between them and the Rajah of Kolapoor, and between each other; and we are enabled to form an opinion regarding the best mode of negotiating with them hereafter. I consider these advantages to be important, and that the public are indebted for them to your zeal, intelligence, and ability.

As it appears to me that I shall not have occasion to detain you for any great length of time from the duties of the office to which you have been appointed in Bengal by his Excellency the Governor General, I beg you to commence your journey to Calcutta whenever you may find it convenient to yourself.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 8th Dec. 1804.

I have received a copy of Mr. Edmonstone's letter of the 17th to Mr. Elphinstone, which has alarmed me a good deal. However, I shall delay to write upon the subject till I shall have turned over in my mind all that must be done in the crisis which may be expected.

The gentlemen of the staff arrived this day, and I propose to set out on the day after to-morrow. I have been sadly annoyed by my servants leaving me. Those who have lived with me ever since I arrived in India have declared that they will not return again into the Deccan. Indeed, if the prevalent reports are founded, they are not in the wrong; the sickness of the army is terrible, and must sweep off many who have escaped the famine.

I have received a letter from Capt. Mahony in Koorg, in which, among other things, he desires to know whether I heard any thing of the sword which the Governor General announced an intention of giving to the Rajah of Koorg. I think it would be desirable to send the sword round to Madras as soon as possible.

To Major Campbell.

Seringapatam, 8th Dec. 1801.

When I was at Madras, I was very anxious to have an opportunity of speaking to you and Major Munro, regarding your own situations and objects. Gen. Stuart was always most kind to me. I had no acquaintance with, or claims upon, him, excepting those of service; and I owe every thing to his confidence, his favorable opinion, and his support. I feel for him an affection and gratitude which I cannot describe; and nothing would give me greater pleasure than to forward the views of any of his friends in this country; particularly of officers so intimately connected with him as you and Major Munro. I therefore trust to you to let me know if you should think that I can render you, or Major Munro, or any of Gen. Stuart's friends the smallest service. We have sustained a sad

Gen. Fraser; and I most sincerely congratulate you upon them. I am rather of opinion, that these successes will render it unnecessary for me to go to the northward. However, I am prepared, and shall not delay after I am well to proceed, if I should find that they are not so complete as by the first accounts they appear to be; or if there should be any serious appearances in Berar.

I acknowledge that I do not agree with Elphinstone respecting the Rajah of Berar. He has undoubtedly been looking for Holkar's success; and if it had continued, he would have co-operated with Holkar. But I really believe the Rajah's armaments, at present, to be defensive; and I think that what he says himself, upon the subject of the letter from Meer Khan, is unanswerable. If we are to be in constant apprehension, my opinion is, that we are in a worse situation than we were before the last war; and there will be an end to surpluses, investments, and payments of debts. I hope that we shall take advantage of this great success against Holkar, to adopt a conciliatory language and policy with all the Native powers, and take my word for it, the peace will be permanent; if we adopt the other line, we shall have war immediately.

If we now go to war with the Rajah of Berar, I must have troops and money; and I must have civil servants, and establishments to take possession of, and govern, his country. Nothing else will answer. The Nizam must complete his subsidiary force; he must fill his forts in Berar proper with grain; and take measures to keep in tranquillity his own countries. Unless all these arrangements are adopted in time, we shall march to Nagpoor and plunder that place; but then we must return to procure provisions. After all, supposing that we should succeed in establishing a government at Nagpoor, it must be weak and precarious. I have received your letters of the 22nd Nov., and Sydenham's of the 23rd.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 11th Dec. 1801.

I received last night your letter of the 2nd, and I assure you that I have regretted most sincerely our poor friend. This loss is a public misfortune, in my judgment; and I am convinced will be so considered by every man who has a spark of public feeling, or the capacity to understand the public interests.

I arrived here on the 30th Nov., and should have marched for Poonah on the day before yesterday, only that I have had an attack not very unlike a fever and ague. I am induced to think it is nothing more than the increase of rheumatism, which I have had hanging about me for the last 18 months; but it is attended by all the symptoms and inconveniences, and requires the same remedies, as fever.

Gen. Lake's and Gen. Fraser's victories in Hindustan have made a great alteration in our situation. We have now a little time to breathe, and I acknowledge that I am of opinion that all will go right.

I do not participate in the fear of Elphinstone respecting the conduct of the Rajah of Berar. I am rather of opinion, that his armaments are intended for his own defence against Meer Khan, and not to annoy us. However, I think it will be a prudent measure to order the detachment in Candeish to draw towards Berar, by the valley of the Poorna, and to



take up a position somewhere in that country, which may be convenient for forage and other necessities; and at the same time will afford the facility of either immediately commencing offensive operations, or of acting on the defensive, as may be thought most proper. I am also of opinion, that Rajah Mohiput Ram ought to be desired immediately to commence forming magazines in Berar. This object he will be able to effect with great facility; particularly, if he is assisted with a little money.

I had some idea at first of breaking up the large detachment under Wallace, to bring his corps down towards Poonah; and to send Haliburton into Berar with his corps, being 4 battalions, the 94th regt., and 2 regiments of cavalry, and all the Mogul troops. In my opinion, this would still be the best plan, if the next letters from Elphinstone should be satisfactory, and if you should agree in opinion with me, that the Rajah of Berar's objects in his armaments are to defend himself. My reason for this opinion is, that I see that another corps of freebooters is forming about Perinda, and I suspect that it will be very troublesome, now that Scindiah has the country between Ahmednuggur and Poonah, unless opposed by a body of the Company's troops. But if Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, and Meer Khan, are likely to join with an intention to invade Berar and the Nizam's territories, the whole force will be required to oppose them; and the detachment, as now constituted, ought not to be broken up.

As for Scindiah, my opinion is, that he is hearty in his detestation of Holkar. He was reduced to great distress, and the British government either could not, or would not, give him assistance. In this state he was found by Sirjee Rao Ghautky, who immediately proposed to him the old Marhatta game, as a mode of relief from his distresses; Scindiah has adopted his proposition, and has acted accordingly against the Nabob or Bopal. However, in my opinion, the late successes against Holkar, and the offer of a supply of money to Eitul Punt, will bring all right again in that quarter; and possibly Sirjee Rao Ghautky will be blown from a gun, if something very bad does not happen before the accounts of Holkar's defeats will reach Scindiah in the Rajah of Berar's territories. I have seen Elphinstone's letter to you of the 20th Nov.

P.S. The 2 regiments of cavalry, and the battalion, were to march to Poonah by the route of Beejapoor. I think it would be advisable again to lay the hawk upon that road. These troops are under the orders of Col. Montresor, of the 22nd dragoons, and I wish that you would send him sircar hircarrahs, perwanahs, &c., to meet him. I have given him every thing I could.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 12th Dec. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 3rd. Your financial statement which it contains, is very satisfactory; and I see exactly, that we have to provide for the Madras corps for the month of Dec. (*i. e.*, arrears for Nov., Dec., and Jan.). There is not a farthing of money at Madras, or in the Ceded districts, or in Mysore. Indeed, I doubt much whether the cavalry, which will march from Bellary, will take with it a sufficient sum for its payment to the period at which Lord W. Bentinck promised to

provide for the payment of all the troops in the field, and in the Deccan. We have, therefore, no resource excepting the produce of our bills upon Bombay and Bengal; which, of course, must be negotiated and arranged by the government of Bombay, for reasons referrible to the Bombay finance. I must request you, therefore, to correspond with Mr. Duncan on the subject, and I think that you ought to have from Bombay the amount I mentioned to you in the letter which I wrote to you from Madras.

I had a very slight attack again last night, but I am better this morning than I have yet been, and I hope that I shall have no more.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 12th Dec. 1804.

Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received your letter of the 6th inst. I acknowledge that I do not attach so much importance as you do to the information received from Elphinstone, or to the movements of the armies of Seindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, as you will have observed by my letter of yesterday. However, I may be wrong, and I know that I want information, as I have not received any intelligence from Seindiah's durbar, or the opinion of its temper from our lamented friend, for a great length of time.

My letter of yesterday will have communicated my opinion of the measures to be adopted immediately, in case you should think the danger real. Besides this, I think we ought to keep the Madras corps, notwithstanding they may be relieved by others from Bombay. Keep the 18th, at all events, till we see the result of these movements in Berar, and I will take it upon myself.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 14th Dec. 1804.

Col. Close has sent me a copy of Mr. Jenkins' dispatch to Mr. Edmonstone, of the 15th Nov.; which, although short, appears to me to contain some very important matter.

I think it almost certain, that the accounts of the victories of the British armies of the 13th and 17th Nov. will produce an alteration in the councils of Seindiah. He will not be so ready to join himself with Meer Khan, and neither will be bold enough to venture upon an attack upon the British possessions. The facts, however, stated in Mr. Jenkins' dispatch are curious, and well deserving the attention of every European politician who has any thing to say to India. Seindiah, whose enmity to Holkar was become proverbial; who allied himself with the Company for the express purpose of defending himself against, and eventually destroying, Holkar; who rejoiced when he found that the war was determined on and inevitable; who has suffered severely in its progress by Holkar's plunder of his town of Mundleysir, and by Meer Khan's plunder of Bhilsa; and who has every thing to hope from its successful conclusion, which the smallest exertion on his part would ensure; instead of making that exertion against his enemy, joins his enemy for the purpose of destroying his friend and ally.

It is unfortunate that I have not yet got the copies of the memorandum, and other papers which I gave to the Governor General at different times,

when I was in Bengal; as, in considering this subject, I should have wished to have before me the details of what was intended for Scindiah. However, I believe I recollect enough to be able to make what I shall say tolerably clear.

There can be no doubt but that Scindiah has already broken the treaty of defensive alliance. Whether the intelligence sent by Mr. Jenkins, of his connexion with Meer Khan, and its object, be true or false, it is probable that he will not now act according to the plan which that intelligence supposes that he has formed; and it will rest with the British government to determine what line of policy it will adopt. If Scindiah should act upon the plan supposed in Mr. Jenkins' intelligence, the British government have no option; we must take Malwa for ourselves, and destroy him and his government. That will certainly be a difficult object to accomplish; but we have no alternative between that and being destroyed ourselves. He will not act upon that plan, however, and the question is what line we shall adopt.

In the case of a breach of treaty, it certainly rests with the British government to adopt that measure which will be most convenient for its own interests. It would be fully justified in having recourse to arms, at the same time that war is not the necessary consequence of every breach of treaty. The question, therefore, is simply one of convenience; and upon this point I have no scruple in declaring, that the present is of all others the worst time to attempt the conquest of Malwa; which must be the object of the war, and the only one which can bring it to a conclusion. We have neither troops, money, civil servants, magazines, nor any one object which would be necessary to carry this plan into execution. There are other reasons also for delaying to attempt it, referrible to the state of affairs in England. It will not be easy hereafter for Scindiah to get any European allies; and his armies and resources will certainly not improve during the interval in which we may think proper to leave him to himself, and to the prosecution of his own plans against Holkar.

The plan which I should recommend to the Governor General would be to call upon Scindiah now to take measures to seize Holkar; if he should refuse, or omit to take any measures for that purpose, I would leave him to himself. I would form the armies in Bundelcund, and in the conquered provinces, according to the plan proposed in one of my memorandums; and the subsidiary forces with the Subah of the Deccan and the Peshwah on the Godavery, according to a plan proposed in one of my letters to you, and another to the Governor General. I would then intimate to Kavel Nyn, or whoever may be the head of the English party at Scindiah's durbar, that the Governor General had been prepared to advance money to Scindiah, and to assist him with troops in the true spirit of the defensive alliance, in order to enable him to settle a government in Malwa, but that Scindiah had broken it in all its essential articles, and that the British government would not revive it; or would not act upon it in any manner as long as Sirjee Rao Ghautky formed a part of the council, or remained in Scindiah's presence. At the same time, I would intimate an intention to perform every article of the treaty of peace.

This plan of conduct may revive the English party, and if it should,

we may depend upon its permanence, and may act with it in the spirit of the defensive alliance; but if Ghautky should last, we may have peace with Scindiah for a time, and possibly, after the example which has been made of Holkar, for a very long time, but we cannot venture to act upon the defensive alliance.

It may be asked, what will be done with Holkar, who, I suppose, has escaped alive? I answer, he cannot now be formidable to the British government. Let him be followed, as I proposed in one of my memorandums to the Governor General, with a reward for his apprehension. If we should take him, so much the better; if not, leave him to his contest with Scindiah, which will revive with double fury.

At all events, Scindiah's intentions being doubtful, I should hesitate to advance into Malwa any but such a body of troops, that it does not appear that the means of the Commander in Chief are capable of appointing. If such a body of troops should advance into Malwa under present circumstances, it would be best at once to seize that province for ourselves.

But I conceive it impossible to form or support such an army at present: the first operation, I suppose, after the battle of the 13th, will have been to invest Deeg, and prevent the escape of any of Holkar's troops or guns; and I conclude that the Rajah of Bhurtpoor will be punished. If Holkar has flown off to the southward, which I suppose he must have done, the cavalry ought to be joined to the Bundelcund corps, which, if there be any, is now the point of danger. According to this plan, with the troops in Hindustan and the Deccan posted as proposed, Ragojee Bhoonslah satisfied, and the Residents at the durbars of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar vigilant, but not unnecessarily alarmed, we should be in a great situation; though certainly not in that state in which we should have been if many unfortunate events had not occurred since the treaties of peace were concluded.

P.S. I have received Mr. Elphinstone's dispatches to the 2nd Nov. I am rather better, but not well yet.

To J. Duncan, Esq.

Seringapatam, 16th Dec. 1804.

In respect to Col. Murray's operations, it is my opinion that they ought now to be more solid than they have been hitherto. He ought to attack Hinglisghur, or any other fort that Holkar may have in that neighbourhood, of which he may be able to get possession. I do not know what orders the Colonel has received from the Commander in Chief, and I cannot venture to give him any.

The Commander in Chief's late victories, however, have made a very material alteration in the situation of affairs; and Col. Murray's advance to the northward cannot now answer any purpose, excepting to distress his own troops, and to place Guzerat in a state of risk. By undertaking the siege of Hinglisghur, or any other fort in that quarter, and within his reach, he will not only forward the objects of the war, but will secure his own position; and he will not be far removed from Guzerat, in case it should be necessary to move into that province. I am induced to give you this opinion, not only from a consideration of the state of the war

with Holkar in Hindustan, but from a general view of the politics of the other courts at the present moment.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 16th Dec. 1804.

Since I wrote to you on the day before yesterday, it has occurred to me that the Governor General may imagine that I wish to recommend to him a violent remonstrance to Scindiah. That is far from my intention; I doubt whether any remonstrance is advisable; at all events a violent one can never be so, and it is certainly very undignified. What I recommend is to leave Scindiah to himself, if he should refuse or omit to attack Holkar; and just to hint to his ministers that as long as Sirjee Rao should remain with him, the British government would do nothing.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan. I am still unwell.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 17th Dec. 1804.\*

I rather think that it would be best to send Goklah on the service against the Prittee Niddee. He will have performed it, it may be expected, before I can reach Poonah; and, at all events, supposing that he should not, there can be no difficulty in drawing him off again.

I saw the dispatch from Major Kirkpatrick regarding Scindiah's va-keel, before I received your letter. It affords another proof that we cannot go on with Scindiah's durbar, if Sirjee Rao Ghautky is continued the minister. It also shows clearly the disposition and intention of that durbar, if Holkar's successes had continued.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I wrote yesterday to Mr. Duncan, regarding Col. Murray's operations. I propose to write this day to Col. Kirkpatrick, regarding the want of troops on the western frontier, and in Berar.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 19th Dec. 1804.

The late dispatches from Mr. Elphinstone to his Excellency the Governor General, particularly one of the 27th Nov., in which he relates a conversation with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, upon the subject of the claims of the Rajah of Berar upon the Soubah's government, for the

\* Sec. of Gov. to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 18th Dec. 1801.

The Governor General in Council deems it to be probable that you will have received from Col. Close all such notification of the arrangement which has been adopted by that officer, from withdrawing Lieut. Col. Wallace to Poonah, in consequence of his supercession in the command of the detachments from the subsidiary forces of Poonah and Hyderabad, by the promotion of Lieut. Col. Haliburton to the rank of Colonel, and for purposes connected with the present condition of the battalions stationed at Poonah; I am directed, however, to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a dispatch from Col. Close stating that arrangement, and the circumstances which, in his opinion, appeared to require its adoption.

The Governor General in Council is of opinion that the arrangement adopted by Col. Close is judicious and proper; his Excellency, however, is pleased to refer the question to you, and to desire that you will communicate to Col. Close your sentiments on the subject of his dispatch.

It is further his Excellency's desire that you will consider the means of providing for the command of the detachment, in the event of your not assuming that command in person; and the Governor General in Council hereby authorises you, in the event of your deeming such a measure to be necessary or expedient, to direct Col. Haliburton to retire to Hyderabad during the continuance of the detachment from the subsidiary force on its present service.

revenues of the pergunahs under Gawilghur, collected by his Highness' officers, render it expedient that I should trouble you upon that subject. There can be no doubt of the justice of the demand of the Rajah of Berar; and it is unfortunate that at this moment he should have a just claim of this description, and still more so, that one of the Company's allies should evade, or delay, to satisfy him. I therefore most earnestly urge you to adopt such measures as you may think most likely to obtain speedy payment for the Rajah; and to communicate upon this subject with the Rajah's vakeel at the Soubah's durbar; and to correspond with Mr. Elphinstone concerning it; in order that the Rajah of Berar may know not only that the British government is not concerned in this act of injustice, but that you have exerted yourself to remedy it.

Connected with this subject is the entirely defenceless state of the province of Berar. It is strange that the Soubah's government should be guilty of an act of injustice which, at any other period, would have occasioned an attack from the Rajah of Berar, and that he should not adopt common precautions for the security of that valuable territory. You will observe that this state of want of defence has not escaped the observation of the Rajah's ministers; and that they expect that Meer Khan's pindarries will make an irruption into the province. The consequences will be fatal to the Soubah's government; the least important will be the loss of the revenue of Berar, and of all the advantages acquired in the late war; and I therefore request you to adopt such measures as you may think necessary, to oblige the Soubah to provide for the defence of this part of his territories.

I have not received any accounts of the state of affairs on the western frontier, to which you refer in your late dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General. During the last war, the banditti upon this same frontier increased in number, because they were neglected; and, at last, nothing but the British troops could force them. The same causes will have the same effects this year; but it must not be forgotten, that the loss to the Soubah, in the mean time, is immense. I must also request that you will point out to the Soubah's government, that the British troops cannot hold out against the constant exertions which they are obliged to make in his service; exertions rendered necessary, not by the common course of events, but by the faults and neglects of his government.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 19th Dec. 1804.

I conclude that if circumstances in Candeish should have permitted, you will have desired that the British detachments in that province should march into Berar, according to the suggestions contained in my private letter of the 11th inst. If you should have complied with my suggestions in that instance, I beg leave now to recommend that, in case the Rajah of Berar should call for assistance to repel the attack of Meer Khan, or any of the other chiefs attached to the cause of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, you will authorise the officer commanding the British troops to move to his assistance without loss of time; provided that he is of opinion that he can do so without risk to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan; provided that his equipments of provisions, &c., are so ample as

to place him beyond risk of want in the territories of the Rajah of Berar, and to render him independent of any supplies which he might expect there; and provided that he has reasonable ground for hope, that by entering the Rajah's country, he will be able to bring Meer Khan's corps to an action.

It is my opinion that the British detachment cannot be moved far to the northward of Nagpoor, in aid of the Rajah, without exposing the Nizam's territories; but there may be cases in which to move it even to that city might equally endanger the safety of those territories: of all those cases, of course, the officer in command on the spot must be the best judge. I propose to send Mr. Elphinstone a copy of this dispatch, and I enclose the copy of the letter which I have written to Mr. Elphinstone.

To the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

Seringapatam, 19th Dec. 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your several public and private dispatches to the 30th Nov., and I am happy to inform you that I am perfectly satisfied that the intentions of the Rajah of Berar are pacific. It is very possible that he may have opened a negotiation with Holkar or Meer Khan, the object of which may have been hostility towards the British government; but the design to attack us, if it ever existed, has certainly been relinquished by the Rajah; and it is most probable that he has been attacked by Meer Khan for this reason.

It is not improbable that as soon as the Rajah of Berar shall hear of the late successes of the troops under the command of his Excellency the Commander in Chief, he will ask for the assistance of the Hon. Company against Meer Khan; particularly if the operations of that freebooter should press upon him, and if his troops should approach to Nagpoor. It does not appear to me that the Rajah of Berar possesses the means of paying for any assistance that may be afforded to him; much less those of subsidising permanently a body of the British troops. At the same time, it would be very desirable to afford him assistance against Meer Khan; particularly if that freebooter should be too strong for him, and if the assistance can be given without risk to the Company's allies.

I have therefore written a letter to Col. Close this day, of which I enclose a copy. I have requested him to authorise the officer commanding the British detachment, which will shortly be in Berar, to move to the assistance of the Rajah, if he should be required to do so, on certain provisions therein stated. I beg you to take an opportunity of mentioning this circumstance to Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, and point out to him the extent of the service which may thereby be rendered to the Rajah's state.

In case the Rajah should require the Company's assistance, I beg you to examine very minutely the grounds which he may have for calling for it; and I beg you to decline to write to the officer commanding the detachment in Berar, unless you should have reason to think that the danger which menaces the Rajah's state is great and immediate.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 19th Dec. 1804.

I cannot better explain my opinion of the Rajah of Berar's intentions

than by sending the enclosed copies of 2 letters which I have written this day to Mr. Elphinstone and Col. Close.

P.S. I rather think the state of affairs, at present, to be such as that the Governor General would prefer that I should return to England to my going into the Deccan. However, I have not decided yet; I wait the next dispatches from Mr. Jenkins; and I shall then, I hope, be quite well, and shall be able to set out, if it should be necessary.\*

To Col. Close.

Seringapatnam, 24th Dec. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 16th inst. It appears that we are not in the situation at Scindiah's durbar in which we ought to be; and I acknowledge that I doubt much whether we shall ever be able to carry into execution the treaty of defensive alliance. But there is a wide difference between the omission to act upon that treaty, and a state of war; and whatever may be the result eventually of Scindiah's conduct, I am convinced that as soon as he shall hear of the defeat of Holkar's armies, he will adopt such a course of proceeding as will leave it in our option either to declare war or preserve peace. I have written my opinion fully upon that subject to the private secretary. The result and object of such a war must be to establish the Company's authority in Malwa; an operation for which we are but ill prepared at present, and therefore I conclude that if peace is the ultimate object of every war, we ought to delay this war, if in our power, till we are prepared with the means of insuring that object.

This state of affairs will be very uncomfortable, I acknowledge, and may interfere with many essential objects; but it is the consequence of our policy, our disasters, and of other unfortunate events since the peace, to which no remedy can now be applied. One of the consequences of this state of affairs at Scindiah's durbar, will be the necessity of forming the two subsidiary forces upon the Godavery. This will be very inconvenient, for many reasons, and may possibly interfere with our settlement of the southern chiefs; at the same time this state of affairs renders a settlement with these chiefs more important. It is obvious that the sub-

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\* The Sec. of Gov. to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 22nd Dec. 1804.

1. I am directed by his Excellency the most noble the Governor General, to transmit to you, for your information, the accompanying copy of a dispatch to the acting Resident at the Court of Dowlat Rao Scindiah, of this date.

2. A copy of his Excellency's instructions to the Resident at Nagpoor, referred to in the 24th par. of the enclosed document, will be transmitted to you in a separate dispatch.

3. You will observe, from the tenor of the enclosed document, that his Excellency the Governor General has judged it proper to place under your control the conduct of those officers in the prescribed negotiations at their respective Courts. With reference to this arrangement, I am directed to observe, that the instructions which you may have occasion to issue to the acting Resident with Dowlat Rao Scindiah, and to the Resident at Nagpoor, under the present communication of his Excellency's sentiments and resolutions, must necessarily be regulated by the course of events, and by the tenor of the communications which you may receive from those officers; but that the extensive powers with which you have been invested will enable you to act, under any state of circumstances, without any reference to the Governor General's authority.

4. With a view to provide for the defect of your presence with the army of the Deccan, or at Poonah, at the time when this dispatch may arrive at that station, the Governor General has deemed it necessary provisionally to invest Col. Close with authority to regulate and control the proceedings of the acting Resident with Dowlat Rao Scindiah, and the Resident at Nagpoor.



subsidiary force can never be employed in any operation for the support of the Peshwah's internal government, and till that settlement is made he can have no force of his own. On the other hand, it may prove difficult to fix a time at which it will be safe to move the subsidiary troops to the southward, from their station on the Godavery, in order to effect the settlement with the southern chiefs, which is so important.

Under these circumstances, it has occurred to me that we ought to take advantage of the present moment, to effect the settlement with the southern chiefs. I am decidedly of opinion that the troops of the Deccan cannot cross the Taptee, and that the force which Col. Haliburton has with him to the northward is fully equal to any thing that can be brought against him, if not stronger than is necessary. Might not the Madras corps, coming down from Poonah, with one of the Bombay battalions, and the 2 regiments of cavalry ordered up from the Ceded districts, reinforced by Goklah, move down towards the Kistna, and effect this long wished for settlement? The only doubt I have upon the subject is, their equipment; for I judge from your letter of the 16th, that Wallace has returned alone, and has left his bazaars, departments, &c., with Col. Haliburton's corps. If that should be the case, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to equip a corps for him at Poonah, as it ought to be; and if his corps should not be properly equipped, it would be better that the business should not be attempted.

The only chance, then, remaining, of effecting a settlement with the southern chiefs, will be to assemble a corps hereafter upon the frontiers of Mysore or the Ceded districts, when all the Madras troops shall have returned within the Madras territories; this will be expensive, but it cannot be avoided. If this should be the case, the object of your attention should be, as soon as possible, to form the Peshwah's subsidiary corps upon the Godavery, somewhere about Toka, and engage as many brinjaries as possible to attend it.

While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid adverting to a very material point, viz., the settlement, on a permanent basis, of the Peshwah's authority in Candeish and the countries on the Godavery, which heretofore were in the possession of Amrut Rao. In this point, two or three subjects are involved, upon which I wish to furnish you with my opinion. The first of these is the person to whose charge the territories in Candeish should be given. In my opinion they ought to be given to one of the Peshwah's ministers. Supposing that it were possible to find another person sufficiently qualified and rich to take charge of these territories, he would find it difficult to support himself in the management, against the constant intrigues working in the durbar at Poonah; the result would be that we should be obliged to take them from him, which would be equivalent to a fresh conquest of Candeish. I only mention this point as one of importance; of course the manager of Candeish must have been fixed upon long ago, and I trust that he has possession of the whole.

The next subject for consideration is the mode of defending and supporting the government in that province. I should wish much to see our troops withdrawn from the forts; and as we have drawn off towards Berar by this time, and may not require the communication with Surat, I beg

you to turn over in your mind, whether we might not give possession of the forts to the Peshwah. But how is the Peshwah to keep them? is a consideration of great importance, in which the competency of the manager appointed again falls in the way. If one of the ministers is the manager, I believe we may depend upon his keeping possession, provided he has a few good troops; but I really think that in a state of such importance as the possession of that frontier province, we ought to stretch a point, to see that the Peshwah has a few good troops to support his government in it, and defend its forts. What say you to allowing him an European officer or two to discipline a body of infantry, to be placed under the manager of Candeish, to defend the forts, &c.? Such a corps, countenanced and supported, as it would be, by the subsidiary force stationed near Toka, and by the Nizam's subsidiary force lower down the Godavery, would do every thing we could require, and would keep the rascals effectually out of the Deccan, particularly if I can prevail on the Nizam's government to have something of the same kind in Berar. Let me have your sentiments upon the whole of this letter.\*

To Col. Close.

Serlingapatam, 25th Dec. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 17th. In respect to Joolall, he appears to be on the Nerbudda, and he may certainly return into Candeish as soon as he hears of Col. Haliburton's march into Berar.

Scindwah, and the countries north of the Taplee, were to fall to Scindiah's share of Holkar's spoils; and it was my intention that that fort should be attacked eventually, by the subsidiary corps to serve with that chief. That, however, appears now to be very uncertain; and if advantage should be taken of the possession of Scindwah, or even of Myhissur, to disturb Candeish, and the Rajah of Berar should remain tranquil, and

\* The Sec. of Gov. to Major Gen. Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 25th Dec. 1804.

1. The recent dispatches received from the Residents at Nagpoor, and with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, combined with the actual state of affairs at Hyderabad, have appeared to render it expedient to issue instructions to the Rt. Hon. Lord W. Bentinck, of which I enclose a copy for your information.

2. In conformity to the tenor of the 2nd paragraph of those instructions, I desire that you will communicate to Lord W. Bentinck your sentiments as to the most advisable mode of strengthening the detachment now stationed at Hyderabad, if you should deem that measure to be necessary or advisable; and that you will adopt such other arrangements as may be within the reach of your immediate authority, for completing the corps which it is proposed to establish at that city.

3. You will observe that the utmost addition which it is proposed to make to the detachment now at Hyderabad is one regiment of Europeans, one regiment of the cavalry, and 2 battalions of sepoys, with the usual proportion of artillery; you will, however, possess more correct means of judging at the period of time when this dispatch may reach you, whether such an addition, or any other reinforcement of the corps now at Hyderabad, be necessary; and I accordingly authorise you to modify the proposed arrangements in such manner as you may deem advisable with reference to the state of affairs in the Deccan, and to the means which you may possess of furnishing the additional troops required for the service at Hyderabad. Under any circumstance, it appears to me to be desirable, during the continuance of hostilities, to strengthen the corps at Hyderabad; and I conclude, that as soon as you receive this dispatch, you will direct the battalion of Madras sepoys, which has been ordered to return from Poonah to the territories of Fort St. George, to proceed in the first instance to Hyderabad.

4. Copies of this dispatch, and of my instructions of this date to Lord W. Bentinck, have been forwarded to the Resident at Hyderabad, who is also directed to communicate with you on this subject, and to whom you will be pleased to signify an early intimation of the measures which you may adopt in consequence of these instructions.

Scindiah and Meer Khan keep to the northward of the Nerbudda, we must make an effort to take possession of Seindwah by means of Col. Haliburton's corps. I conclude that it will be possible to bring it back from Berar, if all should be quiet on the side of Nagpoor.

As I see that we have a store in Jaulna, it will perhaps be necessary to retain, for some time longer, a British garrison in that fort. Upon this point you will be the best judge. Certainly, if we operate against Scindwah from the Deccan, the depôt at Jaulna becomes of great importance. It is my opinion that the store of rice at Poonah ought to be in this year 40,000 loads, and 10,000 in Ahmednuggur. With a large store at Poonah it is always in your power to throw grain forward to any of the posts in advance; and if you should be able to do any thing to the southward in this year, it will be more conveniently situated there than at Ahmednuggur.

I am sorry to lose Major Graham. However, I have no doubt that Mr. Frissell will do his business well.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 26th Dec. 1804.

I received last night your letter upon the subject of Lieut. Frissell's appointment to take charge of the collector's office at Ahmednuggur, in which you included your correspondence with Mr. Waring upon that subject. You are responsible for the choice of the person who should undertake the conduct of Major Graham's duties upon his departure; and it is my opinion that it was not necessary that you should choose a gentleman among those belonging to the Residency. But supposing that it had been necessary that you should depute one of your assistants upon this duty, I conclude that you are not bound to choose any particular gentleman; all that is necessary is that the gentleman you should choose should be qualified, and I really believe Lieut. Frissell to be so. On these grounds I conceive that Mr. Waring has not any reason to complain, more particularly as you have thought it proper to state your reasons for having deputed Lieut. Frissell rather than him upon this duty; which reasons must have satisfied his mind that you had no disinclination to employ his talents, whenever circumstances would permit.

Mr. Waring has written me a few lines upon this subject, and I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to him this letter.

To Capt. Mahony, at Koorg.

Seringapatam, 27th Dec. 1804.

I am very much obliged to you for the perusal of all the papers which have been written regarding the transfer of the territory in Canara to the Rajah of Koorg; they have been copied, and now returned to you. It is very satisfactory to see that this arrangement has been made in a manner conformable to the spirit which prevailed in the original grant. I shall take care that the Rajah of Soonda is received at the military stations in Canara, in the same manner as he was received when he before passed into Koorg, which I believe was satisfactory to the Rajah of Koorg.

To Major Wilks.

Seringapatam, 27th Dec. 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 26th inst.

I have ordered a division Native Court Martial to assemble at the Town Major's office in Seingapatam, at 10 o'clock in the forenoon, on

Saturday the 29th inst., for the trial of the sepoys concerned in the theft mentioned in your letter, and I request that you will order them to be sent in prisoners to Seringapatam, and the witnesses, who compose part of your escort, to attend the Court Martial.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 27th Dec. 1804.

I received last night a private account from Poonah that Vincentjee Bhonslah had taken possession of Manik Droog, in Berar. This place is exceedingly strong, and must have been lost by the treachery of the kil-ladar, or the neglect of the Nizam's government to keep in it a proper and well paid garrison; but those points, however interesting, and upon which I shall give my opinion hereafter, are not so important as the consideration of the mode in which the place has been taken.

Nana Sahib, as he is called, has always been discontented, and has generally been in rebellion against the government of the Rajah of Berar. He suffered particularly by the construction given to the article of the treaty of Deogaum, in respect to the tributary Rajahs; and he has always been of the war faction at Nagpoor.

The first intelligence we have received of the fall of Manik Droog is from the Rajah of Berar's minister. If the Rajah had intended to attack the Company, it is my opinion that he would not have directed his efforts on the side of Berar, but on that of the Bengal provinces, on which alone the Marhattas know well that they can make any impression which can materially affect us. Under these circumstances I am induced to conclude, *prima facie*, that the Rajah has nothing to do with this attack, and that Nana Sahib alone is to blame.

Our policy and our arms have reduced all the powers in India to the state of mere cyphers; at the same time that their intriguing, discontented, and rebellious followers still remain, with increased causes of discontent, diminished sources of profit, and field for speculation and plunder. Nothing can keep these people in order excepting the Company's arms, or a complete state of defence on all points which they can reach.

The Company's arms cannot be every where; at this moment we have 6 disposable battalions in the Deccan: and because the allies do not choose to defend themselves or their territories, their services are required on the frontiers of Candesh; on the frontier of Berar; at Manik Droog; on the Nizam's western frontier, between the Godavery, Ahmednuggur, and Poonah; and upon the Kistna. There remains then only to force the allies to take some measures to defend themselves; and upon this point I have already written volumes.

All that I can say upon the subject is, that it is not in the power of the troops to march over the ground, much less to do all that is required from them at this moment; and we must either alter our system in respect to our allies, or we must double or treble the subsidiary force with each, or our Empire must crumble to pieces from its size, and the inefficiency of the measures adopted for its defence and preservation.

There is another supposed remedy, viz., to make the Rajah of Berar in this instance, and other hostile powers in similar instances, responsible for the acts of those who sally out from their countries on these plundering expeditions. That would do very well in Europe; and if the Governor

General is prepared to take possession of the territories of the Rajah of Berar, what has happened at Manik Droog affords a good pretence. But I say that neither the Nizam, the Peshwah, Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, nor the Guickwar, have the power of controlling their own servants, from causes which it is not necessary now to canvass; and therefore I think that it would not be quite just to punish any of those powers for acts for which they cannot be responsible.

In respect to the steps to be taken on this occasion, I can give no opinion till I shall receive more detailed information. But I suspect that we can do no more than tell the Rajah, that we require him not to give protection to his brother in his country, after this act of hostility. I have desired that if it should be practicable, Col. Lang, who took Manik Droog before, may be sent there again with 2 battalions, and Salabut Khan's horse, to retake the place: but this is a terribly inconvenient movement at the present moment; and I cannot express to you the concern with which I have desired that the troops may be again made to march this great distance.

If the Governor General is resolved to turn out Meer Alum, that is to say, if any body else can be appointed with a better prospect of success, this would be a favorable opportunity to remonstrate with the Soubah against his conduct.

To Col. Close.

Seingapatam, 27th Dec. 1804.

If poor Webbe were alive now, I should have no doubt that we should be able to drive out Ghautky with disgrace to himself and his adherents, and re-establish our friends and influence. Mr. Jenkins ought to receive instructions framed upon a memorandum of mine in the end of Nov., which embraced all points, and a little dexterity would settle every thing. The want of money by Seindiah offers the most favorable opportunity that could occur for the operation of the new plan, and if taken advantage of, with ability, would certainly re-establish every thing.

I think that you will do well to order a detachment against the Bheels, but take care that it is sufficiently strong and well supplied, and that it has guns.

I have already told you that I thought that Goklah should be sent against Prittee Niddee; I understood that an arrangement had been made which provided for the pay of his corps, out of the Ahmedabad farm. What more is required? If you will let me know the particulars, I will consider the subject, and give you an answer.

Rajah Mohiput Ram's intelligence is proverbially false; and it would be well to give Col. Haliburton a caution not to attend to it implicitly.

I received last night your letter of the 19th. It is certainly very difficult to form a judgment of the intention of the Marhattas; but I acknowledge that I am of opinion that the Rajah of Berar is not hostile. The attack upon Manik Droog has been made, in my opinion, without his knowledge or consent. His brother has generally been in rebellion against his government, and he has always been discontented. He suffered particularly by the operation of the peace, and by the Governor General's seizure of the tributary Rajahs upon the frontier; he has been always the main spring of the intrigues of Nagpoor. There is no longer

any power in any of the governments to restrain the rebellious and discontented spirits, and we must expect that they will fly out whenever they see a weak or undefended point. The only remedy is, to be guarded every where, and to force our allies to keep up troops for their own defence. Till that is effected, our system is rotten to the core, and our empire must crumble to atoms by the operations of its size and weakness. The question in this instance is, would it be fair or politic to make the Rajah of Berar responsible for the conduct of his brother? *Prima facie*, I say it would not; but before I can decide, I must have more knowledge of the details of the transaction. In the mean time it is a most distressing event; we have only 6 or 7 disposable battalions in the Deccan, and their services are called for on the frontiers of Candeish, on the frontiers of Berar; at Manik Droog, near Perinda; against the Bheels; and on the Kistna. It is difficult to say what ought to be done. However, if Scindiah and Meer Khan remain across the Nerbudda, and the Rajah of Berar is still quiet, the best mode would be to detach Lang with 2 battalions and Salabut Khan's horse against Manik Droog, to keep Haliburton to the northward in Berar, somewhere upon the Poorna, and to endeavor to equip Wallace's corps again at Poonah.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 29th Dec. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 20th. I suspected that Manik Droog was not taken, as we had no report of the circumstance from Hyderabad; and I am glad to find that the circumstance is contradicted from Nagpoor. I am only afraid now that the Rajah will be bullied into a war, before he can hear of Holkar's defeat.

The Nizam must defend his own country against common plunderers, and the Company must not be involved in a war upon every trifling occasion of this description.

It is my opinion that there ought to be at Poonah and Ahmednuggur the quantity of rice stated in my former letter upon this subject. The arrack at Panwell, if brought up to Poonah, will make the supply sufficient for the present. You will see Manik Droog to the westward of the Wurda, in the map of Lang's marches in Berar, of which Capt. Johnson has a copy. Lang took the place, and says it is strong.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 29th Dec. 1804.

I received last night the further accounts from Nagpoor, which afford ground for hope that Manik Droog has not been taken. Indeed, I suspected that this was the case, as we had had no alarm on the subject from Hyderabad.

I am only apprehensive now, that the Rajah will be bullied into a war, before he can receive the accounts of Holkar's defeats.

The Nizam must be made to defend his own countries against these common plunderers: it will not answer to have a national war every time a few fellows collect and take advantage of the defenceless state in which the Nizam's government choose to keep their countries.

P.S. I hope that Sydenham has been sent away to his station. Mr. Jenkins is a clever young man; but I am decidedly of opinion, that a little dexterity would now turn every thing at Scindiah's durbar in our favor.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 30th Dec. 1804.

I received last night your letter of the 23rd. I enclose a few lines which I wrote to Shawe on the 16th, as explanatory of my sentiments written to him in detail on the 14th.

I shall write to you a public letter on the subject of *Lieut. St. John Blacker*. It occurs to me that it will be advisable to alter your arrangement respecting the *Ahmednuggur* collector's office, now that *Capt. T. Sydenham* is coming to take charge of the Residency at Poonah. *Mr. Waring* will not remain with him as his assistant; and *Mr. Frissell* will be of more use to him by far than *Mr. Waring* could, who will do the duty of the collector's office very well. Under these circumstances I have written to *Mr. Waring*, to desire that the alteration may be made as soon as *Sydenham* shall arrive at Poonah.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 30th Dec. 1804.

I have received from *Mr. Edmonstone* a copy of his dispatch to you of the 4th inst.; and from you, your private letter of the 23rd inst., by which I learn that you were likely to commence your march towards *Col. Wallace's* camp on the 26th inst.

The detachment of cavalry attached to the Resident at the durbar of *Dowlut Rao Scindiah* was made unusually large, on account of particular circumstances in that officer's situation; and it appears that the charge was too extensive for a Native officer, the late Resident having had strong grounds for complaint against the *soubahdar* who had the command of the party. Under these circumstances, I think it very desirable that an European officer of cavalry should have the command of this detachment, and I request you to give the command of it to *Lieut. St. John Blacker*, of the 1st regt. of cavalry, who I understand has lately gone to Poonah on leave of absence.

I shall take measures to apprise his Excellency the Governor General, and the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George, of this appointment.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 30th Dec. 1804.

I have received the copy of *Mr. Edmonstone's* dispatch to Col. Close, of the 4th inst. This arrangement may answer well; but I must still take the liberty to press that *Sydenham* may be sent to the Residency with *Scindiah*; if it is intended that he should fill that situation. We must not forget, that if *Webbe* had had with him a person in whom, from his age, experience, and station, he or the public could have had confidence, he would have halted, and have left the Residency in his charge; and if he had been able to halt, he would have recovered. *Col. Close* is in a very bad state of health; he has a fever regularly every year, and possibly oftener; and he keeps it off only by doses of laudanum. Surely it will not answer to expose the public interests a second time to such inconvenience, if not danger, as has existed since the death of poor *Webbe*. But at all events, I know that *Col. Close*, and indeed every man, would feel uncomfortable, at taking such a charge as that Residency, without the possibility of being able to resign it into competent hands in case of sickness; and as, of course, he would not desire to remain there longer

than during the period which may be necessary to accomplish the objects of his particular mission, he will wish to see on the spot the person possessing the confidence of the Governor General, to whom he can resign, when it shall be expedient or necessary.

If Sydenham's services are so desirable to the Governor General that he cannot spare him, it would be better for the public interests to appoint another gentleman to the Residency with Scindiah. There is one at Madras, who, for sense, discretion, and a knowledge of the languages, is fully qualified. This is Capt. Munro, who was secretary and Persian interpreter to Gen. Stuart, and who, I imagine, will not be employed by Gen. Cradock. But, of course, if this officer should be employed in a diplomatic situation, he must have some chance and hopes of rising, as he will give up the offices which he now holds of D. Q. M. Gen. of the army, and of Persian interpreter to head quarters. I am afraid that I shall be deemed a bore upon this subject; however, I have now said enough, and shall never write another line upon it.

I have received a letter from Elphinstone, of the 7th, which would have alarmed me much, if I were not very certain that the Rajah of Berar is not inclined to war. It would be very unfortunate, however, if Elphinstone were obliged to come away; particularly, as probably, if he were to wait 3 days longer, accounts would arrive of the defeat of Holkar, and of Scindiah's better behaviour.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringapatam, 30th Dec. 1804.

I wrote a letter to Col. Close some days ago, on the subject of the appointment of Lieut. Frissell to the charge of Major Graham's office at Ahmednuggur, when that gentleman should come away. Since I wrote that letter I have received a copy of Mr. Edmonstone's dispatch, of the 4th inst., to Col. Close, by which I perceive that the Colonel is ordered to proceed to the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and that his Excellency the Governor General has ordered Capt. T. Sydenham to proceed to Poonah to take charge of the Residency with the Peshwah, in the absence of Col. Close.

As under this arrangement you are removed further from the charge of the Residency than you were when Col. Close appointed Lieut. Frissell to the charge of Major Graham's office; and as I conceive that you will be still more desirous to obtain that charge, I have to request that you will proceed to take charge of Major Graham's office, either as soon as Lieut. Frissell can return to Poonah, to relieve you at the Residency, or if you should be desirous to remain in charge of the Residency, till the arrival of Capt. Sydenham. You will proceed to Ahmednuggur as soon as Capt. Sydenham shall reach Poonah; and Mr. Frissell is to return to his duty at the Residency with the Peshwah. You will be so kind as to make arrangements, and give directions upon this subject without loss of time, and let me know the nature of them.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 2nd Jan. 1805.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I received yesterday from Mr. Elphinstone. The letter is written on the day after the Rajah had begun



to discharge his troops, and to seize the jaghires of his brother, and had recalled his infantry to Nagpoor. Mr. Elphinstone had been informed many months ago that Amrut Rao was going to Benares by my desire, and that his route would be through Berar and Nagpoor; and if he had recollected the cautious and wary character of that chief, and his conduct in the former war, he would have drawn from his arrival at this period at Oomrawootty, a conclusion directly the reverse from that which he has drawn. It is my decided opinion that Amrut Rao would not have ventured into Berar, or in the neighbourhood of the Rajah of Berar, if he had thought there was a chance of hostilities between him and the Company; notwithstanding that, I do not trust Amrut Rao more than I do any of the others.

P.S. I intend to desire that Amrut Rao may be allowed to proceed.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 4th Jan. 1805.

I enclose a letter of the 18th Dec. just received from Mr. Elphinstone. Prubbaukur Bellall, who is Amrut Rao's vakeel, was with me for above a year, and in the course of that time he had frequent opportunities to do mischief and to intrigue; and I watched him more closely than I ever did any Marhatta. In the whole course of my connexion with him, he was never guilty of any one act of which I could disapprove. He is paid by the Company, and is fully sensible of the advantages which he and his employer enjoy under the British government. He owes his station in Amrut Rao's councils to his having been the instrument employed in arranging his affairs with the English; and, of course, he is the last man who would now become the instrument of connecting him with the opposite party.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 4th Jan. 1805.

When I left Calcutta, the objects of my journey into the Deccan were to prevent Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from becoming parties in the war against the Company; and, if possible, to march a corps of cavalry to join the troops acting in Malwa, under the orders of Col. Murray. It appeared to me possible, that before I could arrive in the Deccan, some event might occur which would render my presence in the Deccan unnecessary, and I asked the Governor General his opinion upon that subject. He answered, that he conceived that the defeat of Holkar's army would render it unnecessary for me to go there; or to stay, if I should hear of its defeat after my arrival.

Under these circumstances, and having had an attack of fever on the day before that fixed for my departure, I determined to delay my march to the northward as soon as I heard of Holkar's defeat, until I should see the impression which that defeat had made upon the durbars of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. I believe that Malcolm apprised you, in due course, of this determination; but should he not have so done, I mention it now, in order that you may be informed of the cause of my delay to march.

The latest intelligence gives reason to believe that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will remain at peace; and therefore I consider that one of

than during the period which may be necessary to accomplish the objects of his particular mission, he will wish to see on the spot the person possessing the confidence of the Governor General, to whom he can resign, when it shall be expedient or necessary.

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The latest intelligence gives reason to believe that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will remain at peace; and therefore I consider that one of

the objects in view in sending me into the Deccan is accomplished. In regard to the other, to endeavor to march a corps of cavalry from the Deccan into Malwa, I have to observe ;

1st : That as the troops are only now ready in the Ceded districts, the season is too far advanced to make the attempt.

2ndly : I see that Col. Murray is running, the Lord knows where, away from Gen. Jones and all his supplies, in obedience to orders which he says he has received from the Commander in Chief.

3rdly : Holkar's army having been defeated, the necessity of a corps of cavalry in Malwa is no longer so pressing ; and the difficulties and dangers attending the undertaking (the latter as affecting both the corps of cavalry which should make the attempt, and the Deccan) exist to as great a degree as ever.

Upon the whole, therefore, I conceive that I am justified in not going into the Deccan, by the accomplishment of one object in view in sending me there ; by a concurrence of circumstances, which render another impracticable, useless, and dangerous ; and by the sentiments of the Governor General. I acknowledge, however, that I have determined not to go into the Deccan not without a considerable degree of doubt and hesitation. I know that all classes of the people look up to me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. I also know that my presence there would be useful in the settlement of many points which remain unsettled, and which probably will require time and peace to bring to a conclusion. But these circumstances are not momentary ; whenever I should depart, the same inconveniences would be felt even in an increased degree, and very possibly the same state of affairs which now renders my presence in the Deccan desirable, will exist for the next seven years. I certainly do not propose to spend my life in the Deccan ; and I should not think it necessary, in any event, to stay there one moment longer than the Governor General should stay in India. I conclude that he intends to go in February, as he proposed when I left Calcutta, in case Holkar should be defeated, and the peace should be certain ; and upon this point, having considered whether my presence in the Deccan for 1, 2, or 3 months would answer any purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not.

In regard to staying longer, the question is exactly whether the Court of Directors or the King's ministers have any claim upon me, strong enough to induce me to do any thing so disagreeable to my feelings (leaving health out of the question) as to remain for a great length of time in this country. I have served the Company in important situations for many years, and have never received any thing but injury from the Court of Directors, although I am a singular instance of an officer who has served under all the governments, and in communication with all the Political Residents, and many civil authorities ; and there is not an instance on record, or in any private correspondence, of disapprobation of any one of my acts, or a single complaint, or even a symptom of ill temper from any one of the political or civil authorities in communication with whom I have acted.

The King's ministers have as little claim upon me as the Court of Direc-

tors. I am not very ambitious; and I acknowledge that I never have been very sanguine in my expectations that military services in India would be considered in the scale in which are considered similar services in other parts of the world. But I might have expected to be placed on the Staff in India; and yet if it had not been for the lamented death of Gen. Fraser, Gen. Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject of a good deal of conversation.

If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of the British Empire, or to insure its peace, I should not hesitate a moment about staying, even for years; but these men or the public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because my presence, in a particular quarter, may be attended with convenience. But this is not the only point in which this question ought to be viewed. I have considered whether, in the situation of affairs in India at present, my arrival in England is not a desirable object? Is it not necessary to take some steps to explain the causes of the late increase of the military establishments, and to endeavor to explode some erroneous notions which have been entertained and circulated upon this subject? Are there not now a variety of subjects in discussion, relating to this country, upon which some verbal explanation is absolutely necessary? I conceive, therefore, that in determining not to go into the Deccan, and to sail by the first opportunity for England, I consult the public interest not less than I do my own private convenience and wishes.

I have now detailed the grounds upon which I have formed my plans and determination to go home; however, I must inform you, that I am not in a hurry to carry them into execution. I am prepared for every thing, and in 5 days I can be at Madras; and on the other hand, if I should see any solid necessity for going into the Deccan, I shall not be remiss in my duty. But I can tell you that I shall not be drawn there by mere suspicions and unfounded surmises.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 4th Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st Dec., and your dispatch to the Governor General, No. 347.

I observe that the minister has required that you should afford him some support with his Highness the Soubah, in order that he may be enabled to carry into execution the measures which are necessary for the protection of the territories of his Highness against the marauders, who have taken advantage of the employment of the Company's troops in operations against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to commit depredations in his Highness' territories. As long as Meer Alum is the minister, and particularly considering that he was appointed to that situation by the operation of the influence of the British government, there can be no doubt of the propriety, and indeed necessity of supporting him, to enable him to carry into execution the measures which are necessary to provide for the defence of his Highness' territories.

You will observe from my former correspondence with you, that I am of opinion that the only mode by which the army of the Soubah can be made efficient, is to take into the Soubah's immediate pay a body of silla-

dar horse. Meer Alum appears to be of the same opinion, but he proposes to provide for the expense of the levies of silladar horse by a confiscation of the jaghires of those jaghiredars who have rendered this measure necessary by deficiency of their quotas of troops. The Governor General has positively disapproved of the measure of resuming the jaghires of those chiefs, in a letter to you: and I have to observe that it will be peculiarly harsh and unjust at the present moment, as the late famine in the Deccan has increased the expense of maintaining troops 6 times its former amount; and of course the jaghiredars must be unable to afford to keep the numbers for the support of which in ordinary times lands are allotted to them.

But supposing the measure to be wise and just, and permitted by the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, the first step towards carrying it into execution must be to collect and pay a force of another description; for the jaghiredars, in the present state of the Soubah's government, will not tamely resign their jaghires; and I conclude that the British troops are not to be employed to force them. The suggestion therefore of Meer Alum upon this subject is impracticable, will produce no resource for the payment of the new troops, and will occasion discontent, and very probably the rebellion of a powerful and respectable class of his Highness' subjects and servants.

My opinion upon this subject has long been decided; the only mode of restoring strength and efficiency to the Soubah's government, for its own internal purposes, and to make it an useful alliance to the Company, is to oblige the Soubah to have in his own pay a body of silladar horse besides his regular infantry. The revenues of Berar and the improvement of his situation in that province, if well managed, would have covered the expense of this body of troops. The government might then bring into order the jaghiredars without the risk of rebellion; and by reducing their jaghires to a moderate size, and by the power which they would have of counteracting the aumils, and of obliging them to pay to the state the revenues of the country as they became due, they would soon gain a sum far greater than that which might be expended in the support of the troops. Besides this advantage, the country would be in tranquillity; employment would be given to the numerous idle horsemen who are in all parts of it, and are ready to join the standard of any plunderer; and the Soubah's government would be an useful and efficient ally to the Company instead of a burthen.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Seringapatam, 6th Jan. 1805.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major Walker, from Mangalore, to which I beg to draw your attention. What Major Walker says certainly merits consideration. I have long observed that the horses die very suddenly after they are first landed; and it would certainly be desirable to try the mode proposed by Major Walker to save their lives, which, if successful, would be a measure of economy. Nothing can be done I fear this year, but probably it would be desirable to authorise Major Walker to have the stables prepared for the reception of the horses of the next season.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Seringapatam, 6th Jan. 1805.

Since my arrival here I have had some correspondence with Col. Close, on the subject of a supply of money to make good the deficiency required for the payment of the troops in the Deccan, to the 1st Feb.; and the Colonel has proposed to me from Mr. Duncan, that your Lordship should allow the house of Messrs. Forbes and Co. to receive sandal wood at Mangalore, on the same terms as that which they received upon a proposition of mine in the last year, to the value of 4 lacs of rupees. This sum will make good the deficiency of the funds required to pay the troops to the 1st Feb.; and if your Lordship should consent to the arrangement, and will let me know it, the house of Messrs. Forbes and Co. will pay the money immediately.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 7th Jan. 1805.

I have received accounts from Bombay, stating that Col. Murray has advanced to Kota, having left behind him, in the possession of the enemy, the forts of Purtaubghur and Hinglisghur. Gungaram Cotaree was collecting a force upon the former of these 2 forts, to impede the communication with Guzerat, of which Col. Murray was aware, and he had taken no steps to secure it, and had left Gen. Jones to his own devices, both as to the mode of supplying the army, and of joining it; and I rather believe that he has taken with him out of Guzerat the *corps de réserve*, which, in my original instructions, I ordered him to leave in that province. Col. Murray, in one of his letters to Gen. Jones, tells him that the communication is insecure, and desires him to provide a secure one, knowing that Gen. Jones has not a soldier left in the whole province. In the mean time I learn from your letter that Gen. Lake has ordered Col. Murray to advance to Shahabad. The communication with Guzerat is gone; and I conclude it is not intended again to depend upon the Kota Rajah for supplies. At all events, the troops will want money, which the Kota man certainly cannot supply. The least that can happen will be that Col. Murray will be obliged to return towards Guzerat, even if he should be unopposed; and in the mean time that province is exposed to the depredations of rascals of all descriptions, who are collecting under Gungaram Cotaree's standard, without a man to defend it.

The order from the Commander in Chief must have left it in Col. Murray's option to advance or not, according to his judgment of the safety of the movements, as affecting his own corps particularly, and Guzerat in general. But the Colonel appears to have forgotten all the circumstances which opposed his advance at a critical period in the last summer, and to be running away now from every thing which is to insure his existence. At all events the Commander in Chief can never have intended that Col. Murray should advance to remain and carry on operations at Shahabad, leaving behind him and on his road the 2 forts of Purtaubghur and Hinglisghur in the possession of the enemy. The Colonel has taken possession of the country in the name of the Company, and the consequence of leaving those forts in the hands of the enemy has been, that the people paid by him to keep the country have joined Gungaram Cotaree. I really am at a loss to know what to do to remedy these evils. We

have not a man to send into Guzerat, and if we had, they are now too late.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 8th Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th Dec. I was convinced that you would do every thing in your power to induce the Soubah of the Deccan to preserve the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar; and if I had seen your dispatch, No. 340, to his Excellency the Governor General, I should not have had occasion to trouble you. It is my opinion that nothing has occurred lately at Nagpoor, which should prevent the Soubah of the Deccan from paying the Rajah the sum of money which is due to him, or the British government from urging his Highness to pay it, and from adopting every measure which can be devised to induce him to do this act of justice.

This being the case, it is my opinion, that if the Soubah of the Deccan should not immediately place at your disposal, or at the disposal of the Rajah's vakeel, the funds required to discharge this demand, you ought to carry into execution the proposition contained in the 7th and 8th paragraphs of your letter of the 29th Dec., and inform the Soubah of the Deccan that you will apply to the discharge of the Rajah's demands the sums in your hands, due to his Highness for the arrears of the sircar pesheush. In whatever mode the money may be procured, I think that it ought to be paid to the Rajah without further loss of time, and without reference to other transactions; respecting which I have considerable doubts.

In my letter of the 4th inst. I entered into the consideration of the increase and reform of the Soubah's military establishment; and it is unnecessary that I should instruct you further upon the subject at present, excepting to inform you that I have reason to believe that the sentiments delivered in that letter are exactly conformable to those of his Excellency the Governor General. I beg leave to refer you to a letter which I wrote to you on the 16th Jan. 1804, for the details of my opinion upon this subject.

To the Sec. of Gov. at Bombay.

Seringapatam, 8th Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th Dec. Col. Murray, in his letter to Capt. Nicolls, of the 29th Nov., has not explained the situation of the Rajah of Purtaubghur, or the causes for which he thought it necessary to make the treaty, a translation of which he has enclosed. As I have no information on these points, I must defer giving any opinion on the treaty.

To Lieut. Col. Montresor.

Seringapatam, 9th Jan. 1805.

Major Gen. Campbell has transmitted to me a copy of the orders of the 4th inst., which he has sent to you, by which I observe that you are ordered to march. I have received intelligence of a date much later than that which Major Gen. Campbell has received, on which he has founded his instructions to you, from which I am induced to believe that your march at the present moment is unnecessary. I have, therefore, to request that you will halt when this letter shall reach you.



To Major Gen. Campbell.

Seringapatam, 9th Jan. 1805. P.M.

I have just received your letter of the 6th, containing your instructions of the 4th to Col. Montresor. Whatever may be the real nature of Scindiah's intentions, there are no grounds whatever for Rajah Mohiput Ram's report, and Col. Haliburton ought to have taken care to ascertain its truth before he reported it to you. It has been positively proved that Mohiput Ram had no ground whatever, excepting his own fears, for his assertion.

In respect to the Rajah of Berar, he has disbanded some of his troops, and has dispersed others; and the British Resident has fixed upon the cantonments which they are to occupy. Under all these circumstances, I believe I am warranted in the assertion, that peace is at present more certain than it has been at any moment since Col. Monson's defeat. I have, therefore, written to stop Col. Montresor till he shall receive further instructions from you. I hope that government will approve my having given these orders; as I have done so from the intelligence from Nagpoor of the 22nd Dec., from which I am induced to form the most favorable opinion of the intention, not only of the Rajah of Berar, but of Scindiah.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Seringapatam, 11th Jan. 1805.\*

I have just had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th inst. Early in the month of December, the Resident at Nagpoor appears to have entertained an opinion that Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah intended to attack the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan; and shortly after he had remonstrated with the Rajah upon the supposed intention, he received intelligence from one of the Rajah's ministers, that the Rajah's brother, Vincatjee Bhoonslah, had attacked and carried the Soubah's fort of Manik Droog. Upon receiving this information, he declared his intention to take his leave of the Rajah. Ragojee Bhoonslah did every thing in his power to convince the Resident that his intentions were pacific; and he promised to comply with certain conditions respecting the discharge and distribution of his troops, dictated to him by the Resident.

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\* The Governor General to Major Gen. Hon. A. Wellesley. Fort William, 9th Jan. 1805.

I have the honor to enclose for your information a copy of a letter, which I have this day addressed to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George, on the subject of the augmentation, which I directed in my letter to his Lordship, under date the 25th Dec. 1804, to be eventually made to the corps serving at Hyderabad.

2. Although, for the reasons stated in my dispatch, of this date, to his Lordship, I have deemed it advisable to annul my instructions to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George of the 25th Dec. 1804, it is not my wish to supersede the exercise of your judgment with regard to the expediency of reinforcing, from the territories of Fort St. George, or Mysore, the troops now serving at Hyderabad. You will, therefore, be pleased to advert to the state of affairs in the Deccan, at the period of time when this dispatch may reach you; and you will determine whether the public interests appear to you to require that any augmentation should be made to the force at Hyderabad. You will communicate the result of your determination to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George, and will be prepared to attend to any suggestions which you may submit to him on the subject of the troops which are now stationed at Hyderabad. You will also be pleased to signify your intentions on this subject to the Resident at Hyderabad. A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George; copies of my dispatches of this date to you, and to the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George, have also been transmitted to the Resident at Hyderabad.

He has since performed these promises in every particular. It has been discovered also, that Vincatjee Bhoonslah did not attack the Soubah's fort of Manik Droog, although some of his troops did plunder a village within the Soubah's territories; and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah has sequestrated his brother's jaghire for this act of outrage, and has promised that he will detain his person at Nagpoor.

The above is the outline of late transactions and intelligence from Nagpoor, the detail of which would prove in the clearest manner that the Rajah of Berar does not intend to commence hostilities against the Company.

It is my opinion that he never did intend immediate hostilities; but on this subject I differ from Mr. Elphinstone, a gentleman for whose abilities I entertain the highest respect. I have no doubt but that if Holkar's success had continued, the Rajah of Berar, and every other power in India, would have attacked us; but the Rajah is too cautious to think of making his attack, till he should find Holkar's success against our real strength far more decided than it has ever yet been. As a proof that the Rajah did not intend hostilities, I mention that he promised, and actually commenced, to comply with the conditions dictated to him by our Resident, before he received intelligence of the defeat of Holkar's armies.

In regard to the attack of Manik Droog, it was never made. The Marhatta armies have long been in the habit of plundering the Soubah's countries; and I acknowledge, that I know no mode of preventing their plunder, excepting by obliging the Soubah to defend his territories. Vincatjee Bhoonslah, the Rajah's brother, whose troops made the plundering incursion, has long been hostile to the English. He suffered by the operation of the late peace; and he has frequently been in rebellion against his brother's government.

It is very doubtful whether it is advisable, supposing it to be just under the circumstances of this case, to make the Rajah responsible for his brother's acts. However, supposing all this to be right, the Rajah has punished his brother, and deprived him of the means of committing similar injuries for the future. I have, therefore, no scruple in declaring, that the Soubah of the Deccan has nothing to fear from the Rajah of Berar, and that, as far as he is concerned, there is no occasion for a reinforcement at Hyderabad.

In regard to Scindiah, it appears that a person, by name Sirjee Rao Ghautky, Scindiah's father-in-law, has lately enjoyed the principal influence in his durbar. This person has long been connected with freebooters of all descriptions, in the territories of the Rajah of Kolapoor, of whom he is likewise a relation; and I defeated his troops, and his brother, in an action which I fought with them in the Nizam's territories, on the 5th Feb. last, and they fled to Kolapoor. He contrived, after I went to Bengal, to pass through the Peshwah's territories to Burhanpoor. Scindiah's pecuniary distresses, and the difficulties which his former ministers found in relieving them, are the foundation of Ghautky's influence; and he proposed as a relief that Scindiah, unmindful of the terms of his defensive alliance with the Company, should turn his arms against his neighbours, and plunder the Nabob of Bopal first, and then the Rajah of Berar.

It is also reported that Ghautky entered into an engagement with Meer Khan, one of Holkar's chiefs, that Scindiah should join him in an attack upon the Company's territories : I have seen no proof of the truth of this report; and from the last accounts from Scindiah's durbar, not only I suspect its truth, but also that Ghautky's influence is declining, as all his plans for relieving Scindiah's necessities have failed; they are greater than ever; and it is said that Scindiah is going to Ougein, to which place he has been advised to go by the British Resident. Indeed, the conduct of the Rajah of Berar is not a bad indication of Scindiah's real intentions.

However, supposing I am mistaken, still the Soubah of the Deccan has nothing to fear from Scindiah, as that Chief has crossed the Nerbudda with his army. Therefore, on the ground of Scindiah's hostile intentions, I do not see any necessity for reinforcing Hyderabad. As for Holkar, he has not a man in the Deccan of any description. In respect to circumstances at Hyderabad itself, I know of none which require the presence of our troops.

I have long been of opinion, that when the Company are engaged in war with any of the Marhattas, it is prudent to collect a *corps de réserve* upon the frontier; and, at the present moment, I consider it far more important to keep even the 2 regiments of cavalry to the southward than to take them to Poonah. The southern chiefs are decidedly with us; but if Scindiah should take a turn, under the influence of Ghautky, it is difficult to say what line the Rajah of Kolapoor would adopt; and, even supposing he were neutral, I am convinced that, if there is not a *corps de réserve* upon the Company's frontier, either Visvaz Rao Ghautky, who is still at Kolapoor, or some other freebooter, will lead a band of plunderers into the Company's territories. If, therefore, any *corps de réserve* should be collected, it is my opinion that it ought to be on the Company's frontier. But I think that no *corps de réserve* is necessary, so long as the cavalry shall remain in the Ceded districts. If it should be necessary to move the cavalry forward, which I do not think by any means probable, there will always be time to collect another reserve upon the frontier before any mischief can be done.

I have now given your Lordship an outline of our political situation, as far as it has come to my knowledge, and my opinion upon it. Considering the difficulties of your Lordship's government, both for want of money and troops, I think you ought not to collect and send forward the reserve to Hyderabad; and I am convinced that the Governor General will be of the same opinion, when he shall receive further intelligence. The Madras battalion, to which the Governor General refers, as being on its march to the southward, has, I believe, already entered Mysore, and I do not think it advisable that it should be ordered to return. It might be kept in Mysore, or ordered into the Ceded districts.

There are still 4 Madras battalions in the Peshwah's territories: 2 of them are with the Nizam's subsidiary force, and are at this time in Berar proper; one is at Poonah, and another in the garrison of Ahmednuggur. The Bombay battalions which have arrived at Poonah are by no means in a state of discipline or efficiency; and I am concerned to add that the

number of men which they lose by desertion in every month is enormous. One of them which arrived at Poonah in July 1000 men strong, has not now more than 400.

Under these circumstances I recommended to Col. Close, when I first heard of the alarm of the Resident at Nagpoor, to keep the Madras battalion which he had at Poonah, and also that in the garrison of Ahmednuggur. These are the only 2 extra Madras battalions now in the Deccan, as only 4 Bombay battalions have arrived. I believe that it will be advisable to leave these corps for some short time longer in the Deccan, on account of the inefficiency of the Bombay troops, but by no means on account of any enemy there may be there.

To Col. Stevenson.

Serengapatam, 11th Jan. 1805.

I shall not pretend in this letter to give you a detail of public affairs since you quitted this country. Shortly after your departure it became necessary to attack Jeswunt Rao Holkar; but the operations of the war fell entirely upon the Bengal army; and I am sorry to say that a detachment of them, under Col. Monson, were not quite so successful as we might have wished. The disasters, however, with which they met have lately been entirely compensated by two grand victories gained in Hindustan, one by the Commander in Chief, and the other by Gen. Fraser. I quitted the army in the Deccan in June, by order of the Governor General, to go to Bengal, and they have since taken all Holkar's possessions in Candesh, &c., without much opposition.

I arranged that you should have 1000 shares instead of 600 of the prize money; and I prevailed upon the Governor General to give you six months' gratuity of your allowance as commanding the subsidiary force, as well as of your batta, so that you see I have not neglected your interests nor your wishes.

You will have heard of Capt. ——'s disgrace. I really had a regard for him, and considered my own credit as well as your's involved in his character; and therefore I did every thing in my power to screen him from an inquiry. However, the complaints against him were of a nature so serious, and as they had been laid before the Nizam's durbar, I could do nothing but make the inquiry; and the result has been the discovery of a scene of disgraceful fraud, such as, I believe, has never before been practised. I enclose you herewith copies of all the papers upon this subject; from which you will be able to form a judgment of every thing that has passed, and of my motives in permitting the inquiry. I hope that your voyage to England has been beneficial to your health, and that you, Mrs. Stevenson, and my godson are well. Pray remember me kindly to her and my godson.

To Major Shawe.

Serengapatam, 12th Jan. 1805.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Brunton, and I shall be very much obliged to you if you will endeavor to obtain for him, if he should deserve it, the mark of the Governor General's approbation of which he is solicitous.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Serinapatam, 12th Jan. 1803.

I enclose you the copy of a letter from the Collector at Ahmednuggur to the Resident at Poonah, which has been transmitted to me, and to which I beg to draw your attention.

The Bheels have long been troublesome on the roads to the northward of Ahmednuggur, and it appears to be necessary to take some effectual measures to check them. Those proposed in the letter from Major Graham appear likely to be successful; I wish you to take them into consideration, and carry them into execution if you should find them practicable.

The 1st, to form a detachment of 5 companies of sepoys, with 2 guns, at Jaumgaum, appears perfectly practicable. It will be necessary only to take care that this detachment has plenty of provisions, and is well commanded; and to instruct the commanding officer very particularly as to the object of placing him there, and to desire him to conciliate Scindiah's officers, and not to interfere with them.

The 2nd, to occupy the post at Taarabad, is also necessary. This must be managed as follows. I enclose a letter, and a translation of it, for the amil of Jaumgaum, or the head person belonging to Scindiah in the Ahmednuggur districts, in which I inform him that I have ordered that this post may be occupied for the purpose of checking the Bheels. The Collector at Ahmednuggur should see him, and endeavor to procure his assent to our occupying it. If he should not consent, the post must be forced, as we must have it; and the Collector may as well hint this to Scindiah's head man, if he should find any difficulty in settling the business.

The 3rd, to occupy the post at Heura, will easily be settled. I enclose a letter, and a translation of it, to Cavy Jung, who will, of course, consent. If he should refuse, the post must be forced; but it is strong, and will require guns.

The 4th measure Mr. Waring must settle with the Peshwah's durbar.

I do not know whether you have any horse at your command; if you should not have any, it will be necessary that the Collector at Ahmednuggur should entertain some, as he did in the former war. Let great care be taken to throw in supplies of provisions wherever the troops may be posted; and wherever the Collector's peons will answer as well as the Company's troops, I should prefer to see them in the posts.

Communicate this letter to the Residency and to the Collector at Ahmednuggur.

To the Manager of Jaumgaum, on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

I have received information that the Bheels and other plunderers have lately been very troublesome in your neighbourhood, and that they have had the insolence to plunder some of my people. This I shall never permit. I have therefore ordered a detachment of the Company's troops into the field, who will take post somewhere in your neighbourhood; and I apprise you of the circumstance, as a friend, in order that you may apply for assistance to the commanding officer of this detachment, if you should

require it, and give him *such* intelligence of the haunts of the Bheels and other plunderers as you may obtain.

I also think that it will be very desirable, and will tend materially to check the Bheels, and to preserve the peace of the country, if the village of Taarabad is occupied by a party of my troops. The Collector at Ahmednuggur will settle this matter with you. I have desired him to occupy the place with his troops, for the purposes above mentioned; but to be very cautious not to interfere with your authority, and to take care that his troops do no mischief to the country.

[*A letter to the same effect written to Gavy Jung.*]

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringapatam, 13th Jan. 1805.

I have received your private letter upon the subject of the refusal of the Peshwah's minister to receive Col. Wallace at the durbar in an honorable manner, and to distinguish him by those marks of his Highness' favor which are usual upon such occasions.

I received accounts some time ago of difficulties made by some of the Marhatta sirdars in the Peshwah's service to serve under an officer of the rank of Col. Wallace; and I am induced to be of opinion that the objection to receive Col. Wallace with the usual marks of distinction is referrible to, and connected with, these difficulties and objections, rather than to the desire of saving the trifling expense which must be incurred upon the occasion.

Upon this ground I conceive it to be proper not to allow this subject to pass unnoticed. I request you therefore to state to Suddashee Munkaiseer that I am of opinion, and I know that the Governor General considers, that Col. Wallace has performed services of the greatest importance to the Peshwah's state, with a degree of gallantry, celerity, and skill, which has seldom been surpassed; that under these circumstances it might have been expected that his Highness would have received with becoming honor and distinction an officer who had served him so well; and that the excuse for not receiving him in this manner is futile and extremely unbecoming, and will be very displeasing to his Excellency the Governor General. If this remonstrance should not have the desired effect, I beg that Col. Wallace may not go to the durbar, and you will inform the minister that I have given you this direction.

To Major Gen. Campbell.

Seringapatam, 14th Jan. 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 10th inst.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I wrote to an officer of rank in Bengal, on the subject of a plan for horse artillery on that establishment, upon which my opinion was required.\* Horse artillery would be desirable, certainly, if well arranged, with proper drivers, and a full equipment of persons and means to take care of and feed the horses. But, even supposing that all this could be arranged, which I should doubt, in time of war, I rather believe that the equipment which I propose in that letter, viz., horses sufficient to draw the field train into action, added to, and

\* See letter to Major Gen. Dowdeswell, dated Fort William, 16th Aug. 1804.

being a part of, the draught bullock establishment, in time of war and on service, although not so flashy, would be more useful.

However, there is no doubt that horse artillery would, on many services, particularly against an European enemy, and near home, be very useful, nay, necessary; but I do not like to undertake to arrange such an establishment during a campaign, because I know that I cannot accomplish it.

I am much obliged to you for your attention to my recommendation of Capt. Brown. Capt. Osborne must certainly be very useful to Col. Macleod; but, in my opinion, he ought not to hold the 2 offices of secretary and Malabar interpreter. If the salary of the latter is not sufficiently large to induce Capt. Osborne to remain in Malabar, it ought to be made so; for it cannot be expected that an officer endowed with the rare qualification of speaking and understanding the Malabar tongue, will serve at a distance from his own Presidency, unless adequately rewarded.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringapatam, 14th Jan. 1805.

When I was at Bombay in May last, I settled a plan with Mr. Duncan, by which the Peshwah's rights at Ahmedabad were to be given in farm to the Guickwar for 10 years. There was some difference respecting the rent which was to be paid, but that was to have been settled between Col. Close and Major Walker.

The produce of the farm, whatever it might be, was to have been allotted to the payment of Goklah's troops, at the rate of 75,000 rupees *per mensem*, and the difference between the amount of the expected rent (I believe 6 lacs of rupees annually) and that sum, was to be made up in a future settlement of accounts with the Peshwah. I believe you will find all this in my correspondence with Col. Close, between April and August last, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will inquire what has been done: 1st, in the settlement of the farm between the Guickwar state and the Peshwah: and 2ndly, supposing the farm to have been settled, what money has been paid on account of it, and how disposed of.

As soon as I shall know that this business has stopped, I shall be able to apply a remedy, and to provide for the payment of Goklah's troops.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringapatam, 15th Jan. 1805.

Mr. Frissell wrote to me on the 29th of Dec., and informed me that Mr. Forbes was willing to make an advance of 4 lacs of rupees to the Madras government for the sandal wood, to be received on the same terms as that given to him through my mediation in the last year. In consequence of this information, I wrote a letter to Lord W. Bentinck, of which I enclose a copy; I have received his consent to Mr. Forbes' proposal, in a letter from his Lordship, of which I likewise enclose a copy.

I request you to communicate these papers to Mr. Duncan, through whom it appears that the proposal was made from Mr. Forbes, and to urge Mr. Forbes to send the money to Poonah as soon as may be convenient.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Seringapatam, 15th Jan. 1805.

I received last night your letter of the 6th. The Bombay corps which

have arrived at Poonah are on the Bombay establishment, and every thing relating to them must be governed by the regulations of the Bombay army. If they have not tents, that is the fault of the government of Bombay; but you cannot make a charge to the government of Fort St. George, of any money advanced to their commanding officers to provide either for their camp equipage or for the carriage of it. It appears that these officers have tents of their own, now in use with their corps, for which the Bombay government give them no allowance. The way to settle this difficulty is to apply to the government of Bombay for an allowance for the time during which the tents have been in use. In respect to the carriage, if the Bombay government adopt our tent regulations, the advances made to the commanding officers of corps can be easily settled with them hereafter; and application must be made to allow these regulations to apply from the period at which those officers received the advance. If our tent regulations should not be adopted by the Bombay government, the bullock agent, who is Robertson, must find carriage for the tents of the Bombay corps, as well as any other carriage that may be required.

It is a difficult matter to transfer the departments, &c., in one day, as you propose; but by no means difficult to continue some of the corps and departments on the establishment of Fort St. George, and others on that of Bombay. Upon this point I refer you to orders which I issued when in camp, of which I enclose copies. The transfer of Robertson's grain and bullock departments will be scarcely practicable while the troops remain in the field.

I do not at all approve of the Madras mode of carrying the Native sick, and I hope that Mr. Duncan will not adopt it.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Seririgapatam, 17th Jan. 1805.

I have received your letter of the 14th inst. I shall take care to keep you informed of events as they occur and come to my knowledge. I have heard nothing from the durbars of Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar since I wrote to you last.

The last letters which I had from Bengal were of the 22nd Dec. You are, I believe, aware that Col. Monson had withdrawn the army from the neighbourhood of Deeg; a movement with which the Commander in Chief was much dissatisfied. His Excellency formed the army near Muttra, on the 30th Nov., and advanced again towards Deeg, and he was to invest that place on the 11th Dec. Holkar's heavy guns, and about 60 pieces of light ordnance, with the remains of his infantry, are in Deeg, and one letter says Holkar himself. The last part of the story, I am convinced, is not true. There is no other intelligence of any importance. I think that the siege of Deeg will put an end to Holkar's means of mischief.

It is absolutely necessary that your Lordship should be informed of every thing that occurs, otherwise it is impossible that you can regulate the affairs of your government in such a manner as to give the aid in your power to forward the objects of the Governor General. I rather believe that the private secretary had formerly a private correspondence



with the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah, by means of which the government of Fort St. George was informed of every thing. So long as the Residents send me their dispatches, I can give you the necessary information; but when that practice ceases, unless the correspondence between your private secretary and the Resident at Hyderabad should recommence, you will be uninformed of events.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringapatam, 18th Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 11th, with which you have enclosed copies of your despatches of that date, addressed to the Sec. of government in the political department.

I regret much the dismissal of Byajee Naig, more particularly as it does not appear to me probable that any steps which could be taken to induce the Peshwah to take him again into his service would have the effect of replacing him in the confidential situation in which his services were so useful to the British government. Indeed, it appears to be difficult, if not impossible, to communicate with his Highness either upon the subject of the removal of Byajee Naig, or upon other measures which you believe that Suddasheo Munkaiseer has in contemplation. I recommend, therefore, that you should have a private conference with Munkaiseer himself upon these subjects. In this conference you will point out to him the various benefits which the Peshwah has derived from his connexions with the British government. You will state that in an alliance of this description, it must be expected that at times designing men will endeavor to disturb the existing friendship; and that to my certain knowledge endeavors of this kind had been made more than once at Poonah, the effects of which would have proved very detrimental to the Peshwah's state. That upon all these occasions Byajee Naig, although a man of inferior rank in the state, and holding no ostensible office, came forward as the friend to both governments, and availed himself of the opportunities which he had of seeing and speaking to the Peshwah and to the British Resident, to set matters in their true light, and to explain to each the truth as it really existed. That under these circumstances I consider the dismissal of Byajee Naig as a misfortune to the Peshwah's government, and to that of the Company, as far as it is concerned in his Highness' welfare; and that I anxiously hope either that he will be again recommended to his Highness' favor by Munkaiseer, or that some other person will be appointed to conduct the communications between his Highness and the Residency, equally qualified by sound sense, honesty, and attachment to his Highness and to his alliance with the Company, and equally favored by his Highness' confidence.

You may take this same opportunity of adverting to the supposed intention of depriving Kundee Rao Rastia of his office of sirsoubah of the Konkan, and Vittojee Naig of his office of killadar of Poonadur. You will point out to Munkaiseer that he will draw upon himself and the Peshwah's government great odium by these measures, and that he will be involved in difficulties of which he will probably not see the end. You will tell him that the British government have no right to interfere in the internal concerns of his Highness' government, but that I cannot contem-

plate arrangements, to effect which must require a British army and a formidable heavy equipment, without remonstrating against them. That scarcely a year has elapsed since, at the expense of the Company and with the British troops, I put his Highness in possession of Poonadur, and afterwards marched a detachment against Loghur. That these places were given to the persons whom his Highness pointed out, as those to whose care he wished to trust them, and no cause of complaint has been assigned against either of them. That, under these circumstances, Munkaiscer cannot expect that, in the midst of a foreign war, the British troops should be brought down to give possession of these forts to newly chosen killadars.

If the assistance of the British troops should not be given to effect these arrangements, the consequence must be, that if they are attempted, the country will be in a state of rebellion against his Highness' government, and the old troubles will be renewed.

In respect to the fort of Loghur, the Peshwah has promised that the person to whom it shall be given shall be agreeable to the British government, a promise which you will tell Munkaiscer that I beg him to recollect in his arrangements. If you should find that, notwithstanding this conversation with Munkaiscer, it is determined to deprive Kundee Rao Rastia and Vittojee Naig of their offices, I recommend that you should adopt measures to convey a memorial to the Peshwah himself upon these subjects, either in a private audience, or in any manner you may think proper, in which you will insert the substance of this letter. It is my opinion that you will do well, at the proposed conference with Munkaiscer, to urge him to give to Goklah a part, at least, of the serinjaunny lands of Prittee Niddee. You will tell him that, to take them for himself, will be a most shameless proceeding.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 18th Jan. 1805.

I have received your letter of the 4th inst. The point in it which requires an answer is the employment of Col. Haliburton's corps across the Taptee.

In considering the propriety of such a movement, it is necessary to advert to the situation of the Deccan in general; and here I must observe that it is the only body of troops whose services we can command from the Taptee to the Toombuddra, and from the frontier of Berar to the sea coast. The natural boundary of the Deccan is the river Taptee, and as long as this body of troops is within that boundary it must have its influence. But if it should once pass that line, particularly for such operations as the sieges of Sindwah and Myhissur, we must not expect tranquillity in the Deccan; and if once there is a serious insurrection, God knows how it is to be overcome. I mention these circumstances only to point out the danger of this movement.

I am perfectly aware of the necessity of clearing out the countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptee; and if nothing else can be got, Col. Haliburton must be employed on this service at all risks. But before we incur these risks, would it not be advisable to consider whether there are not, or might not be, under better arrangements, other modes of effecting this object?

In the first place Col. Murray's corps is useless, and in a dangerous situation, in its position at Kota. That corps is the proper one for these operations. In the next place, the necessity for clearing out the country between the Nerbudda and the Taptee is founded upon the notion of Scindiah's adherence to the alliance. If he should adhere to the alliance, it is surely time that his subsidiary force should be brought into play, and then that will be the proper corps to be employed in these operations.

But supposing the necessity to exist, after all, of employing Col. Haliburton's corps upon this service, it would be prudent to delay in commencing it till the Bombay corps should be in a state of efficiency, discipline, and equipment.

What I would recommend with a view to this object, would be to draw away from Col. Haliburton's corps, if they can be spared, the troops belonging to the Poonah subsidiary force. If the battalions with Col. Haliburton should not be sufficiently strong, then these corps must be left; but Col. Robertson's departments, the store department, and every thing belonging to the equipment of the Poonah subsidiary force, ought to be brought away. In this I include the bazaar, the draught bullocks, the carriage bullocks in Col. Robertson's grain and provision departments, leaving the grain with Haliburton, the carriage bullocks in the store department, the ordnance and military stores in charge of Capt. Noble, excepting what may be necessary for Col. Haliburton's operations.

I would then leave 2 battalions in the camp at Poonah, and collect the Peshwah's subsidiary force at Ahmednuggur. Let it be disciplined and prepared there; and as soon as it shall be at all fit for action, Col. Haliburton might with safety commence his operations.

If the 2 Madras corps, and the 74th, and the cavalry, could be spared from Col. Haliburton's detachment, which I think they might, the operations between the Nerbudda and the Taptee might be commenced immediately. The Bombay troops might be placed in Ahmednuggur, Chandore, Gaulna, &c., and the 4 battalions, and the best of the Bombay troops, collected in the camp at Ahmednuggur.

It will be absolutely necessary, under this arrangement, that Col. Wallace should have at least one of the regiments of cavalry; as it must be recollected that he has no Native cavalry. His bazaar and Robertson's grain bullocks will also be essential to him; otherwise he will not be able to subsist any where at a distance from Poonah. These are my notions upon this operation, which I must now leave to you to carry into execution, at the time you think the most proper. I would advise you to commence immediately to break up Col. Haliburton's detachment, and to send back to Ahmednuggur the corps belonging to the Poonah subsidiary force, as the first step towards enabling you to do the rest with safety.

I entirely agree with you about the southern chiefs; however urgent it is to come to an arrangement with them, it will not answer to commence it until we shall have settled Holkar. Scindiah will never agree to the proposed exchange of his districts in the Deccan for Saugur. However, it may be tried.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Seringapatam, 19th Jan. 1805.

I have received your letter of the 10th inst. I received and forwarded immediately your letter to the Governor General; but as I before informed you, he had already done every thing in his power for you. The redress of your grievance depends upon the Commander in Chief.

I do not augur any thing unfavorable to your promotion because it is not confirmed by the last gazettes. You will recollect that it was made 2 months after the other promotions which have been confirmed, and it is probable that it would be confirmed in due course.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 19th Jan. 1805.

I have received a letter of the 8th inst. from Capt. Sydenham, in which he enclosed the copy of a private letter from yourself to the Governor General, of the 7th Dec., which Capt. Sydenham informs me was the immediate cause of the late orders from his Excellency, directing an increase of the British troops stationed at Hyderabad. As, in consequence of the opinions I have given to the Governor of Fort St. George, his Lordship has not carried those orders into execution, I think it proper to apprise you of the nature of those opinions.

The principal object in view in the increase of the force at Hyderabad was to provide for the security of that city, and the Soubah's government, in case Seindiah or the Rajah of Berar, or both, should join Holkar in the war. It might have been necessary to provide for such an event when you wrote to the Governor General in Dec., or when the Governor General gave his orders consequent to the receipt of your letter. But since the receipt from the northward of the letters written in the end of Dec., I conceive that Hyderabad cannot be considered to have been in any danger.

Considering the nature and extent of the force with which it is possible that an attack might have been made upon Hyderabad, in the event which you expected in Dec., I doubt whether the 2 battalions stationed at that city were not fully sufficient to prevent that force from doing any mischief. I should therefore have hesitated before I should have consented to the march of the troops to Hyderabad, even if affairs had remained in the situation in which they were when you wrote in Dec.

I am fully aware, however, of the general want of troops in the Soubah's territories, and I am convinced that his government cannot exist unless his army is reformed, and his military establishments increased. But this evil is permanent, and requires something more than a temporary remedy, such as the measure of increasing the British corps stationed at Hyderabad.

At all events, when I was called upon to decide whether additional troops should be sent to Hyderabad, not to provide against a casual danger, but to remedy inconveniences of a permanent nature, it was necessary that I should consider the general state of the military resources of the government of Fort St. George, and see, whether to detach such a body of troops as was required at Hyderabad, would not produce inconveniences in the Company's territories, the seat of all our resources, at least as great as those existing in the Soubah's territories, which this measure was supposed likely to remedy.

portant points have been carried at times when the British detachment has been weakest. Indeed, these points were fundamental, and the success in carrying them affords the strongest symptoms of the pervading influence of the British government. One is the succession of Secundar Jah to the musnud, at certainly the most critical period of the British existence in India that has occurred for many years; the other, the appointment of Meer Alun to be minister, against the inclinations of the Soubah, of the family and adherents of his predecessor in office, and I may add, of the whole court.

I believe, therefore, I may venture to conclude, that the decline of our influence is not to be attributed to the want of force immediately at Hyderabad, but to other causes which I shall consider presently. In fact, if it were otherwise, if our influence in the councils of our ally were to be attributed to any thing excepting a sense of our general strength in all parts of India and the world, and of his own interest in connecting himself with that strength; if its increase could be attributed to a stronger, and its decline to a weaker corps stationed at Hyderabad, it must be the worst of all kinds of influence; viz., that of immediate strength operating upon the fears of a timid individual, and must be precisely of the same description with that exercised by the chiefs of parties upon the councils of the late Nizam, from which it must be our greatest boast to have liberated him. If this should be the nature of our influence at Hyderabad, it cannot be considered permanent, and it must cease the moment the cause of it is removed from that city. It must cease also, the moment that the Soubah or his ministers should discover your disinclination to come to extremities, by using the power in your hands to force the measures which you recommend.

I do not know whether I may venture to reason upon the operation of a strong force stationed at Hyderabad, upon the councils of the Soubah, from the experience which I have had at Poonah. I collected there, in May, 1803, the largest British army that was ever assembled in the Deccan; and, however important or trifling, I do not recollect that either the Resident or I carried any one object which we urged at the durbar. Afterwards, although we had only 2 battalions at Poonah, when the Peshwah found that we were really able and willing to protect him against all India, and he experienced the benefit of his alliance with the Company, we found him as willing to attend to our advice, as we had found him before obstinate and reserved.

I have gone much into detail upon this part of the subject, because I think it very material in every discussion regarding these subsidiary alliances; and I am aware that I differ in opinion upon it with many authorities, for whom I have the greatest respect. I acknowledge that I am much inclined to doubt whether all the evils of which we feel the pressure in the Soubah's territories at the present moment, are to be attributed to the decline of our influence, although possibly a remedy cannot be applied, unless our influence is revived. The radical cause of these evils is the want of force in the country to carry on the government; and of this want I had much reason to complain at a period when, I believe, our influence was greatest. In fact, we are now come to a crisis at Hyderabad.

The operation of our system there has been to reduce the force of the sovereign of the country, and troops of banditti have proportionably increased: and at last there is no public force left in the country, excepting the troops subsidised from the Company.

There cannot be a stronger proof of this fact than the present demand for troops. The Deccan is entirely at peace. There is not an army belonging to any known power or chief within a thousand miles of its boundary, and yet the Soubah's government is insulted by troops of banditti; and his Highness has no means of defending himself, excepting by a few of the Company's battalions employed against the common enemy of all the allied powers. It will not answer to bolster up this force by reinforcing it from the Company's armies. Neither the military establishments of the Company, nor the finances of the Soubah, will bear the demand of troops on the one hand, and of money on the other; and after all, supposing that both could afford a demand, such as the Governor General lately ordered, the remedy would be incomplete, till a force three times the strength of the present subsidiary force should have been supplied by the one party, and paid for by the other.

Besides, the evil has been produced by the introduction of our troops into the country; the Soubah has discharged his own, and these have become plunderers from want; and his Highness has no means of conducting his government, or of checking these plunderers, excepting by the assistance of the Company's battalions. These people can be checked by the Company's armies; and in the course of time, when these fighting classes shall have adopted habits of industry, and shall have ceased to breed horses, the tranquillity of the Deccan may be as secure as it is in Bengal. But a shorter, and a less expensive mode of proceeding, which will lead to the same result, will be to oblige the Soubah to support a portion, at least, of those troops which have always served his father's government. This will be an alteration and an amendment of our system; but we must either amend our system at Hyderabad, or we must adopt one entirely different from that on which we have hitherto acted. The amendments of the system I have already considered in detail, in different public letters addressed to you. If we should not adopt them, we must either withdraw altogether from the alliance, or we must take the country for ourselves; as its revenues will not support the number of our troops necessary for its government, and the Soubah's government likewise. But these alternatives are out of the question, and it is not worth while to trouble you with discussing them for one moment. In order to carry through the proposed amendment of our system, it is necessary to re-establish our influence at Hyderabad, which is upon the decline. I trace the decline of our influence in the Soubah's councils to our having recommended to him a minister, in whom from circumstances we can have no confidence, and to whom, therefore, no support is given.

The remedy is plain and certain. Either displace Meer Alum, and appoint as his successor an able man in whom we can have confidence, or support Meer Alum. I have not seen all the dispatches regarding the conduct of the latter, and have not made up my mind upon his competency for his office, supposing him to be honest, or even upon his honesty. But,

in my opinion, matters have gone to such a length at Hyderabad, the evils are of such a magnitude, and require a reform so radical, that I can admit no question about men; and I have no scruple in saying, that if you are of opinion that you should be better able to carry through the measures which are necessary, by means of another person in the office of minister than by means of Meer Alum, this minister ought to be displaced.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 21st Jan. 1805.

1. I have the honor to enclose copies of all the letters which I have written to the Residents at the different darbars, since I arrived in this part of India. The directions which they contained are sufficiently explained in the letters themselves, and it is not necessary that I should detain your Excellency by any further explanation of them.

2. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of letters from the Sec. of government in the Political department, of the dates as per margin.

3. I have not deemed it expedient to make use of the authority which the letter of the Sec. of government, of the 18th Dec. 1804, gave me to relieve the 77th regt. at Goa, by sending the 84th regt. to that settlement from Bombay, as some time would elapse before the relief could be effected; and, in the interval between its commencement and its completion, inconvenience might be felt for the want of the European regt. at Bombay.

4. Between the settlement of Bombay and the territories to the northward, there are now 5 European regts., including the Company's Bombay regt., which is very weak. In this account I do not include the 77th regt. at Goa.

5. There ought to be only 3 regiments in those stations, supposing them complete, and one at Goa.

6. It appears to me, therefore, that it will be practicable, hereafter, to remove one of them, the 84th, to Goa; and then to march the 77th regt. into the territories of the government of Fort St. George. By this arrangement the regiment de Meuron may be relieved from its duties at Seringapatam.

7. The presence of Lieut. Col. Wallace appears to me to be very necessary with the subsidiary force in the service of the Peshwah; and I have every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of Col. Haliburton, in the command of the detachment, from both subsidiary forces, since he assumed it.

8. I have also to inform your Excellency, that I have suggested to Col. Close the expediency of breaking up the large corps under the command of Col. Haliburton, and of sending into the Peshwah's territories the troops and equipments belonging to his Highness' subsidiary force; and of assembling the whole, excepting 2 battalions to remain at Poonah, in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur.

9. My reasons for recommending these measures are, that I wish to draw out from Poonah, if possible, some of the Bombay corps, so as to equip them and discipline them as they ought to be for service in the field. I am desirous also to have it in my power to cover a greater proportion of the country with our troops; and to be able to keep a detachment in the

field, south of the Taptee, in case Col. Close should find it expedient to call Col. Haliburton's corps north of that river, in order to cover Scindiah's march to Ougein. These objects cannot be effected, unless it should be possible to break up Col. Haliburton's corps. But as there is no enemy in the Deccan, I should hope Col. Close will find that measure to be practicable.

10. I have also the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's orders of the 25th Dec., relative to an increase of the corps stationed at Hyderabad, of which Lord W. Bentinck had sent me a copy.

11. Before I had received those orders, I was convinced that the Deccan was in safety. There were no troops of Holkar's south of the Nerbudda, the Rajah of Berar had disbanded a part of his army, and had disposed of that part which he kept, according to directions given to him by the British Resident. It appeared that Scindiah was returning to that line of conduct which is most consistent with his true interests: it was reported that he had crossed the Nerbudda; and, at all events, the conduct of the Rajah of Berar was not a bad indication of Scindiah's real intentions.

12. I know of no event at Hyderabad which required at that city the presence of a larger body of the Company's troops. It appeared that the influence of the British Resident was not so great as might have been wished; but I conceived that the decline of his influence was to be attributed to causes entirely independent of the strength of the detachment stationed at Hyderabad.

13. There existed a general want of strength throughout the Deccan; but the presence of a larger detachment of the Company's troops at Hyderabad would not have remedied this evil, that must depend upon the exertions which the government of the Soubah of the Deccan and of the Peshwah will make in their own defence and support against the efforts of the rabble, who may annoy them in all parts of their territories.

14. At the same time the government of Fort St. George would have found the greatest difficulty in completing the detachment ordered to Hyderabad; indeed, it would have been impossible, without ordering from Poonah the Madras battalion, which is still there, and is the only efficient battalion at that station; and without stripping the Ceded districts and Vellore of the European troops.

15. Under these circumstances, and considering the difficulties experienced in supplying with money the troops in the Deccan already, I hope that your Excellency will approve of the recommendation which I gave to Lord W. Bentinck, under your Excellency's authority, to suspend the movement of this detachment.

16. Mr. Waring communicated to me a copy of the letter from the Sec. of government to the Resident at Poonah, of the 14th Dec., relating to the conduct of the Prittee Niddee. Your Excellency will have seen from the Poonah correspondence, that the Prittee Niddee has been defeated and taken prisoner by Goklah.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seringapatam, 21st Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th inst., in



which you enclosed the copy of your dispatch of that date to the Sec. of government.

The lands granted as serinjaumy to the sirdars of the Marhatta state are held upon a tenure very different from those called jaghires. The serinjaumy lands are granted for the payment of the expenses attending troops and their equipments, and are resumable at pleasure; and it has been customary to resume them, and not to allow any sirdar to hold particular lands for any great length of time, when the government has been in such a state of strength as to be able to enforce its orders. In discussing the question regarding the disposal of Prittee Niddee's lands, it is absolutely necessary to recollect this distinction.

I have always been anxious to protect the great families of the Marhatta Empire, living under the Poonah state; as I am convinced that the peace of the country is more likely to be secure through their means, than through those of any other description of persons who might be brought forward by the Peshwah or his ministers: and in consideration of the length of time during which the Marhatta government has been disturbed by the factions which have existed; of the state of weakness to which the government was reduced; and of the irritation which was produced on the mind of the Peshwah on the one hand, and on those of his sirdars on the other, I have been induced to wink at the disobedience of the Peshwah's orders by the great serinjaumy sirdars to the southward; and to be of opinion that we ought to wait till time shall have effaced from the minds of both parties a recollection of their mutual injuries, and till the allies will be at peace externally, before we endeavor to establish the Peshwah's rights over the serinjaumy sirdars.

There is, however, a great difference between the conduct of these sirdars in general, and of the Prittee Niddee. They have not come forward to assist the Peshwah with the quotas of troops which they ought to have in his service; but they have never been in rebellion to his government, have never used the power which they had in their hands to obstruct the operations of the British armies, and thus to injure the alliance. Forbearance towards them, therefore, may be very proper, on the grounds which I have above detailed, but towards the Prittee Niddee it would be weakness: it would encourage the others to rebellion; and, at all events, you would lose an opportunity of showing them, that even a sirdar of the first family in the state shall not be permitted to rebel against the government of the Peshwah with impunity.

I am therefore of opinion, that the Prittee Niddee ought to be deprived of all his serinjaumy possessions; leaving in his hands his lands held in jaghire, or in enaum, whether by grants from the Rajah or from the Peshwah. I have already told you that I am of opinion, that a part, at least, of the serinjaumy lands, held hitherto by the Prittee Niddee, ought to be given to Goklah.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 22nd Jan. 1805.

I received last night your letter of the 9th. I hope that you will have brought back Col. Haliburton. A position upon the Poorna, somewhere in front of Ballapoor, would be the best for him, and would give a

certain degree of protection to the frontier of Candeish as well as to Berar.

I have written to Poonah about the Bheels. I think that Narsing Kundee Rao ought to be sent into Candeish at all events. I send you a duplicate of my last letter.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Seeringapatam, 23rd Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 15th and 16th inst., the former containing a copy of your letter of that date to the Sec. of government.

When I wrote to you on the 21st inst., I concluded that the Prittee Niddee was actually in the power of the Peshwah, and that the only question for deliberation was the manner in which his Highness should use the power which he had in his hands. It now appears that, owing to a variety of causes, the Prittee Niddee is not in his power, and therefore the instructions which my letter of the 21st inst. contained are not applicable to the actual state of affairs.

The Prittee Niddee had connected himself with bands of plunderers, contrary to the inclination of his mother and his guardian Bulwunt Rao, and his supposed interests. The Peshwah detached Goklah against him, and, with the assistance of the mother and guardian, Goklah got possession of his person; and the mother and guardian promised, that if the Prittee Niddee were delivered into their hands, he should go to Poonah; he was then delivered into their hands. In the mean time, the confiscation of the Prittee Niddee's possessions became a subject of discussion, of which the mother and guardian must have been apprised; and as they would have suffered by this measure, they of course must have altered their intention of going to Poonah, supposing them ever to have seriously intended it.

There is no doubt but that the possession of the Prittee Niddee's person is a great object to the Peshwah's government, the attainment of which would be likely to lead to a speedy settlement with the other southern chiefs. These chiefs are well aware of this fact, and although it is very probable that they were not sorry to see the defeat and dispersion of the banditti which the Prittee Niddee had collected; still they were ready to step forward when called upon, by his guardian and his mother, to prevent the removal of the Prittee Niddee's person to Poonah, and the confiscation of his possessions, and their transfer to a person more likely to support the Peshwah's government. On this ground it is, I conceive, that Chintomeny Rao has detached troops to the support of the mother and guardian of Prittee Niddee; and although Goklah has served well upon many occasions, and appears to have done his duty in the commencement of this service, my mind is not free from suspicion that even he has not been very anxious in his endeavors to remove the person of the Prittee Niddee to Poonah. It must be recollected that this chief is very necessitous, and he is well acquainted with the Peshwah and his minister. It is probable that he heard that he was not to reap the principal benefit from the service which he performed, and not improbable but that the mother and guardian of Prittee Niddee have paid him.

In this state of affairs, the Peshwah and his minister came to the Residency for advice. They knew well that the British government will support them in carrying into execution the measures which the Resident will advise; and that I suspect to be the cause of the apparent confidence and cordiality upon this occasion. However, these sentiments deserve encouragement, and ought to receive it, whatever may be the ultimate decision upon this subject. My opinion upon it now is, that it is merely a question of convenience and of means. There cannot be a doubt but that Chintomeny Rao will be supported by all the southern Chiefs; and the question is, exactly, whether it is convenient, or whether we have the means now to undertake a contest with those chiefs, and to provide at the same time for the other services required.

It is my opinion that we have not the means at Poonah, in the present state of the corps there, supposing that Chintomeny Rao alone were concerned, much less against all the southern Chiefs; and the means cannot be brought from the Company's territories under the government of Fort St. George, without greater inconvenience to those territories than can result from any delay in the settlement of this question respecting the Prittee Niddee. They cannot be afforded at all from Bombay.

Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that you ought to inform the Peshwah's minister that the Prittee Niddee having been given over to the charge of his mother and his guardian, without the advice of the British government, or of any of its officers, the situation of affairs respecting that chief is so materially altered, that you cannot take upon yourself to advise any measures. That Goklah had the Prittee Niddee in his power, and it would certainly have been desirable to bring that chief to Poonah; and that it would still be desirable to see him there; that it appears that to bring him there would require force; and that his Highness and his ministers were best informed whether the means they possessed were sufficient to accomplish that object. If they should doubt respecting their means, you should advise them not to risk an attempt to force the Prittee Niddee again, but to endeavor to accommodate affairs in such a manner with the mother and guardian, as to ensure the future tranquillity of the country.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 23rd Jan. 1805.

I have at last received from Bombay a copy of the orders of the 7th Dec., from the Commander in Chief to Col. Murray.

His corps is entirely out of my reach and control at all events; and I have frequently stated my apprehensions of the consequences of his advance in the manner in which he has made it. The greater the distance he may advance, the greater must be the apprehensions of the consequences. He can have now no communication with Guzerat, and that province and government are left entirely defenceless; however that is not so important, as the probable loss of his corps. The only mode of saving it, is to endeavor immediately to open a communication with it from Bundelcund; and to send forward to it from thence supplies of grain, money, cattle, &c., which it will require. Only reflect that in this corps there

are two European regiments, the loss of which by the same species of disaster as happened to Monson, will not be heard of with common patience in England.

P.S. Should you not have received a copy of the instructions to Col. Murray,\* I send one.

To the Governor General.

Seringapatam, 24th Jan. 1805.

1. Since I had the honor of addressing your Excellency on the 21st inst., I have written 2 dispatches to the Residency at Poonah, relative to the Prittee Niddec, copies of which I have now the honor to enclose.

2. It is not necessary that I should detain your Excellency by an explanation of my motives in writing those dispatches, as they are sufficiently explained in the dispatches themselves. But it may be necessary that I should state my reasons for thinking that the force at Poonah is not in a state to be employed at present against the southern chiefs, and that no reinforcement to it can be drawn from Bombay. I conclude that the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George will have acquainted your Excellency with the distresses of his government for want of troops.

3. Col. Close has, I believe, informed your Excellency of the inefficient and undisciplined state of the Bombay infantry at Poonah. They have not yet got the means of moving their camp equipage, and they are not disciplined; the men are not attached to the service, and desert in large numbers, and the battalion which arrived at Poonah, in July last, 1000 strong, has not now 400 effective.

4. The government of Bombay might send Europeans to Poonah, but those troops, without a body of disciplined, efficient, and well equipped Native troops, would be useless.

5. The government of Bombay have only one battalion of the 9th (newly raised) regiment at that settlement, and a battalion of fencibles, so that they can send no Native troops to Poonah.

To Capt. T. Sydenham.

Seringapatam, 26th Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving Mr. Waring's letter of the 17th inst., in which he has enclosed a copy of his correspondence with the Sec. of government of Bombay, relative to the march of 2 battalions of Bombay Native infantry, from Goa to Poonah, through the territories of the Marhattas.

By letters from Malabar, I learn that the Rt. Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George has stopped the march of those troops to Goa, and they are now stationed in Malabar. But as in this march they would have to pass through the territories of the Rajah of Kolapoor, through the possessions of various polygars and chiefs, with whom I have no communication, and over whom the Peshwah exercises no authority, as well as through the possessions of the southern chiefs; and as it is certain that these battalions would be badly equipped and supplied, and would depend for every thing upon the country, I earnestly recommend that they should not be marched by the route proposed. If it should be necessary or desirable that they

\* See letter to Col. Murray, dated Fort William, 11th Sept. 1804.

should march to Poonah, by far the best mode would be to bring them into Mysore from Canara, to equip and provide them for the march in this country, and that they should proceed by the route on which we have our posts of communication, and by which our detachments always march.

To Capt. Mahony, at Koorg.

Seringsapatam, 26th Jan. 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd, which, according to your desire, I have communicated to Major Malcolm. As the arrival of that dispatch in Bengal is not very urgent, I have taken the liberty of marking a passage in it, which I think it would be advisable to omit.

It does not appear to be at all explanatory of the Rajah's sentiments, excepting those of gratitude and exultation, upon the occasion of receiving from the Governor General a mark of favorable distinction;\* which sentiments are very manifest in the whole tenor of his conduct, as related in the dispatch. But the paragraph in question might be supposed to convey a meaning which it certainly has not, even by those to whom it is immediately addressed; and above all, by other authorities, either in Europe, or who may hereafter be in India; and therefore as a friend to the Rajah of Koorg, I have taken the liberty of marking it, and of recommending that the sheet of the dispatch should be written over again, and the marked paragraph omitted. Major Malcolm agrees with me in opinion upon this subject.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Seringsapatam, 27th Jan. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 26th inst. It was arranged that Major Graham should take upon himself the payment of the party of horse, commanded by Hyder Khan, which served under the collector of Ahmednuggur; and it is but reasonable that when that officer had no further occasion for their services, he should give them a sum of money to enable them to return to Mysore. According to this principle, I have written to the collector of Ahmednuggur, to desire that he will make arrangements to pay you a sum of money equal to 2 months' subsistence for Hyder Khan and his party, and I request you to pay that sum to Hyder Khan.

P.S. I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the collector of Ahmednuggur, on this subject.

To the Collector at Ahmednuggur.

Seringsapatam, 27th Jan. 1805.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from the Resident at Mysore, relative to the pay of Hyder Khan and his party. It appears to me to be reasonable and fair that Hyder Khan and his party should be paid for the time during which they might be expected to be on their march from Ahmednuggur to Mysore, after the day on which you discharged them. I have accordingly requested Lieut. Col. Malcolm to take measures to give Hyder Khan pay for himself and party,

\* A sword.

for the months of Dec. and Jan.; and I beg you to pay Lieut. Col. Malcolm a sum equal to that disbursement, which you will charge in your account as paid to Hyder Khan to pay the expense of his march to his own country.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 28th Jan. 1805.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Mr. Buchan, on the subject of a monument which it is proposed to erect to the memory of Mr. Webbe.\*

\* Mr. Buchan to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

Madras, 23rd Jan. 1805.

It is probable that you may have been already informed of the subject of the paper which I have the honor to enclose. At the first meeting which was held at this place, for the purpose of considering the best means of testifying those sentiments of respect and regard which are so justly entertained for the memory of Mr. Webbe, I was requested by the gentlemen present to communicate to you the result of their determination, and to refer to your consideration their wish to render the act in contemplation more gratifying, by being carried into effect under the patronage of his Excellency the Governor General. It occurred to the meeting that, from the high degree of estimation with which Mr. Webbe had been honored by his Excellency, it might not be improper to solicit from his Excellency the consecration of the intended monument by such an epitaph as might be deemed by the Governor General to be appropriate to the occasion.

This part of the mournful duty no one could be so equal to perform; and if you should not consider the suggestion to be in itself liable to objection, the gentlemen with whom the undertaking has originated would feel themselves highly gratified and honored in your submitting the subject to his Excellency, and in your affording it the aid of your support, in such manner as you may deem most proper. The plan has in its origin been limited to very few persons; and you will observe from the accompanying paper, that it is still intended to confine it to such a scale as may be sufficient for testifying due respect for the character whom it is meant to honor, without making it more general, as a public measure, than might, under every view of the subject, be deemed necessary.

I have to apologize for my delay in conveying to you this communication, which indisposition has chiefly occasioned. I, however, trust that it will not be too late for the interesting purpose, which it is the object of it to promote.

Enclosed in Mr. Buchan's Letter to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, 23rd Jan. 1805.

The undersigned gentlemen, being impressed with sentiments of the highest esteem and respect for the public zeal, eminent talents, and private worth of the late Mr. Webbe, have agreed to request permission to erect a monument to his memory in the church of St. Mary, Fort St. George.

It is supposed that the cost of the monument will amount to £—, for which, or for the sum which may be eventually required, the undersigned gentlemen hold themselves responsible; but as it is suggested that many gentlemen, who are absent from Fort St. George, would be desirous of participating in this mark of respect and esteem for the memory of the deceased, it is agreed that the object be communicated to those gentlemen who are known to have possessed sentiments of respect and regard for Mr. Webbe, or to have lived on terms of intimacy and friendship with him.

It is also agreed to endeavor to ascertain if there be any portrait of Mr. Webbe, and to take measures for procuring it for the purpose of having it engraved, in order that each of his friends may be enabled to possess a representation of him; and it is agreed, that the expense of the engraving be provided for under the responsibility of the undersigned gentlemen, in the same manner as that of the monument.

Mem. Names of the gentlemen present at the original meeting; Sir Benjamin Sullivan, the Hon. Basil Cochrane, Messrs. Harrington, Buchan, Hodgson, Hardis, Garrow, Greenway, A. Cockburn, Capt. J. Grant, Major J. Munro.

Written by Marquis Wellesley, at the bottom of the foregoing Paper, Barraekpoor, 16th Feb. 1805.

Every motive of public duty and private sentiment concur to demand my most cordial approbation of this just and honorable tribute to virtues and talents never surpassed, and of which

The application to the Governor General appears directed more immediately to his private character than to his public situation ; and in this light I do not consider it to be objectionable. His patronage of a mark of respect by individuals to a deserving public officer will add respectability to the undertaking, at the same time that it will mark the Governor General's regard for a man, who was certainly much attached to him personally, and to his principles of government.

At all events, if there should be any thing objectionable in the request, it must be attributed to me, who have forwarded it to be laid before the Governor General, and not to the gentlemen at Madras, who referred their wishes to my judgment, either to be made known, or otherwise, according to my sense of their propriety.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick.

Seringapatam, 28th Jan. 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 16th inst., and it gives me great satisfaction to find that you and I agree in opinion respecting the measures to be adopted in the present situation of the government of the Soubah of the Deccan. I have reason to believe, indeed to be certain, that the Governor General has altered his opinion upon this subject ; and I expect that you will receive instructions at an early period to commence a negotiation with the Soubah, for the purpose of placing his military force on an efficient and respectable establishment. But as this measure is one which must have permanent consequences, it is too important for me to venture to instruct you to enter upon it without the express orders of the Governor General. If the Soubah of the Deccan should raise an army, such as I propose he should, the commander of it will be the person of the first importance in the state. You will, of course, advert to this in good time, and take care that a proper selection is made. Indeed, it is my opinion, that the minister ought himself to command this army, otherwise he cannot expect to hold his place. This is another reason for getting rid of the present minister, if you cannot confide in him.

To Capt. T. Sydenham.

Seringapatam, 29th Jan. 1805.

I received last night your letter of the 21st. Lord Wellesley could not direct your attention to objects more deserving all that you can give them than those to which you have referred in your letter. The records at Poonah are full of my sentiments upon them, both in a public and private form ; and upon the subject of the southern chiefs I have lately written some letters to Mr. Waring, which appear to me to contain a full answer to all the points upon that subject contained in your letter.

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which the memory cannot be preserved with marks of respect more strong than the genuine feelings of my heart, and the impartial testimony of my judgment.

The example of Mr. Webbe's public services should be held forth to the imitation of every British officer, both civil and military, in India ; and I shall be anxious to encourage the plan of erecting a monument to him at Madras, by every means within my power ; by subscription, if I can be admitted as a subscriber, and by every other exertion which the subscribers to such an undertaking can suggest.

It is my intention, at my private expense to erect an obelisk to the memory of Mr. Webbe in the vicinity of this place, and within view of the house.

Those letters will show you that it is my opinion that we have not now the means of entering upon this great arrangement; and, holding that opinion, it may be perhaps unnecessary to point out that this is not the time for entering upon it, supposing we had the means. However, I have no objection to enter into that discussion, and perhaps the knowledge of my sentiments may be of use to you.

We have had glorious successes in the contest with Holkar, but his power of annoying us, or rather our allies, is by no means destroyed. I consider Holkar to be the chief of all the freebooters and vagrants scattered about all parts of India, every man of whom is the declared enemy of the British government. So long as Holkar exists and is in any strength, we cannot consider the territories of our allies in security, and we must protect them with our troops, as they have no troops of their own to protect themselves. On this ground, I say, that, while the war with Holkar shall continue, our views must be directed to the foreign contest to the northward; and we must not enter upon any domestic arrangement which will require the exertion of our troops till that shall be brought to a conclusion.

One of the consequences of our moving the subsidiary force to the southward for this purpose will be, that bands of freebooters now upon the Nerbudda will dash across the Taptee, and extend their operations possibly to Poonah itself. Another might be, that Seindiah and the Rajah of Berar, when they should see the southern chiefs leagued against us, and our troops engaged with them, might think that another favorable opportunity to try their fortunes again with us.

But that which, above all, induces me to wish to postpone the endeavor to make the arrangement, till after the conclusion of the contest with Holkar, in addition to our present want of means is, that I think that it may be effected amicably, and now I am convinced it cannot.

Perhaps you did not know when you wrote your letter of the 21st Jan. that Col. Close might want to draw Col. Haliburton's corps across the Taptee, to cover and protect Seindiah's march to Ougein; and that in that case Col. Wallace's subsidiary force must be moved forwards at least to Ahmednuggur, if it is intended that we should hold any footing in the Deccan, and keep up any communication with the Hyderabad corps, which will cross the Taptee. If you had had a knowledge of these probable operations, you would not have proposed to employ the subsidiary force in effecting an arrangement in another quarter; respecting which I have to say that I have not by any means made up my mind upon the principles on which it ought to be effected, and that I am very certain that it is not very pressing, and that no evil can result from leaving affairs to the southward, in the state in which they are, for some time longer.

You have my opinion upon the march of the troops from Goa. Whenever you may enter upon this southern arrangement, allow me to recommend that you should not depend upon the combined operations of corps which can have no communication; and above all, that on this service, or any other in the Marhatta territory, you should never think of employing, or even marching a body of troops not fully and substantially equipped for its own defence, and well provided with supplies.



To Lieut. Col. Gore, 33rd regt.

Seringapatam, 1st Feb. 1805

I received last night your letter of the 29th Jan. There is no doubt whatever but that I might send to Vellore any quantity of grain, of all descriptions, that you can require; but I doubt much whether it would arrive there at such an expense as to enable the proprietor to sell it cheaper than grain is sold at Vellore at present, by your account, supposing that he were so inclined.

The ordinary price of grain in Mysore is from 24 to 30 seers for a rupee; and it is probable that it will rise rather than fall in price, in consequence of the scarcity in the Carnatic. A man would load a bullock with rice for about 3 rupees, or a pagoda; and he would hire a bullock to carry his rice to Vellore from the eastern rice countries, for about as much more: 72 seers of rice therefore, landed at Vellore, would cost him 6 or 7 rupees, and supposing that no duties were levied upon its passage through the Mysore country, or the Company's territories, he could not afford to sell this rice for 10 seers for a rupee. This state of the facts proves to me, and I dare say it will to you, that there is no combination at Vellore to keep up the price: and, indeed, considering that there must certainly be a scarcity in the Carnatic, in consequence of the want of rain, it is my opinion that the price is extraordinarily low. What do you think of the common grains in the Deccan being at 2 and 3 seers for a rupee at this time last year?

I recommend to you to correspond with Major Macleod upon this subject, or with government; and if there should really be a want of grain at Vellore, government will communicate with the Resident here upon the subject; through whose means quantities can be sent down at the cheapest rate, the duties will be taken off, and you will get it much cheaper than by any other mode that I could point out.

To Capt. T. Sydenham.

Seringapatam, 3rd Feb. 1805.

I enclose the copy of a letter from Mr. Frissell upon the subject of Cavy Jung's jaghire. The letter to Mr. Waring, to which it refers, must be on the records of the Residency, and is dated the 17th Jan.

I believe that Cavy Jung was instrumental in getting the fort of Ahmednuggur for the Peshwah's father, when he held the government, and it is probable that the grant to him was of lands, without requiring service. If this should be the case, service ought not now to be demanded.

The Peshwah must be trained gradually to adhere to the engagements made by himself or his predecessors; and I wish you to have a little conversation with Munkaiseer upon this subject.

I enclose you the copy of a letter which I wrote some days ago to Col. Close. It explains the plans which we have in contemplation for the subsidiary forces.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 3rd Feb. 1805.

Your letters of the 14th Jan. have removed from my mind a load of anxiety upon the subject of my remaining at this place; and I observe from those documents, and the Governor General's dispatch of the 9th Jan., that I have acted in conformity with his wishes and intentions. I

now feel an anxiety only about my departure for England, the extent of which I cannot describe. I have no confidence in my own judgment in any case in which my own wishes are involved. This is the cause of the great anxiety which I have felt, and still feel, upon these subjects.

I know that my presence in England would be useful, and I am certainly very anxious to go there. The peace appears to be established in India: we are certain that the Rajah of Berar will remain at peace; and as for Scindiah, he has crossed the Nerbudda, and, by a letter from Col. Close of the 21st Jan. received this day, and written from the neighbourhood of Col. Haliburton's camp, I see that, up to that period, he had received no intelligence from Mr. Jenkins. I conclude, therefore, that all is right, particularly as the Rajah of Berar has positively disowned and punished those who were guilty of the late irruption into the Nizam's territories. But even supposing Scindiah to be hostile towards us, his plan must be to invade the Company's territories under the government of Bengal; and I certainly cannot impede his progress. All that can be done in the Deccan, is to seize his districts near Ahmednuggur, the city of Burhampoor, and Asseerghur; and there appears no cause for which I should delay my voyage with a view to carrying on those operations, which any body can carry on with equal advantage and success. The time presses for a decision. If I do not go in the first fleet that sails from Madras, I shall lose the season, and may as well delay my voyage till October next; and then I shall be too late to be of any public utility in England.

Upon the whole, therefore, I have determined to take my passage in one of the ships to sail from Madras at the end of this month; and as I have been so fortunate hitherto as to view every thing in the same light with the Governor General, I think that I am not mistaken in this decision. I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which his own wishes are concerned; and I have not come to this determination without consulting Malcolm, who agrees in opinion with me upon every part of the subject.

At all events, supposing that, after the Governor General shall have perused my letter to you of the 4th of last month, he should desire that I should not go to England, the only inconvenience which can result from the step which I now take is, to forfeit my passage money, and to return from Madras.

To Major Shawe.

Seringapatam, 4th Feb. 1805.

I enclose the copy of a letter and other papers received this morning from Mr. Duncan. You will see the real state of Gen. Jones's corps, than which nothing can be much worse. It is very obvious that the Commander in Chief has never had a knowledge of Col. Murray's real state, or of the impediments to his advance to the northward, and that the orders to advance have been drawn from his Excellency by Col. Murray's importunities.

To Col. Close.

Seringapatam, 8th Feb. 1805.

I have received your letters of the 22nd and 23rd Jan. I have nothing to recommend for Col. Haliburton in addition to my letter of the 18th Jan., which I have sent you in triplicate.

Since you quitted Poonah, I have written fully to the Residency ~~there~~

upon every point that has occurred. Byajee Naig is, indeed, dismissed, and Munkaiseer has had the impudence to swear that he is still in favor, although his attendance upon the Residency is discontinued, upon his own desire, that he may have more leisure to attend to the education of his son. I shall continue to watch closely the affairs at Poonah, and advise Sydenham upon all occasions.

As matters appear to be very quiet to the northward, I am going to take a run to Madras, to meet the Commander in Chief, Sir J. Cradock.\* Direct to me by Hyderabad, and Col. Kirkpatrick will forward your letters wherever I may be.

To Captain T. Sydenham.

Seringapatam, 9th Feb. 1805.

I have received your letter of the 1st inst. with the copy of that from Mr. Forbes. My papers are gone to Madras, and therefore I cannot now refer to Mr. Frissell's letter upon the subject of Mr. Forbes' offer for the sandal wood: but I rather think that Mr. Frissell said positively, that Mr. Forbes would give the same price for the sandal wood that he did last year. However, whether he did or not, I never will be instrumental in forcing upon Mr. Forbes a bargain which may prove disadvantageous to him; and therefore I request that you will inquire from him at what price he will take the sandal wood, as I rather believe that government will be inclined to repay him his money by a delivery of that article.

To the Sec. of Gov. Bombay.

Port St. George, 15th Feb. 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th Jan. I consider that it is much to be regretted that Capts. Sykes, Fallow, and M'Intosh should have quitted the army to return into Guzerat, escorted by a body of troops, which from their nature could not be depended upon through a country, in which no measures had been taken to insure the communication between the army and Guzerat. The misfortunes which happened to them are to be attributed to this first false step. It does not appear to me that the person who took the gentlemen in question is an officer in Scindiah's service. He appears to be an independent leader of freebooters, who has taken advantage of the confusion of the times to plunder as much as he can on his own account. Supposing him to be a servant of Scindiah, it does not appear that he took these officers in conformity to orders from Scindiah, or in conformity with general orders, specifying the line of conduct to be adopted in respect to European officers who should pass through the country, as his conduct was entirely different from that of the principal manager stationed at Ougein, who, it is to be supposed, acted in the manner which he considered would be most satisfactory to his employer.

The result of any application, therefore, to Scindiah upon this subject would be, that Scindiah would deny that this person was his servant, and would allege that he was in rebellion to his government, and would call upon the British government to subdue him; or he would acknowledge that he was his servant, would allege that his conduct was in disobedience of and inconsistent with all his orders, and as a proof thereof, would advert to the conduct of the manager at Ougein. In this case, he would promise

\* The late Gen. Lord Howden, G.C.B.

to endeavor to recover from Wittoha buckshee the property plundered from the officers. It is not very probable that any thing would be recovered; and therefore, with a view to the property of the officers, I am of opinion that a reference to Scindiah's durhar would be entirely useless. But as it is desirable to show these powers that British officers cannot be injured either in their persons or their property, without attracting the notice of government, it is my opinion that the Hon. the Governor in Council would do well to draw the attention of the Resident at Scindiah's durbar to this transaction, and to urge him to make a representation upon it to Scindiah, in such terms as he may think proper.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 15th Feb. 1805.

I arrived here on the 13th, about 4 o'clock in the morning, Gen. Cradock having landed, as you will have heard, on the 12th, in the evening. He appears to me to be well disposed to carry on affairs in the manner in which they ought to be conducted, and I hope that every thing will go on well.

I have received no political letters since I saw you, excepting, from Bengal, copies of the dispatches from Mr. Jenkins, which were written in December, of which I had not received copies before. There is nothing new in them of any importance; and it is my opinion that Mr. Jenkins might have turned the course of the negotiation in such a manner as to insure the destruction of Ghautky, and Scindiah's march to Ougcin.

By the last accounts from Bengal, Bhurtpoor had not fallen on the 15th, but it was expected to fall on the 16th or 17th. Meer Khan had crossed the Chumhul at Dhoolpoor, in order to join Holkar; and Gen. Jones had been ordered to follow him, and to fall upon his rear. I think it fortunate that Meer Khan had determined to join Holkar, rather than to fall upon Gen. Jones's rear. I have not yet determined upon my future plans. Every body here has inquired after you.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Cradock, K.B.

Fort St. George, 15th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, to send to Bombay and Fort St. George all corps, troops, and followers belonging to those Presidencies respectively, which may now be in the Deccan, beyond the establishment of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and with the Soubah of the Deccan. The first point to which I beg leave to draw your attention in reference to these orders, is the corps stationed at Bellary, consisting of the 22nd dragoons, the 1st regt. of cavalry, and a battalion of Native infantry, with its guns, in readiness to march into the Deccan. These troops might be ordered into their garrisons and cantonments.

The subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan ought to consist of 2 regiments of Native cavalry, each of 500 men, 2 companies of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, and 6 battalions of Native infantry, each consisting of 1000 firelocks, and 2 companies of pioneers, with the necessary complement of ordnance and military stores. This corps ought to be, according to the orders of his

Excellency the Governor General, entirely composed of troops belonging to the establishment of Fort St. George.

The subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah ought to consist of one regiment of Native cavalry, one company of artillery, 6 battalions of Native infantry, each consisting of 1000 firelocks, and one company of pioneers, with the necessary complement of ordnance and military stores: of this corps, one regiment of Native cavalry ought to belong to the government of Madras, and the remainder of the troops to the government of Bombay, according to the orders of the Governor General.

There are in the Deccan, at present, 4 regiments of cavalry, — companies of artillery, 2 regiments of European infantry, and 10 battalions of Native infantry, and 3 companies of pioneers belonging to the government of Fort St. George; and one company of artillery, and 4 battalions of Native infantry belonging to the government of Bombay. The excess, therefore, beyond the establishment of the subsidiary forces, is of Madras troops, one regiment of Native cavalry, one regiment of European infantry, 4 battalions of Native infantry, and one company of pioneers; and the deficiency is of Bombay troops 2 battalions of Native infantry. By reference to the returns you will observe the incomplete state of all the corps in the Deccan at the present moment; and the fact is, that the numbers of the whole do not amount to what they ought to be by the treaties with the two powers.

The Bombay corps stationed at Poonah are equally incomplete with those serving under the government of Fort St. George; and they are not in the state of discipline or efficiency in which they ought to be for the service on which they are employed. I am therefore of opinion that it will not be proper to draw any part of the Madras Native infantry out of the Deccan till the Bombay government shall have completed the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, by sending to Poonah 2 Bombay battalions still in Malabar. When that measure shall have been effected, it is probable that the Bombay troops now at Poonah will have been disciplined and equipped for service, and then all the surplus Madras Native infantry may be drawn into the territories of the government of Fort St. George.

The European regiments in the Deccan are the 74th and 94th. The 74th regt. are reduced to a very small number of men; and the 94th have been harassed by the severe service of the late war, and have suffered much from sickness in this year, which has been the consequence of the famine in the Deccan. The 74th regt. ought to be marched back into the territories of the government of Fort St. George; or if it be true, as is reported, that this corps is ordered home, they might be sent to Bombay to be embarked. At all events, if they should be marched back, their disabled men, whether by sickness or wounds, ought to be sent to Bombay.

The 94th regt. requires rest, and ought to be relieved. There are two modes in which this relief can be effected: either by sending into the Deccan a regiment of European infantry, direct from the territories of this government, or by sending there the 77th regt., as soon as this corps shall be relieved from Goa by the 84th.

If the last plan should be adopted, the 77th regt. might join at Hullihall, in Soonda, the 2 Bombay battalions which will come out of Malabar, and the whole might march together to Poonah. In this case, it would be necessary to collect at Hullihall the equipments for the 77th regt., and the supplies of provisions which will be necessary for this corps and the battalions on their march. The regiments of cavalry are the 5th and 7th, with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah; and the 3rd and 6th, with the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan. The 5th and 7th are incomplete in numbers, ill equipped, and not highly disciplined. They are young corps, which were never in very good order, and the best measure to be adopted in respect to them would be to draw them into the Company's territories, and to send into the Peshwah's one complete and efficient regiment of 500 men. If, however, it should be determined to keep in the Peshwah's territories one of these regiments, the other ought to be draughted to complete it with men, horses, and horse appointments. The 3rd and 6th are good regiments, and were complete in numbers. But it must be obvious that it is desirable to relieve all these corps, which have been so long in the field.

The government of Bombay can immediately relieve the company of pioneers belonging to the Madras government, which is attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and this company might return with the 74th regt., or the 4 battalions of Madras Native infantry, as soon as these shall return.

Besides the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George, which are in the Deccan, there are 1200 draught bullocks, which are attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah. I have reason to believe the government of Bombay have provided cattle to relieve those above mentioned, and as soon as they shall be relieved they can come into the Company's territories with the Madras troops. In case your Excellency should approve of these proposed arrangements for withdrawing the supernumerary corps from the Deccan, and for the relief of the 94th, I shall write to Mr. Duncan, to propose to him to frame his arrangements accordingly, and at the same time to relieve the staff officers serving with the Peshwah's subsidiary force who are to be relieved.

To E. Scott Waring, Esq.

Fort St. George, 16th Feb. 1805.

I have received your letter of the 1st inst. I have no intention whatever of disturbing you at Ahmednuggur, so long as the Company may hold that possession; but, as their tenure must be considered as very uncertain, I think it advisable that you should not incur any extraordinary expense there. I mention this opinion because I conceive that you wrote your letter of the 1st with the intention of incurring expense, to render your habitation comfortable, if you should have a prospect of remaining at Ahmednuggur.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 16th Feb. 1805.

I received yesterday your letter of the 10th. You have written to Close in the terms which I should have wished you to use. A letter from Close, received last night, of the 28th Jan, says that Jenkins had written

on the 12th, that Seindiah had promised to march towards Ougein on the 16th, and Jenkins believed that he would march in that direction, at least as far as Belenah.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 17th Feb. 1805.

Five ships arrived this morning, which left England on the 4th Sept. Gen. Lake was made Lord Lake of Delhi and Laswarree, and I, a Knight of the Bath, on the 1st Sept. Henry is gone as plenipotentiary to Madrid.

I determined last night upon going to England, and I have this day communicated this intention to my friend ———; a work in which I have had considerable difficulty. No news from any quarter.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 18th Feb. 1805.

I enclose a letter which I have received from Shawe; I have also received one from the Governor General to the same purport. You may keep the letter, as I have a duplicate of it. The Admiral has offered me a passage in the *Trident*, but I am afraid that I have paid for one in the *Marchioness of Exeter*.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Cradock, K.B.

19th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to inform you that I applied to Gen. Lake, in the course of the last year, for leave to go to England, when the situation of affairs in this country would allow of my departure, and I enclose an extract of his Excellency's answer.\*

The Governor General has been pleased to allow me to resign the political and military power with which he had intrusted me in the Deccan, because my presence in that quarter is no longer necessary; and therefore I consider that to avail myself of the Commander in Chief's leave of absence, at the present moment, will not be attended by inconvenience: I therefore request your permission to proceed to England by one of the ships now under dispatch.

In case you should grant my request, I enclose a letter to the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council, by which I resign all appointments and offices which I hold in the army serving under his Lordship's Government, including that of Major General on the Staff, to which I was appointed by the late Governor in Council, at the recommendation of the late Commander in Chief.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort St. George, 19th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I applied to his Excellency the Commander in Chief in India for permission to go to England, whenever the situation of affairs in this country would permit; and his Excellency was pleased to comply with my request.

As the Governor General has permitted me to resign the political and military powers with which I was intrusted by his Excellency in the Deccan, because the state of affairs in that part of India no longer requires my presence, I have applied to Sir J. Cradock for permission to avail myself of the leave of absence given to me by the Commander in Chief,

\* See p. 1153.

and to go to England by one of the ships now under dispatch ; and, in case his Excellency should grant my request, I beg to resign all the offices and appointments which I hold in the army serving under your Lordship's Government, including that of Major General on the Staff, to which I was appointed by the late Governor in Council, at the recommendation of Lieut. Gen. Stuart.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 20th Feb. 1805.

You shall certainly have my picture. Write to Sydenham for a bust, or half-length, or a three-quarters. I enclose duplicates of Jenkins' last letters, which you may keep. Close writes that he was still in Scindiah's camp on the 18th.

To the Sec. of Gov., Bombay.

Fort St. George, 21st Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to enclose a letter, which I have received from Mr. Kier at Bombay, upon the subject of his attendance upon the sick officers and soldiers belonging to the army at Fort St. George, who have gone from Bombay to camp for the recovery of their health. This duty has certainly been performed by Mr. Kier in a manner very creditable to himself, and advantageous to those under his care, and to the public ; and it is to him an extra duty, which can never have been in the contemplation of government, and for which, however laborious, no allowance has been given. I therefore beg leave to recommend Mr. Kier to the consideration of the Hon. the Governor in Council, and to request that he will grant him such an allowance as he may appear to him to deserve, for the extraordinary care and trouble he has had in the attendance upon the sick and wounded officers and soldiers who were obliged to go to Bombay for the recovery of their health.

To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Cradock, K.B.

Fort St. George, 22nd Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to enclose the proceedings of a General Court Martial, ordered by me, under authority from the late Commander in Chief, to assemble for the trial of Capt. ——. A complaint of the conduct of this officer was made to me by Rajah Mohiput Ram, the Commander of the Soubah's forces, in the month of March last ; upon which complaint, after some previous inquiry through the commanding officer of the subsidiary force, Capt. ——— was put in arrest, on charges framed against him, by my orders, and a court martial was assembled for his trial.

In the course of the proceedings on the trial, it appears that the members and the judge advocate were not sworn, which is an irregularity fatal to the legality of the sentence of the Court Martial. It also appears that the Court Martial acquitted the prisoner of some charges brought against him, from ignorance of certain circumstances, which I alone could explain to them ; and for those crimes of which they found him guilty they sentenced but a very inadequate punishment, and one by no means likely to operate as an example to deter other officers, who might be placed in similar situations, from the commission of similar crimes. The late Commander in Chief, therefore, having been pleased to refer this trial for my opinion, notwithstanding that I was no longer in the com-



mand in the Deccan, I ordered that it might be revised, in a letter to the President, which I have the honor to enclose.

From various causes it has not been possible to assemble the General Court Martial till this day, and the number of members at present alive is not sufficient to form a General Court Martial. The sentence passed is obviously illegal, supposing it to be adequate to the crimes of which the prisoner has been found guilty; but of the inadequacy of the punishment awarded there will not be the smallest doubt, after a perusal of the enclosed papers.

There never was a more flagrant instance of breach of trust than that of which Capt. — has been found guilty; and there is no crime which more justly deserves punishment, or more necessarily requires to be held up to the army as obnoxious to every principle of military service. He was placed in arrest, in consequence of the complaint of Rajah Mohiput Ram, the commanding officer of the troops of the Soubah of the Deccan, who has proved the truth of his complaints; and if Capt. — should, by any accident, be suffered to escape with impunity, the worst impressions will be made on the minds of the Natives in general, and serious offence will be given to the Soubah of the Deccan.

Under all these circumstances, I beg leave to recommend that the General Court Martial, of which Col. Macleanne is President, may be dissolved; that Capt. — may be suspended from the service till the pleasure of the Court of Directors is known; and that the enclosed papers may be sent home to show the grounds of this measure.

To Col. Haliburton.

Fort St. George, 24th Feb. 1805.

His Excellency the Governor General has sent me a copy of his letter to you of the 24th Jan., and I proceed to give you my instructions in conformity to his Excellency's orders.

I wrote to Col. Close on the 18th Jan. to suggest to him to withdraw, from the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan under your command, the troops and the departments belonging to the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah, and to send them to Ahmednuggur, there to join Col. Wallace with the main body of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah. It appears that this arrangement is entirely conformable to the wishes of his Excellency the Governor General; and I have, therefore, to desire that you will send to Ahmednuggur, as soon as may be convenient, the brigade of infantry under Lieut. Col. Colman, consisting of the 74th regt., the 1st batt. 3rd regt., 1st batt. 8th regt., and the 5th and 7th regts. of cavalry, the pioneers under Capt. Barclay, the grain department and Col. Robertson, with the bullocks attached to it, the provision department, and every thing attached to the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah, the department of the Commissary of stores under Capt. Noble, and all the ordnance and stores attached to the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah, and bullocks attached to the bazaar, the grain department under Capt. Monteith, and generally every thing and person belonging to the subsidiary force which joined you from Poonah.

As, by their march towards Ahmednuggur, this corps will draw nearer

to their supplies, you are hereby authorised to keep such quantities of the grain in the charge of Col. Robertson as you will require, leaving with him only what will be sufficient to feed the troops on their march to Ahmednuggur; but the bullocks in the grain department attached to the subsidiary force with the Peshwah must not be detained.

In the same manner, if you should have received instructions from Col. Close to prepare for an expedition beyond the Taptee, and should require any of the ordnance and military stores in Capt. Noble's department, you are hereby authorised to detain them, but the cattle must not be detained; particularly the draught cattle of the Mysore establishment must be sent to Ahmednuggur.

I wrote to you on the Jan. to desire that one serjeant, 2 corporals, and 20 matrosses, belonging to the 3rd company of the 2nd batt. of artillery, and attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, should be transferred to the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, to which the 3rd company of the 2nd batt. of artillery is attached. In case this transfer should not have been made, it is to be made before the detachments separate.

The Governor General has been pleased to direct that the 2 subsidiary forces shall take up a position upon the Godavery, to protect the frontiers of our allies the Nizam and the Peshwah, leaving a detachment from each of them, consisting of 2 battalions, with their guns, at Hyderabad and Poonah respectively.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Col. Wallace, by which you will observe that I have directed him to take up a position with his corps at Toka if he should find it possible, or if it should not be inconvenient, with a view to the relief of the troops belonging to the government of Fort St. George, which are to return within the territories of that government. In this case he is to take up a position near Ahmednuggur, and I have desired Col. Wallace to apprise you of his intentions upon this subject.

If Col. Wallace should take up a position at Toka, in my opinion you ought to place your corps at Khair, on the Godavery, where it would be well situated either to join Col. Wallace's corps or to enter Berar for any other object that might be required.

If Col. Wallace should take up his position at Ahmednuggur, it is my opinion that you ought to be 30 or 40 miles higher up the river than Khair, somewhere to the southward of Jaum.

I request you to fix upon the spot which you will occupy in this season, according to the intelligence which you will receive from Col. Wallace and these directions. You will be so kind as to adopt every measure to render your troops comfortable during the rains; you will have hospitals built for the sick, and sheds for the sick horses of the cavalry, bullocks, &c., and you will take early measures to receive from Fort St. George the supplies of clothing, arms, accoutrements, &c., which you will require.

The expenses and establishments of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan are fixed by the regulations of the government of Fort St. George, and I have never exceeded that standard, excepting, as far as I recollect, in the hire of 2000 bullocks to carry grain in the grain department. If they should have exceeded the establishments

allowed by the regulations, they must be brought back to the regulated allowances; but, if you should be of opinion that to carry grain in the grain department is absolutely necessary for the subsistence of the troops, you will continue that establishment, and report the necessity of it to his Excellency the Commander in Chief of Fort St. George and the Resident at Hyderabad.

You will also report to the same authorities the necessity for any other increased or extraordinary establishment which you may think it necessary to keep up, beyond the allowance by the regulations of the government of Fort St. George.

You will take care to keep your brinjaries together; and, as I understand, by a private letter from Col. Close, that they are dissatisfied because they have not been paid the money claimed by them from Capt. Johnston, I request you to take measures to have them paid forthwith, according to the tenor of my letter of 18th June, a duplicate of which I enclose.

To Col. Close.

Fort St. George, 24th Feb. 1805.

The dispatch of his Excellency the Governor General of the 24th Jan.,\* of which you have received a copy, contains directions to return to Fort St. George and Bombay all corps, troops, and followers belonging to those Presidencies respectively, which may now be in the Deccan, beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan.

In carrying into execution those orders, it was necessary, first, that I should advert to the letter which I wrote to you on the 18th Jan., in which I contemplated the possibility that you might call for the services of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, in operations between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda; and it has appeared to me, that to carry into execution his Excellency's orders will not impede this design.

I have therefore written a letter to the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, and one to the government of Bombay, of which I enclose copies. The Commander in Chief has approved of the suggestions which the letter to his Excellency contains, and a perusal of both will show you in what manner it is proposed to effect the relief in contemplation, and to withdraw the supernumerary troops from the Deccan.

I conclude that you have sent to the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah, the troops and departments belonging to it, as suggested in my letter of the 18th Jan.; but should you not have done so, I write orders upon the subject to Col. Haliburton, as I consider the separation of the two forces as a measure which will facilitate the relief and the object of withdrawing the supernumerary troops; and at the same time, will enable you to employ Col. Haliburton's corps across the Taptee, should that measure be necessary. Besides the orders to withdraw the supernumerary troops, his Excellency's dispatch of the 24th Jan. contains orders upon different other subjects connected with the service in the Deccan, upon which I am about to give you my opinion.

The first, and most important of these, is the position of the two subsi-

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches; the Gov. Gen. to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, 24th Jan. 1805, vol. iv. p. 267.

diary forces. It is my opinion, that that serving with the Peshwah ought to be 2 battalions at Poonah, and 4 battalions with the cavalry, artillery, &c., at or near Toka, if the state of discipline and equipment of the Bombay troops should be such as to permit Col. Wallace to take up this position. In that case Col. Haliburton's corps, with the exception of 2 battalions at Hyderabad, might be lower down the Godavery than the spot fixed upon by his Excellency the Governor General, and somewhere about Khair. It is probable that the Bombay troops are not in a state to move to such a distance from Poonah as Toka is; and at all events, it will be more convenient for effecting the relief, &c., that the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah should not be so far advanced. This being the case, I should wish them to take up their ground for this season in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur; and if they remain at Ahmednuggur, it would be best that Col. Haliburton should be with his corps about 40 miles higher up the Godavery than Khair, and to the southward of Jaum. I propose to make Col. Wallace acquainted with my sentiments upon this subject; and to leave it to him to decide whether it will be convenient to take up the position as proposed at Toka or Ahmednuggur; and to desire Col. Haliburton to post his corps either in the neighbourhood of Jaum, or of Khair, according to the position which will be taken up by Col. Wallace, unless you should think it necessary to employ his corps beyond the Taptee.

The next subject for consideration under the orders of his Excellency the Governor General of the 24th Jan. is the reduction of expense in both the subsidiary forces. All the establishments of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan are fixed by the regulations of the government of Fort St. George; and it is sufficient to refer Col. Haliburton to those regulations, and to desire him not to keep up any extraordinary establishments, excepting of grain, if he should find it necessary, and of brinjaries.

The establishments of the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah were fixed by me in G. O. on a scale nearly similar to the establishments attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, which orders have been approved of by his Excellency the Governor General, and the government of Fort St. George. The excess of the establishments attached to the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, beyond those of the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, consists in an additional establishment for the Commissary of provisions, in consequence of his having a large number of Europeans to feed; an increased establishment for the Commissary of grain, in consequence of his having 5000 bullock loads of grain in his department; an increased establishment for the Agent of hired bullocks, in consequence of his having the charge of 6000 hired bullocks; and an establishment for the Commissary of stores proportioned to the number of pieces of cannon of which he had the charge. The establishment of the Commissary of provisions with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah might be reduced as soon as the European troops are withdrawn; but as, in my judgment, it will be proper to keep up the number of loads of grain in the grain department to 5000, till such arrangements can be made with the

Marhatta brinjaries as to insure a constant supply, the establishment fixed for the Commissary of grain cannot be reduced. The same reasoning applies to the establishment of hired bullocks, and the Commissary of stores must of course have an establishment proportioned to the number of pieces of cannon under his charge. There appears, therefore, no room for reduction of expense in the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, excepting in the department of the Commissary of provisions, when the number of Europeans shall be reduced.

There is an officer at the head of the grain department at Poonah, and another in a similar situation at Ahmednuggur; and I conceive that the Commissary of grain with the subsidiary force may take charge of these two depôts, and manage by his Native servants, as soon as the effects of the late famine in the Deccan shall no longer be felt. But so long as these appear, I think that it would not be safe to trust the charge of the depôt to Natives; and therefore I consider this European superintendence at the depôts to be still necessary.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to Col. Wallace and Col. Haliburton, in conformity with the principles stated in this letter.

To the Resident at Hyderabad.

Fort St. George, 25th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to the government of Bombay, the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, and Cols. Close, Haliburton, and Wallace, with a view to carry into execution the Governor General's order of the 25th Jan.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Fort St. George, 25th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received the directions of his Excellency the Governor General to return to Fort St. George and Bombay all corps, troops, and followers belonging to these Presidencies respectively, which may now be in the Deccan, beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Subah of the Deccan. His Excellency has likewise directed that, with the exception of 2 battalions, with their guns, to be detached from each of the subsidiary forces, and to be posted at Hyderabad and Poonah respectively, each of the subsidiary forces should take up a position, upon or near the river Godavery, for the protection of the territories of the Company's allies.

The first step to be taken in conformity with his Excellency's orders, is to collect at Ahmednuggur the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah; and with a view to that object, I request you to march to Ahmednuggur with the troops under your command at Poonah, excepting 2 battalions with their guns, and such of the heavy ordnance as you may find it convenient to leave in the camp at Poonah. These 2 battalions are to be stationed at Poonah until further orders; and in my opinion you will do well for the present to leave Lieut. Col. Chalmers in command of them.

The enclosed copy of a letter to Col. Haliburton will point out to you the measures which I have directed with the view to the collection at Ahmednuggur of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah; and you

will immediately communicate with Col. Haliburton, and do every thing to facilitate the junction of those troops with you.

It is my opinion that the best positions which the two subsidiary forces could occupy, with a view to the defence of the territories of the allies, would be, your corps at Toka, and Col. Haliburton's at Khair; and I should wish those positions to be occupied if possible. But, in fixing upon a position for your corps, it is necessary that I should advert to the deficient state of the equipments of the battalions of the Bombay army, of which the Poonah subsidiary force is composed; to the crippled state of the public departments at the present moment, in consequence of the detachment serving with the Nizam's subsidiary force, and to the consequent inconvenience which you will feel in advancing to any distance from your depôts. I have also to observe, that the difficulty and inconvenience of relieving the Madras troops, and of withdrawing those which are supernumerary, will be increased in proportion to the distance of the position which they will occupy.

Under these circumstances, as I do not apprehend that any inconvenience will result in this season from omitting to advance to Toka, and the only benefit which would result from the measure would be, to place the two subsidiary forces at once in the situations which they will probably permanently occupy; I must leave it to your decision, whether to advance to Toka, or to remain in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, after duly considering the advantages and disadvantages of both measures.

You will apprise Col. Haliburton of your determination upon this subject, in order that he may occupy a corresponding position, according to his instructions.

The orders of the 21st Feb. and the 19th June, 1804, fixed the establishments of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and I conclude that they are arranged accordingly. It does not appear to me that it will be practicable to reduce any of them, excepting that of the Commissary of provisions, which ought to be reduced to the standard fixed by the regulations of the government of Fort St. George, for the department of the Commissary of provisions with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. It will still be necessary to have 5000 bullock loads of rice in the department of the Commissary of grain, and bullocks to carry them, in that of the hired bullocks; and, of course, the corresponding establishments respectively ordered, with a view to the charge of this grain and these bullocks; and the Commissary of stores must have an establishment for the number of pieces of ordnance under his charge.

In case you should find any increase of establishment necessary, you will report such necessity to the Resident at Poonah and the authorities at Bombay, who will give orders upon the subject.

I consider that, until all the effects of the late famine in the Deccan shall have disappeared, it will be necessary to keep the depôts at Poonah and Ahmednuggur under European superintendence, as at present. When those effects shall have disappeared, the Commissary officer, with the subsidiary force, may take charge of the magazines, and manage them by means of his Native servants.

It is intended immediately to relieve the Madras troops and establish-

Marhatta brinjaries as to insure a constant supply, the establishment fixed for the Commissary of grain cannot be reduced. The same reasoning applies to the establishment of hired bullocks, and the Commissary of stores must of course have an establishment proportioned to the number of pieces of cannon under his charge. There appears, therefore, no room for reduction of expense in the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, excepting in the department of the Commissary of provisions, when the number of Europeans shall be reduced.

There is an officer at the head of the grain department at Poonah, and another in a similar situation at Ahmednuggur; and I conceive that the Commissary of grain with the subsidiary force may take charge of these two depôts, and manage by his Native servants, as soon as the effects of the late famine in the Deccan shall no longer be felt. But so long as these appear, I think that it would not be safe to trust the charge of the depôt to Natives; and therefore I consider this European superintendence at the depôts to be still necessary.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to Col. Wallace and Col. Haliburton, in conformity with the principles stated in this letter.

To the Resident at Hyderabad.

Fort St. George, 25th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to the government of Bombay, the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George, and Cols. Close, Haliburton, and Wallace, with a view to carry into execution the Governor General's order of the 25th Jan.

To Lieut. Col. Wallace.

Fort St. George, 25th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received the directions of his Excellency the Governor General to return to Fort St. George and Bombay all corps, troops, and followers belonging to these Presidencies respectively, which may now be in the Deccan, beyond the establishments of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. His Excellency has likewise directed that, with the exception of 2 battalions, with their guns, to be detached from each of the subsidiary forces, and to be posted at Hyderabad and Poonah respectively, each of the subsidiary forces should take up a position, upon or near the river Godavery, for the protection of the territories of the Company's allies.

The first step to be taken in conformity with his Excellency's orders, is to collect at Ahmednuggur the subsidiary force serving with his Highness the Peshwah; and with a view to that object, I request you to march to Ahmednuggur with the troops under your command at Poonah, excepting 2 battalions with their guns, and such of the heavy ordnance as you may find it convenient to leave in the camp at Poonah. These 2 battalions are to be stationed at Poonah until further orders; and in my opinion you will do well for the present to leave Lieut. Col. Chalmers in command of them.

The enclosed copy of a letter to Col. Haliburton will point out to you the measures which I have directed with the view to the collection at Ahmednuggur of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah; and you

will immediately communicate with Col. Haliburton, and do every thing to facilitate the junction of those troops with you.

It is my opinion that the best positions which the two subsidiary forces could occupy, with a view to the defence of the territories of the allies, would be, your corps at Toka, and Col. Haliburton's at Khair; and I should wish those positions to be occupied if possible. But, in fixing upon a position for your corps, it is necessary that I should advert to the deficient state of the equipments of the battalions of the Bombay army, of which the Poonah subsidiary force is composed; to the crippled state of the public departments at the present moment, in consequence of the detachment serving with the Nizam's subsidiary force, and to the consequent inconvenience which you will feel in advancing to any distance from your depôts. I have also to observe, that the difficulty and inconvenience of relieving the Madras troops, and of withdrawing those which are super-numerary, will be increased in proportion to the distance of the position which they will occupy.

Under these circumstances, as I do not apprehend that any inconvenience will result in this season from omitting to advance to Toka, and the only benefit which would result from the measure would be, to place the two subsidiary forces at once in the situations which they will probably permanently occupy; I must leave it to your decision, whether to advance to Toka, or to remain in the neighbourhood of Ahmednuggur, after duly considering the advantages and disadvantages of both measures.

You will apprise Col. Haliburton of your determination upon this subject, in order that he may occupy a corresponding position, according to his instructions.

The orders of the 21st Feb. and the 19th June, 1804, fixed the establishments of the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, and I conclude that they are arranged accordingly. It does not appear to me that it will be practicable to reduce any of them, excepting that of the Commissary of provisions, which ought to be reduced to the standard fixed by the regulations of the government of Fort St. George, for the department of the Commissary of provisions with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. It will still be necessary to have 5000 bullock loads of rice in the department of the Commissary of grain, and bullocks to carry them, in that of the hired bullocks; and, of course, the corresponding establishments respectively ordered, with a view to the charge of this grain and these bullocks; and the Commissary of stores must have an establishment for the number of pieces of ordnance under his charge.

In case you should find any increase of establishment necessary, you will report such necessity to the Resident at Poonah and the authorities at Bombay, who will give orders upon the subject.

I consider that, until all the effects of the late famine in the Deccan shall have disappeared, it will be necessary to keep the depôts at Poonah and Ahmednuggur under European superintendence, as at present. When those effects shall have disappeared, the Commissary officer, with the subsidiary force, may take charge of the magazines, and manage them by means of his Native servants.

It is intended immediately to relieve the Madras troops and establish-



ments serving with the Peshwah's subsidiary force, and you will receive orders upon the subject from his Excellency the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George. With a view to facilitate this relief, it is necessary that you should take an early opportunity of collecting the corps, either at Toka or Ahmednuggur, according to the choice you will make of a position for the monsoon. I imagine that a part of the 2nd of the 3rd occupies the forts of Chandore and Gaulna; and if that should be the case, it would be desirable that you should relieve them by Bombay troops, as soon as you may be joined at Ahmednuggur by the corps ordered from Col. Haliburton's detachment.

I expect that the Peshwah will be able to occupy those forts at an early period, with troops upon whose fidelity dependence can be placed; but in the mean time, till he shall have such troops in his service, and shall have made arrangements for paying them regularly, it will be necessary that these forts should be maintained by our troops. But you will fix such garrisons for them only as shall be absolutely necessary to maintain them against a surprise; and you will instruct the officers who will be placed in command of these forts, to take every precaution to prevent such a disgraceful disaster.

I have the honor to inform you, that I expect that Col. Robertson, Mr. Gilnour, Capt. Welsh, Capt. Bellingham, and Capt. Noble will be relieved in the discharge of their respective departments with the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, by officers of the Bombay army; but you will inform these officers that I have not forgotten their meritorious services while under my command, and that I have recommended them to his Excellency the Commander in Chief at Fort St. George.

When you shall fix upon and take up your position for the rains, I request you to adopt every measure to make your troops comfortable. You must have hospitals prepared for the sick, and sheds for the sick horses and bullocks, and you will communicate to the government of Bombay all your wants, so that they may be supplied at an early period.

In case you should have leisure, I wish you to send to Bombay the remainder of the captured ordnance still at Ahmednuggur.

\*To Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Cradock, K.B.

Fort St. George, 26th Feb. 1805.

I have the honor to enclose copies of the letters which I have written to the Governor of Bombay and to Cols. Close, Haliburton, and Wallace, with a view to prepare for the relief of the Coast troops in the Deccan, upon which subject I had the honor of addressing you on the 15th inst.

You will observe by my letter to the Governor of Bombay, that it is doubtful whether, under present circumstances, he will be able to send the 84th regt. from Bombay to Goa, upon which subject he will communicate with you.

You will observe that, according to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, I have recommended to the government of Bombay officers of the Bombay army, who have hitherto been on the staff in Malabar, and who have lost their situations in that province by the relief

\* The notification of Major Gen. Wellesley being created an extra Knight of the Order of the Bath was not known in India before the 25th Feb. 1805. See G. O. G., pp. 1451, 1452.

which has lately taken place, to fill the staff offices in the subsidiary force serving with the Peshwah, of Commissary of grain and of hired bullocks, held by Lieut. Col. Robertson; of Paymaster and Commissary of provisions, held by Capt. Bellingham; of Commissary of stores, held by Capt. Noble; of Judge Advocate, held by Capt. Welsh; and of Superintending Surgeon, held by Mr. Gilmour. Lieut. Col. Robertson is an officer of such high rank in the service, that I imagine there is no office in Malabar to which he could be appointed; but I beg leave to recommend him in the most earnest manner to your Excellency's favor and protection, and to assure you that there is no officer of his rank in the army to whom the service owes so much as to Lieut. Col. Robertson, for his exertions in different campaigns, in the offices of Commissary of grain and provisions.

The late Commander in Chief was pleased, at my request, to appoint Capt. Bellingham to be D. Q. M. G. in Mysore, and I have only to recommend him to your favorable notice.

Cpts. Noble and Welsh, and Mr. Gilmour, remain without offices, and I beg leave to recommend those officers to your favor. They served in important situations throughout the late war, and were appointed to the offices which they held in the subsidiary force as a reward for their services. They have been removed from these offices in consequence of a military arrangement, which rendered their removal necessary; but I hope that they will be considered by you in the appointments to the offices vacated in Malabar by the removal of the officers of the Bombay army.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 26th Feb. 1803.

I spoke to Lord William this morning about Purneah's intention of taking off the duties, if it was wished; he said that he thought it was not necessary, and he promised to write to you, if it should be deemed so. He also promised to write to Purneah about the behaviour of his troops and peons, as soon as they should be sent back to their own country. I have desired Barclay to send over to you the vakeels of the Marhatta chiefs who are at Seringapatam, and you will do well to communicate with them, and to dismiss them when you have done all the business which you propose to transact through their agency. They cost some money, of which Barclay will give you an account. I have spoken to Sir J. Cradock frequently about you, and I have told him that you would keep him informed of events as they should come to your knowledge. He said that he should be happy to hear from you, and he begged that you would commence your correspondence without ceremony or further loss of time.

Between ourselves, I am not entirely satisfied with him. He has commenced his command by appointing an aid de camp more than he is entitled to, and by claiming allowances which were refused to Gen. Stuart. I find fault only with his judgment upon this occasion, as the result of these claims will be, that he will involve himself forthwith in a dispute with the Council, and the Court of Directors, upon points personal to himself, and, of course, the whole world will be on the side of his opponents. He adopted both these measures without consulting me, or, I believe, any body else; and I know of them only through my old channel of intelligence.

I don't know when we go. I have written to Calcutta about Wilks. Tell him that he has omitted to send me a copy of his report on Mysore. It must be sent after me positively, with all the documents connected with it. Barelay is to remain in his office, and I believe no person will be appointed to Mysore till orders come from Calcutta. I recommended old Chingleput Campbell, or Moneypenny; the former rather than the latter.

It has been reported that Jenkins' camp has been attacked again, and Mr. Wise and Mr. Green have been wounded. I have no account of this event, but, if it be true, I conclude that Mr. Jenkins has again encamped at a distance from Scindiah.

I cannot express to you how much distressed I am at going away and parting with my friends in this country. I recommend Mrs. Freere to your kindness and attentions, which, I am convinced, you will show her on my account.

To the Governor General.

Fort St. George, 27th Feb. 1805.

1. I have the honor to enclose copies of letters which I have written, containing the proposed arrangements, by which your Excellency's orders of the 24th Jan. will be carried into execution.

2. Copies of these letters have been sent to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poonah.

3. As tranquillity prevails throughout the Deccan, and there is no reason to believe that it will be disturbed, I propose to resign immediately the political and military powers in the Deccan with which I have been intrusted by your Excellency, and to avail myself of your permission and that of the Commander in Chief to proceed to Europe by the ships now under dispatch at this place.

To Major Shawe.

Fort St. George, 27th Feb. 1805.

I wish that you would draw the Governor General's attention to Major Wilks' report on the affairs of Mysore, as a most able performance, which throws much light on the transactions in that country, and does credit to the British government.

I should wish that the Governor General would reward Major Wilks by giving him the salary of a Resident during the time he acted in Mysore for Col. Malcolm; and if hereafter it should be deemed expedient to remove the latter to any other situation, Major Wilks will make an excellent Resident in Mysore. The Dewan and all the principal people of that country have the highest respect and regard for him.

As soon as the war is over, and the pressure upon the finances can be relieved, it will be expedient to order the government of Fort St. George to find means of paying the troops in Mysore, besides the subsidy, and to allow the payments on account of the subsidy to accumulate for a few months to pay the debt due by the Company to the Rajah. It presses a little upon the Mysore government at present, but it may be delayed till the peace without inconvenience.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 28th Feb. 1805.

I return Col. Close's letter, which is the first and only intimation I

have had of the event which it mentions. It is a sad one, and I fear that Mr. Jenkins is to blame for having encamped at such a distance from Scindiah, and not having been on his guard. There is nothing new.

To G. Stratton, Esq.

Fort St. George, 1st March, 1805.

The bearer, Nella Tamby, who is now a landholder in the jaghire, was formerly a servant in a public office in Seringapatam, in which very great abuses were committed, of which he gave such correct information as enabled me to trace them to their source; and his evidence at a General Court Martial which took place in consequence was so clear and distinct, that it must have had great weight with the Court. Some of the parties tried by the General Court Martial afterwards prosecuted Nella Tamby for perjury, before the Supreme Court of Judicature at Madras, and put him to great expense and trouble, but he was fully acquitted of the crime laid to his charge. He has informed me that he is now solely occupied in the management of his lands in the jaghire, and has requested a letter from me to any of the gentlemen in charge of the affairs of that district; I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your protection.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 1st March, 1805.

I enclose copies of letters between me and Webbe, upon different subjects relating to Mysore, principally the arrangement of the arrack concerns in the commands. I issued an order upon this subject, of which Barclay will give you a copy; and when the distribution of the arrack money shall be made in the Carnatic, he will furnish you with a list of the claimants in the Mysore country. It will be necessary that you should recall to Purneah's recollection, that he saves about 700 pagodas *per mensem* by the arrack arrangement; besides the sums which he collects from the bazaars of Sera, Bednore, Bangalore, &c., as I fear he will grow a little about the sum he will have to pay, which I hope will exceed 100 pagodas *per mensem* to each commanding officer.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

As I am about to depart for England, I have written a letter to the Dewan, which I enclose, together with a copy and translation thereof for your perusal; and I beg that you will do me the favor to deliver the letter to the Dewan.

To Purneah, Dewan of the Rajah of Mysore.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

Lieut. Col. Malcolm will have informed you that affairs having begun to have a more settled appearance in the Deccan, I have obtained permission to go to England, and I shall commence my voyage in a few days. I part with you with the greatest regret; and I shall ever continue to feel the most lively interest for the honor and prosperity of the government of the Rajah of Mysore over which you preside. For 6 years I have been concerned in the affairs of the Mysore government, and I have contemplated with the greatest satisfaction its increasing prosperity under your administration.

Experience has proved the wisdom of the arrangement which was first

made of the government of Mysore; and I am convinced that under no other management would it have been possible for the British government to derive such advantages from the country which you have governed, as I have enjoyed in the various difficulties with which we have contended since your authority was established. Every principle of gratitude, therefore, for many acts of personal kindness to myself, and a strong sense of the public benefits which have been derived from your administration, render me anxious for its continuance and for its increasing prosperity; and in every situation in which I may be placed, you may depend upon it that I shall not fail to bear testimony of my sense of your merits upon every occasion that may offer, and that I shall suffer no opportunity to pass which I may think favorable for rendering you service.

Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I must take the liberty to recommend to you to persevere in the laudable path which you have hitherto followed. Let the prosperity of the country be your great object; protect the ryots and traders, and allow no man, whether vested with authority or otherwise, to oppress them with impunity; do justice to every man; and attend to the wholesome advice which will be given to you by the British Resident; and you may depend upon it that your government will be as prosperous and as permanent as I wish it to be.

I recommend to your constant favor and protection Bistnapah Pundit, Govind Rao, Ragonaut Rao, Ranary, and all the sirdars and troops who served meritoriously with me in the last war; and Sheshiah and the hircarrahs belonging to you who accompanied me. They are all deserving of your favor. You know that, for some years, I have had under my protection Salabut Khan, the supposed or adopted son of Dhoondiah Waugh. I have given him a sum of money, and placed him under the guardianship of the court at Seringapatam, and I request you to take him into the Rajah's service hereafter, if you should find him to be worthy of your favor.

As a testimony of my sense of the benefits which the public have derived from your administration, of my sincere regard, and of my gratitude for many acts of personal kindness and attention, I request your acceptance of my picture, which will be sent to you from Bengal.

To Col. Wallace, Major Barclay, and Capt. Bellingham.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

His Excellency the Commander in Chief having been pleased to permit me to go to England, it is necessary that I should appoint persons to conduct the prize affairs of the army in the Deccan in my absence, under the orders of his Excellency the Governor General; and accordingly I do hereby appoint you to superintend all affairs regarding this prize, to order a division of it, and to decide upon all claims which may be made to participate in its benefits.

Herewith are enclosed all the papers which I have received from his Excellency upon the subject of prize money, and there remains no question of claims undecided. The only part of the business which remains unsettled is the proceeds of the jewels, which are intended to be disposed of by lottery.

I find upon inquiry that the tickets of the lottery, which it was in-

tended to dispose of at Madras, have not been sold; and I think it probable that those sent to Calcutta likewise remain on hand. However, to delay drawing the lottery will probably not increase the chance of selling the tickets. I have therefore sent orders to the prize agents to publish at Bombay an advertisement, stating the intention to draw the lottery on the 1st June; and I have directed that an advertisement to the same purport may be published here, and at Calcutta, of which I enclose a copy. My intention is, that the tickets which shall remain unsold on that day should belong to the army; and that the prizes resulting from them, if there should be any, should be sold by the prize agents, as part of the prize property.

As soon after the 1st June, therefore, as returns can be received from Madras, Calcutta, and Bombay, of the number of tickets sold in the lottery, and the prize agents can ascertain the amount of the property to be divided, you will order a division upon the principles of the division ordered by me on 1st Aug. last.

There are certain officers who have claims to prize money, of an advanced rank, upon which I have decided. Major Barclay will lay these claims before you, and they must of course be satisfied out of the funds allotted for this second division.

In my opinion, the best thing to do with the lots of jewels which may become the property of the army, in consequence of so many of the lottery tickets remaining unsold, will be to sell them forthwith by auction. I recommend, therefore, that you should take an early opportunity of advertising this sale, describing particularly the lots. Fix the day for the auction, which ought to be at Bombay; and take care that it is known at Poona, &c.

You will be so kind as to order a third and last division, upon the same principles as the first and second, of the money which will result from this sale.

You will make a report of your proceedings on the subject of the prize property, to his Excellency the Governor General, and I hope that I shall hear from you.

To Capts. Fraser and Burn, Prize Agents.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

I enclose for your information and guidance a copy of the authority which I have given to Col. Wallace, Major Barclay, and Capt. Bellingham, to superintend the prize affairs of the army in the Deccan, and of my instructions to them on that subject. I also enclose an advertisement relative to the lottery, which I desire that you will have published in the newspapers at Bombay. I have directed copies of the advertisement to be sent to the agents employed by you in the sale of tickets at Calcutta and at this place, and have requested them to have the same published.

Memorandum for Major Barclay.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

1. I have left a power of attorney with Messrs. Harrington and Co. to receive any money that may be due to me in this country, and I have desired them to dispose of it in a particular manner, and to attend to any demands which you may make upon them on my account.

2. The enclosed letter will show you the sums which I expect to receive. You will be so kind as to remit to them my prize money, and they will dispose of it as I have desired.

3. The demands which there are against me are 1500 rupees due to the Parsee of the Residency at Poonah. Some small sums may also be due to Symonds to make good the payments which I have ordered him to make at Seringapatam, and I may owe Bellingham some money, and some small sums to Messrs. Forbes at Bombay.

4. You will provide for the payment of these debts out of the first money belonging to me which Messrs. Harrington and Co. will receive.

To Capt. Sydenham.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

I have received your letter of the 20th Feb. Under existing circumstances, it is my opinion that Ghautky's cartoon ought not to be allowed to proceed to the southward; although I have no apprehension for any thing he can do. You must take care, however, to proceed with great caution in stopping him; and let him be sent back across the Nerbudda, rather as a suspicious person who has evil designs of his own, than as an agent deputed by Scindiah or Ghautky, and in this proceeding it would be best not to give him an opportunity of explaining to any body the nature of his mission.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Money-penny, of which it will be satisfactory to Purneah to have a knowledge.

I have received your memorandum regarding your own services and views, which I shall make use of when I see occasion. I enclose the paragraph regarding yourself, in my letter to the Governor General, regarding the treaty of peace. The whole letter is published in the new edition of the 'Notes' which I purpose to print as soon as I shall arrive in England. The ships are arrived from Masulipatam, and I expect that we shall sail in a few days. I will write to you again.

To Lord W. Bentinck.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

I have the honor to inform your Lordship that, in consequence of the communication which I had with you when I was here in the month of Nov. last, upon the subject of funds to be provided for the payment of the troops in the Deccan, to the 1st Feb., I commenced a correspondence with the Resident at Poonah, in order that he might endeavor to provide the deficiency of the sums required from Bombay. This deficiency amounted, upon estimate, to 4 lacs of rupees.

The house of Forbes and Co., to which I particularly referred the Resident, agreed to advance, and have actually advanced, the sum required; and they have proposed to receive in payment of the sum which they have advanced the sandal wood belonging to this government, which may be in store at Mangalore, at the rate of 40 pagodas per Madras candy of 500 lbs. of the best sort of sandal wood. This price is not so large as that which the house of Forbes and Co. paid for the sandal wood which they received from this government in the last year; but they allege that they were

disappointed in their expectations in the sale of the sandal wood in China, and it appears that they lost by their speculation.

In case your Lordship should think proper to accept this offer, the house of Forbes and Co. are willing to pay into the treasury in China the proceeds of the sandal wood, and to receive bills on the Hon. Court of Directors, drawn at the same rate of exchange as in the last year. If your Lordship should not approve of this offer, the house of Forbes and Co. are willing to receive payment of the 4 lacs of rupees which they have advanced, from your Lordship's government, or the government of Bombay, in any manner that you may think proper.

In laying these offers of Mr. Forbes before your Lordship, I cannot avoid observing upon their liberality, and noticing them as an additional instance of this gentleman's desire to forward the public service, and to lend himself to the public convenience, whenever it may be practicable. I request your Lordship to make the Governor of Bombay acquainted with your wishes regarding the advance made by the house of Forbes and Co.

To Col. Close.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

I have received all your letters relative to the late unfortunate occurrence at Scindiah's durbar; the last accounts from Mr. Jenkins being the 8th Feb. There can be no doubt but that the conduct of Scindiah throughout has been very improper; but not, in my opinion, in making an attack upon Bhopal or Saugur. There is no doubt but that he had a claim upon the Nabob of Bhopal, and it is more than probable that he had one upon Saugur, which, as you observe, holds but very slightly on the Peshwah; but his misbehavior has been, in my opinion, principally towards Mr. Jenkins himself. The first attack upon Mr. Jenkins was a gross violation of the law of nations, on a point perfectly understood by the Marhattas; and it was Scindiah's business to punish the persons guilty of making that attack, and to take special care that it should not be repeated. The repetition of the attack adds to the enormity of the first offence, particularly as no measures have been taken to punish the persons guilty of it.

The Governor General, in his dispatches, has decided that Scindiah shall be considered guilty of Ghautky's acts, if he retains Ghautky in his service, and does not restrain him; but the question upon this subject, is not whether Scindiah has the inclination, but whether he has the power, of restraining him.

I believe Scindiah to be very weak in intellect, although he has been known at times to assert his own power and dignity with a tolerably strong hand. But I am convinced that neither he nor his real ministers could ever have been concerned in the outrages to which I have referred. I am convinced also, that Scindiah knows that if he were to go to war with the British government, every respectable man in his state and army would leave him. It is my opinion, therefore, that he is overawed by Ghautky; that he feels the danger of endeavoring to arrest Ghautky's person, which can alone put a period to his practices; and he thinks that the measure would, in the event, leave him without resources and without army.



The result of this reasoning is, then, that we have reason to complain of Scindiah's government for acts committed by Ghautky, which, we have reason to suppose, are contrary to Scindiah's inclination, and that of his real ministers, and all his sirdars, but which he had not the power, or that he fears to punish.

It is my opinion that neither Scindiah nor Ghautky means to attack the Company. If they had intended it, they would not have lost the time before Saugur, during which Holkar and Meer Khan have been defeated; and it is to be hoped that the Rajah of Bhurtpoor will have been destroyed; but they would have dashed at once at Bundelcund and upon Benares, during the time that they knew that the Commander in Chief and our troops were engaged with Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpoor's forts. Scindiah's object is, I think, to get together a little money, and to be guided by events; and Ghautky appears to have no object at all, excepting to keep together an army of plunderers, which will give him the power over Scindiah. We must expect that the course of events will be favorable to us; and therefore it is unlucky that affairs have been brought to such a crisis, and that it is absolutely necessary to interfere with a strong hand to save Mr. Jenkins and our honor, by which we shall again risk a war.

I do not see what plan we can adopt, in the execution of which Mr. Jenkins' life will not be in danger; and although it is an object of the first consequence to save his life, I declare that I am doubtful whether a strong measure or a moderate one is most likely to be successful. It is my opinion, that the Governor General or you ought to write to Scindiah, to point out to him the enormity of the acts committed against Mr. Jenkins, who was residing with him in the quality of an ambassador; and who, therefore, by the laws of nations, as they are fully understood by the Marhatas, was entitled to his protection; that the Governor General was disposed to believe that these acts had been committed without Scindiah's knowledge, and against his consent; but they had passed without punishment or even notice, and it was therefore absolutely necessary to withdraw Mr. Jenkins from Scindiah's durbar, and to cease all communication with him, unless Scindiah should, immediately on the receipt of that letter, seize Sirjee Rao Ghautky, and punish him as his conduct had deserved.

But in case Scindiah should omit to punish Ghautky, and Mr. Jenkins should withdraw from his camp, Scindiah should be considered responsible for his security, till he should reach one of the posts occupied by the British army; and if, unfortunately, any accident should happen to Mr. Jenkins, Scindiah must expect the consequences of placing himself in the character of an enemy of the British government.

At the same time that this letter should be written, orders ought to be given to the Bundelcund corps, if it is supposed to be of sufficient strength, to approach towards Scindiah's position. If it should not be of sufficient strength, it ought to be strengthened, particularly in cavalry. Our troops in the Deccan cannot do anything in my opinion; excepting Wallace's corps, to seize Scindiah's possessions about Ahmednuggur, if the war should be determined upon; and Haliburton's to seize Burham-poor, and lay siege to Asseerghur.

Scindiah's army, afford the best prospect of maintaining the peace with Scindiah; which, if we can do with honor, I consider to be an object of the first importance.

In regard to myself, I before informed you, that with the consent of the Governor General, founded upon his hopes that the peace would be uninterrupted in the Deccan, I was going home. From a letter which I received from Major Shawe, dated the 18th Feb., since I began this letter, I judge that the Governor General is of opinion, that the late transactions in Scindiah's camp, of which he had received a tolerably accurate report, through hircarrahs, would not lead to war, and he is determined to preserve the peace, if it can be preserved. Under the circumstances I do not see any thing to alter my determination. But at all events, supposing it were desirable that I should return to the Deccan, 3 months must elapse before I could join the army; the season for operations would be over; and the expectation of my return, as it would check all decided measures, would be more injurious than my presence would be beneficial; therefore, I still propose to embark with the Admiral.

I acknowledge that I wish that affairs were in a more settled state; but I do not conceive that my presence will make any alteration in them. We must expect that, for a time, the affairs of the Marhatta Empire will be unsettled; and I do not consider that the late events in Scindiah's camp have, in any degree, altered the grounds on which I determined to go home; more particularly as, supposing that war should be the consequence of them, the scene of operations will be in Hindustan. I leave in this country some valuable friends, with whom I have been intimately connected in friendship, and in constant communication on public affairs for some years; and I part from them with regret. I consider you as one of them, and I assure you that it will give me the greatest satisfaction to meet you again.

To C. Forbes, Esq., Bombay.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

I have received your letter of the 15th Feb. I am very much obliged to you for the pains which you have taken with my concerns. Capt. Barelay will write to you about my tents, &c. I beg that you will acquaint him or Capt. Bellingham with any sums that you may have paid on my account, either for the lascars, Bombay boxes, &c., and they will settle them with you.

I am going to England, as you will have heard, and I have desired my friends in India to write to me by the overland dispatch, and to send their letters enclosed to you at Bombay. I shall be obliged to you if you will forward such letters as may be sent to you.

I showed to Lord W. Bentinck the papers it contained on the subject of the sandal wood, and he is equally impressed with me of the propriety of your proceedings. I enclose the copy of a public letter, which I have addressed to him upon the subject, the answer to which will go to Bombay, and will be communicated to you; and this will settle every thing.

Upon the occasion of my taking leave of you, I beg to return you my best thanks for much personal civility and kindness which I have received

from you; and I hope that, if you should be of opinion that I can be of any service to you in England, you will command my exertions. Direct to me, to the care of Messrs. Coutts, bankers, in London.

P.S. Lord W. Bentinck has desired me to ask you to communicate to him, confidentially, the particulars of the arrangement which you made with Mr. Duncan, for the occasional advances of money to his government, and the mode in which that arrangement is carried into execution.

To Major Shawe.

Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.

I received authentic accounts some days ago of the disaster which has occurred in Scindiah's camp; and I cannot better describe my sentiments upon it, than by sending you the copy of a letter which I wrote yesterday to Col. Close. I expect that we shall sail either on Thursday or Sunday. The Admiral appears inclined to wait till the latter day.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick.

Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.

I have received your letter of the 20th Feb. It is my opinion, that the arrangement to be made with the Soubah of the Deccan should be, that the whole of the force which he is bound to furnish by his treaty with us should be silladar horse; and the revenues of the lands in Berar to be collected by the Soubah's amildars ought to be allotted for their payment. But the payment ought to be made immediately from the treasury to the different jemidars. If the Soubah has at present any silladar horse in his service, that number may be subtracted from the total number to be now raised for his contingent; but the whole of his silladar horse ought to be put upon the same and the best footing. The command of the silladar horse ought not to be given to any particular person; of course they will be under the control of the commanding officer of the army when brought together; but otherwise each russallah should be under its own jemidar, who should receive his pay direct from the treasury or pay office, and should receive his orders direct from the sircar.

I conclude that Appah Dessaye's claim to the choute of Aurungabad is quite clear; and that this question is not one referrible to the arbitration of the British government. Indeed, I have reason to believe it is so, and, therefore, that Appah Dessaye ought to be paid. The fact of the matter regarding this choute is, that although originally a denomination of a portion of revenue, established by the Marhatta exactions, and in many instances a grievance upon the people, from the mode in which it is collected, it could not be entirely abolished, without making a very serious and dangerous attack upon property.

In some instances that I know of, the Nizam and his mussulmann sirdars have the choute of Marhatta districts, which, of course, was originally exacted by the head of the Marhatta government; and, by subsequent arrangements, has been ceded to the Nizam, and granted by him to his servants. In many instances the choute is arranged by the grant of a few villages in a district in lieu of it; in others, the quarter of the district is in the possession of a choutear, in lieu of his claim to a quarter of the

actual revenue realized from the whole district; and in others, by a more complicated arrangement, the choutear has a certain number of villages, and the sircar besides pays him the sum in which the rent of these villages is deficient, to make up the quarter of the revenue of the district.

In almost every instance that I have seen, the right of the choute exists in some individual who resides in the country, and who is but little more attached to the government of the Peshwah than he is to that of the Nizam, if at all attached to the former; and in but very few instances does it belong to the Peshwah's government. This very claim of Appah Dessaye's is one attached to his office of sirlushkur, and every person holding the office before him has enjoyed it. It is my opinion, therefore, generally, that the question for arbitration by the British government is, whether the Soubah shall pay to the Peshwah the choute of Beeder, which is a question depending upon treaties, and not whether his territories shall be exempt from the payment of that portion of revenue called choute, which has always been paid by them. This choute, to which I have referred, is entirely distinct from that general kind of indiscriminate plunder, to which the Marhattas lay claim all over India. This is a right of the sword, which, of course, ceases when the sword is no longer in their hand; and the Soubah has a right to be exempt from it, excepting in instances in which he has bound himself by acknowledged treaties to pay it.

I enclose you a letter which I have written, and beg you to forward to Col. Close, upon the late occurrences in Seindiah's camp. It is a private communication, which I beg that you will keep to yourself. I admire the abilities of Mr. Jenkins, and I declare that I think he has shown through the late transaction a firmness of mind and of conduct not to be expected from any gentleman of his standing, thrown into his situation.

To Major Shawe.

Fort St. George, 6th March, 1803.

Upon my departure from hence, I am exceedingly anxious about the fate of my Brigade Major, Lieut. Colin Campbell, of the 78th regt., and my aide de camp, Lieut. Close, of the 4th regt. of Native cavalry, particularly the former, who has been with me much longer, and from whom I have received great assistance.

You are aware that he is the nephew of Col. Campbell, and he has already interested the Governor General in his favor by the accounts which he laid before him of the losses of his family in the sea and land services. To my certain knowledge he lost 2 brothers in the campaign against the southern polygars, and a brother and a cousin (Col. Campbell's son) in the battle of Assye. I did not know him by name when I saw him distinguish himself in the storm of Ahmednuggur, and I immediately appointed him my Brigade Major; and in the battle of Assye he had either 2 or 3 horses shot under him, and ever since he has rendered me most important assistance. He is only a Lieut. in the 78th regt., but I have frequently recommended him to Gen. Lake for promotion, and he will get it by seniority in his regiment, it is to be hoped, before much time shall elapse. But in the mean time, I should be much flattered and obliged, and I am convinced it would be satisfactory to the army, if the Governor General would take him into his family. He is now going to

Vizagapatam to Col. Campbell, and I should be obliged to you if you will write to him what may be determined upon this subject.

*Lieut. Close has some hopes that he shall be recommended to be appointed to the Body Guard, and I shall be very glad indeed if that can be done for him, and the Governor General will take him into his family.*

To Messrs. Harrington and Co., Fort St. George. Fort St. George, 5th March, 1805.

I enclose a power of attorney to enable you to receive money for my use. The only sums of money that I know of that are due to me are my allowances as Major General from the 1st March; my share of the bazaar fund from the 1st Jan. 1803, to the 11th July, 1804, and from the 12th July, 1804, to the — March, 1805, of which the former will be paid in a short time; the sum of 2750 pagodas due to me by the Military board for elephants and camels; 500 pagodas by Sir J. Cradock; 400 pagodas by Lord W. Bentinck; 300 pagodas by Major Hall; and 300 pagodas by Major Rennell for horses: the second division of prize money of the army in the Deccan. Major Barclay will assist you in getting this money.

I beg that you will be so kind as to remit to me in England, by the short bills on the Court of Directors at the exchange of 8s. 9d. the pagoda, or by navy bills, or by Mr. Cochrane's bills on Messrs. Coutts, such of these sums of money as you may receive for me from time to time, sending me one set of the bills immediately by the overland dispatch, and another set in the following month by the same conveyance, if no sea conveyance should offer. I request you to direct your letters to the care of Messrs. Coutts, London.

Major Barclay will have occasion to draw upon you for small sums to make payments on my account, and I beg you to answer his drafts; and to inform him when you receive any sums on my account, or will dispose of them as I have above requested.

To Major Shawe.

Fort St. George, 6th March, 1805.

I sent you yesterday the copy of a letter which I had written to Col. Close, on the subject of the late events in Scindiah's camp, the greatest part of which was written before I had received your letter of the 18th Feb. I hope to God we shall be able to avoid a war with Scindiah. Take my word for it, we are not now in a state to attempt the conquest of Malwa; an operation which, under other circumstances, would be a mere joke. The army to whose share it would naturally fall is now drawn to the Jumna, by the Commander in Chief; there is not a sepoy at Bombay, and very few sepoys and not 200 Europeans in Guzerat. The Peshwah's subsidiary force is not yet efficient; and if it were, neither that corps nor the Soubah's subsidiary force could be moved from the Deccan with safety.

You see the time and lives that have been spent in the attempts to subdue the Rajah of Bhurtpoor; and you will see that the army of Bengal will not be clear of that country before the season comes round, in which it will be necessary for them to go into cantonments. I therefore most anxiously hope that all that can be done with honor, will be done to preserve peace with Scindiah as long as possible.

Lieut. Col. Gore, 33rd regt. to Major Gen. the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

Vellore, 28th Feb. 1805.

On hearing that you are about to quit this country, the officers of the 33rd regt. cannot allow you to depart, without endeavoring to impress on you how sensible they are of the very friendly and paternal attention you ever paid to the interests of the corps, while it had the honor of being under your immediate command, as well as of the unremitting manner in which you have continued your vigilance for its welfare since you have been removed to a higher station. Although by the changes in the service many of the officers have not individually experienced the peculiar advantages of having served under your personal superintendence, yet the benefits which have resulted to the whole corps, by having had you at its head, will long be felt; and it must ever remain a source of pride to the 33rd regt. that the person who has so eminently distinguished himself in every branch of the public service intrusted to him, and who has been so deservedly honored by our most gracious Sovereign, was the commanding officer of the 33rd regt.

In the absence of half the corps, whose signatures cannot be obtained, I am requested by the whole to convey to you these, their unanimous sentiments; and to add their most earnest wishes that you may long enjoy every honor, prosperity, and health, that your country can confer. Allow me also to add the satisfaction it affords me to have this opportunity of subscribing myself, with much respect and esteem.

To Lieut. Col. Gore.

Fort St. George, 2nd March, 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 28th Feb.

Nearly twelve years have elapsed since His Majesty was pleased to appoint me to be Lieut. Col. of the 33rd regt.; and in the whole course of that period, during which I have been either in the exercise of the command of the regiment, or in constant communication with the actual commanding officer, I have had every reason to be satisfied with their conduct.

It has been my uniform object to maintain the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy, which I found established in the regiment by the Marquis Cornwallis, our Colonel: and by the influence of this system, the foundation of which is vigilance on the part of the officers to prevent the commission of military crimes; and by the support and assistance which I have uniformly received from Col. Sherbrooke, Lieut. Col. Elliott, and yourself, and the officers of the regiment, my duties, as Lieut. Colonel, have always been a pleasing occupation.

It is most gratifying to me to receive this mark of approbation, conveyed by your letter, from officers with whose conduct I have so much reason to be pleased, and with many of whom I have been so long and intimately acquainted. I beg that you will assure them that I shall never forget their services, and that I shall always be happy to forward their views. I have only to recommend to them to adhere to the system of discipline, subordination, and interior economy, which they have found established in the regiment; and above all to cherish and encourage among themselves the spirit of gentlemen and of soldiers.

With the most anxious wishes for the success and prosperity of yourself and of the 33rd regt.

Address of the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam to Major Gen. the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B., &c.

We, the undersigned, Native inhabitants of Seringapatam, composed of independent soucars, and other persons in the Hon. Company's service, attached to

the several departments, beg leave, with due deference, to acquaint you of the deep regret we feel at hearing that you are so suddenly embarking for Europe.

Gratitude for the tranquillity, security, and happiness we have enjoyed under your auspicious protection, since this country was thrown by Divine Providence under the just and pacific waving banners of the Hon. Company; respect for the brilliant exploits you have achieved, which strengthened the foundation of that tranquillity; and reverence for your benevolence and affability, glow all at once in our hearts with such force, that we are unable to find language sufficient to express our feelings and regret on the occasion of your departure.

We pray to God to grant you health and a safe and pleasant voyage to Europe; but we earnestly hope, and look with anxiety, for the period of your speedy return to this country, once more to extend and uphold that protection over us, which your extensive local knowledge of our customs and manners is so capable of affording.

To the Native Inhabitants of Seringapatam.

Fort St. George, 4th March, 1805.

I have received your affectionate address upon the occasion of my departure for Europe; and I am much gratified by the proof which it affords, that my endeavors to extend to you the benefits to which the subjects of the Hon. Company residing at Seringapatam are entitled, under the existing regulations, have been successful; and that you are fully impressed with the advantages of your situation.

I have had frequent opportunities of observing and reporting your loyalty to Government; and I request you to be convinced, that I shall not cease to feel the most lively interest in every thing which concerns you.

Address of the Officers of the division of the Army lately commanded by Major Gen. the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

Seringapatam, 27th Feb. 1805.

We, the officers present at the head quarters of that division of the army which you have so long commanded, have heard, with unfeigned regret, of your intended embarkation for England.

Participating with the army at large, in admiration of those exalted talents and splendid achievements, which have been so recently distinguished by our gracious Sovereign, we are desirous of offering to you the tribute of our particular respect and gratitude for that consideration and justice in command, which has made obedience a pleasure; and for that frank condescension in the private intercourse of life, which it is our pride individually to acknowledge.

With these sentiments of public reverence and individual attachment deeply impressed on our minds, our regret on the occasion of your departure is mixed with an humble hope, that we are not to consider this important branch of the British empire to be finally deprived of your eminent qualifications.

But in whatever quarter of the globe further honors and distinctions shall await you, our sincerest good wishes will constantly follow your career; and we now beg you to accept our most respectful, but most cordial, farewell.

To the Officers of the Garrison of Seringapatam.

Fort St. George, 8th March, 1805.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 27th Feb., and I am much flattered by the expression of your regret upon the occasion of my departure from this country.

The period which has elapsed since I was appointed to the command of Seringapatam has been probably the most eventful of the history of the British nation in India, and that place has always been an important point in the military operations which have been carried on.

The discipline and good order of that garrison, and the efficiency of the public departments, have always been objects of most anxious solicitude

to my mind; and I am happy to have an opportunity of declaring, that the order and regularity of the troops which have been stationed there have been exemplary; and that the efficiency and zeal of the public departments fixed at Seringapatam have been the principal source and foundation of the successes which you have noticed.

In whatever situation His Majesty may think proper to employ my services, I shall always be interested in the welfare of officers, with whose conduct, in their several public capacities, I have so much reason to be pleased, and in whose private society I have enjoyed so much satisfaction.

Address of the European Inhabitants and Military Officers of the Presidency of Fort St. George, to Major Gen. the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B., on his departure from India.  
Fort St. George, March, 1805.

We have the honor, Sir, to represent the European inhabitants and military officers of this Presidency, who, in justice to themselves, cannot allow you to depart from India, the scene of your splendid career, without offering to you the just tribute of their applause and admiration.

They contemplate the victories of the army lately under your command, as rendered transcendently glorious by the vast superiority in numbers of the enemy, formidably appointed, with whom you had to contend, exemplifying what is possible to be achieved by brave and disciplined troops, conducted with military skill, and inspired by the heroism of their leader.

Under the influence of these impressions, and considering you as having been eminently instrumental in restoring peace to this part of India, they feel an earnest desire of adding, to what history will record, a particular testimony of the sense they entertain of your services. We are therefore desirous to request you will allow them to possess your picture, for the purpose of its being placed in the Exchange Room at this settlement, among the portraits of illustrious characters which already adorn its walls.

It is peculiarly gratifying to us to have been named to wait upon you on this occasion, to convey the sentiments of the community so entirely our own. With the warmest wishes for your safe arrival in England, we beg leave to pledge to you our respect and our affection.

To the European Inhabitants and Military Officers of the Presidency of Fort St. George.  
Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

Although I have served the government of Fort St. George for some years, I have had but limited opportunities of cultivating an acquaintance with the gentlemen at Madras, as I have resided in the provinces. I therefore consider as a most gratifying distinction, the marks of attention with which I have been honored since my arrival here, by a society whose public spirit has been manifested upon every important occasion that has occurred.

The successes of the army which I was so fortunate as to command in the late war, are to be attributed to the various permanent causes which I hope will never fail to produce similar effects. The vigilance of government enabled them to foresee the impending contest, and preparations corresponding with the extent of the operations, calculated to bring the war to a speedy and fortunate issue, were ordered by the Supreme government, and were carried into execution by this government and the government of Bombay, with promptitude and vigor. The governments were supported in these efforts by the civil and military servants, and by the commercial bodies at the different Presidencies, with the zeal which has distinguished their conduct on all occasions.



The discipline and bravery of the troops were to be depended upon in every emergency, and a glorious example was held out to them by the army under the personal command of the Commander in Chief. To these advantages I have to add the cordial co-operation of all the political Residents and civil servants, in communication with whom I acted, an advantage which I must observe that I have uniformly enjoyed in every situation in which I have been placed since I have served this government: under these circumstances, I had every incitement to make the exertions which have met with your approbation.

G. O.

Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

Major Gen. Sir A. Wellesley informs the troops under his command, that he has received the permission of his Excellency the Governor General to resign the political and military powers with which he had been lately intrusted in the Deccan, and the leave of his Excellency the Commander in Chief to proceed to England. He cannot avoid expressing the regret which he feels upon taking leave of officers and troops with whom he has served so long.

In the course of the period of time which has elapsed since Major Gen. Wellesley was appointed to the command of a division of this army, various services have been performed by the troops, and great difficulties have been surmounted, with a steadiness and perseverance which have seldom been surpassed. Upon every occasion, whether in garrison or in the field, the Major General has had reason to be satisfied with their conduct; and he once more returns them his thanks, and assures them that he shall never forget their services, or cease to feel a lively interest in whatever may concern them. He earnestly recommends to the officers of the army, never to lose sight of the great principles of the military service, to preserve the discipline of the troops, and to encourage, in their respective corps, the spirit and sentiments of gentlemen and of soldiers, as the most certain road to the achievement of every thing that is great in their profession.

Upon the occasion of taking leave of the troops who have been so long under his command, Major Gen. Wellesley cannot avoid noticing and recording the assistance which he has received from officers commanding districts and divisions under his orders; and the officers of the staff appointed to assist him: of the former, some distinguished characters are now no more, and others are gone to Europe, and all are sufficiently known to the troops; but in noticing the assistance he has received from the staff, he must record particularly his obligations to Major Barclay, Capt. Bellingham, and Lieut. Campbell of the 78th regt.

Orders will be given from Head Quarters, regarding the mode of conducting the duties and making the reports in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, as also at Goa. The reports from the corps in the Deccan, under the orders of Cols. Wallace and Haliburton, are to be made according to the orders by Major Gen. Sir A. Wellesley, of the 24th June, 1804.

The troops belonging to the army in the Deccan, entitled to share in the prize money of the late war, are informed that measures have been taken to insure, at an early period, the division of that part of it not yet divided.

G. O. G. G.

Fort William, 7th March, 1805.

The Governor General in Council, Captain General and Commander in Chief of the Land Forces serving in the East Indies, has the satisfaction to publish to the army an extract of a letter from the Rt. Hon. Earl Camden, one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State.

Downing Street, 30th Aug. 1804.

Your Lordship's letter of the 25th Dec. 1803, has been laid before the King.

The brilliant and decisive success that has attended the progress of the armies which have been employed in the East Indies, under the command of Gen. Lake and Major Gen. Wellesley, is justly appreciated by His Majesty; and I have, in consequence, received His Majesty's commands to inform your Lordship, that in consideration of the meritorious services and gallant conduct of Gen. Lake, His Majesty has been graciously pleased to create him a peer of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; and that in consideration also of the eminent and brilliant services of Major Gen. Wellesley, His Majesty has been graciously pleased to direct, that the insignia of the most Hon. Order of the Bath should be transmitted to that officer; and that he may immediately evince his sense of Major Gen. Wellesley's merits and services, His Majesty has further directed, that he shall be created an extra Knight Companion of that Order, and that his creation and investiture shall not wait for a succession to a regular vacancy therein.

In transmitting to your Lordship His Majesty's gracious approbation of the services of Gen.

I shall have great pleasure, gentlemen, in complying with your desire and I consider myself to be highly honored by being numbered among those who have been deemed by you to be worthy of this mark of your approbation by the services they have rendered to their country in this part of India; and it is most gratifying to my feelings that the desire of this settlement should be communicated to me by gentlemen distinguished by a long course of able and zealous services, and by their public spirit, and for whom I entertain the highest respect.

Gen. Lake and Major Gen. Wellesley, and in acquainting you that His Majesty has been pleased to bestow these marks of his royal favor upon the respective commanders of those armies which have so much distinguished themselves, it is my duty to state to your Lordship, at the same time, the very high sense which His Majesty entertains of the able and useful co-operation afforded by Lieut. Gen. Stuart, in the arrangements necessary for carrying into execution the plans so judiciously formed by your Lordship, for the operations of the last campaign; and I am commanded to inform your Lordship of His Majesty's entire approbation of that officer's conduct.

Your Lordship has received, by a former conveyance, the intimation of the distinguished manner in which His Majesty considers the enterprise, zeal, spirit, and good conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates employed under the respective orders of Gen. Lake and Major Gen. Wellesley. I cannot, however, close this dispatch without repeating His Majesty's gracious approbation and admiration of that conduct, which has contributed so essentially to the happy and glorious termination of the late war in India.

Extract.

Die Jovis, 8 Maff, 1804.

Resolved, *nemine dissente*, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled, that the thanks of this House be given to Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, for the many important, brilliant and memorable services, achieved by him in the command of the separate army within the Deccan; and also to the several officers of the army, both European and Native, for their gallant conduct and meritorious exertions during the arduous, honorable, and successful campaign in the East Indies.

GEORGE ROSE, Cl. Par.

Earl Camden to Major Gen. the Hon. Sir A. Wellesley, K.B.

Downing Street, 30th Aug. 1804.

His Majesty having been graciously pleased, as a mark of his Royal approbation of your eminent and brilliant services, and in order that he may immediately evince his sense of the same, to direct that you should be created an extra Knight Companion of the Most Hon. Order of the Bath, and that your nomination and investiture should not wait for a succession to a regular vacancy therein, I have the honor to transmit to you, by the King's commands, the proper insignia of that Order, which you will herewith receive, together with a dispensation for wearing the same.

I have also the honor to transmit to you the Statutes of the Order of the Bath, together with a copy of my letter to the Marquis Wellesley, signifying His Majesty's commands that his Lordship should perform the ceremony of investing you with the insignia of that Order.

Allow me, Sir, to offer you my most sincere congratulations on a distinction so highly merited (a).

(a) Although the creation of extra Knight Companion is dated on the 30th Aug. 1804, it was not till the 25th Feb. 1805, that the same was known in India, and it was then published in General Orders as follows:

G. O. G.

Fort William, 25th Feb. 1805.

His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council is pleased to publish, in General Orders, the following extract from the London Gazette, Whitehall, 1st Sept. 1804.

'The King has been pleased to nominate and appoint Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley, to be one of the Knights Companions of the Most Hon. Order of the Bath.'

*Note.* The Order of the Bath at this time consisted of 24 Knights, of whom 3 or 4 were civilians; but in Jan. 1815, the limits of the Order were extended, and composed of 8 classes. The first class, the Knights Grand Crosses, was extended to 72, of whom 12 were to be rewards for civil and diplomatic employments.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 7th March, 1805.

Grant sent to me your letter of the 3rd, yesterday morning. After I had written to you on the 26th I received all Close's letters regarding the outrages at Scindiah's durbar; and I shall send you a copy of my letter to Col. Close upon this subject, if I can get it copied. The outrage may be attributed to Ghautky; but the proof affecting him is not clear, and Scindiah certainly had nothing to do with the business. If Scindiah had intended to attack Jenkins, he would not have called him back to his camp by two of his ministers, but would have sent his pindarries after him, who would have done his business with ease. This, as far as I can judge from a letter received by Lord William from Sydenham, is the Governor General's opinion. However, who committed the outrage, or how it was committed, is not so much the question at present, as how it is to be repaired, and the peace to be maintained: and upon this point I am really at a loss.

It was reported here yesterday that Bhurtpoor was taken, but I don't believe it to be true. Meer Khan entered the Dooab on the 7th with 12,000 horse, and Gen. Smith was close to him on the 9th with 6 regts. of cavalry and the horse artillery.

I hope that you will take care to keep me informed in England of all kinds of events. News from this country of every kind will be very interesting, indeed necessary, to me, for some time after I shall arrive in

Lord W. Bentinck to the Chairman of the Court of Directors.

Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

I am satisfied that the high degree of reputation which has been acquired by Sir A. Wellesley, during the period of his services in India, will render it unnecessary for me to recommend to your particular notice this distinguished officer.

In justice, however, to my own feelings, I cannot forego the occasion of expressing my sense of Sir A. Wellesley's eminent merits and services, and of conveying a public testimony of my sincere regard for those talents and virtues which have so powerfully contributed to strengthen the foundation of the British Empire in India, and to raise our military character to the highest pitch.

The attention of the Court of Directors has been frequently drawn to the high degree of prosperity which the territories of Mysore have obtained under the British influence, and the important benefits which have been derived from the existing state of affairs. In viewing these happy consequences, I feel it to be an act of justice due to Sir A. Wellesley, to state my entire belief, that there is no cause to which they can be so immediately traced as to the judgment and talents of that officer, which have been invariably directed to every means connected with the public interest. He has left his command, amongst the regret of all individuals, civil and military, European and Native.

In tracing such part of this officer's conduct, which may not have appeared upon the public records, it is my duty to state the order and economy with which every department of the service, during the late war, has been carried on. The regularity with which the disbursements of each month have been transmitted could not have been greater in profound peace. I can assert that the general arrangement, the correctness and minuteness of every detail of supply and of account, has been admired by every public and civil officer of the Presidency.

Impressed with sentiments of the strongest regard for the public merits of Sir A. Wellesley, and actuated with the warmest feelings of private respect, I have been induced to give the brief recital of his services, not less eminent in the conduct of the war than in the negotiation of a most honorable and advantageous peace; and I feel an entire conviction that the Hon. Court of Directors will be disposed to extend to Sir A. Wellesley a reception correspondent with his merits and reputation.

England; and I hope that you will give it to me. I believe that we shall sail on Saturday, and I don't know whether I shall have leisure to write to you to-morrow, so God bless you! Remember me to Wilks, and Ingledew, and Little.

To the Resident at Poona, at Hyderabad, and at Nagpoor.

Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

I have the honor to inform you, that having received the permission of their Excellencies the Governor General and the Commander in Chief, and of the Governor of Fort St. George, I am about to proceed to England in one of the ships now under dispatch.

I beg leave to take the opportunity of expressing the great satisfaction which I have had in all my communications with you, since I have had any concern in the political affairs of the Deccan.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm.

Fort St. George, 9th March, 1805.

I return Close's dispatch which I have just received. It would be most fortunate if we could prevail upon ——— to state facts, instead of to declaim against Scindiah. I have not seen any thing like a proof against him, excepting his communications with Ghautky, which may be rendered necessary by the situation in which he is placed. I go on board this day.

To Lieut. Col. Malcolm. H.M.S. *Trident*, 20th March, 1805, Lat. 5° N., Long. 84° E.

I understand that the *Albion* and *Sceptre* are going to leave us this day, and I will not allow them to depart without a letter for you. We have not yet got on very fast, as you will observe by the date of this letter, as we have had light winds and calms; but the ships of the convoy sail better than was expected, and I still hope that we shall have a good passage.

Tell Wilks that I have not seen Mrs. Wilks since we sailed, but I hear that she is well. I conclude that she will write to India by these ships.

In case Purneah should write to me, I wish you would send me a translation of his letter.

I depend upon you for sending me all kinds of intelligence from India. When you shall have an opportunity to send a letter, look over your correspondence, and make up a general letter of all the intelligence you have received upon all points. Every thing, particularly of a military or a political nature, will be interesting.

Before I went away I omitted to suggest to you some arrangements respecting the Rajah's teak wood forests. From conversations which I have had with the Admiral, I find that these forests are an object of great interest in England: they are so particularly, I know, to Lord Melville; and I should be glad to be able to give him authentic information upon them at an early period through your means. I wish therefore that you could prevail upon Purneah to send some people into the forests to make a general survey of them, and to give some general knowledge of the number and description of trees which they contain. The forests might

be divided, and one of his intelligent hircarrabs, or muttaseddees, might be sent to each division, with orders to ascertain, as nearly as circumstances will permit, the number of trees in each, and of what description. In respect to their sizes, the best mode would be to require no more from them than to ascertain the number of trees more than one foot, and the number less than one foot, square. I have long turned over in my mind the situation of these forests, and I am of opinion that the time is now come in which Purneah ought to levy a duty upon the cutting of the trees. As a compliment to the Company, he might excuse their contractor from the payment of this duty; but, on the other hand, Scott must watch the contractor very closely, and take care that he does not avail himself of this compliment to supply the bazaar of Seringapatam with timber, duty free, and thus defraud both the Rajah and the Company. This matter may easily be arranged between you and Scott.

As well as I recollect, the price of timber in Seringapatam ought to be 11 rupees for 12 feet, including the expense of the carriage from the forest. Scott gets his timber for 1 fanam and 60 cash the square foot, the expense of carriage being nothing, as the Company's carts and bullocks draw it in. In my opinion Purneah might levy a duty of 1 fanam a square foot upon the timber, to be levied at the forest, which you will observe would be a sum nearly equal to the cost of cutting the timber, at the same time that it would increase the price of timber but very little in Seringapatam. The great object of the duty would be that it would place the forest under regulations, and would enable Purneah, at all times, to ascertain what quantity of timber is taken out, either for his own purposes, for those of the Company, or for the public market.

Turn this subject over in your mind. You see that, although absent, I cannot avoid to reflect upon Mysore affairs. I cannot express to you the concern which I felt at leaving Madras. Indeed I feel it still; but I am convinced that I never took a step, with the propriety of which I had so much reason to be satisfied, whether I view it in relation to my private views or to the public interests.

The *Albion* and *Sceptre* do not go this day, and I shall not close this letter until they do.

To Major Shawe. H.M.S. *Trident*, 29th March, 1805. Lat. 1° 25' S., Long. 83° 52' E.

The *Albion* is about to leave us to return to India, and although I am very sea sick, I will not omit to let you know how we go on. We have had very fine weather ever since we left Madras; indeed, too much so, as our progress has not been what we might have expected. However, the ships sail well, and as we have now got a tolerable breeze, I hope that we shall get on.

I am very comfortable, and, excepting sea sickness, in good health: you shall hear from me whenever an opportunity offers, and I hope to hear from you by every occasion, whether overland or by sea.

29th March, Lat. 1° 25' S., Long. 83° 5' E.

The *Albion* is just going to leave us, and I must conclude.

To Major Shawe. H.M.S. *Trident*, 2nd April, 1805. Lat. 3° 21' S., Long. 81° 50' E.

The *Albion* has not left us yet, and I enclose a paper which has been given to me by Capt. Page, which I think interesting; and if the Governor General has not yet seen it, or a copy of it, it may be of use to him.

To Col. Malcolm.

St. Helena, 3rd July, 1805.

We arrived here on the 20th June, having had a most tedious passage from Madras. The weather was uncommonly fine throughout, and we had gales only for 3 days off Madagascar, for one day off the Cape, and for 2 days on this side of the Cape. We found here a fleet which sailed from China in January, and we have been joined here by a fleet from Bengal, one from Bombay, and a second fleet from China. The whole amount to about 40 sail of Indiamen and ships from China, which will sail for England, I hope, in about a week, under convoy of the *Trident*, and the *Athenian*, a 64, which has come from China, and the *Mediator*, a frigate sent from England.

My health has been much mended by the voyage, and particularly by a short residence upon this island; and I am convinced that, if I had not quitted India, I should have had a serious fit of illness. I was wasting away daily, and latterly, when at Madras, I found my strength failed, which had always before held out. In short, I do not recollect for many years to have been so well as I have felt latterly, and particularly since I have been here. I have scarcely any rheumatism or lumbago. Mrs. Wilks looks better, I think, than she did when she quitted Seringapatam, and far better than when she embarked from Madras. She is not so comfortably situated here as I could have wished her to be. She is in the country with ——— and ———, who came in the same ship, and I fancy that they find subsistence very difficult. Mrs. ——— is a good woman, and ——— is a very honorable and good man. But he is directly the contrary of *Ho Saheb*; he is not an assenter to propositions; he contradicts every thing; and, upon the whole, it appeared to me that Mrs. Wilks would have preferred to live any where else. However, you may tell Wilks, with my best remembrance, that she is well. I have seen her only twice since we landed, as I live in the country likewise, and the distance to their house is no small matter, and the roads and horses very bad.

You will have been astonished to hear of Lord Cornwallis's appointment to succeed to Lord Wellesley. There are letters here for the latter from Lady Wellesley, which I believe were dispatched from England in November, from which circumstance I judge that he was expected to return before it was determined to appoint Lord Cornwallis. But you know well that I expected that some measure would be adopted to force Lord Wellesley to quit his situation, if he delayed to resign it; and that I informed him of this opinion and the grounds on which I had formed it. Mr. Pitt's appointment to office made some alteration in these grounds, but not a very essential one. I believe that Mr. Pitt has been known to interfere but little in the departments of government, of which he trusts the management to others, and that he refrains particularly from all inter-

ference in the affairs of India. If this should be the case, the administration of India is the same now as it was in the time of Mr. Addington; and the only difference in respect to Lord Wellesley is the greater degree of intimacy subsisting between him and Mr. Pitt, and the greater degree of reluctance which ——— would feel in proposing his removal to Mr. Pitt than to Mr. Addington.

I acknowledge that I am of opinion that this arrangement is intended as a mark of disapprobation of Lord Wellesley, which opinion is founded upon a variety of circumstances which came to my knowledge before I quitted India, with which you are well acquainted. I can see nothing in the papers to the end of February to lead my judgment on this subject; and there is, against the opinion that I have formed, a report in circulation here that Lord Wellesley is to be appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, upon his arrival in England, ——— holding the office only during his absence.

The *Belle* packet arrived here on the 28th June, and sailed on the 29th, having sailed from Bengal on the 2nd April. The letters which she probably had for me were in the packet, which could not be opened, and therefore I know nothing excepting what is in the papers to the end of March. The 4th and 5th failures before Bhurtpoor are disastrous events, of which I apprehend the worst consequences. They must have blundered that siege terribly, for it is certain that, with adequate means, every place can be taken; and ——— having been so long before the place, adequate means must have been provided, or in his power. The fault lies therefore in the misapplication of them, or, most probably, in the omission to employ all those which were necessary to accomplish the object in view, either through the ignorance of the engineers, or the impetuosity of ———'s temper, which could not brook the necessary delay.

5th July. I dined with Mrs. Wilks, at ———'s, yesterday. She looked very well, but complained of her cough. We embark on Monday, the 8th, and I believe that we shall sail on Thursday.

I beg that you will remember me most kindly to Purneah and Bistnapah, and all my friends, black, white, and grey, at Seringapatam and elsewhere within your reach.

Did I tell you before I left Madras that I had recommended to Lord W. that Wilks might have a salary for acting as Resident in Mysore; and to Sir J. Cradock, that young ——— (Webbe's friend in the —th regt.) might be appointed Persian interpreter at Seringapatam, *vice* Knox?

All Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and the Captains of all the India-men in the world, are here. To do the Bengalese justice, their complaints of the inconveniences of the place are less loud than those of any of the others, with the exception always of some persons who growl at every thing. I hear that, when ——— was here last year with Lord Clive, he swore that he would have preferred to spend his time in a French prison.

I hope that ——— will be in office when you will go to Europe. He is the best of ———, and the greatest of quizzes. I really believe that a man of his description, with such a wig and coat, has not appeared in the world for two centuries. The race has been extinct,

I believe ; and how it came to be revived in his person is incomprehensible. His family are very good people indeed.

On board H.M.S. *Trident*, 9th July, 1805.

We embarked last night, and sail to-morrow. I have nothing to add to this epistle, already full of nothing. God bless you, my dear Malcolm !

To Major Barclay.

H.M.S. *Trident*, St. Helena, 9th July, 1805.

I have written to Malcolm and Mrs. Freere a full account of all our adventures, &c., from Madras to this place. We arrived here on the 20th June, and leave this *Shetland the 2nd\** to-morrow, with about 40 sail of Indiamen and Chinamen. I am in very good health, and have now but little rheumatism.

I wish that you would send me some Trichinopoly chains. Let them be packed in letters directed to me to the care of Messrs. Coutts, bankers, London; and given to private hands. Draw upon me for their value. Campbell gave me some at Madras, which I have lost. I don't recollect that I paid him for them. I wish that you would inquire; and if I did not, pay him, and draw upon me for the amount.

It is said here that Col. Stevenson is dead; and that the Court of Directors have given a pension of £300 a-year to his widow, and one of the same amount to Mrs. Maxwell. God bless you, my dear Barclay. Remember me most kindly to Symonds, and to all my friends in India.

\* Major Barclay was a Shetlander.

END OF THE INDIAN DISPATCHES.

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\* \* There are other letters, connected with Indian affairs, which will be found in the subsequent volumes, and registered in the Index to them under the head of 'India.'



## A D D E N D A.

To Major Kirkpatrick (*omitted at p. 437*).

Camp, 8th May, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 2nd, in which you enclosed a copy of your address to the Governor General, No. 242, of the same date, with a copy of its enclosure.

It gives me great satisfaction to reflect that, as soon as I had received intelligence of the irruption of Jeswunt Rao Holkar into the territories of the Nizam, I took measures for their defence; although, in order to do this, I was obliged to break up the disposition of the allied forces, of which his Highness the Nizam and his ministers had approved: the orders for Col. Stevenson's march were dated on the 28th April.

It is unfortunate that his Highness the Nizam's territories should be so situated as to be liable to the predatory invasions of the Marhattas; and it must be obvious to his Highness that no army can give them complete protection. Those places in which there are the greatest riches, and which may happen to be unprotected, must suffer; and for this reason it is advisable that his Highness should, at an early period, adopt measures for the defence of the rich cities, placed like Aurungabad upon his extreme frontier. In case there should be a contest with the Marhatta powers, the operations which may be necessary for the general defence of his Highness' territories must oblige the army to leave some of these places at a distance; and each of them, at a distance from the army, and not having in itself means of defence, is liable to, and probably will, be plundered.

It is easy to perceive, from the tenor of the paper which was sent to you by Azeem ool Omrah, that the Nizam is considerably alarmed at the prospect of a war with the Marhattas. A war with the Marhattas must have been the consequence of the proceedings in this part of India in the months of October and November last, and the Nizam's territories must have been the scene of its operations. The advantageous military positions which we have taken up in consequence of our political arrangements with the Peshwah, and the additional force which those arrangements give us, may, in my opinion, still prevent the hostilities which are apprehended, and, at all events, will considerably alleviate their evil. But this must depend upon our own determination and exertions. We are much mistaken if we suppose that, to depart from our engagements with the Peshwah, and to give up the advantageous military position which we have taken, will alter the supposed intentions of the northern Marhatta powers to go to war, or will save the Nizam's territories. Such a line of conduct not only would expose his Highness' interests and power, but those of the Hon. Company, to the most imminent danger.

I beg that you will do me the favor to assure the Nizam's government that every thing I can do shall be done for the safety of his Highness'

territories. I apprised Col. Stevenson some days ago of the reported intention of Jeswunt Rao Holkar to move towards Hyderabad. I desired him to watch his movements towards that place, and, if he found that he went that way, to march upon Hyderabad with all celerity.

Memorandum for Col. Close (*omitted at p. 610*). Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug. 1803.

1. Certain dollars have been delivered to the Poonah soucar to be coined, which he wishes to lodge in Col. Close's house, to be taken away by him as occasion may require.

2. He has engaged to pay to Col. Close daily 6000 rupees, which Col. Close is requested to receive.

3. The Chinchore soucar, Boodhahy Doss, has engaged to pay daily to Col. Close likewise 6000 rupees, which the Colonel is requested to receive.

4. These soucars have engaged to furnish the means of carrying forward this money to the troops, the Company paying the expense. Col. Close is requested to send forward 50,000 rupees as soon as they shall be received; and so on by 50,000 rupees at a time till the whole shall be sent.

5. Two companies of the 2d batt. of the 3d regt. remain here to furnish escorts for this money.

6. Fifty thousand dollars are given to the Chinchore soucar, for which he is to deliver back 113,125 rupees; and 25,000 dollars to the Poonah soucar, for which he is to deliver back 56,562 rupees. Besides these, there are 10,000 dollars which will be delivered to Col. Close, which he is requested to issue to the soucars, to be coined into rupees, after they shall have finished the others.

Memorandum for Capt. Baynes (*omitted at p. 772*).

10th Oct. 1803.

Capt. Baynes to be informed that I shall be to-morrow at Phoolmurry, which is about 18 miles north from Aurungabad, and about 20 miles W.N.W. from Budnapoor. The enemy have not yet come through the Casserbarry ghaut, as far as I can learn; and it is very possible that I shall not be under the necessity of moving farther to the southward. I will write to him further in the course of to-morrow, after my arrival at Phoolmurry; but if he should not hear from me, I should wish him to march on the 12th to Larsangwee, which is about 12 miles W.N.W. from Budnapoor, on the road towards Phoolmurry.

*The D.A.G. to Capt. Baynes.*

Phoolmurry, 11th Oct. 1803.

The General halts here to-morrow, and requests that you will come on hither, making Larsangwee to-morrow, and this place on the 13th. There are no accounts here of the enemy having come up the ghaut, which there certainly would have been had they come up yesterday; and after hearing of our coming to meet them, it is probable that they will defer the enterprise.

Memorandum (*omitted at p. 909*).

Camp at Deogaum, 14th Dec. 1803.

Col. Stevenson's division are to storm the northern face of the fort of Gawilghur to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock, and the following arrangements are to be made to facilitate and support that operation:

1. Col. Wallace, with the 74th regt., 5 companies of the 78th, and the 1st batt. 8th regt., will place himself under cover in the hill under the Peerputty gate before daylight in the morning. If possible, without giving alarm, he will push on a detachment in front of the 12 pounder battery and as far as the uppermost towers before daylight.

2. About 10 in the morning Col. Wallace will begin to show his force, so as to draw the attention of the enemy to this side of the fort. He will reinforce his party in his front, and push on as many men as he can, without unnecessarily risking them, to the uppermost tower; and will do every thing in his power to draw the attention of the enemy to his side.

3. Col. Stevenson has been desired to make detachments from his storming party to the Peerputty and Delhi gates in order to open them and communicate with and admit the troops from his side. As soon as Col. Wallace shall observe this detachment he will send a detachment to the top of the hill to assist in opening the gates, and he will be prepared to follow with the whole detachment under his orders.

4. Five companies of the 78th regt. and the 1st of the 10th, with a 6 pounder attached to the 1st of the 8th, are to be under the orders of Col. Chalmers.

5. These troops are also to alarm the enemy and draw his attention towards the Delhi gate.

6. Col. Chalmers will be the best judge of the place at which it will be most proper to assemble these troops before daylight, so that they may be sufficiently near, at about 10, to draw the enemy's attention towards, and alarm him for the safety of, the Delhi gate, and he will post them accordingly.

7. At about 10, Col. Chalmers will show himself towards the Delhi gate; and he will push forward a party with the gun and endeavor to blow it open. He will of course cover the advance of this party and support it, and keep down the fire of the enemy by a fire of musketry on the defences.

8. As soon as Col. Chalmers will have entered the fort, whether by blowing open the gate, or by its being opened for him, he is immediately to communicate and co-operate with the troops of Col. Stevenson's division.

9. A company of the 1st of the 8th is to be left in the 12 pounder battery, Barry, &c., for the security of all the stores, &c. A company of the 1st of the 10th to be left in the camp for the security of every thing there.

10. A party of pioneers with crows, pickaxes, and hatchets, and a saw, to accompany each detachment.

11. Major Gen. Wellesley desires that the officers commanding these detachments will give particular orders that the soldiers and sepoys may not be allowed to quit their ranks and go in search of plunder, as is but too commonly the practice. No man is to quit his ranks without the special permission of Major Gen. Wellesley or Col. Stevenson, both of whom will most probably be in the fort; and the officers are made responsible for a due obedience to this order. Major Gen. Wellesley authorises the commanding officers of these detachments to take most effectual measures to prevent the followers from entering with them merely for the purpose of plunder.

*The D. A. G. to Lieut. Col. Wallace.*

Camp at Deogaum, 14th Dec. 1803.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley directs me to send to you the accompanying memorandum for what he intends shall be done by the troops on this side, to facilitate and support the attack to be made on Gawilghur by Col. Stevenson's division to-morrow morning; and he requests that you will communicate the several points of it to the officers concerned, that the whole may be carried into execution.

## ON DEARTH IN INDIA.\*

I READ lately in a Bombay newspaper a statement of a speech made by Sir James Macintosh, the Recorder of Bombay, to the Grand Jury of that settlement, in the course of which, after having adverted to the charitable disposition manifested by its inhabitants to the famished Natives of the neighbouring continent, and the efforts made by the government of Bombay to provide for the relief of those who had come to that island, in search of food, he observes upon the frequent occurrence of dearth in India, and upon the more fatal effects produced by it in that part of the world, in comparison with those produced by the occurrence of a similar calamity in other regions. He particularly points out these two evils as subjects deserving investigation, into which he proposes to inquire, and to which he will draw the attention of his hearers at a future period.

I happened to be in the Deccan in the years 1803 and 1804, during the time this dearth existed, and the calamities occurred which have drawn the attention of Sir James Macintosh, and have excited the charitable feelings of all the inhabitants of Bombay; and as I have had opportunities which few others have, of viewing the Natives of India in their various relations with each other, when concerned with Europeans, as I particularly saw the cause and progress of the evil which every man must lament, and had occasion to advert to the modes which were practicable of alleviating it, I will enter into a consideration of the general subject, which, I hope, will not be deemed entirely useless.

The dearth and consequent famine which occurred in the Deccan in 1803 and 1804, was to be attributed principally to the dry season of 1803. Those who are not acquainted with the systems of government and the customs of the inhabitants of India, or with the nature of the climate, will be of opinion that the recurrence of the dearth might be prevented by a better system of cultivation, or that the pernicious effects of the dearth of the grain in any particular part, viz. famine, and the mortality of its inhabitants, might be prevented by measures of the government.

In order to clear the subject of all difficulty, it is necessary, 1st, to consider generally the different modes of cultivating the land in practice throughout India, and in what manner these modes are affected by a wet or a dry season; 2ndly, to consider in what manner the deficiency produced by the seasons in any particular part could be remedied by the government in that part; and, 3rdly, what are the physical or moral causes which prevent the application of those remedies.

It is well known that the rains in India, which are the great source of all the cultivation, are periodical; and that the whole of the continent

\* Written on the voyage home from India.

does not enjoy the benefit of them at the same time of the year. The western rains, or those which set in in the month of June, with what is called the S.W. monsoon, have by far the greatest influence. They prevail in the whole of Hindustan, including the provinces of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa, all along the western coast of the peninsula, from Surat to Cape Comorin, and across the peninsula, as far as the eastern mountains, commonly called the range of Eastern ghauts. Even the countries to the eastward of this eastern range, the Carnatic and the Northern Circars, are not entirely exempt from their influence, as the rain falls heavily at times in those countries in the months of June, July, and August, the season of the westerly rains; but not in sufficient quantities, in those parts of India, to induce the inhabitants to take advantage of it for the purposes of cultivation.

The countries on the eastern coast of the peninsula, extending from Ganjam to Cape Comorin, and inland as far as the eastern mountains, have the advantage of the eastern rains for the cultivation of their lands; and these begin generally in October, with the N.E. monsoon, and last till towards the end of December.

The rain which falls at this season reaches the other parts of India, as well as the provinces situated on the Bay of Bengal; but it is very partial, and very much in proportion to their neighbourhood to the eastern mountains; and it does not appear that the inhabitants of any of the countries to the west of those mountains take advantage of the easterly rains for the purposes of cultivation, excepting in Mysore.

It follows, then, from this account, that, although the whole of India may be watered in some degree by rains which fall at two different seasons, in June and in October, the inhabitants of Hindustan, of Oude, Bahar, Bengal, and Orissa; of the coast of Malabar, from Surat to Cape Comorin; and of the whole peninsula of India, from the Western sea to the Eastern ghauts, take advantage of the western rains only for the cultivation of their lands; and that the inhabitants of the countries situated on the Bay of Bengal, as far as the eastern range of mountains, take advantage of the eastern rains for the same purposes.

To this statement the Mysore country is an exception. The eastern rains fall heavily, particularly in the eastern parts of that country, and advantage is taken of them in cultivation; and it will appear presently, when I come to consider the different species of cultivation, that the inhabitants of some countries in the Carnatic, through which rivers run which rise in the Western ghauts, and empty themselves in the Bay of Bengal, have likewise the advantage of the western rains in their cultivation; as the rivers which supply them with water are filled by the western rains.

It is well known that the cultivation in India is either of wet land or of dry. The great produce of what is called wet land is rice, excepting in some very particular spots, on which the produce is occasionally wheat, sugar, or Indian corn. But these three last ought more properly to be termed exceptions from the general rule, and do not deserve consideration in a discussion respecting the causes or the consequences of dearth.

In the cultivation of rice the land is watered either, 1st, directly by the

fall of the rain ; or, 2ndly, by artificial canals made by the embankments of rivers ; or, 3rdly, by tanks filled by the rains, or by the overflow of rivers, or torrents, the water running into them by canals ; or, 4thly, by wells filled by the rain, from which the water is drawn by manual labor or that of cattle.

The greatest part of the cultivation of the wet lands in the province of Bengal, and in the countries on the coast of Malabar, is carried on by the first mode ; and, of course, the produce must depend entirely upon the critical arrival of the rains, and upon the quantity of the rain that falls. This quantity generally overflows the whole country ; and in Bengal, particularly, the crop is reaped in boats.

The fall of the water in many of the rivers in India is very great, so much so as to render the rivers torrents in the season of the rains ; and the banks of some of these are low. In these cases dams are thrown across the rivers ; by which means the water is diverted from the principal channel into others for the purposes of cultivation. It frequently happens that the fall of the principal river is so great, and the dam is so well constructed, as to throw water into the inferior channels for the purposes of cultivation, even at the season in which the river is not full. The produce of the lands through which these rivers run, particularly those from which water can be drawn when the river is not quite full, is far less precarious than of those lands which depend solely upon the rains. Of this description are all the lands upon the river Cauvery, from its rise in the western mountains, in all its progress through Mysore, and the countries of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, till it falls into the sea. Innumerable canals are cut from it ; and these happy countries are certain of a crop, whether the rains are abundant, or otherwise. In some instances these canals, after watering a great extent of country, fall again into the river ; in others they are led to great tanks, which afford a constant supply of water for the cultivation of the land in the neighbourhood ; and in every case the cultivation of the country is independent of the rains.

I did not see any river in India of which so much advantage was taken in this way as of the Cauvery ; as none that I saw had such a fall, or banks equally low.

The greatest part of Mysore and nearly the whole of the Carnatic, excepting the countries of Trichinopoly and Tanjore, receive the water for the purposes of the cultivation of their wet lands from tanks. These are filled either by the periodical rains, the water which falls in their neighbourhood running into them and being retained by their banks, or by the overflow of some of the rivers, or rather torrents, which are filled by the eastern rains. Canals are cut from these, which conduct the waters into the tanks.

The beds of these torrents are dry during the whole year, excepting in the season of the rains, and in some instances banks have been built across them at different distances to retain the water. In this manner a river will appear to be a chain of tanks. Although the countries watered by these tanks, whether filled by the rains, or by the overflow of the torrents, are more certain of a crop than those which depend solely upon the fall of the rain in their field, they are not in so good a situation as

those watered by such a river as the Cauvery. I know of no tanks or canals in any part of India excepting in the Company's territories south of the Toombuddra and Kistna, in Mysore and in the Carnatic.

Wells for the purposes of cultivation are filled either by the fall of the rain into them, or by a canal cut from a river. The water is drawn from them by manual labour; but they are little used for the purposes of wet cultivation, excepting in parts of the Northern Circars, and in the Company's territories in Benares and Oude, and generally throughout India, for watering wheat fields, sugar cane, Indian corn, and gardens. I am informed that the whole country of Benares is watered by wells; but those which I have seen in other parts have done little more than afford water to the garden grounds or sugar cane.

A country watered by wells is less dependent for its crop upon the periodical rains than one which receives the water immediately from the heavens into its fields; but such a country is less certain of a sufficient supply of water than one which receives what it requires from tanks or canals.

What I have above written applies solely to the cultivation of wet lands, the produce of which is properly rice. But rice, as the produce of wet lands, is the food of but a very small proportion of the inhabitants of India. This grain is eaten generally in the province of Bengal, along the coasts of India from Orissa and Cape Comorin, and from Cape Comorin to Surat; but it is not the food of the people of the upper countries, that is, of those who inhabit the countries between the eastern and western range of mountains in the peninsula, of the inhabitants of Hindustan, those of Oude, Benares, or Bahar. In the greatest part of this immense tract of country the soil is of a black garden mould, which would not produce rice; and in Mysore, parts of which do produce great quantities of that grain, it is not the food of the common people, but is used as an article of commerce with the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. The inhabitants of all these countries subsist upon what are called dry grains, or the produce of the dry lands; and the nature of the cultivation of these lands of course requires the attention of the person who considers this subject. As the countries which are watered by the eastern rains produce rice, and that is the common food of their people, those who depend upon the produce of the dry lands for their food are the inhabitants of the countries which are watered by the western rains.

They depend for their crop greatly upon the rain which falls on the land which they cultivate; they plough the land and sow the seed with the first rains, and they reap it in the months of December and January. If the rain fails they lose it entirely.

In some parts of India they have small spots of ground watered by wells, which are ploughed early in the season, and produce an early crop. But these appear to be cultivated principally for fodder for the cattle; and at all events, whatever may be the intention, the produce from these small spots of ground must be so small, as to afford subsistence to their cultivators for a very short space of time.

The produce of the land, therefore, and the subsistence of the people throughout India, depend entirely upon the critical arrival and the quan-



tity of the periodical rains; and if these should fail in any particular part of the country, the people of that part must want subsistence.

It does not appear that it would be very possible to improve this system of cultivation either of wet or of dry lands. The rains which fall in the province of Beugal, and in the countries on the coast of Malabar, are generally so heavy, and the countries are so flat and so completely overflowed, as to preclude the possibility of constructing the works, and canals and tanks, which insure the rice crop in parts of Mysore and the Carnatic, and render it less uncertain in others.

The cultivation of dry lands appears equally incapable of improvement. If more wells were dug, the dependence upon the rain would not be quite so absolute; but the number to be dug, in order to produce any effect upon the cultivation and produce of the land, must be very great, and the work would be exceedingly expensive. In a year of famine, the grain produced by the land watered by a well would pay the expense of constructing it; but in the years in which the fall of rain would be plentiful, the well would not be used.

It remains, then, to be considered whether any means can be adopted, either to make the superfluity of one year supply the want of another, or the superfluity of one country provide for the wants of that not so well provided.

MEMORANDUM ON THE PLAN PROPOSED OF AN INTERCHANGE OF  
NATIVE TROOPS OF INDIA AND THE NEGRO CORPS OF THE WEST  
INDIES. 1805.\*

THE plan of employing the negro troops in the East Indies, and the sepoys in the West Indies, ought to be considered in two views: 1st, in a view to its efficiency, supposing it to be practicable; 2ndly, in a view to its practicability, supposing it to be beneficial.

It is supposed that the negro regiments are to be substituted for European regiments in India. It cannot be intended to substitute them for sepoy battalions; as, supposing the ordinary and constant expenso of both descriptions of troops to be the same, the levy and transport of negroes to India would cost considerable sums, whereas the levy of sepoys costs nothing. The negroes could not perform the duties of the sepoys better, or so well, as these have always performed them. It cannot be deemed necessary to send negroes to India to replace sepoys, who may be withdrawn from thence for the service of the West Indies, as hitherto there has existed no very great difficulty in raising as many sepoys for the service in India, as might be thought necessary.

The plan, therefore, must be considered as substituting negroes in India for English soldiers.

It must first be considered for what a substitute is to be found, before it is determined that it is a good one.

The English soldiers are the main foundation of the British power in Asia. They are a body with habits, manners, and qualities, peculiar to them in the East Indies.

Bravery is the characteristic of the British army in all quarters of the world; but no other quarter has afforded such striking examples of the existence of this quality in the soldiers as the East Indies. An instance of their misbehavior in the field has never been known; and particularly those, who have been for some time in that country, cannot be ordered upon any service, however dangerous or arduous, that they will not effect, not only with bravery, but a degree of skill not often witnessed in persons of their description in other parts of the world.

I attribute these qualities, which are peculiar to them in the East Indies, to the distinctness of their class in that country from all others existing in it. They feel that they are a distinct and superior class to the rest of the world which surrounds them; and their actions correspond with their high notions of their own superiority. Add to these qualities that their bodies are inured to climate, hardship, and fatigue, by long residence, habit, and exercise, to such a degree, that I have seen them for years together in the field without suffering any material sickness; that I have made them march 60 miles in 30 hours, and afterwards engage the

\* Written on the voyage home from St. Helena.

enemy; and it will not be surprising that they should be respected, as they are, throughout India. Their weaknesses and vices, however repugnant to the feelings and prejudices of the Natives, are passed over in the contemplation of their excellent qualities as soldiers, of which no nation has hitherto given such extraordinary instances. These qualities are the foundation of the British strength in Asia, and of that opinion by which it is generally supposed that the British empire has been gained and upheld. These qualities show in what manner nations, consisting of millions, are governed by 30,000 strangers.

For this body, endowed with these excellent qualities, are negroes a substitute? It does not appear that the fidelity of the negroes can be depended upon; they are prone to mutiny. They are brave, undoubtedly; but are they unhesitatingly so as are the English soldiers?

The Native public cannot but know that they have been purchased slaves. There will be no distinction between the negroes and the lower classes of Natives; if any, unfortunately, one to the disparagement of the former, and no respect will be entertained for them.

It is a curious fact, but one that has more than once fallen under my observation, that the Natives of India have no fear, or respect, for the military qualities of the soldiers of any European nation, excepting the English. I had under my command for some years the Swiss regiment De Meuron, which, for good conduct, discipline, and other military qualities, was not surpassed by the English regiments. But the Natives heard that they were foreigners, that they had been bought into the service, and they had no confidence in them. What respect, or confidence, could be expected from them in a band of purchased negroes?

The introduction of the negro troops in India will bring with it a new evil not hitherto known there. The government will not be able to place implicit reliance on the fidelity of its troops. Certain classes of them must be taken to watch and balance the power and strength of certain other classes, which evil in itself will obviously weaken the whole. Are the few Europeans who must still be in India to be employed to watch the negroes, or is this service to be performed by the faithful sepoys? In either case the power and strength of the government will be lessened; and yet it is well known that the only power in India is military; and that, if Great Britain should lose her military pre-eminence there, her empire will no longer exist.

Will this evil be kept a secret from the Natives? Our own subjects, nay, our sepoys, would be equally ready with our enemies to take advantage of this decided symptom of internal debility.

My opinions upon this subject are so strong, that, if it be true that Great Britain cannot afford to supply the troops found necessary to maintain its empire in Asia, I would prefer to trust the maintenance of it to a smaller and select band of English soldiers, aided by their faithful and brave companions and adherents, the Company's sepoys, to the adoption of any such substitute as the negro force of the West Indies.

Let them go to Ceylon, where the establishment is less of the nature of a colony than these are on the continent of India. The climate of that island is said to be more congenial to their constitutions than it has been

found to be to those either of Europeans or Natives of India. Their mutinies or misbehavior can do no permanent mischief there, as the body required for the service of that island must always be small.

There appear few, if any, difficulties in the execution of this part of the plan, supposing that it should be determined on. The negro regiments can be sent from the West Indies to India either in transports or in Indian men of war, in the same manner as other troops in His Majesty's service. They can be recruited by purchases of slaves on His Majesty's account in the West Indies, on the west coast of Africa, or on the east coast of Africa, or in Madagascar, or in small numbers, possibly, in the Portuguese settlements in India. They will be expensive recruits, undoubtedly; but if the plan be necessary on account of the difficulties in supplying English soldiers, the expense of the article must not be considered.

It is supposed that they will receive in India the same pay and provisions as the European troops in the same branch in the West Indies. But they will still be less expensive than the European troops, inasmuch as it will not be necessary that their barracks, their field equipage, their hospitals, their arrack, should be equally good and expensive as those now supplied to the European troops.

If, however, it should be intended to make up for the deficiency in quality of the negro troops, in comparison with the Europeans, by sending increased numbers to India of the former, the expense to the Company of this negro establishment will be heavier than that of the European establishment has ever been; and, as I have before observed, the confidence in their efficiency as soldiers, whether in a view to their fidelity, or to their bravery and discipline, and other military virtues, can never be so great.

I come now to consider the other branch of the plan, viz. to send the sepoy to the West Indies. First, I shall consider their probable efficiency, as soldiers, in the West Indies.

The sepoy is to be substituted for the European, as well as the negro troops. There is no man who has a higher opinion, or ought to have a higher opinion, of the sepoy than I have. I have tried them on many serious occasions, and they never failed me, and always conducted themselves well. But it must be recollected that in India we never, or scarcely ever, undertake any service with the aid of sepoy only. The operations of war in India are always, or ought to be, offensive, if they can be made so; and it is possible in an offensive operation to have some of the troops who are to perform it, however desperate it may be, of an inferior description. Accordingly, in proportion to the service to be performed, we have seen  $\frac{1}{4}$ ,  $\frac{1}{3}$ ,  $\frac{1}{2}$ ,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the number of the operating army English soldiers; and it has been held by great authorities that  $\frac{1}{4}$  of the whole army in India ought to be of that description.

Since the battle of Cuddalore, in the year 1783, the sepoy has not been engaged in a regular battle with a European enemy. Upon that occasion a very large proportion, I believe half the army, was composed of European troops; and it has always been customary in the wars in India to increase the proportion of the European troops to the Natives, as the service should appear more arduous.

The services which will be required from the sepoy in the West Indies

will be generally of a defensive nature, against the best troops, excepting the English soldiers, which the world has produced. According to the Indian notion of employing sepoy, I should say that one half at least of the whole number of troops, to be employed upon such an occasion, ought to be English soldiers; and even upon that ground I should not think that I could save to the mother country half the soldiers required for the defence of the West India colonies. As substitutes, I could not consider less than 2 sepoy an equivalent for 1 soldier; and then there must be as many soldiers as sepoy every where. So that the most that the country could gain by this arrangement, supposing it is intended to provide fairly and upon known principles for the defence of the West Indies, would be  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the number of soldiers at present employed there. That is, supposing the number of soldiers now required for the West Indies is 15,000, it might be reduced to 10,000; and the deficiency I should consider to be made good by 10,000 sepoy.

In respect to the offensive operations in the West Indies, I mean those against Charibs, refractory negroes, brigands, &c., the sepoy are entirely unfit for them. The light troops are best adapted for these operations; and the sepoy are the worst of all troops for services of this description. The Europeans or the country troops are always employed upon services of this description, in India, when they occur, which is but seldom, as the country is one generally of plains, and the sepoy are not trained to them. Another reason why they will never make good light troops is, that the services of light troops naturally depend upon individual talents and exertion, and are carried on out of the sight of the officer. Those acquainted with the sepoy know well that they will do nothing against their enemy, excepting led by, and in the sight of, their officers. Add to these defects, that the sepoy are very delicate troops; that their health is affected by unwholesome situations and climate, equally with the Europeans; that the service in hilly and woody countries invariably affects them, and at times sends whole battalions to the hospital; and it will appear that this branch of the plan is not less inefficient than the other, of sending the negroes to India.

The difference between them is, that the West Indies will acquire at least a harmless defence; but not so the East Indies, as I have already shown.

But the difficulties which oppose the execution of this part of the plan are much greater than those which affect the other; and these are of a nature which, supposing it was likely to be efficient, ought in my opinion to induce government to abandon it.

In the first place, the embarkation of sepoy in India has never been otherwise, excepting on the coast of Malabar, than a voluntary service. On the coast of Malabar it has long been the practice to embark the sepoy at Bombay, and to send them to the northern or southern provinces under that government. But in the season in which those voyages are invariably undertaken the weather is always good; the length of the voyage is known to be only a few days; and short trips of that description are not uncommon among the inhabitants of the country.

The Bengal sepoy have never yet embarked in whole battalions. When Native troops are required for foreign service, the practice has been to call

for volunteers from the whole army; and the numbers which turn out are formed into battalions, with officers posted to them. Whole battalions have embarked upon the Madras establishment; but it has always been a voluntary offer made by the soldiers.

The same mode of proceeding must be adopted with a view to obtain sepoy for the service in the West Indies, not only at Madras and in Bengal, but on the Bombay establishment; as, although the sepoys belonging to the latter have been in the habit of embarking for short voyages of a few days' duration, they would be unwilling, and it might create inconvenience to make them embark for service in the West Indies.

To go on the service or not, then, must be left to the choice of the sepoys; and if the length of the voyage, the nature of the country to which they are to be sent, and the length of time they are to be absent, are fairly described to them, I think I may venture to say that very few indeed will voluntarily offer their services.

But I will suppose that they will offer them. They must have with them a certain proportion of their women, and some of their followers. Measures must be taken to feed them, not only on the passage, but in the West Indies, with the description of grain and other food to which each class of them has been accustomed.

Then they must be sent back to India in a reasonable period of time; suppose 5 years from the period of embarkation.

The European officers from the Company's service must accompany them, with their battalions, if whole battalions should volunteer their services, or taken from the regular regiments, supposing that the volunteers for the West Indies should be taken from the whole army, and formed into separate and extra battalions. In either case the European officers must be assured that they will have in the West Indies the same allowances as in India, or it may be depended upon there will be no Native volunteers for the service. If the Company's officers are to have Indian pay in the West Indies, discontent will be created among the King's officers in the same country. If the volunteers for the West Indies are to be formed into extra battalions, to be furnished with European officers from the regular sepoy regiments, the establishment of officers in India must be increased, as it is already too small for the service.

There are numberless inconveniences of minor importance, for which remedies can be found, such as the rank to be held by the Company's officers in the West Indies, the mode of conducting Native General Courts Martial, and the authority under which they are to be held, and other matters. But those first stated appear of such monstrous expense and difficulty, as to render the plan to any extent quite impracticable.

If it should be attempted in this mode, which is the only one in which it can be effectual, it must be expected that the recruiting for the sepoy regiments in India will receive a very serious blow. The families of the Natives will see with additional disquiet their relatives enlist in a service, in which they will know that they are liable to be sent to an unknown country, situated in a different quarter of the globe.

If the plan went only to draw from India a certain proportion of men for service in the island of Jamaica, for instance, where particular prejudices

prevail against the negroes, the best mode of proceeding would be to recruit for this number at Chittagong, in the Bay of Bengal, by means of the King's officers.

But, even according to this plan, much inconvenience would be felt by the Indian service, as the recruiting officers must either give bounty or promise additional pay, or they would get no recruits. Bounty for enlisting is unknown in India, excepting where the King's officers enlisted for the Native regiments in Ceylon, and this enlistment might introduce it. An increase of pay to the troops in India would be equally unnecessary and injurious; and yet it might be necessary to promise it in the quarter of the country in which these recruiting officers would have been.

Another plan for procuring soldiers for the West Indies from India would be to recruit from the Malay coast, opposite Prince of Wales's Island. The Malays are a hardy and brave race, and would make better soldiers for the West Indies than the people of India Proper; and to recruit these would not be attended with any of the inconveniences expected from the recruiting in India.

Upon the whole, I do not conceive that this plan would give to India a force which it is suitable to British India to have, or to the West Indies a force which would be efficient for their defence. On the other hand, the difficulties and expense, attending the execution of both branches of the plan, are such as must tend greatly to overbalance the advantages expected by the more sanguine, but which I am convinced would never be found to exist. Those, in particular, attending the execution of that part of the plan which sends sepoy to the West Indies, must prevent it from being carried to any useful extent, supposing it could be useful at all.

All the arguments upon sending sepoy to the West Indies apply to sending them to the Cape, with the difference only of distance, which, in such distances as either is from India, the sepoy would be unable to appreciate. But if troops are wanted at the Cape, why not send negroes there, and leave India to its old means, viz. English soldiers and sepoy?

## MEMORANDUM \*

ON

## MARQUIS WELLESLEY'S GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

IN order to understand the merits or demerits of Marquis Wellesley's government in India, it is necessary to review the state of that country when his Lordship assumed its government in May, 1798, and that in which it was left in April, 1806, which was the close of the official year in which Marquis Wellesley resigned the government. This subject is large, and will require a minute detail of many measures, of the causes which led to them, and of their consequences. But this paper shall be made as short as possible; and nothing shall be inserted in it which is not necessary for the elucidation of the subjects on which it is written.

The first intelligence which reached Marquis Wellesley, upon his arrival in India, was that the ancient Native enemy of the Company had formed an alliance with the French at Mauritius, for the purpose of attacking the British nation in India; and that, in consequence of this alliance, a body of Frenchmen had already been landed at the port of Mangalore, on the coast of Malabar, who had marched to Seringapatam. Shortly after the receipt of this intelligence, it was known in India that Buonaparte, with a large French army, had landed and taken possession of Egypt, and that the avowed object of this expedition was to invade India by that route.

The state of warfare which was to be expected in consequence of the intelligence of these measures and movements of the enemies of the British government, rendered necessary a review of its situation in all its branches; and what follows is the result of that review, and of the measures which were adopted to apply a remedy to the inconveniences and evils which were found to exist.

The Company were found to have a revenue of £8,059,880, a sum less than that which they had been found to have in 1793, at the renewal of their charter, by £165,748. The debt amounted to £10,866,588, having increased since 1793; and the interest was annually £746,933, having increased since 1793. The total amount of the charges of the government in India, including the interest of the debt, was £8,178,626; and the deficiency of the revenues, in comparison with the charges, at a time of profound peace in India, was £322,530. At the same time the Company's credit was at the lowest ebb. Money could not be borrowed in Bengal at 12 *per cent.* interest; the Company's bonds and securities at that rate were circulated at such a discount, as well at that Presidency as at Madras

\* Written after the Session of Parliament of 1806. The sums and dates, left in blank in the original memorandum, were filled up at the Board of Control and the India House.



and Bombay, as to amount nearly to a stagnation; and with this great war in expectation, the Company's financial servants in India were entirely at a loss to find the means for supporting and carrying on the ordinary operations of the government in time of peace. The Company's armies, although in a high state of discipline, and maintained, that of Fort William at the expense of £1,996,487, that of Fort St. George at the expense of £1,868,498, and that of Bombay at the expense of £641,469, were not in a state of preparation and efficiency to perform the operations which the crisis of the Company's affairs was likely to require from them. The Commander in Chief and Adjutant General of Fort St. George reported that 6 months would be required to prepare for service the army serving under that Presidency, upon which the brunt of the contest was likely to fall; and the government of that Presidency were apprehensive of the consequences of drawing the attention of the enemy, by making the smallest preparation for defence against the attack which they well knew that he had meditated. The army of Bombay, on which naturally the task would have fallen of co-operating in the contest with that of Fort St. George, was necessarily scattered in the disaffected provinces under the government of Bombay; and the army of Bengal was stationed principally in the Vizier's territories, with a view to keep them in tranquillity, and to defend them from the expected invasion of the King of Caubul.

Those powers on whom experience of former wars with Tippoo had shown that the Company ought to rely for assistance were the Nizam, the Peshwah, the Nabob of the Carnatic, and the petty rajahs and zemindars on the coast of Malabar. Since the peace of 1792 with Tippoo, which had attained the object of the alliance between the first two and the Company, the situation of these powers had been considerably changed. The Nizam, by the result of an unfortunate state of hostility with the Marhattas, which ended in battle, and a peace, or rather capitulation, concluded at Kurdlah in the year 1795, had fallen from the state of a great and leading power in Hindustan to that of a tributary to the Marhattas. His ministers were appointed by the Marhattas; his army was disbanded; and the only support of his authority was a corps consisting of about 14,000 men, trained, disciplined, and commanded by French officers. These officers had possession of a considerable portion of the Nizam's territories, from the revenues of which they were to pay their troops; and by the power which they acquired by this possession, and by the state of confusion of the government of the Marhattas at Poonah, the weakness of that of the Nizam, and the supine indifference of that of the Company, they were becoming a French state in the peninsula of India. By their power and violence they overawed the Nizam's councils, and precluded all hope of his co-operation in the war which was expected with Tippoo and his French allies in the year 1798.

The Marhatta government of Poonah, which had afforded such material assistance to the British government in the war which had ended in 1792 by the treaty of Seringapatam, was become equally incapable with the Nizam of affording any aid in that which was expected in 1798. After the peace of Kurdlah in 1795, the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao Narain, threw

himself from a window in his palace at Poonah, and died upon the spot. A contest then ensued for the possession of the power of that government, in which all the principal Marhatta chiefs were engaged, and which, having lasted with various success during the years 1796 and 1797, had ended by placing all the power at Poonah in the hands of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This Chief already possessed the Marhatta territories upon the Jumna and Ganges bordering upon those of the English and the Nabob of Oude, and the actual sovereignty of all those situated to the northward of the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee. By the gain of the influence over the government of the young Peshwah, Bajce Rao, he extended his power to the northern frontier of Tippoo's dominions in Mysore; thus holding in his own hands all the different Marhatta states.

In 1798 this extended power was but feebly established, and would have been unequal to the exertion to be made in the expected contest with Tippoo, even if it could be supposed that Scindiah's policy would have led him to enter into it. But when that Chief became the sole head of the Marhattas, his policy would have led him to support Tippoo rather than the English in the impending contest, supposing his power to have been in that state to enable him to enter into it. He must have been aware that, with respect to him, the English were the most formidable of the two powers; and that his objects would have been forwarded by their defeat. Besides this, Scindiah's principal force consisted in a body of infantry, raised, disciplined, and commanded by French officers; and although the influence of these officers over the government of Scindiah was by no means of the description of that exercised by those in the service of the Nizam over the government of that prince, it was still sufficiently strong to prevent Scindiah from adopting a measure which was contrary to his obvious policy, as the sole possessor of all the Marhatta power from the Ganges to the Toombuddra.

Thus, then, nothing was to be expected from the two powers which had been the principal allies of the Company in the former war with Tippoo; and as the French were likely to be actively and personally engaged in this expected war, it was to be apprehended that they would derive assistance from the force commanded by Frenchmen in the service of those powers who had formerly been considered as the firm allies of the British government.

Since the peace of 1792 the Nabob Mahomed Aly of the Carnatic had died, and had been succeeded by his son, Omdal ool Omrah. This prince, who was very unpopular in his territories, showed every disposition to impede rather than to forward the operations of the British army. He gave them no assistance; and it was afterwards found at Srirangapatam that he was in correspondence with the Company's enemy.

As for the rajahs of Malabar, they (with the exception of the Rajah of Koorg) had been in a state of hostility with the Company from the conclusion of the peace of 1792 till the year 1798, and had kept a considerable proportion of the Bombay army in constant hostile operations against them. No assistance was to be expected from them; but, on the contrary, every thing which was in their power to annoy and harass the army and to aid the enemy.

Add to this representation of the state of our affairs in India at this period, that a revolution had just been effected in Oude by Lord Teignmouth; that the government of the reigning Prince Saadut Aly was most unpopular, and by no means firmly established throughout the country; that his army was mutinous and disaffected; that an invasion of his country was expected from Zemaun Shah, the King of Caubul, against which it was necessary to provide by the assembly of a large force in Oude under the command of Sir J. Craig; and that, in this emergency of affairs in Oude, such was the state of mutiny and disaffection of the Nabob's troops, that his Highness could not trust to them the guard of his person, but was obliged to call for British troops to preserve him from the effects of their treachery; and Sir J. Craig, to whom was intrusted the defence of Oude, considered these troops in the light of an enemy's fortress in his rear.

Another circumstance which embarrassed government in India at all times, and was a considerable source of embarrassment at the period under consideration, was the nature and state of the alliances between the British government and its dependent and tributary states.

These alliances had always been formed in a moment of extreme weakness, and generally after the Native and dependent state had been conquered. The principal stipulation was uniformly protection by the British government, in consideration of subsidy to be paid by the Native state, and in other respects the Native state was declared or was considered to be independent in the management of all its internal concerns.

The Native states having in every instance contracted these alliances in a moment of weakness, in which, of course, all the powers of their governments were paralysed, they have invariably been under the necessity of calling for the assistance of the British protecting government for the support of their authority in the management of their internal concerns.

The system of government in India, the foundations of authority, and the modes of supporting it and of carrying on the operations of the government, are entirely different from the systems and modes adopted in Europe for the same purposes.

The foundation and the instrument of all power there is the sword; and when these alliances have been formed, the sword, or, in other words, the army of the East India Company, became the only support and the only efficient instrument of authority of the protected Native states.

This position of affairs, which was the result of the principle of government long established in the East, and of the weakness of the Native state, was attended by a stipulation in some cases, or an understanding in others, that the Native state should be *independent* in all the operations of its internal government; and at the very moment in which this stipulation was made, the interference of the British government was required, and all the internal concerns of the Native state submitted to its judgment, in order that its agents might see whether the cases in which its interference was called for were of a nature to justify it.

Here, then, the door was necessarily opened to the interference of the British government in every concern; and the result was increased weakness in the Native state, jealousy of this interference, and disunion bordering upon treachery.

These evils had long appeared to require a remedy; and they must have been felt particularly at the moment in which the British government was likely to be involved in a most extensive warfare with the most formidable of the Native powers, assisted by the French.

This having been the state of India at the time Marquis Wellesley assumed the government in the year 1798, the measures adopted to apply a remedy to the evils which existed will form an epitome of the history of his Lordship's administration. I shall detail them in that order which is most likely to make them clear to the understandings of those who will read this paper.

The objects which pressed most upon his Lordship's attention in May and June, 1798, were to place the army of Fort St. George in a situation to resist the expected hostility of the enemy, to relieve the finances from the difficulties under which they labored, and to bring back the allies of the Company to the state in which they had been left by the peace at Seringapatam in 1792, so that the allies might be able to render the assistance in the war which they were capable of affording.

The measures of finance which were at that time successfully adopted laid the foundation of the system which was subsequently acted upon, and which will be fully considered in another part of this paper.

Effectual measures were immediately adopted to put in a situation to enable them to defend themselves the whole disposable force of Fort St. George, and eventually to perform the service which might be, and was afterwards, required from them.

The army of Fort St. George was reinforced by European troops from Bengal, and preparatory measures were adopted to enable government to reinforce it still further with Native troops, when the most favorable season for transporting them by sea should come round.

But the principal measure of those days, that which gave a turn to the state of the Company's affairs in India, and to the general sentiment of the people of that country respecting the British government, was the negotiation at Hyderabad, which ended by the substitution of a British for a French force at the capital of the Nizam.

The Nizam had long been connected with the British government, and by the treaty of        it had been stipulated that he should have the assistance of 2 British battalions when he should call for them. This article\* of the treaty had not been performed till the war broke out with Tippoo, which ended by the peace of 1792, when Lord Cornwallis made a new treaty† with the Nizam, and attached to his army 2 British battalions, which acted with them during that war. At the same time 2 British battalions were attached to the Marhatta army under Pursheram Bhow.

The services of these battalions stationed with the Nizam, as will be observed by the treaty, were to be confined to operations against foreign enemies and domestic rebels; but not to be directed against the Marhattas, and in particular *not* against certain tributaries of the Nizam stationed upon the Marhatta frontier, who were likewise tributaries of the Peshwah.

After the defeat and capitulation of the Nizam at Kurdlah in 1795, which has been above referred to, the Marhattas had obliged his Highness to

\* *Insert the article.*

† *Insert the treaty or letter.*

send these battalions back into the Company's territories; but during the disputes at Poonah for the succession to Madhoo Rao, his Highness had taken advantage of the momentary weakness of the Marhatta government, and had recalled these battalions to his capital.

The object of the negotiation which Marquis Wellesley commenced with the Nizam was to prevail upon his Highness to perform the defensive treaty of Hyderabad, 1st Sept. 1798\*; and as it appeared that his Highness was unable to perform it, on account of the power which the French officers and their faction had over his councils, it was proposed to his Highness that he should dismiss them and their troops from his service for ever; and an offer was made to supply British troops to enable his Highness to accomplish this object, and to remain thereafter at Hyderabad as substitutes for the troops under the command of the French officers.

A treaty was concluded on this basis with the utmost secrecy and dispatch, which contained all the restraining articles for the service of the troops which had been in the treaty of 7th May, 1798; and a body of British troops entered the Nizam's territories, and had made some marches towards Hyderabad before the French officers were aware of their fate. This body of troops, having joined those already at Hyderabad, performed the service on which they were sent without bloodshed; and the Nizam was thus restored to the power of performing his defensive engagements with the Company, and one of the great and fruitful sources of the evils impending over us in 1798, which has been already described, was removed by a timely, well contrived, and able exercise of the power of the British government.

This negotiation at Hyderabad was accompanied by another at Poonah, with a view to the same objects. But this failed, for reasons which will be reviewed hereafter. In the course of this negotiation all the circumstances attending that carrying on at Hyderabad were ascribed to the Peshwah, with a view to prevent the jealousy which might otherwise have been expected upon the renewal of the ancient alliance between the Company and the Nizam.

After one of the principal allies of the British government had thus been placed in a situation to be enabled to perform his treaty of alliance, a negotiation was opened with Tippoo Sultaun, the object of which was to bring that Prince to an early decision, whether he should be at peace or at war with the Company. It was obvious that the assistance which he had hitherto received from his allies, the French, was small in comparison with that which he might expect from them; and that it was not of an extent and description to be very formidable to the British government, particularly as its alliance with the Nizam had been renewed, and the source of danger in that quarter had been removed. All that was required from Tippoo, therefore, was a renunciation of this offensive alliance, and such an unequivocal proof of it as should be *satisfactory* to the whole world; and the adoption of arrangements which should facilitate the usual friendly communications between states not in hostility with each other.†

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. i. p. 682.

† Insert the Gov. Gen.'s demands.

These negotiations were attended by military preparations which were calculated to secure early success and a speedy termination to the war, which it was determined should be the consequence of Tippoo's refusal to give the allies the reasonable satisfaction which they had required. The wisdom of these early preparations was soon proved; for on the very day that Tippoo, after a delay of some weeks beyond the period fixed for his answer to the remonstrance of the British government, dispatched his answer, and desired that a British officer might be sent to negotiate with him, he commenced his march to attack the Bombay army, which was assembled in the territories of the Rajah of Koorg.

In this review of the measures of Marquis Wellesley's government, it is not intended to detail the movements or the actions of the different armies. The result of the well prepared and well combined operations of the war against Tippoo was the capture of his capital, with all his arsenals, treasure, &c., his own death, on the 4th May, 1799; and the subsequent reduction and submission of all his territories to the allied governments.

The army of the Nizam, with the subsidiary force as formed by the late Treaty of 1798, co-operated in this war with the British army; and his Highness' government shared equally with the British government in the advantages arising from its successful termination. The territories of the Company were increased by the addition of those belonging to Tippoo, situated upon the sea coast of Malabar, and those which gave possession of important military positions. The Nizam received an equivalent, contiguous to his frontier; and a portion was reserved for the Peshwah, to be given on the condition that his Highness should become a party to the alliance between the other governments, and should accede to certain stipulations which were proposed to him, and which will be discussed in a subsequent part of this paper. His Highness having refused to accept these conditions, this portion was divided between the Company and the Nizam.

The principal and all the centre part of the territories of Tippoo were given to a descendant of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, in whose person a state was formed under the immediate influence and protection of the British government. This state was connected by a treaty of alliance with the Company, which was bound to defend it on condition of the payment of a stipulated tribute. As alliances of this description, by conferring a nominal independence on the Princes connected by them with the Company, had been found in other instances to be attended with many inconveniences, to render necessary a constant interference by the protecting government in the internal affairs of the Native subordinate state, and to occasion internal weakness, jealousy of the protecting power, and a waste and embarrassment of the resources of the government, it was thought best, in the treaty of alliance with the government of Mysore, to provide for the interference of the British government in all its concerns when such interference might be necessary; and the state in which this government is found to be at this moment, the cordial and intimate union which exists between the government of Mysore and the British authorities, and the important strength and real assistance which it has afforded

usurper had been formally deposed by the authority of the British government under Lord Teignmouth, after a full examination of the justice of his claim; and Saadut Aly had been placed in the government of Oude.

This prince was very unpopular with the army, and was not generally agreeable to his subjects. His disposition was parsimonious, and his habits were not of a nature to conciliate the affections of his turbulent subjects.

When the preparations were making to resist the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, the Nabob, Saadut Aly, although fully convinced of the necessity of collecting the largest force upon the frontier, called for a detachment of the British troops to attend and guard his person against his own turbulent and disaffected troops. He declared repeatedly that these troops were not to be trusted in the day of battle, or on any service; and after viewing their state of discipline and equipment, and obtaining a knowledge of their principles and attachment to the cause of the allied governments, Sir J. Craig considered these troops as worse than useless, as dangerous, and of the nature of an enemy's fortress in his rear; and he actually left a detachment of British troops to watch them, and the turbulent inhabitants of Rohileund, the frontier province of Oude to the north-west.

The Governor General, by his negotiations at the court of Persia, had drawn the attention of the King of Caubul to the defence of his own western frontier; and availed himself of the certain tranquillity which he had obtained on the frontiers of Oude to arrange the affairs of that country on a basis better calculated to give it permanent security and tranquillity, and to increase the strength of the British government on its north-west frontier, which was one of its weakest points.

Towards the close of the year 1799 the Governor General called upon the Nabob of Oude to dismiss his expensive, useless, and dangerous troops, and to fill their places by increased numbers of the Company's troops. The Nabob had desired the assistance of the Governor General in the reform of the different establishments of his government; but the British government had a right, under the article of the treaty of 1798, to require that this reform should be made. After some difficulties, arising principally from the defective principle on which the military establishments were formed, paid, and commanded, this great object was effected; and arrangements were made for introducing into the Vizier's territories 3000 additional British troops, at the annual expense to the Nabob Vizier of 76 lacs of Oude *sicca rupces per annum*.

In order to improve the security of Oude still further, a reform of the civil administration of the government was necessary; and this reform was pressed upon the attention of the Nabob. But while the negotiations for this purpose, and for the final arrangement of the military establishments, were going on, the Nabob bravely declared that he was not able to pay the expense of the troops which had been stationed in his country for its defence at the time of the expected invasion of Zemaun Shah, or the expense of the additional troops which had been necessarily stationed in his country upon the occasion of the reform of his military establishments, although he was bound by treaty to defray the whole of these charges.

A demand was then made upon him to give territorial security, according to the 11th article of the treaty of 1798; and, after a long negotiation, a treaty was concluded on the 10th Nov. 1801,\* by which, in commutation for subsidy, and for the perpetual defence of his country, the Nabob ceded to the Company the territory of Rohilcund, the Dooab, and Gorruckpoor; the two former being his frontier provinces towards the Marhattas, the Seiks, and Affghans, and the latter bordering upon the Company; and he engaged, further, to introduce a better system of management into the territories which remained in his hands.

By the whole of this arrangement the Company gained,

1st. The advantage of getting rid of a useless and dangerous body of troops stationed on the very point of their defence, and ready at all times to join an invading enemy :

2ndly. The advantage of acquiring the means of placing upon this weak point additional numbers of the British troops, and thereby increasing its strength, and the general security of the provinces in their rear :

3rdly. Ample territorial security for the regular and perpetual payment of these funds for the support of their military establishments in Bengal :

4thly. By the introduction of their own system of government and management into the countries ceded to them, and the employment of their own servants in the administration, they secured the tranquillity of those hitherto disturbed countries, the loyalty and happiness of their hitherto disaffected and turbulent inhabitants; and, above all, they acquired the resources of those rich but hitherto neglected provinces for their armies, in case of the recurrence of the necessity for military operations upon that frontier.

These advantages, the full benefit of which, as will be seen hereafter, were felt in a very few years, were gained without incurring any disadvantage whatever; in particular, that was not incurred which appears most likely to weaken a great continental power, such as the Company is in India, viz., the frontier was not increased. The Company were equally bound to defend, and had actually defended, this same frontier in 1798 and 1799, when the country was governed by the Nabob; so that all was gain and strength, without the smallest degree of disadvantage or weakness.

But the advantages in this arrangement were not gained by the Company only; those of the Nabob were at least equal to those of the Company. Whatever increased the security of the Company manifestly increased his security likewise; and here he acquired a great advantage. But this was not all. It is known that the Nabob of Oude had never collected from the countries ceded, and realised in his treasury, even the sum of 76 lacs of Oude sicca rupees, being the old subsidy paid under the treaty of 1798; much less had he realised the increased sum which he was obliged to pay in consequence of the increase of the number of troops stationed in his country. His pecuniary gain was the difference between the annual sum he realised and that which he was bound to pay. Under the new treaty of Nov. 1801, the Company were bound to defend the territories of the Nabob under all circumstances; and no new demand could be made upon him on any account, whatever might be the extent of the ser-

\* See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. ii., p. 598.



vice, or of the expense incurred in their defence. The Nabob has already felt the full advantage of this stipulation.

Besides these advantages of a pecuniary nature, the Nabob derived others from the arrangement. The cession of the provinces had been preceded by the discharge of a large proportion of his troops; and those which remained in his service scattered over the whole surface of his enlarged territories, were unequal to the performance of the duties required from them. These duties could not, with convenience, be performed by the Company's Native troops, commanded as they are by European officers, as the civil government remained in the hands of the Nabob's Native servants. Both the Company's government and the Nabob suffered inconvenience; the former from the frequent calls of the Nabob for the service of their troops in the detail of the collections of the revenue; and the latter from the want of habit of these troops in duties of this description, and the difficulties of performing them through the agency of European officers directed by Native servants. When the provinces were ceded to the Company, the Nabob had the means and advantage of employing in a reduced territory the troops which had been found insufficient for the conduct of the administration of one of greater extent; and these troops, being more immediately under his inspection, and within the reach of his authority, were kept in better order.

Thus, then, upon the whole, this arrangement has been advantageous, and has proved satisfactory, to both the parties to it, whatever may have been the difficulties in settling it; and Marquis Wellesley removed by it all the inconveniences and weakness felt upon the north-west frontier of Bengal, and added considerably to the resources of the British government.

The evil to which Marquis Wellesley next directed his efforts was the nature of the British alliances with its tributary states in general, and particularly with the Nabob of Arcot. The alliance between the Company and the family of this prince had commenced in the infancy of the British power in the peninsula of India, and the terms of it had been altered at different periods. The general purport of them, however, at all times, had been protection of the Carnatic by the Company, on the condition of the regular monthly payment of a stipulated subsidy by the Nabob; that the Nabob should have no political communication with any foreign power, excepting through the intervention or with the consent of the Company; that the Company should not interfere in the internal concerns of the Nabob's government; and the last treaty of 1792 provided particularly that, in case of failure in the payment of the stipulated subsidy, certain countries should be ceded to the Company.\*

One of the great evils in this alliance, as in all those of this description which had been formed in India, was that it provided that the Company should not interfere in the internal concerns of the Nabob's government, at the same time that the interference of the Company in every possible case was absolutely and essentially necessary for the support of the Native government, and was practised on every occasion.

Another evil which affected this, as well as every alliance of the same

\* *Insert the treaty.*

description, was that the amount of the subsidy to be paid to the Company was to be realised from the country by the Nabob; and that this subsidy necessarily bore so large a proportion to the revenues which the country could afford, that it was scarcely possible to realise it so as to make the regular monthly payments required by the nature of the Company's service, and stipulated in the treaty. The consequence was that the Nabob was obliged to borrow money, at large interest, to make his payments at the stipulated periods; and as the Natives were unable or unwilling to come forward to lend their money upon these occasions, the loans were made from the Company's civil and military servants, and the European inhabitants of Fort St. George and its dependencies.

The interest upon these loans was usually 3 *per cent. per mensem*; and the security for the payment of the interest, as well as the principal, was generally a tuncaw, or order, or assignment, from the Nabob, upon the revenues of certain portions of his territories. It is obvious that the tuncawdar, or holder of these orders, could have no interest in the prosperity of the country of which he was thus appointed by the Nabob the temporary collector, excepting to recover from it as he could, and at the earliest possible period, the sums supposed to be due. Here, then, was established a system which tended not only to the oppression of the inhabitants of the country, to the impoverishment of the Nabob, and to the destruction of the revenues of the Carnatic, but it was carried into execution by the Company's civil and military servants, and by British subjects.

In this view of the evil it was of enormous magnitude. The practice of lending money to the Native powers by British subjects had been repeatedly forbidden by the Company, and the continuance of it, therefore, was a breach of their most positive orders; but it was so general, and the profits so large, that no government had been found sufficiently strong entirely to prevent it. But the evil did not consist only in the ruin of the Nabob and his country, and in this breach of order and discipline, but it established at Madras, and in the subordinate territories, a body of men in the service of the Company, or living under its protection, whose interests and objects, as relative to the Nabob of the Carnatic, were different from those of the Company. On all occasions, whether trifling or important, of difference between the Company and the Nabob, the latter was certain of the advice, assistance, and active exertions of this description of men; and he never failed to succeed in his objects. It is not astonishing, therefore, that a Prince whose views were directed to an increase of his political power, and whose vanity was flattered by the services performed and court paid to him by so many Europeans of the first rank and consequence in that country, should have promoted every object which could have a tendency to continue this system, and should have set his face against every measure calculated to restrain it, although it was evidently ruinous to his finances, to the revenues of his country, and to his real interests and independence.

The countries which by the treaty of 1792 had been assigned as security to be assumed by the Company, in case of the failure in the regular payment of the subsidy, were among the richest of all those under the govern-

ment of the Nabob; and it had been particularly provided by the treaty that tuncaws should not be granted upon these districts. Those who lent his Highness their money, however, had no objection to take these countries as their security; and it was natural that the Nabob should feel a slighter degree of interest in the permanent prosperity of those countries than in that of the other provinces subject to his authority. Accordingly, tuncaws were generally granted, contrary to treaty, upon these provinces assigned by treaty for the Company's security; and in aggravation of the accumulated evils of this system, the Company's governments abroad had the mortification to observe the daily and increasing ruin of the resources of Fort St. George, and the deterioration of the prosperity of the provinces allotted as their security by the means of their own servants and those living under their protection. Not a month elapsed that did not afford matter of speculation whether the Nabob could continue to pay his stipulated subsidy; and not one in which he did not procure the money by loan at a large interest, by means which tended to the destruction of the country.

From the time the operation of the treaty of 1792 was observed, every Governor had endeavored to prevail upon the Nabob to consent to an alteration of it, by which the Company's resources should be secured, and the evils above described should be prevented. The endeavors, however, of Lord Buckinghamshire, Marquis Wellesley, and Lord Powis, equally failed in prevailing upon the Nabob to consent to a modification of the treaty; and when the war broke out with Tippoo, the country was laboring under all the accumulated disadvantages of the system, its resources were ruined, and its inhabitants, from long oppression, disaffected.

Besides these evils, there was a manifest indifference, or rather disaffection, in the Nabob, Omdal ool Omrah, himself, to the cause of the British government and its allies, the meaning of which was not discovered till Seringapatam was taken, and the papers of Tippoo had fallen into the hands of the British government. Among them were found all the written communications and correspondence which had been carried on between the Nabob Mahomed Aly and the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah, his son, and Hyder Aly and Tippoo Sultaun, without the knowledge of the Company's government.

The fact of the existence of the correspondence alone was a breach of the treaties by which the Nabobs of the Carnatic had been allied to the British government; but in addition to this fact it was found that the correspondence referred to objects under discussion by the different parties to it, and entirely inconsistent with the principle of the connexion between the British government and the Nabobs of the Carnatic, with the terms of the treaties by which that connexion had been formed, or the existence of friendly intercourse between any states in any part of the world.

As soon as Marquis Wellesley had ascertained all the circumstances attending these communications, by an examination of the persons who had been instrumental in carrying them on, he referred the whole subject to the authorities in England, and stated in detail his sentiments on the conduct of the Nabob, and on the measures which it would be advisable to adopt. These sentiments having been approved, his Lordship pro-

ceeded to carry into execution the measures which he had proposed to adopt.

His Lordship's principles on this question were, generally, that the Nabobs, by their communications with Hyder Aly and Tippoo Sultaun, had broken their treaties of alliance with the Company; and that in consequence of this breach of treaty the Company had a right to act in the manner that best suited their own interest. That which best suited their own interest was, to take into their own hands the entire management of the civil and military government of the Carnatic; giving to the Nabob, for the support of himself and his family, such a proportion of the revenues as should be sufficient for those objects, provided his Highness would acquiesce in the arrangements which should be carried into execution. These principles were considered to apply equally to the son, or supposed son, of the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah, as it was obvious that he could claim to inherit the authority of his father in the Carnatic, and the advantages derived from the connexion with the Company, only under the treaties between the Company and his family, all of which had been broken by the correspondence carried on with Hyder Aly and Tippoo Sultaun, by Mahomed Aly and Omdal ool Omrah.

When the orders from Marquis Wellesley upon this subject reached Madras, the Nabob Omdal ool Omrah was in such a state of health as to be incapable of attending to business; and soon afterwards he died. The supposed son was then apprised of the discoveries which had been made at Seringapatam, of the sentiments of the British government in consequence of these discoveries, and of the measures which they proposed to adopt in the Carnatic. But he refused to accept the situation held out to him under the new arrangement. As the claim of this Prince to succeed to his father, supposing that circumstances had allowed of the succession, was by no means clear, and as it was desirable for the peace of the Carnatic that the Nabob's family should adopt the arrangement, Lord Clive (now Earl of Powis) determined to set aside Aly Hussein entirely, and to propose it to Azeem ool Dowlah, the eldest legitimate son of Ameer ool Omrah, who was the second son of the Nabob Mahomed Aly, and brother of the late Nabob Omdal ool Omrah. This Prince having agreed to the arrangement, a treaty was concluded by which the whole of the civil and military government of the Carnatic was transferred for ever to the Company; and the Nabob Azeem ool Dowlah, and his heirs, were to preserve their title and dignity, and to receive one fifth part of the net revenues of the country.\*

Thus was this important arrangement concluded in a peaceable manner, by which a remedy was provided for all the evils which had attended the former connexion between the Company and the Nabobs of the Carnatic; additional security was given to the British government, and an addition of £800,000 *per annum*, value of 20 lacs of star pagodas, was made to their pecuniary resources. This improvement in their situation was not attended by any extension of their frontier (for the Company was bound

\* Unless the revenue exceed the sum of 25 lacs of star pagodas, in which case the 5th part of the excess was to be applied to purposes of military defence.

before, both by treaty and positive interest, to defend the same line of country), or any circumstance which tended to weaken the British government in the Carnatic.

The arrangement, the nature of which I shall next discuss, is the treaty of 1800, with the Nizam. It will be recollected that the treaty of 1798, which had been a remedy for some of the inconveniences existing at that time in the connexion between the Company and the Nizam, had been directed principally to the object of enabling his Highness to perform his part of the triple alliance of , formed against the power of Tippoo Sultaun, in which object it had completely succeeded. But in reference to the Nizam, there were objects in contemplation also at that moment, which could not be carried into execution; and some inconveniences had grown out of the treaty of 1798 for which it was necessary to provide an early remedy. Between the years 1792 and 1798 the power of the government of the Nizam had fallen under the influence of the Marhattas. This power had large claims upon his Highness; some founded upon the treaty or capitulation of Kurdlah, which claims had been afterwards modified and given up by other treaties; and others founded upon the general principle of overbearing extortion of the Marhatta government.

As will appear in a subsequent part of this paper, the Governor General had endeavored, in 1798, to prevail upon the Peshwah to become a party to the treaty made that year with the Nizam, and to allow the British government to arbitrate in the Marhatta claims on the Nizam's government, but without success; and the Marhattas continued to bring forward these vexatious and groundless claims, and at different periods, as well during the war against Tippoo as subsequently, Scindiah, who at that time possessed the power at Poonah, had collected armies upon the Nizam's frontier for the purpose of enforcing them.

Another evil which had existed in 1798 affecting the Nizam's government, and for which the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, had been no remedy, was the state of the Nizam's government in relation to its tributaries, who were likewise tributaries to the Marhattas. A considerable proportion of the pecuniary resources of the Nizam was derived from this source; but the Nizam was unable to enforce payment of his just demands, which the tributaries were encouraged by the Marhattas to withhold from his Highness.

Under the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798, the Nizam was not entitled to the assistance of the British troops stationed in his country, either to defend him against the Marhattas, or to assist him in overawing those of his tributaries who were likewise tributaries to the Marhattas; and after the conquest of Mysore the British government, which by that event had become paramount in India, was obliged to determine the precise nature of the relation in which it would stand, as well to the Nizam's as to the Marhatta government, and that in which those powers should stand to each other.

It was obvious that the Marhattas would continue to make, and would at length enforce, their unjust demands upon the Nizam's government to the length of replacing affairs at Hyderabad in the situation in which they had been left by the treaty of Kurdlah in 1795, when a Marhatta minister

had governed the Nizam's territories. But this was not the only danger. The Nizam's government could not proceed unless its tributaries were brought under subjection. This measure was necessary as well on account of the pecuniary relief which it would afford to the Nizam, as because the rebellion of these tributaries was a dangerous example of insubordination to the governors and collectors of the revenue of the distant provinces of the Nizam's territories. The existence of rebellion and insubordination in any country must always be formidable to its neighbours; but it is particularly so in India: and in the years 1799 and 1800 the existence of these evils was peculiarly inconvenient to the British government, and impeded the settlement of the new government of Mysore and the conquered provinces.

After the peace of Seringapatam, therefore, the British government were compelled to advert to the means of strengthening the government of the Nizam. Those which occurred were first to encourage and aid the Nizam in raising an army, to be disciplined and commanded by European officers. It would have been impossible to provide the number of English officers which his Highness' service would have required, even if all the persons of this description who might have been prevailed upon to go to India could have been depended upon, and if the national policy in respect to India had allowed of the emigration to that country of such a large body of persons. These European officers must therefore have been foreigners, all of whom have been invariably found to be inimical to the British interests, and principally Frenchmen. Here, then, the evil would have been revived, of which the inconvenience and danger had been felt previous to 1798, and for which the treaty of 1798 had been a remedy.

The second mode which occurred was to encourage the Nizam to raise a Native army. From the treachery of the Native chiefs, from their habits of correspondence and communication with the Marhattas, and the superiority which this nation had acquired over them in a long series of contests, nothing effectual was to be expected from this measure, and it would have led directly to place the Nizam in a state of subjection to the government of Poonah. The Marhattas would thus have been brought to the Company's frontier in the Northern Circars, the Carnatic, and to the boundaries of the new government of Mysore. The power of the Poonah state was at that time exercised by Scindiah, who was in his own right in possession of all the Marhatta power in Hindustan. Thus one Marhatta would have had in his hands all the power from the Ganges and Indus to the frontiers of the Carnatic and Mysore; touching the Company's frontier on the whole line, and possessing the means of attacking it where he should think proper. Such a power has never appeared in India, and it is to be hoped never will!

The third mode was to extend the basis of the treaty of 1st Sept., 1798; to make it generally defensive against all powers; and, in fact, to take the Nizam under the protection of the British government.

Adverting to the state of the government of the Nizam, to the fact that it was incapable from weakness of carrying on its ordinary operations over the countries and people submitted to his Highness' authority, excepting by the assistance of a Gallo-Indian army, by means which would have

subjected his Highness to the Marhattas, or by the assistance of the British government; and that in either of the former cases it would have fallen into the hands of our rivals or enemies, and would have been exercised to our disadvantage, there is no man who will doubt of the propriety of the arrangement made by the treaty of 1800.

But this treaty was preceded and attended by other circumstances, which, as a political measure, rendered it more necessary. It has already been stated that, since the peace of Kurdlah in 1795, the Marhattas had never ceased to make vexatious demands upon the Nizam, supported generally by the assembling of armies upon his frontier. The remonstrances and negotiations of the British government had prevented the invasion of his Highness' territories, with a view to enforce the payment of these demands; and there is no doubt that any symptom of an intention to withdraw from his support would have been followed by their immediate conquest, in the same manner as the omission of the British government to interfere between the two powers in 1795 had been the occasion of the war, and the disasters which were followed by the capitulation of Kurdlah.

Here, then, is a new view of the case—a Marhatta conquest made of the Nizam's territories, in consequence of our moderation at least; and the conqueror placed upon our frontier.

If there had been no treaty with the Nizam, if the British had no interest in his preservation excepting what related to themselves, they would have been bound to interfere to prevent this evil.

But besides the great views of policy which rendered the alteration of the treaty of 1798 desirable, as far as related to the employment of the forces, there were other circumstances, of inferior importance certainly, which rendered expedient the other alterations made by the treaty of 1800.

Under the treaty of 1798 the British government had been bound to furnish the Nizam with a certain force, for the payment of a stipulated sum of money monthly. As was usual in all these cases, this subsidy fell in arrear; and the records of the Presidency are filled with accounts of the complaints made of the existence of these arrears, and of the measures adopted to secure their liquidation. These arrears gave rise to complaints and remonstrances from the British government, which of course must have tended to weaken the good understanding which ought to have existed between the Nizam and them; and they were equally prejudicial to the interests of both powers. The grant of territorial security for the payment of the subsidy removed all these causes of misunderstanding.

The territory which was granted to the Company was that which had been under the government of Tippoo Sultaun, and had been ceded to the Nizam by the treaties of Seringapatam of 1792 and 1799. The authority of the Nizam had never been firmly established in those countries; and the state of confusion in which they were in 1799-1800, was highly prejudicial to the British interests in Mysore, and in the Company's recently acquired countries. The Nizam's treasury had never received any thing from those countries; and his Highness had supported the Company's subsidiary troops by funds acquired from other parts of his territories. It was hoped that the introduction of a better system of government

would have produced order and regularity among this hitherto turbulent people, a hope which has been completely fulfilled; and this territory now yields a revenue of \_\_\_\_\_, a sum fully equal to pay the expenses of the subsidiary force stationed with the Nizam, and of the administration of government in the provinces which his Highness ceded.

Under this arrangement the Company's frontier is defined by the course of the Toombuddra to its junction with the Kistna; and then by the course of the Kistna to its entry into the province of \_\_\_\_\_.

The provinces acquired under this treaty cover the Mysore country to the northward; and have removed the source of danger to be apprehended to that newly established government, from the neighbourhood and example of a turbulent and disaffected people, paying no revenue or obedience to the government under which it is placed.

From the general view which has been given of this arrangement, it will readily be believed that the Nizam wished to accomplish it much more eagerly than the British government did. In fact, his Highness felt that before this arrangement was made his government was not in a state of security; and it will be observed that the security of his Highness' government was the principal object and motive of this treaty. Other objects were connected with this principal motive, equally interesting and advantageous to both the parties to the treaty; and upon the whole it may be said that it does not contain an article or an arrangement in which both parties were not equally interested.

The next subject to which I shall advert is the arrangement made with the Peshwah by the treaty of Bassein. It will be recollected that the Marhatta government of Poonah had been connected with the British government by a treaty made by Lord Cornwallis on 1st Sept. 1798, commonly called the Treaty of Triple Alliance, against Tippoo Sulthan. Under this treaty his Highness was bound to assist the British government and the Nizam, in case either of these powers were attacked by Tippoo.

After the peace of Seringapatam, in 1792, the Marhattas attacked the Nizam, and the war ended by a peace or capitulation concluded at Kurlah, by which the Nizam ceded half his territories, placed the remainder under the influence of the Marhattas, paid a large sum of money, gave up his minister as a prisoner, and appointed other ministers nominated by the Marhattas. Shortly after this peace the Peshwah, Mahdoo Rao Narain, died. A contest ensued among the different Marhatta chiefs for the succession to the office of Peshwah, and the possession of the influence and power of the government, which, after various success, ended in the establishment of the present Peshwah, Bajee Rao, and the possession of all the power and influence of the government by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

This chief already had, by right of succession to his relative Madajee Scindiah, all the Marhatta territories in Hindustan, situated between the river Nerbudda and Taptee, and the Ganges and Indus. The principal support and instrument of his government was an army disciplined and commanded by French officers, with a formidable train of artillery; and, by his influence at Poonah, he had now acquired that part of the power of the Marhatta government which was not already in his hands.



This was the general state of Marhatta affairs in the year 1798, when Marquis Wellesley assumed the government. But this power of Scindiah's was by no means consolidated. A formidable rebellion prevailed in his territories north of the Nerbudda, which was directed and encouraged by the female relations of his predecessor: and the confusion in the southern parts of the Empire which had attended the progress of the contest for the possession of the power at Poonah, had not subsided upon its establishment in the hands of Scindiah.

Besides these causes of disquietude, Scindiah was not uninterested in the invasion of India by Zemaun Shah, at that time expected. The first effects of that invasion would have been felt by Scindiah; and his only hope of safety was in the assistance which he might derive from the British government.

It appears that, from this state of affairs, the Governor General, Marquis Wellesley, endeavored to derive additional strength and security to every part of the British Empire in India. His first object was to procure the assistance of the Peshwah in the war against Tippoo Sultaun, which was impending, according to the stipulations of the Treaty of Triple Alliance; and with this view he endeavored first to prevail upon Scindiah to return to Hindustan for the protection of his northern frontier against Zemaun Shah; and secondly, he acquainted the Peshwah with the course of measures he was pursuing for the restoration of the power and activity of the other party to the alliance, the Nizam; and offered to adopt similar measures for the establishment and support of the power of the Peshwah.

With the object of obtaining the assistance of the Marhattas in the war against Tippoo, was connected another equally important to the permanent interests of Great Britain in India. I have already related the effect which the existence of the Marhatta claims upon the Nizam, and the mode in which they had been enforced, had produced upon the strength of his Highness' government, and upon the general strength and efficiency of the Triple Alliance formed against Tippoo Sultaun, in 1798.

In the view which the British government must have taken of the probable issue of their discussions with Tippoo in 1798, they naturally considered the continuance of that alliance and the strength of all the parties to it as essential to the preservation of the peace of India; and in any event, even if they could have anticipated that which occurred in May, 1799, they must have considered the security of the Nizam's government to be essential to the peace and security of the British territories in the peninsula of India.

The propositions made to the Peshwah, with a view to obtain his assistance in the war, were accompanied by offers to arbitrate in the Marhatta claims on the Nizam, and were attended by a negotiation with Scindiah, to induce him to return to his territories in Hindustan, for their defence against the invasion of Zemaun Shah.

The influence of Scindiah, however, occasioned the failure of this negotiation, and the war against Tippoo was carried on and concluded without the assistance of the Peshwah.

After this event, which ended in the death of Tippoo, the destruction of his power, and the transfer of it to the British government and the allies,

the principal object of the Triple Alliance of course existed no longer. The other objects of the alliance with the Peshwah, viz., the independence of his power in relation to Scindiah, and the arbitration and settlement of the Marhatta claims in his name on the government of the Nizam, still existed. The British government therefore repeated the offers which it had made to the Peshwah, accompanied by others, to allow his Highness to participate in the advantages resulting from the war, which were likewise rejected by the influence of Scindiah.

The negotiation was renewed by the Peshwah at different periods, particularly in the year 1800, when his power and the safety of his person were threatened by Scindiah; but their object was always defeated by the influence and violence of that chief, and by the apprehension of the Peshwah of their effects in the period which must elapse between the moment in which Scindiah might become acquainted with the negotiation and that at which the British troops would be in a position to protect the Peshwah.

At length the confusion which had existed in the northern parts of Scindiah's territories from the period of the death of Mahdajee Scindiah, came to a crisis towards the close of the year 1800, which drew Scindiah's attention, and required his presence in that quarter; and here commenced a new scene in Marhatta affairs, which led immediately to the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent transactions in which the British government have been engaged.

It has already been noticed that the female relations of the predecessor of Dowlut Rao Scindiah were at the head of a party in Hindustan, who were in rebellion against the authority of Scindiah's government. When the contest had lasted for some time, the Marhatta chief, Tuckajee Holkar, who had been next in rank and power to Scindiah, died in the year 1797; and the sons of that chief came to Poonah to arrange with the Peshwah the succession of one of them to the territories of their father. Scindiah's objects in this arrangement were to procure the succession for Cashee Rao Holkar, the legitimate son most likely to favor the pretensions and objects of Scindiah in the Marhatta Empire. The wishes of the family were for Mulhar Rao Holkar, with whom were connected his illegitimate brothers, Jeswunt Rao Holkar and Vittojee Rao Holkar.

While the negotiations were going on at Poonah between these different branches of the Holkar family and the Peshwah, Scindiah, on the night of the Sept. 1797, attacked the camp of Mulhar Rao Holkar, put him to death, seized his widow, and dispersed all his adherents, including his illegitimate brother. Vittojee Rao Holkar was soon afterwards taken in rebellion against the Peshwah, and was put to death at Poonah. Jeswunt Rao Holkar fled first to Hyderabad, and then to Nagpoor, the capital of the Rajah of Berar, where, by the influence of Scindiah, he was put in confinement; and, after a short time, having made his escape from Nagpoor, he fled into Hindustan, where he joined the army of the rebels against the authority of Scindiah's government, assembled under the influence of the female relations of his predecessor. In a short time Holkar acquired considerable influence in the councils and the army of these females, which he soon turned to his own advantage; and he suddenly attacked and plundered them, and placed himself at the head of their

troops. He then increased his forces to the utmost extent that was practicable, and on the 17th and 18th July, 1801, made an attack upon a large detachment of Scindiah's regular infantry stationed at Ougein, the capital of Scindiah's government, which detachment he defeated with great slaughter, particularly of their European officers; and he plundered the city of Ougein. This event drew Scindiah's serious attention to the situation of affairs in Hindustan; and he removed from Poonah with his army in the month of Dec. 1800. His agents, however, still conducted the operations of the Peshwah's government. His Highness' prime minister had been appointed by Scindiah; and, although his Highness' person and his councils were in some degree relieved from the previous constraint under which they had labored for some years, no act of the government could be carried into execution without the consent of Scindiah's servants.

When Scindiah arrived in Hindustan with his army the contest between him and Holkar continued with increased violence; and at length Holkar was defeated in a great battle, which was fought at Indore, the capital of the possessions of the Holkar family, on the . . . . . After this battle, Holkar was obliged to withdraw from Hindustan into the hilly countries between the Nerbudda and the Taptee, into which Scindiah was unable to carry the war, as his attention was still taken up by the settlement of his government in the north of Hindustan, and his armies were not reunited sufficiently from the loss sustained in the different battles which had been fought. Holkar took advantage of this respite to carry the war across the Taptee into the Peshwah's country. In the course of the year 1802 he had several engagements with the Peshwah's troops in Candeish and on the Godavery, in which he was uniformly successful, and at length, in the month of October, 1802, he approached Poonah. Scindiah had sent a small detachment of his regular infantry and a body of cavalry to join the remnant of the Peshwah's army; and on the 25th October, 1802, a great battle was fought between these armies, almost within sight of the city of Poonah, which ended in the complete defeat of the troops of the Peshwah and Scindiah. After this battle the Peshwah fled from Poonah into the Konkan, or low country on the sea-coast between Bombay and Goa. Having been pursued by Holkar's troops, he embarked at Severndroog, on board a ship which was sent from Bombay for his accommodation, and he arrived at Bassein, opposite to the Island of Salsette, on the 16th Dec.; and Holkar remained in possession of the authority of the government of Poonah.

During the progress of Holkar in his invasion of the Peshwah's territories, his Highness the Peshwah renewed the negotiations, which had been so frequently broken off, for the assistance of the British government. These negotiations, however, were not brought to a close on the day of the battle near Poonah; and after the result of that day was known, and immediately previous to his flight, his Highness signed a paper, by which he engaged to perform all the material stipulations required by the British government as the conditions on which they would consent to give him the assistance for which he asked. These were, principally, that his Highness would allot a territorial security for the payment of the troops which the Company would detach into his country; that those troops should

occupy a position within his territories; that the Company should arbitrate on the differences between him and the Nizam; and that the Peshwah should not enter into any treaty or correspondence with any foreign power excepting with the knowledge and consent of the Company.\*

When the Governor General received this paper from Poonah, it was necessary that he should revise all the proceedings in the negotiations at Poonah, and all the reasonings which had led to and operated upon them; and that he should decide according to the new appearance which affairs had taken in the Marhatta Empire since the late revolution.

The principle on which the negotiations at Poonah had turned since the death of Tippoo Sultaun, on the 4th May, 1799, had been, the necessity of introducing the arbitration of the British government in the disputes and claims which existed between the Peshwah and the Nizam. It was obvious that unless the British government should interfere, the Nizam must fall under the power of the Marhattas; and for this reason the treaty of 1798 with the Nizam had been made generally defensive against all powers whatever by the treaty of October, 1800. When this treaty was concluded there existed a necessity for continuing to urge the Peshwah to admit of the arbitration of the British government in the Marhatta claims; or the British government must have been prepared for, and must have expected, war with the Marhatta nation, whenever these claims should be made, and the Marhattas should find themselves in a condition to enforce them. The attainment of this political object, therefore, was the only one likely to insure the peace of the Peninsula of India.

The introduction of the British troops into the Peshwah's territories was a mere military question, and turned exactly upon the chance of being able to support the Peshwah's power, and of giving him sufficient authority in his own government to enable him to perform his treaty with the Company in favor of the Nizam.

The cession of territory for subsidy was the best mode of avoiding the disputes and inconvenience which had invariably attended these subsidiary alliances in other instances; and the article respecting the intercourse of the Peshwah with foreign states was rendered necessary by the nature of the constitution of the two governments, the alliances by which each was bound, and the laws which regulated their intercourse with foreign states. The necessity for this connexion with the head of the Marhatta Empire was rather increased by the successful invasion of the Peshwah's territories, and by the usurpation of his Highness' authority by Jeswunt Rao Holkar; and the circumstances which existed at the close of the year 1802, and in the commencement of 1803, afforded the fairest prospect of effecting this great object without hostilities.

Immediately after the flight of the Peshwah from Poonah, Holkar took upon himself the government of the Peshwah's territories; but finding that this arrangement was not popular, and gave offence to the chiefs in the southern parts of the Empire, he appointed the son of Amrut Rao, who was the adopted son of the father of the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, to be the new Peshwah; and Amrut Rao to be his minister, and himself to be the

\* See the treaty of Bassein.

head of his armies. He endeavored to obtain the consent and acknowledgment of the Nizam and of the British government to this arrangement; and while the negotiations were going on upon this subject, it is well known that he was collecting about his person all the pretenders to authority, and the disaffected subjects of the Company and their allies, that could be found; and he was preparing the documents on which he intended to found the vexatious claims of the Marhatta government on the Nizam, the territories of Mysore and Arcot. He was at the same time urging the British government to acknowledge his new dynasty at Poonah, and to interfere in the settlement of the Marhatta affairs. Scindiah, who had been informed by the Governor General of the progress of the Peshwah's negotiations with the British government in the year 1802, and who must have been aware of the engagement which the Peshwah had signed upon his departure from Poonah, earnestly urged the British government to interfere in the Marhatta affairs, as the only mode of settling their actual confusion.

The animosity between Scindiah and Holkar still existed with the greatest violence; and in the operations which must be carried on to relieve the Peshwah and to restore his authority, there was every reason to expect that Holkar would find himself exposed singly to the hostility of all the great powers in India, and that he would withdraw from the Peshwah's territories.

Orders were therefore issued for the conclusion of a treaty with the Peshwah, upon the basis of the paper which had been delivered by his Highness to the Resident at Poonah on the day preceding his flight; and the treaty was concluded accordingly on the 31st Dec. 1802. Scindiah's minister, who, as was before related, was the Peshwah's dewan, was privy to the whole transaction; and he, on the part of Scindiah, and , on the part of Cashee Rao Holkar, engaged to make good to the Peshwah a part of the expense which he should incur in procuring the interference and assistance of the British government.

The treaty having been concluded on the 31st Dec. 1802, and all the preparatory arrangements made, the British troops marched from the frontiers of Mysore on the 12th March. They were joined on their march by the principal of the Marhatta chiefs and of the Peshwah's officers in the southern parts of the Marhatta Empire. The detachments of Holkar's army, which had been upon the Kistna and Godavery, successively fell back; and the British troops formed a junction with the Nizam's army and the subsidiary British troops in his Highness' service on the 15th April, within 100 miles of Poonah. Nearly about the same time Holkar withdrew from Poonah to the northward; and left that city to be occupied by the British army. A communication was immediately opened with the Peshwah, who was at Bassein, under the protection of a detachment of the army of Bombay; and his Highness entered Poonah and took upon himself the government of his country on the 13th May.

In this manner this great arrangement was effected without the loss of a man. By a skilful and ready application of the forces and resources of the government, and by taking advantage of opportunities, the ally of the

Company was restored to his dignity and to the exercise of his authority ; the usurpation of a most rapacious freebooter was destroyed ; and this dangerous neighbour was removed from the frontier of the Company's allies. At the same time an arrangement was made which was calculated to preserve peace between the Company's allies, to secure the weak government against the unjust claims of the strong ; and, by preserving all in the relative situation in which they were at the moment the arrangement was made, to strengthen all the powers of India against the attacks of a foreign invader, and to secure its internal tranquillity.

From the knowledge which the British government possessed that Scindiah was aware of all the circumstances of the negotiations which the Peshwah was carrying on, that he had earnestly desired their interference in the Marhatta affairs, and, above all, because he must have known that they had acquired a most formidable position for their armies in the Peninsula, of which nothing could deprive them excepting great military success, it was confidently expected that this arrangement would not have occasioned any subsequent hostilities.

But these were not the only grounds on which this expectation of the continuance of peace was founded. Scindiah had, in point of fact, no right to interfere in an arrangement between the Company and the Peshwah, particularly in one concluded under all the circumstances which had attended the treaty of Bassein.

The Marhatta Empire has at times been considered as an institution, in some degree, of the same description with the Empire of Germany ; at others it has been considered as the union of a number of chiefs possessing territory and power, acknowledging the Peshwah as their nominal head ; and at others, the Peshwah has been considered as the real head of a government of which Scindiah and others were only the powerful officers. Arguments have been drawn from the supposed existence of all these imaginary forms of government to prove that the Peshwah had no right to enter into the treaty of Bassein, without the consent of Scindiah and other chiefs of the Marhatta Empire.

Admitting the existence of all, or any, of these forms of government (and excepting the similarity to the Empire of Germany, all have in reality existed at different periods of the Marhatta history), the fact is, and cannot be denied, that the Peshwah has frequently made treaties, not only to which none of the Marhatta chiefs consented, but to which some of them objected. For instance, the Treaty of Triple Alliance, in 1798, was objected to by Mahdajee Scindiah and Tukajee Holkar. The treaty of peace in 1792, at Seringapatam, and of partition, was not consented to by any of the Marhatta chiefs. But if it be true that the Peshwah, who is acknowledged by those who reason upon all these different forms of government to be either the real or the nominal head of what is commonly called the Empire, cannot make a treaty without the consent of Scindiah and the other chiefs, it may be presumed that Scindiah and the other chiefs, who are supposed to be of the second rank, cannot make a treaty without the consent of the Peshwah. How is this fact? They make war and peace in their own names against whom they please, when they please, and as they please ; and never use the Peshwah's name, or

refer to its authority, excepting as a last subterfuge in the discussions which may attend their negotiations. In point of fact, Scindiah, instead of being a powerful subject, and in that light a party to be consulted in an agreement to be entered into by the Peshwah with the British government, was himself the guarantee of the treaty of Salbye between the same parties.

In this very capacity of guarantee of a treaty he must have been considered, and must have been, in fact, independent of the two powers contracting it. Before he became a guarantee, the history of those times shows that he was independent of the Peshwah. But this very act of guarantee has always been considered important in India, particularly by the Native politicians, as it afforded complete evidence of the division of the Marhatta power.

The hopes of the continuance of peace, then, were founded as well upon the right of the Peshwah to conclude the treaty of Bassein, as upon the circumstances which attended its negotiation and its execution.

A new party, however, came forward upon this occasion, through whose means and by whose exertions a peace was patched up between Scindiah and Holkar, on which was founded a confederacy against the British government.

The Rajah of Berar had not been engaged in hostilities since the year 1780, when he had marched to the British frontier of Bengal, and had received a sum of money to desist from his hostilities, excepting during the short campaign of 1795, in which he had co-operated with the other Marhattas against the Nizam. He was the oldest of the chiefs of the present day, and was renowned among them for his wisdom and political knowledge and skill. He had claims upon the power of the state of Poona, from his relationship to the Rajahs of Sattarah; and he was known to have entertained serious designs of forming an union of all the Marhatta powers against the British government.

When he perceived the advantage which the British government had taken of the existence of the disputes among the Marhatta chiefs, he saw that he must become the victim of the arrangement. Holkar had been obliged to retire to the northward in front of the British troops; but he could not venture to cross the Taptee, as he would then have been exposed to Scindiah's hostility. Holkar would have been unwilling to discharge his army; he could not remain in the Peshwah's territories, or invade those of the Nizam; and his only resource to provide for their subsistence would have been to enter Berar.

The Rajah, who clearly perceived this consequence (and who has since acknowledged this motive for his conduct), determined to endeavor to organise a confederacy of the Marhattas against the British government.

Whatever might have been the claim of Scindiah to the possession of the power of the Peshwah's government, and the degree of encouragement he gave to the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, there is no doubt that he lost solid power by the arrangement, which he could not hope to recover. He had nothing to gain by the continuance of hostilities against Holkar; and the sacrifices which he made, and which he intended should be only nominal, were more than compensated by the advantages which he hoped

to acquire from the confederacy, in which, from the efficiency and the general state of his power, he must act the principal part. Holkar could hope nothing from the continuance of his hostilities with Scindiah. The latter had driven him from Hindustan; and in the course of the years 1801, 1802, in which he had settled his government in the northern parts of India, he had acquired additional strength which he could apply in his contest with Holkar, if it should continue.

A combination of all the Marhatta chiefs, with their forces, had long been an object with the Marhatta politicians; and the plan flattered the national vanity, although it was impracticable, unless attended by great and important military successes at its outset. The Rajah of Berar, therefore, succeeded in patching up a peace between Scindiah and Holkar, none of the important articles of which were performed by either party.\*

Before I proceed to the relation of the events which followed the treaty of Bassein, it will be proper to discuss the justice and policy of the British government in entering into the treaty of Bassein, on the ground that they must have expected the event which followed it.

I have already pointed out the objects of the treaty, the favorable circumstances under which it was negotiated, and the probability which existed that its arrangements would be carried into execution without a war, and that it would secure the permanent peace of India. But the faithless nature of the Marhatta character, and the habits of the councils of all the chiefs, are so well known, that it may be admitted that the British government ought to have contemplated the chance of a confederacy of the Marhatta chiefs to oppose the arrangement.

Considering the nature of the materials of which that confederacy was to be formed; that the two most powerful of the chiefs entertained the most rooted and inveterate animosity against each other; that after they had signed their treaty of peace their hostilities continued, and they could not trust each other so far as to place their armies within reach of attack; that none of the chiefs trusted the other; and that the pride of all prevented them from placing the management of the affairs and the command of the armies of the confederacy in the hands of one; the British government had but little to apprehend from this confederacy, provided vigorous measures were adopted at an early period of time to oppose it effectually, and to prevent it from acquiring strength and consistency by success.

The arrangements which had been made by Lord Wellesley, viz. the treaty with the Nabob of Oude, the treaty with the Guickwar, the arrangement at Surat, the arrangements in Mysore, the treaty with the Nizam, of October, 1800, and, above all, the treaty of Bassein, afforded the most efficient means of opposing the confederacy with success. If the troops did their duty with their usual bravery, its early dissolution became certain; and by the advanced position in which the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein placed the British troops, the evils of the war would be removed to a distance from the British territories, the seat of the resources of the government.

\* *Insert the treaty between Scindiah and Holkar.*



But it is not clear that the omission to conclude the treaty of Bassein would not have led equally to a war with all the powers of the confederated Marhatta states, under circumstances of increased disadvantage. The removal of Holkar from Poonah was absolutely necessary on every ground of justice, policy, and good faith; and if the treaty of Bassein had not been made, the British government must have aided Scindiah in effecting that object. Holkar's armies would have been defeated, and the power of his rival, Scindiah, would have been established in full vigor at Poonah. He would thus again have been in possession of all the Marhatta power from the Ganges and the Indus to the Toombuddra; and his situation would have been so far more advantageous, as in the course of the years 1801 and 1802 he had overcome the rebellion which had till then prevailed in his northern dominions, and had completely established the authority of his own government in those rich countries. His first demand would have been upon the Nizam; and here at once the Company would have come in contact with a Marhatta confederacy, but under very different circumstances of strength from that with which they were engaged in 1803. In this contest Scindiah would have been really, as well as nominally, at the head of the confederacy; he would have had no rival, or rather actual enemy, in Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and would have been able to direct all his forces against the British government. He would have had on his side, instead of against him, all the strength of the Peshwah, including, what is of no small importance, all the strength of the southern chiefs situated on the frontier of Mysore. The Company, on the other hand, would have been obliged to engage with this more formidable confederacy with diminished means and resources, as they would not have had the Peshwah and the southern chiefs on their side. But their principal loss would have been the position for their armies which the treaty of Bassein gave them. By adopting this position in the Deccan in 1803, the armies were enabled immediately to render offensive the operations of a war which had been undertaken solely for defence. In the war which must have been expected if the treaty of Bassein had not been concluded, the operations must have been defensive upon a frontier extending above a thousand miles, assailable in all its parts; and the seat of the war would have been either the heart of the territories of the Nizam, or those of the Rajah of Mysore.

Upon the whole, then, I conclude that the treaty of Bassein was a wise, just, and politic measure; that none of the chiefs had any right to interfere in it or question its stipulations; and that it was concluded under circumstances and at a time which promised that it would be followed by lasting tranquillity. If it should be contended that the British government ought to have expected, as a consequence of the treaty, the confederacy and war which happened in 1803, I answer that, with the military and political advantages they acquired by the treaty of Bassein, they had nothing to fear from that confederacy; and that if they had not concluded the treaty of Bassein they would in a few months afterwards have been involved in a war with the same power, much increased in strength and resources, and possessing superior advantages, while those of the Company, in every point of view, would have been diminished. As soon as

the British government was made acquainted with the measures which had been adopted by the Rajah of Berar to arrange a confederacy of the Marhatta chiefs against the Company, the Governor General directed that measures should be taken to make the Rajah of Berar and Holkar acquainted with the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, and to point out to all the chiefs the innocent and defensive nature of the treaty, and the arrangement contained in the article which provided for the security of all their rights. They were at the same time called upon to declare the nature and object of their negotiations, and their views in marching to join each other in a station at so great a distance from the Nizam's frontier. In answer to these representations, Scindiah declared that he could not say whether there would be peace or war till he should meet the Rajah of Berar. After Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had joined their troops in a position which enabled them in one march to enter the Nizam's territories, letters were presented to them from the Governor General, in which the nature and objects of the treaty of Bassein were fully discussed and explained. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar wrote the following answers to these letters.\* In the mean time the peace between Scindiah and Holkar had been signed, although but one article of it had been carried into execution, viz. that which stipulated that Hindoo Rao Holkar, the infant and posthumous son of Mulhar Rao Holkar, should be delivered over by Scindiah to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The object of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in writing these answers to the Governor General's letter was to gain time, to allow the season of the rains to pass over, to conciliate the confidence and receive the co-operation of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to complete their preparations for attack on all parts of the frontier of the Company and the allies. Early measures, however, had been adopted by the British government to resist their hostilities, and their armies were completely prepared in the middle of July, 1803. It was an object of importance to bring the confederates to a decision whether there should be peace or war, before the season of the rains should pass over, before they should have time to complete their preparations, and to conciliate the confidence of Holkar. Accordingly the following letter† was written to them by the commanding officer in the Deccan, in answer to their letters to the Governor General. They refused to comply with the reasonable demand contained in this letter, and the British Resident quitted the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 3rd Aug. and hostilities immediately commenced.

It is useless to follow the operations of the British armies. It is sufficient to state, that, owing to the preparations which were made, the positions which they had taken, and the favorable season in which the military operations were commenced, they were uniformly successful; and the result was, the early dissolution of the confederacy, in which Holkar never joined, and that in less than 2 months the confederates sued for peace.‡

Treaties were concluded with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in the

\* *Insert the answers.* (See the Wellesley Dispatches, vol. iii. p. 250.)

† *Insert this letter* (14th July, 1803, see p. 351).

‡ *See the treaties.*

end of December, 1803, by which the allies gained an acknowledgment of the treaty of Bassein. The Company acquired from the Rajah of Berar the district of Cantlack, &c., by which they insured the defence of a weak part of the frontier of Bengal, and the continuity of their possessions, and the certainty of a communication at all times between the presidency of Fort William and Fort St. George. On the north west frontier they acquired from Scindiah all his possessions on both banks of the Jumna; by which they got that river for a frontier, and secured its navigation, an object of infinite importance to the commerce of that part of the country. They also acquired from Scindiah the town, port, and territory of Baroach, in Guzerat, by which they secured the government of the Guickwar, and all the Company's interests in that quarter. Scindiah was also obliged to relinquish the influence which he had exercised over the person and power of the Mogul; and to admit the independence of all the petty states in the north of India, who, during the war, had connected themselves by treaty with the Company. By this arrangement, which affected the Rajpoot state of Jeypoor, and all the petty Rajahs to the northward of that state, the Marhattas were removed to a distance from the Company's frontier, which was surrounded and guarded by these petty states.

The Nizam acquired by these treaties an exemption from all demands of all descriptions on his territories by the confederates. He also acquired on the side of Scindiah a defined boundary, and all the territories belonging to Scindiah which were within that boundary.

From the Rajah of Berar, the Nizam acquired the province of Berar, with the river Wurda and the hills to the northward as a frontier; by which cession he gained an addition of revenue amounting to £800,000 annually.

The Peshwah acquired from Scindiah the fort and territory of Ahmednuggur, and, by an arrangement made with Amrut Rao at the commencement of the war, he had acquired the jaghire of this chief upon the Godavery. By these arrangements his territories became compact; the city of Poonah was rendered more secure, and the pretext of posting troops in the neighbourhood for the purpose of collecting the revenues of territories in that quarter was annihilated.

Besides these advantages acquired by each of the allies by this war, the British government destroyed entirely the corps in the service of the enemy, which was commanded and officered by Frenchmen, and took from them not less than 823 pieces of ordnance. The advantages resulting from these military successes will be best understood by reflecting on the difficulties and losses sustained in gaining them, and on the reputation for bravery and other military qualities acquired by our officers and troops.

During this war with the confederacy the conduct of Holkar had been rather favorable than otherwise to the British government. This chief had employed his army in levying contributions in the countries under the government of Scindiah situated north of the Nerbudda, and in endeavors to establish the authority of his infant nephew in the jaghire of the Holkar family. When Scindiah was obliged to collect a body of

troops at Ougein, in consequence of the progress made by the army in Guzerat towards that capital, Holkar proceeded to the northward, and began to plunder the Rajpoot states. Shortly afterwards, peace was concluded between the British government and the other members of the confederacy.

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# A P P E N D I X

TO THE

## FIRST AND SECOND VOLUMES.

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THE FOLLOWING LETTERS, THE DRAFTS OF WHICH WERE FOUND ACCIDENTALLY,  
BUT TOO LATE FOR INSERTION IN THE ORDER OF THEIR DATES, ARE MARKED  
WITH THE NUMBER OF THE PAGE TO WHICH EACH IN POINT OF DATE  
SHOULD HAVE BEEN PLACED.



# APPENDIX

## TO THE

### FIRST AND SECOND VOLUMES.

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#### INDIA.

[*The following letters, the drafts of which were found accidentally, but too late for insertion in the order of their dates, are marked with the number of the page to which each in point of date should have been placed.*]

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 71).

Seringapatam, 27th Feb. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 18th inst., and I have the honor to enclose a return of bullocks on detachment, and not in the Mysore country. I enclose an indent for wooden horses.

To the Adjutant General (p. 71).

Seringapatam, 27th Feb. 1800.

I enclose the proceedings of the Committee which sat at Chittledroog on the remount horses. Col. Stevenson has been ordered to send off those chosen for the dragoons; and as soon as I hear that they have left Chittledroog, I will apprise you of it. There has been a mistake in the manner of choosing the horses: according to the mode directed in your letter of the 30th Jan., the 2d and 4th regts. would have been completed, the former with 59, the other with 17; the 2d regt. has now only 54. I have desired Col. Stevenson, out of the lots which have arrived lately at Chittledroog, to complete the 1st and 2d regts. to the numbers ordered in your letter of the 30th Jan., and to have the remaining horses taken care of until further directions respecting them should arrive at head quarters.

To J. Webbe, Esq., Sec. of Gov. (p. 71).

Seringapatam, 28th Feb. 1800.

I have received a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, from Col. Sartorius; and Col. Close has likewise received one, a copy of which he has enclosed to Lord Clive. From both it appears that the Pyche Rajah is possessed of Cotiote, so that our job will be heavier than was at first imagined. The answer to the letter which I wrote to Col. Sartorius on the 26th will throw more light upon the subject, and will enable me to write more particularly to government. In the mean time, it is proper that I should inform you, that by the accounts I have received of the time at which the rains usually commence in Wynaad, I am afraid that we shall be hard pressed for time. I understand that the rivers and nullahs begin to fill in April. If Sartorius is not to be ready till the 20th March, we shall not be able to do much, or any thing effectual, before the rains begin; but if he should be obliged to adopt the longer route of the Tambercherry ghaut, and to make a preparation in consequence, which is to detain his detachment till the beginning of April, there is no doubt but that we shall be too late; and in either case, in order to complete the settlement of the country, and finally to establish the Company's authority, it will be necessary to detach a force into Wynaad

again in the next season. It is true that my detachment being collected and prepared to march, I might alone move into Wynnad immediately. I am strong enough, and I should have more time to complete the settlement of that country. But the Rajah would then go into Cotiote. We must equally operate upon him from both sides in the next season; and as the possession of Wynnad is no object, excepting to establish the Company's authority, it may be a question whether it is not better to leave him undisturbed in Wynnad until an opportunity offers in the next season of rooting, not only him from Wynnad and Cotiote, but all other blackguards of the same kind who are in opposition to the government, and bullying the Company's servants on the Malabar coast. For this purpose I would form, both here and below, strong detachments in the month of October, when the rivers fall; and they ought to be pursued as long as there is a man in arms, or a stronghold unexplored. My idea is, that we shall not be able to effect, in this season, all that is to be done; that we must take the field again in the next; that, in the mean time, the Pyche Rajah will murder and plunder in Cotiote; and, therefore, that we shall do well to defer any operation until we can do all that is necessary. Col. Close is of my opinion; but Sartorius's answer to my letter, and further information respecting the season, will enable us to write our opinions fully to government. In the mean time, I am prepared to march as soon as I hear that the Bombay troops are collected and equipped. I write to you now to open the subject, and that you may have time to consider of it.

To the Adjutant General (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 1st March, 1800.

I have heard from Col. Stevenson that the horses for the European dragoons have left Chittledroog, and I have given directions to the officer commanding the cavalry at Bangalore to forward them without delay. Two more lots of horses have arrived at Chittledroog.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 1st March, 1800.

I enclose a letter from Major Cuppage, and a report of provision stores in Nundydroog.

To Lieut. Col. Montresor (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 2d March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 26th Feb. The appointment to commands under the government of Fort St. George in time of peace is a matter of patronage in the hands solely of the Governor, and is a subject of great jealousy and deliaey. Like all other patronage under similar circumstances, it is frequently bestowed upon those who are, perhaps, not the most deserving of it; and the successful candidates sometimes owe their good fortune to the influence of their friends rather than to their own merit. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to point out what line you ought to follow, in order to obtain for your services that attention which they deserve. A public application through me, which is the most natural line, might be deemed improper, and might fail in producing the object for which you might make it. I know that, under former governments, it would have done so; and one from yourself to the Governor would be unpleasant to you, and might be equally

unsuccessful. I therefore propose to write privately to Lord Clive to state your services, and the situation which you left when removed into Mysore, and to inform him that you have communicated to me your wishes to have a separate command. Although I don't promise entire success from this measure, it will bring you forward to Lord Clive's notice; and his desire to pay attention to officers whose services deserve it, may induce him to place you in a situation which will be agreeable to you. I have this day written to Lord Clive.

To the Adjutant General (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 3d March, 1800.

I enclose two letters from Col. Stevenson, which I beg you will lay before the Commander in Chief. I have sent leave to Capt. Lindsay to proceed to the Carnatic.

To Capt. Grant (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 3d March, 1800.

I enclose an extract of a letter from the Military Board, and an extract of orders alluded to therein, which you will be so kind as to observe.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 3d March, 1800.

Having transmitted to the Military Board your letter of the 15th Feb., I have received from them an answer, in which they state that 'they do not think it necessary to authorise the adoption of the measure proposed in it, but recommend that the paddy in question may be sold at a rate somewhat below the market price, as the most likely means of disposing of it.' To this I beg that you will pay attention.

To Capt. Macintire (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 3d March, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the acting President of the Committee for the valuation of captured stores.

To Capt. Crawford, Madras artillery (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 3d March, 1800.

Having forwarded to the Military Board an application from Lieut. Col. Saxon, the President of the Committee for the valuation of the captured military stores, for permission to destroy certain powder which he had proved, and was found unserviceable, I have been authorised by them to direct that such of the damaged powder as can be turned to no purpose whatever may be destroyed, and written off the books and returns, and you will be so kind as to give orders that it may be destroyed accordingly.

To the Adjutant General (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 4th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter from Col. Pater, in which he requests that certain officers who have lately joined the 2d regt. of Native cavalry may be permitted to take one horse each out of the lot destined for that corps. Lieut. Fortnam has been sick since the prize guard was discontinued, and he is still so; but I hope he will soon be sufficiently recovered to join his corps.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 4th March, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose returns of stores at Nundydroog and Goorybunda, which I have received from Major Cuppage.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 5th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 12th Feb. On the 9th of last month the intentions of government respecting Wynaad were communicated to me; and such has been the exertion of the officers and departments of this country, and the readiness of its resources, that a detachment sufficient to obtain the object proposed (provided it should be assisted by one from the Malabar coast) was collected here on the 26th Feb., and in readiness to move. They are not yet prepared to move at Cannanore, and I don't expect that they will be so till towards the end of this month; and their detachment is necessarily so small, that it appears, by Col. Sartorius's letter, it will not be safe to attempt to enter Wynaad by the Cotiote district, which he says is possessed by the Pyche Rajah.

I have made many inquiries, and have received the best information, regarding the season and the nature of the country. It appears that in Wynaad it begins to rain in general at the Hooly feast; that it continues showery, and that the showers become gradually more frequent till the middle of April, when the rains become violent, and the nullahs fill. The country in general is jungly, with many open spots; the road not so: so that I should have no apprehensions of want of success, if the government of Fort St. George, considering the advanced state of the season, the probability of the speedy approach of the rains and the swelling of the rivers, and the delay in the preparations of the Malabar detachment, think it proper to order that my detachment should enter Wynaad alone.

The reasons, however, which I have communicated to Sydenham, in a letter which he will most probably show to you, induce me to believe that the wisest plan will be to defer all operations in Wynaad till after the rains. These are, the impossibility of obtaining complete success against the Pyche Rajah without the co-operation of a detachment from Malabar; the probability that the season will be too far advanced to be able to do any thing, before that detachment will be prepared to move; the certainty of opposition on the part of the Pyche Rajah; and the inefficacy, and even dangerous consequences, to be apprehended from the partial success in Wynaad of my detachment acting alone. If I was to march to-morrow, I could do no more than establish a post in Wynaad; and most probably my utmost exertions would not enable me to make a complete communication to it, before the rains would oblige me to quit the district. That post would not completely settle the country, or establish the Company's authority. I must return again in the next season, and in the mean time the Pyche Rajah will have had an opportunity, and, indeed, will be forced in his own defence, to burn, plunder, and destroy both Cotiote and Wynaad under the eye of my post. Upon the whole, therefore, I should recommend that all operations should be delayed until the plan of the Governor General can be put in execution. It will be unwise to attempt to establish the Company's authority if it cannot be done completely; and it cannot be done completely in Wynaad and Cotiote, unless two detachments formed in Mysore and Malabar co-operate. If the business should be delayed till the next season, the detachments, particularly that from Malabar, may be made



To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 6th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter from Lieut. Col. Moneyppemy. The buildings stated in the report of the Committee, which assembled on the 14th Dec., are essentially necessary; and the absence of the pioneers will render it impossible to complete them, excepting an order on the subject is given by the Military Board.

To the Adjutant General (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 6th March, 1800.

I enclose some letters which I have received from Col. Stevenson, and I request that you will lay them before the Commander in Chief.

To Lieut. Stevenson (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 7th March, 1800.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your different letters. The intelligence which you have sent me has been the earliest that has been received, and has been proved, by subsequent accounts from other quarters, to be well founded. I shall, therefore, be obliged to you for a continuance of your letters. I have given the bill for the coolies employed in the removal of the hospital, and the proceedings of the committee which you transmitted, to Mr. Gordon, the paymaster; and he will send orders to his servant at Hulliball to pay you the amount. Any expense that you may find it necessary to incur to make the troops comfortable during the monsoon, will be allowed.

To the Adjutant General (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 7th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter from Col. Pater, which I beg you will lay before the Commander in Chief, and the discharge of Abdul Kawder, a trooper in the 2d regt. of cavalry. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Lieut. Knox, respecting Cossim Khan, a soubahdar of cavalry, with whom, and his long services and merits, the Commander in Chief and you must be acquainted. I hope that the conjecture of Lieut. Knox is well founded, and that there is a mistake in the copy of the proceedings of the committee, sent from your office.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 7th March, 1800.

I enclose the proceedings of a committee held on articles received from the Commissary of supply, and of a committee of survey on certain articles received as therein mentioned.

To Major Capper (p. 72).

Seringapatam, 7th March, 1800.

As a matter of accommodation to you, and in order to remove you from a situation which you did not deem pleasant, I put you in orders to take the command of Paughur; and that you might have with you your head quarters and those people belonging to your corps whom you might find useful, I ordered that a company of the 2d of the 4th regt. should proceed to Paughur. It was impossible to take from Major Cuppage the command of Nundydroog; and I requested your friend Capt. Grant to explain to you the relation in which that post stood with the detachments in the field, and the necessity there was in consequence that those detachments should report to, and should be under the orders of Major Cuppage. Under

these circumstances it was impossible to order that you might join and take the command of either of them. It appears, now, that you are desirous of remaining encamped in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog, with the force which you have now got with you. I have but one objection to that measure, which is, that if the troops are in camp they must be on batta; and as this expense, however trifling, will be incurred not on any public grounds, but for your accommodation, I am afraid it will be objected to by government. However, as it is not uncommon, particularly in this country at present, to encamp troops in the neighbourhood of large places, and not to put them on batta, provided that the sepoys, &c., clearly understand that they are not to receive it, I beg that you will encamp in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog in such situation as you may think proper, and I will send orders to Major Cuppage that he is not to consider the troops under your command as part of his garrison.

Upon looking over the return from the garrison of Nundydroog, I observe that you have taken out 300 men instead of one company: it is certainly desirable that you should have with you your staff, your drills and recruits; but as the public service may suffer from the weakness of the garrison of Nundydroog, I beg that, as you do not proceed to Paughur, you will send back all men fit for their duty excepting those whom it may be necessary to keep for the drills.

I purpose to recall the order appointing you to the command of Paughur.

To Major Gen. Brathwaite (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 8th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 4th, and I am happy to find that there is a prospect of carrying into execution your plan for the public service.

Col. Agnew will have made you acquainted with the reasons for which I thought it desirable that Major Capper should not go into the field in command of either of the detachments of his corps. Nundydroog is the point to which all the detachments acting against the polygars on the Nizam's frontier must look for support. If I had wished it, I could not deprive Major Cuppage of the command of Nundydroog; and if I had ordered Major Capper into the field, I must have made his detachment independent of Major Cuppage. This would have been a bad arrangement for the public service, as in the first place it would have deprived us of the advantage of having the general command of all the detachments acting in one district, and on one point, in the hands of one person; and next we should have lost the advantage of Major Cuppage's experience, who has been conducting that polygar business ever since the fall of Seringapatam. Under these circumstances I removed Major Capper to Paughur; but as that arrangement was made merely for his convenience, and as it appeared by his letters to his friend Capt. Grant and to me, that he preferred to remain encamped in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog, I have recalled the order which appointed him to the command of Paughur, and I have desired him to remain encamped in the neighbourhood of Nundydroog (not under the orders of Major Cuppage) until some other arrangement could be made, provided that it is understood by him and the sepoys that they do not get full batta. I imagine that government would object to paying this merely for his accommodation. As soon as the pro-

posed exchange of territory between the Company and the Rajah is finally concluded, I hope the country will become more settled, when I shall have it in my power to lessen Cuppage's command, and to make an arrangement which will be agreeable to Major Capper; and if, in the mean time, an opportunity of employing him offers, I will seize it. I recommended to him to go into Nundydroog again, and to wait with patience until an alteration of circumstances, which I have above explained to you, and which I explained to him, enabled me to make an arrangement which would be satisfactory to him; but since that, I understand that the two Majors have disagreed upon some trifling point, so that there is no chance of his doing that which would be most proper, and would, doubtless, in the end be most to his advantage.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 8th March, 1800.

I enclose a statement of the prices of different articles of grain and provisions in the fort and in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and a statement of a similar kind received from Major Cuppage at Nundydroog.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 8th March, 1800.

I enclose a copy of certain orders which I have issued, which will require the confirmation of government.

I likewise enclose a copy of a letter from Col. Stevenson, respecting carts for the garrison of Chittledroog.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 5th inst., to which I will send you a full reply in the course of to-morrow. It is of importance that your detachment should be as strong as possible in Europeans, and I therefore request that you will detain the battalion companies of the 75th, even if the flank companies should be sent from Mangalore in consequence of your requisition.

To the Adjutant General (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Sec. of Government, and copies of certain papers therein enclosed. I likewise enclose a letter from Col. Stevenson. I have desired him to make an arrangement for doing the duty of Fort Adjutant of Chittledroog, in such manner as he might find it most convenient, provided Lieut. Macintosh, who is absent only on account of his wounds, should not thereby be deprived of his allowances.

To Col. Stevenson (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

It is some time since I have been able to write to you, as my time is much occupied. I beg that you will be so kind as to make in your garrison such arrangement as you think proper for doing the duty of Fort Adjutant, provided that Lieut. Macintosh does not lose his allowances. You should get a book of regulations, for I am afraid that I trouble you very often with a return of your papers, not made out in the ordered form; but it is better that I should send them to you, than that they should be returned by the powers above (or rather below).

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

I enclose a survey report of tents belonging to the 77th regt., held at Chittledroog, a letter from Col. Stevenson, and certain indents for tents for the 2d of the 3d, and for the 77th regt., which I beg you will lay before the Military Board.

To Capt. Crawford, Madras artillery (p. 73).

Seringapatam, 9th March, 1800.

Having received the proof report of powder made this morning, it appears to me that the powder in magazines No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, and No. 5, is of no use whatever, and ought to be destroyed, according to the orders of the Military Board. That in No. 4 may be kept, and will be useful for salutes, &c., and blank practice.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 74).

Seringapatam, 10th March, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the Resident in Mysore, respecting arms and accoutrements for the use of the Rajah's infantry. The papers which are already before the Military Board will show that there are but a small number of serviceable arms in store, and these are captured property. But there are above 13,000 stand of repairable English arms, likewise captured property; and if the Board see no objection, the number required of these may be issued. I have informed Lieut. Col. Close that there are no accoutrements in store, excepting what are wanting immediately for the Hon. Company's troops. I enclose an indent, which I beg you will lay before the Military Board.

P.S. I have desired Col. Sartorius to see to the battalion companies of the 75th, as well as the flank companies, if he should receive the latter in consequence of his requisition.

To the Officer commanding, Mangalore (p. 75).

Seringapatam, 11th March, 1800.

I have the honor to inform you that I have received intelligence that Kistnapah Naig, the polygar of Bullum, has taken possession of the Bissolee ghaut, by which the Seringapatam tappall runs to Mangalore, and that he has stopped and returned 3 tappalls. Under the circumstances of the moment, it has been impossible for me to detach a force to clear the pass, and re-establish the communication through it; and I have, therefore, requested the dewan of the Rajah of Mysore to order his troops, which are in the Bul country, in the neighbourhood of the pass, to clear it. In case, in performing this operation, they should enter the boundaries of Canara, I trust not only that you will not molest them, but that you will afford them every assistance in your power.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 75).

Seringapatam, 11th March, 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 8th, enclosing the copy of that which you have written to the Governor of Fort St. George, and a letter which you have received from Capt. Moncrieff. From the latter, I am convinced that the plan, according to which I proposed that your detachment should advance in my letter of the 9th inst., is the only feasible one, and I therefore beg that it may be carried into execution. In doing this, I have only to recommend that whatever may be the delay in con-

sequence, the roads may be well opened and cleared before the troops and their baggage enter it. You desire to have my orders respecting the 4 companies from Goa. The stronger your detachment is made the better, provided you are able to feed them. I much fear you will be disappointed in your expectations of service from the coolies, which you state, in your letter to the Governor, 'must be pressed and retained under a guard.' If there is any doubt respecting the provisions, it is better that you should not have the 4 companies.

Since I have received your letter this day, I have given directions to the departments here to increase the quantity of rice and provisions with the detachment of troops to be sent from hence to such extent as may be practicable, between this day and that on which I shall march. I have been induced to this, from a consideration of the slight dependence which is to be placed on the coolies; but, in justice to you, I must say that it is not to be attributed in the least to you, but to the nature of the resources and means of the Company on the Malabar coast.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 75).

Seririgapatam, 11th March, 1800.

Col. Sartorius has transmitted me a copy of his letter of the 8th to the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council. As from that it appears that he is obliged to depend for supplies for his detachment on 1500 coolies, 'pressed and detained under a guard,' I have thought it proper to order that the quantity of rice and arrack to accompany this detachment may be increased to such extent as may be found practicable between this and the day on which I shall march.

This will add to my incumbrances, and I have therefore ordered the flank companies of the 77th regt. from Chittledroog to join me. Col. Sartorius has proposed to draw down from Goa 4 companies of sepoys, but I have desired him not to increase his numbers unless he is certain of being able to feed his troops. I enclose the copy of a letter from Capt. Moncrieff, who commands the pioneers on the Bombay establishment, and who has been much employed in Cotiate. It does not appear possible to bring a detachment through that district till we are in possession of Wynad.

To the Adjutant General (p. 75).

Seririgapatam, 13th March, 1800.

I enclose further statements respecting the remount horses for the cavalry. The 1st and 2d regts. of cavalry are completed to the numbers stated in your former letters, and there remain at Chittledroog at present 170.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 75).

Seririgapatam, 13th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter and some papers which I have received from Major Disney. These, with the letter from Capt. Moncrieff to Col. Sartorius, will give you a good picture of the state of our affairs in Malabar, and an idea of what we have to do.

The conclusion which I have drawn from all my information upon this subject is, that there are two things which we have to apprehend, want of provisions and the want of a road. As long as we have provisions, all the nairs in Malabar cannot hurt us, or oblige us to take a step which will give them an advantage. But the want of open roads, in which those who

carry our provisions and supplies and our followers can move in safety, would be as fatal to us as to move from hence without any supply at all. That, therefore, to which I must direct my attention must be, after having provided every thing that it is possible the troops can want, to take care not to move one step until I shall have cleared at least so much of the country as to make it certain that my followers can accompany me, without the risk of those attacks which have always proved fatal to the Bombay troops.

This plan of operations, which in my opinion can alone prove at all successful in the end, must necessarily take up much time. But it is to be considered that the Company's reputation as well as their authority is at stake; and advantage being taken of the experience afforded by the former contest, nothing ought to be done which can expose the troops to similar misfortunes. Our object is not to make a dash into Wynaad, but to establish the Company's authority there permanently. We are aware of the species of opposition with which we shall meet, and our proceedings must be guarded accordingly.

In this season we cannot hope for more than to establish ourselves in Wynand (even if we should have time to do that); and if the business is to be followed up in the west, we must begin early to throw in our resources to Wynaad, and we shall then with ease clear out Cotiote from above the ghauts as well as from below. All that I fear, is that you at Madras will become impatient, and will imagine that we are more slow than is necessary. But let it be recollected that troops must be fed, that provisions must be carried for them, that those who carry them must be in safety, and that to insure that, the country must be opened, and I shall be rather less abused for delay.

To Officers commg., Canara and Malabar (p. 75).      Seringapatam, 13th March, 1800.

By a letter from the Sec. of the Government of Fort St. George, dated March 5th, I find that you have been directed to put yourself under my command. I conclude that it is intended that you should continue to conduct the duties of the troops in the province, and I shall be obliged to you if you will report to me all matters which you think it material that I should know.

I beg to have a return, as soon as possible, stating the numbers and distribution of the troops under your command, likewise a copy of the instructions which you have received from Lieut. Gen. Stuart, and a copy of the standing orders and regulations of the Government of Bombay.

To the Sec. of Government, Bombay (p. 75).      Seringapatam, 13th March, 1800.

By a letter from the Sec. of the Government of Fort St. George, dated the 5th inst., I find that the officers commanding the troops in Canara and Malabar have been directed to put themselves under my command. I conclude that it will be agreeable to the government that they should continue to conduct the duties of the troops in those provinces respectively, and I have given them directions accordingly. As I have never had the honor of serving under the orders of the Government of Bombay, I am ignorant of the standing rules and regulations of their service, of

the channel of communication pointed out for the military, and other matters in which I am desirous of being correct; and I shall be obliged to you if you will furnish me with such information as it may be in your power to afford.

Col. Sartorius will already have made you acquainted with the arrangements which have been made below the ghauts preparatory to the proposed operations in Wynnad. I intend to march from hence on the 20th inst. with the detachment which, in obedience to the orders of the Governor General, is to penetrate that district from Mysore; and I expect that the detachment of the Bombay army will be prepared and will move from Calicut in the first week in April, and enter Wynnad by the Tambercherry pass. I have preferred that route, although in many respects not the most favorable, on account of the lateness of the season, the difficulty of equipping the troops in Malabar, the strength of the Pyche Rajah in Cotiote, and the unfavorable nature of that district to the operations of our troops. From the accounts I received, it did not appear possible that we should be able to establish the Company's authority completely, both in Wynnad and Cotiote, before the Malabar rains should set in; and I preferred to secure the one, and to leave to government the option whether the other should be undertaken in a more favorable season, rather than, by an attempt at both objects, to risk that to obtain which the detachments have been ordered.

To Capt. Mackenzie (p. 75).

Seringapatam, 14th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 7th, and I have delayed to answer it till now, as you tell me that you were about to leave Madras on the next day. I am happy to find that every thing has been arranged at Madras to your satisfaction, and that you will begin your labors with all the advantages that will enable you to bring them to a successful conclusion. You may be assured that you shall have every assistance which the military in this country can afford you, and I shall issue a general order upon the subject, in order to make it certain.

It might have been known to the gentlemen at Madras that we are not very well provided with tents here. However, if you will send an indent to the Commissary of stores at Seringapatam, and if you want carriage, an indent upon Mr. Gordon for it, the tent for Mr. Haynes will be sent over to Bangalore.

Capt. Colebrooke arrived here this morning, and I shall take an opportunity of mentioning to him your wish respecting his guides; but as he sent here only a few to be employed with a detachment about to march, I conclude that he will have made arrangements before he left Madras for supplying you with those which you want.

To Major Gen. Braithwaite (p. 76).

Seringapatam, 14th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 9th, and have sent its enclosure to Gholam Aly Khan. I find that Tippoo was married to the daughter of Imaum Buckshee, who, I understand, was the father of Imaum Hussein; but even during his life she went about the mahal in the habit of a widow. She is now there, and I imagine is as comfortable as the other

women are. There were two women here, the grand-daughters of Chunda Saheb and of Sufder Aly's sister, and they receive from the Company 200 star pagodas *per annum*. Futteh Hyder married the daughter of one of them, and they now reside with him at Vellore. I am acquainted with Imaum Hussein, and if he should come here, I shall be happy to show him any attention in my power, and to forward any further inquiries which he may be desirous of making respecting his family.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 76).

Seringapatam, 15th March, 1800.

Col. Close has communicated to me certain papers (enclosures from the Commissioners in Malabar) which he has received from you, the contents of which induce me to think that the largest force which can be spared from Goa and from Bombay should be brought to Cannanore, and applied in such manner as the exigency of the service may require. If, in consequence of my letter of the 11th inst., you should have desisted from your requisition of the flank companies of the Native battalions at Goa, it is desirable that you should renew it, whether your means of subsistence and equipment should enable you to take them to the field or not. I observe that the gentlemen of the Commission have acquainted the government of Bombay of the state of affairs in Malabar, and I conclude that such reinforcements as can be spared will be sent from thence.

To J. Smee, Esq. (p. 76).

Seringapatam, 15th March, 1800.

Lieut. Col. Close has communicated to me, at different times, papers which he has received from you, particularly some, enclosed with your letter of the 11th inst., of a most interesting nature. As I am charged with the conduct of the operations of the detachments now forming in Malabar and Mysore, and as you appear to have made laudable endeavors, and to have succeeded in obtaining good information of the strength, means, and resources of the enemy with whom we shall have to contend, I am about to acquaint you of the plan of operations which I intend to pursue; and I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to me such further information of the state of affairs below the ghauts, and of the Pyche Rajah's strength, as it may be in your power to afford. As, however, notwithstanding their professions of loyalty and attachment to the Company's government, I suspect that the whole caste of nairs are interested in the preservation of the Pyche Rajah, I request that great care may be taken not to communicate to them more of this plan than is necessary to get their information. My intention is to march from hence on the 20th inst., to enter Wynaad at Edatera, where I shall leave the Company's cavalry to collect provisions, &c., and to proceed along the great Calicut road till I communicate with the detachment of the Bombay army, which I have ordered to proceed by sea to Calicut, and from thence into Wynaad by the Tambereherry ghaut. I understand that this road through the Wynaad country is open and broad, and will require but little repair to make it practicable for troops with guns, stores, &c.; but if it should not be so, I am determined that nothing shall induce me to advance, and thereby risk the subsistence and exist-



ence of the troops, and the reputation of the Company's arms, till I shall have cut such a road as their followers can proceed on in safety, and as will facilitate my communication with this country. After I shall have joined with the Bombay detachment, I propose that either jointly or separately, as may be found most convenient, the two detachments shall cut their way to Binaar or Wynnad, which I understand will be the most convenient situation for a post and depôt. Under different names, the stronghold of the Rajah in the Wynnad country has been described to me as being on a high jungly mountain. I don't conceive that I shall succeed in establishing the Company's authority in Wynnad until he be deprived of this hold, and, of course, my operations will be directed against it; but whatever length of time it may take, I shall not deviate from the principle I have adopted; viz., to open the country for my supplies, and to secure my communication with my rear. From all that I have read and observed of the former contest with the same man, I am of opinion that the want of success is to be attributed to the difficulties in feeding and supplying the troops, which were in great part occasioned by the want of roads.

Having thus given you the principle and outline of the operations which I shall pursue, I proceed to state to you the reason why I have preferred to move the Bombay detachment into Wynnad by the Tanbercherry ghaut, instead of through the Cotiote country; which plan, it appears, you deem most favorable. The orders of government are, that we are to establish the Company's authority in Wynnad. My letters from Col. Sartorius, and by the general tenor of all the information which I have received of the state of affairs in Cotiote, it appeared not to be practicable to move the detachment of the Bombay army through that district, or even farther into it with safety than Cotaparamba. Its absence from Wynnad might risk success in that district, at the same time that its being at Cotaparamba could answer no purpose towards subduing the Pýche Rajah, as it is very clear that the Mysore detachment alone would not be equal to establishing the Company's authority in Wynnad, and afterwards, in this season, to co-operate in Cotiote with the detachment assembled at Cotaparamba. I therefore thought it best to insure an object which will give us such advantages towards obtaining the other in a future season, should government think proper to order it to be undertaken, as will make that also certain, rather than by an attempt at both objects, one of which is avowedly unattainable at the present moment, to risk success in that to which my attention has been particularly directed by government.

By letters and papers which have been sent to Col. Close by Col. Sartorius and by you, it appears that there is something very like a general confederacy among the nairs; and I therefore submit it to you, whether it does not require some consideration before you adopt the measure of giving arms and ammunition to any of them, whatever may be their professions towards the Company's government.

As I have not time at present to write to the Commissioners in Malabar, I shall be obliged to you if you will communicate to them such parts of this letter as you may think necessary for their information.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 76).

Seringapatam, 15th March, 1800.

As I understand, from Lieut. Col. Close, that under the arrangement concluded with Meer Alum, there is no longer any necessity for the detachment in Punganoor, which has hitherto been stationed in that district under the orders of Capt. Munro, I have sent orders that it may be withdrawn from thence, and that it may be put under the orders of Major Capper, of the 1st batt. 4th regt., and marched to Seringapatam. I intend that it should be employed in keeping up the communication, and escorting such supplies as may be necessary to the detachment employed in Wynaad, for which service this garrison is not at present able to furnish troops.

To the Adjutant General (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 19th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter and some papers, which I have received from Col. Pater. It is desirable that the payment of the family certificates of this corps should be continued, until they return from the field. The families of the corps of infantry which are going upon detachment having come from the Carnatic, I have made an arrangement for paying them, at Seringapatam, such sums as the Sepoys may choose to leave for them.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 19th March, 1800.

I enclose papers as follows, to be laid before the Military Board:

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The survey reports on all these carriages are already before the Board.

It is very desirable that the orders for the repairs of these carriages should be received soon, as there is not a serviceable carriage at present at Seringapatam; and even those now going on detachment are in a bad state, as will be perceived by the enclosed report of a committee which has surveyed them.

I have received your letter of the 14th inst., and the committees for the survey of grain and provisions, and of ordnance and stores, will be assembled; but I beg to inform you, that for the reasons given heretofore, it will be impossible to ascertain the quantity of grain and provisions in Seringapatam.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

Government having approved of Capt. Marriott's coming here to take charge of the mahals of Tippoo Sultaun and Hyder Aly, and of the younger Princes, I beg that you will pay him the following sums for their use, which have hitherto been paid to me by order of the Commissioner for the affairs of Mysore:

For the ratif of the mahals, 300 rupees *per diem*, to commence from the 21st inst. inclusive.

For the servants and for enaums for certain women in the mahals of Tippoo Sultaun and Hyder Aly, 316 canterai pagodas per month, to commence from the 1st March.

For the servants and attendants on the Princes, 450 rupees per month, to commence from the 1st March.

To Lieut. Col. Close (p. 77).

Seeringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter from Major Disney, which I beg you will return when you will have read it. Capt. West has received Mr. Warren's letter about his guard. I am really very anxious about the state of this garrison, where there will remain just a sufficient number to furnish escorts for treasure, which is constantly going, and for the gentlemen employed upon the surveys. I am, therefore, desirous that he should keep his guard till he approaches another garrison, or till this is better enabled to give you one. If he has got the regulated certificates, there can be no difficulty in procuring pay in any part of this country; and although I doubt not that Col. Doveton wishes that his men should return, his garrison cannot be in such want of them, or cannot have so many calls upon it as this has.

I have had no return of fever, but I wait till the day after to-morrow to be certain. The troops crossed the rivers this morning.

If Mr. Warren returns to the Bangalore district, it will be much more convenient to give him a guard from Nundydroog.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 77).

Seeringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

I have this instant received a letter from the Sec. of the Government of Fort St. George, by which I am informed that the Governor in Council has determined not to carry on the expedition in Wynnad this season, although it is probable that it may be undertaken early in the next. His Lordship has, therefore, desired that I should make such a distribution of the troops in Mysore, Malabar, and Canara, and such an arrangement for the equipment of them, as may, in my opinion, be best calculated to enable them to act with vigor and effect as soon as the season shall admit of their taking the field.

It is very desirable that the troops which have come from Canara and from Goa should return to their respective stations, provided they can do so with ease at present; and that they can be brought to Cannanore again, at the time when the season will admit of our commencing our operations in Wynnad and Cotiate. Your local information enables you to form the best judgment upon the subject, and I beg that you will act accordingly.

I propose, early in the ensuing month, to pay you a visit at Cannanore, and I shall have some conversation with you regarding your equipments, and the resources in Malabar, and other matters. In the mean time, I conceive that the coolies, stated to have been pressed, may be discharged; and that such other articles of equipment which occasion expense, and which you do not think necessary to retain, in order that the troops may be ready to take the field early in the next season, may be discontinued. I shall write to you again before I leave this place for Cannanore; and if it should be convenient to them, I should be glad to meet Capt. Moncrieff and Mr. Smee there.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 77).

Seeringapatam, 20th March, 1800.

It is necessary that I should inform you, that I have been obliged to employ the troops to quell a disturbance occasioned by the Pariar people,

chiefly the lower orders of gentlemen's servants and the soldiers' cook boys. There had been at Seringapatam, as well as in other parts of Mysore, a difference between two castes, which here, as well as elsewhere, they settled to their own satisfaction; but it appears that the lower orders have an interest in the disputes of the higher castes, and during this settlement they manifested their discontent by repeated riots, and some of the heads were confined. On the 17th, in the morning, the day after the settlement of the dispute above mentioned, mobs of cook boys went about the streets of the fort and pettah before day, threatening the inhabitants if they opened their shops or sold any thing till their head men were released. They then went to the different fords, stopped the people bringing provisions and supplies to the market, detained and plundered them. The shops were shut, and no efforts of the police officers could disperse the mobs.

Under these circumstances, I thought it proper to order out small parties of cavalry and Native infantry from the camp, and a small party of European infantry from the garrison, against the largest mob, which was assembled under the Caryghaut hill, immediately above the ford. The officer commanding the cavalry was within 100 yards of them for above an hour before the infantry came up, and sent them repeated messages to desire they would disperse. They remained, and suffered the infantry to approach them within half musket shot, and still, notwithstanding they were ordered to disperse by the officers commanding the two parties of infantry, they remained till they received their fire. Four of them, including the two head men who had been sent out, were killed, and two wounded; and this mob, as well as the others, dispersed immediately.

I attribute the folly of their obstinacy and their absurdity in supposing that I should sit quiet, and allow the lowest orders of the people to starve the troops, having a camp on one side of them and a large garrison on the other, to nothing excepting to the experience they have had of success, from too much indulgence on former similar occasions in the Carnatic; but in this country, where the Hon. Company's authority is but newly established, I could not suffer it for a moment to be trampled upon by the lowest order of the people, in the service of their officers and troops. I have the pleasure to inform you, that since the infantry fired every thing has been perfectly quiet, the rioters have returned to their peaceable occupations, and I do not imagine that they will again disturb the peace of Seringapatam.

Four persons caught in the fact of forcing the bazaar people to shut their shops, and evidently connected with the other rioters, were tried by a General Court Martial, and sentenced to be hanged; but as I conceived the example which had been made to be fully sufficient, and as every thing had remained quiet from the time the troops fired, I did not think it necessary to carry the sentence into execution.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 21st March, 1800.

Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have received your's of the 17th and 18th. There will certainly be means of employing to great advantage,

during the monsoon, the coolies, which you say have arrived from Bombay, and others which you expect from Palghaut; and I therefore request that you will detain them in the service, at least till I shall have had the pleasure of seeing you.

To Lieut. Col. Mignan (p. 77).

Serlingapatam, 22d March, 1800.

Upon looking over the return which I have received from Col. Sartorius of the troops in the province of Canara, I perceive a remark at the foot of it, that 1463 of the R. and F. included as effective have never had arms in their hands (53 of the grenadier battalion excepted). As I have reason to believe that these recruits have been raised for a length of time, I beg to know the cause of their being backward; and I request that you will signify to the officers commanding corps, and to the officer in charge of the corps of Native recruits, my anxious wishes that they may be brought forward as soon as possible.

Instructions for Lieut. Col. Tolsey (p. 77).

Serlingapatam, 22d March, 1800.

You are to march to-morrow morning with the troops which have been put under your orders, and the Rajah's cavalry under Bisht Pundit, towards Ooscotta, on the Hemavutty river, by the route of Chinroyapatam, Graun, &c., by which the army marched hither from thence.

Kistnapah Naig, the polygar of Bullum, has a polygar station at a place called Ey Goor, which is about 6 miles from the river above mentioned, and is described in the enclosed paper from Capt. Campbell, who went there in the month of September last. From this station, where he has collected about 3000 or 4000 of the people of the country, he attacks the convoys of provisions, &c. which are going to the Rajah's troops at the neighbouring fort of Munserabad, where there is likewise a body of the Rajah's troops encamped, and interrupts the communication between that fort and the post of the Rajah's troops at Ooscotta. You will be joined at Ooscotta by the infantry above mentioned, to be encamped at Munserabad, and you will immediately attack the people at Ey Goor: you will burn that place, and you will hang all the people that you may find in arms, or that you may have reason to know have been so.

It was the rainy season when Capt. Campbell went to Ey Goor; but I have reason to believe that you will find more roads to that place in this dry season than that one which he describes. When you will attack it, you will of course take care to leave your provisions, camp, and baggage behind you in safety, and to keep your flanks strong and clear.

After you will have performed this service at Ey Goor, you will move (by Lacoonda) to the Bissolce ghant, where the polygar likewise has a force, with which he has interrupted the communication between this place and Mangalore. You will drive him from thence and communicate with a post of the Bombay army, which is at the bottom of the pass in the Soobramany pagoda.

On arriving at Ooscotta you will issue a proclamation, which will be dispersed for you by the Rajah's servants, inviting all the peaceable inhabitants to remain in their villages, and stating it to be your intention to burn all villages which you may find deserted, and to hang all people

that may be taken in arms. On your march to the Bissolee ghaut you will put this proclamation in execution.

It is very desirable that Capt. Colebrooke should visit all the passes into the lower country to the northward of the Rajah of Koorg's territories; and I request that you will enable him to do so. After having performed the services above mentioned, and after some of the Rajah's troops under Seyd Mahomed will arrive in the country, should you see no further reason for remaining there, you will move with your battalion to Paughur, where you will put it in garrison; you will send the 2d of the 3d to Chittledroog, where they are to be in garrison; and you will send Capt. Colebrooke and his guides, the artillery and guns, and the pioneers, to Seringapatam. You will have with you a supply of rice, which is sent to be used only in case of necessity, and is to be returned to Seringapatam if it should not be wanted.

If you should find it possible by means of the Rajah's cavalry or infantry to attack the post at Bissolee ghaut at the same time when you will attack Ey Goor, you will do so; and Capt. Colebrooke will afterwards visit it and any passes to the Canara country that may be in the neighbourhood.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 22d March, 1800.

Since I wrote to you last, orders have been received from the government of Fort St. George to stop the expedition into Wynaad.

By my letters and other papers which I transmitted to that government you will have perceived what chance we had of success, and the extent to which we should have gone in this season; but there is every appearance of an early fall of rain; we should in that case have suffered great distress, and should in all probability have been obliged to quit the country without effecting any thing. On the other hand, if the season had remained open, the advantages which we should have derived would not have been very great, and would not have been a compensation for the risk which we run in making the attempt. Our greater means early in the next season will enable us to effect all our objects with ease.

I purpose to go to Cannanore in the course of a few days to get a little knowledge of their means and resources in the Malabar province. I only wait till I get a little strength after an attack of fever which I have had. I have appointed all the gentlemen who have any thing to do in Cotiate to meet me, and I hope to form a plan for our future operations which will answer our purpose.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 23d March, 1800.

In consequence of your letter of the 17th inst. I have ordered the flank companies belonging to the corps in the garrison of Seringapatam to join their respective corps; that all detachments and individuals belonging to the stores which had been taken from that garrison should return to it. The bullocks hired for the service are to be discharged on the 31st inst.; the grain and gunnies provided are to be kept in store till wanted.

Within these few days accounts have been received that Kistnapah Naig, the polygar of Bullum, has got possession of the Bissolee or Soobra-

many ghaut, which had been used as the tappall communication with Mangalore, and that he had stopped our tappalls. It appears that he has collected a number of the ryots of the country at a place called Ey Goor, which had been burnt in September last by Capt. Campbell, and that the Rajah's troops had found some difficulty in keeping up the communication, and in supplying with provisions their post at Munserahnd.

I have therefore sent Lieut. Col. Tolfrey with his battalion, 5 companies of the 2d of the 3d, and 2 guns and artillery attached, and 50 pioneers, and a small proportion of grain, to drive the people from Ey Goor, and re-establish the communication with the province of Canara, and I have instructed him to treat with rigor any of the inhabitants who may be found in arms. As soon as the Rajah's dewan will have equipped with arms and accoutrements a body of infantry which has hitherto been employed in the Anagoondy and Harponelly districts, they are to be sent into the Bul country, and Lieut. Col. Tolfrey is to withdraw his corps, and to proceed to Paughur to send the 5 companies of the 2d of the 3d to Chittledroog, and the pioneers, guns, and artillerymen to Seringapatam. In the mean time, as I have heard that the polygars about Paughur have assembled some people and threaten disturbance, I have ordered 2 companies of the 1st of the 8th from Chittledroog to reinforce that post. I have sent Capt. Colebrooke with Lieut. Col. Tolfrey, in order that he may examine three passes into the Canara country, which are between Koorg and the Hyder-ghur pass. The other 5 companies of the 2d of the 3d are gone back to Chittledroog. Col. Pater has represented that Sera has been found an inconvenient situation for the cavalry, as there is a scarcity of grass, water, and wood. I find upon inquiry that no gram has hitherto been laid in there, and I should therefore propose to place the 2d regt. of cavalry either at Chenapatam, which I am informed is a convenient situation, or in some convenient spot on the Maddoor river, if there should be no objection. I have kept this corps in this neighbourhood till I receive the orders of government. I shall have no difficulty in assembling in the next season troops, bullocks, provisions, &c., for the expedition proposed in a very short time.

I purpose on the 25th to set out for Cannanore, where I expect to meet the gentlemen who are best acquainted with the Cotiote country, and I hope with their information to form a plan for our operations above and below the ghauts. I shall likewise have an opportunity of ascertaining the means of equipment, &c. in the province of Malabar, and how far it may be necessary to assist them from this country.

In my letter of the 15th I informed you that I had ordered Major Capper to Seringapatam from the Nundydroog district with a detachment, the 2d of the 4th. It is convenient to remove him from Nundydroog, as he is senior to the commanding officer there. It will be a convenience to the garrison of Seringapatam that this detachment remain in it, and it is not wanted elsewhere.

I have the honor to enclose copies of orders which I have issued, and which require the confirmation of government. I was induced to appoint Capt. Ogg to be my Persian interpreter, from the want of an officer in that situation in the frequent communications which I am obliged to

have with the natives, and because it was originally intended that I should have one. Capt. Ogg's diligence in arranging the Persian books captured at Seringapatam, and in collecting and arranging the papers of the late Sultaun, has doubtless been made known to his Lordship.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 23d March, 1800.

I enclose a letter from Mr. Anderson relative to a Native General Hospital; and I request that orders may be given to put in a proper state the building which Mr. Anderson recommends should be repaired for that purpose.

To the Adjutant General (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 23d March, 1800.

I enclose the copy of a letter to the Sec. of Government, and of papers sent therewith.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter from Capt. Robertson, and one from Major Kennett, relative to serjeants for their corps. I have lately recommended that serj. major Turton may be appointed an ensign in the 33d regt., and I shall be much obliged to you if you will lay my request before the Commander in Chief, that he will appoint serj. Lewis, of the 33d regt., to be garrison serjeant major; serj. Masters, who was heretofore baggage serjeant of the army, to be key serjeant; and serj. Farrell, late of the pioneers, now on the invalid establishment, to be barraek serjeant of Seringapatam.

The 1st batt. 8th regt., which I heretofore informed you was on its march towards the Carnatie, is still halted at Chittledroog for orders, excepting 2 companies, which you will perceive by my letter to the Sec. of Government are ordered to Paughur. When the 5 companies of the 2d of the 3d will arrive at Chittledroog there will be no difficulty in relieving those companies, and then this corps will be in readiness to march wherever the Commander in Chief may order it; but, considering the service on which the troops will be employed immediately after the rains, he will perhaps be induced to leave it in this country, in which case I will order it into any garrison that he may think proper to point out.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 23d March, 1800.

In your letter of the 14th inst. you mention that among the captured stores there are 9000 serviceable English muskets. As I imagine that you must have taken your information from the first rough calculation made by a committee of which Lieut. Col. Saxon was president, and as the error might have evil consequences at a future period, I enclose an abstract of serviceable and repairable arms surveyed and valued by a committee, of which Lieut. Col. Saxon is president, appointed for the survey and valuation of all the captured stores. By this you will perceive that the number of serviceable English muskets captured was 1685.

To Capt. K. Young (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 23d March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 19th inst., and I am much concerned



that there should have been any errors in the monthly return of the 33d regt. The major present was omitted by mistake.

A letter which will go to you under cover with the return which I received some time ago from Lieut. Col. Cliffe, will point out the reason why Ensign Dixon and Ensign Sullivan are taken on the strength, and why they are still included in the return. By a most unaccountable mistake, of which I can't trace the cause, the establishment of the 33d was originally reckoned only at 1190 R. and F., and by a reference to the returns since the period when the order for the increase of the establishment was issued, you will perceive that only that number has been accounted for. A N. B. at the bottom of the return which will go to you will point out the cause of the increase of the number of 'wanting to complete' not accounted for in the return. There are other mistakes in the return which you have not noticed, but which will be rectified.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 77).

Seringsapatani, 21th March, 1800.

I enclose a return of the number, state, &c. of the elephants and camels, the property of the Hon. Company. The camels have been found unhealthy, and in wet weather unable to carry their loads; I do not therefore recommend that they should be retained. The elephants are hardy and useful for many military purposes besides the carriage of camp equipage, and it is therefore very desirable to retain them in the service. The only disadvantage attending them is the permanent expense in peace; but unless that is incurred, as they cannot be caught and trained at the moment when they may be wanted in war, the advantages to be derived from them must be foregone.

The establishment, as it stands at present, is rather more expensive than the bullocks and bamboo coolies would be who would carry the same number of tents; but it will not be difficult to decrease the expense by discharging the supernumerary attendants, and by giving rather a lower pay to some of those who receive most. It will likewise be proper to turn out of the service the 10 young and the 6 old elephants, and to replace them by 16 fit for immediate work, and to strike off the strength and replace the 2 elephants sent to Hyderabad and that at Vellore. The establishment will then consist of 68 serviceable elephants, which will carry about 550 loads; and if the supernumerary attendants are discharged, and other arrangements made among the attendants, the expense will be considerably reduced.

Capt. Barclay has received a letter from Capt. Wilkes, the military secretary of the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council, which contains certain queries upon this subject. He is now preparing answers to them, which will most probably be communicated to the Military Board, and will bring the whole subject before them.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. (p. 77).

Seringsapatani, 21th March, 1800.

I have to request that, in addition to the 500 bags of rice already ordered for the detachment of troops at present encamped under the Caryghaut hill, and the proportion of provisions for the European part of the same, you will increase the rice and arrack to such proportion as may

be practicable between this day and the 20th, on which day I propose to march from hence. You will of course provide gunnies to hold and earriage bullocks to carry this rice, and earriage for this additional arrack. The provision, grain, pay, and bullock departments will be provided with such establishments as are allowed by the existing regulations of government. In case you should find it necessary, you will take grain from the captured stores, keeping the account thereof according to former orders.

To Lieut. Col. Money penny (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 25th March, 1800.

I am going to Cannanore for about a fortnight or three weeks, and I shall leave the command of the troops here in your hands.

I recommend that you should keep your guards as they are at present, as you might otherwise find the numbers of discontented people in the fort unpleasant. Let me know when the flank companies of the 77th arrive, and what they want, and I will send orders respecting their return to Chittledroog, and other matters connected therewith. 4 companies of the 2d of the 4th are coming: 2 of them are to go to Mysore to relieve the 2 companies there, and 2 of them are to be huttet in the fort in any place which Grant will point out.

The cutwahl will wait upon you daily with his report, upon which you will give him your orders. I recommend that you should allow my moonshee to sit in your house; he will be able to give you information upon some matters which may be referred to you. I send you some papers relative to the late settlement between the eastes, and I recommend that any attempt to disturb the peace of the place may be resisted as it was on the 17th inst.

I leave a book of letters from the Military Board. I shall be obliged to you if you will favor me with a line occasionally when any thing particular happens.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 77).

Seringapatam, 25th March, 1800.

I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from Col. Close. It appears to be proper that an allowance should be granted to Mahomed Aly.

To Lieut. Col. Money penny (p. 80).

Periapatam, 28th March, 1800.

By this occasion Barelay will send you some orders providing for the wants of the 77th flank companies, and for the removal of the sick and convalescent Europeans from Sera and Seringapatam. The doolies which the 77th will get are those lately repaired, the bearers those belonging to the army which are still at Seringapatam, and which I believe have been delivered over to Mr. Gordon; if they have not been so delivered, desire Mr. Anderson to hand them over to him. I write by this post to Mr. Gordon, and give him an authority for still retaining in the service the dooley bearers which will remain at Seringapatam even after the 77th will have marched. Desire Mr. Anderson to provide for the medical care of the 2d regt. of cavalry as he thinks best; to let me know to whom he gives charge of them, that I may give an order upon the subject.

It appears extraordinary that Col. Stevenson should have allowed the

77th to depart so incomplete in lascars and bannoo coolies, and they are so much so that I should imagine that Capt. Macpherson has calculated his wants upon the Bombay allowances of these people, and not upon those of Fort St. George. Let him know that he shall have whatever Seringapatam can afford, but at the same time apprise him that there is a gentleman at Madras who makes people pay for every thing they indent for, beyond what is allowed by the regulations of government.

I have not provided for carriage of the tents of the 77th, as I conclude that that which they have brought will go back with them; but if the people should make any difficulties, let them indent upon Capt. Barclay, and Grant may furnish them with the camels intended for the 2d regt. of cavalry. Barclay writes to Grant by this post, providing other carriage for the 2d regt. in case this arrangement should be necessary.

Major Mandeville might have informed me of the necessity of burning powder, but I certainly do not recollect that I acquiesced in the necessity of doing so on the parade, or at all in the fort. I recommend to you to give him a hint upon this subject. I am glad to hear that Macleod is so well. I hope that he will beat — — —.

I arrived here this morning in two very long marches from Seringapatam. I was detained on the 26th for bamboos for some of my own and of the sepoy's tents, as I thought it best not to start till we had got every thing we wanted.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. (p. 80).

Seringapatam, 28th March, 1800.

Mr. Anderson will have delivered over to you certain dooley bearers who heretofore belonged to the army. You will be so kind as to furnish the flank companies of the 77th regt. with such of them as they may want upon their march to Chittledroog, and you will retain the remainder in the service until you receive further instructions.

To Lieut. Col. Montresor (p. 80).

Seringapatam, 28th March, 1800.

I enclose a letter which I have received from a soldier in the 77th regt., and I shall be obliged to you if you will tell him that if he has any thing to communicate to me, he must send it in the regular form through his commanding officer.

In all corps, but particularly in those in this country, there are great abuses and irregularities in the mode of disposing of any property a soldier may have had. I imagine that we all have adopted different methods of checking them, but I am afraid without great effect, as the interference of the civil tribunals will always control our regimental regulations, and will force the payment of those improperly obtained legacies. In every point of view it is desirable that the civil courts should not have occasion to interfere in any military or regimental concern; but they certainly will interfere when applied to, and the writer of the enclosed letter appears to be one of those who are most ready to call for their interference. Under these circumstances, if there is not something palpably improper in the will, a copy of which is enclosed, which can be proved in the clearest manner, it is advisable that you should order that the legacy claimed should be paid. If there is any thing improper in the

will, it is desirable that the man should be tried for it by a regimental Court Martial, and a copy of their proceedings will be the best answer to any interference on the part of the civil courts.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 80).

Periapatam, 28th March, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 23d. I need not assure you that I shall be happy to take any trouble which government may think proper to impose upon me; but, for two or three reasons which I am about to state, I think there is a better method of executing the proposed works at Seringapatam than to order Mr. Castles to undertake them under my superintendence. 1st; Mr. Castles is a very young man, who undoubtedly has a very good character, but I know him only by report, and he may not be much better than others: 2dly; it is necessary that I should frequently be absent from Seringapatam; in the course of this year I certainly shall not be there for several months, and during that suspension of my actual superintendence a good deal of mischief might be done, for which I could not be responsible: 3dly; the works which are most wanting are of a nature to which a contract is peculiarly applicable, and on which it would be scarcely possible to graft the evils and inconveniences which have usually been felt from that mode of executing public works. I have not by me at present the paper which I sent to the Military Board, but, as well as I recollect, I recommended that the unfinished part of the 2d or inside rampart should be thrown into the inside ditch; that the outside rampart and its parapets should be thickened; that the stone glacis on the river faces should be completed; and that the ditch should be deepened. I conclude that the last is that upon which the Military Board cannot decide until regular levels are taken, and as it is the least material, I would lay it aside entirely till the other works are completed. The other three are mere cooly work, in the execution of which there can be no connivance between the contractor and the engineer. In the execution of the stone glacis there may be more nicety than in the other two, and it will be necessary to employ masons; but if in the advertisement for the contract for this work it is particularly stated that it is to be completed in the same manner as that part finished by the Sultaun, it will at all times be in my power to check any impropriety which may be going on. I would have each contract separate; and indeed it will not be very easy to commence to thicken the outer rampart until the inner ditch is filled: therefore the execution of that work may likewise be deferred.

There is another reason why it is desirable that these works should be done by contract. There are several works going on at Mysore and in other parts of the Rajah's country in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, and I really think that Mr. Castles would find it very difficult to procure the people to perform the work. Your great contractors at Madras would find it worth the trouble and expense, and would send from the Carnatic tank diggers and others, who, with the assistance which the place could afford, would soon complete what we want; but these Mr. Castles could not command. We might make an arrangement with the contractor for the assistance of pioneers, which we might give him.

I lately sent to the Military Board the report of a committee upon the works at Seringapatam. Several repairs are absolutely necessary. The fort is still open on the side which we attacked, and the first object for the attention of the engineer should be to execute the most material of these during the time that the contractor might also be employed under his directions. We shall then get on well, and you may depend upon it that I shall not pass unnoticed any thing that I may perceive improperly executed.

I have got thus far on my way to Cannanore. I expect to be back at Seringapatam on the 20th of next month.

If you should determine to execute the works at Seringapatam by contract, let me know it, and particularly what the Military Board proposes should be done; and when I return I will send you a few memorandums upon the subject, which you may find useful in closing with the contractors.

To Col. Pater (p. 80).

Veerajundrapett, 30th March, 1800.

Capt. Macintire mentioned to me the subject of the carts to be employed in transporting the arms for your regiment, and what follows is the answer which I gave him and the principle on which my sentiments on that subject were founded. You indented upon Fort St. George for certain arms to complete your corps, and in exchange for certain others reported unserviceable. You have received those arms, and you will be obliged to put those in lieu of which they are given into the stores at Seringapatam, and the Commissary must give you his receipt for them. Under these circumstances the Military Board and the Auditor Gen. will consider it as very extraordinary that being at Seringapatam with your corps you should require carts to carry away arms, when by making your arrangements of them, and giving them to your people, you might at once throw into the stores the unserviceable arms. I do not mean to contend that the carts are not absolutely necessary, and that it will not be very inconvenient to you to disturb the new arms and accoutrements before you arrive in your permanent quarters; but that will require to be explained, and you must therefore write me a public letter upon the subject, which should accompany the indent for the carts.

I will take care to send an order for your pay when I receive and transmit the orders for your march. I hope to be at Cannanore on the 2d April, and I shall doubtless hear from you.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 80).

Veerajundrapett, 30th March, 1800.

I have received a letter from Lieut. Stevenson at Mallihall, in which he informs me that Dhoondiah had joined with one of the polygars dependent on the Nizam, and that the two had proceeded towards the Anagoondy country with a view to plunder it; this intelligence is confirmed by accounts from Darwar. I learn also from thence that Schudiah's troops have not yet got possession of the fort of Kolapoor, and that accounts have been received there from Poonah stating that Nana Furnavees was dead.

To Lieut. Col. Montresor (p. 82).

Cannanore, 3d April, 1800.

I cannot in a better manner make you acquainted with Lord Clive's sentiments respecting the letter which I wrote to him about you than by sending you an extract of a private letter which I received from him this morning.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 123).

Camp at Hurryhur, 18th June, 1800.

I have received information from Lieut. Col. Mignan that the mortar beds which had been employed at Jemalabad are entirely destroyed, and that in consequence the fire from mortars had ceased; that Lieut. Col. Cumine had made 3 attempts to get possession of the place by storm, which had been unsuccessful, and in making which he had lost 2 privates killed, and one serjeant and 18 privates wounded. Lieut. Col. Cumine led the attacks, and speaks highly of the conduct of the men under his command who made them.

The rains had set in in Canara, and Lieut. Col. Mignan had withdrawn the troops from Jemalabad, excepting 100 men of the 75th and 300 Native infantry, which are deemed sufficient for the blockade, and I have desired him either to repair or replace the mortar beds without loss of time. A party of Native infantry under a soubahdar had been very successful in the punishment of some banditti which had appeared near Sedasheeghur. The 2 principal men, who for many years had lived by plunder, were killed, and the whole party dispersed.

I hear from Malabar that the posts and roads are finished, which I heretofore informed you I had ordered to be made, and every thing in that province remains quiet. I reached this camp on the 14th inst., and found that the river had risen so much as to be no longer fordable. I have, however, passed over one battalion and 4 field pieces, and the 2d regt. of cavalry with its guns, and I hope soon that the 1st will have joined them. A few horse have appeared in front of the detachment on the other side of the river, but the position they have is so strong and so much protected by this camp, that I should have no apprehension for their safety if all Dhoondiah's army were on this side of the Werdah. By all accounts it appears that he is still at Savanore, and has detached across the Werdah a small body of cavalry and infantry in order to take possession of the different forts in this part of the country, and to make the collections. There is no fort of any consequence, but Dhoondiah's people are in them all, excepting Havanore. I have heard from Lieut. Col. Maclean that he has been instructed by the Resident at Hyderabad to put himself under my orders, and was preparing to cross the Kistna on the 6th inst.; this river had filled on the 3d. He had not been joined by Saddoolah Khan, or by more of the Nizam's troops than 1000 horse, and with this his force consisted of 1400 infantry and 8 guns. He had not heard from Saddoolah Khan, but he imagined that he was at Bellary, on the right bank of the Toombuddra. I have written to Lieut. Col. Maclean to desire that he will immediately endeavor to communicate with and join himself to Saddoolah Khan; and I have written to this sirdar to request that if he should not already have crossed the Toombuddra, he would make all his preparatory arrangements and pass it immediately, and that he should direct his views

towards forming a junction with Lieut. Col. Maclean; the 2 corps, when joined, are to move towards the Nizam's frontier. I have been informed that Saddoolah Khan is at Copaul: in that case it will not be difficult for Lieut. Col. Maclean to join him.

Ball Kishen Punt arrived in my camp yesterday with 300 or 400 horse. I had already explained to him by letter, of which I sent you a copy, the extent of his Lordship's views in the armament which had been made, and he appeared well disposed to co-operate with me. He assures me that I shall find in the country quantities of forage and grain, and every thing which the troops can want. He says that Appah Sahab and Goklah are gone to Kittoor for the purpose of procuring some money from the polygar, after having obtained which they will move to the southward.

I propose to give over to Ball Kishen Punt all the forts, &c. of which our troops may get possession, excepting those which I may find it convenient or safe to keep.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 123). Camp at Hurryhur, 19th June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 13th inst., with its enclosures, and beg leave to inform you that the circumstances to which they allude had previously come to my knowledge, and, upon inquiry, I found that the matter of which Capt. Macgregor apprised the Board, originated in a mistake of Mr. Gordon, the garrison storekeeper, who, contrary to my instructions, had an intention to purchase grain in this neighbourhood for the purpose of storing it at Chittledroog, whereas my orders to him were to purchase all the grain, which he should lay in at and to the southward of Sern. The Rajah's dewan misconceived the arrangement that had been concerted with him for the purpose of facilitating that measure, as also for supplying the cavalry; and, under that misconception, wrote the Marhatta letter which was sent to you. I have, however, the satisfaction to state, that no inconvenience was felt from those mistakes; that no grain has been purchased here by Mr. Gordon's people; that if there should hereafter be any want of grain for the cavalry horses, it cannot be attributed to that cause.

I shall take care that the usual survey reports and estimates shall be transmitted to the Board, for the repairs of the 6 pounder carriages sent into Chittledroog, previous to any work being undertaken.

The necessity of again troubling the Board with a similar charge to that of Capt. Macintire's for ammunition boxes (undertaken to be made by that officer solely on account of the emergency of the service and of the inability, at that period, of the Commissary of supplies to furnish them) will not exist, the Commissary of supplies having since had it in his power to provide himself with an establishment equal to answer any demands that may hereafter be made upon him.

I enclose an indent for felling and hand axes; there are very few in this country, and they are much required.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. (p. 123).

Camp at Hurryhur, 19th June, 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th inst. As it has been found necessary to remove the paddy from one granary to an-

other, it is proper that coolies should be employed to remove it, and that they should be paid for so doing. I rather imagine you have heretofore communicated with the Military Board upon this subject: you will in that case act according to what they may have directed, whether the coolies are to be paid in paddy or otherwise. I do not know whether it is intended that the captured property should defray the expense of removal of this paddy from one granary to another.

To Major Brown (p. 123).

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th inst. As Lieut. Col. Montresor is of opinion that the garrison of Nuggur cannot spare more people than two companies of 70 R. and F. each, you will send them of that strength with the treasure, instead of that which I heretofore ordered.

To Lieut. Col. Saxon (p. 123).

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I have to request that you will be so kind as to order the Commissary of stores at Seringapatam to make up a 3 pounder carriage and limber, and to equip it with the necessary stores; and you will send it when finished to Major Cuppage, upon his requisition. The Commissary of stores will receive from the Commissary of supply such articles as he will want for the construction of this carriage, &c., upon his indent, which I beg you will countersign. I also request that you will communicate to the Commissary of supply my orders to comply with this indent.

Major Cuppage will want a tumbril for 3 pounder ammunition, and I beg that you will be so kind as to desire the Commissary of stores to put in repair one of those which have been surveyed, and to repair which orders have been given by the Military Board. If all these have been repaired and are already in use, you will be so kind as to assemble a committee to survey one of the tumbrils in store: let an estimate be made of the repairs required, send the proceedings and estimate to me, and I will order the repairs.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 123).

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose an indent which I have made upon the stores at Seringapatam for certain articles which will be wanted by the troops in the field, and are to be forwarded to Chittledroog. I have desired that two iron 12 pounders might be prepared at the latter place, in case I should have occasion to call for them.

Major Cuppage is in the field in the Nundydroog district, with a detachment, and heretofore found a 3 pounder of the greatest use in that part of the country; the carriages of those now at Seringapatam are entirely unserviceable, and I have therefore written to the commanding officer there to request that he will have one 3 pounder carriage made, and that he will send it to Major Cuppage, properly equipped, upon his requisition.

To the Adj. Gen., Bombay (p. 123).

Camp at Hurryhur, 20th June, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received



from Col. Sartorius, by which you will perceive that he has not found it necessary to make a larger advance to the irregular mophals, on their being discharged, than one month's pay.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 126).

Camp at Hurryhur, 21st June, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose you descriptions and estimates of repairs made to the buildings occupied as barracks by the troops at Chittledroog. These buildings have been repaired under the inspection of the Commanding officers, by working parties of their corps, for want of other people at that place.

I likewise enclose a description of certain works wanting to the fort of Hullball, in Soonda; and, as they are very trifling, and it is possible that that fort may be attacked, I have requested that they may be executed by the officer in command of that place, as Capt. Johnson, of the Bombay Engineers, whose report I enclose, was obliged to return to the coast on account of his health.

To Lieut. Col. Close (p. 126).

Camp at Hurryhur, 21st June, 1800.

I enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from Major Blaquiere regarding the complaint of a bazaar man at Bangalore, about cumlies purchased by Mr. Ward.

Yesterday I sent a patrol to Arnee, to reconnoitre the place, meaning to attack it this day, as soon as some ladders were made. It was evacuated last night; my troops are now in the fort, and I propose that it should be delivered over to Bull Kishen Punt this afternoon.

I hear that Dhoondiah is gone to the northward.

To Major Gen. Braithwaite (p. 126).

Camp at Hurryhur, 21st June, 1800.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 16th inst. I am sorry to hear of the desertion among the followers of the 25th dragoons: I suspected something of the kind, as well in regard to them as to the palanquin boys sent to me. Not one of either of the sets, one of 150, the other of 108 boys, has yet arrived at Bangalore. Blaquiere tells me that they get too large an advance at Madras, which, if it be true, is certainly one cause of their desertion. However, it matters not; I have a good number of doolies, and I expect a few more, and my Europeans keep their health in a most extraordinary manner. The Natives who have been at Chittledroog are sickly, and I shall be obliged to leave some of them here, where they will recover, and be hereafter a great security to my convoys.

I will do every thing in my power to procure recruits: we must enlist them, and allow them to remain at the place where they were enlisted for a year or two. Those enlisted in camp will never much mind moving, but the others cannot bear to quit their own country.

I am glad you approve of the arrangement for Capt. Scott and Mr. Francke: I have been so busy that I have not yet had time to send up the orders upon the subject. I find Capt. Scott very satisfactory and useful.

Before now you will have heard that the Peshwah has consented to my entering the Marhatta territory in any force I please. I have got over

the river all the cavalry, all the Europeans and their provisions, all the guns, the great bazaar, and many brinjarrics. To-morrow I shall have over the store department, and nearly all the other corps. The 25th dragoons will not join me till the 24th. I sent a patrol yesterday to Arnee, to reconnoitre the fort, meaning to attack it this morning as soon as some scaling ladders should be made; but it was evacuated during the night. My people are now in it, and I give it over this evening to Ball Kishen Punt.

My convoys must come this way, and I believe after all it is the best. The river below the junction is a mile broad, and very difficult to pass; although Tippoo certainly passed it there in front of a Marhatta army, after he had been at Adoni, and on his way to Savanore, in his war of 1786. I hear that Dhoondiah has left Savanore and is gone to the northward; I conclude to attack Appah Sahab if it be true that he has left Savanore. I will make inquiries regarding the possibility of making tents in this country.

To Lieut. Col. Mignan (p. 126).

Camp at Hurryhur, 21st June, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose you the extract of a letter which I have received from the Sec. of Government upon the subject of your wish to have powers given to you to try and punish offenders by military process in the province of Canara. In obedience to the orders of government, as therein expressed, I hereby authorise you to bring to trial by military process, and to punish with death if necessary, all persons who may be found in open hostility against the British government, or caballing for the purpose of disturbing the tranquillity, or of exciting disaffection in the territories of the Company.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 126).

Camp at Hurryhur, 21st June, 1800.

I have the pleasure to enclose an extract of a letter which I have received from the Adj. Gen. at Bombay, and the copy of a paper therein enclosed.

I arrived here on the 15th inst., and have been since employed in the passage of the Toombuddra, which has filled. I have, however, got across the river the largest proportion of my troops, provisions, and stores. Dhoondiah Waugh is at Savanore with the greatest part of his army; a small body of cavalry only are on this side of the Werdah. I yesterday sent a patrol to reconnoitre the fort of Arnee, on the left bank of the Toombuddra, about 6 miles below this place, and I intended to have attacked the fort this morning: it was evacuated, however, in the night, and my troops took possession of it this day.

I beg that you will be so kind as to communicate to the Commissioners in Malabar that part of this letter relating to my operations.

To Lieut. Col. Dalrymple (p. 126).

Camp at Hurryhur, 21st June, 1800.

I was in hopes that I should have had the advantage of your assistance in the command of the force which I perceive by your letter of the 9th has been ordered from Hyderabad under Lieut. Col. Bowser. I think that you would have had another opportunity of giving Dhoondiah a

defeat, and the public service would certainly have derived great advantage from your experience in that species of warfare, to say no more immediately to yourself. However, we must do our best. I have formidable accounts of Dhoondiah's force, and he certainly has got possession of the entire province of Savanore. My force, however, is, I hope, more than a match for him. I hear that he went off from Savanore on the 19th towards Hoobly: if he be really gone there, it is either to attack Appah Sahib, or to make a dash into our province of Soonda. But the Marhattas think that he will rather prefer the Nizam's country to any other, and that he will enter the Doonab. He has but few people on this side of the Werdah, and we shall soon have that entirely settled: his people evacuated Arnee last night. The largest part of my troops, stores, &c., are across the river, and I hope ere long to be able to give some account of this fellow.

I am much obliged to Orr for his sketch of the country. Col. Stevenson is with me, and is well.

To Col. Stevenson (p. 126).

Camp at Hurrybur, 21st June, 1800.

I received information last night, which has been confirmed this day, that a party of cavalry went yesterday from Ramnee Bednore to a place called Timun-cotta, that they were to go thence to Rutnambully, and that they were to hang upon our frontier there in order to impede and prevent, if they could, the junction of a battalion of sepoys coming up from Soonda. It is very desirable, on many accounts, that this party which is in our rear, and consists of about 600 horse, as it is said, should be driven off, and that the country in our rear should be settled. For this purpose I shall be obliged to you if you will to-morrow take the 1st and 4th regts., and, if you think it necessary, the 1st batt. 8th regt. and their guns, and proceed up the river to Hulloor, and operate against this detachment according to the information which you will receive. Ramchunder Punt, a principal man of the Bhow, will accompany you, and will settle the country; and as soon as you find that this party has left that part of the country, which I think it probable they will do immediately that they hear that you approach them, I beg that you will return to join me at this place. I write this night to the officer commanding the battalion of Bombay sepoys, on his march, to put him on his guard: and if in consequence of your going to that part of the country this banditti should leave it, I shall be obliged to you if you will write him a line to inform him of his safety, and direct it to the officer commanding the 1st batt. 4th regt., and send it to the amildar at Shikarpoor to be delivered to him as he passes. I enclose you a rough sketch of the country, which will give you some idea of the relative situations of the places.

You will probably not get to Hulloor to-morrow. I do not recommend it to you to wait for Ramchunder Punt, but I will take care that he shall follow you.

I send you some proclamations.

The 1st of the 4th ought to be at Hoonelly by about the 25th; they ought therefore to be near Ondagunny and Shikarpoor to-morrow or next day.

To the Officer commg. 1st batt. 4th Bombay regt. (p. 126).

21st June, 1800.

I have received information that a body of Dhoondiah's cavalry is gone towards the frontier near Shikarpoor and Ondagunny, with a view to interrupting your junction with me. I have sent a detachment against them under the orders of Col. Stevenson, and I have desired that officer to write to you to Shikarpoor. This letter is merely to put you on your guard, as I have no apprehension whatever for your safety, and I beg that you will proceed on your march as directed without loss of time.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 130).

Camp, opposite Hurryhur, 25th June, 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th inst. When I heard from Lieut. Col. Maclean, he had with him 2 battalions of the Hon. Company's Native infantry, consisting of about 1400 men and 8 guns, and he had besides 1000 of his Highness the Nizam's cavalry. Saddoolah Khan's detachment consists, I have been informed, of 1760 cavalry and 4504 infantry, with 8 guns. If this detachment should join Lieut. Col. Maclean, which I have requested they would, and if they really consist of the numbers stated, I do not conceive that it will be necessary to call for a reinforcement of cavalry; but as there has been no communication between Lieut. Col. Maclean and Saddoolah Khan, as the latter is supposed to be south of the Toombuddra, and it is therefore probable that a considerable time will elapse before he can join with the former, I deem it very desirable that he should be reinforced before he advances far towards the frontier. I wrote to Capt. Kirkpatrick on the 16th inst., to request that, if possible, the 3d regt. of cavalry and the grenadiers of the detachment at Hyderabad might be added to Lieut. Col. Maclean's corps; they were at one time ordered to march under Lieut. Col. Bowser, but I understand that it has since been found necessary to detain them at Hyderabad.

It is very desirable that Lieut. Col. Maclean's detachment should be reinforced, either by a junction with Saddoolah Khan, which I have desired both parties to endeavor to effect, or by a reinforcement from the northward of the Kistna, before he advances to the frontier.

To Lieut. Col. Saxon (p. 130).

Camp, on the Toombuddra, 26th June, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 23d inst. and its enclosure, being the copy of one which you have received from Mr. Gordon regarding the retrenchment of working money to a serjeant and 2 matrosses employed under a general committee on the captured military stores in Seringapatam. These men were employed by order of the late Commander in Chief, which I communicated to you. Whether they were to be paid by the public or by the prize agents was not stated; but whether by the one or the other eventually, there appears to be no doubt but that as the property from the proceeds of which they might be paid, if they are to receive their money from the prize agents, is retained by order of government, the government will have no objection to allowing the persons employed about this property to be paid by the paymaster, until the final arrangement regarding it is made. If this matter is represented to the military Auditor Gen., he will probably allow Mr. Gordon to pay the

working money, and carry it to the account of the captured stores. Mr. Gordon has already an account open under this head.

I shall take measures in consequence of the copy of a letter from Capt. Macleod, which you have enclosed. The detachment for Coimbatore is, I conclude, gone on, and must remain near Capt. Macleod till it is decided that the money is not to be sent from thence.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 130). Camp, on the Toombuddra, 26th June, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose extracts of orders which I have issued to the troops under my command, and which will require the confirmation of government.

I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Lieut. Col. Torin, in which I make an arrangement for the care of the sick men of the 1st regt. of cavalry. This corps had suffered much by sickness in the neighbourhood of Chittledroog, several sopoys had deserted, and the men in general appeared disheartened. Under these circumstances I trust that his Lordship will approve of the arrangement made.

As the 1st of the 1st and 1st of the 8th Native infantry were nearly in a similar state, I desired that such men of those corps as were in Chittledroog should be removed from thence with those belonging to the 1st regt. of cavalry.

To the Adjutant General (p. 132.) Camp at Ramree Bednore, 27th June, 1800.

It appeared to me that I should be better supplied with forage at this place than on the bank of the Toombuddra, where the troops had been encamped for a considerable length of time, that I should be better situated for clearing out the southern part of this country towards the Rajah's frontier; and that I should find no difficulty in receiving the further reinforcements coming from the Carnatic and Soonda, and an additional number of brinjaries, which are necessary to me, and I accordingly marched here this morning.\*

To the Sec. of Government (p. 133). Camp at Ramree Bednore, 28th June, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Capt. Grant, enclosing one which he has received from Mr. Gordon regarding a retrenchment from his accounts as barrack master of certain charges for purdahs furnished for the barracks of the artillery, 33d regt., and Scotch brigade, by order of the late Commander in Chief, in May, 1799. This order was given to Capt. Grant by me, by the desire of the Commander in Chief, and as the monsoon was about to set in at the time, they were absolutely necessary in order to shelter the men from the weather: their barracks were open choultries. I hope that a consideration of these circumstances will induce his Lordship to confirm this order, which I always conceived had been laid before him by Lieut. Gen. Harris.

I likewise enclose a letter from Capt. Grant and an enclosure from Lieut. Knox, the fort adjutant of Seringapatam. It appears that Lieut. Knox's expense and trouble have been considerably increased in conse-

\* The remaining part of this letter is a copy of that to the Sec. of Gov. at p. 132.

quence of his having paid soldiers and sepoy's belonging to nearly every corps in the army by my orders, which duty was before performed by an officer stationed at Seringapatam only for that purpose, and receiving full batta for doing it. I must take this opportunity of bearing testimony of the diligence and attention of Lieut. Knox to the men under his charge, and I beg leave to recommend him to the favorable notice of government.

I yesterday transmitted to the Commander in Chief an account of the capture of the fort of Rannee Bednore by the advanced guard of this detachment under the orders of Lieut. Col. Money Penny, which I conclude he will have laid before government.

To the Adjutant General (p. 133).                      Camp at Rannee Bednore, 20th June, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Major Spry, of the 77th regt. I shall be obliged to you if you will lay my request before the Commander in Chief, that I may be permitted to return to Major Spry his letter to Col. Stevenson of the 31st May, and that he may be released from his arrest. I hope that the Commander in Chief will grant this request, and as before your answer could reach me it is probable that it might be difficult for Major Spry to join this detachment, I propose to give him permission to leave Chittledroog in order to join his corps.

To Capt. Brown (p. 133).                      Camp at Rannee Bednore, 30th June, 1800.

I hear that the 3 troops of the 19th dragoons have arrived at Bangalore with the arms, but that they halt there for further orders; I wished that they should come on immediately with the arms intended for Chittledroog, but upon looking over the letters upon this subject I perceive that this wish is not so clearly expressed as it ought to be.

It may be convenient to Capt. Kennedy to join the remainder of the regiment following under Major Paterson, and if that should be the case, as this letter will not reach you long before their arrival, I leave it to Capt. Kennedy to move on with his detachment or not, as he may think it most convenient to his corps, to his means of procuring forage, &c. If he should move on, he must bring with him the 1000 stand of arms ordered for Chittledroog; if he should wait for Major Paterson, as it is probable that these arms will considerably delay his march, he must immediately send them forward on the road under a sufficient escort from his detachment; and if the corps should overtake them they will bring them on. My object is, that the arms should come on as soon as possible, as they will delay the march of the 2d division of the 19th, which I am anxious should join me with all convenient expedition; whether they are to be escorted by Capt. Kennedy's whole detachment or by a part of it, will depend upon his sense of his own convenience and of that of his corps.

I give you a good deal of trouble, but you manage my business so well that I am sure you must take pleasure in doing it, and I therefore have no regret in giving it to you. Capt. Kennedy and Major Paterson shall hear from me on their march to and at Chittledroog. Pray present my best respects to Lady Clive and the young ladies.

To Lieut. Col. Cumine (p. 133).

Camp at Raanee Bednore, 30th June, 1800.

It was my duty to report to the Commander in Chief in India the circumstances attending the operations of the detachment under your command at Jemalabad, and my sense of your conduct, and I performed this duty with great pleasure. I have now the honor to enclose you an extract of a letter which I received yesterday from Sir A. Clarke.

To Col. Stevenson (p. 135).

Camp at Raanee Bednore, 1st July, 1800.

I have had the pleasure to receive your letters, and I am glad to find that every thing goes on so well in your part of the country. It is most desirable that every thing should be completely settled there, and that every tannah of Dhoondiah's should be driven out, as I expect that the people about Shikarpoor will continue to bring forward supplies, which they have already commenced to give us. For this reason I should wish you to remain either at Massoor, or somewhere on the frontier, for a few days longer, and act as you may think best to insure the settlement of the country, and the expulsion of every man belonging to Dhoondiah.

Write a letter to the officer commanding the 1st batt. 4th Bombay regt., to desire him to join you either from Ondagunny or Shikarpoor. I do not yet *know* that he has marched from Hullohall, and he may, therefore, not arrive at either of those places till after you will have accomplished the objects above held out to you, and will have marched to join me. If that should be the case, you will order him to follow you by the route of Massoor, &c.

I am sorry that you have not got a sufficiency of provisions for your party of Europeans. It is probable that you will have no further occasion for Capt. Weston's company, and I therefore beg that you will send them back alone by the route of Coopayloor. Keep all the provisions for the artillerymen, and other Europeans, that will remain with you. Provisions for to-morrow, the 2d, will be sent to Coopayloor to meet Capt. Weston's company; and the next day they will receive their provisions in this camp.

I am not quite certain that I shall not march towards Havery before I am joined again by you: it will depend much upon the state of our supplies, which I am happy to tell you are coming in fast.

To Major Walker (p. 135).

Camp at Raanee Bednore, 1st July, 1800.

I have had the honor to receive your letter, and I am concerned to find that there is any probability that the tranquillity of Malabar will be disturbed during the rains.

I may safely venture to say, that Dhoondiah Waugh will not have it in his power to give any assistance whatever to the Pyche Rajah; that he will be too hard pushed to think of any thing but his own safety: but still, the Pyche Rajah may think the period at which the troops in Mysore are employed in this part of the country, a fair opportunity to endeavor to make an impression on Cotiote.

The means of defence and resistance must be looked to in such an event, whatever may be the consequences. The Company's troops having been established in certain posts in the centre of the Cotiote country, and measures having been taken to secure a communication with those posts

from the rear, as well as one between each of them, I never can submit either to suffer them to be insulted, or to withdraw them.

Each post is, I understand, now sufficiently garrisoned for its own defence at least; the town of Tellicherry will afford good cover for a body of troops, which it may be expedient to collect immediately, for the purpose of giving assistance to any post that may be attacked, and I write this day to Col. Sartorius, to desire him to have a watchful eye upon the Pyche Rajah, and to measures for their support the moment that he finds that there is any chance that he will make an attempt upon any of our posts in the Cotiote country. By your letter it would appear that the gentlemen of the Commission are disposed not to have a contest with the Pyche Rajah about the revenue, if he should wish to collect it from Cotiote. I don't know the amount of the revenue, or whether it is worth a contest; but, surely, it cannot be intended to give up all those who have assisted us in establishing ourselves as we have in Cotiote, and whose existence, in all probability, depends upon that of our power in that country. There can be no doubt of our ability to collect the revenue, at least in the western parts of the district; and I imagine that if it is seen that we are not willing to give up a point without contesting it, and that if we proclaim that if any man pays revenue to the Pyche Rajah, he will be obliged, at one time or other, to pay it likewise to the Company, we shall have, at least, as good a chance as the Pyche Rajah of getting the revenue of the eastern part of the district. I offer you this my opinion, with due deference to your superior information; at the same time I must inform you that I never shall suffer the posts in Cotiote to be withdrawn or insulted as long as there is a man in Malabar who can be sent to their support.

My operations in this part of the country are going on to my satisfaction. On the 27th of June I marched here, and I found this place in possession of Dhoondiah's garrison, consisting of 500 men. I attacked the fort with my advanced guard, and carried it by escalade, without the loss of a man on our side, and the greatest part of the garrison were killed. My detachments have cleared the whole country on this side of the Werdah of Dhoondiah's people; and my communication with the Rajah of Mysore's territories, on both sides of the Toombuddra, is perfectly free. I propose to march forward to-morrow or next day, and I will take care to keep the gentlemen of the Commission informed of whatever may happen,

To Col. Sartorius (p. 135).

Camp at Rannee Bednore, 1st July, 1800.

I have received a letter from Major Walker, by which I perceive that there is some chance that the posts in Cotiote will be attacked by the Pyche Rajah. He doubts whether his information be founded; but whether it is or not, I judge that the gentlemen of the Commission are rather inclined to temporize, and that rather than have a contest, they will resign to the Pyche Rajah all the revenue of Cotiote. I have nothing to do with the revenue, but I have with the honor and safety of the troops; and although they are given in a private letter, you will understand what follows to be my positive orders.

As soon as you will find from Capt. Moncrieff, who will, of course, have the best intelligence of the Pyche Rajah's intentions and movements,



that he means to make an attack upon Cotiote, or if you should have intelligence upon which you can rely of such a design from any other quarter, you will immediately take measures for assembling, at Tellicherry, such a body of troops as you may think can be spared from the other parts of Malabar in order to oppose him; and you are to support the posts in Cotiote at all events.

I understand that you have plenty of provisions at Cotaparamba for any number of troops that can be collected in Malabar; that the posts in advance are well supplied; and I therefore foresee no possible inconvenience from a contest with the Pyche Rajah in Cotiote at the present moment, which we should not feel from a contest with him at any other that he might prefer.

I carried this fort by escalade on the 27th of June, without any loss on our side; and the greatest part of the garrison, consisting of 500 men, were killed. Nearly all Dhoondiah's people are withdrawn from this side of the Werdah; and my communication, both with Bednore and the countries on the other side of the Toombuddra, is free and secure. Matters are going on as well as I could wish.

To Lieut. Col. Close (p. 135).

Camp at Ramree Bednore, 2d July, 1800.

I have received your letter of the 28th June, and I am glad to find that Bowser was likely to march on the 18th. I heard from government upon the same subject. The stronger Bowser is the better; the other battalion therefore will be an acquisition of importance. It is reported that Goklah has been beat somewhere near Kittoor; his yakeel, however, Lingo Punt, says that it is not true, and that he is in a position so strong that Dhoondiah cannot approach him. I thought it extraordinary that, being safe on the other side of the Malpoorba, he should have thought of crossing that river until we should have crossed the Werdah, and should be near enough to assist him in case he should be attacked. To this Lingo Punt says, that Kittoor and the neighbourhood are Goklah's jaghire; that when Dhoondiah went to Hoobly, he was fearful that they would be plundered, and that he crossed the river for their preservation. He was well aware when he did so of the probability that Dhoondiah would come down upon him, but he knew also that he could place himself in security in Kittoor.

Whatever may be the true state of the case regarding his position at Kittoor, I suspect that he crossed the Malpoorba because he heard that the Kolapoor Rajah had sent a body of troops to the assistance of Dhoondiah, which probably gave him some anxiety for his rear, and that he thought that our advancing would keep Dhoondiah about Savanore, and that he would not move towards him.

We get up some few brinjaries, and I propose to move forward towards Havery to-morrow. Matters are settled in our rear towards Shikarpoor, and we have even received some supplies from thence. I do not believe that there is now a horseman on this side of the Werdah. No account yet of the Bombay battalion.

I return Munro's letter, which I think a very curious production. His idea of Gordon is very correct: I have been obliged to send back many of his letters for want of one specific proposition upon any subject. I

have heard from Lieut. Col. Mignan regarding the proposal to store grain, and he is of opinion that it is not necessary in any part of Canara. I have a report from Nuggur that Jemalabad is in our possession again, the garrison (excepting 4 men) having contrived to get over the rock in the night on the side which was not blockaded. This is not very glorious, but it is fortunate, and I propose immediately to order into Soonda the flank companies of the corps which is there, and into this country those of the corps now with this detachment. By a letter from Major Walker it appears that the Pyche Rajah has thoughts of coming into Cotiote. We must look to the support of our posts in that country, and if Canara remains quiet, it may probably be necessary to bring to Tellicherry one of the 4 battalions which are in that province. This arrangement, however, is in contemplation only in case it should be absolutely necessary. I have had a letter from Major Munro about the ghauts, and making arrangements for the settlement of the country in our rear. This is certainly very necessary, but it is nearly accomplished by the Bhow's people; and I am afraid that the assumption of the civil government by Munro would be looked upon as a breach of faith in us. Ball Kishen Bhow has proposed that Ram Rao's peons should be introduced into this country; and as soon as I can see Ram Rao, and ascertain from him whether a few of them can be spared for a short time, I will decide whether I will call upon him for their assistance, and the stations which they shall occupy.

When all these large bodies of troops are collected in the districts of Savanore and Darwar, I shall tremble for their subsistence. Soonda produces literally nothing, and these countries nothing but dry grain, which our people don't like. Bowser tells me he has no brinjarries; but I write to Capt. Kirkpatrick upon that subject. Upon the whole, however, it is very clear that we must depend upon Mysore and the brinjarries from that side.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 135).

Camp at Ramree Bednore, 2d July, 1800.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received a report from Nuggur stating that Jemalabad is again in our possession, and I have reason to believe it to be well founded. If it should be so, Lieut. Col. Mignan will be able to afford you some assistance in case the Pyche Rajah should enter Cotiote. I beg that you will immediately open a correspondence with him and ascertain how this matter stands, and if you find that he is of opinion that he can spare you a battalion consistently with the preservation of the peace in Canara, you will call for it if you should find it absolutely necessary. You are not, however, to call for this battalion unless it is perfectly clear to you that the Pyche Rajah intends to enter the Cotiote country during the rains.

To Lieut. Col. Mignan (p. 135).

Camp at Ramree Bednore, 2d July, 1800.

I received a report yesterday from Nuggur which I have some reason to believe is well founded, stating that the fort of Jemalabad is again in our possession. If this should be the case, and any of the garrison should have fallen into our hands, I conclude that you will treat them as you have been ordered by Major Gen. Brathwaite. Under the idea that this

report is true, I beg that you will make the following arrangements. The flank companies of the 2d of the 4th are to join their corps in Soonda as soon as may be practicable, and you will be so kind as to correspond with the commanding officer in that province in order to ascertain which route would be the best for them to take. It appears to me that they might move by Bilghy and Chandergooty and Soonda to Hullihall, and that they would meet with no impediment excepting that which is the consequence of the season.

I write to the commanding officer in Soonda this day, and I inform him that these companies will take this route, and I desire him to send orders to alter it if he should think any other more convenient. The companies of the 2d of the 2d are to join their corps, which is in the field with this detachment. They are to proceed by Jemalabad up the Cardagall ghant to Oostara, from thence by Saerapatan, Turrikerra, Benkypoor, to Hooley Honore, and along the Toombuddra to Hurrayhur. At Hurrayhur they will receive further orders from me. You will be so kind as to take care that all these troops have a sufficiency of money to last till they reach the place of their destination; and you will caution the officers commanding them not to suffer their followers or others to do any injury to the country of the Company or of the Rajah of Mysore. I have received intelligence which makes it probable that the Pyche Rajah will move into Coticote and attack our posts in that district. These must be supported.

The re-capture of Jemalabad and the generally peaceable state of Canara may enable you to detach one battalion into Malabar if Col. Sartorius should find it necessary to call for it. I have desired him to correspond with you upon this subject, and to find out from you whether it will be possible for you to afford him this assistance consistently with the preservation of the peace in Canara. He has my orders not to make a requisition for a battalion unless he finds it absolutely necessary, and that it should be unattended with inconvenience to the affairs in Canara that you should detach it.

P. S. I am afraid that the march of the companies of the 2d of the 4th from Mangalore to Bilghy will be scarcely practicable at this season of the year. If that should be the case, they may ascend the Cardagall ghant and march with those of the 2d of the 2d as far as opposite Hoonnally on the Toombuddra, where they will cross that river and move by Shikarpoor to Chandergooty and thence into Soonda. I have apprised the commanding officer in Soonda that it may be necessary that they should take this route.

To the Officer commg., Hullihall (p. 135). Camp at Ramree Bednore, 2d July, 1800.

I am much surprised that I should not have received from you any accounts of the probable time of the march of the 1st batt. 4th regt, and that you should not even have mentioned them in any of your letters, the last of which, dated the 25th June, I have just received.

I have reason to believe that we have again got possession of Jemalabad, and in expectation that the report which I have received upon this subject is well founded I have written this day to Lieut. Col. Mignan to desire that the flank companies of the 2d of the 4th now in Canara may be sent to join their corps in Soonda without delay. They will ascend the Bilghy

ghaut and will march by Chandergooty and Soonda to Hullihall, if it should be practicable to move them through Canara as far as the Bilghy ghaut at this season of the year. If that should not be practicable, they will ascend the Curdagall ghaut to Oustara, and move through the Mysore country along the Toombuddra to Hoonelly, and from thence by the usual route into Soonda. If you should have reason to think that any other road into Soonda would be more favorable or convenient, you will be so kind as to apprise Lieut. Col. Mignan thereof.

To Lieut. Col. Bowser (p. 135).

Camp at Ramee Bednore, 2d July, 1800.

I have to inform you that I shall move towards the Werdah to-morrow, which river I propose to cross as soon as I shall have been joined by some brinjaries coming up in my rear. You will be so kind as to proceed as pointed out in my letter to Lieut. Col. Maclean of the 6th June. If you should be joined with that officer, there will be no reason for waiting for Saddoolah Khan; your detachment alone will be sufficiently strong, and you will proceed to the frontier, and allow that sirdar to follow you. Take the earliest and every opportunity of apprising me of your situation.

It is very desirable that you should bring with you a supply of rice, as the Savanore country produces only dry grain; and as large armies have been in that country for some time, it is probable that even the dry grain is scarce.

To Col. Stevenson (p. 135).

Camp at Ramee Bednore, 2d July, 1800.

I have received your letter of yesterday, and I propose to march to-morrow morning towards Havery. When you will find that every thing towards the frontier is settled, and in possession of the Bhow's people, I shall be obliged to you if you will join me at Havery. I have heard nothing of the Bombay battalion, although I have received letters from Hullihall as late as the 25th June. If you should be able to march for Havery before they join you, leave orders for them at Shikarpoor to follow you there by the shortest road.

It is reported here that Dhoondiah has beat Goklah. Goklah's vakeel denies it; but it does not appear to me to be quite certain that the report is not founded.

I think we had better allow the tappall to run as usual. That at Shikarpoor is managed by a Native writer, who is rather young in the business; and I am afraid that he will be puzzled by an increase of lines on which letters are sent.

I have a report from Nuggur, which I believe to be founded, that we have regained possession of Jemalabad.

To Lieut. Col. Close (p. 136).

Camp 3 miles south of Havery, 3d July, 1800.

I am sorry to inform you that I have every reason to believe that Goklah has been beat. It appears that he was about to retire from his position near Kittoor, that he had sent off his baggage, and remained himself to cover the rear with about 250 horse. Dhoondiah attacked this body, cut it to pieces, and it is said that Goklah was killed. The main body was then pursued, and it is said that all the guns, &c., fell into the hands of Dhoondiah. The horse escaped, some to Darwar, where

they are now in the service of Bappjee Scindiah, and others to Hullihall, in Soonda, with Chintomeny Rao, where they are now supposed to be. Dhoondiah pursued this last party to Hullihall, and left them when he found they were there in safety. This is a bad business, and entirely unaccountable. I am at a loss to find a reason why Goklah crossed the Malpoorba, till he was certain that I was within reach to give him assistance. I believe that he must have passed that river before I passed the Toombuddra; certainly he did so, long before he could have heard that I was in this country, and prepared to move forward. Your accounts of the conspiracies in Mysore, &c., are very extraordinary; the people must be mad. Nothing will answer effectually but to put this Dhoondiah down, and severity with his adherents who may be caught.

I don't think that the loss of Goklah's army will make much difference in my plan of operations. I shall seize Savanore if I can, and unless I see a fair opportunity of getting at him without the possibility of his escaping, I propose to wait till Bowser's corps can be brought to co-operate. I have no doubt but that I am fully strong enough, but there is no use in giving him a fruitless pursuit.

The brinjaries come on by degrees, and I get supplies (but of dry grain) from the country. This has enabled me to strike off much of the consumption of rice, and I have now reduced it to but little more than half a seer per day for every fighting man. It is impossible to expect to supply an army with rice in this part of the country. It must all be drawn from the distant parts of Mysore, and that cannot be done without a larger number of cattle than, I am afraid, the brinjaries have at this moment. For warfare in the Marhatta country, we ought to have a post at Hurryhur, with granaries, &c. &c.

I should like much to have Bistnapah Pundit. He is an intelligent fellow, who knows much of this country, and he is well known and respected in it. He might join me without his troops, and his absence from them would not, probably, be attended with any bad consequences.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 138).

Camp, right of the Werdah, 7th July, 1800.

After I had got possession of Rannee Bednore, on the 27th June, I thought it desirable to settle the country towards the frontier of Bednore, and to drive Dhoondiah's people out of the forts of which they had got possession. I sent Col. Stevenson with a sufficient detachment on this service, which has been performed to my satisfaction. The whole country on this side of the Werdah is cleared of the enemy, and my communication with Hurryhur, and with the countries on this side of the Toombuddra, is uninterrupted. It is very clear, however, that the people are very averse to the government of the Bhow's family, whether from a recollection of former oppressions, or from a sense of their inability to give them adequate protection, I can't say; but it is certain that they are desirous of a change.

During the time that Col. Stevenson was employed towards the Rajah's frontier, I advanced first to Havery, and then to this river; and I am now making my arrangements to pass it. I hope to be able to throw a bridge across; and I propose to construct a redoubt on this side, and to establish here a post for the care of the bridge and of my boats, and as

will give him more stability in the country, or to drive from the frontiers of Soonda the people who have been in that province for the last month.

This country produces nothing but dry grain, of which I receive an abundance from it; but as the Sepoys and followers of the Company's armies are accustomed to rice, and unwillingly use any other grain, it is difficult to supply their consumption in a country so far removed as this is from those in Mysore which produce rice. The brinjaries, however, are coming on by degrees; I draw some rice from the Bednore country, and I hope to draw some from Soonda as soon as the frontier will have been cleared. I have heard from Lieut. Col. Mignan that the hill fort of Jemalabad is in our possession, the holders of it having found means to make their escape over the rock. They left in the fort 4 sepoys of the 2d of the 3d Bombay regt., whom they had taken prisoners there. About 50 of them, I understand, have since been taken by a party of sepoys, who had been detached in pursuit of them, aided by the people of the country; and I hear from Lieut. Col. Mignan that there are hopes of taking the ringleader.

To Lieut. Col. Saxon (p. 139).

Camp, right of the Werdah, 8th July, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter from the Secretary of the Military Board. You will be so kind as to obey the orders which it contains, without loss of time.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 130).

Camp, 10th July, 1800.

I enclose the copy of an estimate of the expense of repairs necessary to the buildings occupied by the troops at Anantpoor, and a description of those necessary at Moondnagoor, in Soonda, which I have desired may be carried into execution.

To the Adj. Gen., Bombay (p. 139).

Camp, left of the Werdah, 10th July, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that Jemalabad is again in our possession. The banditti who were in it contrived to make their escape, on the night of the 24th or 25th June, over a part of the rock which was supposed impracticable, and they left in the fort 4 men of the 2d of the 3d Bombay regt., whom they had taken in it. The officer in command of the blockade dispatched parties in pursuit of them, who, I understand, have, with the assistance of the people of the country, taken about 50. Lieut. Col. Mignan informs me that he has hopes that he will be able to take Jerim Naig, the leader. He proposed to try all that were taken, who were in general deserters from the Company's service; and to put in execution the sentences which should be passed upon them, in different parts of the province of Canara.

Having regained possession of Jemalabad, I have ordered the companies detached into Canara from the 2d of the 2d, and 2d of the 4th, to be sent to join their respective corps without delay, in obedience to the orders of Major Gen. Bowles. The companies of the 2d of the 4th will, I am afraid, find some difficulty in reaching their corps. Dhoondiah beat Goklah's army and killed Goklah near Darwar, on the 29th or 30th of last month, and the beaten army fled and was pursued to the ground under the walls of Hullihall in Soonda. This has prevented the 1st of

the 4th from marching to join me in the field; and the 2 battalions of the 4th regt. are now in Hullihall, and the whole of Goklah's army under its walls. The number of cavalry which must be in the neighbourhood of Hullihall will, for some time at least, render it difficult for so small a body as 2 companies to march thither. These 2 companies shall, however, join their corps as soon as possible.

I have taken advantage of the fall of Jemalabad, from which I expect as a consequence that the province of Canara will be in complete tranquillity, to desire that Lieut. Col. Mignan will, if possible, reinforce Col. Sartorius with one battalion. To this I have been induced from hearing that the Pyche Rajah has manifested designs against our posts in Cotiote, which every principle of honor and policy determines me to support at all events. This battalion, however, is to be called for only in case of absolute necessity, and is to be given only in case it should be perfectly convenient.

The soubahdar, about whose conduct I enclosed a report from Lieut. Col. Williamson, in my letter of the 17th June, is called Ibrahim Khan, and he bears an excellent character in the service.

To Lieut. Col. Palmer (p. 140).

Camp 5 miles S. of Savanore, 11th July, 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th June, and the packets from Bombay sent by the bearer. Before you receive this, you will have heard that Dhoondiah Waugh has fought and defeated Goklah's force between Darwar and Hullihall, in Soonda; that the latter was killed, and that his troops had fled to Hullihall, under the walls of which place they are now in safety. Dhoondiah pursued them till his advance was fired upon from Hullihall. I have written to some of the chiefs who are in Hullihall, and wounded, to desire that they will keep the troops together, and to inform them of my intention to move towards them as soon as possible. I had requested Goklah not to cross the Malpoorba till he was certain that I had crossed the Werdah, and was sufficiently near to give him assistance if he should be attacked. Unfortunately, he crossed that before he could have known that I was across the Toombuddra, and you are acquainted with the consequence. From his having sent to Dhoondiah his mother, his family, and effects, which he had taken last year, and from his vakeel, Lingo Punt, having been in Dhoondiah's camp (as I am informed) immediately before he came to mine, I am induced to believe that he crossed the Malpoorba upon some assurances that he would not be attacked.

I have hitherto regularly given over to Ball Kishen Bhow the forts and country which have fallen into my hands. He is the Dewan of Appah Sahab; and from what you state in your letter of the 28th June, I am afraid that this may not please the Peshwah. I have been induced to adopt this plan as well because it proved the moderation of our views, and showed clearly the real object of our armament, as because it was necessary that the country should be settled by some person, in order that I might have the benefit of its resources. This I have enjoyed hitherto; but if the Peshwah should be desirous that the country should be given over to any other person, there will be no difficulty in making the transfer as soon as Dhoondiah will have been subdued. Till that event takes place,

it is better that no steps should be taken, or indeed much said upon the subject; as, in fact, in no other case will this country belong to any body.

The troops are all across the Werdah. It is said that Dhoondiah is now at Hoobly, and that he is coming this way.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 144).

Camp at Savanore, 18th July, 1800.

On the 11th inst. I heard that Dhoondiah Waugh had advanced to Koondgul, with an intention of giving me battle. At this time my detachment and all their baggage and stores had crossed the Werdah; and it appeared to me to be an object of consequence to get possession of Savanore, as a place into which I could put those articles in safety during the time that I might be engaged with Dhoondiah. I accordingly marched to Savanore on the 12th. On the 13th, in the evening, I learnt that Dhoondiah had come from Koondgul, to within 2 coss of my camp on that morning, and that he had returned towards Koondgul. Dhoondiah went off in the night of the 13th to Carwah, about 18 miles from thence, as soon as he heard of my intention to march; so that between the morning of the 13th and that of the 14th he must have marched above 18 coss, or 54 miles. He left a garrison of 600 men in Koondgul, which place was stormed by my troops and carried, with but small loss, on the evening of the 14th. Upon this occasion I had much reason to be satisfied with the conduct of, and the assistance I received from Col. Stevenson, Lieut. Col. Torin, Lieut. Cols. Tolfrey, Major Powis, Capt. Balfour of the artillery, and Capt. Todd and the grenadiers of the 73d.

On the 15th I marched to Luckmaisir, which place was evacuated, and on the 16th to Sirhitty. This last had been invested for the last three weeks, and the siege was raised upon my approach. Dhoondiah went from Carwah on the 15th to the jungles behind Dummul, and from thence to Unygurry, between Dummul and Darwar, at which place he was yesterday morning. I returned to Luckmaisir yesterday, and to this place this day, in order to get my baggage and a supply of provisions. Every thing here has remained in safety during my absence. A large number of brinjaries have come to the redoubt on the Werdah, and will join me this evening, and, if necessary, I could advance again to-morrow. I took advantage of Dhoondiah's marches to the eastward to desire the chiefs of the remnant of Goklah's army to march from Hullahall in Soonda through the jungles to this place. They have not attended to the advice I have given them ever since they have been beat, as they quitted Hullahall, where they were in safety, and went to Darwar on the 15th inst. I have hopes, however, that they will have marched from Darwar on the 16th at night, and if they followed the route which I pointed out to them they will join me to-morrow.

When I found upon my arrival at Koondgul on the 14th that Dhoondiah avoided an action, I issued a proclamation, in which, in the name of the Company, I offered a reward of 30,000 rupees for his person, as I was authorised by the orders of Government of the 25th May. From this measure I expect the best effects, as his people had begun to abandon him, even on the day he fled from Koondgul, and the desertion has increased ever since. It is not impossible but that some of those who will leave him may be desirous to earn the reward, the offer of which, at all events,



will increase his fears and suspicions, their discontents, and the confusion of his camp.

Although from the sudden flight of Dhoondiah I did not attain the object which induced me to march from hence on the 14th inst., some advantages have resulted from it. An opinion of our superiority has been given to our own people, to his, and to the country in general. One of his garrisons has been cut off, we have got possession of Luckmaisir, which is a large and rich place, and have raised the siege of Sirhitty; and if Goklah's sirdars comply with my request, I shall be joined by a body of cavalry which will enable me to commence the pursuit of him in such a manner as that I may hope soon to see the greatest part of his force dispersed. I have heard that Lieut. Col. Brown was not likely to march from Raichore before the 10th inst., and I have no doubt of being able to bring him forward with security, even if he should not be joined by Saddoolah Khan, which I observe is more than probable.

To the Adjutant General (p. 144).

Camp at Savanore, 18th July, 1800.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Sec. of Government, in which I give an account of the proceedings of this detachment since the 7th inst. The troops attacked Koondgul after a march of above 22 miles, and that they had been under arms above 12 hours. The cavalry surrounded the place; the gateway was attacked by the 1st of the 12th, and an endeavor was made to blow it open, while the grenadiers of the 73d regt., under Capt. Todd, supported by those of the 1st of the 8th, escalated the curtain on the opposite side with a spirit which overcame every obstacle. I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the attack of Koondgul: the wounds which were received are in general trifling.

To Lieut. Col. Close (p. 146).

Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have received your letters of the 15th. In regard to Becm Rao, I think that he ought to be brought before a Military Court of Inquiry; and, if you should be of the same opinion, send him to Major Isaacke, with the enclosed letter of instructions. If you should think the inquiry you have made sufficient (not for his conviction, as that is perfectly clear, but) to warrant my giving an order for his execution, I will send the order to Major Isaacke for his execution at Chittledroog, by return of post; and in that case destroy the letter of instructions now enclosed.

To the Officer commg. in Soonda (p. 147).

Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

I hear from Major Munro that the amildar with his peons has been able to retake Bonawassi. I have written to desire him to increase his number of peons as far as possible, and to endeavor to drive the banditti entirely out of the Company's territory. It is very desirable that you should assist him, and probably you will be able to get Budnaghur, by another attempt made in concert with him, and with the assistance of his peons, by the garrison of Moondnagoor. If it cannot be got in that way, I must endeavor to stretch out to that quarter myself; and Budnaghur must be watched by the peons, in order that the people in it may do no mischief till I can approach them.

It is very desirable that some means should be adopted immediately for clearing out that part of Soonda from which I expect hereafter to draw some supplies.

To Major Isaacke (p. 147).

Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

Lieut. Col. Close will deliver to you a prisoner, by name Beem Rao, who is charged with having endeavored to seduce from the service of his Highness the Rajah of Mysore a rissalahdar of horse, in order that he might enter into that of Dhoondiah Waugh. Having been authorised by government to try by military process, and to punish with death, if necessary, persons who might be concerned in intrigues and endeavors to foment disturbances in the territories of the Hon. Company and of the Rajah of Mysore, I desire that you will forthwith assemble a Court of Inquiry, which is to consist of as large a number of officers as can be conveniently assembled, of which Court you are to be president; and that you will inquire into the circumstances stated against Beem Rao, by the examination of evidences against him, and of such as he may have to produce in his own favor. You will transmit to me the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and its report.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 147).

Camp at Savanore, 19th July, 1800.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 8th and its enclosures. My letters to you of the 1st and 2d inst., in which I anticipated the event which has since occurred, will have pointed out to you the measures which I wished you to take; and I am happy to find by yours of the 8th, that you were about to collect a force at Tellicherry.

I have no apprehension whatever for any of the posts in Cotiote, as I find that they are supplied with provisions, and that you are about to take measures for their support. I should imagine that the triangle of which Cotaparamba, Montama, and Canote are the angles, will soon be too hot for the Pyche Rajah, and I do not well see in what other part of Cotiote he will remain. He must then either move into some other district, or he must go up the ghauts: if he does the one, the gentlemen of the Commission will probably be able to oust him by means of the Native agency which you mention; if he does the other, you must, if you think yourself sufficiently strong, push on your roads to the foot of the ghauts, connect them well with your posts, and have every thing in readiness for the time when government will have troops in Mysore at leisure to make an attack on Wynaad from this side, and will give you orders to prepare to take the field. If you are not sufficiently strong to push on your roads, you must content yourself with keeping that portion of country of which we have already got possession by means of our posts. Mananderry must be got from Kydree Amboo if possible, without offending him. I have received a letter from Lieut. Col. Mignan, in which he says that he will be able to give you some assistance.

I marched 22 miles to ongage Dhoondiah on the 14th; he fled, and I stormed the fort of Koondgul, in which he had a garrison of 600 men. I then proceeded to Luekmaisir, which was evacuated, and thence to Sirhitty, the siege of which place was raised upon my approach.

Dhoondiah retired to the jungles behind Dummul, and his people have

already begun to leave him. I have retired here to get my baggage, &c., which I left in Savanore, and I intend to move forward again in a day or two. It is very evident, from what has passed, not only that I am superior to him, but that he knows it.

To the Officer commg. in Soonda (p. 148).

Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

Since I wrote to you yesterday I have been joined by the cavalry which was heretofore under the command of Goklah, and I expect to be joined this evening by that under Chintomeny Rao, which I understand has also marched from Darwar. This has materially altered the circumstances of this army as they relate to forming a junction with the 1st batt. 4th regt. It is not necessary now that I should go towards Darwar, and the 1st of the 4th must therefore act as hereafter pointed out. This corps is to march immediately upon the receipt of this letter with artillerymen and without guns from Hullihall to Moondnagoor; the officer commanding it is to communicate with the amildar Mungush Rao, and in conjunction with him will form a plan for driving out the banditti from the neighbourhood of Budnaghur, Screy, and Bonawassi. He will most probably find himself sufficiently strong to make an attempt upon Budnaghur without guns; but if he should not be so, he will detach 2 companies and the artillerymen from Budnaghur by the route of Hangal and Bancapoor to a redoubt on the other side of the Werdah, about 7 miles from the latter place, and he will make a requisition upon Capt. Doolan, who commands there, for 2 six pounder field pieces, with the assistance of which he will be able undoubtedly to possess himself of Budnaghur. After having performed this service he will march to the Werdah, return his guns to Capt. Doolan if he should have found it necessary to call for them, and remain encamped opposite the redoubt until he receives further orders from me.

You will observe that it will be necessary that the 1st of the 4th should be well supplied with ammunition, and with rice for 6 or 7 days; and it will also be necessary that this corps should receive their pay for July, for which, if I am not misinformed, there are funds at Hullihall. If there are not, you will give my most positive orders to the amildar to furnish them to you; but in case that should not be practicable, I am inclined to hope that the want of money will not stop this corps a second time. Let me hear from you when the corps marches. I have no fear whatever for your garrison, provided you keep up your stock of provisions, to which I trust you pay attention, and upon which subject I beg to hear from you as soon as possible.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 148).

Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

I have the pleasure to inform you that I was joined last night by the cavalry which had been under the orders of Goklah, and that I expect to be joined this day by that under Chintomeny Rao. My whole attention will now be given to bringing forward Lieut. Col. Bowser; and although it has rained heavily for the last 24 hours, which in this country renders the roads impracticable for troops with guns, I hope to be able to march on the day after to-morrow if it should clear up. I have received accounts from Cotiote that a body of troops belong-

ing to the Pyche Rajah had come down the ghauts; a few followers had been cut off upon the roads, and a feeble attempt had been made upon the advanced posts. These, I am informed, are well supplied with provisions and every necessary article to enable them to defend themselves; and on the 1st of this month, in expectation of the attack which has since been made, I desired Col. Sartorius to collect in Tellicherry as large a body of troops as could be spared from other stations in Malabar, and he will have no difficulty in marching them to the support of any of the advanced posts, or even, in my opinion, in driving the Pyche Rajah from the western part of the Cotiate district. In what manner he is to be entirely subdued is a question which will be decided hereafter, when there will be less occupation for the troops. Besides the troops which Col. Sartorius will be able to collect from the stations in Malabar, he will be further reinforced from Canara, should he require it.

I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have received from Major Blaquiére of the 25th light dragoons. Government have already decided upon a similar application made by the officers commanding troops in the 25th dragoons; but as Major Blaquiére has written to me upon the subject, it is proper that I should inform you that, from what I have seen of the 25th dragoons and their horses, I am persuaded that the latter would be unfit for service in a short time if the saddle bags were added to the weight which they at present carry. The dragoons will not pay the expense of their carriage, as they have a right to expect that they should be carried for them, if not upon their horses, by some other means; and under these circumstances, if it be really an advantage, or indeed necessary, that the saddle bags should not be on the horses, his Lordship will probably think it proper that the expense should be defrayed by the public rather than by the captains of troops.

I have likewise the honor to enclose a letter from Capt. Scott. His zeal and abilities are well known, and it is not necessary that I should say more than that I have had every reason to be satisfied with him, in order to recommend that he may have the allowances which he had heretofore in situations similar to that which he now fills.

I likewise enclose a letter from Capt. Ogg. He has acted as Marhatta as well as Persian interpreter, and on every occasion I have derived the greatest assistance from him.

To Lieut. Col. Palmer (p. 148).

Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

After I had written to you on the 11th inst., having heard that Dhoondiah Waugh was moving this way, and conceiving that Savanore might be a convenient situation for my baggage, &c., in case he should approach me, I marched here on the 12th. On the 13th, in the evening, I heard that he had come to within 6 miles of my camp, and had returned to Koondgul. I threw my baggage into Savanore on the morning of the 14th and marched to Koondgul, but he had fled in the night to Carwah as soon as he heard of my intention to march: and in fact, between the morning of the 13th and that of the 14th he must have marched about 54 miles. He left a garrison of 600 men in Koondgul, which place my troops stormed on the evening of the 14th. On the 15th I marched to Luckmaisir, which was evacuated, and the 16th to Sirhitty, the siege of

which was raised. On the 17th and 18th I returned here for my baggage, provisions, &c. I took advantage of the flight of Dhoondiah from Koondgul to bring forward the remnant of Goklah's army which had still remained at Hullahall, and I have the pleasure to inform you that they joined me last night. Although the flight of Dhoondiah prevented me from attaining the object for which I undertook the expedition, it has not been unattended with advantages, particularly as it has established our superiority in the eyes of our own troops, those of our enemies, and those of the whole country. I march towards Kalasa on the 22d.

To the Adj. Gen., Bombay (p. 148).

Camp at Savanore, 20th July, 1800.

I have to inform you that I have received intelligence from Col. Sartorius, stating that the Pyche Rajah had sent a large body of troops down the ghauts, that some followers on the road near Cotaparamba had been cut off, and that a feeble attempt had been made upon one of our advanced posts. These are reported to be well supplied with provisions and every necessary for their defence, and I have no apprehension for the safety of any of them. In expectation of the event, which it appears has now taken place, I desired Col. Sartorius on the 1st inst. to collect at Tellicherry all the troops that could be spared from the other stations in Malabar; and I wrote to Lieut. Col. Mignan on the same day, being that on which I heard of the fall of Jemalabad, to desire that he would send assistance to Col. Sartorius if he should find it practicable. I have heard from Lieut. Col. Mignan that he will have it in his power to assist him. With a corps collected at Tellicherry which can certainly move in safety along the great roads to any of the posts which may be attacked, not only they will be in perfect safety, but it will not be easy or safe for the Pyche Rajah to remain below the ghauts, at least not in the western part of the Coliote district. I have therefore strong hopes that this warfare will not be serious or of long continuance.

As it appeared that Dhoondiah Waugh was inclined to give me battle, I threw my baggage into Savanore on the 14th inst. and moved from hence to Koondgul, where he had been encamped. He fled as soon as he heard of my intention to march towards him, and I have reason to believe that he marched 54 miles in less than 24 hours. He left a garrison of 600 men in Koondgul, which place my troops stormed on the evening that I marched there. On the 15th I went to Luckmisir, which place was evacuated, and on the 16th to Sirhitty, the siege of which place was raised. I returned here on the 17th and 18th, in order to get my baggage, provisions, &c. I took advantage of the flight of Dhoondiah Waugh to bring forward the remnant of Goklah's beaten army, which had remained at Hullahall from the day of their defeat. They joined me in this camp last night, and I propose to move forward to form a junction with Col. Bowser, who is coming from the Doonab in a day or two.

The general result of the last expedition has been very satisfactory to me, although from the flight of the enemy I failed in the original object for which I undertook it; particularly so as it has established our superiority in the eyes of our own troops, in those of the enemy, and of the whole country. I am informed that Dhoondiah's people began to leave

him on the day he fled from Koondgul, and the desertion has continued ever since.

It is to be hoped that the prospect of an early termination of the warfare in this country may have some effect in preserving tranquillity in Malabar.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 148).

Camp at Savanore, 21st July, 1800.

I have received a letter from Col. Close, in which he desires me to let you know the sums which I shall require periodically to meet all demands in this country. We have now in camp a sufficient sum to pay the troops, &c. in August for this month, and there is a sum of one lac and 30,000 pagodas on the road from Seringapatam, which, with what will be received in camp for hills, &c., will be sufficient to pay the troops for August and September in the beginning of October. The Rajah's kists are not included in these sums, and they will answer to pay the troops not in the field. Munro has in his hands one lac of pagodas, and he has paid the troops in Canara to the 1st Oct. It would not answer to draw from him all he has, but we might take 50,000; one lac of pagodas then from Madras or elsewhere, at Chittledroog early in October, with 50,000 from Munro, will be an ample provision for us till December.

I shall not want any bullocks from the Carnatic: the few that we have are so bad that I shall be obliged to discharge them as soon as I get the next supply from Mysore; they cannot bear the cold of this climate.

I am getting on well, and if this rain, which has now lasted 48 hours, will cease, it will not be long before this warfare will be at an end. If it lasts, however, I am afraid that it will destroy all my cattle.

To Mr. Uthoff (p. 148).

Camp near Luckunisir, 23d July, 1800.

I understand from a letter from Major Munro that a vakeel from the Kolapoor Rajah, charged with offers of co-operation against Dhoondiah, left Goa for my camp some days ago. He has not yet reached it, and I am therefore under the necessity of troubling you upon a subject relating to this chief.

Dhoondiah has lately manifested an intention of crossing the Malpoorba into the territories of the Rajah of Kolapoor, whereby he will certainly for a time avoid my pursuit. It will not be difficult for the Rajah of Kolapoor, if he is serious in his desire of opposing him, to stop him at the Malpoorba; and I beg that you will do me the favor to inform him of this intention, to desire him to take the earliest measures to frustrate it, and to let him know that if he does not do so, he will be the cause of the injury which his country must suffer from my entering it with the British army, that of the Nizam, and that of Goklah; and that it is not improbable but that his conduct, in giving an asylum to Dhoondiah Waugh, may be reckoned an act of hostility which may have consequences still more disagreeable to him than those I have above mentioned.

To W. H. Gordon, Esq. (p. 148).

Camp at Luckunisir, 23d July, 1800.

I have to inform you that the last 500 bullocks which came to the

army were entirely unservicable at the moment they arrived, and would have been rejected if an opportunity of mustering them had offered before they died.

Capt. Mackay informs me, that none of the principal owners of the bullocks hired by you are in the field; that in general they are at Seringapatam; and there is one lot of 100 bullocks into which, by my order, he is making a particular examination, which are returned as belonging to a man, by name —, who owns in fact only two of them, and is a writer in your office at Seringapatam. The consequences of the absence of the bullock owners in general, and of these fictitious owner-ships, have already proved almost fatal to the army. The people in charge of the bullocks are servants, who, in general, receive but little pay, and whose time in camp might be employed to much better advantage to themselves. They have no interest in the preservation of the bullocks, and the consequence is, that although there is an abundance of forage in the country, the public cattle have been starved, and in two days' rain at Savanore about half of them have died. This is a matter of serious importance to the operations of the troops, must be stated to government, and will become one of inquiry.

I write now to request that you will hire bullocks and forward them to camp loaded with rice, without delay; and that when you do hire them you will take care that the real owners, or some person on their behalf, who will have a sincere interest in the preservation of the bullocks, shall accompany them.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 148).

Camp at Luckmaisir, 23d July, 1800.

There is some difficulty respecting the settlement of an account for a sum amounting to about 2000 rupees, which Mr. Gordon paid to the 77th regt. for provisions when they were on their march from Malabar into the Mysore country. Mr. Corsellis says that the 77th regt. were no longer on the Bombay establishment, and that he had closed his accounts, as far as regarded that regiment, as soon as they quitted Malabar. I beg that you will do me the favor to inform Mr. Corsellis, and all the gentlemen at the head of the different departments in Malabar, that the 77th regt. remained on the Bombay establishment till the end of March; that they were paid by the paymaster in Mysore, whose accounts, disbursements to that regiment, will go before the Military Auditor Gen. at Bombay, in the same manner as those for the Native corps belonging to Bombay, but serving in the Mysore country. In these accounts Mr. Corsellis is charged with the above sum, which was paid to a man acting as his deputy with the 77th. This man must have kept the account of the disbursements, and it is proper that he should give them to Mr. Corsellis, who must either open his old account or a new one on account of the 77th regt., in order that they may be brought forward in proper form.

Mr. Corsellis will do well to correspond with Mr. Gordon upon this subject, and to send him a receipt for the money; and Mr. Gordon will then return the different receipts which he has in his possession from the person who acted as Mr. Corsellis's deputy with the 77th.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the Sec. of Government at Bombay regarding certain appointments made by you for the proposed

field service in Malabar in March last, in answer to letters which I wrote on the 23d May and 1st June.

To Capt. Mackay (p. 148).

Camp at Lucknaisir, 23d July, 1800.

In consequence of the severe loss in bullocks which the detachment has sustained in the last 3 or 4 days, I have made a requisition upon Ball Kishen Bhow and upon the country for others, and a number have been procured and brought into camp. You will be so kind as to pay for them at the following rates, viz. the best at 4 star pagodas each, the second sort  $3\frac{1}{2}$  star pagodas each, the third sort at 3 star pagodas each. You will arrange them to the departments in proportion to their losses, and you will issue them to the bullock owners in camp in the following manner: Each owner is to have, as nearly as possible, an equal number of the three sorts, and he is to be charged with the price of all the bullocks delivered over to him, in the manner of an advance, which is to be repaid to the public by a monthly deduction in the hire of the bullocks, in the usual manner.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 150).

Camp at Lucknaisir, 24th July, 1800.

The bad weather, mentioned in my letter of the 20th, continued to the night of the 21st, and destroyed at that time nearly one-half of the public hired carriage cattle of the detachment; but it was evident that I could remain no longer at Savanore, and I moved on the morning of the 22d, which proved fair, about 10 miles towards Lucknaisir, and encamped in the midst of large and populous villages. These contained abundance of cattle; and Ball Kishen Bhow having besides supplied me with some, I have been enabled to move forward again.

It is evident that upon the present bullock system a similar inconvenience is always to be expected. The detachment left Mysore with the finest bullocks that I have yet seen with troops. There has been at no time a want of forage, and the saw bullocks and the cattle in the service of individuals are in high condition; but there is a want among the public hired cattle of the presence of the real owners, those who might feel for their loss, and who would take pains for their preservation. The real owners are dubashes at Seringapatam or at Madras, who employ servants as fictitious owners in camp; and it is often necessary to force them out to bring forage for the cattle to eat. The consequence is they are starved, and hard work or bad weather (of the former of which, it is to be observed, upon this occasion they have had none, and of the latter only two days) destroys them all, reduces the best troops to a critical situation, and puts an end to every intended operation.

It is impossible to alter the system at present, or probably at any time; but it would be a considerable relief to it if the tents of the officers were carried by themselves. Whenever there is a difficulty the camp equipage department suffers most, and to relieve it is attended with most inconvenience. In fact, a bullock which is not taken care of is very unequal to carry an officer's tent, which at this season of the year is generally wet. Besides, although under the regulations a larger hire is paid for bullocks which carry tents than for others, it is by no means so profitable an employment for cattle as if they were in any other



department. When cattle carry tents, it is necessary that they should all be produced every day, and that the drivers should be complete, or the officers complain. When they are employed in the carriage of grain or of stores, all, or, at least, a large proportion of the spare bullocks are employed in carrying goods for the bazaar people or individuals, from which a profit is derived. The number of drivers for these bullocks is not necessary, and is never complete. Thus, then, the employment of cattle in the camp equipage department, although highest paid by the public, is not the most lucrative to the bullock owners; and in consequence the camp equipage, instead of having the best, generally have the worst bullocks, and is most difficult to move. If the public bullocks of other departments should fail, it is always possible to find other means of carriage in an army; but tents require the cattle in the service of the public; and if these fail, it is not at all times possible to replace them. For all these reasons I take the liberty of again recommending that the officers may be put on tent allowance.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have written to Capt. Mackay, which will point out the arrangements which have been made upon this occasion. It is but justice to the Marhattas to mention, that I have received from them all the *greatest assistance, and most cordially given*, to relieve our distresses.

By the last accounts of Dhoondiah, it appears that he wishes to cross the Malpoorba; but he has no boats, and the river has overflowed its banks.

I have heard that the Rajah of Kolapoor has dispatched a vakeel to my camp, who is now on his way with offers of co-operation. I have written to this chief to desire him not to suffer Dhoondiah to cross the Malpoorba; and I have besides written to Baba Sahib, the younger brother of Appah Sahib, *who has a force between the Gutpurba and Malpoorba*, to desire him to exert himself for the same purpose. Lieut. Col. Bowser ought to be by this time at Copaul, and I have written to him to join me at Dummul on the day after to-morrow.

To the Adjutant General (p. 151).

Camp at Dummul, 26th July, 1800.

I expected to be joined here by Lieut. Col. Bowser, from whom I have heard from Copaul, and to whom I sent orders to march hither. I shall not wait for him, however, but shall continue my march towards the Malpoorba, which river I understand that Dhoondiah is most anxious to cross.

P.S. The killadar fell into our hands, and was hanged.

To the Commissioners in Malabar (p. 153).

Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800.

As I conceive that our success in this country may have some influence in preserving the peace in Malabar, I have the pleasure to inform you that I yesterday took Dummul by storm, with the loss of very few men wounded. I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote to the Adj. Gen. at Fort St. George, in which the details of the affair are given.

Dhoondiah is on the Malpoorba, which river he is desirous of crossing. This place was evacuated yesterday after the accounts arrived of the fall of Dummul, and he has now no stronghold whatever in the Savanore or

Darwar countries. If the weather continues fair, I shall reach the Malpoorba before he can cross it.

I am concerned to hear that the adherents of the Pyche Rajah have attacked our advanced posts in Cotiote, and have cut off the communication between them and Cotapuramba. In expectation of this event I wrote to Col. Sartorius on the 1st July, to desire him to collect at Tellicherry the largest body of troops that could be spared from the other stations in Malabar; and when he will have done so, he will have no difficulty in relieving the posts which may be attacked, or probably in keeping the Pyche Rajah's adherents entirely out of the western part of Cotiote.

I am glad to see that Kydree Amboo is faithful to his engagements.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 153).

Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800.

My letter of yesterday to the Adj. Gen., in which I gave an account of the capture of Dummul, will have made his Lordship acquainted with the events which have occurred since the 24th inst. I marched here this morning, and found that the place had been evacuated as soon as the accounts arrived of the fall of Dummul. Dhoondiah has now no stronghold in this country, and it is evident that his object is to fly across the Malpoorba. If the weather continues fair, however, and the roads are not rendered impracticable for troops, I shall reach that river before he can get across it. At all events, his party must break up and his troops must disperse. Under these circumstances it becomes necessary to consider what steps shall be taken to secure us against their assembling again under Dhoondiah if he should escape me, or, if he should fall into my hands, under another chief equally daring and probably with more ability. It is clear that Dhoondiah's power and success are to be attributed to the quarrels between the chiefs on the frontier, principally between the family of Pursheram Bhow and the Kolapoor Rajah, and to their extreme weakness in consequence of these contests. I propose, then, to endeavor to reconcile the Rajah of Kolapoor, whose vakeel is on his way to my camp, with Appah Sahib; and I have written to Lieut. Col. Palmer to request that as the Bhow's family have a kind of possession of the Savanore and Darwar countries, they may be given over to them entirely as the sole jaghiredars and jemidars under the government of Poonah. I hope to succeed in these objects with the assistance of Lieut. Col. Palmer, if his Lordship should approve of them, without pledging his government to any thing; and if they are attained, we may hope that such a force as Dhoondiah has will not again be assembled in this country.

To Lieut. Col. Palmer (p. 153).

Camp at Gudduck, 27th July, 1800.

The badness of the weather and the want of forage at Savanore having destroyed a large proportion of the carriage cattle with this army, I was under the necessity of requesting the assistance of Ball Kishen Bhow and of Goklah to procure me some. I have the pleasure to inform you that they supplied my wants, and have enabled me to move forward again.

I marched from Savanore on the 22d, was joined at Sirhitty by Chintomeny Rao and his party of horse, and went yesterday to Dummul, which place was stormed by my troops. I enclose a copy of the letter

which I have written to the Adj. Gen., in which I give an account of this affair. I marched here this morning, and found that the fort had been evacuated when the accounts arrived of the fall of Dummul.

I beg that you will do me the favor to inform the Peshwah that I found in irons in Dummul the man who had been his killadar, and had defended the fort for many weeks against Dhoondiah Waugh. His name is Jewajee Punt, and I have given over to him the charge of that place and of this, in which I understand the Peshwah had likewise a garrison. Dhoondiah Waugh is on the Malpoorba, which river it is obvious that he is desirous of crossing. If, however, the weather continues fair, and the roads are not rendered impracticable by a heavy fall of rain, I shall also be upon the Malpoorba before he can cross it. The fall of Dummul is a severe blow upon him, and as he has now no fort or stronghold whatever in the Savanore or Darwar countries, I think it probable that his followers will daily decrease in numbers. Whatever may be the result of the operations of which I have had the direction, it is necessary that we should turn our minds to the future arrangements for this country. It appears to me very clear that Dhoondiah's power and former success are to be attributed originally to the weakness of the government at Poonah, but immediately to the contests between the different jaghiredars and chiefs upon the frontier, and their consequent weakness. It is almost certain that Dhoondiah's force will be dispersed, and it is possible that his person may be in my power; but in the one case there is no security that his force will not assemble again the instant I retire to the Mysore country, under the same leader, or in the other case under another, perhaps equally daring and with more ability. Under these circumstances, in order to insure the tranquillity of our own territories, it will be necessary that we should take some steps to remedy the deficiency in the government of our neighbours, which has endangered it, and has been the cause of the expense which has been incurred in the assembling of the troops under my command.

It will perhaps be scarcely practicable to remedy the first great cause, viz., the weakness of the government at Poonah, but it may be practicable in some degree to remedy the second.

The history of Dhoondiah's progress is as follows. Appah Saheb, who, as the representative of Pursheram Bhow, I understand to be the jaghiredar of Savanore, was involved in a war with the Rajah of Kolapoor. Dhoondiah entered into the service of the latter, but soon became too strong for him, quarrelled with him, set up for himself, collected about him the disaffected and discontented of all parts of India, and took advantage of the absence of Appah Saheb and of Goklah (who I understand to have been a jaghiredar under Pursheram Bhow and his son) at the siege of Kolapoor, to seize the strong places in this country, and to establish himself in it in such manner that no force which they could bring could ever drive him from it. The quarrel, then, of the Rajah of Kolapoor and Appah Saheb, and their weakness, have brought forward Dhoondiah, and we must get the better of him and of such as he is, by reconciling these two chiefs, and by establishing one strong government on this frontier. To do the former may not perhaps be a matter of much difficulty, as, from all the inquiries which I have made, I find that the quarrel, originating in the confusion at Poonah, in which Pursheram Bhow unfortunately took part, has been

continued for various bad reasons, and particularly because Piersherian Bhaw was killed in a battle which was fought in consequence of it. The Rajah of Kolupoor has sent a vakeel to my camp, and when he arrives I shall endeavor to make peace between the Rajah and Appah Sahib, of course without pledging our government to any thing. In this probably you may be able to give some assistance at Poonah. I certainly disapprove much of the government of Appah Sahib, and if it were possible to give over the country to another without a farther convulsion and consequent weakness, I should be glad to do so: but as that is impracticable, I should propose that Appah Sahib should become the sole jaghiredar or jemidar of the Savanore and Darwar countries, that all the strong places should be given over to him, and that all the other jaghiredars and officers of the Marhatta government should be under him.

I write to you upon this subject as the proper person to settle it, and I state the result of my inquiries and reflections upon it. Of course when the object for which I was sent into this country is accomplished, I shall return to Mysore unless otherwise ordered by government; but still I hope that through your means such a system will be established as will render us certain that our tranquillity will be undisturbed in future. I imagine that this will be a favorable opportunity to establish a tappall between Poonah and Mysore, and I shall be glad to hear from you on that subject.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 156).

Camp at Seemdootty, 1st Aug. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Adj. Gen. at Fort St. George, which will make you acquainted with the circumstances of a success which has been gained over Dhoondiah Waugh by the troops under my command: I beg that you will communicate it to the Commissioners in Malabar.

By the tenor of a letter from Mr. Wilson to Mr. Smee, which I have received from Lieut. Col. Close, I am happy to find that the adherents of the Pyche Rajah do not think they have a very good chance of getting possession of our advanced posts in Cotiote. Let me know the names of the gentlemen who have defeated them, and the corps who composed the garrisons, that I may report them favorably to government.

To Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick (p. 156).

Camp at Seemdootty, 1st Aug. 1800.

I have not had time to write to you lately, but my public letters to Fort St. George will have made you acquainted with every thing that has been going on. I write now because I find that a tappall is laid to Hyderabad from Lieut. Col. Bowser's camp, and I think you will receive this letter before the accounts from Madras will reach you. You will have heard of our storming Dummul. I moved on, and on the 30th attacked one of Dhoondiah's camps on the Malpoorba after a march of 26 miles. We drove every thing that was in it into the Malpoorba, where a multitude of people were drowned. I have got his guns, elephants, camels, gun bullocks, &c., and every thing he had has fallen into my hands. His people are leaving him fast, and another blow of the same kind, which I am meditating on some brinjaries and an army with them, who I see are bent upon escaping through the Kittoor coun-

try, will, I hope, bring the war to a close. My troops are in high health and spirits, and rich with the produce of the plunder of Dhoondiah's camp.

To Lieut. Col. Palmer (p. 156).

Camp at Soondooty, 1st Aug. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Adj. Gen., which gives a detail of my operations since the fall of Dummul and Gudduck. After I had taken the guns mentioned in the postscript, I found the Marhatta chiefs so slow in taking possession of them, that I destroyed them, as otherwise they would infallibly have fallen into the hands of the enemy again after I marched this morning.

I am concerned to have to mention to you (and I request that you will take an opportunity of stating it to the Peshwah), that excepting from Ball Kishen Bhow, I do not receive any assistance whatever from any of the Marhatta chiefs. I cannot prevail upon them to obey my orders, and as they plunder the country, and consume quantities of forage, they are so much worse than useless that I have been under the necessity of desiring them to encamp at a distance from me. From Ball Kishen Bhow I receive assistance in supplies, and although he has not great abilities, I must say for him that he is a true friend to the English, and is willing to do every thing in his power to forward the common cause. I suspect that Dhoondiah will go into the Kolapoor country, and I have written to the Rajah to apprise him that if he does so I shall follow him; and shall treat his friends, and those who give him an asylum, as the enemies of the Company, the Peshwah, and the Nizam.

To Sir W. Clarke (p. 156).

Camp at Soondooty, 1st Aug. 1800.

You must excuse me for not writing to you more regularly, but I really have not had time to do so. I have now got half an hour, and I proceed to give you an account of my operations to this day.

On the 24th June, the whole of my corps had crossed the Toombuddra; on the 27th I advanced, and stormed Ramnee Bednore. I then detached towards the frontier of the Nuggur country, cleared that of all Dhoondiah's cavalry, and on the 2d July, having been joined by some supplies I expected, I advanced to the Werdah. The whole of my detachment had crossed that river on the 11th, and I then constructed a redoubt for the security of my boats, and of my communication with the rear.

On the 12th, having heard that Dhoondiah proposed to come down to give me battle, I advanced to seize Savanore, in order that I might have a place of security for my baggage during the time that I might be engaged with him. Accordingly, I got possession of Savanore, and encamped in front of that place. On the 13th Dhoondiah came within 2 coss of my camp, examined it, and retired to Koondgul. As soon as I heard of this movement, I ordered my detachment to march light, with 5 days' provisions, and I threw my baggage into Savanore. I marched on the 14th to Koondgul; Dhoondiah had fled, and we stormed that place: on the 15th to Luckmaisir, which place was evacuated on our approach; on the 16th to Sirhitty, the siege of which place was raised; on the 17th and 18th, I returned to Savanore to get my baggage, provisions, &c. &c. When Dhoondiah went off from me to the eastward, I wrote to the

Marhattas, who were at Hullihall, to bring them forward, and I was joined by young Goklah on the night of the 19th. I was detained at Savanore by the wet weather, which makes the roads in this country impracticable, till the 22d; and on the 23d and 24th I remained in the neighbourhood of Luckmissir, to get a supply of bullocks. On the 25th I moved forward to Sirhitty, to form a junction with Lieut. Col. Bowser, who was coming from the Nizam's country, and was at Copaul. On the 26th I moved to Dummul, which place we stormed. I did not wait for Col. Bowser, but moved on the next day to Gudduck, which was evacuated; the 28th, to Moondnagoor; the 29th, to Noolgoond and Allagawaddy. Dhoondiah had been for some time encamped at Soondooty, and he was crossing his baggage over the Malpoorba at Manowly.

As soon as he heard of my arrival at Allagawaddy, which is 15 miles from hence, he broke up from Soondooty, and sent part of his army to Doodwar, part to Jellahal opposite Badamy, and part to Manowly, with the guns and baggage.

I marched from Allagawaddy on the morning of the 30th, and went 26 miles to the enemy's camp opposite Manowly. This I surprised, attacked it with cavalry, drove every thing in it into the Malpoorba, and took 6 guns, 2 elephants, many camels, horses, bullocks, &c. innumerable. A large number of people and all his baggage were lost, and this part of the enemy's army entirely destroyed. I returned to Soondooty this morning. Lieut. Col. Bowser has joined me, and I have in view another expedition, with which I hope to close this warfare in this country.

I am obliged to you for your intelligence regarding the vakeel from the Kolapoor Rajah. I suspect that Dhoondiah looks for an asylum in that country, but I have written to the Rajah, to let him know that I shall follow him there, and shall treat as an enemy to the Company any person who may give him an asylum. This letter and the impression which the rapidity with which my troops have carried every thing before them has made, will probably have the effect of preventing this Rajah from gratifying his wish of giving Dhoondiah assistance.

To the Officer commg. at Hullihall (p. 157). Camp at Soondooty, 2d Aug. 1800.

I beg that you will without delay write to Mr. Uthoff, and request that he will forward to Hullihall as large a quantity of arrack for the use of my troops as he can prevail upon the merchants of Goa to bring up the ghauts. They must bring it to my camp, or, if circumstances should not render it necessary that I should remain in the field in this country, they may lodge it in Hullihall. Mr. Uthoff will be so kind as to settle with them the price which they are to receive for their arrack in either of those cases.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 157). Camp at Soondooty, 2d Aug. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose a description of repairs made to the buildings occupied as barracks by the troops in the fort of Nuggur, and the proceedings of a committee which examined them. I also enclose a letter from Major Browne. Upon this last I must observe, that I have no power to authorise the repairs of magazines, granaries, or store rooms; but I conceive that these repairs are very necessary, and I hope the Military Board will authorise them.

To the Adjutant General (p. 157).

Camp at Soondooty, 2d Aug. 1800.

After I wrote the postscript to my letter of the 31st July the Marhattas were so slow in taking possession of the fort of Manowly that the enemy re-occupied it after nightfall. I had, however, brought to our side Dhoondiah's guns, and, as I found the Marhattas had no means of bringing them away and were unwilling to remain to guard them opposite to Manowly, I destroyed them before I marched yesterday morning.

I cannot say too much in favor of the party who, under Lieut. Fitchet and Lieut. Jackson of the 73d, swam the river to seize the boat which was lying under the fort of Manowly. I must, however, inform you that I had several offers from different officers to perform the same service; and it was, in fact, attempted by a party of the 25th dragoons about half an hour after the camp was attacked and carried, and failed only because the stream was so rapid that the men were carried far below the place at which the boat was stationed.

I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded from the 30th July to the 1st Aug.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 157).

Camp at Soondooty, 2d Aug. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Mr. Anderson respecting certain exactions from the dooley maistries and bearers in the pay office at Fort St. George.

I have likewise the honor to enclose a letter and enclosure from Lieut. Col. Mignan, regarding the fort of Jemalabad, and I beg leave to recommend that it may be destroyed. The fort of Mirzan, in Canara, was lately taken possession of by a banditti which went down the ghauts, and it will require a detachment of the Hon. Company's troops to retake it. There are other forts in Canara unoccupied as Mirzan was, and they are all liable to be taken in the same manner. For this reason it is very desirable that they should be destroyed as soon as they can be surveyed, and their probable utility can be determined.

My letter to the Adj. Gen. of the 31st July and of this day will have made his Lordship acquainted with the circumstances of the defeat of part of Dhoondiah's army on the Malpoorba on the 30th, and of the loss of his guns. That part of his army which he had sent to the eastward has returned, and is gone towards Kittoor, and I shall follow him to-morrow. It is obvious that he is going into the territory of the Rajah of Kolapoor. The vakeel of this Rajah arrived in my camp this morning. I have desired him to inform his master that if Dhoondiah crossed the Malpoorba I should follow him; that the killadar at Manowly had allowed Dhoondiah's army to encamp and cross the Malpoorba under the guns of his fort, and that the fort had fired upon the Company's troops. This must have been done either by the orders of the Rajah, or it must have been contrary to them. If it was done in consequence of the Rajah's orders, I must consider him as an enemy, and should act accordingly when I should enter his country in pursuit of Dhoondiah; if it was contrary to his orders, he must seize and send to my camp the killadar of Manowly. It is certainly an object of great consequence that I should not be obliged to cross the Malpoorba, although I have already made all the arrangements for bringing forward boats for that purpose; and I therefore

thought it proper to inform the Rajah of Kolapoor that I was aware of his connexion with Dhoondiah, and to give him reason to dread the consequences of my entering his country as an enemy. It will not be difficult for him to stop Dhoondiah if he pleases, and I hope that the fear of those consequences will induce him to exert himself for that purpose.

The vakeel said, that he had no doubt but that his master would collect a body of troops to oppose Dhoondiah immediately.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 191).

Camp, 18th Sept. 1800.

I have the honor to enclose a letter from Lieut. Castles, the engineer at Seringapatam, and to send herewith plans and estimates of repairs wanting to the aqueduct on the island of Seringapatam, and of certain necessary buildings for the accommodation of 2 European regiments in that garrison, which I request you will lay before the Military Board. I have written to Lieut. Col. Saxon to desire that he will allow Lieut. Castles to have such of the timber taken out of the Mysore palace as he may want for public purposes, upon his receipt, taking care to ascertain the value of what he will deliver to him. It will rest with the Board to determine whether this timber shall be given over to the Commissary and be issued upon indent, or whether it shall be valued, and issued at its valuation to those gentlemen who are charged with the construction of public buildings or other public works. The timber given to Mr. Castles will be liable to this decision, and in the mean time the public works will not be delayed for want of it.

There has always been a scarcity of timber at Seringapatam, but particularly latterly, since the Pyche Rajah has sent his mairs from Wynnad to take possession of Edatera. This fort, however, they have again evacuated; and it is to be hoped that the people who were heretofore employed in cutting timber on the borders of Wynnad and Mysore will resume their former occupation. Having received a report from Lieut. Col. Saxon, stating that after sending out of the garrison of Seringapatam 4 six pounders with the detachment which will march from thence under the orders of Lieut. Col. Harcourt, only one six pounder will remain in it, I have written to him to desire that he will call upon the Commissary of supply to make 6 six pounder carriages for that number of English captured guns. The carriages in the field are in general worn out, and all the new and spare carriages at Chittledroog will be required to replace them. I have the honor to enclose returns of ordnance and military stores in the garrisons in the Nundydroog district.

To Lieut. Col. Saxon (p. 194).

Camp at Kanagherry, 18th Sept. 1800.

I have to request that you will give over to Lieut. Castles, the engineer at Seringapatam, such of the timber which will have been taken out of the Mysore palace as he may think necessary to enable him to go on with the public works. You will take for this timber Lieut. Castles' receipt, but previous to the issue of it you will be so kind as to assemble a committee and let the timber be valued. I have written to the Military Board to request to know their decision whether this timber is to be given over to the Commissary, and to be issued upon indent, or whether it is to be delivered to those charged with the execution of public works at a



valuation. The timber issued to Lient. Castles will be liable to the decision of the Military Board upon this point; but in the mean time it is to be given to him in order that the public works may not be delayed for want of it.

I request that you will call upon the Commissary of supply to make 6 six pounder carriages, according to the most approved construction, for 6 English captured serviceable guns.

To Col. Sartorius (p. 194).

Camp at Kanagerry, 18th Sept. 1800.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 6th inst. The first object of your attention must be to throw into Montana such a supply of provisions as will secure that garrison from a probability of want. To that every thing else must give way. To weaken Cotee-angary or any other post in the country which has heretofore been reckoned of importance is a matter of immaterial consequence, when compared with the necessity of getting the better of, or, I may say, of defending yourself against the Pyche Rajah. When he shall have been subdued, every thing else will be quiet, and probably the numerous posts now out in Malabar will be found to be of no use. The Rajah presses you now upon Montana; you must relieve that post by all means, and at all events in the first instance, and it will be time enough afterwards to consider in what mode we shall carry on the war.

The result of my observations and considerations upon the mode of carrying on war in jungly countries is just this, that as long as the jungle is thick, as the enemy can conceal himself in it, and from his concealment attack the troops, their followers and their baggage, the operations must be unsuccessful on our side. You propose as a remedy to move in small compact bodies in different directions, in order that the enemy might have no mark, might be in constant fear of falling in with some party, and might lose confidence. I agree in opinion with you that your remedy might answer some purposes for a body of troops which could move without baggage or incumbrances of any kind; I say only some purposes, because their success would not be complete; our troops cannot move to all parts of the jungle as the nairs can, and it might always be expected that at some place or other our detachment would get into a scrape. But as we know that no troops can move without baggage so as to answer any purpose for which an operation might be undertaken, and as that mode of carrying on the war will avowedly not answer where there is baggage, we must look for some system, the adoption of which will enable us to bring on in safety that necessary evil. I know of no mode of doing this excepting to deprive the enemy of his concealment by cutting away the lower part of the jungle to a considerable distance from the road. This you say is a work of time; it is true it is so, but it must be recollected that the labor of every man turns to account, that the operations, however long, must in the end be successful, and we shall not have to regret, after a great expense of blood and treasure, that the whole has been thrown away, and the same desultory operations are to be recommenced in the following season, as has been the case hitherto, and as will always be the case until some such mode of carrying on the war with security to the followers is adopted.

We will suppose that my principle is conceded, and that it is agreed that in order to be successful we must secure those who supply us with all we want, and that the best mode of doing this is to cut away the jungle in order to deprive the enemy of his concealment; I proceed to state in what manner I should carry on my operations in *Cotiate*.

I would assemble my troops at *Cotaparamba*, and begin by laying open the country back to *Tellicherry*, lest when I should move on towards *Montana* the enemy should take advantage of the close jungles between *Cotaparamba* and *Tellicherry* in order to interrupt my communication with the latter, which must be secure before I can hope for success. After having done this I should push forward my advanced posts, well strengthened in different directions, as you propose in your letter of the 6th inst. Under their cover strong working parties should be employed in clearing the jungle. When they should have cleared forward to the distance of 2 or 3 miles I would move the camp that distance, and remain in that new position till more road and country should have been cleared for me. By degrees I should get forward to the most advanced of my posts, and the result of my labors would be, that no man would venture into a country where I had deprived him of his advantage, viz., his concealment. But even if he should venture in my rear, tempted by the prospect of interrupting my communication and distressing me for provisions, he could not do so without my knowledge, and a very small body of troops would answer to protect my convoys when the country will have been opened, and I should be thus enabled to derive all the advantage of the discipline of my troops.

After having thus got myself well forward in the country, my posts well established and supplied, and my communication with my rear well secured, as well as that between one post and another, I would begin to carry on the war on a more active plan, and I would send out light detachments in all directions in order to hunt out every man who should be in the country. If at the same time another body of troops was carrying on operations on a similar system in *Wynnad*, I would endeavor to open a secure communication with that country. In the end you may depend upon it that the *Pyche Rajah*, nor no other man, could hold out; he would be deserted by his people, and probably at last would fall into the hands of one of my detachments, as *Dhoondiah* did a few days ago.

Depend upon it, my dear sir, that the success of military operations in India depends upon supplies; there is no difficulty in fighting, and in finding the means of beating your enemy either without or with loss: but to gain your object you must feed, and you can feed only by communication with the sea, and you can secure that communication only by the operations which I have above described.

In the mean time, however, many modes of distressing the *Pyche Rajah* might be adopted. Nairs, I am informed, are gentlemen, and probably the idlest of that character. The *Wynnad* country, which is in their possession, is almost a desert, and certainly does not produce a sufficiency for their consumption. They live there upon what is sent to them from the coast, and they pay for what they get by sandal wood, pepper, &c. I am informed that the Company's servants buy these articles from the nairs of *Wynnad*. In the first place you should call

upon the Commissioners publicly (and do so in my name if you like it) to put a stop to all communication between Wynnad and Malabar, and particularly to stop the trade from the latter in rice.

There is a fellow, by the name of Mousa, at Tellicherry who supplies the Rajah with rice, to my certain knowledge. A hint might be given to him that I am in the habit of hanging those whom I find living under the protection of the Company and dealing treacherously towards their interests; that I spare neither rank nor riches; but that, on the contrary, I punish severely those who by their example create the evils for which the unfortunate people suffer.

I have written you this letter in a private form, but I beg that you will hand it over to your successor if you should think of going to Bombay, as containing my sentiments on the operations to be carried on in Cotiote, and the grounds upon which I have formed them.

To Lieut. Col. Palmer (p. 195).

Camp at Copaul, 20th Sept. 1800.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 1st inst., and I lose not a moment to reply to that part of it in which you mention that complaints had been made to the Peshwah of the violence committed by my soldiers on numbers of Marhatta women, the wives of Brahmins. I received particular directions from the government of Fort St. George upon this subject, and had therefore every inducement of duty, as well as of inclination, to prevent the excesses of which the Peshwah complains. I am happy to say that I have found my soldiers as orderly and as obedient as they are brave; I have stormed the enemy's camps twice, and I have had the misfortune of being under the necessity of taking three fortified places (besides two taken by one of my detachments) by storm. I have never heard a complaint of such a thing as you mention, excepting at Dummul. Two women, not Brahmins or Marhattas, were taken out from that fort, but were restored to a person who claimed them in less than an hour after they were taken out.

Bull Kishen Bhow has been with my army since I entered the Marhatta country, must have heard of those complaints, if any grounds for them had been given, and of course would not conceal what he had heard from the Peshwah. I have the honor to enclose you a paper written by him upon this subject. Not only have no excesses been committed by my troops, but I have the satisfaction of knowing that the inhabitants of the country have uniformly looked up to me for protection against the violence and oppression of the Marhatta chiefs; I have always been obliged to protect those in the neighbourhood of my camp by safeguards, and I have frequently been under the necessity of remonstrating with the different chiefs regarding the manner in which they treated the unfortunate inhabitants. In justice to my army I must also state one fact, which will prove in the clearest manner their good conduct. It has seldom happened to me to halt a day at any place excepting to make preparations for crossing one of the rivers; but I have never halted any where that a bazaar has not been opened, and that the inhabitants did not continue in the pursuit of their different occupations.

I have been thus particular in my answer to this part of your letter

because I received the most positive orders from the government which I have the honor to serve upon this subject; and I had flattered myself that the conduct of my troops had been such as to give universal satisfaction.

To Lieut. Col. Close (p. 195).

Camp at Copaul, 22d Sept. 1800.

I have received letters from the Military Board regarding the repair of the public buildings in Chanderghooty and Cowleydroog, and others from the officers in command of those stations, regarding the repairs of the buildings occupied by the troops. In the last year, when government authorised me to order repairs to be made to the latter, I thought that the officers might be trusted to make these repairs themselves; and I adopted that mode particularly as there were no engineers in the country who could undertake the works to be performed. I am sorry to say that there is such a want of sentiment among the gentlemen of the Bombay establishment that, although they have charged large sums for buildings for their troops, they have done nothing, and the troops are as much exposed to the weather as ever; and they now look out for a job of this kind as a matter of legal profit. They have bored me to death with letters upon the subject, and at last they have reached the Military Board through the medium of Mr. Gordon. By one of the letters, which I enclose you, it appears that the fort of Chanderghooty is falling down; which I acknowledge I look upon as a fortunate circumstance; and, in my opinion, the work to be undertaken there should be to hasten its destruction. If you are of that opinion, I will give orders that the garrison may be withdrawn and sent to Nuggur. If you should be of opinion that it is necessary to have a post at Chanderghooty, the buildings must be repaired; and I see no mode of doing that excepting by Purneah's maildars, the Company defraying the expense of those buildings which are occupied by its troops, and which contain its stores and provisions. At all events, in my opinion, the post may be withdrawn from Cowleydroog. Purneah might perhaps be unwilling to allow that fort to be entirely destroyed, but such a breach might be made in it as would render it impossible for any of the polygars in the neighbourhood to pretend to hold it, and the provisions and stores it contains might be destroyed. We could (in case we withdraw these posts, and that at Anantpoor) have a respectable garrison at Nuggur, which, in my opinion, would answer the purpose of preserving the peace of the country much better than these scattered posts. Thus we should get rid of a job of the most distressing kind. There is nothing, I assure you, so bad as the Bombay gentlemen. Return the enclosed letters.

To Lieut. Col. Palmer (p. 195).

Camp at Copaul, 22d Sept. 1800.

I have received your letters of the 7th and the 9th. Lord Clive will most probably have made you acquainted with the instructions to me of the 9th. I am fully prepared; and I conceive that the occurrence of one of the events which will authorise me to act will be most fortunate for the Marhatta Empire. You will probably think it proper that I should suspend my endeavors to reconcile Pursheram Bhow's sons with the Kolahpoor Rajah until it is seen what turn affairs will take at Poonah.

To Gen. Sir A. Clarke, K.B., Commr. in Chief (p. 195). Hanawall, 23d Sept. 1800.

The service on which the troops under my command have been lately employed has given opportunities to the officers of His Majesty's service to distinguish themselves, and it is my duty to report them to you. The corps in the field were the 19th and 25th light dragoons and the 73d and 77th regts. When the army was assembled they were in high order, and I have the pleasure to inform you that, notwithstanding the length and rapidity of our marches, they are still so. I have had occasion to report to government and the Commander in Chief on the coast the conduct of Lieut. Col. Moneyppenny in the attack of Ramnee Bednore; of Capt. Todd, of the 73d, in that of Koondgul; of Capt. (Major) M'Pherson, of the 77th, and Ensign Hooper, of the 73d, in that of Dummul; and that of Lieut. Fitchet and Lieut. Jackson, with some men of the 73d and 77th regts., in swimming over the river Malpoorba, and seizing a boat under the fort of Manowly, by which I was enabled to take possession of 6 of the enemy's guns. Upon all those occasions the officers and men of those regiments who were engaged highly distinguished themselves. I have likewise had occasion to report the conduct of Major Blaquiere and Major Paterson in the attack and defeat of the enemy's army on the 10th inst.

Although it has not fallen to the lot of Lieut. Col. Montresor to be engaged in any of the more brilliant services of the campaign, I have received from him upon all occasions the greatest assistance. He commanded a detachment which destroyed 5 of the enemy's guns in the jungle of Talloor, and another which took and brought into camp above 10,000 brinjaries, left by the enemy on the left bank of the Malpoorba. His conduct and that of Lieut. Col. Moneyppenny have upon all occasions given me the greatest satisfaction.

I have the pleasure to inform you, however, that generally throughout this service the zeal of the officers and the patience and alacrity with which the men bore fatigue, bad weather, and the various hardships to which our situation naturally exposed them, enabled me to undertake and perform operations which under other circumstances would have been impracticable.

To Lieut. Col. Cliffe (p. 195).

Camp at Hanawall, 23d Sept. 1800.

I have this day taken occasion to write to the Commander in Chief, and to mention to him the names of those officers in the King's service whose conduct in the late campaign I had reported to the government of Fort St. George and the Commander in Chief on the coast. Among these is Lieut. Col. Montresor.

Accounts have reached me of the melancholy death of poor Robinson of the 86th, which occasions a vacancy in that corps. I hope that you will not think that I take too great a liberty with you in requesting that you will use your interest with the Commander in Chief to obtain for Lieut. Col. Montresor the Lieutenant colonelcy. I assure you that there is no officer in the service more deserving of his favor, or who has had and has taken so many opportunities of distinguishing himself. I understand that the 2 majors of the 86th, Bell and Bailly, are either gone or going home.

To Lieut. Col. Harcourt, 12th regt. (p. 195).

Camp at Hanawall, 23d Sept. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 16th and its enclosures, and I have the honor to send you the copy of a letter which the Dep. Adj. Gen. has written to Mr. Jones. I beg to inform you that you are to consider all the Hon. Company's troops and servants under your orders in the same light as those of His Majesty in the same situation; and you are to treat them accordingly when they do not attend to your orders, to those of the Commander in Chief, or to the regulations of the Company's service.

To Capt. Kirkpatrick (p. 195).

Camp at Hanawall, 23d Sept. 1800.

I omitted to mention to you in favorable terms the services of Suddoolah Khan, who I always found to be zealous in the cause in which we have been engaged. I shall be much obliged to you if you will take an opportunity of mentioning his name to the minister.

I was detained 2 days near Copaul by a violent fall of rain, and I was sorry to find that my old friend Meer Alum, who was there, had fallen into disgrace at court. I understand that he has long been a faithful adherent to the British nation, and I hope therefore that his disgrace will be but of short continuance.

To Major Robertson (p. 195).

Camp at Hanawall, 23d Sept. 1800.

I have perused the letter from the Paymaster Gen. of the 13th inst. which you left at my tent, in which he desires that you will give bills to the Collectors who may furnish you with money rather than receipts for the different coins. There is a difficulty upon this subject which has probably not occurred to Mr. Roebuck, and to which it will be necessary that you should draw his attention. The late orders of government point out clearly that the troops are to be paid in the coins which are received from the Collectors by the paymasters, at the rate at which the former certify them to be current in the district under their jurisdiction; and it is thus easy for the paymaster to give a bill upon the Presidency for the sum which he may receive from the Collector. The paymaster in Mysore has been in the habit of receiving money from the Resident and from the Collector in Canara, and latterly he has received some from the Collector in Coimbatore. All the coins in which the sums of money have been received are valued by these three gentlemen at different rates relatively with each other and with the star pagoda; and it has therefore been impossible to adhere to the late regulation of government upon the subject of the rate at which money is to be paid to the troops, and it has continued to be issued to them according to the merrik of Seringapatam, which was settled by Gen. Harris in May, 1799. The effect of an attempt to put in execution the last regulation of government would be, that one part of this army, which should be paid in Sultauny pagodas received from the Resident, would receive them at 8 *per cent.* above stars; and another, which should be paid in the same coins received from the collector in Canara, would receive them at 12 *per cent.* above stars. The only mode then which could be adopted was to pay the troops at the exchange settled by Capt. Macleod under the orders of Gen. Harris, and to put in force only that part of the regulation of government which requires that the coins in which the amount of each abstract is paid

should be stated on its back. The rate of exchange of Seringapatam is the same as that at which the money is received from the Resident, and there is no difficulty whatever in settling the account with him.

Major Muuro most probably makes his returns to the Board of Revenue of certain sums collected and paid to the paymaster in Mysore, valuing the Sultauny pagoda at 12 *per cent.* above stars; but the paymaster in Mysore is obliged, from the circumstances above stated, to issue these same coins to the troops at the reduced rate of 8 *per cent.* above stars: he cannot therefore give a bill upon the Paymaster Gen. for their amount at a higher rate than that at which he pays them, and Major Muuro cannot take a bill for their amount at a lower rate than that at which he values them in his returns to the Board of Revenue. Thus the only mode of settling the account until the further orders of government can be received appears to me to be that the paymaster in Mysore should give receipts for the coins which he will receive. In making the above statement I have mentioned only the Sultauny pagodas, and the difference of the rate at which they are valued relatively with stars in Mysore, Canara, and Coimbatore; but there is as great a difference in other coins both relatively with each other and with the star pagoda.

I propose in the course of a few days to submit a proposition to government which I hope will remove these difficulties, and will enable the paymaster in Mysore to settle with the Collectors in the regular mode for the sums which he will receive from them. In the mean time I see no mode of settling the account at all excepting that of giving receipts for the different coins.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 197).

Camp at Dummul, 26th Sept. 1800.

Some difficulties have occurred in putting in execution the order of government of the 12th Aug. in this army and in the Mysore country, and in settling the mode of giving acknowledgments to the Collectors for the sums of money received from them by the paymaster in Mysore and his deputy in the field.

This order provides, that when advances are made for the payment of the troops in any other coin than star pagodas, the Collectors will furnish the paymaster with certificates, specifying the coins and the rate of exchange (relatively with the star pagodas) at which the advances may be made; and it appears to be intended that this certificate should regulate the rate at which all payments in such coins shall be made to the troops. It is to be supposed that the Collector certifies that to be the rate of exchange which generally prevails in his district; and as the troops to whom payment in these coins is made, may be supposed to be stationed in the district, that rate is equitable, and gives them a full equivalent for the star pagoda.

The paymaster in Mysore, however, does not receive advances of cash in coins different from the star pagoda, only from the Resident, but he receives advances from the Collectors in Canara and in Coimbatore. These gentlemen have furnished him with certificates specifying the coins, and the rate of exchange at which the advances have been made, and of course they have stated in their certificates the rate at which those coins were current in the district under their management. But unfortunately the

which has pronounced a sentence of death on certain men who have been brought before it. I have not the power to confirm this sentence excepting in a case of urgent necessity, when to wait for your decision might have consequences prejudicial to the discipline of the army, which does not exist at present. I shall be glad to receive your orders respecting the execution of this sentence on each of the persons on whom it has been pronounced. I send you all the proceedings of the Court Martial, and I shall not carry into execution any of the sentences pronounced till I receive your orders, lest I should thereby disclose the nature of those sentences upon which in particular a reference is made to you.

I am concerned to observe that desertion has been so frequent, and that the temptation in the Marhatta territory to commit this crime should be so great as to render it necessary that at least one of the sentences of death should be put in execution.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 198).

Camp, 28th Sept. 1800.

I enclose the proceedings of a committee of the 77th regt. on the repairs wanting to the buildings occupied as barracks by that corps at Chittledroog. I ordered that these repairs should be executed, and I enclose an account of the expense incurred, and the proceedings of a committee assembled to examine the buildings after the repairs were executed. I likewise enclose an indent upon Fort St. George for certain articles wanted at Chittledroog.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 199).

Camp at Lacoonda, 29th Sept. 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th Aug. and its enclosures. I conceive that it is not necessary to occupy with the Company's troops the forts of Chandergooty and Cowleydroog; and having consulted the Resident, I find that he is of the same opinion, and I have therefore given orders that their garrisons may be withdrawn. To repair the buildings in these forts, or the forts themselves, would be attended with considerable expense, and, under the circumstances above mentioned, would be useless, and I have therefore not given any orders upon the subject. I have desired the officers commanding those places to give over to the Rajah's officers all the provisions and military stores which they contain, taking their receipts for the same.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the officer commanding Chandergooty, which points out the repairs wanting to the fort and to its buildings.

To Lieut. Col. Harcourt (p. 199).

Camp at Lacoonda, 29th Sept. 1800.

I have to inform you that a complaint has been sent to me by the head man at \_\_\_\_\_ of the conduct of a dubash in your service. Another complaint of the same kind has been forwarded to me by Lieut. Col. Close of the behaviour of this same man at Ooscotta, into which Lieut. Col. Close has requested a gentleman in that neighbourhood to make an inquiry, and I will transmit you the result. It is the common practice of this kind of people to commit all sorts of excesses, and to plunder the inhabitants of the country through which they may pass, in the name generally, and at all events under the authority, of their master. The



inhabitants complain to him, and as he does not understand the language he is obliged to call for his dubash to interpret what they say; and as the subject of their discourse is the outrage of which the dubash himself has been guilty, it seldom happens that the officer in whose service he is obtains a knowledge of the circumstances of which they wish to give him information. Thus the complaint is treated with indifference, the relief sought for is not obtained, and the officer is supposed by the people to be a gainer by the acts committed under his authority, for which, upon a complaint to him, they have received no redress.

I have been thus particular in a statement of the manner in which these transactions are carried on, because you have not been long in this country, and cannot have obtained a knowledge of the circumstances which I have above mentioned. This statement, however, will point out to you the necessity of keeping a watchful eye upon your dubash, if circumstances should oblige you to retain him in your service.

I also enclose you an extract of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Close, to which I beg to draw your attention. It is absolutely necessary that the property of the inhabitants of the country should be protected; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give such orders to your detachment, and take such measures from time to time, as will ensure this object.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 199).

Camp at Lacconda, 20th Sept. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 26th Aug., enclosing an extract of a letter from the Military board upon the subject of stores of grain and provisions in Chittledroog, Cowleydroog, Bednore, and other garrisons above the ghauts. It is certainly necessary that a store of grain should be collected at Chittledroog, and one sufficient for the garrison at Bednore; but in my opinion it is unnecessary to occupy the forts of Cowleydroog or Chandergooty upon this frontier, and finding that the Resident is of the same opinion, I have given orders to withdraw from them the garrisons. It will not be proper to make any collection of grain in those places. The great difficulty of carrying on military operations in this country consists in the scarcity of rice, which is produced either in countries at a great distance from the scene of operations, or in others nearer, but in some seasons of the year very difficult of access. This difficulty points out the necessity of establishing a large *dépôt* of rice as near the Marhatta frontier as may be possible; and in my opinion a *dépôt* of rice and of arrack ought to be established at Hurryhur upon the Toombuddra, and another at Hullihall in Soonda. The former might easily be made a very sufficient post, and might be dependent upon the garrison of Chittledroog; it would be difficult and probably more expensive to render the fort at Hullihall what it ought to be than to construct a new post at that place. Posts at both these places are, however, necessary to facilitate operations in the Marhatta territories, and *dépôts* of grain ought to be collected at each of them. I took measures to collect rice and arrack at Hullihall when I was in that neighbourhood in the month of August. The advanced state of the season and the previously disturbed state of the country has prevented any great progress in the former, but I have been able to procure some of the latter from Goa.

which has pronounced a sentence of death on certain men who have been brought before it. I have not the power to confirm this sentence excepting in a case of urgent necessity, when to wait for your decision might have consequences prejudicial to the discipline of the army, which does not exist at present. I shall be glad to receive your orders respecting the execution of this sentence on each of the persons on whom it has been pronounced. I send you all the proceedings of the Court Martial, and I shall not carry into execution any of the sentences pronounced till I receive your orders, lest I should thereby disclose the nature of those sentences upon which in particular a reference is made to you.

I am concerned to observe that desertion has been so frequent, and that the temptation in the Marhatta territory to commit this crime should be so great as to render it necessary that at least one of the sentences of death should be put in execution.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 198).

Camp, 28th Sept. 1800.

I enclose the proceedings of a committee of the 7th regt. on the repairs wanting to the buildings occupied as barracks by that corps at Chittledroog. I ordered that these repairs should be executed, and I enclose an account of the expense incurred, and the proceedings of a committee assembled to examine the buildings after the repairs were executed. I likewise enclose an indent upon Fort St. George for certain articles wanted at Chittledroog.

To the Sec. of the Military Board (p. 199).

Camp at Lacoonda, 29th Sept. 1800.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th Aug. and its enclosures. I conceive that it is not necessary to occupy with the Company's troops the forts of Chandergooty and Cowleydroog; and having consulted the Resident, I find that he is of the same opinion, and I have therefore given orders that their garrisons may be withdrawn. To repair the buildings in these forts, or the forts themselves, would be attended with considerable expense, and, under the circumstances above mentioned, would be useless, and I have therefore not given any orders upon the subject. I have desired the officers commanding those places to give over to the Rajah's officers all the provisions and military stores which they contain, taking their receipts for the same.

I enclose the copy of a letter from the officer commanding Chandergooty, which points out the repairs wanting to the fort and to its buildings.

To Lieut. Col. Harcourt (p. 199).

Camp at Lacoonda, 29th Sept. 1800.

I have to inform you that a complaint has been sent to me by the head man at \_\_\_\_\_ of the conduct of a dubash in your service. Another complaint of the same kind has been forwarded to me by Lieut. Col. Close of the behaviour of this same man at Ooscotta, into which Lieut. Col. Close has requested a gentleman in that neighbourhood to make an inquiry, and I will transmit you the result. It is the common practice of this kind of people to commit all sorts of excesses, and to plunder the inhabitants of the country through which they may pass, in the name generally, and at all events under the authority, of their master. The

inhabitants complain to him, and as he does not understand the language he is obliged to call for his dubash to interpret what they say; and as the subject of their discourse is the outrage of which the dubash himself has been guilty, it seldom happens that the officer in whose service he is obtains a knowledge of the circumstances of which they wish to give him information. Thus the complaint is treated with indifference, the relief sought for is not obtained, and the officer is supposed by the people to be a gainer by the acts committed under his authority, for which, upon a complaint to him, they have received no redress.

I have been thus particular in a statement of the manner in which these transactions are carried on, because you have not been long in this country, and cannot have obtained a knowledge of the circumstances which I have above mentioned. This statement, however, will point out to you the necessity of keeping a watchful eye upon your dubash, if circumstances should oblige you to retain him in your service.

I also enclose you an extract of a letter which I have received from Lieut. Col. Close, to which I beg to draw your attention. It is absolutely necessary that the property of the inhabitants of the country should be protected; and I shall be obliged to you if you will give such orders to your detachment, and take such measures from time to time, as will ensure this object.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 199).

Camp at Lacsonda, 29th Sept. 1800.

I have received your letter of the 26th Aug., enclosing an extract of a letter from the Military board upon the subject of stores of grain and provisions in Chittledroog, Cowleydroog, Bednore, and other garrisons above the ghauts. It is certainly necessary that a store of grain should be collected at Chittledroog, and one sufficient for the garrison at Bednore; but in my opinion it is unnecessary to occupy the forts of Cowleydroog or Chandergooty upon this frontier, and finding that the Resident is of the same opinion, I have given orders to withdraw from them the garrisons. It will not be proper to make any collection of grain in those places. The great difficulty of carrying on military operations in this country consists in the scarcity of rice, which is produced either in countries at a great distance from the scene of operations, or in others nearer, but in some seasons of the year very difficult of access. This difficulty points out the necessity of establishing a large depôt of rice as near the Marhatta frontier as may be possible; and in my opinion a depôt of rice and of arrack ought to be established at Hurryhur upon the Toombuddra, and another at Hullihall in Soonda. The former might easily be made a very sufficient post, and might be dependent upon the garrison of Chittledroog; it would be difficult and probably more expensive to render the fort at Hullihall what it ought to be than to construct a new post at that place. Posts at both these places are, however, necessary to facilitate operations in the Marhatta territories, and depôts of grain ought to be collected at each of them. I took measures to collect rice and arrack at Hullihall when I was in that neighbourhood in the month of August. The advanced state of the season and the previously disturbed state of the country has prevented any great progress in the former, but I have been able to procure some of the latter from Goa.

A *dépôt* of rice ought also to be made at Nundydroog, and I beg leave to suggest that wherever there is a garrison there should be a store of provisions sufficient to last the garrison for 6 months.

In my opinion, then, there ought to be large *dépôts* of rice and arrack at Chittledroog, Hurryhur, and Hullyhall, upon the north-western frontier, and at Nundydroog. At Seringapatam there is a large quantity of grain at present. The next operation is the mode of supplying this grain, of taking care of it, and of replacing it at the seasons when that may be desirable. The mode proposed by the Military Board would certainly throw the expense on the Rajah, and the trouble on his servants; but I doubt whether the interference of the servants of one government in the concerns of the other will be advantageous. As the *dépôts* are to be made for the use of the Company's troops, it will be best that the Company's servants should collect, should have the charge and superintendence, and the disposal of them, and if it should be decided that the expense is to be borne by the Rajah's government, it will be better to settle that account by means of the Resident than to have any interference in the formation of the *dépôts* on the part of the Rajah's servants in order to insure that object. The state of the buildings for holding grain and provisions at all these places is a subject which requires attention. There are no buildings at Hurryhur fit for the purpose, and they must be constructed when the place is repaired. I have ordered some temporary buildings to be constructed at Hullyhall, which will answer for the present: those at Chittledroog, Nundydroog, and indeed all the garrisons in the Mysore country are in ruins. It is difficult to point out a plan for repairing them, but I will consult the Resident upon the subject, and with his assistance I hope to be able to submit a proposition to government, the execution of which will be practicable. The buildings for military stores and ordnance are likewise in general in a ruinous state. As Chittledroog is a place of great importance, it is desirable that measures should be taken as soon as possible to put the storehouses in repair, and to build good sheds for the ordnance at that station.

In case his Lordship should be pleased to authorise me to order the Commissary of stores at Chittledroog to repair and construct proper buildings for the military stores and ordnance, I have the honor to enclose estimates of the expense which must be incurred for these purposes.

To Major Gen. Brathwaite (p. 200).

Camp at Kalaspoor, 30th Sept. 1800.

When I received your first letter upon the subject of making up tents in the Mysore country, I wrote to Mr. Gordon to make the inquiry which you wished; but although I have since repeated my inquiry, I have as yet received no answer from him. I rather imagine, however, that we shall not be able to make up tents of a good quality, as the cloth is very bad. I write from conjecture, and from having observed that all Tippoo's tents have worn out much faster than those made by the Company's contractors. I wish that Lord Clive would give the officers tent allowance, and thus ease the public means of conveyance of their heaviest burthen. A hired bullock not taken care of is not able to carry the fly of an officer's tent when smart marches are to be made; it is inconceivable what a number of cattle have been killed in this campaign at that work,

and I am at this moment obliged to draw from the grain department 300 bullocks to apply them to the carriage of tents. This makes the number 1200 that have been thrown upon the camp equipage since I marched from Savanore in July. I will not do any thing about pontoons till I return to Seringapatam.

I have long wished to write to you about the state of my regiment. They have been exceedingly sickly ever since they went into Seringapatam, and were so much so when I took the field that I could not bring them with me, of which I was very desirous. They have continued so ever since, and latterly their sickness has increased to such a degree as to induce Lieut. Col. Shee to request Col. Saxon to encamp them on the outside of the fort, keeping inside of it only the men on duty. I have written to Col. Saxon to desire that he will comply with this request. This, however, will at least be only a temporary relief, and what I have to request is, that you would do me the favor to turn over in your mind whether it will be possible to relieve the 33d from Seringapatam entirely. It is probable that they would recover if they were to go to the coast, but they certainly never will while they remain at Seringapatam. At the same time I must inform you that it is absolutely necessary that there should be a regiment of Europeans at that place as long as the inhabitants are allowed to remain in the fort. A parcel of idle Moorish horsemen and peons reside there, and I doubt not that since Dhoondiah's defeat their numbers have increased, and I should not like to see the arsenal, &c., at Seringapatam exposed to the chance of a conspiracy among them to surprise the garrison.

The Native troops, notwithstanding all the pains that are taken, cannot be brought to live in their barracks; they go to their families at night, and the arms and barracks are guarded by a few men of each company who remain there: they are always liable, therefore, to be cut off in detail. We have had some heavy rain lately, which impedes my march, but I am moving gradually towards the frontier of Soonda.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 200).

Camp at Koorooly-cotta, 1st Oct. 1800.

I have just received your letter of the 25th Sept., and I propose to order Lieut. Col. Mackay to Chittledroog, from which place he can join Lieut. Col. Bowser in the Dooab by the road of Anagoondy, as soon as we learn that the new treaty at Hyderabad is concluded. The Toombuddra will be fordable before Lieut. Col. Mackay can reach Anagoondy.

I have not yet received an answer from Capt. Kirkpatrick to my proposal to allow Lieut. Col. Bowser's detachment to remain in the Dooab under my orders, and liable to be called upon to join me, if the Nizam intended to co-operate in the attainment of the proposed object at Poonah, and it was not intended that the whole of the subsidiary force should be employed. If the Nizam should not co-operate, or if it was intended that the whole subsidiary force should be employed, I proposed that Lieut. Col. Bowser should cross the Kistna immediately. In the first case it would be useless to keep him any longer in the Dooab; in the second, I proposed that he should join Lieut. Col. Dalrymple, and that the subsidiary force should act separately on the northern side of that river.

Whatever may be the decision at Hyderabad upon the question, Lieut. Col. Mackay's corps will be well placed at Chittledroog, either to join Lieut. Col. Bowser in the Dooub, to proceed to Hyderabad, or to join the whole subsidiary force on the north side of the Kistna. I have ordered the 5 companies of the 12th, as well as the 2d of the 5th, to halt. We shall have much upon our hands in Mysore as soon as the new treaty is concluded, particularly if I should move to the northward; the 12th will not be much wanted in Malabar, as I understand that the 88th are ordered thither from Bombay, and even if the former were to be sent below the ghats at present, they would be too late for the relief of Montana, which I imagine must be made early in this month. Upon the whole, therefore, I have thought it best to retain the detachment of this corps in the Mysore country. I am moving towards the frontier of Soonda; my object in this is to live upon rice, and not to consume the supplies of that grain which come from the Mysore country. I informed Lord Clive that I had written to Lieut. Col. Palmer to desire that he would request the Peshwah to give me an order for the delivery to my charge of the fort of Darwar, which was to be used only in case I should move forward. I have received no answer to that proposal; but I think it absolutely necessary that I should have Darwar, and I have made all the arrangements for seizing it, if I should advance, and should not have received the orders for its delivery to my charge from Poonah, or should not be able to prevail upon the killadar to give it up to me by fair means.

I propose to throw into Darwar the present garrison of Hullihall, reinforced by some Europeans from Gou. The conduct of the killadar of Darwar in the late contest is a great inducement to me to seize that fort. I have not only to consider the advantage which I shall derive from the possession of it, but the disadvantage which I shall labor under, if the killadar should give it up to Scindiah, or should espouse his cause, or even if he should persevere in the line of conduct which he adopted during the late contest.

You will have heard from Col. Palmer that the Peshwah was on the 7th Sept. almost in the state in which he expected to be. Scindiah had introduced his troops into Poonah, and had placed guards over the houses of many of the Peshwah's adherents, but not over the Peshwah. I have not heard from Lieut. Col. Palmer since the 7th, nor from any other quarter, that Scindiah has gone further.

To Capt. Moncrieff (p. 200).

Camp at Koorooly-cotta, 1st Oct. 1800.

In the first place I must call to your recollection that I particularly desired you to give me your sentiments upon all matters connected with the public service in Malabar, and that, therefore, no apology is required for having done so. The difference between your opinion and mine is not very great; but even if it was as great as the distance is from pole to pole, there is every reason why you should not omit to state it to me as freely as you form it. Having said thus much, I have to thank you for your letter (no date), in which you enclose the copy of one to Col. Sartorius of the 6th Sept., and I shall proceed to consider the difference between your sentiments and mine.

I conclude that you will have seen a letter which I wrote to Col. Sar-

torius on the 18th Sept., in which I enter fully into a statement of my opinion regarding the mode of carrying on war in a jungly country, and I apply those opinions to the state of the Cotiote district and to the enemy with whom we have to contend in that quarter. The great principle upon which I ground my opinion is that you must have a secure communication between your posts and the sea, or between your detachments in that country and the sea; and I contend that that communication will not be rendered secure till the nairs are deprived of their concealment.

Your idea is, that to open the road more than it is at present will be attended with bad consequences, and you say that the greatest loss was sustained at those places at which the road was most exposed; and you propose to secure the communication with Montana by means of posts, to be established at intermediate stations between that place and Cotaparamba. I agree with you entirely, that in order to subdue a country more is required than to be able to march through it; but before you can subdue it you must certainly have that ability with very small detachments at least. Indeed the security of the communication appears to be the great object of your consideration as well as of mine; we differ only as to the means of obtaining it.

I will suppose that all the posts which you propose should be established are finished, garrisoned, and provided; and that the Pyche Rajah should enter Cotiote at the head of 1000 nairs, and should attack any one of those posts. In what manner is it to be relieved? Is it to be left to its chance, or must the army which can be collected move to its assistance? If the latter is the plan to be adopted, is it not probable that the same loss will be incurred as was suffered upon the late occasion?

You say that the nairs will not dare to post themselves between our garrisons when they will be so near one another; but experience has shown us that they will approach as near to us as one enemy will approach another; and as they would take care to cut off the communication between one post and another, there could be no concert, which is all that they might have to fear from their position between any two of our posts. I don't mean to assert that the number of our posts would not diminish our risk, but still it would not give us security, which is what we must look for.

I now come to consider your objection to opening the jungle on the sides of the roads. It is that the enemy takes a position inaccessible directly to our troops, from which the openness of the jungle enables him to see them, and he annoys them. This is the constant practice every where; but it is the business and duty of the commanding officer to make his arrangements for dislodging the enemy from such situations before he exposes the great body of his troops to the fire which can be given from them; and after this has been done sometimes, the enemy is not so ready to trust himself in a position of the kind. I don't pretend that, by opening the jungle, I shall gain absolute security, as I am aware that even in an open country the communication is always liable to be interrupted; but I contend for it that where concealment is the great object and the principal resource of the enemy, the diminution of the means of affording it to him is the most effectual mode of distressing him. It is certainly true that it is necessary to have posts in the country along the

road which is to be used as the communication, particularly if the enemy should be disposed to operate upon your line of communication with your rear; and I may, therefore, conclude that the establishment of your posts upon my roads would be the most effectual plan to subdue this Rajah.

I have got possession of Dhoondiah's correspondence with many people in the Company's territories, but I have not found any with the Pyche Rajah, or with other people in Malabar. I have, however, the most accurate intelligence that he carried on such a one, and I find that your accounts corroborate those which I have received. If the rebellion of the Pyche Rajah has been occasioned by Dhoondiah, it is to be hoped that his defeat and death will weaken the efforts to be made to attain its object.

To Major Munro (p. 200).

Camp at Koorooly-cotta, 1st Oct. 1800.

The fort of Soopah is falling down, and the place is so unhealthy that neither officers nor men can remain in it. I have ordered the post to be withdrawn, and the fort and the grain it contains to be given over to the amildar. Mungush may occupy it.

To Lieut. Col. Harcourt (p. 200).

Camp at Koorooly-cotta, 2d Oct. 1800.

I received in the night your letter of the 28th Sept. On the 14th Sept. I sent to Lieut. Col. Close a letter in which I desired you to halt at Seringapatam, or if you had marched to return thither. I sent that letter to Lieut. Col. Close, to be forwarded to you upon the occurrence of certain events, at that time probable, which were likely to come to his knowledge, and which would render it necessary to retain in Mysore the troops under your command. I mention this circumstance at present in order to explain the reason why you will probably receive that letter and this at the same moment, as I yesterday wrote to Lieut. Col. Close to desire that if he had not already forwarded to you my letter of the 14th Sept. he would do so as soon as possible. Whether you do receive it or not, you will halt at Seringapatam, if this should reach you there, or you will return thither if it should reach you after you shall have marched from that place.

The destination of the 12th regt. will certainly be different from that of the 2d of the 5th; and it is therefore necessary that you should allow Lieut. Col. Mackay to obey the orders which he may receive.

To the Sec. of Government (p. 206).

Camp at Hoobly, 4th Oct. 1800.

I enclose an account of all the contingent expenses incurred by the troops under my command from the time they took the field to the end of September, payment of which is not provided for in the orders and regulations of government. I shall be obliged to you if you will lay this account with the vouchers before the Rt. Hon. the Governor in Council, with my request that he will order payment of it to be made.

To Sir Wm. Clarke (p. 206).

Camp at Hoobly, 5th Oct. 1800.

I have lately had a letter from Lieut. Col. Close, in which he proposes that Capt. Johnson should be employed on the survey of Soonda, to which, if you have no objection, I have none. I shall be obliged to you if you will tell Capt. Johnson that I am desirous of having a conference with him; and that I beg he will join me at this place, or wherever he may hear I am when he will reach Hullihall.



